



City Research Online

City St George's, University of London

Citation: Littler, J. (2005). British heritage and the legacies of 'race'. In: Naidoo, R. & Littler, J. (Eds.), *The Politics of Heritage: the legacies of 'race'*. (pp. 1-20). London: Routledge. ISBN 9780415322119

This is the accepted version of the paper.

This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. To cite this item please consult the publisher's version.

Permanent repository link: <https://city-ref-test.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/6033/>

Copyright and Reuse: Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, unless otherwise indicated, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. For full details of reuse please refer to [City Research Online policy](#).

Introduction

British heritage and the legacies of 'race'

from Littler and Naidoo, *The Politics of Heritage*, Routledge 2005

British heritage is the heritage of a nation of nations, shaped through waves of migration and diaspora, wide-ranging imperial histories and contemporary flows of globalisation. Not that you would necessarily know this from a cursory glance at many of its key sites and symbols. The St George's Cross, afternoon tea and stately homes have often been used as emblematic of 'British heritage': a process in which white (and often upper- or middle-class) Englishness is used to define the past. But, and particularly more recently, a range of initiatives, from exhibitions at Bradford Art Galleries on Sikh art, through the work of Cardiff's Butetown History and Arts Project, to Darcus Howe's televisual analysis of the *White Tribe* and Eddie Izzard's programme about English immigration, *Mongrel Nation*, have sought to question what, and who counts as being part of it. Such revisions of British heritage have exposed both the aggressive self-aggrandisement of white Englishness and the complex histories of its flags, tea and houses in the process.

At *Whose Heritage?*, an Arts Council conference in 1999, Stuart Hall identified such activity as part of a 'deep slow-motion revolution' still in progress: an unsettling of British heritage from its smug position as bounded entity unquestioningly representing the interests of the white English upper- and middle-class great and the good. Equally, though, he argued, heritage will not just simply and inevitably improve with the passing of time. Hall's speech is reproduced in this collection and it raises several key concerns that this book seeks to carry forward. Firstly, it foregrounds how we should think of 'heritage' not as an immutable entity, but as a discursive practice, shaped by specific circumstances - through histories, interests, patterns, collisions and politics. Secondly, it insists that rethinking national heritage does not only mean 'including' 'other' heritages by simply tacking them on to an official national story that is already sealed, but that it instead involves revising Britain's island stories to acknowledge their long and intertwined histories with complex patterns of migration and diaspora. Thirdly, it indicates that changes to what is *understood* as 'heritage' work themselves through on a number of different spheres, areas including, but not restricted to, policy, popular culture, academia and a myriad of heritage institutions. Heritage formations, in other words, are about process and policy as much as practice.

This collection explores how we might locate and understand such challenges to what Hall termed 'the Heritage' and how we might interrogate the obstacles and opportunities for heritage practices to address 'race'. Whilst 'race' as a category is widely discredited, we live with the remnants, the husk and the fallout of its legacies. These legacies shape the way British heritage has been produced and consumed and what and who gets to count as being part of it. Taking as its premise that heritage and the legacies of "race" is not a somewhat specialist topic concerning 'ethnic minorities', but a mainstream issue affecting us all, this book asks several questions. What has been assumed to be part of British heritage, and how has this been marked in terms of 'race', 'ethnicity' and nationality alongside gender and class? Who has decided what constitutes 'heritage'? And, most of all, what are the possibilities for radical heritage agendas that can imagine decentred, hybrid and culturally diverse narratives of British history and identity?

In asking these questions the collection draws from a number of different debates. A wealth of work has emerged over the last couple of decades on the heritage industry, on what 'Britishness' means in the contemporary context of multiculturalism and devolution, and on the colonial history of museums and galleries, and yet in comparison there has been relatively little work linking such discussions together. By attempting to draw out some of the connections between these debates, this book aims to provide a space to explore what the possibilities are for progressive practice and activating theory and to open up further discussion on how the legacies of 'race' continue to shape heritage.

The heritage of 'heritage'

It is useful to begin by exploring some of the complex historical meanings of 'heritage'. What is circumscribed as 'heritage' is historically specific, culturally contingent and philosophically debatable. Its parameters have changed through the way it is used, and by the particular meanings that have coalesced around it. In medieval times it was used in religious discourse to mark the elect, the 'people chosen by God' (Samuel 1994: 231). Later, through industrial modernity and capitalism, through imperialism and the nation-state, its particular association with blood, land, property and old, 'high' culture was formed. Heritage proclaimed the 'lineage' of particular groups - their worth and power - at the expense of others. Letting what was deemed important from the past stand as self-evident, as just being there, singular, 'natural' and not subject to question was one of the key ways in which 'the Heritage', to use Hall's definition, accumulated power. Equally, the groups who got to define it - who 'had' heritage, in other words - were mainly upper

or upper middle class white people, particularly men, and their use of heritage imbued them with a power which others were invited or compelled to appreciate.ⁱ

To acknowledge this dominant formation is not to say, however, that what was classified as being ‘heritage’ either did not change or was passively imbibed by a docile populace. Peter Mandler’s work on the various booms in nineteenth century popular consumption of public histories provides us with one example of how these complexities might be explored (Mandler 1997). Nor does it mean that heritage was as ‘fixed’ as it appeared; as with Robert Young’s description of English imperial identity, we can imagine it fissured by difference and marked by longing for otherness, even whilst its fixed and stable nature was asserted (Young 1995: 2).ⁱⁱ But these longer-standing elitist connotations, the associations of heritage with the blessed ‘natural’ rights of specific individuals, lineage and stock, do explain how it became available to become linked to racialised discourses.ⁱⁱⁱ

The conspicuous changes and challenges to dominant conceptions of heritage over the past few decades have, as Hall puts it, taken place in the context of the dismantling of the Enlightenment ideal of ‘universal knowledge’ - in which white Britons could claim to speak for other cultures - alongside the democratisation process in which ‘ordinary’ lives ‘have slowly taken their subordinate place alongside the hegemonic presence of the great and the good’. Such a democratic revitalisation of heritage owed a great deal to the practices of left historians concerned with excavating ‘history from below’, and with producing what John Urry calls a ‘proliferation of alternative histories’ (Urry 1990: 121) both inside and outside of the academy. These perspectives - for academics, most famously manifested on the pages of *History Workshop Journal* and through the work of Raphael Samuel - consciously sought to expand *whose* past could count as heritage (see Samuel 1994). It thus became more acceptable for ‘heritage’ to mean the past of the working as well as the upper classes, washtubs as well as gilt-edged paintings, back-to-back houses as well as stately homes.

