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ATTITUDES TO UNIONISATION
AND THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
SYSTEM IN A CLEARING BANK

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PH.D THESIS

THE CITY UNIVERSITY

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

The central focus of this thesis is an analysis of the results of an attitude survey conducted amongst a weighted quota random sample of 406 staff in the Domestic Banking Division of a 'Big Five' London Clearing Bank between September 1979 and April 1980. The survey examines the attitudes of staff in four main areas. Firstly, in finding out what factors in the workplace environment positively and negatively influence employees to join, and play an active or non-active part in, a Staff Association or a Union, and in one representative body rather than the other, and what leads employees to be averse to collective representation and thus not to join either body. Secondly, investigating the social backgrounds of the staff and the particular educational and personal influences brought to bear on them, leading them to membership or non-membership of a representative body. Thirdly, discovering how members or non-members feel these representative bodies, the individual Bank's internal industrial relations system, and the industrial relations system in the Clearing Banks generally, might be improved to make them more effective and successful for collective bargaining, and other forms of representation, both within the individual Bank and amongst the Banks generally. Acquiring 'grass roots' reaction to the Johnston Enquiry proposals was seen as an essential part of this process. Fourthly, looking at the positions, attitudes, and motivation of staff who become office representatives. These attitudes are placed in the context of an historical analysis of the development of the

industrial relations system in the London Clearing Banks, and within the context of the findings of other industrial relations research, particularly concerning the major divide in academic theory between the 'sociological', Blackburn et al, and the 'industrial relations', Bain et al, theorists. The survey's main theoretical findings support the latter theorists but also identify an important group who combine both characteristics equally.

CHAPTER 1

THE BASIS OF THE THESIS

1.1.0. The Theoretical Setting

1.1.1. The first two areas for the examination of staff attitudes were an investigation of the effect of factors in the workplace environment, and factors relating to the social backgrounds of staff, and the educational and personal influences on them, leading to membership or non-membership of a particular representative body, either the Union or Staff Association (see Chapter 2 for the historical analysis of this divided representation), and this area of investigation provided the most important theoretical focus of this thesis.

1.1.2. There exists a major divide in Industrial Relations theory between the 'sociological' school represented particularly by Blackburn (1) and others (see 4.4.1. onwards), and the 'industrial relations' school represented particularly by Bain, Coates and Ellis (2) and others (see 4.4.1. onwards). The 'sociological' school contends that the reasons for employees joining or not joining representative bodies are due mainly to social factors external to the actual workplace, particularly social class, location, background, and upbringing. The 'industrial relations' school, on the other hand, contends that such influences are minimal, compared to the importance of the internal factors influencing membership or non-membership, specific to the individual's workplace, working conditions, and systems of work.

1.1.3. As the originator of the debate, Blackburn's, fieldwork had been carried out in a major Clearing Bank in the 1960s, although in a different Bank and with a much more limited sample (see 4.3.2.) than this survey's, it seemed appropriate for this study to also be carried out in a major Clearing Bank, following an arousal of interest in the London Clearing Banks' industrial relations system, whilst completing a taught Master's degree at The City University Business School in 1978. The main theoretical aim of the thesis was to see which of the 'sociological' and 'industrial relations' theories appeared to be more probably correct, particularly in the Clearing Bank context but also, possibly, more generally, in the wider context of white-collar industrial relations.

There are flaws in the methodological bases of both theoretical schools as will be shown in the first chapter, but they do illustrate the two main research processes used in white-collar industrial relations research. That of the sociologists which tends to be inductive in that a theory is developed and then may or may not be tested by collecting appropriate data; and that of the industrial relations researchers which is largely deductive, carrying out a piece of research based, naturally, on hypotheses, but drawing their conclusions and theory from the research data actually obtained and changing their hypotheses if necessary. The approach of this thesis follows in the latter mould, deducing conclusions and theory from the actual data obtained from a representative weighted quota random sample in a major London Clearing Bank.

1.1.4. As well as this main theoretical focus the thesis also has a practical focus to provide up-to-date information regarding 'grass roots' feelings on the complex industrial relations system existing in the London Clearing Banks which existed in 1978 and still exists in 1981, which had led to the commissioning of Dr. Tom Johnston, then Head of the Scottish Manpower Services Commission and now Vice-Chancellor of Heriot-Watt University, to study their industrial relations structures in the summer of 1978. As he had decided against sampling individual bank employees' opinions, it seemed a valuable academic exercise to acquire 'grass roots' reactions to his main findings.

1.1.5. The fourth, and minor, focus of the study, was to acquire office representatives' views on their roles and functions, as a means of adding to the slender literature on this topic, as one was bound, in the course of conducting the questionnaire survey, to meet such representatives.

1.1.6. The hypotheses and outline of the questionnaire designed to test them, which follow, were devised during the first three months of the study and were based on the Blackburn, and Bain, Coates and Ellis, studies, mentioned above, and the first Johnston Enquiry report.⁽³⁾

1.2.0. The Hypotheses of the Study

1.2.1. Question 1: (a) Male, (b) female

Hypothesis

Female staff are less likely to be members of either body, BIFU/SA. If they are members of either, more likely to be BIFU than SA, as likely to go the whole way if decide to join a body at all and join the most 'unionate' body.

Female staff less likely to be in career with strong possibility of upward movement and thus less desire to join more 'respectable' management-approved SA. Male staff may belong to either - dependent on other variables as should be strong possibility of upward movement if competent, talented, individuals and stay with bank.

1.2.2. Question 2: Would you be kind enough to tell me to which of the following age groups you belong?

(a) 16-25 years, (b) 26-35 years, (c) 36 and over.

Question 3: How long have you been with the bank?

(a) Under 2 years, (b) 2-5 years, (c) 6-10 years, (d) over 10 years.

Hypotheses

Young females least likely group to be members of either body due to job being temporary stepping stone for income until marriage. Young males' attitudes will depend on background, career prospects, attitude to present job.

25-35 male age group probably most likely to be in one body or other as prospects in the bank will be established,

they will have been able to see operation of the 2 bodies and compare them, and they will be least tainted by pre-1968 anti-NUBE feelings in most banks. Attitudes of over 35s may well be influenced by historical positions of BIFU and SA. The longer period in the Bank may have exposed them to an issue or advantage that makes joining one of the bodies more attractive than non-membership.

1.2.3. Question 4: What type of job do you do in the branch?

Hypotheses

The lower the position in the bank the likelier will be membership of BIFU or SA, the higher the position the less likely membership will be due to feelings of individualism being successful. Professional, management trainees who see ladder to top likely either to be non-members or members of SA. The location of individuals is likely to influence attitudes due not only to the general feelings in a particular branch or department, but also to the ingrained attitudes of geographical area - staff in North West are more likely to be members of BIFU than staff in the South East, as working class culture is stronger there.

1.2.4.Question 5: How long have you been in this job?

Hypothesis

There may be a pattern between a certain period of employment in a particular job or grade in the Bank and the decision being made to join BIFU or SA.

Staff who have been in a particular job or grade for a long period of time might be more likely to be members of either representative body than those who have not.

1.2.5.Question 6: Had you been employed elsewhere before joining the Bank and were you a member of a union/ staff association there?

Hypothesis

Attitudes to representation generally may have been influenced either favourably or unfavourably in another work situation and these may prejudice rational choice between BIFU and SA.

1.2.6.Question 7: Are you a member of BIFU/SA and if so, how soon did you join after joining the Bank?

Hypothesis

Most staff are likely to join a representative body within the first two years of service if they are ever going to join, as if a representative body does not make contact or an impression in this period, it is unlikely to do so in the future.

1.2.7. Question 8: What were the reasons for your becoming a member?

Question 9: What do you think you gain by being a member of this body rather than the other?

Hypotheses

BIFU should attract more committed, radical unionists, probably with strong working-class backgrounds, or those disillusioned and frustrated with careers, organisational attitudes in the Bank, wanting a strong, powerful representative body. The Staff Association should attract the more conservative staff, those who are in good positions or see themselves as attaining these positions, and those who see the TUC affiliation of BIFU as a political alignment with the Labour Party and a class alignment unsuited to bank employees, and the use of strike action as unethical and somehow 'wrong' for them. Of course, the reasons for joining either may be far less rational/irrational and far more pragmatic.

'Real' issues for membership, substantive ones such as threats to job security from mechanisation, threats to an acceptable life style, such as Saturday opening, or a threat to material well-being from inflation to personal lifestyles, which leads to support for a wage claim, may lead to membership; or situational, social pressures such as pressures from the other members of staff in a Branch, or the automatic signing of a form for membership soon after joining, may lead to membership of BIFU or SA. Fringe benefits, such as cheap insurance, discount cards, may be the main inspiration to membership of either body. Staff may belong to both, one body for ideological reasons, the other for its purely material fringe benefits.

1.2.8. Question 10: If you were a member of BIFU/SA but have now left, why did you leave?

Hypotheses

The reasons for leaving may lie in those for joining if, for instance, an individual only joined because of personal pressure on him, say, from a superior, that this is what he should do, and he/she came to see no benefits in actually belonging. A member may feel that he/she did not receive the support that should have been forthcoming on a particular personal problem or that the union/Staff Association's performance and actions regarding a 'collective' issue have not been forceful enough. On the other hand, the issue may have been simply a monetary one that fees were increased beyond a level that the member felt worthwhile - presumably some criticism of the services provided would exist if this was the case. Alternatively, some, particularly Appointed and Managerial staff may have reached a certain hierarchical level in the bank, and think membership no longer appropriate, or that Staff Association membership is more appropriate or more acceptable to their employers than membership of BIFU. Movement from the Staff Association to BIFU amongst such staff is unlikely.

1.2.9.Question 11: Did you join the rival organisation and what were the reasons for doing so or not doing so?

Hypotheses

There may be a specific objection to the other organisation's operations, or there may be a 'football team' analogy, as suggested by Blackburn, that if you have been a member of one organisation you are unlikely to join its nearest rival. Presumably a Liverpool supporter would not change to supporting Everton if he became disillusioned with Liverpool but he might start supporting a non-rival team such as Southport! Similarly, a disillusioned BIFU member would probably not join the Staff Association, as his values would not be represented by that organisation, but he might be happy to join another union, say ASTMS or APEX, although doing so would be of little value from the collective bargaining standpoint as neither of these bodies is recognised for bargaining purposes in any of the three banks where BIFU and the Staff Association have sole negotiating rights.

1.2.10.Question 12: If you have never joined a representative body, what are the reasons for this?

Hypotheses

There may be ideological reasons or other reasons outlined in questions 1-6, or the reason may simply be apathy and the feeling that it makes no difference if one is a member or not as one still gets the same benefits as members from the collective bargaining process.

1.2.11. Question 13: Are you satisfied with the way in which the BIFU/SA is organised and if not, what improvements do you feel could be made in the organisation or services provided? (a) Yes, (b) No, (c) Undecided.

Hypotheses

People may feel that the representative system is inadequate due to no branch office representatives, or that the leadership is not accountable enough to members and does not adequately reflect their views. On the other hand, they may be quite happy.

1.2.12. Question 14: Do you take an active role in the BIFU/SA and attend branch meetings and if you do, or do not, what are the reasons for this? (a) Yes, (b) No.

Hypotheses

Staff may be critical of the organisation's actions but may not attempt to influence it by going to meetings. This may be due to apathy, or to the fact that the meetings are not arranged with enough care or foresight for people to be able to get to them easily. Male staff may be more likely to attend meetings than female staff due to less family ties, greater interest in active involvement.

1.2.13. Question 15: Did your parents influence your views on trade unions in any way, favourably or unfavourably, and what did they do for a living?

Hypothesis

Parental pressure/class background may or may not influence membership of either of the representative bodies, or non-membership of either.

1.2.14. Question 16: Did anyone else close to you a friend, relation or teacher, say, influence your attitudes to trade unions when you were young and could you tell me what type of school you went to? Please state qualifications.

Hypotheses

The attitudes of relations, friends, and teachers, may have influenced those of children towards union or staff association membership, or non-membership of either, as may education. Those with lower educational attainments are likely to be more influenced by such external individuals. The influence of such attitudes may survive or may be tempered and totally changed by an employee's actual work experience.

1.2.15. Question 17: On balance, therefore, would you say that your reasons for membership/non-membership were due mainly to influences affecting your outlook before you joined the bank, or to factors specifically affecting you in the bank, or to a combination of both?

(a) External influences, (b) Internal influences, (c) Combination.

Hypotheses

This will test the major divide in academic industrial relations theory between the 'sociological' and 'industrial relations' schools; staff may be influenced into membership of a representative body, or non-membership, by 'internal' industrial relations factors, particular to the Bank or the individual representative bodies, or 'external' sociological factors, such as parents, or the media, or they may be influenced by a combination of both.

1.2.16. Question 18: Do you favour national negotiating on any issues between your representative body and all the Clearing Banks, or do you feel that all negotiating should be internal? Please give reasons.

(a) National (b) Internal

Hypotheses

BIFU members should favour negotiations being mainly at a national level in line with union policy, and SA members should prefer solely internal negotiations.

Discrepancies in attitudes will be interesting, and may show poor communications, such as a BIFU member favouring internal negotiations, or an SA member national negotiations, or they may illustrate that staff join either body for what they consider to be more valuable, important reasons.

1.2.17. Question 19: Do you think that the present arrangements for presenting staff views and claims to the Bank are satisfactory? If not, in what ways might they be improved?

Hypotheses

Staff may be happy or unhappy with various aspects of the industrial relations system and they may be either employer-oriented problems or representative body-oriented problems.

1.2.18. Question 20: Are you aware of the 1978 Johnston Enquiry findings?

Hypothesis

A majority indicating knowledge of the Enquiry findings will indicate good communication by both the representative bodies and the employing organisation; a minority indicating such knowledge will indicate poor communication by these groups.

1.2.190 Question 21: Either way, would you agree with his

proposals that:

(i) There would be a new single staff representative body to negotiate on the previously nationally negotiated arbitral matters, with a Bank section of this body to negotiate on domestic issues internally? Please give reasons.

(ii) That the proposed third tier body, to which this single representative body, and BIFU's membership outside the Clearing Banks, should affiliate, should be affiliated to the TUC? Please give reasons.

(iii) That there should be no 'closed shop', compulsory membership, of this new body, but that the Bank should encourage membership? Please give reasons.

Hypotheses

This will provide a test of the match of the Johnston Report - which was based on consultation with the leaders of the representative bodies, and top managers - with 'grass roots' opinion. BIFU members should favour one united representative body, affiliation to the TUC, and the 'closed shop', more than Staff Association members.

For Office Representatives

1.2.20. Question 22: Why did you become a representative?

Hypotheses

Interesting to see if to help fellow-employees, or to create an alternative means of career progress in union/SA due to his/her bank career being blocked, or as a stepping-stone to bank career promotion.

1.2.21. Question 23: How much time do you spend on representative matters per week on average?

Hypotheses

The role may be too time-consuming and complex for a part-time representative to carry out adequately without affecting his full-time job role, and thus his career prospects, and the individual branch team's effectiveness. Alternatively, it may not take much time, either because there are few complaints, or the representative organises his time well, or he may skimp on representative matters, which presumably should correlate with felt dissatisfaction of members with the services provided by the representative.

1.2.22. Question 24: What are the main functions of the representative's role?

Hypotheses

The opinions may or may not fit in with the ideas of the union/SA membership. This should test the degree of communication of the Union/SA organisations with the representatives, and of the representatives and Union/Staff Associations with the membership. It will also be interesting to see any different emphases placed on the role and any situational factors which may effect these.

1.2.23. Question 25: What are the satisfactions/frustrations of the role?

Hypotheses

May take up too much time to do an adequate job for members, or there may be a lack of power or defined role for representing the staff's interest from BIFU/SA/employer, or it may be fulfilling, satisfying role.

1.2.24. Question 26: Do you see yourself continuing in this role?

Hypotheses

May see career progression or means of improving matters if stays in role, or as an impediment too frustrating and annoying, so determined to give up.

1.3.0. The Methodology of the Study

1.3.1. The raw material for this thesis was acquired from the 406 interviews carried out amongst a sample of employees from a major London Clearing Bank, in its London, South-East, and North Regions, using the questionnaire outlined above. These three regions comprised half the number of regions, in the Bank, in England and Wales, the other three being the South-West, West Midlands and Wales. The London and South-East regions were chosen due to my location as a research student in London, but as it was thought likely that a sample drawn solely from those regions would not be representative of the Bank's representative body membership, as a whole, the survey also encompassed the North region as being likely to be a more 'unionate' area. These ideas proved correct as is shown in Chapter 3 and appendices 1-4.

1.3.2. In deciding on a sample size, restrictions were placed on the size and type of research that it would be possible to carry out by various factors, but efforts were made to overcome these restrictions and thus achieve as representative a sample as possible. The main restricting factor was that, as a single individual carrying out the research, there were obvious limitations on the number of people who could be interviewed in the time available, and on the amount of money available for travel and accommodation with which to conduct the research.

Having consulted with various members of the Personnel Research Unit at the City University Business School, opinion generally regarded about 450 people as the maximum number that it would be feasible to interview personally, and carry out an analysis of the data for, in the time available. It was felt that personal interviewing would be better than relying on a postal questionnaire, particularly with the sensitive type of questions on attitudes to unions and social background that would be asked, which might well lead to a very low response rate from a postal questionnaire. Thus it was decided to take a sample of approximately 450.

- 1.3.3. It was not possible to take a random 450 sample from all Domestic Branch Banking employees in the London, South-East and North regions as, understandably, the Bank would have found this extremely difficult to organise, and it was felt that if one or two individuals were chosen in a branch then suspicion and difficulties might be caused, as they would wonder why they had been chosen, and other members of the branch staff would wonder why they had not been chosen. Thus the Bank suggested that all the staff in selected branches should be interviewed, from the Manager to the messenger, in order that all members of the branch would see that they were all being involved in the research, and that no-one was receiving treatment different from anyone else.

It was hoped that by carrying out the research in these three regions a representative sample of Domestic Banking employees would be acquired, both by grade, and representative body distribution, which is what was achieved, as described in Chapter 3.

- 1.3.4. The procedure adopted for carrying out the sample was to look at the number of branches in each size category in the three regions (i.e. the number of people working in each branch subdivided into groups of five - 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, etc.) The Bank provided coded printouts of the branches in each of these three regions divided into areas and size of branches, an example of which is illustrated below.

ANALYSIS OF BRANCH STAFF NUMBERS

30.6.79
Ref. RMA

Region Code: D Area Code: 1

TRANCHES OF STAFF NUMBERS	NUMBER OF BRANCHES
Less than 6	-
6-10	1
11-15	14
16-20	6
21-25	3
26-30	3
31-35	1
36-40	1
41-45	3
46-50	1
51-55	1
56-60	-
61-65	1
66-70	1
71-75	-
76-80	-
81-85	-
86-90	-
91-95	-
96-100	-
Greater than 100	-
Area Sub Total	36
Region Total	-

Using these the number of people employed in each of these categories was calculated by multiplying the number of branches by the median number of people in each category (i.e. 6-10 people, median number of people employed = $8 \times$ total number of branches, say, 95 = 760 people). The number of people in each category was then calculated and divided by 3 which defined the first group, up to a third of the total population figure, as representative of small branches, and that corresponded with branches employing 20 or fewer people. The second group thus cumulated up to two-thirds of the total figure, which was taken as representing medium size branches, which corresponded to those employing between 21 and 40 people. The third group, representing large size branches, therefore employed more than 40 people. The sample was therefore divided, in each of the three regions, into these three groupings. It was also decided to aim for a balanced split between the three size groupings and thus to get approximately 150 people in each of the small, medium and large groupings of branches, across the regions, as well as approximately 150 people selected from each region.

1.3.5. In the small-sized groupings, the total number of branches in the less than 6 and up to 20 employees range was split into thirds, and the branch equating to each third of the total branches was selected. For example, in the South-East where there were 45 branches, the fifteenth, thirtieth and forty-fifth branches in the coded listings given to me by the Bank were therefore chosen. Each regional selection gave one 11-15 branch and two 16-20 branches, thus giving median totals of 49 in each of the Regions and a maximum of 55 in each, and an overall median of 147 and a maximum of 165 as the total number of interviewees from branches employing under 20 staff.

1.3.6. In the medium-sized grouping the total number of branches in the 21-40 range was split into quarters, and the branches equating to the first two quarters were chosen in each Region, as the majority of branches were contained there. For example, in the London area where there were 216 branches, the 54th and the 108th branches were thus chosen. Each regional selection gave one 21-25 and one 26-30 branch in each Region, thus giving medians of 51 in each of the Regions and a maximum of 55 in both, and an overall median of 153 and an overall maximum of 165 potential interviewees.

- 1.3.7. In the large size grouping the median branch was taken from the total number of branches with over 40 staff, which resulted in two branches in the 46-50 size range being chosen, in the South-East and the North Regions, and one branch in the 51-55 size range being chosen, in the London Region. Thus the overall median potential number of interviewees for this group of three branches was 149 and the overall maximum 155.
- 1.3.8. Compared to the overall median figure of 449, the actual total number of staff in the branches selected turned out to be 435, of whom 29 did not wish to be interviewed. Thus, a manageable, randomly selected, sample, was achieved for the purposes of this attitude survey.
- 1.3.9. The sampling procedure therefore resulted in 18 branches being randomly chosen, 6 in each region, and the Bank's Personnel Division was then asked to identify the chosen branches which were described, for example, as Region A, Area Code 8, Tranche 21-25, Branch No.2. Once the identity and location of the branch was traced from the computer listings, the Bank contacted the Local Manager to make sure he was happy for his staff to be involved in the survey. Once this agreement was achieved, a timetable for the visits was forwarded to the Personnel Division and this was also agreed with the individual

branches. Once compiled, the agreed timetable was strictly adhered to and on arrival at the branches contact would normally be made with the sub-manager who proved a key figure in the interviewing process since he would work out a rota to release individual employees, and sometimes persuade them to take part, in order to fit into the branch's work patterns. All the interviews were conducted in the Branch's interview room, or the staff room when the interview room was being used for Branch business. All the questionnaires were conducted by myself with the answers being manually recorded on an individual questionnaire form as illustrated in the following pages.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. (a) Male
(b) Female
2. Would you be kind enough to tell me to which of the following age groups you belong?

(a) 16-25 years
(b) 26-35 years
(c) 36 and over.
3. How long have you been with the Bank?

(a) Under 2 years
(b) 2-5 years
(c) 6-10 years
(d) over 10 years
4. What type of job do you do in the branch?

(a) Unappointed
(b) Appointed
(c) Managerial
5. How long have you been in this job?

(a) Under 2 years
(b) 2-5 years
(c) 6-10 years
(d) Over 10 years
6. Had you been employed elsewhere before joining the Bank and were you a member of a union/staff association there?

7. Are you a member of BIFU/SA and if so, how soon did you join after joining the Bank?

OrganisationLength of time before joining BIFU/SA

- (a) BIFU
- (b) SA
- (c) Unattached

8. What were the reasons for your becoming a member?

9. What do you think you gain by being a member of this body rather than the other?

10. If you were a member of BIFU/SA but have now left, why did you leave?

11. Did you join the rival organisation and what were the reasons for doing or not doing so?

12. If you have never joined a representative body, what are the reasons for this?

13. Are you satisfied with the way in which the BIFU/SA is organised and if not, what improvements do you feel could be made in the organisation or services provided?

- (a) Yes
- (b) No
- (c) Undecided

14. Do you take an active role in the BIFU/SA and attend branch meetings and if you do, or do not, what are the reasons for this?

- (a) Yes
- (b) No

15. Did your parents influence your views on trade unions in any way, favourably or unfavourably, and what did they do for a living?

16. Did anyone else close to you - a friend, relation or teacher, say, influence your attitudes to trade unions when you were young and could you tell me what type of school you went to? Please state qualifications.

17. On balance, therefore, would you say that your reasons for membership/non-membership were due mainly to influences affecting your outlook before you joined the bank, or to factors specifically affecting you in the bank, or to a combination of both?

- (a) External influences
(b) Internal influences
(c) Combination

18. Do you favour national negotiating on any issues between your representative body and all the Clearing Banks, or do you feel that all negotiating should be internal? Please give reasons.

- (a) National
(b) Internal

19. Do you think that the present arrangements for presenting staff views and claims to the Bank are satisfactory? If not, in what ways might they be improved?

20. Are you aware of the 1978 Johnston Enquiry findings?

- (a) Yes
- (b) No

21. Either way, would you agree with his proposals that:

- (i) There would be a new single staff representative body to negotiate on the previously nationally negotiated arbitral matters, with a Bank section of this body to negotiate on domestic issues internally? Please give reasons.

- (ii) That the proposed third tier body, to which this single representative body, and BIFU's membership outside the Clearing Banks, should affiliate, should be affiliated to the TUC? Please give reasons.

- (iii) That there should be no 'closed shop', compulsory membership, of this new body, but that the Bank should encourage membership? Please give reasons.

For Office Representatives only

22. Why did you become a representative?

23. How much time do you spend on representative matters per week on average?

24. What are the main functions of the representative's role?

25. What are the satisfactions/frustrations of the role?

26. Do you see yourself continuing in this role?

1.3.11. The raw analysis of the questionnaires was carried out after the final interviews had been conducted in April 1980. The analysis was done manually and without the use of a computer for two main reasons. The first was that the questionnaire contained a number of open questions, and it was not felt desirable to pre-code these possible replies as such a procedure could easily have led to important reasons, or subtle attitude differences, being missed. By conducting a manual analysis, an accurate analysis of different reasons has been achieved and any future replication of this work in another bank could now, with confidence, use a questionnaire pre-coded into the responses acquired in this survey. The second reason for not using a computer was the fact that the University's system was undergoing change at the particular time it would have been required and the problems for actual users of the system held a certain notoriety. It thus seemed preferable to keep control of the analysis of the information, which in the long run probably proved quicker, and probably provided a closer understanding of the information gathered, for the writer.

1.3.12. Before analysing the results of the survey (Chapter 3) it is important to place the study in its historical context, which is done in the following chapter.

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CHAPTER 2

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM IN THE LONDON CLEARING BANKS

2.1.0. Introduction

2.1.1. The London Clearing Banks, which are probably better known to the general public as the 'High Street' Banks, due to the proliferation of their rival branches throughout the towns and cities of England and Wales, consist of Barclays, Lloyds, Midland, National Westminster and Williams & Glyn's. These five Banks have evolved out of various mergers and amalgamations of Clearing Banks over time, and the twentieth century has seen these five emerge from the ten main clearers that existed at the beginning of the century. Lloyds and Midland have maintained their independence, in this period, but Barclays took over Martins Bank in 1968, the National Provincial, Westminster and District Banks formed the National Westminster in 1970, and Williams Deacon's, Glyn Mills and the National Banks formed Williams & Glyn's in 1970.

2.1.2. The term 'Clearing' Banks is given to these organisations because they operate the cheque system for customers and have a clearing house where they exchange cheques between themselves. In addition, these Banks offer the public a wide range of banking services, current and deposit accounts, current accounts being those on which cheques can be drawn and on which no interest is paid, whereas deposit accounts do acquire interest payments; overdraft and loan facilities; foreign exchange facilities; the provision of financial advice and investment management services, as well as acting as executors and trustees.

2.1.3. This chapter of the thesis is aimed at examining the gradual emergence and development of staff and employer representative bodies, and the establishment between them of negotiating procedures on remuneration and terms and conditions of employment, which have developed in the London Clearing Banks in this century. An important division has emerged, for the purposes of negotiation, between Clerical and Managerial Staffs and Non-clerical Technical and Services Staff, the latter being mainly messengers and maintenance men, during this period, and terms and conditions of employment for these two staff categories are now generally negotiated separately.

2.1.4. The development of the industrial relations system in the London Clearing Banks has mainly taken place in the past sixty years, and began after the First World War, with the formation in 1918 of the Bank Officers Guild. The formation of this body acted as a catalyst to the formation of rival internal Staff Associations and it is the rivalry and interaction of these employees' representative bodies, as well as the roles of the employers, in the development and establishment of a formal collective bargaining system, which will initially be examined in this thesis. The establishment of national joint negotiating procedures in 1968 between the National Union of Bank Employees, the Staff Associations, and the employers, will then be examined, and the consequent formation of internal negotiating machinery within the separate banks on issues outside

national determination. It will then be necessary to conclude by examining recent developments in the Banks' industrial relations system, particularly NUBE's withdrawal from most of these established negotiating procedures from March 18th 1978, and the consequent establishment in April 1978 of an Enquiry by Dr. Johnston, Chairman of the Scottish Manpower Services Commission, into 'the whole question of staff representation and negotiating procedures in the major London Clearing Banks', with a discussion of his various reports and recommendations between 1978 and 1980, and subsequent developments.

2.2.1.0. Employees, Employers and their Organisations 1902-1968

2.2.1.1. The National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE)

2.2.1.2. The National Union of Bank Employees was created in 1946, when the Bank Officers' Guild, founded in February 1918, and the Scottish Bankers' Association, founded in 1919, amalgamated. The amalgamation occurred because the SBA had found itself in a very weak negotiating and recruiting position in Scotland, after being excluded from the national negotiations, established in 1946, between the Scottish banks and the Central Council of Scottish Bank Staff Associations. This thesis is not concerned with the operations of the Scottish banks but the origins and development of the Bank Officers' Guild, as a representative body for Clearing Bank staff, in England and Wales, provides the thesis' initial focal point.

2.2.1.3. The movement for employee organisation in the London Clearing Banks had its origins in the early part of this century, when the Banking system, as we know it today, began to emerge, with various amalgamations between the innumerable small banks which had been located all over the country, and trade unionism amongst clerical workers also becoming established due partly to this process of amalgamation and rationalisation, which led to a loss of job status and satisfaction(2.2.1.5). The first known attempt to form a Union in banking was made in 1902 by a certain Henry Warren who, under the

sarcastic title, 'The Kindness of the Directors', wrote a stinging attack on the way banks treated their staff, and advised the bank clerks to combine into a Union, as this held the only hope of standing up to the employers. The reaction of his employers, the Midland, in dismissing him, reflects the general attitude of the bank employers to 'Union' employee organisations, which was to last for many years.

2.2.1.4. In 1914, another attempt to organise met with rather more success, when a number of bank clerks, proceeding with great caution, established the National Association of Bank Clerks. Meetings and membership were generally kept secret and the organisation took the precaution, due to the employers' known hostility, of appointing a secretary, Stokes, who was not a bank employee. It looked, at first, as if this new Union might flourish, but with the outbreak of the 1914-18 war, interest waned, and the organisation fizzled out.

2.2.1.5. During the war the bank amalgamations continued and by 1918 the 'Big Five' of Barclays, Midland, Lloyds, Westminster, and National Provincial, which were to continue as the largest banks until the late 1960s, had emerged. For the clerk, the old personal relationship with his employer was unmistakably gone. He was now an employee in an increasingly centralised bureaucracy, and he was conscious of a loss of status. In a publication 'Down the years with NUBE' (1) published by them in 1953, it is stated, "From the staff

point of view, banking was rapidly becoming less professional and more commercial. The Banker's Clerk (an employee of the private bank of earlier times) had already become a bank clerk, and now he began to feel he was merely a clerk in a bank." The amalgamations had also led to some downgrading of work and a decline in salaries. This process of the effect of monopoly capitalism on skilled labour and job satisfaction mirrors well the thesis propounded by Harry Braverman in his book, "Labor and Monopoly Capital".(2)

2.2.1.6. Although the occurrence of the war had killed off the NABC (2.2.1.4.) it also gave great impetus, as it did generally to the workers in Britain, to the movement for employee organisation. The fall in the bank clerks' economic standing, which had been continuing for several years, was greatly aggravated by the wartime inflation. By 1917 the cost of living was 85% above the 1914 level, and in the following year this increased to 120%, but no Bank was paying more than a 20% bonus on 1914 salaries, and not all were paying this. The war experience of many of the bank clerks, who returned to their jobs from the fighting, had also reduced their status consciousness; the idea that they were somehow superior to other clerical employees, and that trade unionism and collective organisation was thus undignified, and 'beneath them', had been considerably modified by their war experience

of fighting with, and relying on, comrades from a wide variety of social backgrounds and occupations. However, such status, élitest, attitudes, did remain, and are probably still current, in varying degrees, amongst a large number of bank employees who are members of the Staff Associations.

2.2.1.7. The impetus from the war led a group of men, most of whom had been founders of the NABC, to form a provisional committee, in December 1917, in Sheffield, to establish a new combination of bank clerks, which led to the formation of the Bank Officers' Guild in February 1918. By October, it had made such progress that it was decided to move the headquarters to London, and, in April 1919, it held its first national meeting, attended by delegates from its ten branches, at which the first General Secretary, J.R. Hannan, was appointed. In October 1919 the first Annual General Meeting was held, at which Non-Clerical staff were excluded from membership, for fear of lowering the status of the Guild, particularly in the eyes of the bank directors, so certain status considerations were still important to BOG members and, indeed, Non-clerical staff were not allowed into membership until 1941. In this division between Clerical and Non-clerical staff lay the roots of the separate negotiating machinery, at both national and domestic levels, which was introduced for these two categories of staff in the London Clearing Banks from 1968. By 1924-25 the BOG had over 25,000 members and the BOG/NUBE gradually

increased its membership in the London Clearing Banks, with various ups and downs which will be examined in looking at the Staff Associations' growth, and it had gained 64,000 of these members by 1981.

2.2.1.8. Throughout this period the BOG, and then NUBE, as it became in 1946, attempted to gain recognition from the Clearing Bank employers to negotiate terms and conditions of service for their membership, nationally. However, the initial reaction of the employers to the establishment of the BOG had been generally hostile. As the Midland chairman Sir Edward Holden is reputed to have said, "a serpent has raised its head in banking . . . I'll smash the BOG or die in the attempt", and the employers had reacted by actively supporting the establishment of internal Staff Associations. However, the degree of alacrity with which the banks embraced the idea of a Staff Association to represent its employees, as a "better devil" alternative to the BOG, varied, as will be seen (2.2.2.0) and the Midland Bank was probably initially, and indeed until 1968, the most hostile to the BOG. The degree of progress of the BOG/NUBE in gaining even internal employer recognition, let alone the national recognition which they obviously sought as a national intra-bank union, also varied between the banks. The Irish-based National Bank, which was eventually to become part of Williams & Glyn's, was the first of the eventual London Clearing Bank members to grant the BOG recognition, in 1932.

In January 1941 there was a significant breakthrough for the BOG when Barclays Bank recognised it, due to its substantial membership in the bank, and the dissatisfaction of Staff Association members with the Association's performance. In 1960 the Westminster granted limited representational rights to NUBE, and in 1961 the Lloyds Bank Chairman granted representational rights to the General Secretary direct to him. In 1964 William Deacon's granted the Union recognition. It was in the early 1960s that the eventually successful movement, by NUBE, to gain really effective representation and national collective bargaining rights, across the Clearing Banks, took off, and it is that process, which really led to NUBE becoming an effective part of an industrial relations 'system', which will now be examined.

