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**The reformed Committee on World Food Security and the
global governance of food security**

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Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Food Policy

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DECLARATION

I declare that the work presented in this thesis, except those elements specifically declared, is all my own work carried out and finished at City University London.

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Abstract

This research explores the reformed UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) as an institution addressing a changed world, and as an illustration of evolving global food security governance. The research sets out to answer the extent to which the CFS is realising its reform objectives and how it is positioning itself within a changing architecture of global food security governance.

Informed by literature on global governance and embedded neoliberalism, the inquiry centres around three case studies – Civil Society Mechanism, Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests, and the Global Strategic Framework – which serve to highlight the operationalization of key reform objectives while simultaneously providing insight into broader policy processes and dynamics. Data was collected through document analysis, participant observation, and interviews. The resulting analysis provides clear evidence of the impact of enhanced participation on policy outcomes and concludes that the policy recommendations emerging from the CFS are amongst the most comprehensive and useful in terms of applicability and uptake at the national and regional level. The analysis also reveals that despite its methods, outcomes and mandate, the CFS is being systematically undermined by other actors seeking to maintain influence and sustain neoliberal hegemony across food security policies at the global level.

The research contributes to global governance theory by describing the functioning of a mechanisms that can address democratic deficits in global governance while elucidating related opportunities and challenges. The research also contributes to scholarship on global food security policy by challenging the application of previous analyses to the contemporary reality.

The research addresses limitations in global governance literature by mapping the complexity of social and political relations across sites of negotiation, contestation and compromise between actors. The policy implications derived from this thesis focus on the need to further problematize food security and for policies to target structural causes of food insecurity. Building on the experiences of the CFS, this thesis concludes that transparent, participatory mechanisms need to be created which acknowledge, and seek to rectify, existing imbalances in power relations in policy-making processes.

Key Words: Committee on World Food Security; Food Security; Food Policy; Participation; Global Governance; Embedded Neoliberalism; Civil Society Organizations

Acronyms

AFSI	L'Aquila Food Security Initiative
AMIS	Agricultural Market Information System
AGRA	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program
CCAFS	Challenge Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security
CFA	Comprehensive Framework for Action
CFS	Committee on World Food Security
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CSM	International Food Security and Nutrition Civil Society Mechanism for relations with the CFS Committee on World Food Security (UN)
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
G20	Group of 20
G8	Group of 8
GAFFSP	Global Agriculture Food Security Program
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDPRD	Global Donor Platform for Rural Development
GIEWS	Global information early warning system on food and agriculture
GMO	Genetically Modified Organism
HLPE	High Level Panel of Experts
HLTF	UN Higher Level Task Force on Global Food Security
IAASTD	International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development
ICARRD	International Conference on Agrarian reform and Rural Development
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDA	International Development Association
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
FIAN	FoodFirst Information and Action Network
ILO	International Labour Organization
LVC	La Via Campesina
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIE	World Animal Health Organization
PRAI	Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources
RAI	Responsible Agricultural Investment (former PRAI)
rai	CFS principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (also CFS-rai)
Rio +20	United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, 2012
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SOFI	State of Food Insecurity in the World (FAO annual report)
SOFA	State of Food and Agriculture in the World (FAO annual report)
SDN	Sustainable Development Network
SM	Social Movement
SRRTF	Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition

UCFA	Updated Comprehensive Framework for Action
UN	United Nations
VGGTs	Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security
VGRtF	Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realization of the right to food in the context of national food security
WAW	World Agriculture Watch
WB	World Bank Group
WDR	World Development Report
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade and Development

1. Introduction: Setting up the problem

1.1. Introduction

In 2007-2008 world food prices spiked and global economic crisis set in. The United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) declared that more than one billion people were going hungry (FAO 2008d). The international community responded with a swell of activity. One important initiative was the reform of the United Nations' Committee on World Food Security (CFS). At the height of the crisis, the Committee's 123 member countries adopted a series of reforms with the aim of becoming the foremost international, inclusive and intergovernmental platform for food security. The mandate of the reformed CFS is ambitious: understanding how the Committee is achieving its objectives and the position it occupies transnationally is the focus of this research.

This Chapter maps out the crisis that led to a watershed period in the organization of the architecture of global food security governance. It opens by reviewing the impact of the food price spikes and then examines reasons for these spikes. Given that the crisis is seen to have marked a moment of change – the end of the era of cheap food, or the start of increased food price volatility, attention is also paid to the impact and reason for recurring food price crises. This is followed by a review of the chronology of multilateral action around food security which serves to illustrate not only the volume of activity (in turn pointing to the significance of the crisis), but also identifies international priorities for addressing the problem. The latter begins to map out the architecture of global food security governance.¹ This Chapter concludes by introducing the structure of the thesis and identifying the research questions.