But the 1980s heritage revival was also associated in various ways with new forms of reactionary conservatism, and the arguments around the extent of this ‘democratisation’ process, now anthologised in books such as *Culture and the Public Sphere* and *Representing the Nation*, became known in some quarters as ‘the heritage debates’ (McGuigan 1996: 116-134; Boswell and Evans 1999). The term had been invigorated by the rise of the right in the 1970s, as a predominantly conservative alliance of the ‘great and the good’ fought tooth and nail against Labour’s attempt to introduce a Wealth Tax

by annexing the fear of private aristocratic loss to nationalist sentiment (Hewison 1995: 191-3; Mandler 1997: 401-18). Later, culminating in the 1980 National Heritage Act, such revitalisation mutated into a Thatcherite version of heritage that was often used to *popularise* the idea of elitism, making prestige more available, something to be sought after and competed for rather than inherited (Wright 1985; Bird 1996).

Packaged in a variety of ways, used to sell goods, services, organizations, tourism and national identity, heritage became 'a key word in our national vocabulary; it is what Britain sells' (Morley and Robins 2001: 8). New, popular, category-melding kinds of heritage emerged, such as the heritage experience attraction (see Bennett 1995), and a Britain of floppy fringes, lavish interiors and costumed detail emerged on celluloid with the genre of heritage cinema (see Vincendau 2001). 'Heritage' could therefore encapsulate a range of practices and discourses, including money-spinning commodities to be 'mined' (or enterprisingly invented) whilst other kinds of mine were being closed down (Hewison 1987; Corner and Harvey 1991); as a populist challenge to official conservative history (Samuel 1998); or sophisticated disrupter of traditionally bourgeois modes of aesthetic display (Rojek 1993). Just as the core themes of 'enterprise' and 'heritage' came for many to define the political and cultural agenda of British life during the Thatcher era (Corner and Harvey 1991; Morley and Robins 2001: 5), so did the heritage debate function to a large extent as 'a critique of the Thatcher years' (Boswell and Evans 1999: 112).

As we have argued elsewhere, these debates had relatively little to say about the way heritage was racialised. They focused primarily on issues around class and simulacra rather than examining the interplays of gender or 'race' (Littler and Naidoo 2004). Such conceptions of simulacra - which might be traced from Plato through Debord and Baudrillard - often relied on a sterile binary opposition between 'real' or 'fake' representations of the past, and could easily be mobilised to implicitly mourn and validate a lost sense of authenticity, providing a sealed-off conceptual framework unable to account for complexity or processes of change. Many of these debates, therefore, came to circulate primarily over the question of whether these new histories were 'real' emancipatory histories-from-below, or Thatcherism in period dress, and often only gestured towards the rise of heritage in relation to the decline of empire. In part, this replicated the whiteness of many of the heritage displays under discussion themselves, and the relatively piecemeal and circumscribed effects of mainstreaming diversity in

heritage institutions. However, this response was not uniform, with Patrick Wright, for example, insightfully both locating British fascination with heritage in the context of the decline of its world role and gesturing towards how heritage functioned in relation to racialised discourses at home (Wright 1985; Littler and Naidoo 2004).

Whilst these heritage debates were being discussed in and around cultural studies and cultural history, 'heritage' was also taking different resonances in different contexts. 'Heritage studies', for example, was emerging as a more vocationally orientated discipline, as an offspring and/or sibling of tourism studies, archaeology and museum studies.^{iv} In and around museums 'heritage' became a term used alongside archaeological remains and exhibitions as a way of gesturing towards the apparent expansion of ways of presenting the past, including the use of new technologies and modes of display. Its increasing invocation as an issue for governmental and policy attention helped consolidate an area now regularly defined as 'the heritage sector', which has been urged to adopt pivotal new roles in terms of governmental strategies for social inclusion. Under new Labour, the meaning of heritage has mutated in interesting ways. In the early years of Blair, the Department of National Heritage became the Department of Culture, Media and Sport, and the archaic and Thatcherite connotations of the word 'heritage' were dropped, as swinging new Labour claimed to represent thrusting hyper-modernity. On the one hand, then, the role of 'heritage' in new Labour discourse has become less conspicuous (even though, as Andrew Higson has pointed out, the young country of Cool Britannia that Blairism was promoting still offered a heritaged-up version of national identity, merely referencing a different era: the 1960s (Higson 2001: 259). On the other hand, the invocation of 'heritage' and 'the heritage sector' in policy documents, particularly around social inclusion, and as a means of selling Britishness, has increased, as discussed below. Looking for heritage policy therefore becomes a more complex business, as it is more diffuse and references to heritage are scattered across policy documents relating to museums, libraries and archives, the natural and built environment, the culture and media industries, lottery funding and tourism.