2.2.1.9. There had been two main attempts by NUBE and the Staff Association to resolve their antagonistic, competitive, relationship, and to unite in a joint staff side, in negotiating machinery. In 1941, largely as a consequence of the Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order issued by the Government in 1940, which is an interesting example of the effect of third party intervention in an industrial relations system, tripartite discussions between the employers, Staff Associations and the BOG took place, but due to the BOG's fears of loss of autonomy in the proposed machinery, negotiations became deadlocked, and nothing further happened until 1952. Then, a joint Union/Staff

Association working party was briefly established to consider the Union's objections to the 1941 proposals, probably largely due to the employers' refusal to accept a petition organised by NUBE and signed by over 50,000 bank employees out of a potential 90,000, in favour of a national minimum salary scale, on the grounds that there was no competent national staff body. Support for this petition arose from the fact that after the war manual workers were gaining pay increases more successfully than bank staff and, indeed, most white-collar workers. This joint action was shortlived as the Union membership narrowly rejected collaboration with the Staff Associations. However, they had a change of heart in 1954, and the tripartite negotiations of 1941 were started again, under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour, but these discussions also broke down, largely due to objections from the Lloyds and National Provincial Staff Associations, as they felt national negotiations would diminish their internal negotiating power and status. Thus, relations between the rival staff representative bodies returned to their usual hostility until the early 1960s.

22.1.10. It was then that the strained relations between NUBE and the Staff Associations broke into the public arena, when, in March 1962, NUBE made a complaint to the Committee on Freedom of Association of the International Labour Organisation, that 'four named banks', District, Martins, the National Provincial, and Yorkshire, were preventing it 'from exercising its proper and normal

function as a trade union by supporting and using internal Staff Associations, in breach of the trade union clauses in the International Labour Organisation's Convention No.98' concerning the rights of employees to organise and bargain collectively. The Honourable Lord Cameron, a Scottish judge, was appointed Chairman of the ensuing Inquiry into this complaint, and reported (3) to the Minister of Labour, in August 1963, that 'the Union's specific complaint on ILO Convention No.98 was not proven', and he observed that 'it did not appear to me that any firm basis could be found for the suggestion that the Staff Associations were not independent, or that they were dominated by the employers'. The Inquiry further found that 'the real cause of the hostility admittedly shown by NUBE to the Staff Associations, is that their existence is an obstacle to the achievement of national and exclusive representation, by the Union, rather than dislike of them (as claimed) as being convenient puppets in the hand, and under the domination, of the employers'. But the evidence concerning the conduct of the Staff Associations indicated, in Lord Cameron's view, that despite the hostility and poor relations between the Union and the Staff Associations, both bodies could be regarded as capable of responsibly representing banking employees in their membership. In consequence, the 'Report of the Inquiry'(3) included a recommendation that industrial relations in banking could be improved by a renewal of the attempt to set up joint national negotiating machinery, on which both

the Union and the Staff Association would have representation, for negotiation 'on matters which can be regarded as of common concern to the employees of more than one bank, and the consideration of which justified a certain degree of concerted or common action.'

2.2.1.11. There is some debate about just how influential this recommendation was in stimulating the events that followed, Blackburn (4) feeling that it would be 'unduly naive to suppose' that the moves leading to the establishment of the joint national negotiating machinery in 1968, 'was simply a result of the Report', and feeling that the 'fundamental reasons for the move towards national machinery was the Staff Associations' actions in taking the banks to arbitration (1961-5) for salary awards', which Olive Robinson in an article in 1969 (5) saw as having been very effective. However, the Cameron Inquiry undoubtedly played an important part, and in July 1964 the Committee of London Clearing Bankers, representing the employers, invited the Central Council of Bank Staff Associations (CCBSA), and NUBE, to enter into discussions on the foundation of national negotiating machinery. Despite early reluctance on the part of the Staff Associations, a working party, comprising three representatives of the clearing banks, three from the staff associations, and three from NUBE, was set up in February 1965, to work out actual draft constitutions, which could form a basis for a system of national negotiations. After

14 sittings, draft constitutions were submitted, in March 1967, to the Clearing Banks, Union and Staff Associations, but in July these plans collapsed due to 'inadequate support' from the Staff Associations.

2.2.1.12. As a result of this situation NUBE decided to take industrial action, in November 1967, in the form of a 2-day withdrawal of labour by their members employed in Wales, and the same action was taken, in December, by members in Blackpool, Bolton, Doncaster and Nottingham, in defence of the proposed national machinery. The threat of further strikes in other areas, led the Minister of Labour to intervene in the dispute, and, at his instigation, the tripartite talks were re-opened. Arrangements for national machinery, broadly similar to those proposed by the 1965 working party, were subsequently adopted, by all the parties, in February 1968, except Midland Bank and its Staff Association which signed the Agreement later, in May. Alan McAnulty, who at that time was Chairman of the NUBE branch in the Westminster Bank in Bolton, and helped organise the strike there, says that NUBE were rather surprised at the capitulation of the Clearing Banks within two months of the second stage of action, but the intervention of the government minister undoubtedly speeded the process. The details of these national negotiating procedures will be examined in Section 3.

2.2.2.0. The Staff Associations

2.2.2.1. It is intended in examining the development of the internal staff representative organisations, in the London Clearing Banks, to look at them in groups, corresponding to the Bank into which they have, in certain cases, since 1968-70, become amalgamated. It seems necessary and logical to do this for the sake of clarity, and also for illumination, since such a process may help to throw light on why staff attitudes in a certain bank should now be constituted as they are, in relation to both the Staff Associations and NUBE, due to the historical development of attitudes since 1918. This process should also illustrate well, how the degree of antipathy towards, and support for the BOG/NUBE, has shaped the development of the internal Staff Associations in the industrial relations system, and this should serve to illustrate how the BOG/NUBE was the catalytic force in the development of the collective bargaining system which emerged in the London Clearing Banks.

2.2.3.0. Midland Bank Staff Association

2.2.3.1. The bank where a Staff Association was first constituted was the Midland, and this bank was probably the most hostile to the BOG, as was illustrated earlier (2.2.1.8) in the quotation from its Chairman, in 1918, Sir Edward Holden. It was largely on his initiative that the Staff Association was formed. Early in 1919, he summoned 30 Branch Managers to a meeting in London

to consider staff matters, where the decision was made to form a Staff Association, and this was formally embodied in a letter from these Managers to all Branch Managers on February 4th 1919, (6) 'we have further decided to take immediate steps to form an Internal Staff Association or Guild, as we do not consider it right that any persons other than our own officers should interfere in the affairs of this bank . . . and we hope that you, as a Manager, will do everything in your power to promote the formation of the Association'.

2.2.3.2. The Association, although the only recognised representative body for employees, had little effect on the bank's management's actions before the Second World War, which was well illustrated during the economic 'Depression' period of the early 1930s, when salary cuts were introduced without even the pretence of consultation. When F. Hyde, the Managing Director of Midland Bank, was asked in 1931 (7) if the Staff Association was consulted on the reduced salary scales he replied, "No; we told the Association what we were going to do". However, this lack of influence did not affect membership, which rose steadily, prior to 1940, from 55% of potential membership in 1920, to 65% in 1925, and it topped 70% in the early 1930s. This contrasts with the declining membership of the BOG, from an early peak of nearly 45%, to 25% in 1931, and a mere 16% at the outbreak of war, but this is possibly not surprising since it did not even have nominal recognition.

2.2.3.3. After the war, there was a general feeling of frustration and agitation, amongst bank clerks, over their lack of success in gaining pay increases comparable to those that manual workers were getting (2.2.1.9). This feeling of frustration seems to have brought home to the Midland Staff Association its real position of impotence in influencing matters inside the Bank, as its Grand Committee resigned in 1950, recommending dissolution of the Staff Association because it had no negotiating power. A vote was taken of the membership and, in spite of the hope expressed by the Bank's Chairman, that the Association would continue, it dissolved in 1951. NUBE did everything it could to capture the disillusioned membership, but with little success. At the end of 1952 a Managers' Association was launched, and shortly after this, in 1953, a circular from four members of staff, to which the Bank's Chairman, Lord Harlech, had endorsed his approval, invited the staff to vote for a new Staff Association, and 4,700 did so.

2.2.3.4. The new Association was launched towards the end of 1953, with a new procedural agreement, which eventually provided for independent arbitration, after NUBE had attacked the original idea of arbitration by three of the Bank's directors as a mockery of justice. This was a very important breakthrough, generally, for staff representation in the banks, as it began the establishment of the principle of arbitration as the ultimate

recourse for the settlement of disputes, which was to become established throughout the Clearing Banks, and was embodied in the 1968 and 1970 national negotiating procedures for Clerical and Non-Clerical Staffs and in the domestic agreement in 1970-1. The establishment of the principle of arbitration gave the Staff Associations a sanction to ensure that the Banks paid some heed to their claims, although they did not actually begin to invoke it until 1961, when both the Midland and Lloyds Staff Associations took their employers to arbitration to gain pay awards.

2.2.3.5. The new Staff Association flourished, with a maximum membership of 14,000 being achieved in the early 1960s. Various benefits were gained for the staff, particularly that of being the only bank with a salary scale for the whole staff, and this resulted in their gaining a pay increase in 1966, a year of pay policy, when the other Banks' staff received nothing, as they had no published salary scales (8). Probably as a result of these gains, the Midland Staff Association, along with the National Provincial, became one of the most strongly committed to internalism and opposed to national negotiating machinery, and as a result it did not join the 1965 Working Party (2.2.1.12), and it was the last of the Staff Associations to sign the Declaration setting up joint national negotiating machinery, three months after the others (2.2.1.12). This devotion to

internal negotiation foreshadowed the Staff Association's decision, in February 1974, to become a section of ASTMS, which also strongly dislikes national negotiations and favours company bargaining.

2.2.4.0. Lloyds Bank Staff Association

2.2.4.1. The moves towards internal staff representation

actually began slightly before those in Midland Bank, when a Staff Representation Committee was established in November 1918, by the Bank, but the Committee did not acquire a constitution until 1921, two years after the Midland Bank Staff Association. The constitution provided that membership was automatic for everyone on the payroll, without admission fee or subscription, which differed from the Midland, where, although no entrance fee was charged, an annual one shilling subscription was required of each member. The General Secretary of the Lloyds Association was appointed by the Bank, which alone had the power to remove him from office, although the Association members were allowed to elect the Central Committee, and the Bank asked Managers to give every assistance at elections. Many of the compulsory members showed little interest in the Association, and, during 1921, the BOC, which at the time was strong in Lloyds Bank, suggested a strategy of mutual self-help between the two organisations, and that a joint circular should be issued, in which Horley, of the Staff Association, would advise the staff to join the BOC, and Clegg, Honorary President of the

BOG, would advise his members to cooperate in the elections and workings of the Staff Association. However, this suggestion was turned down, the chance of united action was lost, and after that a relationship of hostility developed between the two organisations.

2.2.4.2. During the Depression years of the early 1930s, support for the Staff Association ran low, and in the 1933 elections there were no candidates in 7 of the 75 constituencies, and in 42 the candidates were all returned unopposed. Some time after this the Union suggested a ballot of the staff to see which body they wanted to represent them, as they had also done in 1930 and 1932, but, as before, the suggestion was turned down by both the Bank and the Staff Association. In response to this continuing pressure from the BOG, the Chief General Managers sent a letter in February 1935 (9) to all members of the Staff, attacking the BOG, whilst praising the Staff Association, and concluded by urging 'a loyal adherence to your own Staff Representative Committee and a steadfast refusal to recognise any claims or offers of representation by the Bank Officers' Guild'. Shortly afterwards, in May, the Bank's Chairman took up the same theme in a speech, with the Press present, so the staff were left in no doubt about what was expected of them, and about this time the Guild's membership in Lloyds began to fall faster than in the other Clearing Banks.

2.2.4.3. At the beginning of the War, the Association, with the support of the Bank, changed its constitution to become a 'new' voluntary body, charging subscriptions, rather than a compulsory, non-subscription paying, organisation, in order to be able to use the arbitration machinery established by the 1940 Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order. If it had not done this the BOG would have been placed in a powerful position for representation purposes, but the move was essentially strategic, to comply with the conditions of the Order, rather than a practical effort to 'take on' the management of the Bank. The members of the executive committee of the original Association founded the new body, with the help of the Management, and without reference to the members! This move away from cost-free representation to subscription-paying representation was an important development in the industrial relations system, which also occurred in the Barclays, Martins, and District Banks, since people have a natural meanness and apathy towards paying subscriptions, and thus a majority are always likely to favour a free organisation, and are likely to become more choosy and concerned about services provided, particularly when there is an alternative as there was with the BOG, when they have to pay for them. On the whole the BOG seems to have gained, initially, from these developments in these three Banks, the staff presumably feeling that the BOG's services were more worthwhile. However, in Lloyds Bank, the Management's opposition to the BOG seems to have played a more significant part in the

staff's thinking, with worries about membership possibly affecting their chances of promotion, and the BOG/NUBE's membership continued to decline steadily from 1942-54, although numbers have risen since then.

2.2.4.4. From the early moves to unite staff representation in Lloyds the divide between the two organisations had grown considerably by the mid-1950s. The Lloyds Staff Association had been given arbitration rights similar to those in the Midland, in the early 1950s, and it was largely instrumental, along with the National Provincial, in the breakdown of the attempt to establish national negotiating machinery in 1954 (2.2.1.9) as it felt that national machinery might 'prejudice or diminish' its 'status or function'. In 1961 the Staff Association decided to make use of the status conferred on it in the early 1950s, to actually take the bank to arbitration in support of a pay claim, and by the early 1960s its independent attitude towards the employers had developed to the extent that its attitude to national negotiations had totally changed, and it felt these to be 'essential, and cooperation with NUBE desirable', (4) - these national negotiations being established initially in 1968.

2.2.5.0. Barclays and Martins Bank Staff Associations

2.2.5.1. These two Staff Associations became amalgamated into Barclays Bank Staff Association when the merger of these two banks took place in 1968, (indeed Lloyds Staff Association might also have been joined with

them, had not the Monopolies Commission, at that time, refused to allow Lloyds to join the merger). The formation of the Staff Associations, in both banks, resulted from requests for recognition, to the employers, from the BOG. At the employers' instigation, a Staff Representation Committee was formed, in Martins, on June 22nd 1919, and Barclays, the last of the Clearing Banks to do so, established a Staff Association in 1921. In both organisations, there were no subscriptions, and all staff automatically became members, unless they sent in a written resignation. The BOG attempted initially to use the Barclays Staff Association to present Guild policy, but this proved impossible in the face of determined opposition from the Bank, and thus these early attempts at cooperation perished.

2.2.5.2. The opposition of the Clearing Bank employers, generally, to the BOG, and their support for the internal Associations, in the 1920s and 1930s, naturally led the BOG to be concerned about possible intimidation and victimisation of its members. One of the most serious cases of this arose in Martins Bank in 1931, where an employee and member of the BOG's executive, A.D. Thomas, had signed a letter from the Union to the Bank, requesting an opportunity to discuss proposed salary cuts, and to be generally recognised. The General Manager of the Bank reacted by giving Thomas a week to withdraw from the position taken up in the letter or to seek full-time employment

in the Guild. The BOG successfully fought this attempted victimisation, but it illustrates the antipathetic attitude of Martins Bank to non-Staff Association members in those years.

2.2.5.3. During the salary-cutting measures taken by the employers in the Depression years neither Barclays nor Martins Staff Association was effective in opposing the cuts, which had been Thomas' and the BOG's concern (2.2.5.2.). In a Circular to their membership, in June 1932, the Martins Staff Association admitted 'the Committee were notified that the Directors had decided on new scales'(10). Barclays Staff Association, when announcing cuts for 1934, sought to justify them, with a statement 'that the Board said the cuts were due solely to a decrease in the Bank's profits',(11) although these had actually increased by £30,000!

2.2.5.4. As mentioned earlier, (2.2.4.4.) the Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order, 1940, led to the establishment of 'new' voluntary associations, charging subscriptions, in both Martins and Barclays, but whereas this decision was not even referred to the members in Martins, it was in Barclays, and even though there was a vote against it, it was established! However, there was considerable opposition in the Bank to this move, and the BOG's substantial membership in Barclays had been strengthened at the beginning of 1940, when Barclays absorbed the Union Bank of Manchester. Thus, when the Bank's Chairman issued a circular making it clear that the Bank was willing to negotiate with

whatever body the staff wished to represent them, they opted for the BOC, with the result that Barclays became the first London Clearing Bank to recognise the BOC in January 1941.

2.2.5.5. The Union's membership at the time of recognition was a little over 6,000 and this rose rapidly to 9,672 by 1942, which probably represented over 50% completeness, and there seems no doubt that this growth in membership was a result of the Union's success in gaining recognition, which fits in with both Blackburn's (4) and Bain's (12) theories that the granting of recognition to a Union by an employer encourages Union membership. However, in spite of the Union's success, a substantial minority continued to prefer an internal association, and at the end of 1941 its membership was about 5,100, from which it increased very slowly in the 1940s and early 1950s, and then more rapidly up to the formation of national negotiating machinery in 1968. No arbitration agreement was reached with either of the staff bodies in Barclays, or the Staff Association in Martins, in the early 1950s, as was the case in the Midland, Lloyds, Westminster, National Provincial, District, and Glyn Mills Banks, which removed a potentially effective form of representation from these employee representative bodies in these two banks.

2.2.5.6. The employer-dominated position of the Martins Bank Staff Association, from NUBE's point of view, was, of course, instrumental in the bringing of NUBE's complaint to the International Labour Organisation (2.2.1.10) and Lord Cameron's subsequent Report, which was one of the main factors in the move towards the establishment of the national negotiating machinery in 1968. It must be clearly stated here, though, that Lord Cameron found no substance in NUBE's allegations, and was very scathing in his Report about their 'evidence'. (13)

2.2.6.0. The Westminster Bank Guild, the National Provincial Bank Staff Association, the National Provincial Bank Ladies Guild, and the District Bank Staff Association

2.2.6.1. All these Staff Associations merged to form the National Westminster Staff Association with the merger of the Westminster, National Provincial and District Banks, announced in 1968, which became operative from January 1st 1970.

2.2.6.2. There is some doubt as to whether the Westminster Bank Guild was founded on the Directors' initiative, Allen and Williams (14), or whether it 'owed its inception entirely and solely to the initiative of the staff itself' (15). However, what is not in doubt is that the Guild was founded in 1919, and that it originally proposed to affiliate to the BOG on a 'per capita' subscription basis. The Union, probably unwisely, rejected this proposal, since the Staff Association proved to be the most successful of all in recruiting

members. By 1923 it had 80% completeness which it virtually maintained up to 1968.

2.2.6.3. The origins of the National Provincial Staff Association were unusual in that it did not emanate from London, as with the other Staff Associations, but in the provinces. Following a meeting, at Bristol, in March 1919, rules were drafted, which were adopted by a meeting in Birmingham, in April. For a time, the Association drew most of its support from the provinces, as the London staff had decided against forming a purely internal Association and in favour of joining the BOG. At first, the Bank's hostility to staff representation made it no more willing to recognise an internal Staff Association than the BOG, and the Staff Association appealed to Guild members to join forces with them. They did, and, following a joint request for recognition, the Staff Association, alone, was recognised. However, the Bank did agree to postpone cuts in bonuses following pressure from the BOG in 1922; this success embarrassing the Staff Association, which had taken no action, and it was not until 1926 that the BOG reached the situation of 'persona non grata' in the National Provincial Bank, which it had achieved in the other Banks from the moment their Staff Associations were founded. It was then that the Bank introduced a reduced salary scale, which it had agreed with the Staff Association, which was opposed by the BOG. The Bank replied to the Guild's opposition efforts with a circular to

Managers (16), forbidding from their noticeboards all notices on pay and conditions of service which did not emanate from Head Office, or the Staff Association, and it proceeded to introduce new scales. Thus, the position was established, where the Bank supported the Staff Association, in direct opposition to the BOG, with the result that the Staff Association's completeness gradually grew in the Bank, reaching about 60% during the 1930s.

2.2.6.4. The National Provincial Bank Ladies Guild was formed in 1935, after a request from the Bank's female employees, to the Staff Association, that membership should be extended to include women, had been turned down. This separate representative body in the Bank continued in existence to become a signatory to the national negotiations established for Clerical and Managerial Staffs in 1968.

2.2.6.5. 1935 was also the year in which the District Bank became a Clearing Bank, following its amalgamation with the County Bank. A Staff Association had been founded in the Bank in 1927, with a compulsory membership, but it did not become really active until 1935, when, following the amalgamation, the District Bank embarked on the most persistent period of intimidation experienced by the BOG in any of the Clearing Banks. After the amalgamation, over half the Bank's staff were Union members, but, in the face of a determined campaign against the Union, there were many resignations, and the 1935 membership of 1,372 had fallen to 559 by

1938. It was generally believed that no Guild member would ever be promoted, and it was not until 1946 that NUBE's General Secretary was able to announce that intimidation had ceased, but the membership never recovered. In tandem with this intimidation, the Staff Association began holding elections for its Staff Committee in 1935, for the first time since its foundation eight years earlier. The Staff Association was established on a 'new' voluntary basis during the war following the government's 1940 Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order, without reference to the membership, in similar fashion to the process in Lloyds and Martins. The Staff Association in both the Westminster and National Provincial had charged subscriptions from the outset so they were immune from the Order.

2.2.6.6. The slow movement towards greater independence from the management of the Banks, referred to earlier in the Midland and Lloyds after the 1939-45 War, occurred in all three of these Staff Associations, but was particularly marked in the Westminster Bank Guild. The granting of institutional arbitration agreements in these Banks in the 1953-5 period, although not used, until 1964, by the Westminster Bank Guild, and 1965, by the National Provincial Staff Association, reflected the Associations' determination to more effectively represent their members. In tandem with this process, their opposition to NUBE probably increased, and it was the opposition of the National

Provincial Staff Association and the employers, together with the Lloyds Staff Association (2.2.1.9.), which led to the breakdown of the attempt to establish a national negotiating machinery in 1954-6. Both the National Provincial and the District Bank Staff Associations were cited, together with Martins, in NUBE's complaint to the ILO which led to the Cameron Inquiry Report, which gave impetus to the movement that led to the establishment of national negotiating machinery in 1968, together with the Staff Association's own successes, including those of the Westminster Bank Guild and the National Provincial Staff Association, in taking the Banks to arbitration to gain improved pay awards.

2.2.7.D. Glyn Mills Staff Association

2.2.7.1. Of the three Banks which joined to form Williams & Glyn's Bank in 1970, the only one that had a Staff Association was Glyn Mills & Co. The National Bank, with its Irish base, had recognised NUBE back in 1932, and Williams Deacon's had recognised them in 1964 'essentially in the light of certain comments in Lord Cameron's Report' (17). An attempt had been made to establish a Staff Association in Williams Deacon's after the 1940 National Arbitration Order, but it had come to nothing, whereas this Order did give a successful impetus to the foundation of the Staff Association in Glyn Mills Bank. As the Commission on Industrial Relations Report No.35 (18) said, 'it was set up as a result of management initiative and its original role was purely consultative'. In 1956

it gained an arbitration agreement and a Joint Consultation Committee was the main forum for negotiating discussions until the merger in 1970. The Staff Association became one of the members of the Banking Staff Council side, to the national negotiations, when these were established in 1968.

2.2.8.0. The Central Council/Confederation of Bank Staff Associations

2.2.8.1. The Central Council of Bank Staff Associations was formed as a central forum for the informal discussion and dissemination of views and ideas, amongst the Staff Associations, in 1923. It also acted as a central lobbying body to put forward a united viewpoint from the Associations on industrial relations matters in the Clearing Banks. For instance, it took a leading part in the organisation of the talks to establish national negotiating machinery, in 1941, and 1951. It continued in existence until it was reconstituted as the Confederation of Bank Staff Associations in 1968, to provide a formally constituted discussion and decision-making forum for its membership, in order for them to take a united approach on matters raised in the joint negotiating staff fora for Clerical and Managerial and Non-clerical staffs, established in 1968 and 1970, respectively.

2.2.9.0. The Non-Clerical Bank Staff Association

2.2.9.1. Separate Non-Clerical Staff Associations, for Technical and Services Staff, were founded in Lloyds Bank in 1942, and in the Midland and Glyn Mills Banks, and they held informal discussions on policy in a Central Council, but these had no real effect on the development of the industrial relations system in the Clearing Banks, prior to 1968, except in mirroring the different interests and concerns of this minority group of staff from the Clerical and Managerial Staff. They really only became a significant entity in the industrial relations system when they brought pressure to bear on the employers, to establish national negotiating machinery for them, to mirror that given to the Clerical and Managerial Staff in 1968. This was established with the setting up of the separate Joint Negotiating Council, for Non-clerical Banking Staff, (2.3.4.1.), in 1970, the signatories being Lloyds, Midland, and Glyn Mills Associations, together with representatives from the Council of Non-Clerical Bank Staff Associations and the Barclays Staff Association (Non-Clerical Committee), even though Technical and Services Staff employed by the Banks only amount to 5% of the total staff employed. Their role in the industrial relations system from that time is traced in Sections 3 and 4 of this chapter.

2.2.10.0. Employers and their organisations

2.2.10.1. The attitude of the employers in opposing Union

representation for their staffs and supporting the establishment and growth of internal Staff Associations, though giving them little real negotiating power, until the granting of arbitration rights in the majority of the Banks in the 1950s, has already been illustrated. During the 1918-68 period the Clearing Bank employers met informally, in such bodies as the Committee of London Clearing Bankers, and the British Bankers Association, where they would discuss their views and ideas on a variety of matters relating to the operations of these Banks, but they had no formal, central, collective bargaining negotiating body, to negotiate with their staffs, simply because no formal system of national negotiating procedures existed. However, although each Bank theoretically acted independently in negotiating with its staff there was bound to be informal discussion in the bodies referred to, and generally between the Banks, on salary levels and other terms and conditions of employment, since they all carried on very similar operations.

2.2.10.2. This process of consultation gave the employers a united front on issues of pay and conditions, in this period, whereas the staff representative bodies were divided, and even the CCBSA could only rarely induce united action, and their employers also joined together

in an informal 'gentlemen's agreement' to operate a system whereby staff employed by one bank could not, on leaving, be engaged by another. This informal agreement aimed at preventing the poaching of staff and lessening the need for competitive remuneration between the Clearing Banks. With the establishment of formal national negotiating machinery, on May 22nd 1968, these informal processes of joint negotiating strategy, by the employers, naturally had to be replaced by a formal joint negotiating organisation in which the Clearing Bank employers could decide on objectives, and so the Federation of London Clearing Bank Employers was established. However, the agreement on not employing staff that had been employed by another Clearing Bank, was to last until the early 1970s.

2.3.0. The National Negotiating Parties and Procedures

2.3.1.1. The Federation of London Clearing Bank Employers

2.3.1.2. The Federation was established on May 20th 1968, as the formal negotiating body for the employers' side in the Joint Negotiating Council for Banking, which was formally established two days later, as the negotiating forum for the employers and employees' representatives, for negotiating terms and conditions of employment of Clerical and Managerial Staffs. When the Non-clerical Banking Staff Council was established in 1970, to negotiate terms and conditions

of employment of Technical and Services Staff, the Federation also started to represent the employers side on this national negotiating body. At the time the Federation was established, all the ten Clearing Banks discussed in Section 2 were members of it. In the next two years these were halved in number due to the various amalgamations which occurred during this period. Between 1968 and 1972 various amendments were introduced to the Federation's rules, and for the sake of clarity, and so that the last formal constitution of that body will be considered in this thesis, the construction and operation of the Federation established in 1972, which officially continued until March 1978, will be examined (19). The Federation is currently only operating in respect of Non-clerical negotiations following NUBE's withdrawal from the national negotiations for Clerical and Managerial staff in 1978 (2.4.8.0. ff).

- 2.3.1.3. The Federation is open to any members of the Bankers Clearing House Ltd., and, since 1972, these have been Barclays, Lloyds, Midland, National Westminster, and Williams and Glyn's. These Banks fund the operations of the Federation on a proportional basis, and for an amount established at its 'first meeting in every calendar year', the proportion being based on the number of employees in a particular Bank, 'at the last preceeding 31st day of December included in the return made by it to the Department of Employment

in respect of the year ending on that date'. The Federation is run by a Council to which 'each of the banks shall be entitled to nominate one member'. These five members nominate a Chairman at the 'first meeting in every calendar year', and for a meeting to be able to transact business there must be a quorum of four members.

2.3.1.4. The objects of the Federation were couched in highly legalistic terminology and in summary are:

- (i) to nominate six representatives to serve as the employers' representatives on the Joint Negotiating Council for Banking, for Clerical and Managerial Staff, and the Joint Negotiating Council for Non-Clerical banking staff. The National Westminster Bank has never joined this latter body as the non-clerical staff there preferred to keep negotiations entirely internal;
- (ii) to give general guidance and instructions to these representatives on any matter raised or proposed to be raised in the Joint Councils;
- (iii) to 'facilitate the proceedings, or ensure the full and proper presentation of the employers' case', in any reference to arbitration from the Joint Councils due to inability to reach a negotiated agreement within the Councils.

2.3.1.5. 'Meetings of the Council shall be held as often as may be necessary for the prompt consideration of matters from time to time referred to the Council'. Voting on these matters can either be on a show of hands, or, if the Chairman or any member requests it,

on a secret 'poll' basis. As with the proportional amount of subscriptions to the operating costs of the Council, this is based on the numbers of employees in each bank on 'the last preceeding 31st day of December'.

2.3.2.0. The Banking Staff Council

2.3.2.1. This body, which represented Clerical and Managerial Staffs in national negotiations, until March 1978, was also established initially on May 20th 1968 (20). The three main objectives of the Council, in summary, were laid down as precisely the same, though obviously from the employees' viewpoint, as those of the Federation. They were:

- (i) to nominate six members to be representatives of the staff side in the Joint Negotiation Council, three being NUBE representatives and three being from the Confederation of Bank Staff Associations (CBSA);
- (ii) 'to give such mandate, instructions or guidance' to these representatives on any matter raised or proposed to be raised in the Joint Negotiating Council;
- (iii) 'to facilitate the proceedings, or ensure the full and proper presentation of the employees' case' in any reference to arbitration from the Joint Negotiating Council.

2.3.2.2. 'Any association, guild or other body . . . constituted primarily for the purpose of negotiating terms and conditions of employment on behalf of employees of any one or more of the Banks' was

eligible for membership. These were originally the nine Staff Associations and NUBE, but, after the amalgamations of 1968-70, these reduced to NUBE and the Barclays, Lloyds, Midland, National Westminster and Glyn Mills Staff Associations. These were further reduced during 1973 when the Glyn Mills Staff Association merged with NUBE and in 1974 the Midland Staff Association became part of ASTMS (2.4.1.2.) and withdrew from national negotiations. In 1968 the Banking Staff Council comprised 24 members, 12 from NUBE and 12 from the CBSA, but this number had reduced to 6 from each representative body, 12 in total, by 1978. Meetings were quorate as long as at least 3 members from each side were present 'when the meeting proceeds to business'.

- 2.3.2.3. The Council always operated on a 'poll' vote in the event of a show of hands not being acceptable to any member of the Council, mirroring the situation in the Federation; a situation which always irritated and annoyed NUBE since, because of their lower total membership in the Clearing Banks since 1968, they were always at a disadvantage in the face of concerted CBSA voting, and this was one of the main reasons for their giving six months notice of withdrawal from participation in this body in September 1977 (2.4.3.2). The poll vote was based on the membership figures which were returned by the Secretary of each staff

body, to the Staff Council, at the end of each year, and a mechanism was provided in the Constitution whereby, in every second year, an independent person or firm could be appointed to investigate and ensure the accuracy of these numbers.

2.3.2.4. An Annual meeting of the Council was held within ten weeks of the close of the Council's financial year to elect its honorary officers, a Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Treasurer; to consider the financial situation of the Council and to make sure its operations were adequately funded; and to fix the amount of annual contribution that was to be shared by the staff bodies. Other meetings of the Council were held 'as often as may be necessary' and 'in any case not less frequently than once in every six months'.

2.3.3.0. The Joint Negotiating Council for Banking (JNC)

2.3.3.1. This Council was established on May 22nd 1968 (21) but ceased to function in March 1978 due to NUBE's withdrawal. The constituent members of this body were the six representatives from the employers side, the Federation (2.3.1.4.), and the six representatives from the employees side, the Banking Staff Council (2.3.2.1.), who met in this Council to negotiate 'any proposals or questions . . . relating to rates of pay or conditions of employment of the Managerial and Clerical staffs of the Banks for the time being represented upon this Council'. By the mid-1970s over 165,000 staff were covered by this Council's

negotiations. The matters for negotiation in the JNC were referred to as 'arbitral matters' and were as follows:

- (i) Minimum national rates of pay in the basic clerical grades I-IV.
- (ii) Basic retiring salaries.
- (iii) Minimum salaries for Branch Managers on first appointment.
- (iv) Territorial allowances including London allowance.
- (v) Safety of employees.
- (vi) Working hours and overtime.
- (vii) Holidays of staff below management level.
- (viii) Any other matters affecting salaries or conditions which it was jointly agreed should be considered as an 'arbitral matter'.

2.3.3.2. The term 'arbitral Matters' was used because if any matter discussed or negotiated in the JNC could not be settled on the basis of one vote from each of the employers and staff sides, arbitration was provided for in the Council's Constitution. The procedure was:

- (i) if a failure to agree occurred on any arbitral matter before the JNC, the matter was referred to a further meeting which had to be held within 30 days of the failure to agree;
- (ii) if no agreement was reached at this second meeting either side could take the matter to arbitration, and the request for arbitration had to be made at that meeting, or within 21 days.

2.3.3.3. The arbitration tribunal consisted of an independent Chairman, one nominee from the employers' side and a nominee from the staff side. The matter referred to arbitration, had to be dealt with within six weeks of its reference, and the results of arbitration were binding on both parties. This allowance for binding arbitration was a unique feature of the London Clearing Banks industrial relations system, and was a continuation of the arbitration rights first granted to the majority of the Staff Associations, by the Clearing Banks, in the early 1950s.

