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A 'Corpus Vile' of International Order: Protection, Coercion, and the British Blockade of Greece, 1850

Georgios Giannakopoulos

ABSTRACT

This article reconstructs the British blockade of Greece in 1850 as an experiment in intervention short of war. Commonly remembered through the prism of the Pacifico Affair and Palmerstonian gunboat diplomacy, the blockade has been treated as an episodic display of British power rather than as a practice of international governance. Drawing on British, Greek, and French sources the article shifts attention from justification to implementation, tracing how naval coercion was organised, contested, and experienced across ports, ministries, and public arenas. It shows that the blockade operated as a disciplinary instrument directed at a formally sovereign European state, testing the limits of protection regimes, treaty obligations, and the law of nations. Far from suspending Greek agency, the crisis provoked intense domestic debate over sovereignty, dignity, and European belonging, while also exposing fractures among the Great Powers charged with guaranteeing Greek independence. The Greek case reveals how nineteenth-century international order was produced through everyday practices of coercion that blurred the boundaries between war and peace.

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Introduction

Athens, January 1850. In the depths of a bitter winter, a British naval squadron appeared off the ports of Salamis and Piraeus. Recently stationed in the Dardanelles to contain the aftershocks of the European revolutions of 1848, the fleet now carried a more pointed mission. The Greek government was presented with an ultimatum: unless it agreed to settle a series of long-standing claims—ranging from compensation for damaged property and mistreated subjects to territorial disputes over two Ionian islets—Britain would impose a naval blockade. The threat was not war, but something more ambiguous: a coercive intervention justified in the language of law, protection, and order.

The ultimatum was delivered at the royal palace. King Otto and Queen Amalia received Vice-Admiral William Parker and the British ambassador, Thomas Wyse, in private audience shortly before a formal dinner. There, Britain's demands were presented; moments later, the same men sat down at the royal table. Amalia later described the admiral and his entourage as 'pirates', their presence an affront to royal dignity.¹ Her lady-in-waiting recorded Parker's visible discomfort as he dined beneath chandeliers with hosts he had just threatened. The scene captured a defining paradox of nineteenth-century intervention: coercion enacted through civility, force cloaked in sociability, and sovereignty performed under duress.

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The winter of 1850 was saturated with accusations of piracy. British officials depicted Greece as a haven of brigands and lawlessness, incapable of protecting foreign lives or property and threatening the stability of the neighbouring British Ionian protectorate. Greek officials, journalists, and satirists turned the charge back on the Royal Navy, casting the blockade itself as an act of maritime predation. This encounter marked the opening of what became known as the ‘Pacífico Affair’—an episode usually remembered as a textbook instance of Palmerstonian gunboat diplomacy.

The blockade has been treated more often as illustration than as object of analysis. In the historiography, it appears primarily as evidence of Britain’s assertive foreign policy or as a parliamentary morality play about imperial overreach.² What remains underexplored is how intervention short of war functioned in practice: how naval coercion was organised, calibrated, and contested across ports, ministries, courts, and public arenas. By focusing on implementation rather than justification, this article shifts attention from intention and rhetoric to the everyday workings of coercive power.

In this article, intervention refers not to formal war or occupation, but to coercive action undertaken by one state against another in peacetime, justified through legal, diplomatic, or protective claims. Such interventions occupied an indeterminate space between war and peace. They relied on the selective use of force, the mobilisation of legal argument, and the invocation of responsibility or protection, rather than declarations of hostilities or territorial conquest. It was precisely this ambiguity—between reprisal, protection, and punishment—that made practices such as ‘pacific blockades’ powerful instruments of nineteenth-century international governance.

The British blockade of Greece exemplifies this form of intervention with particular clarity. It targeted a formally sovereign European state whose independence was guaranteed by treaty, yet whose autonomy was constrained by debt, protection regimes, and Great Power oversight. The blockade thus functioned as a disciplinary instrument directed not toward an ‘uncivilised’ empire but at a protected state within Europe itself, testing the limits of treaty obligations, collective guarantees, and the law of nations.

This article advances three claims. First, it reconstructs the blockade as a practice rather than a moment, showing how intervention was assembled through naval operations, diplomatic manoeuvres, and administrative improvisation. Second, it recentres Greek responses, demonstrating that intervention did not suspend political agency but instead provoked intense domestic debate over sovereignty, dignity, and European belonging. Third, it situates the episode within a wider genealogy of intervention without war, arguing that Greece functioned as a diagnostic site in which the politics of protection were made visible. Read in this light, the blockade of 1850 illuminates a transitional moment in nineteenth-century international order, when sovereignty was increasingly governed not through conquest but through legalised coercion exercised in the name of protection.

Protection, sovereignty, and the conditions of intervention

Since its independence in the 1830s Greece occupied an ambiguous position within the nineteenth-century international order: formally sovereign yet structurally constrained by regimes of protection. Established as an independent kingdom under the collective guarantee of Britain, France, and Russia, Greece enjoyed juridical recognition while remaining subject to sustained external scrutiny tied to order, creditworthiness, and regional stability.³ Protection functioned as a mode of governance that conditioned sovereignty on acceptable conduct, rendering the Greek state legible to foreign assessment and, in moments of perceived failure, vulnerable to coercive enforcement.

Recent scholarship on empire, law, and sovereignty helps clarify the political logic of this exposure. Work associated with Lauren Benton and others has shown that sovereignty in imperial and semi-imperial worlds was rarely absolute; it was instead assembled through uneven

distributions of legal authority across spaces marked by exception, overlap, and contingency. In such settings, protection operated less as a shield than as a technology that produced graded and conditional forms of sovereignty.⁴ Greece exemplified this dynamic with particular clarity. Its independence was affirmed through international treaties and Great Power recognition, yet that recognition was inseparable from an externalised right to judge whether the state was properly governed. Sovereignty was thus open to recalibration through legal argument, diplomatic pressure, and, ultimately, coercive practice.

The protection regime that structured Greek independence was multilateral in form but asymmetrical in effect. Britain, France, and Russia claimed collective responsibility for the kingdom's security, yet each power interpreted protection through its own strategic and political priorities. Protection entailed not only defence against external threat but an ongoing interest in the internal order of the new state. When these expectations were perceived to be unmet, intervention could be framed as enforcement rather than aggression.