The complex legacies of heritage, a living term, are such that there are some very different heritage paradigms in circulation within disciplines, and some quite separate conversations and understandings of what constitutes 'legitimate' discussion around it, for example, in cultural studies, archaeology, history and business studies. In this book 'heritage' is used in a relative open sense, and the book aims to make connections between these varied uses. 'Heritage' here, therefore, includes walking tours, public

spaces, films, commercial enterprises and national days, as well as exhibitions and statues, and the contributors range from archaeologists to curators, from policy officers to educational consultants to academics. Such openness, as Raphael Samuel once said in a slightly different context, does produce as many problems as it resolves, (Samuel 1998: 36) and will inevitably and inescapably reflect our own backgrounds in cultural studies and the encounters and biases that brings with it. However, we hope it will also work to make productive connections when thinking about heritage's formation in relation to the legacies of 'race'.^v

The legacies of 'race'

If the heritage debates did not devote too much space to the legacies of 'race', plenty of other areas did. The expansion of museum studies since the 1980s has resulted in a proliferation of work examining and theorising connections between museum display, imperialism and colonialism (Karp and Levine 1991; Coombes 1994; Clifford 1997; Hooper-Greenhill 1997; Barringer and Flynn 1998; Hallam and Street 2000; Simpson 2001). In addition, a broad array of *practical* projects across the institutional heritage sector, particularly in museums, have displayed interest in refashioning British heritage, some of which are discussed below. All this work was able to draw on an expansive body of historical enquiry that has demonstrated the multiple heritages of Britain (Visram 1986; Fryer 1984; Gilroy 1987; Ramadin 1999) and the interwoven globalised histories of empire (Hall 2000, Young 2001).

Here it is necessary to make a few preliminary points about terminology. Like 'race', national identity and ethnicity are social and cultural constructions, rather than being natural propensities of people born or living in particular places. There have been similarly deep-rooted beliefs in their essential 'characteristics' together with the common (con)fusion and conflation of the three terms. Partly because of its etymology, 'ethnicity' can be used in both in an essentialised sense (as a marker of 'natural' difference in a similar way to the word 'race', only glossed with the meaning of 'a sense of place') (Gilroy 2000: 94) or as a tool to move away from such essentialised biological conceptions and cultural racisms to enable an interrogation of how particular social, geographical historical experiences can shape identity (Sollers 1986; Brah 1992; Hall 1992; Hutchinson and Smith 1996).^{vi} Whether we chose to use the term 'ethnicity' or not, we require a sense of the history of the term - to ensure it is never reified, or taken as a given - and to ensure local complexities are always scrutinised, as cultural racism can all too easily slip in through the back door.

The historical slippage between ethnicity and 'race' does also mean that some interesting possibilities lie in integrating what could loosely be called 'four nations' and post-colonial perspectives, which as Siân Jones discusses in this volume, are often quite separate. Internal colonisation within Britain, for example, has often been understood in ethnic and racialised terms (see Young 1995: 71) and 'external' colonisation was often marked by and constructed through its relationship with Britain's three 'other' nations. As Raphael Samuel illustrates in *Island Stories*:

St Andrew's Day was more fervently observed in Bombay and Calcutta, Otago and Queensland than it was in Edinburgh and Glasgow. It is indicative of the importance of these Empire connections, and of the imaginative hold they exercised, that the first Celtic nationalisms, emerging as they did in the high noon of Britain's colonial expansion, had an unashamedly imperial dimension. Indeed, it is possible to see the growth of Empire and the ethnic revival of the 1870s and 1880s as two sides of the same coin; each, after its own fashion, worshipped at the feet of race consciousness, that scientific version of natural selection theory which in the later nineteenth century intoxicated thinkers of all stripes (Samuel 1998: 35).

The possibilities of fusing four nations and post-colonial histories are therefore hugely significant. Thinking about the legacies of 'race' in British heritage and how they have been mutually shaped by ideas about ethnicity means that we can start to think, for example, about the complexities of Scotland's role as both coloniser and colonised, and the role of the Celtic diaspora in imperial heritage. We can also consider how Northern Ireland's exclusion from stories of national heritage is often marked through ethnic difference. In turn, this opens up more possibilities of thinking more internationally, more diasporically. Clearly 'British' heritage cannot just be confined to the practices that occur within the landmass marked politically as Britain. 'British heritage' is international, in its multilayered histories formed through colonialism, slavery and trade. To draw from the famous quote from Salman Rushdie, British heritage, like English history, 'happened overseas' (Rushdie 1988: 343; Bhabha 1994: 166-7).

In addition, how ideas about 'race' have structured heritage need to be considered alongside other kinds of exclusions, of which there are many. Artefacts and information relating to disabled people have, for example, notoriously languished in museum basements and footnotes (Delin 2002). The consideration of the gender of heritage has

similarly been subject to little discussion (particularly surprisingly given the prominence of housewives, land girls, Victorian servants and ‘feminised’ shopping spaces in the reconstructions of heritage experience attractions that emerged from the 1980s). The dominant mode of heritage found in British public spaces had been to enshrine masculine prowess and heroism; if women were depicted it was usually as abstract and mythically transcendent figures (Rutherford 1997; Aitchison 1996; Warner 1996).

How, then, can such a variety of heritage contexts and factors be theorised together? In their recent book *The Geography of Heritage* Graham *et al* point out that ‘heritage cannot exist as a universal absolute. Ultimately, because it is what and where we say it is (the pivotal variant being ‘we’) then one person’s heritage is the disinheritance of another.’ They coin the term ‘heritage dissonance’ to describe this ‘profusion of messages reflecting different purposes’ (Graham *et al* 2000: 93). This goes some way to help think through the multiplicity of different heritages, but it is also a model that appears to suggest that heritage can only ever be imagined as a series of individualisms. We would argue instead for a framework which can understand heritage as a more open process, one which shows how various inheritances interconnect, and can be changed through encounters, rather than the constantly individualised model of elevating ‘someone’s heritage at the expense of someone else’s’. To adopt such a model involves investigating how ‘racialised’ understandings took on particular characteristics according to their relationship to (or articulation with) such factors as gender, class, sexuality and age. It involves looking at the past and present of international and transnational heritage and its power relations alongside what took place and what is taking place within the borders of ‘Britain’.