2.3.4.0. The Joint Negotiating Council for Non-Clerical Banking Staff

2.3.4.1. This separate national negotiating body for Non-Clerical Clearing Bank Staff (22), mainly messengers and maintenance men, was established two years after the Joint Negotiating Council for Banking, on June 11th 1970, (2.2.9.1.), and it is still in operation, as NUBE did not withdraw from this part of the national collective bargaining system in 1978 (2.3.4.2.). The Constitution of this JNC is very similar to that of the Clerical JNC, and it also has six employers' representatives from the Federation, and six Union/Non-Clerical Staff Association members, although, as previously mentioned (2.3.1.4.), the National Westminster is not represented amongst them in a voting capacity although both their employers and staff sides send

observers to the Council's meetings. The organisation and the objectives of the Non-Clerical Banking Staff Council, are identical to those of the Banking Staff Council (2.3.2.1.-2.3.2.4.). The procedures for the settlement of disputes and the arbitration provisions are also identical to those outlined for the Clerical JNC (2.3.3.1.-2.3.3.3.), but the matters for negotiation naturally vary slightly as the Non-Clerical JNC is concerned with a different category of employees. These matters for negotiation are also termed 'arbitral matters', due to the provision of binding arbitration, in the event of a second failure to agree between the parties, and cover:

- (i) Basic salaries or wages.
- (ii) Minimum retirement salary or wages.
- (iii) Service payments.
- (iv) Territorial and London Allowances.
- (v) Safety of staff.
- (vi) Working hours, overtime, and holidays.
- (vii) Any other matters affecting pay or conditions which it is jointly agreed should be considered as arbitral matters.

2.3.4.2. Since its establishment, this Council has undergone radical membership changes, as the Midland Bank Non-Clerical Staff Association withdrew, after joining the Clericals in going to ASTMS; Glyn's Non-Clerical Staff Association joined NUBE after the publication of CIR Report No.35 (18), in February 1973; and Lloyds

Bank Messenger and Non-Clerical Staff Association decided to go to NUBE after a further CIR Report, No.78 (23), in July 1974. As a result of these amalgamations the only Technical and Services Staff currently represented by a Staff Association, on the Non-Clerical JNC, are those in Barclays Bank Staff Association, the rest being represented by NUBE. As NUBE had the bulk of representation in this body it felt no need to withdraw from it in 1978, when it withdrew from the Clerical JNC and the Internal joint negotiations (2.3.5.1. ff). Thus the Non-Clerical JNC is the only part of the Clearing Banks' national negotiating system still in operation.

2.4.0. Section 4: Internal Collective Bargaining Procedural Agreements

2.4.1.1. Barclays, Lloyds, Midland and National Westminster Banks

2.4.1.2. Having established national collective bargaining machinery, it was a natural and logical progression for the parties to this machinery to establish internal, domestic, negotiating agreements. The first Bank to do this was Barclays in May 1969, thus re-establishing its leading, innovative, role in the London Clearing Banks' industrial relations system, having been the first of the banks to recognise NUBE in 1941. A Joint Committee, comprising four representatives of the Bank and two each from NUBE and Barclays Staff Association

was established, to discuss and negotiate matters relating to the terms and conditions of employment of Managerial, Clerical, and Non-Clerical Staff, that were not within the jurisdiction of the JNCs. Negotiating arrangements were established in the National Westminster, in June 1970, for Clerical staff and Managers, and in Lloyds Bank, in November 1970, for Clerical staff alone, and here the maximum number of representatives was increased to six from each side, three each from NUBE and the Staff Association, forming the staff side. The actual matters discussed varied slightly between the Banks since they all have somewhat different job evaluation grading (apart from the first four grades), and appointment structures, but the type of matters that were discussed are illustrated by some of the matters that were negotiated in Lloyds Bank:

- (i) maximum salaries for above average performance in Grades I-IV;
- (ii) minimum and maximum salaries for the senior supervisory grades;
- (iii) complete salary structures for shorthand typists, data processing staff, and technical and professional staff;
- (iv) salary progression through all grades from 'national' minima to 'domestic' maxima;
- (v) holidays of Appointed staff;
- (vi) rules of the Retirement Benefits Scheme.

2.4.1.3. In the Midland Bank a formal procedural agreement was signed between the Bank and NUBE to cover Clerical Staff in December 1970, but no such agreement was signed with the Midland Bank Staff Association, although negotiations were still carried on, separately, with them. The Midland Bank Staff Association had been one of the keenest opponents of the national joint negotiating machinery and thus had no intention of losing its separate negotiating identity, internally, in the Bank. However, a Joint Domestic Negotiating Council was established between the Bank, NUBE, and the Non-Clerical Staff Association, in June 1971, comprising four representatives from the Bank and two each from the Staff bodies. The National Westminster Bank also established a separate joint agreement, for its Non-Clerical staff, in June 1970, as its technical and services staff preferred to negotiate purely internally, since they felt they could achieve better results by doing so, than by becoming involved in the national negotiating machinery. Lloyds Bank established internal joint negotiations for its Non-Clerical staff in September 1970. The type of matters negotiated in these Non-Clerical internal agreements can again be illustrated from the matters negotiated in Lloyds Bank:

(i) salaries or wages for staff, above the nationally agreed basics;

- (ii) salaries or wages for staff who are not covered by the national negotiations, eg. catering and domestic staff, night cleaners, Stationery Department staff;
- (iii) allowances for staff on special duties, e.g. staff on bullion vans;
- (iv) shoes and clothing allowances.

2.4.1.4. Under the terms of these formal agreements the negotiating committee met as often as was required and provision was given that after a second failure to agree on any matter either side could refer the matter to an arbitration tribunal consisting of a nominee from the Bank, a joint Union/Staff Association nominee, and an independent Chairman. These provisions thus copied those of the national negotiating machinery.

2.4.1.5. None of these joint internal agreements has survived the later developments, in the London Clearing Banks' industrial relations system, in this decade (2.5.1.1.ff), as all the joint domestic Clerical agreements were ended by NUBE from March 1978, and subsequently Midland Bank rescinded its separate formal negotiating agreement with NUBE (2.5.3.3.). In the Non-Clerical sphere NUBE's withdrawal ended the joint negotiations in the National Westminster Bank, and the agreements in the Midland Bank and Lloyds Bank ended in 1974, when the Midland Non-Clerical Staff Association joined ASTMS, and the Lloyds Bank Messenger and Non-Clerical Staff Association merged with NUBE following CIR Report

No.78 (23). However, these agreements were very important since, along with the national agreements which preceded them, they gave NUBE and indeed some of the Staff Associations, formal written recognition by all the Clearing Banks for the first time. Thus they were an important landmark in the development of an industrial relations 'system' in these Banks. Basic informal recognition has not been affected by NUBE's withdrawal from all the negotiating agreements except the Non-Clerical JNC, and none of the Banks have withdrawn recognition from any of the staff representative bodies following the publication of the Johnston Inquiry Reports, (2.6.1.1.-2.6.1.10) and such action would presumably only ever be taken as a last resort in an attempt to achieve a single staff representative body in the Banks.

2.4.2.0.Williams and Glyn's Bank

2.4.2.1.The one London Clearing Bank not mentioned, so far, has been Williams & Glyn's, and this is simply because it is the only one of the 'Big Five' which has managed to remove joint staff representation by both NUBE and a Staff Association, and to attain the stated ideal of all the London Clearing Bank employers of 'one staff body'. It achieved this situation as a result of its referring the matter of which was the 'most appropriate form of organisation for the purpose of collective bargaining and consultation,'(18) for its staff, to the Commission on Industrial Relations, on March 19th,1972.

2.4.2.2. When the three Banks, Glyn Mills and Co., Williams Deacon's Ltd., and the National Bank, became a trading organisation on January 1st 1970, the employees of the latter two Banks were represented solely by NUBE, but those of Glyn Mills were represented by a Staff Association. The Bank encouraged a merger between the two bodies but, although the officials of the Staff Association were prepared to merge with NUBE, thinly attended membership meetings voted against this, and so the Bank referred the matter to the CIR. In its Report of February 13th 1973, its main conclusion was that 'recognition of NUBE alone for negotiating and consultative purposes would make most sense in industrial relations terms'(18). It did not accept the contention of the CBSA 'that joint arrangements involving both NUBE and the Williams and Glyn's Staff Association should be set up because this would follow a pattern found in other Clearing Banks.' (18). As a result of this report, Joint Negotiating and Consultative arrangements were established between the Bank and NUBE in 1974.

2.5.0. Section 5: Structural Developments in the Clearing Banks' Industrial Relations System in the 1970s.

2.5.1.1. The entry of the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS) 1974.

2.5.1.2. One of the most significant developments was the entry of the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs, ASTMS, into the London Clearing Banks' industrial relations system. This occurred

largely as a result of the Heath Conservative Government's general intervention into the country's industrial relations system with the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, which required all trade unions to register with a Registrar of Trade Unions. The trade union movement, generally, was opposed to the Act, which it saw as an unwarranted, and undesirable, tampering, with the existing 'voluntarist', British industrial relations system. NUBE had been a member of the TUC since 1940 and, indeed, the issue of TUC affiliation, had been, and continues to be made, a major issue by the Staff Associations, as evidence of NUBE's undesirable socialist political associations, although from any rational viewpoint this is certainly not a realistic charge. However, NUBE realised that not registering under the Act would probably lead to a large fall in their membership, since all the Staff Associations were registering, and great representational advantage could be taken by the Associations, in the London Clearing Banks, if NUBE did not do so. Thus they registered under the Act, with the result that they were expelled from the TUC in 1972.

2.5.1.3. At this time the Midland Bank Staff Association was becoming more and more frustrated at its lack of success in negotiations, with the professional industrial relations staff that the Bank had started to employ, and with delays in the speed of negotiation, due to the parallel, separate, negotiations of both

itself and NUBE with the Bank (18). The Officers of the Association felt it was necessary to explore the possibility of merging with a larger organisation, whilst retaining its ideal of company bargaining, and ASTMS appeared the best organisation through which to achieve these objectives. ASTMS was keen to represent the Midland staff in order, both, to increase their membership in the finance sector, generally, and to gain a foothold in the London Clearing Bank sector, specifically. Such a merger would most probably not have been possible had NUBE still been affiliated to the TUC, since NUBE could probably have kept ASTMS out of the Banks' industrial relations system, by invoking the Bridlington Agreement. However, since NUBE was no longer in the TUC it could not do this, and, at the end of 1973, a 2 to 1 majority of the Midland Bank Staff Association membership, voted in favour of the merger, which was registered under the Trade Union Amalgamation Act in February 1974. The entry of a third kind of staff body, an amalgamated unit of the fastest-growing, general, white-collar union, in the country, into the London Clearing Banks industrial relations system, was worrying and upsetting to all the existing parties, NUBE, the CBSA, and the Banks' employers.

2.5.2.0. The Association of Banking Finance Unions (ABFU) 1973-5

2.5.2.1. The concern of all the established parties in the industrial relations system, over the merger of the Midland Bank Staff Association with ASTMS, led the Federation of London Clearing Bank Employers to suggest,

in October 1973, that an Association should be formed to act as an umbrella organisation, to which all the domestic staff representative bodies would be affiliated, throughout the London Clearing Banks, in order to prevent the possibility of chaos developing in their newly established national and domestic negotiating systems. Under these proposals NUBE and the Staff Associations would have ceased to exist, as separate entities, and, in their place, one Staff Union would have been established in each Bank, to carry out internal negotiations, and these unions would have come together to negotiate nationally agreed items, in a new national negotiating forum, that was to have been designated, the English Clearing Banks Council. A working party was established to consider the viability of these proposals, which NUBE joined, as it was suffering membership setbacks, particularly in Barclays where it had always been, until the late 1960s, in a majority position, and where membership of the Staff Association increased from 16,300 to 23,000 between 1970 and 1972, and it was also having financial difficulties, this being the time when it purchased Sheffield House in Esher, which increased its enthusiasm to join in the discussions. Enthusiasm, in the normal course of things, was not likely to be high for the Federation's proposals, since in any such arrangements NUBE influence in Barclays, Lloyds and National Westminster, was likely to be considerably reduced in a single staff Union, due to its minority staff memberships in these Banks.

2.5.2.2. The working party discussions carried on over a period of two years, until October 1975, when, with a compromise agreement having almost been reached, NUBE backed out. During the two years of discussions its finances had recovered as it had concluded 20 procedural agreements in other financial institutions, and this gave it the ability to back out of the proposed amalgamation, when it foundered on three main differences of principle between itself and the Staff Associations:

(i) Payment of subscriptions. The Staff Associations wanted subscriptions paid into the separate Staff Unions with a capitation fee going to ABFU, whereas NUBE argued that the subscriptions should go direct to the central organisation, ABFU, and then be allocated amongst the Staff Unions.

(ii) Membership. NUBE wanted the members to be members of ABFU, whereas the Staff Associations wanted them to be members of the separate Staff Unions.

(iii) Officials. The Staff Associations wanted each Staff Union to have its own officials employed separately by the particular Union, whereas NUBE wanted all officials to be ABFU officials, and for them to be allocated, centrally, as a particular Bank's officials.

In conjunction with the collapse of these talks, NUBE rejoined the TUC in November 1975, with the help of a loan from the EEPTU to pay its outstanding affiliation fees, a move which was bound to exacerbate the reopening of hostile relations which had just occurred with NUBE's withdrawal from the ABFU proposals.

2.5.3.0. The Withdrawal of NUBE from Joint National and Internal Clerical and Managerial Negotiations 1977/8.

2.5.3.1. Obviously, by the end of 1975, relations between NUBE and the other staff bodies, except the Midland Bank ASTMS Section, were decidedly chilled. In fact, NUBE and the ASTMS Section in Midland Bank, were to get together in discussions, in 1976 and 1977, in attempts to establish a joint negotiating procedure in the Bank, which would remove the tedium, for all parties, of the separate, parallel, negotiations, that existed there. However, these discussions also broke down, on November 21st 1977, when NUBE's National Executive Committee gave notice of its withdrawal, due to its worsening relations with ASTMS, caused partly by a personality clash between the two General Secretaries, and also by the fact that attempts by the TUC to establish agreement between these two largest unions in the British finance sector, had strained relations. The discussions were also not helped by the fact that NUBE had given six months notice of its withdrawal from its existing joint, domestic, negotiations, with the Staff Associations, in Barclays, Lloyds, and the National Westminster Banks, as well as the joint national negotiations for Clerical and Managerial Staff.

2.5.3.2. The reasons for this withdrawal were given by the present General Secretary of NUBE, Lief Mills, in the Union's publication, 'Policy for Progress' (24), published in February, 1978. 'In September 1977 our Executive Committee decided that the time had come to call a halt to further joint negotiations, as we were continually trapped in the

position whereby, whatever achievements were gained through the JNC and BSC, this did not result in a resolution of the problems of divided staff representation, but, in fact, only made these problems worse, by giving an obvious recruitment advantage to the Staff Associations, through their lower subscriptions. Of even greater significance was the growing realisation that the staff's problems could not be solved by the policies and tactics which were imposed on the BSC by the Staff Associations' block vote." This latter comment referred mainly to the split in the Clerical Banking Staff Council in 1977 on the staff representative bodies' attitude to the Government's Phase 2 Pay Policy. NUBE supported a Phase 2 settlement from July 1st, but the CBSA was able to outvote NUBE with its superior poll vote, in favour of a policy of skipping Phase 2 and going for a 10% rise from August 1st. Because of this decision the pay claim was inevitably referred to arbitration which predictably made an award within the Phase 2 guidelines. Thus, NUBE's members had to wait six months for a rise, which NUBE would happily have accepted in July, but for the 'poll vote' system, and the anger caused by this affair led NUBE to give its six months notice of withdrawal from the joint national Clerical and Managerial negotiating machinery, and the joint internal negotiations, to which it was a party. This theoretically became effective on March 19th 1978, although in practice NUBE withdrew from attendance at these joint meetings immediately, which further upset the Staff Associations.

2.5.3.3. NUBE naturally did not withdraw itself from its own independent procedural agreement with Midland Bank, but as the Midland would have been left as the only Bank with an agreement on Clerical Staff negotiations, which included an arbitration provision, and as NUBE had suspended its joint working discussions with ASTMS, the Bank gave notice to terminate this 1970 agreement from May 20th, 1978. This action concluded the existence of any formal negotiating machinery for Clerical and Managerial Staffs in the London Clearing Banks, (although separate procedural agreements with each of two representative bodies in Midland Bank were signed in December 1978), and along with Williams & Glyn's procedural agreement with NUBE, which also covers Technical and Services Staff, left these and the Non-Clerical national negotiating machinery as the only formally constituted procedural agreements in existence between 1978 and 1981.

2.6.0. Section 6: The Johnston Enquiry Reports 1978-1980.

2.6.1.1. The truncating of the development of the industrial relations system for Clerical and Managerial Staffs in the London Clearing Banks, except internally in Williams & Glyn's, led the London Clearing Banks to request Dr. Tom Johnston, Director of the Scottish Manpower Services Commission, to conduct an 'Enquiry into Staff Representation in the Major London Clearing Banks' (25) during the Spring and Summer of 1978, after NUBE had withdrawn from the formal joint negotiating machinery.

His terms of reference were 'to investigate the whole question of staff representation and negotiating procedures in the major London Clearing Banks, and to report with recommendations' (25).

2.6.1.2. His first Report (25) was published in October 1978.

As he stated in his 'Background', 'it was agreed . . . that the enquiry would be a "one-man" investigation, covering the five London Clearing Banks (Barclays, Lloyds, Midland, National Westminster, and Williams & Glyn's) who make up the membership of the Federation, and that it would examine both national and domestic arrangements. It was further agreed that the enquiry would be conducted in private, informally, and that the object was to produce recommendations for consideration by the parties' (26). The problem with this approach was that, as can be seen from the details of the groups with whom Dr. Johnston held meetings, contained in the Report (27), he only consulted the officials of the interested parties, indeed he 'determined there was nothing to be gained from this (an attitude survey). In my judgement, it would have been extremely difficult to formulate a question or questions which gave a clear indication of staff attitudes' (28). Thus, he gained no 'grass-roots' opinion on the industrial relations situation, and it was therefore a major aim of my study to acquire this, as well as reaction to Dr. Johnston's actual proposals, which is presented and discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

2.6.1.3. Dr. Johnston's first recommendation was 'that the staff side should establish a single, responsible "industrial" Union for the clearing banks sector. For convenience, I shall refer to this as the Clearing Bank Union, or CBU . . . This would be a new body, with a new name, NOT the Staff Associations thinly disguised in a loose Federation and NOT NUBE with a series of domestic Sections'.(29) Because 'the 1968 JNC established a two-tier structure which has proved remarkably durable on substantive matters (and) it is the procedural and power problems, particularly within the BSC, which have caused the breakdown' (30) he recommended that the previously existing list of national arbitrable matters in the JNC should become those negotiated by his recommended single, united, representative body, the CBU. Within each individual bank there would be in-house or domestic 'sections' of this central, united, body, to negotiate on domestic matters, particular to each bank, as had occurred previously in the joint negotiating machinery where issues outside the national arbitrable matters were bargained over domestically.

2.6.1.4. Because of the complication of NUBE's representative interests in related fields such as Scottish banking, Trustee Savings Banks, international banks, finance companies, insurance companies, and building societies, described by Dr. Johnston as 'NUBE's "rump"' (31) he felt it necessary to go outside his terms of reference

as 'one cannot reasonably expect the present NUBE to pull in its horns, abandon that range of groups, and devote its energies to making a CBU work'(32).

Dr. Johnston thus suggested the formation of a third-tier body to which these members outside the clearing banks, as well as the CBU, would belong, as one united body representing 'some 200,000' (33) members.

2.6.1.5. His second main recommendation was that 'there is everything to be said for a strong trade union within banking being affiliated, through its umbrella body, to the TUC. It would strengthen the trade union movement and bring to it a larger infusion of knowledge of the world of banking and finance. That is the argument of principle. In practice, in addition, I see no prospect of NUBE being willing to have its membership of the TUC made negotiable as part of the deal to be done for the establishment of a CBU. I recommend, therefore, that from the start of the discussions leading to a CBU there should be a clear declaration and acceptance of the proposition that the new body will affiliate to the TUC'(34). He also recommended that the employers should 'endorse my recommendation . . . that the CBU should be affiliated to the TUC, and indicate their strong support for the concept of their Clearing Bank Union playing an active and explicit part in mainstream trade unionism through the TUC. This also involves declaring support for

voluntary unionism. In return, they are entitled to make it clear that they are not prepared to accept any form of agency or closed shop in the clearing banks'(35).

2.6.1.6. This latter sentence expressed his third main recommendation, that there should be no 'closed shop', which was further advocated towards the end of the Report. 'I consider there are enough susceptibilities about union membership clauses, both among employers and staff, for this to be dismissed quite definitely as a possibility'(36). He referred to NUBE's pressure on Williams & Glyn's, in their sole bargaining role there, for an agency shop agreement and the bank's response that such an arrangement would be contrary to the concept of individual freedom. 'NUBE withdrew its claim, and the bank reaffirmed its policy of recognising NUBE as the body with sole bargaining rights, and its policy of encouraging staff to belong to the Union. It has gone further. It has drawn the attention of staff who exercise their freedom not to join a Union to certain points - the fact that non-union members enjoy the benefits arising from the collective activities of their union member colleagues; that in a large organisation collective representation is essential; and that membership of the union does not in any way detract from the right of an employee to direct and personal presentation of his or her views to the management. This provides an admirable framework

for promoting strong and unified trade unionism, while meeting the susceptibilities of those who, for their own good reasons, may not wish to join a Union, particularly one which, through its umbrella body, is affiliated to the TUC'(36). Thus, whilst against the 'closed shop' concept, Dr. Johnston firmly believed that union membership should be positively encouraged by the Banks' employers.

2.6.1.7. The results of this first Report were that both the Staff Associations and NUBE agreed to enter into discussions about the proposals, and if, and how, they could be implemented, at a series of six meetings held between December 1978 and June 1979, chaired, at their invitation, by Dr. Johnston. The other main development in this period was that at its Annual Conference in April 1979 NUBE decided to change its name to the Banking Insurance and Finance Union, BIFU(37), largely as a result of Dr. Johnston's proposal for a third-tier umbrella body, as the conference decided that the principle of direct membership should be maintained which would mean that union membership would be held directly with this third-tier body, rather than with the proposed Clearing Bank Union or proposed individual Bank sections.

2.6.1.8. At the conclusion of these six meetings Dr. Johnston produced a second Report (38) 'at the express invitation of the Staff Associations in Barclays, Lloyds, and the National Westminster Banks, and the Banking, Insurance

and Finance Union . . . to compile a specific package of proposals for the three tier union structure' (39). However, he began the Report with a section entitled 'the round of discussions and obstacles to progress' (40) in which he castigated all the parties for their lack of positive progress. He stated that the Staff Associations had been 'myopic' (41) but that they 'have clearly not been assisted in widening their horizons by . . . BIFU' (42). He considered the NUBE conference decision to change their title to BIFU as 'provocative' (43) and, indeed, it was certainly an incautious strike for the new proposed third-tier ground and nomenclature of the new umbrella body, which was bound to cause added friction to BIFU's relationship with the Staff Associations, as Barclays, Lloyds, and the National Westminster Staff Associations saw the third-tier umbrella body as an extremely loose federal structure, with the Clearing Bank Union and the individual bank sections having separate Certificates of Independence, and carrying out most of the negotiating and decision-making themselves. Thus, the same centralism versus separatism split which had dogged the earlier ABFU discussions was still very prominent.

2.6.1.9. Dr. Johnston pointed out, as a further problem, the lack of 'any coherent response' (44) from the Staff Association in the Bank in which my 'grass roots' survey was conducted, until May 1979. This was largely due to the fact that they had employed MORI to conduct

a survey (45), of their total membership, on Dr. Johnston's main proposals, and thus the delay may well be understandable. Ballot papers were distributed in April 1979 to their 33,041 claimed members, and 15,890, 48%, were completed and returned (46). The finding of their survey was that 74% favoured a single, united, staff representative body incorporating a domestic Bank union, 21% were against it, and 5% did not know (47). On the question of TUC affiliation, 50% were opposed to it, but 44.5% would accept it, although half of these would only do so as the price to pay for united staff representation (48). Dr. Johnston was very critical of the way in which this latter question had been formulated as it 'was extremely narrow in context. No effort was made to inform the membership about TUC services' (49).

2.6.1.10. Having criticised all the parties he then proceeded to go into further detail on the structure and mechanics for achieving his original proposals which it was planned should be discussed, and moulded into actuality, in detailed implementation working parties, involving the Staff Associations and BIFU. Two meetings of all the staff bodies were held to discuss this Second Report in October and November 1979, but after these meetings the talking ceased, and Dr. Johnston, finally, in January 1980, produced a brief third Note (50), essentially signalling the end of the discussions on his proposals. Although he stated that 'it would . . .

be inappropriate for me, as the man-in-the-middle, to allocate blame for the present impasse', his final sentence stated 'whether the work of building can go ahead is up to BIFU' (51). Precisely what the true reasons were for the breakdown of the talks is hard to know. Although the Staff Associations had said they would accept the Second Report as a package, and BIFU had agreed to sign heads of agreement on six major matters, BIFU steadfastly refused to rejoin the joint negotiating machinery which Dr. Johnston had proposed as an 'act of faith' in both his reports, and, as Dr. Johnston stated in his Note, they felt 'there were matters which were still unclear in the Report, matters on which there appeared to be contradictions, and topics on which the Report was silent'(52). However, BIFU had not withdrawn from the discussions when the three Staff Associations decided that they were 'not satisfied that there was substance in these reservations. They saw them as likely to prove a running sore in the subsequent discussions, leading to endless quibbling, and conceivably to a Mark III Report' (53), and each, separately, issued statements in December 1979, stating that because of BIFU's refusal to accept the Second Report, in full, they were withdrawing from the talks. How far further discussion would have been fruitful, and whether, indeed, either side ever really wanted the talks to succeed, is debatable.

2.7.0. Section 7: Developments since the breakdown of the
Johnston talks

2.7.1.1. The most immediate development was the decision of the three Staff Associations involved in the talks 'to proceed with the setting up of a new Union for Clearing Bank Staff based on the recommendations contained in Dr. Johnston's Report'(54), in December 1979. What, in fact, they proposed, was to create a Clearing Bank Union by themselves, the plan being that this body should co-ordinate and carry out negotiations on agreed 'national' matters common to all three banks, with the existing Staff Associations remaining in existence to negotiate on 'domestic' matters. Thus, 'the recommendations contained in Dr. Johnston's Report' were in no real sense being followed, as claimed, as, obviously, BIFU was not a party to this arrangement. Indeed, the formation of this limited Clearing Bank Union, which was established formally in September 1980(54), with its own newly-appointed General Secretary, could well be seen as a negative development so far as any future resolution of the problem of divided staff representation in the London Clearing Banks is concerned, since a new 'interested party' and power base has been created whose additional agreement to any future unification proposals would presumably be required. (The term 'presumably' is used as the precise relationship between the Clearing Bank Union and its creators is, in practice, still unclear). On the other hand, it

could prove a positive development in that the nettle of changing titles from Association to Union has been grasped by the former Associations, except, significantly, one, whose own Constitutions in the new structure were also published in September 1980 (55,56,57), and there is, now, a formally created body whose aim and function is to carry out national-level negotiations, so that, just conceivably, a future compromise amalgamation with BIFU might be made easier. All these developments took place after a ballot of members in which a very clear majority of those returning their ballot forms had voted in favour of them. The development in BIFU's organisation, in this period, has been the creation of an English Clearing Banks Section (58) which, interestingly, includes the Co-operative Bank as well as the 'Big Five' Banks.

2.7.1.2. Alongside these structural developments there have been moves by both the employers and the representative bodies to formalise their separated collective bargaining relationships in separate formal Procedural Agreements. These have either been agreed or are about to be agreed in the four Clearing Banks with split representation. Ironically, however, the one Bank, Williams & Glyn's, which does not have the split representation problem, has announced its intention of ending its sole negotiating Procedural Agreement with BIFU, in order to obtain an amendment which will end compulsory arbitration in the Bank. Separate negotiations have also continued at national level with the Federation of London Clearing Bank Employers. Thus the conflict and backbiting between

the Union and Staff Associations continues which is unsatisfactory both, as will be illustrated in the next Chapter, to employees, and also to the Bank employers who would prefer, for the sake of simplicity and efficiency, negotiations with one united staff representative body, as suggested by Dr. Johnston, or, at the very least, some form of joint negotiating machinery. But what will happen is questionable. The following chapter, and the heart of this thesis, gives the results of an attitude survey conducted amongst a representative sample of Domestic Banking employees in one of the 'Big Four' Banks, with this split representation. Perhaps these results may give a new impetus to discussions and produce action to create a single, united, staff representative body which, as will be seen, a clear majority of 'grass roots' opinion desires, as well as the Bank employers.

2.8.0. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THIS ANALYSIS WITH PREVIOUS THEORY

2.8.1.1. As well as the value of this chapter in providing the historical setting for the development of the industrial relations system in the London Clearing Banks, and the context for the attitude survey results which follows, it is also valuable to examine how far it supports George Bain's thesis that both employer attitudes (60), and government attitudes, and government-inspired third party action (61), can have a very important influence on the development of trade union recognition and membership growth in an industry.

2.8.1.2. These theories would certainly appear to be supported by the Banks' negative attitude to Union representation for their staffs and their support and funding for Staff Associations which held back the development of NUBE

into a fully recognised, negotiating party, until 1968, when recognition was granted by the employers as a result of three main factors created by a combination of employers' attitudes and government action. Most of the employers had initially granted arbitration rights to their favoured Staff Associations in the 1950s and they thus created the rod for their backs that the Staff Associations were to use in the 1960s and which thus made national negotiations far more attractive; the Cameron Report was a direct consequence, in part, of the existence of an employer-dominated Staff Association in the District, Martins and National Provincial Banks; and it was the Minister of Labour's intervention to stop NUBE's 1967 industrial action and the reopening of the tripartite talks on national-level machinery which ultimately led to the establishment of the national machinery in 1968. Later government action in the form of the 1971 Industrial Relations Act legislation led to the entry of ASTMS into the Clearing Banks' industrial relations system, and the Commission on Industrial Relations which it established had, through various reports, an influence on the development of the system, as the government-issued 1940 Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order had done back in the Second World War.

2.8.1.3. There is also some evidence here to support Bain's later work's investigations of the importance of the general economic factors in the business cycle on union growth (62, 63) in that the initial founding of the Bank Officers' Guild, which developed into NUBE and then BIFU, occurred partly because of the effect of wartime inflation on bank clerks' salaries, and standards of living, which gives some support to the factors of rate of change of

prices (64) and rate of change of wages (65) included in his model for union growth. Also the major recession years of the late 1920s and early 1930s were generally bad for BOG membership which supports the factors of unemployment and falling union density having a negative effect on union membership, which are also propounded in Bain's model.

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CHAPTER 3

The Attitudes of Staff to Unionisation and the Industrial Relations System in a Major London Clearing Bank

3.1.0. Introduction

3.1.1. Having traced the historical background of the industrial relations system in the London Clearing Banks in the previous chapter, the major aim of this thesis, as outlined in Chapter 1, was to carry out an attitude survey amongst a representative sample of employees in one of the major London Clearing Banks to discover the feelings of staff in four main areas. Firstly, to find out what factors in the workplace environment positively and negatively influence employees to join, and play an active part in a union or staff association, and one representative body rather than the other, and what leads employees to be averse to collective representation and thus not to join either body. Secondly, from examining the social backgrounds of the staff and the particular educational and personal influences which were brought to bear on them, which led to membership or non-membership of a representative body, to see what light this study would throw on the major split in industrial relations academic theory between those who support a general theory of 'sociological' reasons leading to membership and those who support an 'industrial relations' theory for membership. Thirdly, to discover how members or non-members feel these representative bodies, the individual Bank's internal industrial relations system, and the

industrial relations system in the Clearing Banks generally, might be improved to make them more effective and successful for collective bargaining, and other forms of representation, both within the individual Bank and amongst the Banks generally. An essential part of this would be to acquire 'grass roots' reaction to Dr. Johnston's main proposals. Fourthly, and finally, the survey aimed to examine the positions, attitudes, and motivation, of staff who became office representatives of the union or staff association.

- 3.1.2. All the raw numerical information acquired from the survey questionnaires is contained in Appendices 1-4. The hypotheses on which the questionnaire was based, the questionnaire itself, and the methodology of the survey has been described in Chapter 1. The purpose of this chapter is to give a narrative analysis of of the main findings of the survey, in the same order as the questions were asked, and the data appear in the Appendices, in order to provide a unified approach and ease of cross-referencing from the narrative text to the data, and to draw conclusions from these findings.
- 3.2.0. The statistical fit of the sample data with the actual Domestic Banking Division Data as at December 31st, 1979.
- 3.2.1. The fact which needs to be highlighted, initially, is the very high response rate in the survey of 93.3% (406 out of the 435 staff randomly selected to complete the questionnaire). The sample was drawn from the — Domestic Banking Division as this division contains

all the branch banking staff who are most commonly associated as 'bank staff', and who made up 79.4% of the Bank's total staff as at December 31st, 1979. This high response rate was achieved largely as a result of the interviews being conducted personally with the interviewees by the researcher, combined with the backing and help of the Bank's Personnel Management Department, and the two representative bodies, together with local management support in the eighteen branches visited, in encouraging staff to be interviewed personally.

3.2.2. Before discussing any of the membership patterns of the Staff Association, the Union, or non-members, it is necessary to see how closely this sample of a major London Clearing Bank's branch banking employees fits with the actual population of these staff at the time the interviews were conducted, in terms of male/female distribution, the distribution by age of staff, and the split between unappointed, appointed and managerial staff (these being the three major areas where comparison is possible, as more detailed matchings, including, say, the male/female distribution of lengths of service were, understandably, unavailable easily from the Bank, and the cost of procurement for this study was prohibitive). The interviews were carried out between September 1979 and April 1980, a period of six months, and the actual, real, figures with which the sample figures are compared, come from the

Bank's "Annual Report to Staff"(1), from information acquired from the Bank's Personnel Division of the actual distributions of staff as at December 31st, 1979, the mid-point of the interviewing period.

3.2.3. The male/female distribution in the sample, in percentage terms, was 46.3% male and 53.7% female which compares well with the actual Domestic Banking Division figures of 42.2% and 57.8% respectively, particularly as the actual percentages exclude any figures for messenger staff (see Table 2 and explanation below) which, if included, would bring the actual figures closer to the sample's by 1% to 2%. The actual distribution, by age, of staff is given in Table 1 below with the comparative sample percentages in brackets.

TABLE 1
Male/Female Distribution by Age

Age	MALE	Actual %	Sample %*	FEMALE	Actual %	Sample %*
16-25	7511	15.8%	(21.4%)	18783	39.5%	(38.2%)
26-35	4356	9.2%	(10.3%)	4984	10.5%	(11.3%)
36 & over	8181	17.2%	(14.6%)	3724	7.8%	(4.2%)
TOTAL	20048	42.2%	(46.3%)	27491	57.8%	(53.7%)

*Figures in Appendix 1.

3.2.4. Here the match between sample size and actual population distribution is good, half the categories being within 1.5% of accuracy. The one major difference lies in the larger size of the group of males in the 16-25 age range, and the lower size of the 36 & over male age range in the sample than actually exist.

This difference may largely be accounted for in that the actual figures include 1009 staff employed at Domestic Banking Headquarters and City and West End Region (Personnel) who were not included in the sampling exercise, but cannot be extracted from the official figures, and the majority of these specialist staff are likely to be in the 36 & over category. Also the majority of the Technical and Services Messenger Staff would probably be in this category.