This logic was sharpened by Britain's position in the Ionian Islands. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, the 'United States of the Ionian Islands' became a British protectorate functioning as an imperial frontier in the eastern Mediterranean.⁵ The Islands' proximity to the Greek mainland, combined with overlapping commercial networks and disputed jurisdictions, ensured that questions of piracy, navigation, and territorial control were rarely confined to bilateral diplomacy. Claims over small islets such as Cervi (Elafonisos) and Sapienza acquired significance not because of their intrinsic value, but because they lay at the intersection of Greek sovereignty and British imperial authority. The Ionian frontier thus became a site where protection, sovereignty, and coercion repeatedly collided, transforming local disputes into matters of imperial concern.

Seen from the vantage point of British imperial practice, the use of maritime pressure against Greece was neither anomalous nor improvised. Throughout the nineteenth century, British officials treated naval demonstrations, reprisals, and so-called 'pacific blockades' as instruments that could compel compliance without formal war. Their legal ambiguity was not a weakness but a strength; such measures allowed coercion to be presented as redress, protection, or enforcement rather than belligerence. These blockades were pieces of a wide puzzle; over the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, naval and commercial blockades had become central instruments in the imperial repertoire of economic warfare. During the Napoleonic Wars, Britain and France deployed them to disrupt rivals and reorder maritime trade; in the decades that followed, they increasingly used them jointly as tools of co-imperial management, as in the Paraná conflict of the 1840s. It took the aftermath of the Crimean War for the emergence of a clear legal framework governing the operation of naval blockades.⁶

Financial dependence further intensified this dynamic. Greece's reliance on foreign loans, raised under the auspices of the protecting powers, bound questions of sovereignty to fiscal credibility. British officials in particular linked political order to economic reliability, treating disorder as both a moral failing and a financial risk. Under these conditions, the language of protection merged easily with that of fiscal discipline. Domestic political instability rendered these external pressures more acute. Too young to rule when he arrived in Greece in 1833, King Otto initially governed through a Bavarian regency whose political orientation leaned toward France, widely regarded within the palace as Greece's most reliable external supporter. These alignments soon crystallised in domestic politics through the emergence of the French, English, and Russian parties—factions that did not simply mirror foreign interests but wove them into local rivalries, patronage networks, and competing visions of political order. Over the following decade, the balance of influence shifted repeatedly. British leverage increased in the mid-1830s; a period contemporaries described as 'Russian ascendancy' followed after Otto assumed direct rule; and after the constitutional revolution of 1843, France again emerged as the dominant external interlocutor in Athens.⁷

This configuration depended heavily on the political skills of the Greek politician and minister Ioannis Kolettis, whose ability to manage factional competition and foreign alliances helped sustain a fragile equilibrium. His death in 1847 removed a crucial stabilising figure. What followed was acute volatility; between 1847 and 1849 Greece experienced four governments and dozens of ministerial changes. In the absence of a dominant broker, leading politicians—including Alexandros Mavrokordatos, leader of the ‘English Party’—turned increasingly to foreign embassies, seeking support, mediation, and protection. Domestic politics became ever more entangled with external supervision.⁸

British diplomatic reporting portrayed this instability as evidence of misgovernment. The long-serving ambassador Sir Edmund Lyons repeatedly highlighted banditry, administrative weakness, and unresolved grievances involving British subjects. Lyons was an officer of the British Navy with active involvement in the Greek War of Independence. In fact, he had transported King Otto to Greece in 1832. When calls arose in the late 1830s to recall Lyons, Lord Palmerston reportedly remarked that his replacement would be an admiral rather than a diplomat—an explicit signal that naval force stood ready to substitute for diplomacy.⁹ A limited naval deployment in 1847, following an incident involving Ionian vessels, confirmed how readily the language of protection could slide into accusations of intervention. The Greek Anglophile press chastised Greek Russophiles for calling it an ‘English intervention’ and accused them of turning a blind eye to the presence of the French Navy moored to support the Francophile Greek government.¹⁰

The genealogy of coercion without formal war in the Greek case can be traced back to the very moment of Greece’s emergence as a state. The naval battle of Navarino in 1827—often remembered as a decisive humanitarian intervention that secured Greek independence¹¹—was preceded by a form of coercive maritime pressure that already blurred the boundary between peace and war. The allied fleets of Britain, France, and Russia entered Greek waters not as belligerents but as enforcers of an armistice, charged with restraining Ottoman operations rather than prosecuting a declared conflict. Their presence was framed as pacific and protective. Violence followed not as the explicit objective of the mission, but as the contingent outcome of an attempt to impose order through naval containment. In this sense, Navarino did not simply inaugurate Greek independence through battle; it also exposed an early logic of intervention in which maritime power was deployed to compel compliance without a formal declaration of war. This episode anticipated later practices of pacific blockade, embedding coercion within the language of protection from the outset of the Greek state’s international existence.¹²

What distinguished the British blockade of 1850 from earlier Mediterranean precedents was not only its disciplinary purpose but its unilateral execution. Unlike the joint interventions that had characterised the management of Greek affairs since independence, Britain acted alone, without the prior assent of France and Russia—the other guarantors of the Greek kingdom under the 1832 settlement. This move immediately exposed the fragility of the protection regime on which Greek sovereignty rested and triggered a debate over the legality of coercion. British officials defended the blockade as a lawful reprisal grounded in the law of nations, while French and Russian diplomats invoked treaty obligations to argue that unilateral coercion violated the principles of collective guarantee. Greek officials, joined by critics of the policy within Britain itself, mobilised the same legal vocabulary in the opposite direction, insisting that coercive measures were permissible only as a last resort and only after judicial remedies had been exhausted.

Rather than treating the blockade as a brief diplomatic rupture or a footnote to gunboat diplomacy, this article approaches it as a process—one that unfolded simultaneously in harbours, newspapers, ministries, and chancelleries. By reconstructing both the material mechanics of naval coercion and the political debates it provoked within Greece and among the Great Powers, the article shows how the crisis neither suspended Greek agency nor clarified the meaning of protection, but instead exposed the unresolved tension between collective guarantee and unilateral enforcement at the heart of mid-nineteenth century international order.

Claims and grievances: from individual injury to international pressure

By the late 1840s, British protection of Greece had acquired a concrete and increasingly confrontational form crystallised around a growing set of unresolved claims advanced on behalf of British subjects resident in the kingdom. These disputes did not initially appear exceptional. Property damage, compensation demands, and jurisdictional disagreements were familiar features of post-independence governance. Yet in the context of accumulated frustration and diplomatic impatience, they became vehicles through which broader judgements about Greek compliance were articulated.