The past-in-the-present: international, national and local heritages

A good example of such an exploration of the imperial and international histories through which British heritage has been built is recent work around the grand eighteenth century stately home in Leeds, Harewood House. Built and sustained from money accrued by the Lascelles family from slave plantations, this house, like many other British and American grand or stately homes, can also be viewed as a form of plantation house (Said 1994; Kauffman 2003). Recently, Harewood has begun investigating its intricate connections to the transatlantic slave trade, unearthing documents in its basement detailing its plantation histories, working with historians at the University of York and acting as the venue for a heritage sector conference based around the project (Interculture 2003). Tracing these complex stories produces better understandings of these interconnected relationships, of

how, as James Walvin has pointed out, 'Britain is steeped in a slave past in a way people don't recognise' (Walvin 2003), and has the potential – even if it is not yet fully realised – to integrate the history of slavery into the centre of a national heritage story (Heywood 2003).

Clearly, in more conservative quarters, even acknowledging that slavery or colonialism ever happened and that Britain was a part of it is still offensive. The *Daily Mail* continues to be outraged by any whiff of the mention of slavery in the National Maritime Museum; and the sanitized history of *Cadbury World* in Birmingham bypasses slavery, let alone current economic imperialism, on its journey through the history of chocolate (Ransom 2001: 116). This brings us to the issue of how, if thinking the complexities of heritage involves rethinking a series of relations that existed in the past, it also involves thinking through the relationship of this heritage to the present in its implicit or explicit form. In this collection Bill Schwarz suggests that comprehending the past in the present is arguably the least developed aspect of post-colonial research. Barnor Hesse, analysing the presentation of America's slave heritage in Stephen Spielberg's film *Amistad*, has powerfully argued that in the film the 'memory of slavery is haunted by the spectre of a de/colonial fantasy' which establishes the memory of slavery as 'the memory of its heroic and inevitable abolition'. It treats plantation slavery as a one-off act of barbarity that happened in the past and which has no links to the present (Hesse 2002: 150, 157-8). Hesse argues that an 'ethics of postcolonial memory' should involve remembering and re-excavating the

...numerous interdependencies that obtained between Christianity and slavery, liberalism and imperialism, democracy and racism, each of which was mutually constitutive of Atlantic capitalism's framing of modernity. Through insisting on the naming of these political formations we may 'remember' something quite distinctive, yet traditionally unarticulated. How the slavery plantation complex's formative relations of exploitation, exoticism, racism, and violence produced the consumerist contours of Western culture, principally through customizing the transnational cultural production and consumption of mundane staples of the Western lifestyle, such as coffee, sugar, cotton and tobacco' (Hesse 2002: 160)

In short, what it means to 'remember' now, he argues, involves 'refusing to efface through forgetfulness' the implications of colonialism and slavery and acting against their contemporary legacies (Hesse 2002: 165).

It is clearly possible to acknowledge the brutality of empire whilst not acknowledging its links to the neo-imperial present, to a world in which more than a billion people don't have access to clean drinking water. Whilst the newly opened Empire and Commonwealth Museum in Bristol makes serious progress, for a British museum, in delineating the brutality of empire and the rich mix of our interwoven pasts, for example, its attempts to tackle the issue of continuities in-between the British empire and contemporary global imperialism is only very sporadically gestured towards. This is registered symbolically in the museum shop, in which only a very small proportion of the copious amounts of tea for sale on the shelves are fair trade.

Likewise, it is equally possible to acknowledge the brutality of earlier forms of imperialism whilst actively arguing for a newly invigorated version in the present. Such practices mesh into the category of what Paul Gilroy, Martin J. Beck Matustik and others have discussed as corporate multiculturalism, when a diversity of employees or corporate image is used to sell products for capital gain which perpetuates private profit and global inequalities of wealth (Gilroy 2000; Matustik 1998). There is clearly a range of points on this spectrum, from US gung-ho neo-conservatives, through Niall Ferguson's *Empire*, to Nike's multicultural aspirational optimism offering images of diversity whilst perpetuating the global exploitation of labour, and DEMOS's suggestion that Britain should be packaged as a multicultural hub. In this context it is also instructive to note the continued use of heritage to add value to corporations and to legitimise their practice – a process that has built on the 1980s alliance between consumerism and heritage. For Nike managers, for example, 'every company has a history. But we have a little bit more than a history. We have a heritage, something that's still relevant today' (du Gay and Pryke 2002: 214).

Clearly then 'multicultural heritage' can be articulated in a number of ways. It can be promoted as a characteristic of an entrenched nation-state that imagines its present and past as multicultural, but which has simultaneously sealed off many of the routes for current and future immigration and asylum, a recognition which is, to borrow Matustik's terms, profoundly 'one-sided' (Matustik 1998: 109). There is much further scope for heritage projects to explore the connections between stories of past and present refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants. It is often easier for heritage projects to ignore rather than confront migration, asylum, racism and imperialism, but there are projects attempting to do this, such as the 2003 *Migrations* exhibition at Gallery Oldham (Futuresonic 2003)

and the forthcoming Rich Mix Cultural Foundation in Tower Hamlets. However, unlike America with its Museum of Immigration in New York, and Australia with its Migration Museum in Adelaide, Britain does not yet have a fully funded and resourced national museum of migration (Szekeres 2002). Our nearest equivalent, 19 Princelet Street, Spitafields, London, which aspires to this role with its historically significant building and its exhibition on *Suitcases and Sanctuary*, is at the time of writing still struggling for funds just to keep open.^{vii}