- 3.2.5. The other major area of comparison is the split of staff between the various gradings of managerial, appointed, and unappointed (grades 1-4 clerks), secretarial staff, and messengers (Technical and Services staff). Again the actual figures are given in Table 2, over, with the sample's percentages in brackets:

TABLE 2
Distribution of Domestic Banking Staff by Grade

Grade	TOTAL STAFF	Actual %	Sample %*	MALES		FEMALES	
				Actual %	Sample %*	Actual %	Sample %*
Managerial	3234	6.8%	(5.2%)	6.8%	(5.2%)	0.04%	(0.00%)
Appointed	5244	11.0%	(9.4%)	10.1%	(9.1%)	0.9%	(0.2%)
Unappointed							
Grade 4	3368	7.1%	(7.6%)	5.9%	(6.2%)	1.2%	(1.5%)
Grade 3	4795	10.0%	(11.8%)	5.1%	(6.4%)	5.0%	(5.4%)
Grade 2	17202	36.2%	(35.5%)	8.1%	(9.1%)	28.1%	(26.3%)
Grade 1	10610	22.3%	(22.2%)	6.2%	(8.6%)	16.1%	(13.5%)
Secretarial	3086	6.6%	(6.6%)	0%	(0%)	6.6%	(6.6%)
Technical & Services (Messengers)	No figure available		(1.7%)	No figure available	(1.7%)	0%	(0%)

* Figures in Appendix 1

3.2.6. These figures provide a very good fit between the sample distribution and the actual distribution as all the total staff percentages are within 1.8% of accuracy and the male/female splits are all within 2.6% of accuracy, with the majority within 1% of accuracy. The reason for there being no figure available for the Technical and Services messenger staff is that no separate figure is kept for the number of messengers employed in the Domestic Banking Division apart from the Bank as a whole. There were 1619 messengers employed in the Bank as a whole as at 31st December 1979, but although the majority of these are likely to be employed in the Domestic Banking Division, they could be distributed between any of the Bank's ten divisions. The Bank and staff organisations only keep records of the total messenger figures and do not keep records of their distribution throughout these various divisions.

3.2.7. These difficulties over the precision of official figures for the Domestic Banking Technical and Services messenger membership stretch into the fourth and final measure of the sample's fit with actuality, the membership distribution of staff between the two representative bodies in the Bank, the Staff Association and BIFU, and those who are not members of either body. As at 31st December, 1979, the Staff Association claimed 23734 members of staff who were actively employed in the Domestic Banking

Division, and BIFU claimed 8850. The percentages for membership were thus Staff Association 49.9%, BIFU 18.6%, and non-members, on these figures, accounted for 31.5% of the membership. The sample figures are based on a total sample of 408 which excludes the Technical and Services membership, but includes 9 staff who count twice as members of both representative bodies. Thus we have percentages for the sample group of Staff Association membership 36.8%, BIFU 19.1%, and non-members 44.1%.

3.2.8. The sample may, therefore, appear to over-represent non-members at the expense of Staff Association membership, but because of the problem of the accuracy of the representative bodies' claims about membership and the question of how far their membership figures are adjusted once a member ceases to pay subscriptions, there is possibly good reason to believe that the sample figures are closer to reality than the claimed membership of the Staff Association may suggest. The figure that does match well in the sample with the actual position, is that for BIFU membership, and there are excellent reasons to believe this actual figure is highly accurate as it is based on a critical survey carried out by BIFU's Assistant General Secretary for recruitment in late 1979/early 1980. It is also interesting that if one adds the ex Staff Association and ex Both non-members into the Staff Association figure, the match becomes 43.9% to the actual claimed figure of 49.9% which is a much closer fit. However, even if these caveats

are groundless, which is unlikely, it may well be more valuable to have a slight imbalance to non-members, given that the general pattern of much greater Staff Association membership is, anyway, accurately reflected in the sample, in the gathering of valuable information on why people do not join representative bodies even when they are given a choice of representative bodies to join, which should be of general interest, as well as more specific interest to the Bank and representative bodies who are concerned in this study.

- 3.2.9. This comparative analysis of the sample population with the actual factual information which exists about the make-up of the Domestic Banking Division employees in the Bank should provide confidence in the survey's ability to fairly and accurately illustrate the attitudes and opinions of this particular group of white-collar employees. It may well be that similar attitudes would be found to exist in the other London Clearing Banks, particularly those that have both a Staff Association and BIFU, but confirmatory studies using the questionnaire and the findings from this study would need to be carried out to confirm this. Any wider application of the findings might well present difficulties, a trap, however, which previous doctoral students of industrial relations in the Clearing Banks have been liable to fall into, as is shown in the later part of the next chapter (4.3.1 to 4.3.8).

3.3.0. The testing of the hypotheses concerning the respondents' membership background

3.3.1. Various hypotheses were formulated (1.2.1.-1.2.24)

before the study commenced and it is necessary and valuable to assess how closely they fit the information accumulated in the first seven questions correlating background information on location, sex, age, grade, and experience, with membership of either representative body or non-membership. Firstly, the regional difference in membership which the sample clearly illustrates is very interesting as the hypothesis (question 4 hypothesis 1.2.3.) held before embarking on the research was that BIFU membership would be stronger in the North-West area than in the London or South-East areas, and this is borne out strikingly by both the sample and actual BIFU area membership figures. If we compare the percentages of those who belong to either of the representative bodies in the sample in the three areas (those in both bodies counting twice), we find that in Inner London the percentages are 81.5% in the Staff Association and 18.5% in BIFU, in the South-East 82.1% in the Staff Association and 17.9% in BIFU, whereas in the North-West 26.1% are in the Staff Association and 73.9% in BIFU. This is a highly significant difference (all references to significance in this analysis refer to the 5% level of significance using the Chi Squared Test), and supports the findings of Bain and El-Sheik (2), as well as fitting with the actual BIFU figures (3)

which show that the North Region has the highest percentage regional membership 'density' (4) amongst the Domestic Banking Divisions with a 32.8% density, whereas Inner London has a 13.3% density and in the South-East the density is 12.4%. (These official figures only became available after the sampling procedure had been completed).

3.3.2. The reasons for such a difference in regional attitudes within the same organisation, which treats all staff equally in terms of job-evaluated salary scales, are difficult to be precise about, but must lie partly in the nature of the region itself with its much stronger 'working class' culture than in the Inner London or South-East areas, and in its much higher level of unemployment at the time the surveys in these particular regions were carried out, (as at April 10th 1980 (5) unemployment in the North-West was 8% whereas in the South-East as at November 8th 1979 (6), the mid point of the London and South-East surveys, it was 3.5%). Any specific areas of regional attitude differences will be drawn out in the following analysis of attitudes shown and opinions expressed in response to the questionnaire.

3.3.3. The initial hypotheses about the membership distribution were, firstly, that female staff were less likely than male staff to belong to either representative body, but that if they were members of either body they would be more likely to join BIFU than the Staff Association as they would be likely to go

the whole way if they decided to join a body at all, and join the most 'unionate' body (question 1 hypothesis - 1.2.1). Also, as female staff were less likely to be in a career with a strong possibility of upward movement through promotion, particularly to the highest levels, there would be less desire or pressure to join the more 'respectable' management-approved Staff Association. (The latter phrase might be considered a little controversial as some might argue that both bodies are now recognised and are equally 'respectable'. However, the attitudes of staff, which will be examined later, still show this historical divide and if one looks at the managerial affiliations in the sample one finds that 68.2% are in the Staff Association and only 18.2% in BIFU, and even in the much more BIFU-orientated North-West 66.7% of managerial staff are in the Staff Association which is an interesting bias). It was also hypothesised that females in the 16-25 age range would be the least likely group to be members of either body due to the job being a temporary stepping-stone for income until marriage (questions 2 and 3 hypotheses - 1.2.2.) in the majority of cases. The males in the 26-35 and 36 and over age ranges were thought most likely to be in one of the two representative bodies as their careers would by then be established in the Banks. The extent to which these original hypotheses on the sex and age range distribution of the membership sample are borne out is shown below.

3.3.4. In the sample 64.9% of the male staff were in the two representative bodies, of which 57.3% were in the Staff Association, and 42.7% in BIFU (these figures included 7.4% of all members who were in both bodies). Of the female staff, only 46.8% were in the two representative bodies, of which 75.7% were in the Staff Association and 24.3% in BIFU (these figures included 0.98% of all members who were in both bodies). Thus the hypothesis that female staff are less likely to join either of the representative bodies is supported by the data. However, the idea that those who join would be more likely to join BIFU than the Staff Association is convincingly refuted and female members are over three times more likely to join the Staff Association than BIFU. The actual reasons for this preference will be examined later in the analysis. (3.5.1.)

3.3.5. Probably the easiest way of judging the age-related membership distribution is to present the information in tabular form. The clearest means of assessing the likelihood of a particular age range belonging or not belonging to a representative body is to present the figures for non-members in each category. However, to just provide this figure would be too simple, in some ways, as it might well be argued that those who had joined one of the two bodies, but had since left, should be excluded from such an analysis as they have, at some point, been attracted to membership. These figures are given below.

TABLE 3Non-membership of representative bodies by age

Age	<u>MALES</u>		<u>FEMALES</u>	
	Present non-members	Never member of rep. body	Present non-members	Never member of rep. body
36 & over	16.9%	3.4%	35.3%	29.4%
26-35	42.8%	16.7%	54.3%	19.6%
16-25	43.7%	40.2%	54.8%	43.2%

3.3.6. Thus on either basis the hypothesis that the 16-25 age group of females is the least likely group to belong to either representative body is supported, but this is shown more clearly if ex-members are excluded from the non-membership figures. As might be expected, male staff in the same age-range are the next least likely group to be members and the hypothesis that males in the 26-35 and 36 and over age ranges would be the most likely to be members is supported by both sets of figures. The females in the 36 and over age range are something of a rare breed in Domestic Banking amounting to only 4.2% of the total sample, and thus the higher percentage of this group who have never been members of either body than any of the four groups shown in the over 26 age range is not surprising, as they are likely to have more 'independent' characters in order to have wished to continue working, or to return to work, and thus the attraction of belonging to a representative body for them is always likely to have been smaller than for the other groups.

3.3.7. The other main hypotheses relating to the information concerning membership distribution in the sample were that the longer the period of employment (questions 2 and 3 hypotheses 1.2.2.), the longer the period of time spent in a particular job grade (question 5 hypothesis - 1.2.4.), and the higher the grade (question 4 hypothesis - 1.2.3.), the likelier would be membership of a representative body. It was also hypothesised that the higher the grade the greater would be the likelihood of membership of the Staff Association, rather than BIFU, due to the current and historical position of the Staff Association as a more 'acceptable' body, and the fact that as BIFU has only been recognised for negotiating purposes for a decade, most school-leaver entrants aged over 26 would probably be influenced in their initial choice, to some extent, by the fact that they would be joining a somewhat impotent unrecognised body (?).

3.3.8. To judge the accuracy of the first of these hypotheses we can look at Table 4 where we have the percentage non-membership figures laid out as in Table 3, to assess whether membership of a representative body is more likely the longer the individual's length of service.

TABLE 4Correlation of non-membership with length of service

Length of service	<u>MALES</u>		<u>FEMALES</u>	
	Present non-members	Never member of rep. body	Present non-members	Never member of rep. body
Over 10 yrs	28.2%	7.1%	45%	17.5%
Over 5-10 yrs	26.7%	16.7%	51.7%	24.1%
2-5 yrs	16%	16%	42.5%	31.9%
Under 2 yrs	62.5%	60.4%	65.7%	61.6%

These figures, particularly those for staff who have never been members of either body, support the hypothesis that the longer the length of service of individuals, the more likely they are to be members, and this is a logical finding since the longer one works in any organisation the more likely it is that the value of belonging to a representative body will become apparent to an individual due to a personal problem being sorted out or general improvements in salaries or conditions of service being seen to be achieved by a representative body. There are a couple of interesting hiccups in these figures which require comment. Firstly, at the 2-5 years service level for both sets of male non-membership figures, and for the female non-membership figures including staff who are ex-members of either body. This may well be accounted for by the fact that, as the answers to question 7 show, 88.5% of staff who become non-members, after being members, joined their representative body within the first two years of service, and the figures in Table 4 indicate that it is not until after 5 years service that proper assessment is

made of whether it is worth continuing such membership. The other hiccup is in the slight increase in non-membership in the male 'over 10 years' category which includes ex-members, but the increase is only slight and probably associated with increasing reconsideration of the value of membership. The figure excluding ex-members fits the pattern hypothesised in being considerably reduced and appears increasingly from this analysis to be the more logical figure to take account of. Table 4 also shows that male staff are more likely to be members of a representative body throughout all periods of service than females.

3.3.9. Table 5 contains the same percentage non-membership figures as the previous two tables but this time for the length of service in a particular job grade.

TABLE 5

Correlation of non-membership with length of service in a particular grade

Length of service in particular job grade	<u>MALES</u>		<u>FEMALES</u>	
	Present non-members	Never member of rep. body	Present non-members	Never member of rep. body
Over 10 yrs	14.3%	0%	40%	0%
Over 5-10 yrs	20%	4%	58.6%	27.6%
2-5 yrs	30%	12.5%	46%	23.8%
Under 2 yrs	41.4%	32.8%	56.9%	51.7%

These figures again bear out the hypothesis that the longer the length of service in a particular job grade the more likely is membership of a representative body. Again, there is a small hiccup in the figures amongst the female staff. It is debatable whether the discrepancy lies in the '2-5 years' category again or the

'over 5-10 years' category, but whichever it is the most likely reason would appear to be similar to that suggested above that no re-examination of the value of membership takes place until after 5 years have been spent in a particular job grade when, for instance, a lack of promotion may well lead to disillusionment with the effectiveness of an individual's representative body resulting in resignation from it, and certainly a level of female disillusionment with promotion opportunities in the bank and a feeling of annoyance with the representative bodies in not getting something done about them is shown in the later analysis (3.15.3).

3.3.10. To test the hypothesis that the higher the grade of the staff the likelier would be membership of a representative body, in particular the Staff Association, it is again easiest to examine the sample's percentages in tabular form. The percentages refer to the percentage of the staff in a particular grade who are either members of the Staff Association or BIFU, and again there are two non-membership figures, one including ex-members of either body, and the other excluding them. Only Grade 1 clerical staff and above are examined as both the secretarial staff and the Technical and Services staff have their own separate hierarchies and career outlooks.

TABLE 6

Correlation between grading and membership/non-membership
of representative bodies

NON-MEMBERS

Grade	SA	BIFU	Present non-members	Never member of rep. body. % of present non-members
Managerial	68.2%	18.2%	13.6%	0%
Appointed	43.6%	38.5%	17.9%	5.1%
Grade 4	41.9%	16.2%	41.9%	12.9%
Grade 3	36.7%	28.6%	34.7%	20.4%
Grade 2	33.3%	20.0%	46.7%	28.7%
Grade 1	27.7%	6.7%	65.6%	64.4%

These figures bear out the hypothesis very well, with a steadily increasing percentage at each higher grade belonging to a representative body. There is a hiccup in this pattern in Grade 4 which may well be accounted for by the fact that staff in this grade are on the verge of their first appointment, and the desire to achieve this may lead to a questioning of the desirability of belonging to a representative body in the promotion stakes. It is also interesting that in this grade 83.8% of the staff are equally either in the Staff Association or are non-members, and it has the highest percentage preference for the Staff Association over BIFU of those who are members, except for the Managerial level, which again may be caused by the lure of promotion, or, conceivably, by the fact that Staff Association membership, or non-membership of either body, may be more likely to lead to promotion to Grade 4 in the first place. The pattern of staff increasingly having experience of belonging to one or other of the representative

bodies as they move up the hierarchy is excellently illustrated by the 'never been a member' figures which, after the figures shown are subtracted from 100%, show that only 35.6% have such experience at Grade 1 level, whereas everyone at the Managerial level has been a member of one or other of the representative bodies. The steadily increasing Staff Association membership at each higher level, with its jump at the Managerial level, also bears out the hypothesis that Staff Association membership is more likely at each higher grade. The pattern of BIFU membership is interesting with its peaks at Grades 2 and 3 and the Appointed grade and might well be due to a combination, partly of staff with increased confidence having attained these gradings of being fully in the career stream and feeling that BIFU membership is then allowable, particularly in view of the Grade 1 membership figure, and partly of staff who become frustrated with slow promotion to the next level and feel the need to belong to what they see as a more powerful and effective body to represent their interests.

3.3.11. The information given by the sample's respondents to question 6 is interesting. The initial surprise is the number of staff (Appendix 1) who had previous work experience before joining the Bank (19%) as it is a commonly-held view that virtually all Bank staff employees go into banking usually straight from school, with a few straight from university. It is interesting that of the 40.3% of these staff who were

non-members of either representative body in the Bank, 93.5% had not been members of a representative body in their previous employment, 75.9% of these being non-members because they did not wish to belong to the representative bodies that existed, and 24.1% because there was no representative body available for them to join. Of these latter staff, 31% had joined either the Staff Association or BIFU after joining the bank but had subsequently all left, and of the 2 non-members, both male, who had previously been in a union in previous employment, only one had tried BIFU after joining the bank and had also subsequently left. Thus these figures do clearly suggest that if a person is not a member of a representative body in his or her previous employment, then they are unlikely to subsequently become members, although some may sample such a body in their new employment, but then subsequently leave it.

3.3.12. It is interesting that 71.4% of the Staff Association members who had been previously employed elsewhere were people who had not been members of a representative body in their previous employment, and 80% of these members were people who had had the option of joining a representative body in their previous employment. This suggests that the Staff Association may serve a valuable purpose in attracting people into membership of a collective bargaining organisation who otherwise would remain outside a more 'unionate' (8) organisation. Of the BIFU members, a slight majority had been in a union in their previous employment and

it might well be expected that individuals who had previous experience of union membership would be attracted to the more 'unionate' organisation. However, it is perhaps surprising that an equal number, eight staff in both the Staff Association and BIFU, should have been union members in their previous employment, as one might well have expected a clear majority of such staff to be in BIFU. The only other area of interest is that the three male staff who were in both the Staff Association and BIFU had all been union members in their previous employment, which implies a particularly marked impact on their psyches of the value of union membership to lead them into becoming members of both the representative bodies available to them in the Bank.

3.3.13. The other main question dealing with background information about the respondents in the first part of the questionnaire, question 7, (there being further information later - 3.10.1.-3.12.4. - concerning their social and educational backgrounds), concerns the period of time it took for them to become members of their respective representative bodies. Again, the percentages are probably best represented in tabular form, including in the figures for each representative body, those in both bodies, and those non-members who had at some point been members of either or both representative bodies.

TABLE 7

Length of time taken to join representative bodies

	<u>SA</u>		<u>BIFU</u>	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Immediately (Total) (within 1 month of entry)	35.7%	32.7%	32.8%	30.2%
<u>Split</u>				
Voluntary decision	70.0%	46.9%	56.5%	30.8%
Influence of others	30.0%	53.1%	43.5%	69.2%
Within 2 years (outside first month of service)	51.1%	50.0%	44.3%	60.5%
Over 2 years	13.2%	17.3%	22.9%	9.3%

These figures provide a clear, overall pattern to the membership behaviour of staff in joining both representative bodies, irrespective of whether the staff are male or female, in that the largest group of staff in all categories, and indeed an overall majority of the staff, decide to join a representative body within their first two years of service, thus bearing out the hypothesis . (1.2.6.) with most joining after their first month of service. Of those joining in this period, the males and females in the Staff Association are almost equally split in their preference for this time-scale whereas females in BIFU are significantly more likely to join in this period than the male members. The next most common period for entry is within the first month of service with a very similar number of both male and female staff in both the Staff Association and BIFU joining at this time. However the females in both groups, particularly those joining BIFU, are significantly more likely to be influenced by another person, a more senior member of staff, or by their peers, to

join, than the male staff who in both the Staff Association and BIFU, but perhaps surprisingly, seemingly more commonly in the Staff Association, are likely to make up their own minds about joining a representative body. The least common period for deciding to join is after two years service, but it is interesting that whilst female members of BIFU are the least likely group of staff to join during this period, nearly a quarter of the male members of BIFU are likely to join at this time, which may be due to a variety of reasons, perhaps their longer-term view of their careers with the Bank leading to a more leisurely pace for joining, or a desire to make sure that they are making the right choice, or simply that the merits of BIFU as a representative body take longer to filter through to employees for whatever reason, or as suggested earlier that it takes longer for staff to acquire the confidence to join BIFU.

3.4.0. Why do employees join representative bodies?

3.4.1. The next group of questions, 8-14, were asked to discover why people joined and left either of the representative bodies, or did not join at all, and whether they were satisfied with the operations of these bodies, and how far they actually played an active part in them by attending meetings. The complexity of the numerical analysis carried out on the answers to question 8, which provides the answers to the first of these questions, can be judged from examining the appendices. For the purposes of this narrative analysis it seems fair to count the responses of ex-members in with those of current members in both the overall analysis, which will come first, and then the examination of any significant regional differences in the sample. The

ex-members' responses will be siphoned out finally to examine whether any type of reason for initially joining is more likely to hold within it the seeds of later leaving behaviour than others.

3.4.2. Table 8, below, gives the main overall reasons with over 2% of respondents in the sample, of both current members and ex-members, for joining the representative bodies, with a percentage split of Staff Association and BIFU membership, each followed by their male/female split.

TABLE 8

Reasons for 224 staff joining representative bodies

Reason (in order of popularity)	Total %	SA(M/F) %	BIFU(M/F) %
1.Conviction of need for membership of particular representative body which is best able to protect interests, improve conditions, in their opinion, based on rational choice having weighed up the alternatives.	29.1	45.8(60.5/39.5)	54.2(80.0/20.0)
2.Decision based on advantages offered by SA/BIFU representative.	19.6	58.9(21.2/78.8)	41.1(43.5/56.5)
3.Pressure from superiors.	11.6	39.4(53.8/46.1)	60.6(55.0/45.0)
4.Because peers in it, desire to conform, join representative body that colleagues felt to be of value.	10.2	75.9(54.5/45.5)	24.1(42.9/57.1)
5.Discounts available.	4.9	92.9(69.2/30.8)	7.1(100/0)
6.Combination of 1 and 5 above.	3.2	77.8(14.3/85.7)	22.2(100/0)
7.Combination of 2 and 5 above.	2.8	100(50/50)	-
8.Received letter/ leaflet explaining advantages.	2.5	100(28.6/71.4)	-
9.Combination of 2 and 4 above.	2.1	83.3(20/80)	16.7(0/100)
Others (see appendices)	86.0		
Total	100.0		

All the other reasons given had under 2% of the sample supporting each of them and the details of these can be found in the Regional Appendices 2-4.

3.4.3. It is, perhaps, consoling for the representative bodies that the largest group of staff joined through personal conviction of the value of belonging to a particular body. It is probably not surprising that the majority of these should be in BIFU rather than the Staff Association, but it might be felt a little surprising that nearly 46% of Staff Association members in this largest group should be members through personal conviction, since there is a tendency to regard Staff Association membership as primarily due to more materially beneficial factors such as attractive discounts on consumer goods. The clear majority of male staff in this category, in both the Staff Association and BIFU groupings, is perhaps not surprising, but the fallacy of considering females much more likely than males to be attracted into membership purely by discounts on material goods, is shown in reason 5, where over twice as many men as women were attracted into membership by discounts.

3.4.4. The value of the representative bodies employing staff to go round the branches, encouraging membership, and personally outlining the value and advantages of membership, is illustrated by the fact that nearly 20% of members join because of such a personal approach. Women in particular are attracted into both bodies by this means, especially into the Staff Association. The receipt of a letter or leaflet outlining the advantages of membership also attracts

women into the Staff Association far more than men but a far smaller number of members overall are attracted by this latter means which is only eighth in the order of priority of reasons given for joining.

3.4.5. It is perhaps surprising to find that 'pressure from superiors' is a much more common reason for members to join BIFU than the SA, but perhaps it is not so surprising that a majority of both SA and BIFU members in this category are male, as concern for their career progress might well be expected to lead them into following their superiors' advice. An explanation for more staff becoming members of BIFU than the SA through pressure from superiors might well lie in the fact that, as shown earlier, (3.3.10), the largest percentage of any grade's staff, in BIFU, are at the Appointed staff level, and it is these Appointed staff who would be most likely to be the 'superiors' applying pressure to join, as their everyday contact with staff is much greater than those at a Managerial level. Such pressure would probably be stronger and the level of conviction of the value of membership higher from staff in BIFU, rather than the SA, at this level, as they would be likely to be aware of their minority membership position in the bank as a whole and thus be keen to encourage membership. It is because of the inherent, and opposite, implications of this same factor, the much larger membership of the SA in the Bank, that it is not surprising that over three times as many staff are attracted into membership of the SA than of BIFU, through the fact of their colleagues', their peer group's, general preference for the SA.

3.4.6. It is interesting to note the combination of personal conviction and materialism embodied in the reasoning for joining in the sixth largest reason-grouping. In the seventh largest grouping it may well be that the advantages offered by the SA or BIFU representative, which appealed, were the discounts, but the two were inextricably linked in the replies given to the question. The power of the combined influence of pressure (from colleagues and representative body representatives whose individual powers are illustrated above) to join one of the two bodies, particularly the SA, and particularly amongst women in both the SA and BIFU, is illustrated in the ninth and final grouping for reasons for joining the two bodies.

3.4.7. If we siphon out the 57 ex-members' reasons for joining, which are shown in Appendix 1, as promised earlier (3.4.1.), it is interesting that the largest single group (17, 28.8%) had joined because of pressure from superiors, 64.7% having been in BIFU and 35.3% in the SA. These figures back up the hypothesis (question 10 hypothesis, 1.2.8.) that such personal pressure would be the least stable of reasons for joining a representative body, and would eventually be the most likely single reason to lead to an individual resigning his or her membership of that body. An exactly similar number of ex-members (17, 28.8%) left after initially being persuaded to join by a combination of persuasion from one of the representative body's staff (10, 16.9%)

and the desire to be in the same representative body as their peers (7, 11.9%). It is perhaps surprising that as many as 12, 20.3% of ex-members, should have left after expressing their original reason for joining as a conviction of the need for membership - this illustrates the fact that conviction can be altered by the experience of membership of a representative body, and shows the need for the Bank's representative bodies to continually find out, and provide, the requirements of their members, if they are to maintain their membership after initial enrolment.

3.4.8. As the final part of this analysis the regional distribution of these reasons for joining representative bodies will be examined, to see if there are any particularly interesting differences in Table 9 below.

TABLE 9

Regional distribution of reasons for joining a representative body

Reasons (as in Table 8)	London %	Regional Position	S-East %	Regional Position	N-West %	Regional Position
1. Conviction of need for membership of particular representative body which is best able to protect interests, improve conditions, in their opinion, based on rational choice having weighed up the alternatives.	20.0	(1)	28.4	(1)	33.7	(1)
2. Decision based on advantages offered by SA/BIFU representative.	17.9	(2)	22.1	(2)	16.8	(3)
3. Pressure from superiors.	6.3	(5)	6.3	(4=)	21.1	(2)
4. Because peers in it, desire to conform, join representative body that colleagues felt to be of value.	9.5	(3)	11.6	(3)	9.5	(4)
5. Discounts available.	7.4	(4)	6.3	(4=)	-	(8=)
6. Combination of 1 and 5 above.	1.0	(9)	6.3	(4=)	3.2	(5)
7. Combination of 2 and 5 above.	5.3	(6=)	5.3	(7)	-	(8=)
8. Received letter/leaflet explaining advantages.	5.3	(6=)	1.0	(9)	1.0	(7)
9. Combination of 2 and 4 above.	<u>4.2</u>	(8)	<u>2.1</u>	(8)	<u>2.1</u>	(6)
Total	76.9		89.4		87.4	
Others (see Appendices)	<u>24.0</u>		<u>10.6</u>		<u>10.8</u>	
	100.0		100.0		100.0	

These figures are based on 95 staff in each region who gave reasons for joining a representative body.

It will be noted that the number of staff covered by the nine reasons, with over 2% of the overall sample supporting them, in Table 9, is only 76% in London compared with 89.4% in the South-East and 87.4% in the North-West, but this is accounted for by the higher number of small group combination reasons in the London region which can be seen in Appendix 2.

- 3.4.9. The London and South-East regions are very similar in their ranking of the various reasons given for joining, but the number joining, purely through conviction, or persuasion by representative body staff, is higher in the South-East than in London. The other main difference between these two regions is the larger percentage attracted into membership by the somewhat unusual combination of conviction and discounts in the South-East, and the larger number attracted by receipt of a letter or leaflet explaining the advantages of membership, in London.
- 3.4.10. In the North-West over a third of the members in the region held a personal conviction of the need to join a representative body, an even larger number than in the South-East, which is probably explained by the significantly higher BIFU membership there. A much higher percentage were influenced into becoming members by pressure from superiors in the North-West region than in either London or the South-East regions which again fits with the earlier finding that this reason is more commonly given by BIFU rather than SA members (3.4.5.).

A similar percentage to that in London joined in the North-West due to persuasion from representative body staff, or because their colleagues were in a particular body, whereas the South-East had more staff joining for both these reasons. An equally low percentage to that of the South-East's staff joined in the North-West because of the receipt of a letter or leaflet, as well as the combination of persuasion from representative body staff and joining the body their colleagues were in. However, no-one in the North-West was attracted into membership purely by discounts, or by their combination with the persuasion of representative body staff, whereas over 5% of staff in both London and the South-East were attracted by both these reasons. The major reason for this would seem to lie in the lack of interest in discounts from BIFU staff, and the latter's preponderance in the North-West region, the only attraction at all from discounts in the North-West being in their combination with a personal conviction of the value of joining and a small percentage, larger than in London but smaller than in the South-East, joined for this reason.

3.5.0. Why do employees belong to one representative body rather than the other?

3.5.1. This question was asked of the 224 current members of BIFU and the Staff Association in the sample in order to ascertain the perceived gains for staff in belonging to one body rather than the other. The overall figures are given in the following table.

TABLE 10

Advantages for the 224 members in belonging to their particular representative body

Reason (in order of popularity)	Total(%)	SA(M/F)(%)	BIFU(M/F)(%)
1.Preference for BIFU as stronger, independent, negotiating body.	21.9	-	100(77.6/22.4)
2.Desire to belong to particular representative body as better gains from pay rises, discounts, protection.	15.2	67.6(39.1/60.9)	32.4(54.5/45.5)
3.Preference for SA as representative body solely concerned with bank staff.	14.7	100(48.5/51.4)	-
4.Antipathy to unions, and hence BIFU, because 'too powerful' or 'strike-prone'.	11.2	100(40/60)	-
5.Desire to belong to a representative body, no positive, perceived gains otherwise.	9.8	86.4(36.8/63.2)	13.6(0/100)
6.Member of both representative bodies.	4.5	90% male 10% female	
7=. Antipathy to perceived militancy of BIFU.	4.0	100(55.6/44.4)	-
7=.Feeling that SA representatives, as Bank employees, work better with the employers in negotiations to the benefit of staff - less antagonistic, more realistic approach, closer understanding.	4.0	100(88.9/11.1)	-
9.Subscriptions lower in SA.	3.1	100(57.1/42.9)	-

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TABLE 10 cont'd

Advantages for the 224 members in belonging to their particular representative body

Reason (in order of popularity)	Total(%)	SA(M/F)(%)	BIFU(M/F)(%)
10=.Preference for BIFU as more efficient and professional organisation.	2.2	-	100(80/20)
10=.Not aware of any advantages in being SA member, thinking of cancelling membership.	<u>2.2</u>	100(20/80)	-
Total	92.8		
Others (see appendices)	<u>7.2</u>		
	100.0		

All the other reasons given had under 2% of the sample supporting each of them and the details of these can be found in the Regional Appendices 2-4.

3.5.2. It may appear surprising that a preference for BIFU as a 'stronger, independent, negotiating body' should be the largest group, with over 20% of current members belonging to it, given the much lower membership of BIFU, both in the sample and in actuality, in the Domestic Banking Division, relative to the SA. However, as can be seen from the table, the division of opinion amongst BIFU members was much narrower than that of the SA membership's and the majority of it was concentrated in this category as was thought likely (question 8 and 9 hypothesis 1.2.7.).

3.5.3. It is perhaps gratifying both for the representative bodies and for the advocates of the value of representative bodies as an aid to good industrial relations that the majority of the preferences stated were positive reasons, based on the perceived value of membership of the particular body, rather than purely negative reactions to unions generally (reason 4), or BIFU in particular (reason 7=). It is interesting that only 3% of members should state that they were influenced by the lower subscriptions required by the SA for membership, (although the exact accuracy of this figure is hard to judge since people are probably generally reluctant to give such 'materialistic' reasons). It is interesting too that a majority of these should be male staff, as the inequality of membership fees is often put forward, particularly by BIFU, as a significant reason for their minority membership position, and as a particular attraction to females.

The fact that 90% of those who are members of both representative bodies are males is hardly surprising as membership of the two representative bodies and the payment of two membership subscriptions per month is only likely to appeal to the more long-serving, career-orientated male bank staff.

3.5.4. The regional distribution of preferences, below, shows up some interesting, and perhaps predictable, differences between the regions.

TABLE 11

Regional distribution of advantages for belonging to a particular representative body

Reasons (as in Table 10)	London (%)	Regional Position	S-East (%)	Regional Position	N-West (%)	Regional Position
1. Preference for BIFU as stronger, independent, negotiating body.	9.0	(5)	9.9	(4)	52.2	(1)
2. Desire to belong to particular representative body as better gains from pay rises, discounts, protection.	9.2	(4)	23.5	(1)	11.9	(2)
3. Preference for SA as representative body solely concerned with Bank Staff.	22.4	(1)	14.8	(3)	6.0	(4)
4. Antipathy to unions, and hence BIFU, because 'too powerful' or 'strike-prone'.	11.8	(3)	18.5	(2)	1.5	(8=)
5. Desire to belong to a representative body, no positive, perceived gains otherwise.	14.5	(2)	4.9	(5=)	10.4	(3)
6. Member of both representative bodies.	6.6	(6)	3.7	(8=)	3.0	(6=)
7 =. Antipathy to perceived militancy of BIFU.	5.3	(7=)	4.9	(5=)	1.5	(8=)
7 =. Feeling that SA representatives, as Bank employees, work better with the employers in negotiations to the benefit of staff - less antagonistic, more realistic approach, closer understanding.	2.6	(9)	4.9	(5=)	4.5	(5)
9. Subscriptions lower in SA.	5.3	(7=)	3.7	(8=)	-	(11)

TABLE 11 cont'd

Regional distribution of advantages of belonging to a particular representative body

Reasons (as in Table 10)	London (%)	Regional Position	S-East (%)	Regional Position	N-West (%)	Regional Position
10=. Preference for BIFU as more efficient and professional organisation.	1.3	(10=)	2.5	(11)	3.0	(6)
10=.Not aware of any advantages in being SA member, thinking of cancelling membership.	<u>1.3</u>	(10=)	<u>3.7</u>	(8=)	<u>1.5</u>	(8=)
Total	89.3		95.0		95.5	
Others (see Appendices)	<u>10.7</u>		<u>5.0</u>		<u>4.5</u>	
	100.0		100.0		100.0	

3.5.5. The differences between the regions in the distribution of the first four preferences are the most interesting and worthy of comment. The fact that half the North-West's current membership should prefer BIFU due to its being a 'stronger, independent, negotiating body' whereas under 10% of staff in London and the South-East gave this reason, a highly significant difference, is hardly surprising given the far greater BIFU membership in the North-West than in the other two regions. The far more pro-union attitudes of this area also account for the minimal general anti-union feelings in the North-West compared with the South-East, in particular, and London, shown in reason 4, as well as for the total lack of appeal of the SA's lower subscriptions (reason 9). The much higher numbers in the South-East than in London preferring membership due to 'better gains from pay rises, discounts, protection', and the higher number preferring the SA 'as a representative body solely concerned with Bank staff' in London than the South-East illustrate interesting divergencies of opinion, and perhaps suggest a more materialistic scale of judgement amongst South-East staff as opposed to a greater concern for a separate identity and maintenance of independence in negotiations from other Banks amongst London-based staff.