One of the most persistent of these claimants was George Finlay, a Scottish philhellene, historian, and long-term resident of Athens. Finlay had invested heavily in land during the early years of independence, viewing property ownership as both a personal commitment and a contribution to Greece's development. When part of his estate was expropriated in the 1830s for the expansion of the royal palace gardens, compensation was promised but never fully delivered. Over the following years, Finlay pursued redress through petitions and diplomatic channels, framing his case as a test of Greece's legal reliability and its treatment of foreign investors. His appeals were measured and legalistic, grounded in precedent and comparison, and they supplied British officials with a narrative of institutional failure.¹³

A very different figure, Don Pacifico—a Gibraltar-born Jew and former Portuguese consul—also saw part of his property encroached upon during the expansion of the royal gardens.¹⁴ But his most consequential grievance was of a different order. In April 1847 his family home in central Athens was ransacked by a mob enraged by a royal decree banning the traditional Easter burning of an effigy of Judas Iscariot—a gesture made in deference to a scheduled visit of the Jewish-French banker James Mayer de Rothschild to discuss the question of the Greek loans. As one of the prominent Jews in Athens, Pacifico became an easy target for anti-Semitic violence.¹⁵ The attack, and the authorities' conspicuous failure to intervene, exposed the fragility of law and order in the capital and reinforced long-standing British perceptions of Greek lawlessness and institutional failure. Moreover, this action created a threatening atmosphere for some British subjects in Athens. In April 1847 Finlay wrote to the British ambassador asking for 'protection', noting he felt exposed and in 'personal danger'.¹⁶

The contrast between the two cases is telling. Finlay framed his demands not as personal entitlement but as a call for equitable treatment, citing instances where other foreign nationals had received swift and favourable settlements.¹⁷ Pacifico's appeals were urgent, dramatic, and infused with a sense of vulnerability as a foreigner and a Jew.¹⁸ Throughout 1849 Pacifico would plead to Palmerston: 'Are we, my Lord, to remain abandoned in a foreign land, unprotected by my own country, fearing at every moment assassination or the burning of my house?'¹⁹; 'Will English subjects continue to be sacrificed to Greek arrogance? No, I cannot believe it. If England were to suffer such humiliation from Greece, all of Europe, the entire world, would laugh and cease to respect her'.²⁰ A year later he would plead that 'any approach short of force will likely prove useless'.²¹

Greek government officials grew increasingly frustrated by Pacifico's appeals to the British authorities. At first, they challenged his right to demand protection, citing his earlier work as a Portuguese consul in Greece.²² Most importantly, Greek ministers insisted that the local courts were the designated venue for the settlement of Pacifico's claims. The Greek government, they argued, could not afford more rights to a non-Greek citizen than those reserved for its own citizens. In the words of the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs: '*L'intervention étrangère dans une affaire intérieure porterait atteinte à la souveraineté nationale*' ('Foreign intervention in a domestic matter would infringe upon national sovereignty').²³ But it was precisely foreign intervention that Pacifico was arguing for, citing concurrent precedents in the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America, namely, Portugal and Paraguay: '*Je me bornerai à rappeler ici les précédents de Portugal et du Paraguay, qui sont à eux seuls décisifs*' ('I will limit myself to recalling the precedents of Portugal and Paraguay, which are in themselves decisive').²⁴

The British decision to blockade the Greek ports cannot be reduced to the personal claims of Don Pacifico or George Finlay. These cases, though prominent and symbolically potent, were symptoms of a deeper and more volatile accumulation of British grievances rooted in the eastern Mediterranean balance of power. Central to these tensions was the increasingly fraught relationship between the Greek kingdom and the Ionian Islands. For Britain, the Islands were not merely a territorial possession but a strategic frontier: a military vantage point into the Ottoman world, a node in the protection of routes to India, and a hub through which maritime insecurity—especially piracy—was to be contained. Greek political instability and nationalist aspiration in the region therefore carried implications that extended well beyond Athens.

Britain's role as 'protector' of the United States of the Ionian Islands under the Treaty of Paris (1815) created an inherently ambiguous political and legal arrangement. The Islands retained their own constitution, assemblies, and courts, yet ultimate authority rested with a Lord High Commissioner appointed by London. This form of supervised autonomy rendered the Ionian frontier particularly sensitive to Greek influence and to movements advocating *enosis* (union with Greece). It also generated persistent jurisdictional uncertainty when Ionian interests intersected with Greek territory, especially where claims involved the periphery of Ionian authority rather than its core.²⁵

This ambiguity came sharply into focus in jurisdictional disputes over indemnities owed to Ionian ships from acts of piracy and, importantly, in the case of two small and uninhabited islets, Cervi (Elafonisos) and Sapienza, lying close to the Peloponnesian coast. Their significance derived not from population or resources but from their potential as anchorages, coaling points, and surveillance positions in an age of expanding imperial maritime infrastructure. A shipwreck near the islets in 1849 revived competing claims. Greek officials insisted that the islets were historically and administratively linked to the Greek mainland. Queen Amalia noted with incredulity the British ambassador's argument that 'a small country like Greece' sought to claim territory from 'the biggest power in the world'.²⁶

Diplomatic tensions intensified with the arrival in Athens of Thomas Wyse, who replaced Lyons in 1849. The Greek court initially welcomed the change, hoping for a reset in relations. Palmerston instructed Wyse to review the growing list of unresolved claims. Early signs appeared encouraging; with mediation, Finlay's case seemed to be advancing.²⁷ Yet, Wyse soon concluded that the Greek government was stalling elsewhere. Together with officials in London, he began to recommend stronger measures, including the forcible occupation of the disputed Ionian islets.²⁸ Greek resistance hardened. Writing in November 1849, Foreign Minister Konstantinos Glarakis dismissed the British territorial demands as an 'arbitrary extension' of imperial power.²⁹

Ironically, this escalation unfolded against a momentary calm within Greece itself. Amalia recorded in her diary in November 1849 that 'quiet and order reign in the Kingdom. The people work their land, plant, build'.³⁰ The source of unease lay beyond Greece's borders. British and French squadrons had assembled in the Dardanelles during the Eastern Crisis triggered by the Ottoman decision to grant asylum to Polish and Hungarian refugees after the revolutions of 1848. Although that crisis was quickly resolved, it had already heightened naval readiness and sharpened imperial sensitivities across the eastern Mediterranean.