Multicultural heritage, then, can be articulated to a range of ends, not all of them progressive. A decade after the murder of Stephen Lawrence, racism still clearly takes a range of subtle and unsubtle forms in British culture. The high-profile incorporation of symbols of 'the Commonwealth' and migrant communities into the Queen's 2003 Golden Jubilee festivities, for instance, might variously signify both progressive multiculturalism and the perpetuation of imperial discourses. Multicultural heritage can also be used to embed essentialised ideas of cultural difference, whether through exoticising 'other' cultures or homogenising and sentimentalising 'local' white English heritages. Whilst localised heritage - indicating what Kevin Robins termed 'the importance of place-making in placeless times' (Robins 1991: 38) takes varied forms, its more parochial and nostalgic incarnations often rotate around racialised exclusions. As David Morley puts it:

The destabilisations of the postmodern period have certainly engendered a variety of defensive and reactionary responses: witness the rise of various forms of born-again nationalism, accompanied both by sentimentalised reconstructions of a variety of 'authentic' localised 'heritages' and by xenophobia directed at newcomers, foreigners or outsiders' (Morley 2000: 194).

Today's range of heritage practices activate the legacies of 'race' in a variety of ways other than the reactively insular, end-of-Empire English heritage identified by earlier commentators - although that is still on offer too. But clearly the reasons why heritage organisations and practices came to adopt particular positions in relation to the legacies of 'race' are not simply to do with their powers of analysis. It is also because of the politics of the location and the institutions in question: about their position, how they are affected by policies, how they build their power, and the processes through which change can happen. On a broader level it is about their insertion into the current cultural and political conjuncture.

Politics and Policies

Recently many more ‘mainstream’ heritage organisations have begun to include histories of non-white communities that were previously absent from their narratives,^{viii} due in part to governmental emphasis on heritage’s role in mainstreaming diversity and combating social exclusion. How governmental policies and politics shape heritage is not exclusively a matter of cultural policy, partly because broader political agendas shape what gets demarcated as ‘cultural policy’ at any given time, and partly because the meanings of ‘heritage’ are not formed by policy alone. However, cultural policy is still obviously hugely significant for the formation of heritage. Recent years have by and large witnessed the continuity of the post-war, high culture-orientated trajectory of cultural policy, supplemented by an entrepreneurial populism and the impact of lottery funding (which has often functioned to get high profile flagship projects off the ground but not to keep them there – for a discussion of this see Worpole 2001: 237). For our purposes here, there are two distinctive areas of cultural policy that deserve particular consideration: ‘social inclusion’ and ‘creative business’.

The work of the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU), particularly in its 1998 report *Bringing Britain Together: A national strategy for neighbourhood renewal* set in motion much of the government’s cultural policy recommendations affecting heritage and diversity. The tenth of its eighteen ‘policy action teams’ (‘PAT 10’) focused on how culture and sports could be used to fight against social exclusion, recommending changes to bodies that distribute exchequer and lottery funding and to related organisations (*Building on PAT 10*: 5).^{ix} The heritage sector has been forced to consider more thoroughly whom it is taking for granted and whom it is excluding, not only in terms of education and outreach, but also in terms of representation and recruitment policies. For example, the thoroughly researched recommendations of the Cultural Access Group in *Not for the Likes of You* tackled broadening access and changing practice, and *People and Places*, the 2002 DCMS report promoting social inclusion in the built and historic environment emphasised the importance of change in organisational cultures. Whilst in various ways such initiatives may be problematic, the emphasis in these documents on the capacity of culture to change attitudes, identities and lives is music to the ears of those already versed in these issues. They have promoted ideas of shared communities and equality and have clearly had effects (Sandell 2002: 17). At a broader level, the language of social inclusion, as The Parekh Report on *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain* points out, is down-to-earth and can therefore mobilise more and wider support than drier terms such

as ‘reducing inequality’, and can encourage a holistic approach to deprivation (Runnymede Trust 2000: 78-9).

However, as many commentators have pointed out, the language of inclusion can also imply assimilation to a pre-existing set of national norms rather than a genuine diversity. As The Parekh Report put it, the terminology of inclusion ‘inherently focuses on marginality and boundaries, and therefore fails to address problems at the core’ (Runnymede Trust 2000: 79). It can imply that there is only one already sealed and written national story, with room at the most for a little non-threatening difference, and to which ‘newcomers’ need to conform to gain acceptance. The outlines of such a politics have been only too crudely visible in David Blunkett’s pronouncements on desirable characteristics of British citizenship, characteristics on which all immigrants should be tested. Such a discourse is of course not seamlessly replicated throughout cultural policies and is at odds with the works of many progressive heritage organisations and practitioners. However, at the same time, it is a powerful discourse, and it is clear that certain deeper-rooted, vested establishment power interests, such as the monarchy, can remain unchallenged and even be shored up by gestures of cultural ‘inclusion’, as we have discussed elsewhere (see Littler and Naidoo 2004). What is more, the focus in many DCMS documents such as *Building on Pat 10* is also often problematically very one-way, as strategies of cultural inclusion are being used as a sop or plaster in cases of deprivation without the broader reasons for such deprivation being taken into account. In other words, attempts to use heritage to create social inclusion are often made without this being ‘joined up’ to the issues of the erosion of basic public services through lack of funding and marketisation.

In this context it is also very instructive to look at how heritage, social inclusion and cultural diversity are discussed in terms of how they can contribute to the creative economy and be used to generate economic growth.^x From Chris Smith’s pronouncements in *Creative Britain* to the British Tourist Authority’s packaging of Britain as an excitingly mixed place to be, the idea of selling an image of Britain as vibrantly diverse, in order to encourage economic growth has gathered pace. Recent DCMS heritage policy documents have demonstrated attempts to make more links between business sponsorship and social inclusion objectives. PAT 10 for example recommended ‘a two pronged approach’: more industry sponsorship to be used to promote disadvantaged areas and individuals, and for more inclusion in terms of audiences and workers in the creative industries (PAT 10: 49). Whilst cultural industries

can be run along a number of different lines, from co-operative to capitalist (for some of the history of this in connection to cultural policy, see Bianchini 1987) the yoking together of inclusion with industry in this context primarily involves the integration of what Matustík termed ‘corporate multiculturalism’ into the contemporary enterprise/heritage agenda. In effect, the use of images of diversity to sell creative business and to sell national heritage can be viewed as being another twist in the longstanding saga of what John Corner and Sylvia Harvey usefully termed the ‘enterprise and heritage couplet’ (Corner and Harvey 1991: 45).