3.6.0.Why do employees leave a representative body after becoming members?

3.6.1.Of the total sample interviewed, 58 staff - 14.3% - had been members of the SA or BIFU but had subsequently left. However, 59 reasons were given as one of these staff had been a member of both bodies and gave a separate reason for leaving each of them. Of these staff 46.6% (27) had been in the SA and 51.7% (30) had been in BIFU, whilst one had been in both bodies - 1.7%. It is interesting to note the fairly equal disillusionment, as judged by the indicator of ceasing membership, with both bodies.

3.6.2.Table 12 below gives the main reasons for ceasing membership. The term 'ex-NUBE' is used as this was the union's title before it was changed to BIFU in April 1979 (see 2.6.7.) and most staff would have left it when it was NUBE.

TABLE 12

Reasons for 59 staff ceasing membership of their particular representative body

Reason (in order of popularity)	Total (%)	ex-SA(M/F)(%)	ex-NUBE(M/F)(%)
1. Had not gained any perceived benefits so no point in continuing to be a member, could not see any benefit in joining alternative representative body.	22.0	76.9(40/60)	23.1(0/100)
2=.Subscriptions increased, felt too expensive for perceived benefits.	15.3	22.2(0/100)	77.8(28.6/71.4)
2=.Membership lapsed (due to external reasons, involuntarily, see area analyses) and did not bother to renew it, not interested in alternative body.	15.3	44.4(50/50)	55.6(0/100)
4=.Left representative body to reduce overall financial commitments.	6.8	50.0(100/0)	50.0(100/0)
4=.Happy in job, no grievances, so could see no value in continuing membership of a representative body.	6.8	50.0(0/100)	50.0(100/0)
6=.No perceived benefit from split negotiating structure and angered by it.	5.1	-	100.0(100/0)
6=.Left SA as in 1977 held out for higher pay rise for 6 months and then settled for original offer, did not want to join NUBE.	5.1	100.0(0/100)	-
Total	76.4		
Others (see appendices)	23.6		
	100.0		

Again all the other reasons given had under 2% of the sample supporting them and the details of these can be found in the Regional Appendices 2-4.

3.6.3. The emphasis on a materialistic, 'value for money'

assessment of membership is interesting, and, in the majority of reasons given for leaving, it is a failure of the benefits received from membership to match expectations which leads to the staff ceasing to be members of both the representative bodies. It is interesting that over three-quarters of those in the largest group who could see 'no point in continuing to be a member' as they 'had not gained any perceived benefits' were disillusioned with the Staff Association, and that a clear majority of those disillusioned with either body, for this reason, were women. It suggests a possible need for a higher profile from the Staff Association in gaining benefits for women or publicising those benefits more clearly.

3.6.4. The problem of the higher subscriptions charged by

BIFU is reflected in the fact that over three-quarters of those in the second largest group, who gave an increase in subscriptions as their reason for leaving, had left BIFU, and a clear majority of these were women. It is interesting, though, that they were not attracted into the SA by its lower subscriptions. The lapsing of membership due largely to members temporarily leaving the bank or intending to leave is, not surprisingly, most common amongst female staff and both bodies suffer fairly evenly from members being lost for this reason. The fact that such staff were not motivated to rejoin illustrates a lack of perceived benefits from membership.

The fact that all those who left in order to reduce financial commitments were males is interesting - often marriage was mentioned as causing the need for this expenditure reduction. It is interesting that the two members of staff who left NUBE due to their happiness in their jobs and lack of grievances should be a manager and an appointed officer which may also reflect a certain feeling of a lack of appropriateness, or need for, belonging to NUBE in a successful career. However, the fact that only two did this shows that it is not a common reason, as is commonly hypothesised (question 10 hypothesis, 1.2.8.). It is also interesting that it was only male members of NUBE who gave their reason for leaving as anger with the split negotiating structure. The desire for acquiring cash in the hand from pay negotiations at the earliest opportunity amongst some female members of the SA, and their disapproval of the SA's tactics in 1977, which delayed a pay rise, is also illustrated by the figures in Table 12.

3.6.5. There is little point in providing a regional comparison for these figures as they are very small as individual regional samples, and also disproportionately distributed amongst the three regions. In fact this latter point is worthy of comment as 22.8% of staff in the North-West in the sample had ceased to be members of a representative body, whereas only 11.2% of staff in London, and 9.9% of staff in the South-East, had given up being members of a representative body after joining

one. This difference may well reflect the more apathetic, less questioning attitude of staff in London and the South-East, who are more likely to unquestionably stay in a representative body, more commonly the SA, once they are recruited, whereas a representative body has to be seen to produce tangible benefits and thus provide value for money, if membership is to be continued, in the North-West, where there appears to be a more critical attitude to both bodies - of the 22.8% who had ceased membership in the North-West 60.7% had been in NUBE, and 39.3% in the SA.

3.6.6. As there were only 24 staff in the sample who had left one representative body and then joined the other, including some who had later even reverted back to their original body, and their reasons, given in answer to question 12, are very much fragmented, there seems little value in reproducing the figures either nationally or divisionally in tabular percentage form. However, a few comments will be made here about the reasons given, the details of which can be found in Appendices 1-4. Before doing this it is probably best to comment here on Blackburn's (9) 'football team' analogy contained in the Hypotheses (question 11 hypothesis 1.2.9.). This is that if a bank employee has been a member of one of the representative bodies he or she is unlikely to join its nearest rival if, for some reason, disillusionment with the initial choice of body leads to a desire to leave. The evidence of this survey would suggest a

certain amount of support for this contention as 61 (the 58 previously considered (3.6.1.-3.6.4.) plus 3 who left NUBE for a period but later rejoined it) of the 85 staff who had left one of the two bodies, 71.8%, did not join its rival. However, the fact that 28.2% did leave and join the rival body, even if some ultimately returned to their original body, shows that a substantial number of staff can be attracted by the rival representative body. Thus, whilst the survey evidence would suggest that the majority of staff who leave one of the representative bodies will not join its rival, particular reasons may occur to change the allegiances of some staff to membership of the rival body.

3.6.7. Amongst these staff the major single reason for leaving one body for another was amongst those leaving the SA for BIFU because they wanted to be represented by what they perceived as a completely independent body which they felt would be more likely to be successful in negotiations. This attracted 25.9%, 7, of this group of 24 staff, and it is very interesting that the six male staff amongst them were all Managerial or Appointed staff, which shows that career or promotion prospects do not only lead, as hypothesised (question 10 hypothesis 1.2.8.) to a drain of membership from BIFU to the theoretically more 'acceptable' representative body to the employers, the Staff Association. Indeed, if

the answers given by Managerial and Appointed staff who have changed representative bodies are examined, they show that of these 9 staff, 6 had left the SA for NUBE (and, in addition, one other had left NUBE for the SA and then returned to NUBE,) and only 3 had left NUBE for the SA. There would thus appear to be at least an equal and, from this evidence, a rather better than equal chance, that staff who are of Managerial and Appointed status will change allegiance to BIFU as much as to the SA, which refutes the hypothesis (question 10 hypothesis 1.2.8.) that the movement of such staff is likely to be only towards the Staff Association.

3.6.8. The only other two reasons for a change of allegiance which were discovered were, firstly, the pressure of persuasion to change by a NUBE branch representative in 11.1% of cases, all female, combined with the feeling of wanting to be in the same representative body as the majority of their colleagues, which illustrates the value of ensuring the branch representative system is efficiently organised and that a representative is properly appointed in each branch. The second reason was the feeling that BIFU's affiliation to the TUC is too extreme and that the TUC is too politically involved which was given in 7.4% of cases, both Managerial males.

3.7.0. Why do employees not join either representative body?

3.7.1. Given the fact that staff in the Bank have a choice of joining two representative bodies with quite distinct

ideologies, some people may be surprised that all the staff are not catered for by one body or the other, and that there are a substantial number of staff who have never been members of either body. On the other hand, some may be surprised that there are not more non-members, given the divided state of staff representation and the continuing feud between the SA and BIFU. In this sample, 30.8% of the staff interviewed (125) had never been a member of either body and the major reasons for this are given on the next page.

TABLE 13

Reasons for 125 staff not being a member of either representative body

Reason (in order of popularity)	Total (%)	M/F (%)
1. No real benefits in being a member, not aware of any value in belonging.	30.4	21.1/78.9
2. Have not found out enough about the 2 bodies yet to make a proper decision on whether to join either body or not join at all.	19.2	37.5/62.5
3. Antipathy to representative bodies because too 'powerful', 'militant', or 'strike-prone'.	16.8	42.9/57.1
4. Not yet member of permanent staff, no point in joining representative body until is, or part-timer so no point in joining.	12.8	50/50
5. Wants to see single, united representative body, no point in becoming member of either part of split representation.	5.6	57.1/42.9
6. Get same benefits whether member or not, would join if only got benefits if a member.	4.8	33.3/66.7
7. If subscription rates cheaper or free would join one of bodies.	2.4	0/100
Total	92.0	
Others (see Appendices)	8.0	
	100.0	

All the other reasons given had under 2% of the sample supporting each of them and the details of these can be found in the Regional Appendices 2-4.

3.7.2. Perhaps the first point to note is the clear majority of women in 5 of the 7 categories and their clear majority representation amongst staff who have never been members of either body, 65.6% as compared with 34.4% who are males, which fits with the earlier findings that female staff are more likely to be non-members than male staff (3.3.4.).

3.7.3. The biggest grouping illustrates that a lack of awareness of any benefits from membership is the main reason for staff being non-members. This may be due to a lack of publicity by the representative bodies of the material gains they have achieved for members, or to a feeling that the benefits are no better than the employer would anyway have given them. Certainly it suggests the need for the representative bodies to give a higher profile to publicising their achievements to non-members, and this might partly be achieved by ensuring the appointment of an active branch representative in every branch to distribute such information to known non-members. The fact that each representative body does not have a representative in each branch is a problem commented on later (3.8.1.). The need for greater availability of information, from both bodies, on their structure, activities, and achievements, is further illustrated by the second largest grouping. The third largest group illustrates a fairly strong anti-union bias and are probably staff who would never be attracted into representative body membership at any

time. Of the fourth group, only 3 of the 16 staff in it were part-timers, and the other 13, who were all young recruits in their 6-month probationary period, would probably, along with staff in the second group, be most ripe for recruitment once accepted onto the permanent staff. The disenchantment with the existing split representation is illustrated by the fifth largest group of respondents and it is interesting that this is the only group with a male majority. The sixth largest group provide an argument for the value of closed-shop agreements, as there is obviously no imperative to join a representative body if staff get the same benefits as those negotiated by their representative bodies even if they are not members of those bodies. The final group might be said to illustrate a 'something for nothing' syndrome, but equally may reflect the need for publicity by the representative bodies of the financial costs of effective representation.

3.7.4. Before examining the regional distribution of reasons for non-membership, Table 14 below, it is interesting to note that 47.2% of the staff who have never been members of either body come from the London region compared with 28.8% from the South-East and 24% from the North-West. This may well be accounted for by a more temporary, less career-orientated, approach to Bank work and work generally in London. The fact that

the North-West has the smallest number of such staff is probably commensurate with its being the most unionate of the three regions, and as the region with the highest unemployment of the three when the survey was conducted, the one which would have the most career-orientated staff.

TABLE 14

Regional distribution of reasons for not belonging to either representative body

Reasons (as in Table 13)	London (%)	Regional Position	S-East (%)	Regional Position	N-West (%)	Regional Position
1. No real benefits in being a member, not aware of any value in belonging.	40.7	(1)	16.7	(3)	26.7	(1=)
2. Have not found out enough about the two bodies yet to make a proper decision on whether to join either body or not join at all.	16.9	(3)	30.6	(1)	10.0	(4)
3. Antipathy to representative bodies because too 'powerful', 'militant', or 'strike-prone'.	8.5	(4)	22.2	(2)	26.7	(1=)
4. Not yet member of permanent staff, no point in joining representative body until is, or part-timer so no point in joining.	18.6	(2)	8.3	(4=)	6.7	(5=)
5. Wants to see single, united representative body, no point in becoming member of either part of split representation.	3.4	(5)	-	(7)	16.7	(3)
6. Get same benefits whether member or not, would join if only got benefits if a member.	1.7	(6=)	8.3	(4=)	6.7	(5=)
7. If subscription rates cheaper or free would join one of bodies.	1.7	(6=)	5.6	(6)	-	(7)
Total	91.5		91.7		93.5	
Others (see appendices)	8.5		8.3		6.5	
	100.0		100.0		100.0	

3.7.5. The distribution of the first two reason-groupings would appear to show that the representative bodies have to do the most advertising and convincing of their value in London and the South-East, but the fact that 'no real benefits in being a member' ranks first equal in the North-West shows there is also work to be done there. It is not surprising to find that 'antipathy to representative bodies' because they are perceived as 'too powerful', 'militant' or 'strike-prone' is strongest in the North-West, given BIFU's supremacy there and its more radical image and approach to industrial relations in the banks. It is also not surprising that anger with split representation is higher in this region given the preference for stronger representation illustrated by the significantly higher BIFU membership in the North-West. The only other point of note is that the largest number of probationary staff were in the London area which perhaps, again, reflects London's more fluid labour market and more rapid labour turnover.

3.8.0. Are members satisfied or dissatisfied with their representative bodies?

3.8.1. Of the 233 employees (some staff counting twice as they were members of both bodies, hence this figure) in the two representative bodies, a majority - 159, 68.2% - were satisfied with the organisation and performance of the two representative bodies. 103 of the 152 SA members were satisfied, 67.8%, and 56 of the 81 BIFU members were satisfied, 69.1%, remarkably similar

proportions. Of the other 74 staff, 21 were undecided, almost unanimously, as to whether they were satisfied or dissatisfied with the Staff Association. There was one member of both bodies who joined 8 of this group in being 'unable to give an opinion due to never taking an active role' but he was the only BIFU member in this undecided category, and the rest of the group - 13 - were all SA members who 'don't know enough about how the SA is organised to give an opinion, due to a lack of communication' either from the central organisation, or their local branch representative, or through not having a local branch representative. The other 53 staff members who were almost equally divided between the SA and BIFU were dissatisfied with the organisation and performance of the two bodies for the reasons given in Table 15 below. A clear majority of these staff in both groups were male, 77.4% overall.

TABLE 15

Reasons for the dissatisfaction of 53 staff with the organisation and performance of the representative bodies

Reasons (in order of popularity)	Total (%)	SA(M/F)(%)	BIFU(M/F)(%)
1.Dislike of in-fighting of SA and BIFU, should be one united representative body.	22.6	38.5(40/60)	61.5(100/0)
2.Not enough direct contact with membership to find out members' views on issues.	17.0	33.3(100/0)	66.7(50/50)
3.Not enough information on what representative body doing, showing advantages of being in it, particularly about the progress of negotiations.	13.2	71.4(80/20)	28.6(50/50)
4=SA too slow in getting speedy answers to problems - dislike of bureaucratic committee structure of SA and issues 'being left on the table'.	5.7	100(100/0)	-
4=.Dislikes SA seconded officials being paid by bank as feel reps. paid by employer cannot adequately represent staff.	5.7	100(100/0)	-
Total	64.2		
Others (see appendices)	35.8		
	100.0		

All the other reasons given had under 2% of the sample supporting each of them and the details of these can be found in the Regional Appendices 2-4.

3.8.2. Thus the largest group of dissatisfied members were dissatisfied with the split representation and the in-fighting between the SA and BIFU and it is interesting that of the 9 male staff giving this reason, five were Managerial or Appointed staff. The feeling that there is not enough direct contact and consultation with members to find out their views on issues is stronger amongst BIFU than SA members, but the feeling that there is not enough information given to members about what the representative body is doing, and the progress of negotiations, is much stronger amongst the SA members, particularly amongst the male members, than amongst the BIFU members. The other two single reason groups which appear in the above analysis both illustrate male membership dissatisfaction with the SA, and it is interesting that two of the three staff complaining of the slowness of the SA in getting speedy answers to problems were branch representatives, and that two of the three staff disliking SA officials being paid by the Bank were Managerial or Appointed staff. A large percentage of the reasons - 35.8% - were particular individual dissatisfactions, and because of this, and the relative smallness of the sample group, and its unequal distribution amongst the regions, there is little value in producing a regional comparison table, but these individual reasons and their distribution can be found in the Appendices 1-4.

3.9.0.Do staff attend local meetings of their representative bodies?

3.9.1. The clear answer from the sample in answer to this question (question 14 in Appendix 1) is that the vast majority of staff do not take an active role in their representative bodies at a local level by attending local branch meetings. This result is not surprising given the generally negative, non-participative reactions found elsewhere by other researchers (see Chapter 4, 4.3.4.). Of the 224 current members of the two representative bodies, 212, 94.6%, did not attend local branch meetings and they included ten branch representatives, five from each body, who did not attend. Only 22 staff in the three regions said they took an active role in their representative organisations and 20 of these were branch representatives. In the 18 branches visited, only half had SA representatives and ten had BIFU representatives, one large branch in the North-West having two BIFU representatives. Hence the earlier comment (3.7.3.) that the representative bodies need to tighten up and increase their appointments of local representatives. The views of these representatives on their role, and their attitudes to that role, will be examined after the main analysis of the questionnaires (3.17.1.-3.17.6.) but it does seem disturbing that nearly half the representatives who had taken on this function did not feel bound to attend local branch meetings to represent their members' views on issues, and to find out what the particular

body was doing at a local level, particularly in view of the almost complete lack of attendance of rank and file members at such meetings.

3.9.2. The 212 members who did not go to meetings were almost equally split between male and female staff, 51.9% male and 48.1% female, and thus, although most of the branch representatives, 17 of the 20, and the other two non-representative staff taking an active role in their organisations, were male, which tends to bear out the hypothesis (question 14 hypothesis 1.2.12) that male staff would be more likely to take an active role, it could hardly be said to be borne out very convincingly. The reasons for members not attending meetings are given on the next page.

TABLE 16

Reasons for 212 members of representative bodies not attending local branch meetings

Reasons(in order of popularity)	Total(%)	SA(M/F)(%)	BIFU(M/F)(%)
1.No interest, strong reason to go, knows representative body there if needed.	28.9	61.9(30.8/69.2)	38.1(54.2/45.8)
2.Not enough time.	25.1	61.4(65.7/34.3)	38.6(77.3/22.7)
3.No meetings in branch, would have to travel too far to attend local area meetings.	19.4	64.3(55.6/44.4)	35.7(86.7/13.3)
4.Not aware of meetings, might go if was, particularly if held in the branch.	9.0	78.9(33.3/66.7)	21.1(50/50)
5.Pays subscriptions, happy to let others get on with actual participation and running of body.	6.6	60.0(50/50)	40.0(33.3/66.7)
6.Not aware of meetings, wouldn't go anyway.	6.2	84.6(27.3/72.7)	15.4(0/100)
7.Rely on staff representative to attend meetings and report back.	4.3	100(33.3/66.7)	-
Total	99.5		
Others (see appendices)	0.5		
	100.0		

3.9.3. The first comment that needs to be made is that, although this table gives the total joint reasons for both SA and BIFU members for not attending meetings, the order for individual tables for the SA and BIFU would be identical, except that in the SA table reason 6 would come before reason 5, and in the BIFU table reason 5 would come before reason 4.

3.9.4. It is interesting that the largest group of staff did not go simply because they felt no need to, happy in the knowledge that they could call on the services of the representative body if required. The fact that a clear majority of the members in both the SA and BIFU in the second largest group giving 'not enough time' as their reason for not attending were male staff, and that these included 13 staff, 24.5% of this group, who were of Managerial or Appointed status, and two representatives from both the SA and BIFU, is of note. Combined with the third largest reason-grouping, which again had 13 staff of Managerial or Appointed status, 31.7% of the group, and 3 SA and 2 BIFU representatives, again with a clear overall majority of male staff, particularly amongst BIFU members, who said that they did not go to meetings because there were not any in the branch and they would have to travel too far to attend area meetings, a dilemma is posed for both the staff representative bodies and the Bank employers. Are they happy with this extremely non-participative situation amongst members of the representative bodies or not? If the representative bodies want attendance

at meetings and involvement in their organisations to increase, it would seem, from the evidence of this study, that they need to negotiate rights for staff to attend branch or local area meetings during work time, as well as generally developing a better system of more easily attended branch level meetings, and if the employers wish to foster such participation and increase the democracy of these organisations, they will need to adopt a positive attitude to providing such facilities and time.

3.9.5. The fourth and sixth reason-groupings show that the grapevine of communication about when and where meetings are taking place could be improved in both representative bodies, particularly amongst female staff, and the fourth one also points up the fact that 9% of all members would probably attend branch level meetings which supports the comments above. The fifth largest group illustrates the fairly apathetic body of opinion which is usually found amongst the mass membership of most employee representative bodies, and is probably also present amongst members of the first and last groups. Indeed, the more cynical might say that apathy probably lies at the heart of all these reasons (they would probably call them 'excuses') since, if people were really keen to get to the presently available local meetings, they would make the effort. However, although the 'apathy-theory' of non-participation is possibly correct in many cases, if

the representative bodies and the employers do not make the effort to make active participation as easy as possible, i.e. preferably at local branch level and in working hours, then the chances of anything more than a small minority actively participating at meetings are remote.

3.9.6. The regional distribution of reasons for members of representative bodies not attending local branch meetings is given on the next page.

TABLE 17

Regional distribution of reasons for members of representative bodies not attending local branch meetings

Reasons (as in Table 16)	London (%)	Regional Position	S-East (%)	Regional Position	N-West (%)	Regional Position
1. No interest, strong reason to go, knows representative body there if needed.	27.4	(2)	23.7	(2)	37.1	(1)
2. Not enough time.	30.1	(1)	15.8	(3)	30.6	(2)
3. No meetings in branch, would have to travel too far to attend local area meetings.	13.7	(3)	27.6	(1)	16.1	(3)
4. Not aware of meetings, might go if was, particularly if held in the branch.	11.0	(4)	10.5	(4)	4.8	(5)
5. Pays subscriptions, happy to let others get on with actual participation and running of body.	8.2	(5)	3.9	(7)	8.1	(4)
6. Not aware of meetings, would not go anyway.	5.5	(6)	9.2	(5=)	3.2	(6)
7. Rely on staff representative to attend meetings and report back.	<u>2.7</u>	(7)	<u>9.2</u>	(5=)	<u>-</u>	(7)
Total	98.6		99.9		99.9	
Others (see appendices)	<u>1.4</u>		<u>0.1</u>		<u>0.1</u>	
	100.0		100.0		100.0	

It is interesting that the North-West, with its preponderant BIFU membership, should have the largest proportion of members with no 'strong reason to go' to meetings, because they were happy that their representative body was 'there if needed'. A much smaller proportion of staff in the South-East gave 'not enough time' as their reason for not attending meetings than members in the London and the North-West regions, but a much larger proportion than in these two areas, indeed the largest grouping in the South-East, gave the reason that there were 'no meetings in their branch' and that they 'would have to travel too far to attend local area meetings'. Lack of knowledge about the existence of meetings was much less of a reason for non-attendance in the North-West, than in London and the South-East, and reliance on the staff representative to attend meetings and report back was much less in the North-West, and in London, than in the South-East. The number of staff in the South-East who were happy to pay their subscriptions and let others get on with the actual participation in, and running of, their representative body was smaller than the almost identical percentages of staff, just over 8%, who were prepared to do this in London and the North-West.

3.10.0. The social background of staff related to their membership/non-membership of the representative bodies

3.10.1. The social class background of the staff (question 15) was ascertained in the most commonly used fashion, by asking respondents about their father's occupation and then using the government's census classification of occupations by class (10) to group the respondents. The total overall distribution of the sample by class is shown below with the distribution of the managerial and appointed staff amongst the classes and the male/female distribution.

TABLE 18
Overall distribution of respondents by class

Class	Total(%)	Managerial/appointed(%)	M/F(%)
Class 1	9.6	10.2	61.5/38.5
Class 2	40.4	49.1	42.1/57.9
Class 3 (non-manual)	8.4	10.2	47.1/52.9
Class 3 ³ (manual)	30.0	23.7	44.3/55.7
Class 4	5.9	3.4	54.2/45.8
Class 5	1.0	-	50/50
Unclassifiable	4.7	3.4	52.6/47.4
	100.0	100.0	

Those in the 'unclassifiable' category either could not provide the information necessary for classification, or were not willing to do so.

3.10.2. As banking is generally regarded as a prestigious occupation, it is perhaps surprising that only 50% of the recruits in the sample should be from Classes 1 and 2. Indeed, the fact that 36.9% of the sample

was from a manual background, 30% from Class 3 alone, was something of a surprise, but these facts illustrate that banking is seen as a preferred occupation by those from manual class backgrounds, probably as a form of upward social mobility as well as, certainly in the past, a secure, well-paid occupation. Their very considerable presence in the sample also illustrates that such a career is almost equally available to those born outside the top two 'professional' classifications and that the Bank recruits widely from applicants with a manual class background - some might argue that as only 6.9% of the sample were from Classes 4 and 5 that there is still a distinct bias to the top end of the manual scale, but then the problem of the lower level of educational attainments of children from these class backgrounds may well influence this situation.(11)

3.10.3. The fact that the proportions of Managerial/Appointed staff are distributed between the classes in virtually the same order as the total number of staff, in each category, is interesting, but it is clear from these figures that the chances of reaching a Managerial/Appointed position are proportionately greater in the top three classifications, than in the others, as might be expected. However the fact that 27.1% of those in Managerial/Appointed positions came from manual backgrounds would indicate that those with the ability can certainly reach the higher echelons. The fact that more staff from non-manual backgrounds reach these

positions may well be linked with the generally better educational opportunities enjoyed by these social classes.(11)

3.10.4.The male/female split amongst Classes 2 and 3 Non-Manual and Manual, amounting to 78.8% of the respondents, reflects the fairly even, but slightly female-weighted split, of the total sample, and the actual Domestic Banking staff distribution. Male staff are more prominent amongst those in Class 1, which would be expected, and there are slightly more, and an equal number, of males, in Classes 4 and 5 respectively, which, again, would be expected given the earlier marriage age and lower career orientation of females in these categories.(11)

3.10.5.The distribution of members and non-members of the two representative bodies between the social classes is also of considerable interest and is given below.

TABLE 19

Distribution of representative bodies' members and non-members by class

Class	SA (%)	BIFU (%)	Non-members (%)
Class 1	34.2	19.5	46.3
Class 2	39.4	18.8	41.8
Class 3 Non-manual	31.4	20.0	48.6
Class 3 Manual	36.0	19.2	44.8
Class 4	45.8	12.4	41.8
Class 5	40.0	20.0	40.0
Unclassifiable	23.8	33.3	42.9

3.10.6. These figures are of importance in the great debate, and split, which exists in industrial relations academic theory - which will be examined in detail in the final chapter of this thesis - between the 'industrial relations' and 'sociological' schools of theory. The 'sociological' school, characterised by Blackburn(12) and others, sees social class background as a most important element in the decision of staff to join or not to join trade unions. The evidence of this survey, in Table 19, refutes that proposition in relation to the Domestic Banking staff of this particular bank, as the non-membership percentages in each social class are remarkably similar. A further test of the impact of social class on membership patterns is to see if more staff in the lower social classes are attracted to the more 'unionate' representative body, BIFU, as might be expected. On examining the figures, however, BIFU's percentage membership in each social class is remarkably similar, ranging from 18.8%-20% except, paradoxically, amongst Class 4 staff where the percentage is in fact much lower, and this class, along with Class 5, would be the two classes in which one would expect union membership to be strongest, if social class background was a powerful determinant of membership choice. Indeed, the highest percentages of Staff Association membership are, again paradoxically, for the 'sociological' theorists, highest in Classes 4 and 5, amongst staff in this sample. Thus the reasons for joining a particular representative body, in this sample, clearly appear to lie outside social class background.

3.11.0. The personal influence of parents, relations, friends or teachers on an individual's choice of representative body membership or non-membership correlated with their educational background

3.11.1. The clear tendency amongst respondents in the sample (question 16) was for the majority of staff not to be influenced by people outside the workplace, parents, relations, friends, or teachers, in their choice of which representative body to join, or whether they should join such a body at all. Of the 406 respondents, 323 - 79.6% - said they were not influenced in their decision by these external individuals' influence and only 83 - 20.4% - said that they were. However, it is of interest that a fifth of the sample should be influenced in this way. In conducting the questionnaire some people tended to regard an admission of 'influence' as a weakness, some kind of character defect, but the interviewer carefully probed anyone's reply which seemed to be conditioned by such an influence, and so there can be complete confidence about the accuracy of these responses.

3.11.2. In order to see if there is any correlation between the level of education and the effect of external personal influence on individuals, the hypothesis, (question 16 hypothesis, 1.2.14.), being that less well educated staff might be more prone to such pressures, Tables 20 and 21 below show the type of school attended, educational qualifications attained, and male/female distribution of the uninfluenced and influenced groups.

TABLE 20

Type of school attended and qualifications gained by the 323 uninfluenced staff

Type of School	Total (%)	Degree (%)	M/F (%)	'A' level (inc.matric) (%)	M/F (%)	'O' level (inc.Sch.Cert) (%)	M/F (%)	CSE (inc.RSA) (%)	M/F (%)
Public	3.7	-	-	58.3	(71.4/28.6)	41.7	(80/20)	-	-
Private	3.1	10.0	(100/0)	20.0	(0/100)	60.0	(66.7/33.3)	10.0	(0/100)
Grammar	44.9	2.8	(75/25)	32.4	(63.8/36.2)	60.0	(51.7/48.3)	2.1	(0/100)
Comprehensive	30.3	-	-	16.3	(18.8/81.2)	58.2	(28.1/71.9)	24.5	(0/100)
Sec.Mod.	15.8	-	-	9.8	(60.0/40.0)	58.8	(30.0/70.0)	15.7	(12.5/87.5)
Others	2.2 100.0	-	-	14.3	(0/100)	28.6	(0/100)	-	-

The educational achievement parts of this table omit 17 staff who had no educational qualifications.

TABLE 21

Type of school attended and qualifications gained by the 83 influenced staff

Type of School	Total (%)	Degree (%)	M/F (%)	'A' level (inc.matric) (%)	M/F (%)	'O' level (inc.Sch.Cert) (%)	M/F (%)	CSE (inc.RSA) (%)	M/F (%)
Public	4.8	25.0	(100/0)	50.0	(100/0)	-	-	-	-
Private	3.6	-	-	33.3	(100/0)	66.7	(0/100)	-	-
Grammar	45.8	2.6	(100/0)	42.1	(87.5/12.5)	52.6	(50/50)	-	-
Comprehensive	33.7	-	-	7.1	(50/50)	78.6	(22.7/77.3)	14.3	(0/100)
Sec.Mod.	<u>12.1</u>	-	-	20.0	(100/0)	70.0	(57.1/42.9)	10.0	(0/100)
Total	100.0								

The educational achievement parts of this table omit 2 staff who had no educational qualifications.

3.11.3. These tables show a marked similarity between the percentages of both the uninfluenced and influenced groupings that went to each type of school, and the educational attainments of each group, and type of school, are also very similar. The fact that the largest group of staff from every type of school, except public schools, in both the uninfluenced and influenced groupings, had an 'O' level standard of education is probably the most striking similarity. There is, therefore, no evidence to support the hypothesis that staff with lower educational achievements would be more prone to external pressure in joining a particular representative body, or not joining one - indeed the majority of staff with CSE or RSA/Pitmans typing qualifications and, indeed, with no qualifications, are in the uninfluenced grouping.

3.11.4. The high percentage of staff who join the Bank straight from school, after taking their 'O' levels, is borne out by these figures, as 57.4% of the sampled staff in the Domestic Banking Division had an 'O' level standard of education when they joined and indeed 72.2% of the sample had educational attainments no higher than 'O' level standard. It may be of surprise to some that non-secretarial staff with educational attainments below 'O' level are recruited by the Bank.

3.11.5. As a further point of general interest it is

valuable to examine the educational qualifications of both the Managers and Appointed Officers in the Bank's branches. Of the 21 Managerial staff, 5 - 23.8% - had an 'A' level standard of education and 15 - 71.4% - had an 'O' level standard of education, whilst one had no educational qualifications. Of the 38 Appointed staff, 9 - 23.7% - had an 'A' level standard of education, 26 - 68.4% - had an 'O' level standard of education, and 3 - 7.9% - had no educational qualifications. Thus, judged by the overall educational attainments of the sampled respondents and those of present Managerial and Appointed staff, the chances of an 'O' level entrant into the Bank achieving Appointed Officer status and above are still good, and it might be said that banking still offers a Napoleonic 'career open to talents'.

3.12.0. The educational background and attainments of members and non-members of the representative bodies

3.12.1. A further comparison which can be drawn from the information in question 16 is a comparison of the respective educational establishments attended, and academic qualifications achieved, by members of the Staff Association, BIFU members and non-members, to see if there are any major differences in the educational backgrounds of these three groups. It has been shown earlier (3.10.5) that social class does not appear to affect the particular affiliations, but it may be that educational backgrounds and attainments do. Tables 22-24 below give the percentage figures for each group.