Once the need for naval presence in the Dardanelles passed, British priorities shifted. Palmerston redirected the squadron toward Greece. Orders were issued for the fleet to move to Salamis, the island commanding the approaches to Piraeus and the Athenian basin. Long valued as a natural anchorage and freighted with symbolic resonance as the site of the ancient victory over Persia, Salamis offered both strategic leverage and dramatic visibility. Vice-Admiral Parker was instructed to support Wyse in securing immediate redress and, should diplomacy fail, to take all necessary measures to compel compliance.³¹

Few knew of the plan in Greece—not the leaders of the Anglophile party such as Mavrokordatos, nor the envoys of the other protecting powers. Days before the intervention, Wyse discreetly sounded out the French ambassador, Thouvenel, on whether France might take

stronger measures to defend its interests. Thouvenel, a figure of considerable influence in Athens throughout the 1840s, declined.³² The appearance of the British fleet off Salamis took everyone by surprise. At first, when the British squadron appeared on the horizon, Amalia admired the spectacle – ‘how grand and beautiful it looks,’ she wrote. Three days later she would lament: ‘Evil has struck us like a thunderbolt.’³³

The blockade in practice

The 1850 blockade of Greece has received remarkably little attention from historians. In response to the British ultimatum the Greek government convened a high-profile judicial commission comprised of supreme court justices, law professors and jurists, some of whom were connected with the ‘English’ party. The commission found the British claims unjustified and deemed the threat of blockade unlawful. The argument echoed the government’s position that the domestic Greek legal system had the sole jurisdiction to settle the personal claims to injury.³⁴ In regard to the territorial claims, a detailed note from the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated the Greek position.

On the day of the commencement of the embargo in Piraeus, 19 January, Wyse and the officers of the British legation in Athens suspended diplomatic relations and boarded the fleet’s mothership, HMS *Queen*.³⁵ The embassy issued appeals to all British citizens in the country to take extra precautions for their safety and offered to issue passports to those who wished so.³⁶ The weather in Athens quickly turned very cold and the sight of Wyse on board a British vessel issuing orders became a point of satire. Amalia noted how the severe snowstorm in Athens constituted ‘Une réponse Russe à une note Anglaise.’³⁷

With the British fleet firmly anchored off Salamis, the strategic island commanding the approaches to Athens, the blockade quickly extended to Greece’s principal maritime arteries. It first sealed Piraeus, the capital’s harbour and the nerve centre of state provisioning; it then expanded to Syra, the commercial hub of the Aegean and Greece’s main entrepôt for international trade; and, finally, to Patras, the key outlet for agricultural exports to western Europe. Parker and Wyse decided on the spot the parameters of the blockade, while keeping the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office informed of their moves. The hope was that the disruption would quickly force Greece to pay the indemnities. If that did not work, the alternative, in Parker’s words, was to seize ‘as many Greek vessels with their cargoes as will cover the amount of the claims made by the Hellenic government.’³⁸

Naval operations began by immobilising Greek warships and patrolling minor ports, including Spetses and Poros. Greek merchant vessels were halted and, when carrying cargo, towed to Salamis. Orders instructed captains to act with restraint, inform foreign consuls, and avoid unnecessary provocation.³⁹ In practice, however, enforcement quickly spilled beyond Greece proper into the Ionian sphere, exposing the tension at the heart of Britain’s dual role as coercive power and protector. Several Greek vessels were brought to Corfu, the administrative centre of the Ionian protectorate. The reaction was immediate and unexpected. Local opinion rallied openly in support of Greece, and newspapers long considered moderate adopted a sharply critical tone. Writing privately to Palmerston, the Lord High Commissioner reported a state of ‘most unusual agitation,’ expressing astonishment that Ionian inhabitants—whose legal status and commercial security Britain claimed to defend—should forget their interests in their strong sense of nationality, and should evince in their looks and language much more regret at the humiliation of Greece than gratitude for the protection afforded to them by Her Majesty.⁴⁰ The episode exposed the limits of imperial loyalty in a region where cultural, political, and national affinities cut across the formal boundaries of protection. The High Commissioner attributed part of the unrest to the influence of French and Russian consuls, but the reaction suggested a deeper problem: the blockade of Greece risked destabilising Britain’s own frontier of informal empire.

Formally, the blockade did not extend to vessels sailing under foreign flags. Yet this distinction immediately exposed a practical problem that threatened to undermine the effectiveness of the measures. A substantial proportion of ships flying the Greek flag were, in practice, chartered to carry cargo owned by foreign merchants. Any attempt to detain such vessels risked entangling Britain in disputes with neutral powers and disrupting commercial interests it was anxious to protect. To manage this ambiguity, British naval authorities issued notices to foreign consuls in the main port cities, warning that, from the commencement of the blockade, vessels under the Greek flag were no longer to be chartered by foreign merchants. Greek ships were permitted to land cargo only if it could be shown to be *bona fide* foreign property, and captains were instructed to scrutinise manifests and paperwork closely to establish ownership.⁴¹

The tensions were most visible in Syra, the bustling Cycladic entrepôt. The morphology of the port made comprehensive enforcement difficult, and British commanders advised caution. The stagnation of the wheat trade had left many Greek vessels stranded in Constantinople, while public sentiment on the island was already inclined toward the 'Russian view of things'.⁴² A blockade, one officer warned, would inflame anti-British feeling without producing compliance. He was right. Local authorities moved public funds to the French consulate for safekeeping, while merchants exploited every available loophole to evade restrictions.⁴³ Newspapers captured the emotional register of disruption. The weekly *Aiolos* described an eerily silent harbour and a community on the brink: 'Imagine a blockaded, deserted island,' it implored, 'without any means of provision for the bare minimum to sustain itself.' Beyond material hardship, the paper articulated a sense of betrayal. Britain, once celebrated as a liberator, now appeared as an imperial disciplinarian inflicting humiliation on 'an infant nation under her guardianship'.⁴⁴

Comparable reactions surfaced elsewhere. In Patras, the British vice-consul reported 'an unusual degree of irritation in the public mind', noting public displays of patriotism and the popularity of French and Russian representatives. Fearing violence, he briefly contemplated relocating his operations aboard a British vessel. Local papers described the blockade as an 'insult to national pride' inflicted by 'the friends of humanity—the English'.⁴⁵

Athens became the stage on which the blockade's political drama unfolded. News of the British ultimatum initially produced an unusual sense of unity. Crowds cheered the embattled royals and gathered outside the Russian and French legations to express their gratitude to their envoys, while the government deployed troops to protect British residents and prominent Anglophile politicians such as Mavrokordatos. Even amid rising tension, restraint prevailed. The French ambassador, noting with evident satisfaction the crowd's appeal to his legation, observed that 'not a single cry was raised against England'.⁴⁶

Parliamentary debate struck a careful tone. The Greek Foreign Minister presented the country as caught between gratitude toward a historic benefactor and the imperative to defend national dignity and sovereignty.⁴⁷ Even Anglophile politicians endorsed the need for restraint and cohesion.⁴⁸ Yet as the crisis deepened, language hardened. By mid-February, ministers warned that Britain no longer acted as protector but sought to 'destroy' the state it had helped create.⁴⁹

The Athenian press amplified these divisions. Major Athenian newspapers—*Athena*, *Elpis*, and *Aion*—each loosely aligned with one of the three parties (the 'English', the 'French' and the 'Russian'), covered the crisis with diverging emphases. While nominally reflecting English, French, and Russian interests respectively, their editorial positions were shaped by domestic loyalties and ideological fault lines.