‘A welcome mat by a closed door’: processes and practices

For heritage practices and organisations the challenge is how to work within or around such contexts.^{xi} For example, there is a need to interrogate how diversity policies translate in practice, to how public institutions and archives continue to make assumptions about what is considered ‘important’. It is clear that pious words about diversity alone are not enough. Naseem Khan gives a vivid example in this volume of how Glyndebourne Opera House once fulfilled the four per cent ‘ethnic minority’ quota demanded of it by the Arts Council by staging a one-off production of *Porgy and Bess* with an all black cast, a classic case of how lip-service can be paid to diversity without it being mainstreamed through the organisation with any thoroughness or longevity. As Khan remarks dryly, ‘[n]o-one who has been to Glyndebourne recently would be able to see the continuing effects of that brush with diversity’. Similarly, policies that bolt-on access without reviewing and reworking the ideologies at work throughout an organisation, Khan argues, can simply offer ‘a welcome mat by a closed door’. Whilst such examples illustrate the influence of policy on practice (in this case by encouraging tokenistic inclusion), it also indicates that policy alone is not the sole factor that needs to be explored, and that politics and policies need to be explored alongside process and practice. Heritage, in other words, is not only about policy and representation but also about the lived and affective experiences and entanglements between various types of institutions and policies and the interests and agendas of individuals and groups. What happens to people and processes behind the scenes at an institution is also crucial to the way meaning is created, change occurs and ideologies are produced.

A heritage practice is in itself a type of theory with its own epistemology, and some forms of practice might therefore be judged as more progressive or ‘advanced’ than theories of heritage. Equally, however, ‘practice’ need not be romanticised, but rather the opportunities to interrogate and learn from it grasped. There are a wide range of

possibilities of bringing theory and practice together in new ways. We need to pay attention to how change happens and to the possibilities for and limitations on this. This does not merely mean that cultural analysis should always and merely be reduced to a technocratic capacity, to fit into or to tinker with pre-existing policy objectives; but rather that an ethical commitment to social change for a more equal society has to be accompanied by a strategic sense of what is possible to be done and when. To combine this with Hesse's formulation, what we might call 'a postcolonial ethics of heritage' might emphasise the art of the possible in its most capacious, imaginative sense in order to strategically pursue its ends.

Revising 'the Heritage'

To explore these issues, this collection is split into two sections: one is themed around the relationship between policy, process and practice; and the other contextualises these issues by exploring how the international pasts and presents of various versions of 'British heritage' have negotiated the legacies of 'race'. Inevitably there are overlaps between these two sections, as their concerns seep into each other. Inevitably, also, there are many other areas and types of heritage that it would be useful for this book to discuss (such as, for example, Chinese heritage in Britain, British heritage in India, or inter-European heritage). However, the usual restrictions apply: word length, the need for the book to act as a space which brings issues together; the need to pose questions and open up debate rather than formalising an overarching archive. We have deliberately not split the book into sections such as 'multicultural', 'four nations' and 'white' heritage as we wanted to increase the traffic between the often polarised debates around these areas and to foreground their interwoven texture.

The first section, 'British heritage is international heritage', takes an expansive view of British heritage by examining how in many ways it has always been profoundly un-British. The contributors interrogate the international past of British heritage and explore the implications of this in a variety of ways. The section starts with Stuart Hall's keynote speech from the Arts Council's 1999 conference, *Whose Heritage?*, which is picked up on and discussed in other chapters, such as Naseem Khan's and S.I. Martin's. Passionate yet measured, sweeping yet strategic, Hall's is a characteristically acute diagnosis of what is to be done.

One point that Hall makes is that the process of democratising 'the Heritage' has 'so far stopped short at the frontier defined by that great unspoken British value – "whiteness"'.

As Richard Dyer pointed out, some people (such as ‘white English’) have been regarded as ‘more white’ than others (such as Jews and ‘white’ Eastern Europeans) (Dyer 1997). Many of the contributions following Hall’s consider the relationship between the formation of white heritage and the legacies of ‘race’. Jonathan Rutherford explores why so much contemporary heritage still relates inappropriately to the past by tracing its connections to the formation during modernity of white male English subjectivities.

Like Jonathan Rutherford, Siân Jones questions the idea of a contained and homogenous ‘majority-white-indigenous’ culture and heritage. She seeks to unsettle the gulf between ‘four nations’ and ‘multicultural’ agendas in her chapter which creates an object-biography of the ninth century A.D. Hilton of Cadboll stone. Elizabeth Crooke’s chapter considers the presentation of heritage in Northern Ireland, focusing upon how alternative forms of heritage in Northern Ireland are beginning to come to the fore: ‘the unofficial, unsafe, contested history of the conflict, which is seeking recognition’.

Sharon MacDonald discusses the significance of the recent upsurge in Holocaust commemoration across Europe and America, focusing in particular on the meanings generated around Holocaust Memorial Day in Britain. Examining how Holocaust Memorial Day constructs a national identity against a generalised sense of racial purity-seeking evil, she also explores the possibilities that it might also allow Britain to extend a sense of wartime moral superiority, avoiding cultural reflection on its own past and present racism.

Roshi Naidoo examines how racism can exist in covert form in heritage projects that present themselves as progressive multicultural alternatives. Picking her way through a heritage climate replete with buzzwords around ‘inclusion’, ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘diversity’, she draws on a range of specific case studies to argue that we need to re-examine and challenge liberal myths about past and present.