TABLE 22

Educational establishments and qualifications of the 143 Staff Association members

Type of School	Total (%)	Degree (%)	'A' level (inc. Matric) (%)	'O' level (inc. Sch. Cert) (%)	CSE (inc. RSA) (%)	No qualifications (%)
Public	3.5	-	60.0	20.0	-	20.0
Private	4.2	-	33.3	66.7	-	-
Grammar	44.8	1.6	40.6	54.6	1.6	1.6
Comprehensive	29.4	-	11.9	66.7	21.4	-
Sec. Modern	16.1	-	17.4	52.2	17.4	13.0
Others	2.1	-	-	-	-	100.0

TABLE 23

Educational establishment and qualifications of the 71 BIFU members

Type of School	Total (%)	Degree (%)	'A' level (inc. Matric) (%)	'O' level (inc. Sch. Cert) (%)	CSE (inc. RSA) (%)	No qualifications (%)
Public	5.6	-	50.0	50.0	-	-
Private	2.8	-	50.0	50.0	-	-
Grammar	54.9	2.6	25.6	69.2	-	2.6
Comprehensive	21.1	-	20.0	66.7	13.3	-
Sec. Modern	14.1	-	10.0	70.0	-	20.0
Others	1.4	-	-	100.0	-	-

TABLE 24

Educational establishment and qualifications of the 182 non-members

Type of School	Total (%)	Degree (%)	'A' level (inc. Matric) (%)	'O' level (inc. Sch. Cert) (%)	CSE (inc. RSA) (%)	No qualifications (%)
Public	3.8	14.3	57.1	28.6	-	-
Private	2.7	20.0	-	60.0	20.0	-
Grammar	41.2	4.0	33.3	57.3	2.7	2.7
Comprehensive	36.3	-	13.6	59.1	25.8	1.5
Sec. Modern	14.8	-	3.7	66.7	18.5	11.1
Others	1.1	-	50.0	50.0	-	-

3.12.3. The similarities of these tables are again probably more striking than the differences, and illustrate a very similar split between all three groups in the spread of educational establishments from which all their members come. Every educational establishment grouping in each of the three groups (except BIFU's Private School grouping) had a majority of members with an 'O' level standard of education, apart from, in all three groups, those from Public Schools, where a majority (again except for BIFU) had 'A' levels. The educational backgrounds of staff in each of the three groups are ordered Grammar, Comprehensive, Secondary Modern, with the Public Schools, Private, and 'Others', bringing up the rear. The four main differences in the groupings are, firstly, the higher percentage of BIFU members from Grammar schools, nearly 55% of their membership coming from such schools; secondly, the higher percentage of non-members from Comprehensive schools; thirdly, the higher number of staff with an education below 'O' level standard amongst non-members; and fourthly, a lower percentage of staff with an education below 'O' level standard amongst BIFU members, compared with the non-members, in particular, and also the SA membership. These differences imply that both representative bodies, and particularly BIFU, need to devise specific recruitment strategies for both the less well-educated staff, and the staff who join with a 'Comprehensive' schooling. The fact that most of the graduate

staff, admittedly a very small group in the sample, were non-members, is also of interest, and suggests need for arguments to be devised to attract them into membership, as, although they may be a relatively small group within the Bank, as well as in this sample, their chances of reaching Managerial and Appointed positions, if they stay with the Bank, should be greater than other groups. As was shown earlier (3.4.2.) the third most important reason given for joining a representative body was 'pressure from superiors' and if the graduate staff continue as non-members during their banking careers they are most unlikely to ultimately exert such pressure on their staff to join either body, and indeed their influence may well be exerted in the opposite direction, to prevent membership.

3.12.4. The only staff not included in Tables 22-24 are those who were in both the Staff Association and BIFU. As there were only ten such staff it is obviously hard to draw any wide-ranging conclusions from their distribution, but it is interesting that they followed the general ordering of the educational establishments of the other three groups, with 50% from Grammar schools, 30% from Comprehensives, and 10% each from Secondary Modern and 'Other' schools. Of the five staff from Grammar schools, two had 'A' levels, two had 'O' levels and one had no qualifications; of the three from Comprehensives, the majority had 'O' levels; the one person from an Elementary school had no qualifications.

3.12.5. The one other question which might be asked, and has so far not been answered, in this area of the analysis, is whether any of the four groupings of SA members, BIFU members, members of both bodies, or non-members, contain many more staff who have been influenced or uninfluenced in their decisions by external individuals, than the others. These figures are given below.

TABLE 25

External influence or lack of it amongst representative body members and non-members

Representative Body	Not Influenced (%)	Influenced (%)
Staff Association	78.3	21.7
BIFU	83.1	16.9
Both	80.0	20.0
Non-members	79.1	20.9

3.12.6. These figures again illustrate the remarkable similarity of distribution amongst the four groupings with all the categories being within 5% of each other, with the lack of influence of external people being dominant in each. The fact that the BIFU grouping was the least influenced, fits with their majority position amongst the largest grouping giving personal conviction as their reason for joining a representative body, which was shown earlier (3.4.2.). The fact that the Staff Association membership shows the greatest degree of influence is of interest, but there is no significant difference from the other groupings.

3.13.0. The relative importance of the influence of external and internal factors in determining the staff's choice of representative body or non-membership.

3.13.1. Having determined that social class appears to have no influence on the staff's decision to join either representative body or not to join (3.10.5), and that the influence of external people affected just 20.4% of the sample (3.11.1), and that educational background had only very slight influences (3.12.3), the basic similarities in the educational background of the membership groups, illustrated above, being far more striking than any differences, the final question, aimed at determining the relative value between the 'sociological' theorists and the 'industrial relations' theorists, asked the respondents to state whether their reasons for membership of either representative body, or neither, were due mainly to purely external influences, purely internal influences, or a combination of both sets of influences.

3.13.2. The overall results are very interesting and are given below.

TABLE 26

Distribution of influences leading to membership or non-membership of the representative bodies

Influence	Total(%)	SA(%)	BIFU(%)	BOTH(%)	N/Ms(%)	TOTAL	M/F(%)
External	8.4	-	-	-	100	100	35.3/64.7
Internal	60.6	39.8	19.1	3.3	37.8	100	43.9/56.1
Combination	31.0	35.7	19.0	1.6	43.7	100	54.0/46.0
Total	100.0						

It is clear from this table that purely internal reasons determine whether the majority of staff join, or do not join, a representative body. These 'internal' reasons were reasons specifically related to the respondents' employment situation in the Bank, and all groups are well represented in this category, with 68.5% of the SA members, 66.2% of the BIFU members, 80% of those in both bodies, and 51.1% of non-members, giving such 'internal' reasons for joining. It is interesting that a majority of the staff giving purely 'internal' reasons were female as was the majority of those giving purely 'external' reasons. The fact that purely 'external' reasons, reasons from outside the employment situation in the Bank, only accounted for 8.4% of the total sample, and then purely as a reason for non-membership, is of particular interest. (These staff accounted for 18.7% of the total non-membership grouping in the sample.)

3.13.3. These two sets of results thus appear to bear out the Bain et al (13) 'industrial relations' thesis for representative body membership, or non-membership, over the Blackburn et al 'sociological' thesis. However, what this division in the academic theory on the subject tended to hide, and possibly ignore, which this study clearly brings out, is the importance, for a significant group of people, 31% of this sample's total respondents, of a combination of both internal and external factors in their decisions, comprising and constituting, inseparable, intertwined, importance in their minds. These staff are distributed across

all the membership groupings with 31.5% of the total SA members, 33.8% of the total BIFU members, 20% of the total in both bodies, and 30.2% of the total non-members, with the majority being male, unlike those in the purely 'internal' and 'external' reason groupings.

3.13.4. The 'internal' reasons for joining or not joining have already been detailed in sections 3.4.1 to 3.4.10 and 3.5.1. to 3.5.5. For the purposes of analysing what the main 'external' reasons were, it seems wise to first examine those reasons given by the non-members who had been influenced in their decisions not to become members purely by 'external' reasons, to see what such powerful influences were, and these are given in Table 27.

TABLE 27

Purely 'external' influences on 34 staff given as reasons for non-membership

Reasons (in order of popularity)	Total(%)	M/F(%)
1. Negative influence of media (newspapers, radio, TV) against joining a representative body	41.2	35.7/64.3
2. Independent character, never been interested in joining a representative body	29.4	30.0/70.0
3. Parents anti-union	5.9	50.0/50.0
4. Combination of 1 and 5	5.9	100.0/0
5. Study of unions at school, anti-union attitude of teachers	2.9	100.0/0
6. Combination of 1 and 3	2.9	0/100
7. Combination of 1, 3, and 5	2.9	0/100
8. Others (see Appendices)	<u>8.9</u>	0/100
TOTAL	100.0	

3.13.5. It is very interesting that the negative influence of the media was the main reason, given by those purely influenced by 'external' factors, for not becoming members of either representative body, and that the majority of these staff were female. It is also interesting that female staff were in a majority amongst those giving an 'independent character' as their reason for not being interested in representative body membership, the second largest group. The relatively small influence of parents as a pure, single, reason for non-membership, is of note, in view of their greater importance in combination with 'internal' factors, which is illustrated in Table 28 on the next page.

3.13.6. If these purely 'external' reasons were added to the 'external' reasons stated by those giving a 'combination' of both 'external' and 'internal' factors for their membership or non-membership of either representative body, the following pattern emerges.

TABLE 28

Total 'external' reasons given by 160 staff for membership or non-membership

Reasons (in order of popularity)	Total(%)	SA(%)	BIFU(%)	N/M(%)
1. Negative influence of parents (mainly father) opposed to unions.	18.8	43.3	-	56.7
2. Negative influence of media (newspapers, radio, TV) against joining a representative body.	18.1	17.2	-	82.8
3. Positive influence of parents in favour of unions.	10.6	50.0	16.7	33.3
4. Independent character, never been interested in joining representative bodies.	7.5	-	-	100.0
5. General political outlook.	3.8	50.0	50.0	-
6. Combination of 1 and 2.	3.1	60.0	20.0	20.0
7. Positive influence of media for joining a representative body.	3.1	-	80.0	20.0
8. Good experiences of other members of family with their representative bodies.	3.1	50.0	50.0	-
9. Bad experiences of other members of family with their representative bodies.	2.5	-	-	100.0
10. Had already seen advantages of belonging to representative body in previous employment.	2.5	25.0	75.0	-
Others (see Appendices)	<u>26.9</u>			
Total	100.0			

All the other reasons given had under 2% of the sample supporting each of them and the details of these can be found in Regional Appendices 2-4.

3.13.7. The fact that there were positive, as well as negative, 'external' influences can be clearly seen from the table. Whereas negative media influence had been the major factor influencing the non-members who were only influenced by 'external' factors, the major importance of parental influence, particularly of the father, both favourable, and, particularly, unfavourable, to trade unions, in combination with 'internal' influences, is clearly shown and accounts for 29.4% of these respondents. Most of the influence was negative against joining unions, affecting non-membership and SA membership almost equally, but not affecting BIFU membership at all. Two BIFU members were positively influenced into membership by their parents but the majority in this category were SA members, with those who were non-members, the second largest group, being those who had either been members or were planning to join. The negative influence of the media was the other main influence, with over 10% of these respondents, and over 80% of this category were, again, non-members, but it did include some SA members, whereas the solely externally influenced group giving this reason, did not. No BIFU members were negatively influenced by the media, but of the small group that was influenced positively to join, most were from BIFU. General political outlook and the good experiences of other members of the family, with their representative bodies, positively influenced both SA and BIFU membership equally, whilst bad family

experiences only acted negatively, inducing non-membership. The one other group with over 2% of the sample had 'already seen the advantages of belonging to a representative body in their previous employment', and the majority of these belonged to BIFU.

3.13.8. To finish this part of the analysis the regional distribution of these external reasons will be examined to see if there are any interesting differences between the three regions. The numerical distribution of these staff was: 62 in London, 51 in the South-East, and 47 in the North-West.

TABLE 29

Regional distribution of the 'external' reasons for membership or non-membership

Reasons (as in Table 28)	London (%)	Regional Position	S-East (%)	Regional Position	N-West (%)	Regional Position
1. Negative influence of parents (mainly father) opposed to unions	21.0	(2)	13.7	(2)	21.3	(1)
2. Negative influence of media (newspapers, radio, TV) against joining a representative body.	22.6	(1)	15.7	(1)	14.9	(2)
3. Positive influence of parents in favour of unions	11.3	(3)	9.8	(3=)	10.6	(3)
4. Independent character, never been interested in joining representative bodies	9.7	(4)	9.8	(3=)	2.1	(6=)
5. General political outlook	1.6	(8=)	3.9	(6=)	6.4	(4=)
6. Combination of 1 and 2	3.2	(6=)	3.9	(6=)	2.1	(6=)
7. Positive influence of media for joining a representative body	-	(10)	3.9	(6=)	6.4	(4=)
8. Good experience of other members of family with their representative bodies	6.6	(5)	-	(9=)	2.1	(6=)
9. Bad experiences of other members of family with their representative bodies	1.6	(8=)	5.9	(5)	-	(9=)
10. Had already seen advantages of belonging to representative body in previous employment	3.2	(6=)	-	(9=)	-	(9=)
Others (see Appendices)	20.0		32.4		34.1	
Total	100.0		100.0		100.0	

3.13.9. These figures show that the negative influence of parents against joining unions was less in the South-East than the other two regions, and was the most important external influence in the North-West, whilst the positive influence of parents was similar in all three regions. The negative influence of the media was greater in London than the other two regions, and an 'independent character', leading to a lack of interest in representative bodies, was less prevalent in the North-West than elsewhere. The impact of general political outlook, and the media, as positive influences for joining, were much stronger in the North-West than in London. 'Good experiences of other members of the family with their representative bodies', and the awareness of the 'advantages of belonging from previous employment', were stronger in London than elsewhere, and, indeed, neither influence was stated by the staff in the South-East, and the latter reason was also absent from those given in the North-West. However, 'bad experiences of other members of the family with their representative bodies' was more important in the South-East than elsewhere, and, again, it was absent from the reasons given in the North-West.

3.14.0. The preferred level for collective bargaining negotiations

3.14.1. The purpose of the last 4 questions in the questionnaire was to discover the attitudes of the sample's respondents on the issues which the Bank, and the two representative bodies, would probably consider the most central to the future health and growth of an effective industrial relations system. The Johnston Enquiry proposals and discussions examined earlier (2.1.6.0-2.1.6.10) lacked, as was mentioned, any real grass-roots survey or discussion, and so this survey aimed to acquire this, as well as eliciting opinion on the perceived effectiveness of the industrial relations structure, in the Bank, in the period following the cessation of joint national and domestic negotiations.

3.14.2. The first question aimed to discover the level at which staff felt collective bargaining negotiations should take place, to see if there was a distinct preference for national or domestic negotiations, and to see what match there was between the views of members of the respective representative bodies and the official policy stances of these bodies. BIFU's policy, as a cross-bank negotiating body believing that the differences, both in the tasks carried out and organisational structures within the Banks, are minimal, has always been in favour of national cross-Bank collective bargaining negotiations. The Staff Associations, on the other hand, as representative bodies specific to each bank, and jealous of their individual autonomy, have always placed the emphasis on collective bargaining at the individual bank level.

Thus BIFU members should favour national negotiations and SA members should favour internal negotiations.

3.14.3. The distribution of opinion between the different representative body members and non-members and the male/female split is shown in Table 30 on the next page.

TABLE 30

The preferred level of collective bargaining negotiations amongst the 406 staff

Level	Total(%)	SA(%)	BIFU(%)	Both(%)	N/M(%)	Total	M/F(%)
National	44.4	29.4	28.9	3.4	38.3	100.0	48.9/51.1
Internal	35.7	43.4	9.0	2.1	45.5	100.0	52.4/47.6
Combination	5.4	36.3	13.6	4.5	45.6	100.0	68.2/31.8
Regional	0.5	50.0	-	-	50.0	100.0	100/0
No strong feelings	<u>14.0</u>	26.3	5.3	-	68.4	100.0	12.3/87.7
Total	100.0						

3.14.4. Thus the biggest group of staff favoured national-level collective bargaining negotiations. 73.2% of all the BIFU members in the sample were in this group and whilst this is a fairly high percentage which would be expected (question 18 hypothesis 1.2.16), it shows a substantial number of members, i.e. 26.8%, who do not follow the central policy of wanting national negotiations, which is somewhat surprising. Amongst this group there was also a majority of SA members over BIFU members which either illustrates that an important number, 37.1% of the total SA membership in the sample, are attracted to SA membership by other factors which are more important to them than the SA's official policy of internal negotiations, or that the SA and BIFU do not communicate their official policies clearly, as if they did, these SA members, given this stated preference, should be BIFU members rather than members of the SA. Of course, though, other factors and policies may, quite understandably, be more important in determining these dissenting members' allegiances than this central issue of where negotiating should take place. It is interesting that the largest group of non-members, 37.9% of the total, should prefer purely national negotiations and thus, presumably, if all negotiations took place at this level, they would be more likely to join a representative body. However, one might wonder whether

if BIFU made more of the fact that this was their major aim, as a selling point, they might be attracted earlier.

3.14.5. The specific reasons for this largest group of staff preferring national-level negotiations are given in Table 31 on the next page.

TABLE 31

Reasons for 180 staff favouring national-level collective bargaining negotiations

Reasons (in order of popularity)	Total(%)	SA(%)	BIFU(%)	Both(%)	N/M(%)
1 Fairness, same jobs being done in all the banks so all similar gradings should be paid the same and have centralised negotiations to achieve this.	32.7	25.4	37.3	3.4	33.9
2. Unified negotiations provide unity and strength between bank staffs, more weight in negotiating with employers, and thus likely to get better benefits from them.	26.7	33.3	31.3	4.2	31.2
3. Desire for similarity of conditions between banks to prevent disharmony, some bank staff getting more than others and thus all wanting to work for one bank.	17.2	35.5	9.7	3.2	51.6
4. Wider opinion gained at national negotiations of what is happening in each bank will result in wider-ranging negotiating approach leading to better terms and conditions generally.	7.7	28.6	28.6	-	42.9
5. Employers get together and decide on offers to be made between themselves so need for staff to get together and negotiate nationally with them.	5.5	30.0	60.0	-	10.0
6. Combination of 1 and 2.	2.8	40.0	-	-	60.0
7. National negotiations would simplify and speed up the process of submitting claims and achieving negotiated settlements	2.2	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0
8. Others (see Appendices)	5.2				
TOTAL	100.0				

All the other reasons given had under 2% of the sample supporting each of them and the details of these can be found in the Regional Appendices 2-4.

- 3.14.6. It is interesting that, amongst the largest grouping favouring national negotiations because of 'fairness', BIFU members were the biggest group, and indeed, 42.3% of all the BIFU staff supporting national negotiations in the sample gave this reason. The one other reason in which BIFU support was dominant was the need for the staff of all the banks to get together for negotiations to match the employers' procedure of doing this. The other points of note are the very even distribution of support from both SA and BIFU members, and non-members, for the greater weight in negotiations, and better benefits, that are likely to come from unified across-bank negotiations, and the simplifying and speeding up of negotiations, as well as the equal support from SA and BIFU members for a wider-ranging national negotiating approach leading to better terms and conditions generally. However, the biggest grouping of this group, and the overall majority supporting the third most popular reason, that of national negotiations preventing the disharmony which would arise amongst staff in the other banks if one bank offered better benefits than the others, were non-members of either representative body, as were those who felt that a combination of fairness and more weight/better benefits would result from national-level bargaining negotiations.
- 3.14.7. The fact that 35.7% of the total sample favoured purely internal, individual bank-level, collective bargaining negotiations, illustrates the strong division of opinion amongst the respondents on this issue. There

were far less 'displaced persons' in this group, the number of BIFU members favouring internal negotiations only accounting for 9% of this group, but the fact that they exist is of interest and calls forth the earlier comments of their existence implying a lack of communication about central policy on the part of both representative bodies or the existence of other valued benefits from membership of BIFU which override this central issue. However, these comparative figures do suggest that BIFU has less of a communication problem concerning this central policy than the SA, particularly when account is taken of the fact that, as with those favouring national negotiations, the largest single grouping favouring internal negotiations were non-members, although they accounted for a very slightly smaller proportion of the total non-membership grouping, 36.3% as opposed to the 37.9% favouring national negotiations, but, again, if purely internal negotiations existed, presumably these current non-members would be more likely to join a representative body. The fact that the non-members are thus even more equally split than the current membership, over the level at which collective bargaining negotiating should take place, illustrates the dilemma for both the bank and the representative bodies in trying to get one or other of the alternatives solely established, and perhaps leads naturally to the conclusion that the previously-established joint negotiating machinery, with some issues nationally negotiated and others negotiated internally, is the only logical compromise which would work, and the system which should be returned to.

3.14.8. Two other points of comparison can be made between the two groups, the slight male bias in the internal negotiations group, as opposed to the slight female bias in the national negotiations group, and the fact that, of the small group in the sample in both representative bodies, twice as many favoured national negotiations, 60% of this group, as favoured internal negotiations, 30%. The distribution of reasons for those favouring internal negotiations is given in Table 32 on the next page.

TABLE 32

Reasons for 145 staff favouring individual bank-level collective bargaining negotiations

Reasons (in order of popularity)	Total(%)	SA(%)	BIFU(%)	Both(%)	N/M(%)
1. Should negotiate with own employer, gain from own efforts - the Bank's own profitability.	38.6	42.9	10.7	-	46.4
2. Each bank has its own working practices, differing payment structures, and problems which should be negotiated on separately, internally.	31.7	43.5	8.7	4.3	43.5
3. Feeling that competition between Banks in negotiations will raise benefits.	6.2	33.3	11.1	-	55.6
4. National negotiations less effective, take longer to produce settlement.	6.2	33.3	11.1	-	55.6
5. Staff Association closer to wishes of Bank's staff, better representative body to push for Bank staff's views.	5.5	62.5	-	-	37.5
6. Favour internal negotiations until favoured Johnston 2-tier solution is available.	4.8	42.9	-	14.2	42.9
7. Need to try to keep negotiations internal as much as possible to try to take account of individuals' opinions - hard enough to do just internally but national negotiations even more impersonal.	2.8	25.0	-	-	75.0
8. Others (see Appendices)	4.2				
TOTAL	100.0				

All the other reasons given had under 2% of the sample supporting each of them and the details of these can be found in the Regional Appendices 2-4.

3.14.9. The clear preference amongst all the membership and non-membership groupings, including BIFU membership, for the top two reasons is interesting. The fact that non-members were the overall majority grouping favouring competition in negotiations to raise benefits, and internal negotiations to produce quicker settlements and to keep the negotiations as accountable to individuals' opinions as possible, is also of interest. The equal split between SA members and non-members amongst those favouring internal negotiations until the Johnston solution became available and the fact that some non-members felt the SA was the better representative body to push for the Bank staff's views, and yet had not joined it, are also of interest.

3.14.10. 5.4% of the sample favoured a combination of collective bargaining levels, but there was a certain lack of unanimity about what issues should be negotiated at what level, as can be seen from the Appendices, and not all those supporting such a mixed national level/domestic level system would go along with the split of issues that used to exist in the Clearing Banks previously established joint negotiating machinery examined in Chapter 2., as 13.6% of the sample grouping wanted pay to be an item of internal negotiation. However, most - 77.3% - of this grouping saw pay as an item for national negotiation combined with hours of work, as previously existed under the old joint negotiating system, and this is the one clear element of opinion which can be ascertained from the grouping. The fact that non-members were,

again, the largest single grouping of those supporting a combination of bargaining levels, and that over half of these had previously been in the SA or BIFU, is of interest, as is the fact that there were twice as many males as females in this grouping.

3.14.11. Two of the staff, both male, one an SA member and one a non-member, felt that national negotiations did not take enough account of regional differences and that therefore there should be Regional level negotiations comprising the representatives of all the banks together on the employers' side and the representatives of all the staff together on the employees' side, but this was very much a minority viewpoint.

3.14.12. All the other staff in the sample - 14% - most of whom were female, had 'no strong feelings' about the level at which collective bargaining negotiating should take place, and presumably would be content to accept whichever system was generally felt best. As stated earlier, given the clear division of opinion, a return to a negotiating system consisting of some matters being nationally negotiated, and some internally, would seem the only realistic possibility, as the chances of everyone accepting a majority decision, which on the basis of this sample would mean national-level negotiations for all items, is probably highly unlikely, however much it might simplify and rationalise the London Clearing Banks' industrial relations system and please BIFU.

3.15.0. The satisfactoriness of the present industrial relations system

3.15.1. The staff in the sample were asked (question 19) if they felt the present arrangements for presenting staff views and claims to the Bank were satisfactory. The responses are shown in the following table.

TABLE 33

Satisfaction with the present industrial relations system

Satisfied	Total(%)	SA(%)	BIFU(%)	Both(%)	N/M(%)	Total	M/F(%)
Yes	63.6	39.9	15.1	2.7	42.3	100	41.1/58.9
Yes with reservations	4.7	26.3	21.1	-	52.6	100	42.1/57.9
No	26.8	27.5	26.6	2.8	43.1	100	59.6/40.4
Don't know	4.9	25.00	-	-	75.00	100	45.0/55.0
Total	100.0						

3.15.2. Thus the majority of all the respondents, and of each grouping, were satisfied with the present arrangements for presenting views and claims to the Bank, with the majority of these staff being female. However, 31.5% were not happy or had reservations about the structure, and a further 4.9% did not know whether they were satisfied or not. It will be seen from the reasons given below (Table 34) that sometimes this unhappiness stemmed from the internal organisation and structure of the Bank, as a whole, which respondents felt needed change, in order to improve the industrial relations system, as well as from dissatisfaction with the representative bodies themselves.

3.15.3. Of those who were reserved about their happiness, most - 63.2% - had purely individual reasons which can be seen in Appendices 2-4. Of those whose reasons matched, 15.8% were unhappy with slowness in their upgrading as they felt they deserved such promotion, 10.5% were unhappy with the system which restricted the numbers of people allowed to be in any particular grade in the branches, unrelated to an individual's performance, and felt the system should be made more flexible to allow upgrading on merit, without limit, in the clerical grades, in any branch, and 10.5% felt that the Bank was such a big organisation that it was difficult to present their views easily, one of those being an SA member and one an ex-member of BIFU.

3.15.4. The reasons given by the staff who were dissatisfied with the industrial relations system, the majority of whom were male, are given in Table 34 on the next page.

TABLE 34

Reasons for the dissatisfaction of 109 staff with the present industrial relations system

Reasons (in order of priority)	Total(%)	SA(%)	BIFU(%)	Both(%)	N/M(%)
1. Should not be split representation between SA and BIFU, should be one united staff representative body.	30.3	12.1	45.5	6.1	36.3
2. Unhappy with having to raise problems through manager, should be confidential, advisory, third party with whom one can raise problems and get them solved outside branch confines.	10.1	27.3	-	9.1	63.6
3. Not asked for personal opinion about what's going on in Bank, by Bank or representative bodies, told what's going on by means of circulars, should be greater consultation by them.	8.3	22.2	33.3	-	44.5
4. Bank does not encourage staff to make their views known through the representation system or publicise it enough, which they should, as in the Bank's interests that their views should be heard - thus staff unaware of procedures and reluctant to take up issues.	4.6	40.0	40.0	-	20.0
5. Annoyed that longer-serving people only get same percentage pay rises and holidays if in unappointed grades as those who have just joined - should be proportionate increase for longer-serving staff to provide differential.	2.8	66.7	33.3	-	-
6. Problem of understaffing of branch, has raised problem internally and got no satisfaction	2.8	-	33.3	-	66.7
7. Others (see Appendices)	41.1				
TOTAL	100.0				

All the other reasons given had under 2% of the sample supporting each of them and the details of these can be found in Regional Appendices 2-4.

3.15.5. As with those who had reservations about the system, a considerable number of the dissatisfied staff gave purely individual reasons for their dissatisfactions which can again be seen in the Appendices 2-4.

Certainly the clearest grouping of reasons for dissatisfaction, above, was aimed at the representation system being split between the SA and BIFU. Perhaps predictably the largest group in this grouping were BIFU members as BIFU has always favoured a single cross-bank representative body for all clearing bank staff. It is interesting that non-members should be the largest group who dislike having to take up problems through their managers and who would like the creation of a third party advisory body, by the Bank, outside branch confines, with whom to sort out problems. As this group had rejected membership of one of the representative bodies which might otherwise have served such a third-party advisory purpose, and the rest of the grouping were members of the SA or both bodies, a system of provision of direct, confidential, advice from the Bank's area personnel staff, before involving the local manager, might be worth investigation to solve this felt dissatisfaction.

3.15.6. The desire for greater consultation, by both the Bank and the two representative bodies, the encouragement and publicising of the existing industrial relations system and its procedures by the Bank, the problem

of the erosion of holiday differentials, the problem of understaffed branches, and problems with the grading system, are all factors leading to dissatisfaction, which are highlighted in the above table, and about which positive action should be considered by both the Bank and the representative bodies. Of course, these dissatisfactions have to be set against the satisfaction of the majority of respondents, but one would hope that both the Bank and the two representative bodies would wish to attain as near 100% satisfaction with the industrial relations system as possible, and the final part of this analysis concerning reactions to the main Johnston Enquiry proposals will illustrate how far the feelings of the largest group of dissatisfied staff, that there should be one united representative body, are shared as an ideal future by others who presently are satisfied with the general industrial relations system.

3.16.0. 'Grass roots' reaction to the Johnston Enquiry proposals

3.16.1. The first question that was asked was whether each respondent was aware of the findings and recommendations of the Enquiry. This was aimed at discovering how widely-aware staff were of the Enquiry's results which, at the time, the Bank employers hoped would be the solution to the problem of divided representation in the London Clearing Banks. The results were as follows.

TABLE 35

Awareness of the Johnston Enquiry findings and recommendations

Aware	Total(%)	SA(%)	BIFU(%)	Both(%)	N/M(%)	Total
Yes	40.6	42.4	25.5	3.0	29.1	100.0
No	59.4	30.3	12.0	2.1	55.6	100.0
Total	100.0					

3.16.2. The fact that under half of the staff were aware of the recommendations is somewhat disturbing, given the fact that, at the time of the first interviews, the original Johnston Report had been available for a year, and one would have expected that most of the staff, particularly the representative bodies' members, would have been made aware of its main findings. The fact that the largest grouping of those who were aware of the findings were SA members, is really of small comfort to the SA, compared to the fact that a majority of their membership in the sample - 51% (see figures in Appendix 1) - were not aware of the findings. Of the BIFU membership, 59.2% were aware of the Enquiry findings which is comparatively better, but this still leaves 40.8% who were not. Those who were in both bodies were evenly divided between awareness and non-awareness. It may be of comfort to both the representative bodies that the largest group of those who were unaware of the findings, were non-members of either body, but the size of this group should worry the

employers, whose responsibility it should have been to make sure the Johnston message was communicated to these staff in the branches, assuming, of course, that they wanted it to be communicated. Thus, both the Bank employers and the two representative bodies should be concerned at the lack of communication illustrated by the answers to this question.

3.16.3. As the level of communication may depend on the regional and area communications networks, both within the Bank's own organisation and within that of the representative bodies, it is worth examining whether the level of awareness was significantly better in any of the three regions where interviews were conducted.

Table 36

Regional awareness of the Johnston Enquiry findings and recommendations

Region	Aware	Total(%)	SA(%)	BIFU(%)	Both(%)	N/M(%)
<u>London</u>	Yes	36.8	60.7	8.9	1.8	28.6
	No	63.2	28.1	5.2	4.2	62.5
<u>S-East</u>	Yes	36.6	54.2	18.7	4.2	22.9
	No	63.4	48.2	3.6	4.2	47.0
<u>N-West</u>	Yes	49.6	16.4	45.9	3.3	34.4
	No	50.4	9.7	33.9	-	56.4

It is of interest that non-awareness dominates in all the regions, although it is less in the N-West than in London and the S-East, where the levels of non-awareness (around 63%) and awareness (around 37%), in both regions, are remarkably similar. The N-West region's representative bodies can be comforted by the fact that it was the only region where a majority of SA members, BIFU members, and members of both bodies,

were aware of the findings, whereas London only had a majority of SA members who were aware of them, with BIFU members being evenly divided, and those in both bodies having a clear majority who were unaware of the recommendations, and the South East only had a majority of its small numbers of BIFU members and members of both bodies who were aware of the findings, whereas the clear majority of SA members were not. In all the regions a clear majority of the non-members were unaware of the Report's findings.

3.16.4. The fact that the majority of staff interviewed were unaware of the main Johnston findings did not matter for the purposes of the questionnaire, as the main recommendations were stated in the three questions asked specifically about them, and as the interviews were personally conducted, a clear, and identical, explanation of what Johnston envisaged resulting from these recommendations, could be given to those who were unclear as to their meaning.

3.16.5. On the first question as to whether there should be a new, single, staff representative body, the Johnston Clearing Bank Union, to negotiate nationally on the matters which were previously jointly negotiated nationally, with the individual Bank's section of this body to negotiate on domestic issues, internally, the overall results are shown in Table 37.

TABLE 37

Support for the Johnston proposal of a single, united representative body negotiating both nationally and domestically

In Favour	Total(%)	SA(%)	BIFU(%)	Both(%)	N/M(%)	Total
Yes	60.6	27.3	25.6	2.8	44.3	100.0
No	26.6	62.0	2.8	2.8	32.4	100.0
No strong feelings	12.8	17.3	9.6	-	73.1	100.0
Total	100.0					

3.16.6. These findings would appear to give a clear endorsement for the formation of a single staff representative body negotiating some issues nationally and others, in an individual Bank section, domestically. If one was willing to accept that the respondents stating 'no strong feelings' would probably be willing to accept the majority opinion, over 73% of the staff interviewed would thus support this new structure. It is very interesting that the SA members giving a positive yes or no reaction were equally split - 50%/50% (see Appendix 1) - on whether they wanted a single body or not, which reflects, rather more strongly, the earlier findings (3.14.4.) that 37.1% of the total SA membership in the sample would ideally prefer all negotiations to be at a national level. The Staff Association's formation of their own form of a Clearing Bank Union (2.1.7.1.) does not cater for this strong body of opinion, within one of the SAs, for a properly united, single, staff representative body negotiating on both

national and domestic issues, and a significant minority of its membership does not even agree with the central policy emphasis on internal negotiations. The vast majority of BIFU's membership - 88.7% - supported this proposal, as was expected in the hypothesis (question 21 hypothesis 1.2.19.) since BIFU has always wanted a single cross-Bank representative body. Perhaps importantly, a clear majority - 59.9% (see Appendix 1) - of non-members, also supported this proposal, which implies that many of the current non-members would be prepared to join a new single staff representative body negotiating some matters nationally and some internally.