The Anglophile press attempted a balancing act by evoking the British support for Greece in the War of Independence, though it struggled to justify Britain's actions. *Athena* framed the blockade as a kind of civilising discipline—a painful but necessary lesson administered by a great and enlightened power. Britain, it argued, remained a philhellenic actor whose intervention sought not domination but moral correction.⁵⁰ The British claims, even though they were unjust, could force Greeks to 'get a grip of ourselves'.⁵¹ *Elpis*, closer to the French Party, adopted a mournful tone, recalling Britain's role in independence but blaming both British arrogance and

Greek mismanagement for the rupture.⁵² *Aion*, the organ of the Russian Party, responded with fury, accusing Britain of imperial aggression and warning that its true aim was to dismantle Greece's maritime economy and overthrow the monarchy. By early February the paper was reporting how Greeks in the country were burning copies of the Anglophile press. In a series of acerbic editorials, *Aion* invoked past British 'betrayals' and charged Britain with engineering regime change. The newspaper ridiculed the notion that Britain would mobilise a fleet for the sake of a 'stingy Spanish or Portuguese', referring disparagingly to Pacifico. 'Hellas,' it thundered, 'has two governments: one in Athens and the other in Ampelakia [Salamis]; the first is Greek, the second English—the Athenian governs by law, the Ampelakian by cannon.'⁵³

What the blockade produced was not a neat demonstration of British power, but a prolonged and uneasy confrontation in which coercion had to be constantly adjusted, justified, and defended. Naval pressure disrupted commerce and immobilised the Greek fleet, yet it also exposed the limits of enforcement; merchants evaded restrictions, neutral flags blurred jurisdictional boundaries, and imperial authority fractured along its own frontiers. On shore, the blockade reshaped political language. What had begun as an effort to secure compliance through pressure was increasingly experienced as humiliation, betrayal, and moral injury—sentiments articulated not only in the press but in parliamentary debate and private correspondence. Britain's claim to act as a protector enforcing order was thus persistently shadowed by accusations of imperial overreach. Far from resolving the meaning of protection, the blockade destabilised it, transforming a technique of governance into a site of contest over sovereignty, legality, and power. These tensions would soon be replayed in a different arena: the legal and political debates in Britain and Europe over whether coercion without war could be reconciled with the principles of international order.

The British, the French, the Russians and the law of nations

The British blockade of Greece raised a fundamental question at the heart of nineteenth-century international order: could a protecting power unilaterally coerce a state it had helped create without violating treaty obligations and the law of nations? Nowhere was the sense of rupture sharper than in the French legation at Athens. Ambassador Thouvenel described the situation as 'without precedent in the annals of diplomacy'. To him, the British demands—financially onerous and legally untested—amounted not to the enforcement of justice but to an unworthy abuse of power that threatened both Greece's solvency and the credibility of the collective guarantee established in 1832.⁵⁴

Paris offered little guidance. Louis-Napoleon's government, still consolidating authority after 1848, remained uncommitted to a clear Eastern policy, leaving Thouvenel to improvise. 'I have no love for Greece,' he confessed, 'but continued British aggression may yet make me a philhellene.'⁵⁵ Privately, he warned that Britain's unilateralism risked reducing France to a subordinate role in the Mediterranean, recalling the diplomatic humiliation of 1840. Yet despite his sharp language, French resistance remained rhetorical. Lacking both consensus and leverage, France confined itself to protest, revealing how hollow the guarantor system had become when confronted with determined unilateral action.⁵⁶

Russia responded with indignation tempered by restraint. Foreign Minister Nesselrode reminded London that Greece had been created 'by Russia and France as much as by England' and insisted that unilateral coercion violated the London Treaty of 1832.⁵⁷ Russian diplomats protested the seizure of vessels and the inspection of cargoes sailing under the Russian flag, while publicly accusing Britain of undermining Greek sovereignty. Privately, however, St Petersburg counselled Athens to pay the indemnities, recognising the futility of resistance. Strategic priorities—the preservation of the Ottoman Empire and continental stability—ultimately outweighed any commitment to confront Britain. The blockade further strained Anglo-Russian relations, already tense over British support for refugees within Ottoman domains. Yet for all its diplomatic

bluster, Russia was not prepared to materially assist Greece. The blockade, however, pushed Russian diplomacy to move ahead with a much discussed and negotiated commercial treaty with Greece.⁵⁸

In Britain, the blockade first unfolded not in Parliament but in the public sphere, where newspapers, correspondents, and letter writers grappled with its meaning and legitimacy. *The Times* played a central role in shaping this debate. While broadly defending the principle that British subjects were entitled to protection abroad, the paper adopted a notably cautious tone toward Palmerston's methods. Its editorials warned against allowing legitimate grievances to slide into punitive overreach, repeatedly raising the question of proportionality and drawing attention to the diplomatic risks of unilateral action against a treaty-guaranteed state.⁵⁹

Philhellenic voices, long invested in Greece as a moral and political project, seized on the blockade as a betrayal of Britain's historical role. In one widely cited letter, signed 'An Ionian', a contributor invited readers to imagine a reversal of roles: were a Greek fleet sufficiently strong to blockade the port of London in pursuit of restitution for the Elgin Marbles and indemnities for the damage done to the Parthenon, 'the English public's surprise would parallel that of the Greek reaction to the warlike phenomenon now on display at Piraeus'.⁶⁰ Such interventions reframed the crisis not as a technical matter of claims and reprisals, but as a moral and historical affront, exposing the tension between Britain's self-image as Greece's liberator and its present posture as coercive enforcer. By the time the issue reached the British parliament, the legality of the blockade had already been unsettled in public discourse, its authority challenged not only on juridical grounds but through appeals to memory, reciprocity, and imperial restraint.