Lynda Dyson’s essay explores the representation of bicultural difference at New Zealand’s Te Papa Tongawera museum and in doing so demonstrates that ‘British heritage’ is not confined to Britain. Her chapter describes how British heritage is simultaneously being displaced whilst its residual ‘superiority’ – transmuted into ‘Pakeha pride’ and homogenising representations of ‘Maoris’ – continues to be affirmed, and

shows how this is connected to a number of factors including the commercial imperatives of a globalising neo-liberalism.

Whilst the first section predominantly focuses on theories and ideologies of the legacies of 'race' in British heritage, the second section, 'Policies, processes and practices' considers how these issues can be worked out in practice. The contributors deal with questions of how policy shapes heritage, how public institutions and archives make assumptions about what is considered 'important', and how cultural practitioners have produced what many consider to be 'progressive' versions of heritage.

Starting from the premise that we need to investigate policy and policy recommendations and the responses to it in order to understand the contemporary heritage context, Jim McGuigan explores these issues of cultural racism in relation to the vitriolic media response to The Parekh Report on *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*. This book was one of the most significant recent attempts to influence policies affecting British heritage, and its reception tells us much about the problems facing heritage that seeks to address the damage done by the idea of 'race'.

There are many autobiographical elements to this second half, as curators, policy advisors and archive researchers write about their experience of trying to implement particular projects or what has been learnt from their involvement with them. For example, in 1976, *The Arts Britain Ignores* provided the first survey of arts practice emanating from ethnic minority communities in Britain and argued that this culture should be considered and funded as part of overall national arts provision. Here, its author, Naseem Khan, reflects on its genesis and upon the way terminologies, the terms of the debate and arts and heritage provision have changed since 1976. John Hamer reflects on his experience of the changing status of the word during his time as both 'responsible historian' and educational advisor to the Heritage Lottery Fund. As he points out, in relation to the legitimacy of 'history', 'heritage' remains for many a suspect concept, a word 'guaranteed to make the crustier sort of historians reach for their revolvers', and argues that heritage education is integral rather than inimical to the future of history.

Gill Branston and Carol Tulloch both discuss projects representing previously marginalised heritage. Gill Branston's work with the *Butetown History and Arts Project* (BHAP) in the Tiger Bay area of Cardiff, in the form of interviews on memories of local cinema-going from the 1930s to the 1950s, foregrounds heritage stories which cut against

the grains of more white, patrician and work-oriented histories of Wales and which bring the longevity of Cardiff's diasporic connections to the fore. Carol Tulloch describes working as a curator with heritage institutions including the Black Cultural Archives, the V&A and several local hairdressing salons (which exhibited a small touring exhibition on hairdressing histories). Her account foregrounds the challenges of working with a variety of 'mainstream' and 'alternative' institutions. S.I. Martin, novelist, researcher for the Channel 4 TV series *Britain's Slave Trade* and tour guide for the *Black London Walk* discusses how presenting previously obscured heritage is not simply a matter of popularising it, but is also a question of being able to access the research, which means thinking about how sources are valorised.

Mark Perryman, who has been involved with a variety of initiatives to re-imagine Englishness, considers one of the most populist contemporary incarnations of heritage by discussing the uses to which the English flag is put. He focuses in particular on its meanings in the context of devolution and the expansion of its popularity during the 2002 World Cup, and claims that it is both possible and preferable to reclaim the flag for a multicultural and postcolonial Englishness. 'We cannot ignore what is written in England's history books' he argues 'but nor should that history be used as an excuse for inaction. Engagement requires the seeking out of the variegated components of a historical narrative, and seeking out alternative narratives too.'

Both sections, then, address heritage as a form of past-in-the-present. They ask what varied forms of heritage – or various heritages - have to say about the legacies of 'race', whether they say all that they should say, and if not, how we can change them. There are many clear examples around us of how 'The' Heritage was racialised, gendered and classed: public statues erected to the leaders of colonial military battles, museums that represented white European cultures as civilised and everything else as 'other', pronouncements about national heritage that drew on discourses of blood, stock and belonging. In the final piece of the collection, Bill Schwarz asks what appropriate ways to remember the imperial past might be. Reminding us that 'memory can only work in conjunction with forgetting', he argues that the best types of memory-text create new passages between past and present, working through rather acting out the past. Highlighting how heritage can exist around us in a myriad of forms, and addressing critiques of postcolonial understandings of heritage, he points out that questions about the multiple and extraordinary power of the past in the present are still only just beginning to be formulated.

Common Heritage

In March 2003, when American and British forces were bombing Iraq, a small exhibition in London, *Our Life in Pieces: Objects and stories from Iraqis in exile* was drawing to a close. Here, you could walk around the tiny white light room, holding the rudimentarily printed guidebook in which statements and stories about the objects on display were provided by the people who had lent them to the gallery. The objects were described in terms of the significance they had for their owners, all exiled in London at various points over the past decades. A stone, a Kurdish headdress, a book, a bus pass, a stamp. These objects, these stories brought into being Iraqs that were very different from the Iraq of news bulletins and headline photos, all sand and militarism.

As the guidebook mediated to its visitors a diversity of voices talking about the objects, it slipped between by turns lyrical, prosaic and enigmatic descriptions, stories that enlivened and made specific these objects and wove other stories through them, showing how they had been part of peoples lives and how peoples lives had been part of them (Act Together 2003). It was a patchwork of different textures. In part the exhibition became about how global events and transnational occurrences have shaped the lives of these people and their flamboyant and mundane, extraordinary and prosaic objects. The exhibition was important because, at a time when Iraqi 'difference' was being both narrowly defined and demonised, it made possible not only a different view but an accessible range of different views.