3.16.7. Obviously this survey was only conducted in one of the Banks but it suggests that efforts should be rapidly renewed to achieve a single representative body carrying out negotiations at both national and local level, for all Clearing Bank staff in the Barclays, Lloyds and National Westminster Banks, where staff representation is currently divided between a Staff Union or Association and BIFU. Clearly the majority of the staff interviewed want this, and if one accepts that the nine SA members who stated they had 'no strong feelings' on this issue, would continue membership of the single body formed by such majority opinion, then it is fair to say that a majority of all the staff groupings

currently represented in the Bank, SA members, BIFU members, members of both bodies, and non-members, would support this development. Indeed, the probable level of participation in such a body would be slightly higher, at 73.4%, than the joint membership density presently claimed by the two staff bodies, about 70%, which, as has already been shown (3.2.8), may well be an overestimate. The establishment of a united, single, representative body, would result in a simplified and rationalised industrial relations system both between, and within, the three Banks, which would obviously please the Banks themselves, as well as a clear majority of staff. The obstacle, as shown by the failure of both the ABFU talks (2.1.5.2.) and the Johnston talks (2.1.6.10) lies with the two representative bodies being unable to find a basis for unity. Hopefully the findings of this research may move them back onto that search.

3.16.8. The specific reasons for staff wanting a single, united representative body are shown in Table 38 on the next page.

TABLE 38

Reasons for the 246 staff wanting a single, united representative body

Reason (in order of priority)	Total(%)	SA(%)	BIFU(%)	Both(%)	N/M(%)
1. Unity would provide a stronger and more effective negotiating body, likely to achieve better results.	63.0	28.4	29.7	3.2	38.7
2. More sensible to have one body for a united staff approach.	12.2	13.3	20.0	3.3	63.4
3. Would remove quarrels and bickering over policies, achievements - both bodies claiming the credit for a particular gain, no good for staff.	6.9	35.3	29.4	-	35.3
4. Single body will speed up the process of getting issues put forward for negotiation, and negotiated, remove staff side arguments.	5.7	14.3	7.1	-	78.6
5. Fairer to have uniform conditions of service between the Banks which are best achieved by a unified, single, negotiating body.	3.7	33.4	44.4	-	22.2
6. Likes separation of negotiating areas, within unification, for concentration on the Bank's issues, within the Bank, and more general issues nationally.	3.3	50.0	25.0	-	25.0
7. Will get wider range of views and ideas on issues to be negotiated both nationally and internally, leading to better negotiated settlements.	2.4	16.7	-	-	83.3
8. Others (see Appendices)	<u>2.8</u>				
Total	100.0				

All the other reasons given had under 2% of the sample supporting each of them and the details of these can be found in the Regional Appendices 2-4.

3.16.9. The domination of the feeling that 'unity would provide a stronger and more effective negotiating body, likely to achieve better results' is very interesting, as is the fact that there are an almost equal number of SA and BIFU members who feel this, and the fact that non-members are the largest grouping giving this reason. Non-members are also the largest grouping who feel that it would be 'more sensible' to have one body for a united staff approach, that a single body will speed up negotiations, and that 'better negotiated settlements' will result from the wider range of views and ideas on issues that will be exchanged, and merged, in unified negotiations. All three groups were fairly equally represented amongst those feeling that the removal of 'quarrels and bickering over policies and achievements' would result from unity, whereas BIFU members were predictably the biggest grouping feeling that uniform conditions between all the Banks would result from unity, which would be fairer, and SA members, again predictably, were the largest grouping liking the idea of the separation of negotiating areas between national and domestic levels on particular issues. From this data, it is probably fair to say that it is the idea of a single, united, representative body, that attracts most staff, rather than, necessarily, the particular Johnston recipe for its attainment, and

it is,perhaps,some fresh structure for attaining
this that the two representative bodies should
again start seeking.

3.16.10. The reasons for the minority opposing a single,
united body are given in Table 39 on the next page.

TABLE 39

Reasons for the 108 staff opposing a single, united representative body

Reasons (in order of priority)	Total(%)	SA(%)	BIFU(%)	Both(%)	N/M(%)
1. Single body would become too much like a union, more militant, prefers internal Staff Association with its own identity.	33.4	91.7	-	2.8	5.5
2. Better to have choice of separate representative bodies to satisfy different staff outlooks, maintain separate Staff Association to accommodate the Bank-orientated ideology, union for more general cross-bank ideology.	32.4	45.7	5.7	5.7	42.9
3. Competition between the existing bodies leads to better settlements.	14.8	43.7	-	-	56.3
4. Each bank should have its own separate, united, representative body, negotiating everything individually with each employer.	10.2	36.4	9.1	-	54.5
5. Ideological differences too great to be able to work out differences, develop truly united approach, discussing it for years without success.	2.8	66.7	-	-	33.3
6. Others (see Appendices)	6.4				
Total	100.0				

All the other reasons given had under 2% of the sample supporting each of them and the details of these can be found in the Regional Appendices 2-4.

3.16.11. The almost equal division of opinion between the two most popular reasons is interesting. Not surprisingly, most of those fearing that a single representative body would become more militant, more unionate, were SA members, but it is interesting that amongst those giving the second most popular reason, that it is better to maintain the Staff Association for those with an internalist negotiating ideology and BIFU for those with a cross-bank negotiating ideology, the majority were almost evenly split between SA members and non-members. A similar even split exists between those feeling that the competition between the existing bodies leads to better settlements, a grouping consisting only of SA members and non-members, with the latter having a small majority. The larger of the two smallest groupings supported the idea of a separate, single, united, representative body in each of the Banks to negotiate all issues internally, the majority of this grouping being non-members. The smallest grouping, in which SA members were in a majority, felt that the ideological differences between the two bodies were too great for them ever to achieve true unity, a view which, hopefully, may be proved wrong in the near future, if both the Staff Associations and BIFU take note of the findings of this research as an impetus to resume talks.

3.16.12.Regarding Johnston's proposal that the new third-tier body in his proposed structure, to which the Clearing Bank Union, and BIFU's membership outside the Clearing Banks, would be affiliated, should affiliate to the TUC, the 'grass roots' reaction was unfavourable, as shown below.

TABLE 40

Reaction to the Johnston proposal of affiliation to TUC

In favour of affiliation	Total(%)	SA(%)	BIFU(%)	Both(%)	N/M(%)	Total
Yes	23.1	20.2	27.7	6.4	45.7	100.0
No	44.1	47.5	14.0	1.7	36.8	100.0
No strong feelings	<u>32.8</u>	29.3	15.0	0.8	54.9	100.0
Total	100.0					

Thus, under a quarter, 23.1%, of the sample supported TUC affiliation, the largest group, 44.1%, opposed it, and there was a large group, 32.8%, who had 'no strong feelings' largely because they felt they did not know enough about what the TUC did, or what affiliation involved, to have an opinion either way. Again, if it is assumed that most of those saying they had 'no strong feelings' would be prepared to support the majority view, then affiliation to the TUC for any new single, united, body would not appear to have much support. However, as one who can appreciate the rationale of a co-ordinating body for the trade unions to unite policy, and to provide research and other central services,

as well as a central spokesman for the trade union movement in the form of the TUC General Secretary, as Dr. Johnston did, it is possible that those with 'no strong feelings' might be persuaded of the advantages of affiliation if it was done in the right way, which would produce a majority in favour of TUC affiliation. The most powerful argument in its favour might well be the more powerful moderating voice which an affiliated body of most of the country's Clearing Bank staff could provide in the TUC, and if the executive of a new united body united behind a campaign to publicise this and other advantages of affiliation, before a reference to the membership for a decision was finally made, even many of those currently opposed to such affiliation might be converted.

3.16.13. It is interesting that only 36.6% (see Appendix 1) of the BIFU membership positively favoured TUC affiliation, with 28.2% having 'no strong feelings', and 35.2% being opposed to such affiliation, as BIFU is the single representative body in the London Clearing Banks currently affiliated, apart from ASTMS in the Midland Bank. The Staff Unions and Association, and the Clearing Bank Union as a whole, are not affiliated, a policy which is supported in this survey by the fact that only 13.3% of the SA membership in the sample supported affiliation, although a further 27.3% had 'no strong feelings'. Thus the hypothesis

(question 21 hypothesis 1.2.19.) that BIFU members would be more likely to favour TUC affiliation than SA members is borne out, though not as strongly as might have been expected. It is also of note that the largest grouping of non-members, 40.1%, had 'no strong feelings', and that a majority of those who were members of both bodies, 60%, favoured TUC affiliation.

3.16.14. The reasons given by those favouring affiliation are presented in Table 41 below.

TABLE 41

Reasons given by 94 staff for favouring TUC affiliation

Reasons (in order of priority)	Total (%)	SA (%)	BIFU (%)	Both (%)	N/M (%)
1. Would make representative body stronger, more powerful.	50.0	23.4	29.8	4.3	42.5
2. Should be part of wider union movement, should be associated with other workers to discuss issues, take advice, put forward bank employees' views, and reach agreements with them on united approach to problems.	48.9	17.4	26.1	6.5	50.0
3. Others (see Appendices).	<u>1.1</u>				
Total	100.0				

There was, therefore, an almost equal division of opinion, amongst those favouring TUC affiliation, between those who felt that such affiliation would make a new united representative body 'stronger and

more powerful', and those who felt that this new body should affiliate in order to be 'part of the wider union movement'. All the separate groupings of SA members, BIFU members, members of both bodies, and non-members, were also fairly equally split between these two reasons.

3.16.15. The reasons given by those not favouring affiliation are presented in Table 42 below.

TABLE 42

Reasons given by 179 staff for not favouring TUC affiliation

Reasons (in order of priority)	Total(%)	SA(%)	BIFU(%)	Both(%)	N/M(%)
1. TUC too powerful, Bank union could be forced to come out on strike.	49.7	41.6	18.0	-	40.4
2. Bank representative body should keep itself separate from other unions of TUC, concern itself solely with the interests of its own members.	12.8	43.5	8.7	-	47.8
3.= TUC too big a body, clearing bank union would have little influence, be swamped by other unions.	6.7	50.0	-	16.7	33.3
3.= Opposed to political involvement of TUC with Labour Party.	6.7	41.7	16.7	8.3	33.3
5. General unease, no specific advantages.	6.1	63.6	9.1	-	27.3
6. TUC too dictatorial through block votes, unions need to be responsible to members.	5.6	60.0	20.0	-	20.0
7. TUC affiliation would make attitudes of bank representative body more militant.	2.2	100.0	-	-	-
8. Others (see Appendices)	10.2				
Total	100.0				

All the other reasons given had under 2% of the sample supporting each of them and the details of these can be found in the Regional Appendices 2-4.

3.16.16. Nearly half those opposing TUC affiliation did so, therefore, because they felt the TUC was too powerful and that it could force a new single, united, Clearing Bank Union to come out on strike in support of other affiliated unions' industrial action, or general TUC policies. The SA members were slightly in the majority over non-members in giving this reason, and this fits with the traditional SA opposition to striking as a tactic in collective bargaining negotiations. SA members were in a majority amongst all the other reasons given, except for the one gaining the second largest support, that a Bank representative body should 'concern itself solely with the interests of its own members' where, again, the split amongst those supporting this opinion was almost equal between the SA members and non-members, as with the dominating reason, but the non-members this time were in a slight majority. The fact that most of the BIFU members who opposed affiliation also felt that the TUC was too powerful, and might force a united Bank union to come out on strike, is very interesting.

3.16.17. The third of the Johnston Enquiry's main proposals was that there should be no 'closed shop', compulsory membership, of the proposed, united, single, representative body, but that the Banks should encourage membership. An overwhelming majority of those in the sample, 90.4%, agreed with this proposal, although a small number of these staff, 7.4%, were opposed to

the Bank 'encouraging membership'. Of the remaining 9.6% of the staff, 2.7% were undecided, and the rest, 6.9%, were in favour of some form of 'closed shop'. Of these staff, five were in the Staff Association; thirteen were in BIFU; two were in both bodies; and eight were non-members. It is not surprising that most of these staff were BIFU members, (and bears out, though weakly, the question 21 hypothesis 1.2.19), or that 46.4% of them came from the more radical N-West region (see Appendix 4), but it is surprising that exactly a quarter of these staff were in Managerial or Appointed jobs, five in BIFU, and two in the SA. The main reasons for support of a 'closed shop' are given in Table 43 on the next page.

TABLE 43

Reasons given by 38 staff in favour of a 'closed shop' agreement

Reasons (in order of priority)	Total(%)	SA(%)	BIFU(%)	Both(%)	N/M(%)
1. Should be a 'closed shop' subject to provision being made allowing payments to charity instead of the union, should be a contribution to some body if get benefits of pay rises, improvements in conditions, from representative body's negotiations.	39.3	18.2	63.6	-	18.2
2. Should be a 'closed shop' as everyone should pay dues to the representative body negotiating pay increases, improved benefits, for all staff.	28.6	12.5	37.5	-	50.0
3. Should be a 'closed shop' to provide the impetus for all the staff to get together and solve problems.	10.7	33.3	33.3	-	33.3
4. Others (see Appendices)	21.4				
Total	100.0				

All the other reasons had under 2% of the sample supporting each of them and the details of these can be found in the Regional Appendices 2-4.

3.16.18 Thus, even amongst this very small group who favoured a 'closed shop', the largest grouping, including 53.8% of the total BIFU members favouring one, and the majority of those in Managerial and Appointed grades favouring one, wanted such an agreement to allow the payment of subscriptions to a charity, rather than the union, if staff did not wish to make payments to the representative body, a concept which was first embodied under the 'agency shop' provisions of the


1971 Industrial Relations Act (14). The concept of a 'closed shop', supported by the minority, was thus a relatively moderate one, and Dr. Johnston was quite correct not to suggest the establishment of one, since the chances of a 'closed shop' agreement ever getting the support of a majority of bank staff, let alone the 80% support required under the 1980 Employment Act (15) is obviously, on this sample's evidence, virtually non-existent.

3.17.0. The attitudes of branch representatives to their roles

3.17.1. Before looking at the attitudes of the SA and BIFU representatives to the questions posed to them in the supplementary questionnaire, it needs to be explained that the role of office representatives generally in the London Clearing Banks is very limited, although BIFU is actively seeking to increase the office representatives' field of action, and indeed an agreement to establish 'accredited' representatives in the Midland Bank in 1980 (16) may well herald important developments in their role throughout the Banks. The current disputes procedure in the Bank in this study, is illustrated below (17), and it would be correct to say that at the time the interviews were conducted the role of the representatives in both representative bodies was limited, mainly, to being a communication point, both for distributing information from the representative body to the other branch members, and informing the representative body of any local problems.

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

If you think you have a problem, or a sense of grievance



Staff Assoc. or NUBE members-
You may ask for representation
in the Appeals Procedure concerning
Job Evaluation for unappointed Staff

3.17.2. Of the twenty representatives in the sample, eleven were in BIFU and nine in the SA. As two of the BIFU representatives were in one branch, this means that eight of the branches visited did not have a BIFU representative and nine of the branches did not have an SA representative. Whilst this is probably partly attributable to the varying strengths of the two representative bodies, between London and the South-East region's branches and the North-West region branches, it should be a matter of concern to both bodies that these flaws exist in their local organisation, since although the representatives' role may be limited, without them communication and recruitment of new members are bound to suffer. Indeed, if membership densities of the two representative bodies in branches where there was a representative, and ones where there was not, are compared, the figures show a 48.7% SA membership density amongst all the branches with an SA representative, and a 23.4% BIFU membership density amongst the branches with a BIFU representative, but only a 21.4% SA membership density for all the branches without an SA representative, and a 14.1% BIFU membership density for all the branches without a BIFU representative.

3.17.3. The fact that 85% of the representatives were male, was expected, as male staff are likely to be more committed to an active role in a representative body. In fact all the BIFU representatives were male and the

three female representatives were in the Staff Association, a third of the total SA representatives in the sample. A further interesting difference between the two representative bodies is that whereas five of the SA representatives were aged 36 and over and only one was in the 16-25 years age range, in BIFU there were five representatives in the 16-25 years age range, the biggest single age-grouping, and only four were 36 years and over. The fact that all, except two (both Grade 2), of the representatives, were in Grade 3 and above, is of note, as is the fact that there were one managerial and seven appointed grade representatives in the two bodies. Although one would feel that a certain level of responsibility and experience would be useful for a representative in a branch, it is dubious whether it is a good idea for the senior members in a branch to also be representatives, as there must to some extent be a clash of interests, and it is doubtful how free a clerical member of a branch would feel in taking up a problem with such a representative. Perhaps this is a matter that both bodies should look into for the future.

3.17.4. The fact that the majority of representatives in each of the representative bodies, 65% of the total representatives in the sample, volunteered to perform the role, as they felt it necessary, and also a means of getting to know directly what the representative body was doing, is interesting. Of the others, 25% were asked to take on the role by the particular

representative body, and 10% were nominated, without consultation, but agreed to do it. Thus, the apathy which is apparent in staff taking no active role in their representative body by not attending branch meetings, is also reflected here, as there was no formal contested election amongst members for any of these 20 positions of representative, which would be expected in most representative bodies. The actual time spent on representative matters was very small, 50% spending less than 30 minutes a week, and a further 30% spending between 30 minutes and an hour, and only 20% spending as much as two hours a week on representative matters on average. 80% of the representatives felt that the current amount of time they spent on representative matters was 'about right'.

3.17.5. There was a fairly even division of opinion on what the main functions of the representatives' roles were, nine (45%), the largest group, seeing themselves as points of contact, to whom the representative bodies could send information which could then be passed on to the members in the branch. Six (30%), five of whom were BIFU representatives, saw the main function of their role as encouraging membership, and five, 25%, saw themselves as a reference point for helping members with problems, a 'membership-focus' rather than the 'representative body focus' of the largest single group. On the question of how their role could be developed, seven, 35%, were not aware of any way in which it could be, five of these being SA members, but

amongst the other thirteen, 65%, there was a variety of suggestions. Of these, four, the majority being in BIFU, felt their performance and abilities could be improved by attending a training course; two, both in BIFU, felt their role would expand if a single, united, body was created; and two, again both in BIFU, felt their role could be expanded if they were allowed an afternoon a week by the Bank to concentrate on representative duties and to meet other representatives in the area. All the other views given were individual ones and can be seen in Appendix 1.

3.17.6. As to the satisfactions and frustrations of the representative role, ten, half the representatives, the majority of whom were in BIFU, felt no particular satisfaction, and nearly half, nine, felt no particular frustrations, the majority of these representatives being in the SA. Six of the ten stating a satisfaction from the role, four of whom were in the SA, said they got satisfaction from the feeling of being in a position to help their fellow-members with problems and difficulties. The other reasons given were individual ones as were most of the reasons for frustrations, but three, the majority in BIFU, were all frustrated by the split representation between BIFU and the SA, and two, both in BIFU, felt frustrated by the apathy of staff to union membership. Whereas eight BIFU representatives voiced frustrations, only

five voiced satisfactions, compared to only three SA representatives voicing frustrations and five voicing satisfactions. Thus, overall, it would seem fair to conclude that SA representatives are generally more satisfied with their roles than BIFU representatives. However, ten of the eleven BIFU representatives said that they saw themselves continuing in the role, as did eight of the nine SA representatives, and a clear majority of both groups also did not see their activities as representatives having any effect, either favourable or unfavourable, on their careers.

3.18.0. Summary of the main findings of this survey

3.18.1. The following summary draws out the main conclusions from this survey which, as will be discussed in the final chapter, may, or may not, be generally applicable to other industrial relations settings.

(i) There are significant differences in levels of unionisation amongst employees working for the same organisation in different regional areas of the country. In this study, the North regional area had a significantly higher Union, as opposed to Staff Association, membership, than the London and South-East regional areas (3.3.1.-3.3.2).

(ii) Female staff are less likely than male staff to join either body but those who do join are three times more likely to join a Staff Association rather than a Union (3.3.4.).

(iii) Female staff in the 16-25 age range are the least likely group to belong to either representative body. Male staff in the same age range are only slightly more likely than the females to be members. Male staff in the 26-35, and 36 and over, age ranges, are the most likely staff to be members of a representative body (3.3.6.).

(iv) The longer an employee's length of service, the more likely he or she is to be a member of a representative body (3.3.8.).

(v) The longer an employee's length of service in a particular job grade, the more likely he or she is to be a member of a representative body (3.3.9.).

(vi) The higher the grade of an employee, the more likely he or she is to be a member of a representative body, particularly the Staff Association (3.3.10.).

(vii) If a person was not a member of a representative body in his or her previous employment, they are unlikely to subsequently become members, although some may sample such a body in their new employment, but then subsequently leave it (3.3.11.).

(viii) A Staff Association may serve a valuable purpose in attracting staff into membership of a collective bargaining organisation who otherwise would remain outside a more 'unionate' organisation (3.3.12.).

(ix) An overall majority of staff decide to join a representative body within their first two years of service, outside their first month of service (3.3.13.).

(x) Female staff are significantly more likely to be influenced by another person, a more senior member of staff, or a peer, to join a representative body, than male staff, who are more likely to make up their own minds about membership (3.3.13.).

(xi) The largest group of staff join representative bodies through personal conviction of the value of belonging to a particular body (3.4.3.).

(xii) It appears to be fallacious to consider female staff to be more likely to be attracted into membership purely by discounts on material goods, as in this sample over twice as many male staff were attracted into membership by such discounts (3.4.3.).

(xiii) The value of a personal approach by representative bodies to potential members, particularly female staff, is illustrated by the fact that nearly 20% of members in the sample joined because of such a personal approach (3.4.3.).

(xiv) 'Pressure from superiors' is a much more common reason for staff, particularly male staff, to join the Union rather than the Staff Association (3.4.5.). Such pressure, however, is shown to be the least stable of reasons for joining a representative body, and is the most likely single reason leading to an employee resigning his or her membership of that body (3.4.7.).

(xv) The clear majority of staff favoured one representative body rather than the other for positive reasons, based on the perceived value of membership of the particular body, rather than purely negative reactions to the alternative body (3.5.3.).

(xvi) Membership of both representative bodies is far more common amongst male staff than female staff (3.5.3.).

(xvii) Failure of the benefits received from membership to match expectations most commonly leads to staff ceasing to be members of both representative bodies (3.6.3.).

(xviii) The problem of the Union's higher subscriptions leading to members leaving is reflected in the sample (3.6.4.).

(xix) Most of those who leave one of the representative bodies do not subsequently join the rival representative body organisation (3.6.6.)

(xx) The majority of staff who are not members of either representative body are female (3.7.2.).

(xxi) Lack of awareness of any benefits from membership is the main reason for staff being non-members (3.7.3.).

(xxii) The majority of members in both representative bodies are satisfied with the organisation and performance of the two bodies (3.6.1.).

(xxiii) The majority of those who are dissatisfied with the organisation and performance of the two representative bodies are male (3.8.1.) and the largest group of dissatisfied members disliked the split representation and in-fighting between the two representative bodies (3.8.2.).

(xxiv) Most current members of the two representative bodies do not attend branch meetings and nearly half the local branch representatives do not attend local branch meetings (3.9.1.). Most of the very few who do attend these meetings are male (3.9.2.).

(xxv) The largest group of staff who are representative body members do not attend branch meetings as they feel no strong reason to attend, happy in the knowledge that they can call on the services of the representative body if required (3.9.4.).

(xxvi) The fact that 44.5% of members do not attend branch meetings either because they do not have enough time, or because there are no meetings in the branch, and they would have to travel too far to attend one, requires positive action from both the employing organisation and the representative bodies if they really want to increase staff participation in representative body activities (3.9.4.).

(xxvii) The evidence of this survey refutes the proposition that social class background effects membership or non-membership of representative bodies (3.10.6.).

(xxviii) The majority of staff are not influenced by people outside the workplace, parents, relations, friends, or teachers, in their choice of which representative body to join, or whether they should join such a body at all (3.11.1.) and such external influences have a similar lack of influence amongst the four different staff groupings of Staff Association members, Union members, members of both representative bodies, or non-members (3.13.6.).

(xxix) There is no evidence that staff with lower educational achievements will be more prone to external pressure in joining a particular representative body or not joining one (3.11.3.).

(xxx) Less well-educated staff and those who join the Bank with a 'Comprehensive' schooling are the least likely groups to belong to the representative bodies, particularly the Union (3.12.3.).

(xxxi) Purely internal reasons, specific to working within the particular organisation determine whether the majority of staff, 60.6%, join, or do not join a representative body (3.13.2). The most important reason being personal conviction of the value of belonging to a particular body (3.4.3.).

(xxxii) Purely external reasons for membership or non-membership from outside the employment situation, influenced only a small percentage, 8.4%, of the sample, and then purely as a reason for non-membership (3.13.2.). The most important reason being the negative influence of the media against joining a representative body (3.13.4.).

(xxxiii) The importance of a combination of both internal and external reasons leading to membership or non-membership for a significant group of staff, 31%, is established by this survey (3.13.3.).

(xxxiv) The largest group of staff, 44.4%, favoured national level collective bargaining negotiations (3.14.4) but opinion was clearly split 35.7% favouring purely internal negotiations and 5.4% a combination of both levels. These findings would tend to suggest that a return to a similar combination of bargaining levels as existed under the previously established collective bargaining procedures would provide the most cohesive solution to these divided attitudes.

(xxxv) The majority of staff were satisfied with the present industrial relations system (3.15.2), but of those who were not, the largest group were unhappy with the split representation between the Staff Association and the Union and felt there should be one united representative body (3.15.5).

(xxxvi) The lack of awareness of staff about the Johnston Enquiry findings illustrates a disturbing lack of communication by both the representative bodies and the Bank employers (3.16.2).

(xxxvii) A clear majority of all the staff interviewed favoured the formation of a single staff representative body negotiating some issues nationally and others, in an individual Bank section, domestically (3.16.6), and the largest group favoured this as they felt it would provide a stronger and more effective negotiating body, likely to achieve better negotiating results (3.16.9).

(xxxviii) The largest group of staff opposed TUC affiliation but there was no overall majority opinion on this issue (3.16.12), most staff opposing affiliation felt that the TUC was too powerful and that a Bank Union could be forced to come out on strike by it.

(xxxix) An overwhelming majority of those interviewed felt that there should not be a 'closed shop' agreement.

(xl) The absence of a local branch representative of both representative bodies in some of the branches sampled should be of concern to both bodies, as the evidence suggests that membership density of the respective bodies is higher in branches where there is a representative than where there is not (3.17.2). SA representatives were generally more satisfied with their roles than BIFU representatives but most saw themselves continuing in the role and did not see their activities having either a favourable or unfavourable effect on their careers (3.17.6).

Chapter 3 - References

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CHAPTER 4

THE VALUE OF THIS STUDY FOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS THEORY

4.1.0. A predictive model?

4.1.1. The purpose of this concluding chapter is to draw out the findings from this study which have importance for general industrial relations theory, and which could provide a predictive model for industrial relations, certainly in the specific London Clearing Bank in which the study was conducted, and possibly for Clearing Banks generally, and even for white-collar industrial relations and British industrial relations as a whole.

4.1.2. How far the findings summarised at the end of the previous chapter, drawn as they are from a sample which, whilst appearing to be representative of all the branch staff in a particular Bank, is only drawn from one particular Bank, can be generalised to the other Clearing Banks, white-collar industrial relations generally, or industrial relations knowledge and theory as a whole, is obviously questionable. Certainly some of the findings would appear to support generally held views of

trade union membership behaviour, whilst some are specific to the Bank's particular industrial relations structure, where there is not just a single representative body recognised for collective bargaining purposes, as in many industries, or even no recognition given to a representative body at all, as in some, but recognition is given to two representative bodies: a Union affiliated to the TUC which believes in cross-Bank negotiations, and a loose grouping of the former Staff Associations into a body which calls itself a Union but which still maintains an attitude against TUC affiliation and essentially favours internal negotiations by each constituent member specific to each individual Bank. To test the predictive ability of the main findings would really require an exercise involving the acquisition of background data on staff, and, on the basis of this survey's findings, attempting to say

that particular staff should be in this or that representative body, or be non-members, and have certain attitudes, and to see how closely the predicted results matched reality. This might prove a useful exercise for future research. What is also required is replicative studies using this survey's questionnaire, particularly in the London Clearing Banks, to gain an overall opinion survey on their particular problems, but also in other industrial relations settings, in order to see how the results obtained, compare. What it is possible for this study to do is to compare its main generally-applicable findings with those of other studies in the same and other areas.

4.2.0. A comparison of this study with other studies in the London Clearing Banks

4.2.1. There have been six other studies of aspects of industrial relations in the London Clearing Banks by Blackburn (1), Brown (2), Heritage (3), Graham and Llewellyn (4), Rix et al (5), and Dowden (6), over the past sixteen years, and, as will be seen, because

of the varying directions and emphases of the studies, the differing questionnaires used, the differing, but limited, nature of the methodologies used in all the studies, and the fact that the studies were conducted at different points in time in a variety of different banks, any detailed comparison of their findings with this study's is difficult, and has to be done with caution, but it is not impossible.

4.2.2. Blackburn's study was the first, and as will be seen later, because of the edifice of theory which he subsequently built up on it, both in his thesis and in the book (7) which he later published, which became the focus for the 'sociological' theoretical school, it has a particular importance, and thus examination of its methodological base is particularly important. The first point that should be made is that Blackburn's study was carried out in parallel with the project on 'Automation and the Non-Manual Worker' (8) undertaken by the Industrial Research Section of Liverpool University's Social Science Department, under Enid Mumford and Olive Banks, in the early 1960s, where the staff of a Bank, code-named Royal Exchange, but in fact the old Martins Bank, was included in the field of study. Blackburn states in his thesis that 'the only disadvantage of proceeding in this way was that the sample of interviewees was chosen to meet the requirements of the project on office automation, and not the requirements of this study', (9) This was a serious, and it could

be argued, a fatal flaw, in any attempt at achieving a randomly selected, representative, sample for his study, since the interviews were thus carried out in five branches of the Bank chosen for the purposes of another study, because these branches were those in which a computer was to be introduced for the keeping of accounts, and indeed, as Blackburn says 'the clerks interviewed were those doing jobs connected with the keeping of these accounts'.(10) Thus the interviews were carried out in only five branches, with staff dealing with only one part of the Bank's branch operations, with only 101 clerks, where 'the average age for the women was 21 while the median age was only 19, and for the men the average and median ages were both 23'.(11) Blackburn does say 'therefore it will be seen that the interviewees did not form a random sample but were a slightly incomplete census of clerks doing a specific range of jobs in certain branches. Consequently the application of any conclusions from the interviews to bank clerks in general must be done only with the utmost caution ...'(12) The major problem with his work, however, is that neither in this study nor in his later publications has he endeavoured to limit the application of his limited findings in this way, but has generalised from these findings into the whole edifice of his Unionisation = Unionateness x Completeness theory for industrial relations generally. He has followed, in fact, a statement contained in his thesis, four pages

before the one above: 'It may be expected that the findings of this study will have a wider application than banking. Admittedly, we cannot be sure that some factor in the banking situation has not altered the results so as to destroy their generality',(13) (indeed one would have thought that there might well be many factors specific to the situation of Clearing Bank staffs and the consequent moulding of their opinions, particularly as Blackburn himself, earlier in his thesis, claimed them to be an 'aristocracy'(14) amongst clerks, in so doing backing Lockwood's claim(15)) 'but any scientific knowledge is liable to correction with further research. At least, the presumption is that in view of the methodology and the field of study, the findings do apply generally, until they are modified by actual application in a different field.'(16) In view of what Blackburn later says, and the reality of the fragile survey basis of his study, it would seem probable that his findings could only be limited to the Accounts staff of the five branches of one specific London Clearing Bank, in an unstable, technologically revolutionary situation, at a specific period in time between 1960 and 1963. Given these facts, and the fact that at the time Blackburn carried out his study the whole industrial relations situation in the Clearing Banks was very different from what it is now, particularly as NUBE (BIFU as it is now) was not recognised in Martins Bank at the time of his study, any detailed comparison of my results with

his is difficult, particularly as this Bank no longer exists as an independent commercial entity and this study was carried out in a different bank.

4.2.3. There are grave problems, also, with Heritage's work, the other Doctoral study of industrial relations in the Clearing Bank area. The first major problem is that he uses interview data collected in 1972 and 1973 to sociologically interpret the growth of trade unionism in the London Clearing Banks from 1960 to 1970. He, himself, says 'the question of whether, or to what extent, the results of survey data gathered in 1972-73 can be held to be retrospectively applicable to workers during a previous period . . . and hence to shed light on events during that period, is an extremely difficult one to answer with any degree of security'.(17) One can only say that rationally one can have only the gravest doubts, particularly in view of the major changes in industrial relations that occurred in the Clearing Banks between the 1960s and 1970s which were examined earlier in Chapter 2. There are further problems with the methodology of his study as his sample consisted of just 88 clerical staff interviewed in two branches of Barclays Bank, one in Leeds and one in Coventry, and two branches of Lloyds Bank, similarly located. The branches were 'determined by themselves (the Banks) in consultation with the researcher'.(18) Heritage himself admits two major problems with this interviewing procedure.

(i) 'The sample of interviewees would be established on an entirely voluntary basis as a result of an internal canvass of branch officials within the branches selected . . . (thus) . . . the sample is the product of the employee self-selection together with whatever elements of selection were generated by the Banks' internal canvassing operations'. (19)

(ii) 'The practical necessity to interview in the larger city centre branches . . . (since) . . . it was thought advisable to interview in the larger branches as the continual diversion of staff away from their normal duties would tend to disrupt the activities of smaller branches. The number of staff in the branches at which interviews took place varied between 50 and 116 persons and the proportion of the staff interviewed varied between 25 and 40 per cent.' (20)

Heritage states 'given these conditions, the sample interviewed cannot of course be regarded as a random one. . . hence the results of the survey data to be reported below can, at best, only be regarded as descriptive and illustrative in character and will be treated as such . . . thus, whilst it is possible to place considerable weight on some of the inferences from the sample to the banking population as a whole, such inferences must and will be treated with the maximum caution'. (21) It might be justifiably suggested that Heritage overstretchers himself even in the modest claims of this final sentence, given the admitted powerful limitations on his study. Because

of these, there are, again, difficulties in comparing the results of our studies, but as it is one of the few studies with which such comparisons can be made, this needs to be done (4.3.1. onwards).

4.2.4. Part of Susan Brown's survey into participation in NUBE was also carried out in Coventry but in her case it was in the Coventry branch of NUBE, the other branches where her questionnaires were conducted being Birmingham, Evesham, South Warwickshire and Worcester. Members in these five branches were randomly selected and sent a questionnaire to complete. Possibly because she chose the method of a self-completion questionnaire her response rate was only 36%, 72 returned out of 200 sent out, and this rather negates the fact that, unlike Blackburn's, Heritage's, and my own, surveys, which are limited to particular banks, she had staff in her sample from all the London Clearing Banks and the Trustee Savings Bank. Because of these shortcomings in her research, the small sample, the limitation of the survey to a specific geographical area, and also the fact that she was concerned, not with overall attitudes of staff to the industrial relations system, but specifically with the degree of participation of the members of only one of the representative bodies, there are, again, difficulties, in directly comparing our results. She does, however, point to the difficulty of judging the degree of members' 'participation' which my survey (3.8.1.) and others, in other areas, have shown to be very low if judged on attendance at branch meetings (22)(23)

what can be termed 'formal attendance', and she raises the question which is raised elsewhere (24, 25, 26) of the importance, and difficulty, of judging 'informal' participation, which was not attempted in my survey.