Parliamentary debate sharpened the issue further. Critics focused less on the sum demanded than on the principle at stake: could naval force be used in peacetime to extract redress from a small state under joint protection? The Earl of Aberdeen, leader of the Conservative opposition, framed the issue starkly. If Britain had a dispute with Belgium—whose independence was likewise guaranteed by the European powers—would it blockade Antwerp? The answer, he insisted, was obvious. Greece, he concluded, had become a '*corpus vile*' upon which experiments in coercion could be performed.⁶¹

At the centre of these disputes lay competing interpretations of Vattel's *Law of Nations*. Palmerston repeatedly described the blockade as a lawful reprisal—coercive measures short of war—invoking Vattel's allowance for the seizure of property to obtain 'just indemnification'.⁶² From this perspective, Britain was not waging war but enforcing justice against a recalcitrant state. Critics countered that Vattel sanctioned intervention only as a last resort, after the exhaustion of legal remedies—a condition manifestly unmet, since Greek courts were already adjudicating the claims. Aberdeen warned that Palmerston's expansive reading transformed an exceptional doctrine into a standing right of imperial coercion, hollowing out the formal equality of states that Vattel ostensibly upheld.

What made the Greek case particularly revealing was that Palmerston's legal reasoning drew on a wider repertoire of imperial practice. Similar claims of lawful reprisal had underpinned British and French blockades and interventions in Latin America, as well as British coercive diplomacy in China after the Opium War.⁶³ In these contexts, the protection of subjects, debt enforcement, and commercial security were routinely framed as matters of legal redress rather than aggression. Greece, however, occupied a different category: a European, Christian, treaty-guaranteed state. The blockade thus collapsed distinctions between imperial and European orders, revealing how techniques refined in semi-colonial spaces could be redeployed within Europe itself.

Palmerston's defence culminated in his famous invocation of *Civis Romanus sum*.⁶⁴ To supporters, the analogy affirmed a moral duty to defend British subjects wherever they resided; to critics, it exposed the arrogance of a power claiming exemption from the very law it invoked. If protection were elevated into a universal principle, Viscount Canning warned, British subjects everywhere would advance claims arising from war, disorder, or misgovernment.⁶⁵ What Palmerston presented as legal clarity appeared, to his opponents, as dangerous elasticity.

Across the Channel, French commentators echoed these concerns. The *Revue des Deux Mondes* distinguished sharply between ‘Palmerston’ and ‘England,’ condemning the Foreign Secretary’s unilateralism while seeking to preserve the ideal of Anglo-French cooperation. Mocking the appeal to *Civis Romanus sum*, it warned that such extraterritorial exceptionalism would render British subjects ‘unwelcome across Europe’. Law, the *Revue* argued, could not serve simultaneously as a language of order and a license for intimidation.⁶⁶

The controversy also divided British philhellenes, none more acutely than George Finlay. Publicly, he criticised Palmerston’s heavy-handedness, objected to the targeting of merchants and shipowners, and rejected the inclusion of the Ionian islets in the dispute, insisting that questions of protection should have been handled collectively by the guarantor powers.⁶⁷ Privately, however, he expressed gratitude that Britain had defended ‘the just claims even of the humblest individuals’, believing such action would strengthen the attachment of British subjects to the crown.⁶⁸ Finlay’s reflections ultimately reached beyond the immediate crisis. In a stark assessment of the Greek experiment itself, he warned that ‘Greece, under the protection of the three powers, and loaded with debt, could not be an independent power. False appearances always produce evil consequences.’⁶⁹ The blockade, in this light, did not simply expose Greek weakness or British overreach; it laid bare the structural contradiction of a sovereignty simultaneously guaranteed, indebted, and enforceable. Finlay’s diagnosis captured the paradox at the heart of liberal empire: that protection, far from securing independence, could hollow it out—rendering sovereignty a legal fiction sustained through coercion rather than consent.

The aftermath

The blockade, whose intensity fluctuated over three months, formally ended on 28 April 1850. Its first six weeks had been the most severe—the French reporting that Piraeus lay in chains. Early efforts at mediation failed. Baron Gros, dispatched from Paris, shuttled between the British legation and the palace from his room at the *Hôtel d’Orient*, warning that continued pressure risked humiliating both Greece and France. By mid-April, however, the gap between the British and Greek positions remained unbridgeable. Under renewed threat of naval action, the Greek government capitulated and accepted British terms.

The settlement placed the Pacifico and Finlay claims on a path to resolution but left the territorial dispute over Cervi and Sapienza unresolved. In Paris, the outcome was widely regarded as a diplomatic failure. Thouvenel admitted that French hesitation had ‘necessitated this capitulation,’ exposing the erosion of France’s prestige in the eastern Mediterranean.⁷⁰ In Athens, relief quickly replaced anger. Wyse observed ‘not the slightest exhibition of ill will,’ as exhaustion set in.⁷¹ British officials were keen to portray the blockade as orderly and restrained, even pressing for compensation to Greek merchants whose vessels had been seized, in the hope of restoring commercial goodwill.

Even as the Foreign Office sought to contain the fallout of the blockade in London, British officials in Greece reported a marked deterioration of order. By June 1850, while the terms of the settlement were still under negotiation, Wyse warned of a visible ‘spirit of violence’ spreading across the country. ‘Brigandage,’ he reported, was ‘rapidly and lamentably on the increase,’ particularly in western Greece.⁷² These developments reinforced a familiar diagnosis within the British legation: that Greek political life remained dangerously fragile and factionalised, with leading figures allegedly aligning themselves with either French or Russian agendas. Wyse repeatedly emphasised—both to Athens and to London—that the legation remained ‘aloof’ from interference in domestic affairs. Yet this posture of restraint was difficult to sustain. On several occasions British officials intervened directly, often under liberal or constitutional pretexts. For instance, when a new law, supported by the Russian legation, appeared to curtail freedom of expression, Wyse protested that it violated constitutional guarantees.⁷³

This logic surfaced most clearly in disputes over Greek diplomacy itself. Rather than retreating inward after the blockade, the Greek government sought to reassert its international standing by doubling its diplomatic budget and reopening embassies in the capitals of the protecting powers—London, Paris, and St Petersburg. The Foreign Minister justified the move in parliament: ‘Europe must acquaint itself with our morals, understand our needs, be informed about our propensities and destination, and to that effect a Greek ambassador is the most relevant instrument.’⁷⁴ When these plans were floated to Wyse, he dismissed them as wasteful and ill-timed—a drain on scarce resources. His rebuke provoked an unusually sharp retort from the Greek minister, who insisted that the decision lay solely with the government and concerned ‘national dignity and independence.’⁷⁵ Wyse’s stance was indicative of the kind of interference he believed Britain was entitled to exercise in Greece. The right of Greece to appoint its own ministers, he argued, was as ‘incontestable’ as the right of ‘a country like Great Britain, to whom large sums are due, to remonstrate against what she may consider a misapplication of resources on the part of her debtor.’⁷⁶ In the end, the Greek government persevered.