It was reminiscent of Richard Sandell's description of how in an exhibition in Nottingham a memorial from one man to his deceased male lover, in the form of a ceramic bowl, together with text explaining it, did not provoke the degree of adverse comment that was expected. Sandell quotes Ivan Karp's discussion of how assertions of unbridgeable difference tend to exoticise objects and cultures as 'other' (Sandell 2002: 13-14). He puts the noticeable popularity of this exhibition partly down to its emphasis on 'sameness' alongside 'difference'.

Our Life in Pieces also encouraged a multiplicity of narratives to group around a theme. Both gesture to how heritage can exist as interwoven, genuinely diverse and, in Nima Poovaya-Smith's words, 'by rather than *for*' a community (Poovaya-Smith 2003).

Bringing different experiences together, ones that do not necessarily agree with each other, works to create what Chantal Mouffe terms agonistic pluralism: a model of democracy that does not work for a smooth final resolution but which recognises that any consensus will always be provisional and conflictual, which does not ignore the place of passion and feelings and seek to leave it 'outside' any debate, but a model of democracy that can recognise passion and conflict and which seeks to mobilise it towards sharing equalities of power (Mouffe 2000). *Our Life in Pieces* evoked a range of different Iraqi heritages existing in London, a range which became at the same time a part of British heritage. Its title remains a stark commentary on what happens if we do not pay attention to the legacies of imperialism and 'race' and how they shape our heritage today.

ⁱ One arch example being Kenneth Clark and his best-selling book and TV series from the 1970s, *Civilisation*.

ⁱⁱ 'Perhaps the fixidity of identity for which Englishness developed such a reputation arose because it was in fact continually being contested, and was designed to mask its uncertainty, its sense of being estranged from itself, sick with desire for the other' (Young 1995: 2).

ⁱⁱⁱ Raphael Samuel notes the marked upturn in the word's use from the beginning of the twentieth century, and so it is interesting to speculate on this usage in the context of British imperialism - on the rising currency of the word at a high point of British imperialism. Samuel also argued strongly for a more participatory *genealogy* of heritage, although what he provides of this is predominantly a twentieth-century genealogy (Samuel 1994: 231).

^{iv} *The International Journal of Heritage Studies* for example describes heritage in terms of *conservation*, stating every issue that: 'Heritage varies from the aesthetic object conserved in a museum to wildlife conserved within a nature reserve.'

^v What might be extrapolated from the recent mutations in heritage's meanings is that it seems increasingly possible to trace a developed genealogy for heritage as meaning something that is *shared* - amongst and across generations - as well as being able to trace a genealogy of heritage as the inheritance of *individuals*, which in the post-industrial West became most commonly articulated to discourses of superior worth. As Simon Critchley has pointed out, Derrida uses 'the heritage' to mean 'the dominant Western tradition': '[h]e selects a concept from what he always describes as 'the heritage' - let's call it the dominant Western tradition - and then proceeds, via an analysis that is at once historical, contextual and thematic, to bring out the logic of that concept' (Critchley

2001) a usage which suggests both the specific exclusivity of its white European patrilinear context, and which has the potential to mean something less elite, something broader and more capacious. One of the more optimistic aspects of heritage today is that it can be less predominantly charged with a conservative version of Victoriana and more charged with a sense of collective pasts, as, for instance, The Parekh Report showed by using 'mixed heritage' as a key term where in the past the term 'mixed race' might have appeared (Runnymede Trust 2000: 41).

^{vi} This ambivalence relates to its etymology. Formed from 'ethnikos', mainly used to refer to gentiles, and 'ethnos' (nation) 'ethnicity' has a long history of being used to refer to 'foreigners' or 'others'. As 'race' became an awkward term after the Second World War, the obsolete word was revived, as a means by which a distance from biological essentialism could be suggested - although at the same time it could be used to reinforce it. Stuart Hall acknowledged that the meaning of 'ethnicity' as a term has been forged by its links to nationalism, imperialism, racism and the state, but argued that it could be decoupled from such simple linkages and used to examine the complexity of identities, in order 'to notice that we are all ethnically located and our ethnic identities are crucial to our subjective sense of who we are. ...this precisely is the politics of ethnicity predicated on difference and diversity' (Hall 1992: 258). See also Sollers 1986 and Hutchinson and Smith 1996.

^{vii} See <http://www.19princeletstreet.org.uk>.

The Rich Mix project supported by the Greater London Authority and the British Council exhibition

^{viii} As Moira Simpson has documented, there is a long if sporadic history of radical projects within the museum sector (Simpson 2001). However, as Siân Jones points out in this volume, drawing on Eileen Hooper-Greenhill, 'tellingly much of the commentary focuses on repeated references to a few temporary or travelling exhibitions which have achieved almost iconic status, such as the *Peopling of London* exhibition at the Museum of London, and *Warm and Rich and Fearless* [an exhibition of Sikh Art] displayed at Bradford and Walsall Museum and Art Gallery'. For accounts of these exhibitions, see Hooper-Greenhill 1997.

^{ix} Its recommendations were split into different sections, which in turn led to or influenced follow-up reports, such as a cross-sector Libraries, Museums, Archives and Galleries policy review and the Arts Council's strategy for social inclusion.

^x The importance of tourism in the construction of heritage, and since the 1980s in particular, has long been noted (McGuigan 1996: 128-132; Walsh 1992; Boniface and Fowler 1993; Kirschemblatt-Gimblett 1998).

^{xi} Organisational processes has until recently remained a relatively under-theorised subject in contrast to, say, the representational politics of a museum display, a finished film, or the effects of national cultural policies. Now, work such as, in media studies, the *Media Practice* series, or, in museum studies, the *Heritage-Conservation-Management* series, is busy interrogating and theorising the institutional processes through which cultural products are produced and interpreting their effects, and there remains a lot of scope for further work in these and adjacent areas.