4.2.5. Rix et al's survey combines one of Heritage's methodological problems with one of Brown's. His survey was conducted amongst all employees of Barclays Bank in Yorkshire in September 1979. Barclays Bank was chosen as it appeared to have the least optimistic membership outlook for BIFU in May/June 1979 (ironic in view of the fact that Barclays was the first Bank to give NUBE recognition in its original Bank Officers' Guild form(2.2.5.4) and that the BOG/NUBE had considerably more members than the Staff Association in the Bank until the late 1960s (2.5.2.1)) and BIFU wanted to find out why this was so. 'Full-time BIFU employees distributed the questionnaire in person at each branch, explained the procedure for self-completion, and collected the questionnaire from the branch on the same day. Because of the differing nature of each branch it was not possible to ensure standardisation of instruction between the survey administrators. . . the response rate was high (60%+) but we must assume, as it is normally necessary to assume, that the non-responders differ along some important dimension from the responders' (27). Thus

the Rix survey had both the Heritage problem of losing control of the administration of the questionnaire, and the Brown problem of the self-selection of the respondents, problems which can be overcome, if, as with my survey, you are able to gain the employer's cooperation to have total control over the administration of the questionnaire, by conducting all the interviews personally, in branches which you, the interviewer, have randomly selected (see 1.3.1-1.3.9). Although, of the seven surveys, including mine, Rix's is the second largest to mine in terms of the number of respondents, with 386, these limitations in the methodology, combined with the facts that his respondents were all from one regional area, and in a different bank from mine, make detailed comparison of our results, again, difficult.

4.2.6. Both Graham and Llewellyn, and Dowden, used Clearing Bank staff employed in Oxford, to provide the survey data contained in their studies. Graham and Llewellyn were carrying out a study on 'Women in the Occupational Structure' at Oxford University, and the sample on which their study was based consisted of 39 staff, 50% of the total staff in one branch of Barclays Bank in Oxford, with whom personal interviews were carried out. Obviously the aim of the study was very different to mine, and the very limited sample both in size and location, and, again, the fact that it was carried out

in a different bank, make valid comparison of our data problematical. Dowden's study was the latest to mine, chronologically, being carried out in February 1980, and he interviewed 83 clerical staff in seven branches of the 'Big Four' banks in Oxford. His is the only other study to have acquired any attitudes on some of the subjects examined in my survey, in the same Bank where my study was carried out, but as there were only 22 staff in two branches in one location from this Bank and, as he rightly admits, 'I may be at fault in surveying in just one location' (28), again comparison of our work has to be done with caution.

4.2.7. Thus, as can be seen, the actual locations, both of the Banks themselves and their geographical locations, have usually been different to mine, in the other studies carried out in the London Clearing Banks; the scope of the studies and their focal points vary; and the methodologies, on the whole, have been very limited, and make valid comparison of our results more difficult than it might otherwise have been. Furthermore, the degree of generalisation that can be made to draw out any generalised theory of industrial relations from such disparate studies is bound to be limited. Thus, what is required before any generally applicable industrial relations theory can be properly evolved for the Clearing Bank sector, or any other sector, is adequately funded, co-ordinated, research, using commonly administered questionnaires from a fully

representative sample. This author is confident of the applicability and validity of these results to the particular Bank in which they were obtained, and at the particular time they were obtained, but how much further, logically and rationally, one can go philosophically, is debatable. It is possible that a similar spread of responses would exist in the other two Clearing Banks that have both a Staff Association and BIFU, but in both, the character, organisation, leadership, and attitudes, of the particular Staff Associations is slightly different, as is the character of the particular BIFU Assistant General Secretary in each Bank, and without research is these Banks using the same or a very similar questionnaire, verification is impossible. As to the other two major clearers, one would probably expect different responses and attitudes in the Midland Bank, where the staff's choice is between two unions, BIFU and ASTMS, for representation, and there is no Staff Association, and, indeed, where over half the staff are not in either of these representative bodies, and, possibly, where there is a more 'advanced' approach to industrial relations practices, not just because of its recognition of two unions for representative purposes, but because of its development and pioneering of a Jointly Accredited Representatives system among the Banks with dual representative bodies (Williams & Glyn's having first developed such a system with BIFU). Certainly, the questionnaire used for this study would

have to be largely revamped, and the attitude expressed might well be different, in Williams & Glyn's Bank, where there is no split in representation and BIFU alone has the sole representative and negotiating rights.

4.2.8. Thus, generalisation from the various studies so far conducted in this one sector of industrial relations, either to itself, or more generally to British industrial relations theory, or indeed world global theory, is difficult. However, although the methodologies of these previously conducted studies are limited, and their areas of investigation and concentration are mainly different from those of this study, they are the only ones we have, imperfect though they may be, and thus a general comparison of their findings, with mine, where possible, appears valuable and necessary in a thesis of this nature.

4.3.0. A comparison of this study's findings with those of other studies.

4.3.1. There would appear to be four general areas in which comparison is possible:

- (i) Male/female attitudes.
- (ii) Why staff do or do not join representative bodies.
- (iii) Employer attitudes to the staff and their representative bodies and employee attitudes to the employers and the staff representative bodies.
- (iv) The effect of the media and other external influences on staff attitudes to their representative bodies.

4.3.2. Male/female attitudes

4.3.2.1. In the first of these comparisons, that of male and female attitudes to unionisation, Lockwood (29) had hypothesised, on the basis of his mainly historical analyses of clerical workers, that women would not be less likely to join trade unions than men, since their career opportunities were less good, and they therefore would have less to lose from membership, and might even be more likely to join. Blackburn (30) found that 'it is clear that women were less interested than men in staff representation.' It appears that this was partially due to the fact that the women tended to be more apathetic, but to a large extent it was also due to their having less experience of the rival bodies and their propaganda. Because of the high labour turnover, there is always a substantial proportion of the female staff in this inexperienced position! The findings of this thesis support Blackburn's findings that female staff are less likely than male staff to join either body (3.3.4. and 3.7.2.) which may be hardly surprising as Lockwood's book was essentially subjective and not based on any objective study data, and also support his emphasis on the importance of short or long service having a relatively negative or positive effect on membership (3.3.8.). It would appear too simplistic, however, from the findings of this thesis, to attribute female non-membership to

apathy, since lack of publicity and communication of the benefits to be gained from membership, appeared as the main reason for non-membership in this thesis' findings (3.7.3.). Indeed, one has to worry about Blackburn's categorisation of 'apathy' since nearly 5% of his limited sample said they had not been asked, which clearly indicates a lack of communication as their reason for not joining, but Blackburn decided that such statements were an expression of apathy (31). This finding appears to be a much more positive main reason than Heritage's finding (32) that 'much of our evidence points to the unchosen, barely motivated, semi-considered and almost random character of female staff's organisation membership'. Indeed, the number of females stating positive conviction as their reason for joining a representative body, in this thesis (3.4.3. and 3.5.3.) would oppose this finding. A surprisingly high percentage of his 88 respondents, 81% (33), 58% of whom were women (34), had been members of a staff representative organisation during their period of employment. However, at the time of his interviews only 9 of the 37 male staff were non-members, whilst 22 of the 51 female staff were non-members (35) which supports the findings of both my work, and Blackburn's, that females are less likely to be members of representative bodies, at a specific point in time, than males.

4.3.3. Why staff do or do not join representative bodies

4.3.3.1. The second area of comparison, as to why staff join or do not join representative bodies has already been briefly touched upon. In his study, Blackburn suggested (36) that five years was the significant period of experience in employment during which staff decided whether or not to join a representative body. The finding of this thesis (3.3.13) is that the first two years of service is the significant period during which staff decide whether or not to join. Blackburn also found that 'for the majority, the most important factor explaining how they came to join was social pressure.' (37) Pressure from superiors or peers only emerged in third and fourth positions in this thesis, whilst the conviction of the need for membership, of the particular body which was best able to protect the staff's interests, and improve their conditions, based upon a rational choice, came clearly top (Table 8, 3.4.2.). Blackburn's Table 12 (38) provides only 13 responses for joining either representative body out of the 79 members asked, the majority of these stating 'ideological' reasons. One can only assume that either Blackburn found a distinctly uncommunicative or unthinking sample of staff, or that the question posed was inadequate to acquire a proper answer.

- 4.3.3.2. The clear majority of staff in Heritage's sample joined because they were asked or canvassed as is shown in his Table 6.7(39). As has been stated above, this finding does not tally with those of this thesis, although such canvassing, particularly by SA or BIFU representatives, was found to be important for the second largest group (19.6%) of staff (Table 8, 3.4.2.). Heritage's findings supported Blackburn's in that there was 'a strong tendency for SA members of both sexes who has been "asked" to join, to indicate the rank of the person who had asked them to join. The ranks cited in those instances were uniformly high' (40). This finding is not borne out by this thesis and, indeed, of those stating 'pressure from superiors' as their reason for joining a representative body, the majority were in BIFU, not the SA (Table 8, 3.4.2.).
- 4.3.3.3. Heritage, like Blackburn, found that 'in sum, membership of both organisations is a rather undramatic affair in which over 40% of each organisation's members could give no real reason for membership' (41), indeed the main reason-grouping given for membership of both bodies in his Table 6.8 was 'no reason given'! (42). As suggested previously, the quality of the questions asked or the method by which the sample was chosen may well have accounted for this inability.
- 4.3.3.4. There is a remarkable similarity between the percentage of members in both Blackburn's, Heritage's and this thesis' samples that had joined and held joint membership

of both representative bodies. Blackburn reported that 5% of his sampled members were in both bodies (43) and Heritage found that 4.5% of members were in both bodies (44) which is the same figure as in this thesis (Table 10, 3.5.1.).

- 4.3.3.5. In deciding which of the two representative bodies to join, the staff interviewed in Blackburn's sample did not have a properly free choice, since at the time of his survey only the Staff Association was recognised for negotiating purposes, and, indeed, he states that a fifth of those who were not NUBE members, in his sample, had not joined the union because it was unrecognised for bargaining purposes (45). This factor did not play a part in either Heritage's or my surveys as they were both conducted after recognition had been granted to the NUBE/BIFU.
- 4.3.3.6. If one looks at why staff cease membership of either body, Heritage's findings back up those of this thesis in discovering that the level of the union's subscriptions plays a very important part in leading staff to cease membership. In Table 6.12 (46) he shows that the level of subscriptions payable is the most important reason for staff leaving NUBE, and this finding is mirrored by this thesis (Table 12, 3.6.2.). However, that is the only similar reason that is given by both samples of staff for leaving the two representative bodies. Blackburn found 'no evidence to suggest that clerks are attracted to the SA rather than NUBE because of the lower subscriptions'. (47). This study found a small percentage of members, 3.1%, who were attracted by the lower subscriptions of the SA (Table 10, 3.5.1.).

4.3.4. Employer attitudes and employee attitudes to each other and the staff representative bodies

4.3.4.1. The third area of comparison is in the area of employer attitudes to the staff, and their representative bodies, and the employee attitudes to the employers and their own staff representative bodies. When Blackburn carried out his study only the Staff Association in Martins Bank was recognised for collective bargaining purposes, and so his finding that some clerks felt that they should support the Staff Association, and join it, if they accepted the rises which it won for them (48), would not apply in the post-1968 situation, when the NUBE/BIFU was also recognised. It could be argued that the muddying of representation which has taken place in the Banks by having two representative bodies may have removed this 'duty' reason to join a representative body since it is now often unclear as to whose pressure has been most important in gaining a particular concession from the management. It can often be very difficult to judge the real worth of a negotiating body in any ultimate pay settlement, even if only one recognised representative body exists. The split in representation which has existed since 1968 has been shown, by this thesis, to be the most important reason causing staff to be unhappy with the present industrial relations system in this study's bank, with a clear feeling being expressed that the two representative body organisations should join into

into one united representative body (3.15.5., 3.16.6. and 3.16.9). It is interesting that 23% of the males and 12% of the females in Heritage's survey supported these findings in giving their feeling of the 'need for one negotiating body', Table 6.11 (49), as their reason for leaving the Staff Association. Heritage's study also showed, in the same table, that the largest number of both male and female staff, 38%, gave as their reason for leaving the Staff Association, as being that it was not separate or independent enough from the Banks (50), a finding which is also supported by this thesis (3.6.7.).

4.3.4.2. This study also supports Heritage's finding, Tables 6.14 (51) and 6.16 (52), that the majority of both SA and BIFU members were happy with the performances of their representative bodies, and, that of those who were not, the majority were male (3.15.2.). However, the financial benefits gained by both bodies was the main reason given for joining both, Tables 6.13 (53) and 6.15 (54) in Heritage's study, whereas in this study, the majority of members, in both bodies, gave a different main reason for joining the respective bodies. The majority of BIFU members felt that BIFU was a stronger, independent negotiating body (Table 10, 3.5.1.) and the majority of SA members felt that the SA was the one representative body solely concerned with Clearing Bank staff and no other groups of workers, and therefore was a better body to belong to.

4.3.4.3. With regard to the employee attitudes to the employers, it is difficult to find evidence to support Heritage's statement, in his study, 'few bank clerks endorsed a "conflict" view of employer-employee relationships or stated staff/employer relations in the Bank were not "very good"' (55) as over 25% of the clerks in his sample (56) took a conflict view or stated that the employer/employee relationship was not very good. It is difficult to judge what the responses of this study would have been to such a question since staff were not explicitly asked it, but certainly conflict, in certain areas, does exist, for some staff, over particular issues, such as grading problems, understaffing of branches, and the erosion of holiday differentials (3.15.6), as well as problems with communication, both downwards from the employers and management, and upwards to management (3.15.6). There is obviously, also, conflict between the two representative bodies in the present industrial relations system, which appears to be a substantial cause of conflict, amongst staff, with the existing Clearing Bank industrial relations system itself (3.15.5).

4.3.5. The effect of the media and other external influences on staff attitudes to their representative bodies

4.3.5.1. The final area of comparison that can be made is on the influence of the media, and other external influences, on staff attitudes to their representative bodies.

Neither Heritage nor Blackburn, nor any of the other banking studies, have identified the importance of the media as a negative influence on staff attitudes to the representative bodies in the Clearing Bank industrial relations system, which this study illustrates (3.13.4.).

4.3.5.2. As to the external background of the staff interviewed, both Heritage's (57), and Graham and Llewellyn's (58) work show a marked increase in the number of both male and female clerks with manual backgrounds, compared with Blackburn's sample of the early 1960s. This study bears out this finding, with 36.9% of all the sample interviewed coming from manual backgrounds. Both Heritage and Graham and Llewellyn also looked at the educational backgrounds of the staff interviewed, and found substantial differences in the backgrounds of male and female staff. In Heritage's sample 67.6% of the men had received a grammar school education, whereas only 31.2% of the females had received such an education; similar percentages of male and female staff in the sample, 8.1% male, 5.9% female, had attended public or private schools; 23.3% of females had been to comprehensive schools as opposed to 8.1% of males; and 33.1% of females had received a secondary modern or technical education, as opposed to 5.4% of males (59). In Graham and Llewellyn's survey, 50% of the sample's female clerks had come from secondary modern schools,

whereas none of the male staff had attended this type of school. Similarly, 85% of the male staff had attended selective secondary schools whereas only 46% of the females had done so (60). These findings are largely supported by those of this study in Tables 20 and 21 (3.11.2.) and the Appendices on which these tables are based.

4.3.5.3. Neither Heritage's nor Graham and Llewellyn's studies, nor any of the others, have carried out the same, in-depth, correlative analyses, of this social and educational background material, with membership of either of the two representative bodies, or non-membership, as has been done in this study (3.11.2.-3.12.4.). Only Heritage has carried out a comparison in one comparable area, that of class background and the type of staff representative organisation joined, and he stated, in his thesis, that 'no relationship was established, for either sex, between "current membership" of either type of staff organisation and class background (as indexed by parental occupation)' (61). This finding supports mine, and refutes Blackburn's study's specific finding that there was 'a clear tendency for male clerks from homes where the father's occupation placed them higher on the social scale, to be less sympathetic to unions, and so to join the less unionate SA, or neither organisation. There was no such tendency among the women' (62). Indeed, twice as many women as men (10-5) were members of NUBE, rather than the SA, amongst his 'professional, managerial and higher technical grouping' (63). The 'supervisory,

clerical and lower technical' group split 10-8 in favour of NUBE membership (64). Indeed, the only group which split in a fashion which one would expect, if the major influence claimed by the sociological school for the influence of social background on union membership was to hold any substance, was in his 'manual' category where there was a 10-3 NUBE/SA split (65). In his 'other and deceased' category, there was a 10-11 NUBE/SA split (66). These figures clearly illustrate the inadequacy of Blackburn's sample, and findings, to in any way properly prove the sociologists' thesis for union membership, of whom he is held to be a major proponent on the basis of this study, and the next section of this thesis will go on to examine the division of theory amongst the sociological and industrial relations schools, and the place of the evidence of this study's findings within it.

4.4.0. The 'sociological' versus the 'industrial relations' theorists

4.4.1. The major problem with the 'sociological' school and one of its major proponents, Blackburn's, work, is that he has fallen into the traps expounded in the last two sections in that he has built on what we have already seen to be a most flimsy methodological construction, and extremely flimsy results, an edifice of generalised industrial relations theory. Having developed his 'Unionisation=Unionateness x Completeness' theory, on the basis of this evidence (67), he proceeded with Prandy, who himself had carried out a study of professional employees' relative allegiances to trade unions and professional associations(68) to produce a 'conceptual

framework' (69). They were concerned to refute the idea that white-collar unions were distinct entities from manual unions and to show that they were similar entities at different points on the same continuum, a view expounded much earlier by Klingender (70). In a further article (71), nine years later, they admitted to flaws in the unity and applicability of Blackburn's theory, based on an attempt to test it amongst an all-male, randomly selected, quota sample, drawn from a range of manufacturing industry, insurance companies, and local and central government. Despite the use of complex analysis using the Guttman scalogram, Coombs' 'unfolding analysis', and multidimensional scaling, convincing evidence of the general applicability of the theory is still missing and it is very hard to believe in Blackburn's concepts of 'unionateness' in the real industrial relations world, where the need for a particular union to maintain its differentials over another is often more important than any unity with the other unions or the Labour Party, and where the most concrete example of united unionateness this century, the nine-day General Strike of 1926, itself ended in disunity and mutual recriminations amongst trade union leaders and their members. Obviously the attitude survey at the heart of this thesis also illustrates the division of attitudes amongst 'white-collar' staff, not only in the degree of unionateness

between the more moderate Staff Association and the more militant BIFU, but also the division of attitudes within these separate memberships on whether, for instance, there should be national or domestic level collective bargaining negotiations (3.14.4) or a united representative body in the London Clearing Banks (3.16.5).

4.4.2. This lack of unity, in outlook, amongst workers, to trade union representation, is well illustrated by Roberts, Cook, Clark and Semeonoff in their book (72) and article (73) based on interviews, conducted in 1972, 'with 474 economically active males from a sample selected at random from the electoral registers covering the adjacent Woolton and Allerton districts of Liverpool . . (containing) . . an occupationally heterogeneous population with similar numbers in white-collar and manual jobs, distributed throughout the Registrar-General's social classes'. They state that 'both blue-collar and white-collar employees are prepared to employ either individualistic or collectivistic action, or a combination of both, depending upon the strategy that they consider best suits their particular situation' (74). They state that they do not argue that their investigation conclusively proves this proposition but that it 'is one worthy of serious consideration and further research' (75). It certainly appears a more realistic appraisal of what actually occurs amongst representative body members, in that there may well be very little consensus of

approach amongst individual members or amongst different unions on issues even when they are in similar employment, with similar conditions, in the same industry, as in the London Clearing Banks. Although union leaders representing all types of workers may subscribe to a common 'labour' ideology, Cook (76) has shown that this consensus stops well short of the grass roots. Personal advancement and promotion have been shown to be sought at the expense of the idea of pursuing group interests, through collective action, by both Sykes and Burns (77, 78). Mercer and Weir (79) have claimed that the attitudes of white-collar unionists are distinctly pragmatic and that if they feel their careers are blocked they may turn to trade unionism but they still retain middle-class orientations. According to this school of thought, white-collar unions tend to be narrowly oriented, conservative interest groups, unconcerned with the pursuit of general social justice, more concerned with specific occupational interests, and preferring cooperation rather than conflict with management. Roberts and Gennard's 'Reluctant Militants' study (80) and Blain's (81), Goldstein's (82), and Strauss' (83), studies support this line of argument.

4.4.3. Roberts, Cook, et al's, work, and these other studies show the dangers of generalised sociological theory in industrial relations and it is precisely this windmill that Bain, Coates, and Ellis, tilted at in the

early 1970s. Their book, published in 1973, (84), followed Allan Flanders' initial development of the 'industrial relations' approach (85), and was a review of the literature and industrial relations studies that had been done up to that time and was based on a philosophical view derived from the three authors' own individual researches (86, 87, 88) which sought to make clear their 'feelings of unease about the considerable body of literature in which patterns of union growth and character are explained primarily by reference to various aspects of the system of social stratification' (89).

4.4.4. It is therefore important to examine the work, mainly Bain's, and its methodology, on which this opinion was based, in order to see what evidence he had found to support this contention from his important, pioneering work into the growth and development of white-collar unionism in Britain.

There are a number of problems with the methodology of Bain's work prior to the publication of his joint 1973 work. The first is that his research was largely carried out by reference to secondary sources of statistical information, in particular census information, and other government, particularly Ministry of Labour, publications. His 1966 article in the BJIR (90), his Royal Commission Research Paper (91) and his subsequent book (92) relied on these sources. However, he did also undertake a survey of individual employers and employers' associations in private industry during May to July 1966, personally conducting interviews with 25 major firms and 14 employers'

associations and, additionally, sending a questionnaire to 15 firms and 142 employers' associations to which he got an 86% response rate. The employers' associations being chosen, with the help of the CBI, as the most important ones in the industry concerned, and the firms being chosen, partly because of their size, and, partly, because they were known to have refused, or granted, recognition to a white-collar union. The employers' survey was supplemented by information gained from interviews with 60 full-time officials of the major unions catering for white-collar employees in the private industry. There are thus two main problems with the research; firstly that it draws general conclusions on the growth of white-collar unionism which may or may not be applicable to specific industrial situations, particularly to purely white-collar employments such as banking or insurance as these were relatively new 'unionised' phenomena in the mid 1960s, and Bain's main concentration was on "the major factors which promote or hinder the growth of trade unionism amongst white-collar workers, particularly those employed in manufacturing industries, in Great Britain . . . manufacturing has been singled out for special attention in this study (as) . . . manufacturing industries are the major 'commanding height' of the economy and offer the trade union movement its largest untapped potential of white-collar members (and) statistical data are more plentiful for this sector of the economy than for others, and this makes it easier to test generalisations about union growth".(93)

By 1979/80 manufacturing had ceased to be the 'commanding height', and service industries with mainly white-collar workforces had come much more to the fore in the British economy. Secondly there is the problem that his research does not really touch 'grass-roots' union membership opinion because of his decision not to conduct a generalised attitude survey and, like the information on which the Johnston reports were based (2.6.1.2.), his only sources of original information are from officials of both employers and trade union organisations whose representations of 'grass roots' attitudes is perhaps, doubtful. He states that he deliberately did not concern himself "with discovering why one worker in a given environment joins a trade union while another worker in the same environment does not . . . (as) . . . this study is concerned with explaining the behaviour of groups rather than of individuals" (94). This is a major difference between his approach and that of this study, which aimed at examining individual white-collar attitudes to trade unionism, in a specific industry, and a specific industrial relations setting, with unique components, structures, and problems. It would seem as problematical to draw conclusions from the general industrial relations setting to the specific, as to draw conclusions from the specific industrial relations settings to the general, as is done to a limited extent in this study, and as equally valid or invalid.

There is a third possible problem in that, because of its dependency on official figures, Bain's work is always dependent on historical information, and has only been carried up to 1974 in subsequent articles (95, 96), and thus its applicability to current white-collar attitudes is always likely to be questionable. There is also the problem of the accuracy of Bain's statistics "this does not mean that these statistics are completely accurate. They are not. And if the generalisations which are based upon them are to be properly evaluated, their shortcomings must be fully understood." (97)

With these important caveats in mind it is still valuable, because of the breadth of his research, unlike Blackburn's, and the other studies in the London Clearing Banks, to examine how far his generalised findings fit with the findings of this study's thesis, based on its specific attitude survey, outside the fit between his work and the historical analysis of this study which has been examined earlier and appears to fit well. (2.8.1.1. - 2.8.1.3.).

Bain's first major conclusion is that "the density of white-collar unionism tends to be highest in Wales and to a lesser extent in the northern and north-western areas of the country and lowest around London and the eastern and southern areas" (98). This conclusion was later supported by a further study initiated by Bain, at Warwick, based on a random sample of 1457 manufacturing establishments with fifty or more full-time employees (99) conducted between November 1977 and January 1978. The

findings of this specific survey in a non-manufacturing white-collar setting would support these findings, with its significantly higher Union membership in the North region than in London and the South-East (3.3.1-3.3.2) as would BIFU's actual membership survey figures (100). Bain says, in support of Lockwood, (101) that "female employees appear to have no inherent characteristics which make them more difficult to unionise than men, or, at least if they have, unions have been able to overcome them". (102). The evidence of this study (3.3.4) is that female staff are less likely than male staff to join either a Union or a Staff Association, but, if they do join either body, they are much more likely to join a Staff Association, and that "inherent characteristics" may well play a part in this preference, and thus would not support Bain's conclusions.

Bain finds no evidence to support Shister's claim that "younger workers are likely to show a greater propensity to unionise than older workers" (103). This study shows clearly that older male staff are the most likely staff to be members of a representative body, whilst male and female staff in the 16-25 age range are the least likely staff to be members, thus supporting Bain's findings. Although Bain himself did not feel that this particular influence was of 'great importance' (104) from his British survey, possibly because of his inadequate data base, his hypothesis that, because "trade unions may have poorly designed structures and use inappropriate techniques for recruiting white-collar employees" (105) white-collar

employees may not get organised and recruited, even though they feel the need for trade unionism, is supported by this survey's evidence, which finds that the main reason for staff being non-members is their lack of awareness of any benefits from membership (3.7.3), which suggests the need for better communication systems by the Bank's representative bodies. Evidence of problems of communication is compounded, from this survey, by the staff's lack of awareness about the Johnston Enquiry findings, and the absence of local branch representatives of one or other of the representative bodies in half the branches visited (3.17.2). Bain's findings of the importance of employers' attitudes in the degree of unionisation, referred to earlier (2.2.5.5., 2.8.1.1., 2.8.1.3.), is also reflected in the lack of time made available for local representative body meetings in working time (3.9.4.).

Bain also examined, specifically, the sociologists' argument that the social origins of workers determine many aspects of their behaviour. Bain found the same problem of comparability of data in the considerable amount of information which has been collected on the social origins of various white-collar groups "because of differences in sample size, reliability, and date, nor are they comparable with the data on union membership which has been collected for this study" (106) as was found earlier, by this thesis' author, in directly comparing the results of this survey's data with other work carried out in other London Clearing Banks in the past. Bain also found contradictory findings from some

of the surveys, particularly those carried out in America(107,108,109,110,111). All that Bain felt able to conclude, "until such time as there are better empirical studies, is that there is not generally a connection between social origins and union membership"(112). This conclusion was reinforced by his own general survey data where "variations in the density of white-collar unionism . . . would seem to be too large to be explained by variations in social origins. The density of unionism amongst draughtsmen is 80% in vehicles, 50% in engineering and electrical goods, and less than 6% in chemicals. It is extremely doubtful if the social origins of draughtsmen vary sufficiently from industry to industry to account for these variations in union density. Nor is it very likely that the high degree of clerical unionism in the public sector and the low degree in the private sector is accounted for by differences in social origins".(113). The criticism that can be made of Bain is that such statements are too generalised without carrying out specific surveys in these industries. However, such specific research carried out in this survey supports this view strongly, as it also strongly supports Bain's later footnote contention that "the influence of education upon the propensity to unionise is probably much the same as the influence of social origins, namely - little, if any," (114) a finding which had previously been found by Goldstein and Indik (115) in their study of professional engineers.

4.4.5. Thus, whilst not supporting all Bain's main general findings, the evidence from this specific survey in a London Clearing Bank lends support to most of them, and it was largely on the basis of these arguments and a wide-ranging literature survey, that Bain, Coates and Ellis, in their 1973 book, concluded that "far from distinct class or status positions generating simple, coherent, and distinct images of social reality which then shape and sustain markedly different patterns of union growth and character, perceptions of reality . . . (are) . . . demonstrated to be varied, overlapping, and capable of change over time. No easy equation could then reasonably be expected between social position, social imagery, and trade unionism" (116). They therefore conclude that there is no significant relationship between the variables of social stratification and trade unionism, "all that is being denied here is the assertion that social stratification constitutes the predominant, or even a major, determinant of union growth and character . . . none the less . . . it is neither possible nor desirable to dismiss completely the impact of social stratification upon union growth and character." (117).

Their book predictably drew the barbed attentions of the leading figures of the 'sociological' school in review, Blackburn (118) and Prandy (119), and also a very superficial, dismissive review from a Professor at the University of California (120), but their general view is one which seems much more practical and reflective of the reality of industrial relations, and is largely supported by the evidence of this thesis. The newly acquired research data contained in Chapter 3 shows that both social class and background and education had no significant impact on whether staff joined the Staff Association, the Union, or neither representative body and, indeed, the similarity of the percentage splits of the three groups in each social class was striking (Table 19, 3.10.5), as was the similar spread of educational backgrounds amongst Staff Association members, Union members and non-members (Tables 22-23, 3.12.2.) which supports the Bain, Coates, and Ellis, view. On the question of what factors influenced membership or non-membership (Table 26, 3.13.2), the majority, 60.6%, gave 'internal' reasons related to their employment in the particular Bank, and the particular characters of the two representative bodies, but there were 8.4% who gave purely external, 'sociological' reasons, but then only for non-membership, the largest group stating negative media influence, which is interesting in view of the Glasgow University Media Research Unit's recent findings of media bias in the

coverage of industrial relations (121). However, such purely 'sociological' reasons were not given for membership of either representative body.

There were also an important 31% of those interviewed who gave a combination of both internal 'industrial relations' reasons and external 'sociological' reasons for both representative body membership and non-membership. The identification of this significant group's existence has important consequences for industrial relations theory, as, hopefully, will the other findings of this study, since their existence proves that the attractiveness of an all-embracing, black-and-white theory for union membership growth, and character, in industrial relations, is extremely hard, if not impossible, to achieve. Indeed, the 'industrial relations' theorists have acknowledged, as shown above, that social aspects cannot be dismissed completely, but they may not have been prepared, previously, to give them the equal status which for 31% of the individuals in this study, they obviously require.

It would seem difficult not to agree with Rosemary Crompton (122), (though not with her overall sociologically based view), who has recently raised this whole debate again in the pages of 'Sociology', that 'construction of universal theory may be academically satisfying, but it is prone to the danger of being too general to be particularly helpful, or even positively misleading' (123). Thus, whilst the generalised 'industrial relations' theory could be applied correctly to the majority of staff in this study,

generalised 'sociological' theory could only be applied to a small group of non-members, and both generalised theories are inadequate for the 31% of staff who are equally influenced in their reasons for membership or non-membership of representative bodies, by both 'industrial' and 'sociological' reasons.

4.4.6. Thus the findings of the thesis, from a specific industrial setting, that of a major London Clearing Bank, largely support the general findings of the 'industrial relations' theorists led by Bain, on the reasons for white-collar union membership and growth. Certainly the majority, 60.6%, of respondents in the sample were influenced into membership or non-membership by 'internal industrial' factors, and it may well be that a similar proportion of staff would be similarly influenced in many other white-collar industrial relations settings. The theories of the 'sociological' school are shown to have only a relatively minor sole impact on staff, influencing only 8.4%, and then only towards non-membership, and again similar results might well be found in other white-collar industrial relations setting. Neither theoretical school adequately explains the 31% of staff who were equally influenced by both factors and thus the influence of external 'sociological' factors in combination with internal 'industrial' factors needs to be taken account of by industrial relations theorists in the future, and their existence should be looked for by future industrial relations researchers. Likewise the fact that 91.6% of staff were influenced wholly or in part by 'internal

industrial' factors and only 39.4% were influenced wholly or in part by 'external' sociological' factors is a blow to the sociological theory of white-collar trade union membership or non-membership as a viable academic theory applicable to anything but a minority of white-collar staff, certainly in relation to the specific banking commercial setting examined by this thesis, and possibly to all other white-collar settings.

4.5.0. A proposed model

4.5.1. Given the breadth and depth of the survey conducted in this thesis and the apparent representativeness of its population to that of Branch banking employees, as a whole, in a particular bank, perhaps a model can be tentatively proposed that might be applicable to the whole of the Clearing Bank sector and in other white-collar, industrial relations, settings.

4.5.2. The model concerns the factors that will lead or not lead an individual employee to join a staff representative body at a particular, latitudinal point in time. Although this study is similar to those of Bain, Elsheikh and Price it differs, essentially, in that it is a snapshot, latitudinal view, rather than an historical, longitudinal view, as is theirs, of the factors influencing white-collar union membership.

4.5.3. The proposed latitudinal model is as follows:

Actual work situation (position, promotion, status, skill, organisation)

Plus

4.5.3. The proposed latitudinal model is as follows:

Actual work situation (position, promotion, status,
skill, organisation)

Plus

Effectiveness of staff representative organisations

Plus

Ability of staff representative bodies to communicate
their value to staff

Plus

Social background (upbringing, parents' ideas, education)

Equals

Attitude to union membership

Plus

Degree of Unionisation

This could be shortened to:

$$W + E + C + S = A + D$$

4.5.4. It would appear from the evidence of this thesis that the social background factor would, in many cases, equal nought, and that, in the majority of cases, the other three factors would have most influence. However, again on the evidence of this thesis, the social background factor would, for nearly a third of white-collar staff, be likely to equal the value of the other factors, and, for a small number of employees, it would be the dominant, if not the only, positive factor. The attitude to unionisation would thus be more or less positive depending on the relative

value of the first part of the equation, and the degree of unionisation would be a measure of both density and unionateness.

- 4.5.5. As with all models there is the problem, in reality, of valuing each of these factors on some sort of numerical scale in order to give the equation practical value. It would seem likely from the evidence of this thesis that some of the values would be negative values. However, even if the model's practical application may prove difficult, its theoretical contribution in provoking thought and comment, should make its formulation valuable.

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APPENDIX 1 - OVERALL ANALYSIS

406 Staff (29 non-response)

APPENDIX 2 - LONDON ANALYSIS

152 Staff (9 Non-response)

APPENDIX 3 - SOUTH-EAST ANALYSIS

131 staff (4 non-response)

APPENDIX 4 - NORTH ANALYSIS

123 staff (16 non-response)

(pp. 304- 515)

have been removed for confidentiality reasons