Conclusion

The British blockade of Greece in 1850 was neither an aberration nor a simple episode of gun-boat diplomacy. It was an experiment in coercive intervention short of war—one that exposed how protection, law, and sovereignty were negotiated in practice within nineteenth-century international order. The crisis revealed that coercion did not require formal war, nor did it stand outside legality. On the contrary, legal argument structured intervention even as it became a site of contest, allowing force to be exercised while preserving the language of peace.

What makes the Greek case especially revealing is its position at the intersection of imperial and European orders. Greece was not a colony, nor even a semi-sovereign dependency in the conventional sense. It was a formally independent state whose sovereignty had been jointly guaranteed by Britain, France, and Russia, and whose emergence was celebrated as a triumph of European liberalism and humanitarian intervention. Yet it was also an unusually early and exposed site of foreign intervention, subject from the outset to financial supervision, diplomatic tutelage, and periodic coercion. The blockade of 1850 demonstrates how techniques more commonly associated with imperial governance—reprisal, maritime containment, the protection of subjects, and the selective suspension of commercial normalcy—could be redeployed within Europe against a recognised sovereign state. Greece thus occupied a liminal position: neither fully inside the European state system nor clearly outside it, but governed through a hybrid regime of protection and discipline.

In this sense, Greece functioned as a laboratory in which global imperial practices of coercion were tested, adapted, and normalised in a European setting. The blockade anticipated later uses of ‘pacific’ coercion in Latin America, the Ottoman world, and China, while also differing from them in a crucial respect: Greece’s sovereignty was not denied but continually invoked. Intervention was justified not against independence, but in its name—enforced by the very powers that had created and guaranteed the Greek state. This paradox helps explain both the intensity of Greek resistance and the unease the episode generated among contemporaries. Coercion here did not mark a departure from international order, but one of its formative mechanisms.

This episode also foreshadowed the dynamics of Anglo-French relations in the eastern Mediterranean. As later evident during the Crimean War, cooperation rested less on trust than on necessity. Greece served as a testing ground where rivalry, coordination, and restraint were rehearsed in miniature. The Pacifico Affair did not derail Anglo-French relations, but it exposed their fragility and clarified the terms on which co-imperial management would proceed.

Finally, the blockade illuminates how intervention abroad shaped political identity at home. Palmerston's appeal to *Civis Romanus sum* transformed the protection of subjects into a national creed, even as it unsettled established norms of international conduct. Greece thus served not only as an object of intervention, but as a mirror in which Britain measured its own power, prestige, and moral authority. In this sense, the blockade was less about settling claims than about defining the terms on which order would be enforced in a world where the boundaries between war and peace, empire and Europe, sovereignty and supervision, were increasingly blurred.

Notes

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8. Griffith to Palmerston, confidential letter, 22 April 1849, [Kew, United Kingdom National Archives, Public Record Office], F[oreign] O[ffice Records] 32/170.
9. Palmerston to Greek officials, 11 September 1838, cited in Petropoulos, *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece*, 322.
10. *Athina*, 3 April 1847. [NB: The publication dates of the Greek press follow the Julian calendar].
11. Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914: The Emergence of a European Concept and International Practice*, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); Alexis Heraclides and Ada Diallya, *Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century: Setting the Precedent*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019).
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14. Lyons to Palmerston, 8 January 1849, FO32/170.
15. For context see Evdoxios Doxiadis, *State, Nationalism, and the Jewish Communities of Modern Greece*, Paperback edition (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 75; Christopher A. Casey, *Nationals Abroad: Globalization, Individual Rights, and the Making of Modern International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 8.
16. Finlay to Lyons, 16 April 1844, Finlay MSS, FIN/GF/B/02.

17. Finlay to Lyons, 4 September 1848, FO286/125; Finlay to Lyons, 18 October 1848; Finlay to Lyons, 27 November 1848, FO286/125.
18. Pacifico wrote that it was his Jewish identity that had rendered him particularly vulnerable: *'ma position d'étranger, d'israélite, de sujet britannique, m'exposait non seulement à être dépouillé, mais à être outragé sans recours'* ("my position as a foreigner, a Jew, and a British subject exposed me not only to being looted but to being insulted without redress"). See also Fleming, *Greece: A Jewish History* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 28.
19. Pacifico to Palmerston, 8 March 1849 FO32/173.
20. Pacifico to Palmerston, 12 June 1849 FO32/173.
21. Pacifico to Palmerston, 12 December 1849 FO32/173.
22. Pacifico to Lyons 19/31 August 1848, Pacifico to Lyons 19/31 August 1848; 31 August/12 Sep, Pacifico to Lyons 19/31 August 1848 15 Oct 1848, FO286/125.
23. Cited in Pacifico to Lyons, 'Réfutation', 24 January 1848, FO286/124. This lengthy document, written by Pacifico, has quotes from two letters by the Greek Foreign Minister Glarakis of 14 December 1847 and 8 January 1848; Pacifico to Lyons, 3 February 1848 FO286/124.
24. Pacifico to Lyons, 'Réfutation', 24 January 1848; Pacifico to Lyons, 22 February 1848, FO286/124. See also David Mclean, 'Trade, Politics and the Navy in Latin America: The British in the Paraná, 1845–46', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 35, 3 (2007), 351–70. Aion (25 January 1850) has a reference to the conduct of the British in Portugal accusing them of meddling in internal British politics to gain more influence over the French. [NB: The publication dates of the Greek press follow the Julian calendar].
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26. Bouse and Bouse (ed.), *Anekdotēs-Epistolēs-Tis-Vasilissas-Amalias-Ston-Patera-Tis, 1836–1853*, vol. 2, 564.
27. Wyse to Palmerston, 18 July 1849, FO32/171; Wyse to Palmerston, 7 August 1849; FO32/172; Wyse to Palmerston 18 September 1849, FO32/172.
28. Addington to Monck, 15 August 1849, FO286/123; Wyse to Parker, 20 October 1849; Wyse to Parker, 23 October 1849, FO32/172.
29. Glarakis to Wyse, 17/29 November 1849, FO32/172.
30. Bouse and Bouse (ed.), *Anekdotēs-Epistolēs-Tis-Vasilissas-Amalias-Ston-Patera-Tis, 1836–1853*, vol. 2, 563.
31. Wyse to Palmerston, 8 December 1849, FO32/172; Palmerston to Wyse, 30 November 1849, FO286/123.
32. Wyse to Palmerston, 28 November 1849, FO32/172.
33. Bouse and Bouse (ed.), *Anekdotēs-Epistolēs-Tis-Vasilissas-Amalias-Ston-Patera-Tis, 1836–1853*, vol. 2, 571, 573.
34. Aion, 10 January 1850; 19 January 1850 [NB: The publication dates of the Greek press follow the Julian calendar]; Greek Parliament Records 1850 Vol, 7/19 January 1850, 56–68. See also Thouvenel to French Foreign Minister 18 January 1850 in Edouard Antoine Thouvenel, *La Grèce Du Roi Othon: Correspondance de m. Thouvenel Avec Sa Famille et Ses Amis* (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1890), 283.
35. In parliament Palmerston insisted that Britain did not formally cut off diplomatic channels with Greece. Palmerston House of Commons, 1 March 1850, *The Hansard* 109, 345.
36. 'Circular to British and Ionian citizens', Elpis, 10 January 1950; Aion 16 January 1850 [NB: The publication dates of the Greek press follow the Julian calendar]; See also Thouvenel to Foreign Minister, 28 January 1850, Thouvenel, *La Grèce Du Roi Othon*.
37. Bouse and Bouse (ed.), *Anekdotēs-Epistolēs-Tis-Vasilissas-Amalias-Ston-Patera-Tis, 1836–1853*, vol. 2, 577.
38. Parker to Earl Grey, 22 January 1850, FO32/187.
39. Parker to Wyse, 11 January 1850; Parker to Wyse (ca. 20 January 1850) FO286/123; Parker to Nicholas Vassittart, commander of HMS Frolic, c. 22 January, FO32/187.
40. H.G. Ward to Palmerston, 8 February 1850, FO32/187.
41. Parker "memo", 24 January 1850, FO32/187; Parker "memo" to F. Perhalm captain of "Odin", 26 January 1850; FO32/187; Parker to Earl Grey, 28 January 1850, 22 January, FO32/187; Parker "memo" to F. Perhalm captain of "Odin", 24 January 1850, FO32/187.
42. Slade to Parker, 24 January 1850; FO32/187.
43. Wilkinson to Palmerston, 2 April 1850; Wilkinson to Palmerston, 1 June 1850, FO32/186; Parker to Earl Grey, 8 February 1850, FO32/187; Thomas O. Knox to Parker, 2 February 1850, FO32/187; Parker note, 3 February 1850, FO32/187. By April things had quietened down. An officer of the British fleet observed that there were about 40 empty merchant vessels at Syra; one Greek ship which had taken flag after the embargo had been taken off and one that took the Russian flag had reversed. W. Palliser to Parker, 20 April 1850, FO32/188.
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45. *Minos*, 18 January 1850. This is cited in Aion 22 January 1850 [NB: The publication dates of the Greek press follow the Julian calendar].

46. Thouvenel to Foreign Minister, 28 January 1850, Thouvenel, ~~La Grèce Du Roi Othon~~, 294; ~~The Times~~, 'The State of Europe', 8 February 1850.
47. Greek Parliament, 7/19 January 1850, Greek Parliament Records 1850, Vol.1, 30.
48. Greek Senate, 7/19 January 1850, Greek Senate Records 1850, 15.
49. Greek Senate, 1/13 February 1850, Greek Senate Records 1850, 33.
50. Lina Louvi, ~~H-Evropi-ton Ellinon-Protoypō, Apeili, Prostatis~~ (Athens: Alexandria, 2020), 249; See also Athena, 4 March 1850.
- ~~[NB: The publication dates of the Greek press follow the Julian calendar].~~
51. Athena 4 March 1850.
- ~~[NB: The publication dates of the Greek press follow the Julian calendar].~~
52. Elpis, 13 January 1850. [NB: The publication dates of the Greek press follow the Julian calendar].
53. ~~Aion~~ 28 January 1850; Aion, 22 January 1850; Aion 25 January 1850 [NB: The publication dates of the Greek press follow the Julian calendar].
54. Thouvenel to Cuvillier Fleury, 28 February 1850, Thouvenel, ~~La Grèce Du Roi Othon~~, 329.
55. Thouvenel to Cuvillier Fleury, 28 January 1850, Thouvenel, ~~La Grèce Du Roi Othon~~, 299.
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57. Cited in Barbara Emerson, ~~The First Cold War: Anglo-Russian Relations in the 19th Century~~ (London: Hurst, 2024), 198; See also ~~Aion~~, 19 January 1850 [NB: The publication dates of the Greek press follow the Julian calendar].
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62. Emer de Vattel, ~~The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury~~, edited and with an Introduction by Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008). Book II, Chapters IX, Chapter VII, Chapter VIII. See Palmerston, House of Commons, 4 June 1850, Hansard 111, 718. See also Jenniffer Pitts, 'Intervention and sovereign equality: Legacies of Vattel', in Jennifer Welsh and Stefano Recchia (ed.), ~~Just and Unjust Military Intervention: European Thinkers from Vitoria to Mill~~ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 132–53.
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66. ~~Revue des Deux Mondes~~, 7/1 (July 1850), 178–92.
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69. George Finlay, 'Greece Again', 529.
70. Thouvenel to Prince de Broglie, 28 April 1850, ~~La Grèce Du Roi Othon~~, 361–63.
71. Wyse to Palmerston, 4 May 1850, FO32/181.
72. Wyse to Palmerston, 8 June 1850, FO32/182.
73. Wyse to Palmerston, 6 July 1850, FO32/182.
74. Greek Parliament Records 1850, Vol.2, 89.
75. Deliyannis to Wyse, 2/14 October 1850, FO32/184.
76. Wyse to Deliyannis, 16 October 1850, FO32/184.

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The author confirms that the data supporting the findings of this study are available within the article.