1.2. The State of Hunger in the World

Between 2006 and 2008 international food prices soared and an additional 200 million people were estimated to have gone hungry (DEFRA 2010:2)². When prices peaked, one sixth of humanity – one billion people – were estimated to be undernourished (Demeke, Pangrazio, and Maetz 2009; FAO 2009e, 2011a, 2012f)³. In addition to malnutrition, an additional 50 million

¹ This map is enhanced throughout the thesis, notably in Chapter 4.

² The United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2009b) calculated an additional 115 million people were pushed into chronic hunger due to rising prices.

³ The FAO (2008d) reported that at the height of the food price spikes, 1.2 billion people were chronically undernourished. In 2012, upon the request of the Committee on World Food Security, the FAO revised its methodology and enhanced its data. With these improvements the estimated number of chronically undernourished was reduced to 870 million in 2010-2012 (FAO 2012h). These are the most legitimate figures available with respect to global hunger and therefore large shifts can motivate policy makers to act. Unfortunately, these measurements remain limited. First the prevalence of undernourishment indicator is defined solely in terms of availability of dietary energy and its distribution in the population. It does not consider other aspects of nutrition. Second, the calculations rely on minimum activity levels whereas many poor and hungry have livelihoods that involve manual labour. Finally, the method is unable to capture the impact of short term shocks unless they impact longer-term consumption patterns (FAO 2012h).

people were pushed into poverty due to the higher cost of food (FAO 2011a; World Bank 2011b). Rising food costs resulted in food riots and civil unrest in more than 60 countries, (FAO 2011a; Zaman et al. 2008), generated appeals for food aid from 36 countries (USA 2011), and countries that had long been considered food secure faced the threat of limited food imports as a result of export restrictions put in place by some food exporting countries (DEFRA 2010; Sharma 2010). Editorialists declared the end to the era of cheap food (Arusa 2011; Cookson 2011; Elliot 2012), while the international NGO Oxfam (2012:1) accused policy-makers of having “taken cheap food for granted for nearly 30 years”, adding “those days are gone.”

Buttressed amidst a burgeoning global economic crisis and a rapidly expanding environmental crisis, the food price crisis of 2007-8 challenged dominant assumptions about food security, agriculture and development, prompting many policy makers, analysts and food producers to grapple with an increasing number of variables that made up a so-called “perfect storm” (Headey, Malaiyandi, and Shenggen 2009). These variables included environmental challenges, demographic shifts, rising energy prices, demand for biofuels, depreciation of the U.S. dollar, unfavourable weather and trade shocks, panic purchases, and export restrictions (Headey et al. 2009). This storm illustrated the growing interconnectedness of agricultural, energy and financial markets (Wise and Murphy 2012) but also disrupted the dominant logic food security policy, permanently changing the public policy debate on food security (HLPE 2011:17) and ushering in an era of food price volatility.

We are facing a new context: we now live in an environment where supply and demand are more closely aligned, natural resource bases are shrinking and agricultural systems are increasingly threatened by climate change. Research indicates that food price volatility is expected to remain the norm and the drivers of volatility in international markets (e.g., biofuels, speculation and climate change) have yet to be addressed (FAO 2009e; G20 2011a; High Level Panel of Experts 2011b; McCreary 2011). This new context demands increased international cooperation and coordination. Things are not likely to return to what they were and now the human, social and economic costs are higher than the cost of inaction. In short, the world food situation is being redefined (Von Braun 2007; Hart 2009).

The problem has also shifted. As we will see below, when the concept of food security emerged, it was very much in the context of availability: how to get enough food supply to meet growing demand? The 1980s and 1990s were marked by questions of access as it became clear that availability of food does not guarantee access (Sen 1981). However, the post 2007-8 crisis reality is grounded where these two challenges intersect. While access remains a problem, the question of availability has re-emerged as a new challenge and will be an increasingly pressing issue due to impacts of climate change, growing demand for food (e.g., changing diets, population growth, biofuels), rising cost of petroleum, restricted availability of water, desertification and soil degradation.




Figure 1: Percentage of undernourished persons in the world (1969-2008) (FAO 2012b, ammended by author)




Figure 2: Number (in millions) of undernourished persons in the world (1969-2008) (FAO 2012b, ammended by author)

International actors lined up to express their concern and rallied around renewed calls for achieving food security. New initiatives were launched and new players emerged. As a result, food security – the notion that all people, at all times, have access to appropriate food to meet their daily needs – has regained prominence on the international agenda (Duncan and Barling 2012; de Schutter 2010, 2012). Many acknowledged the challenges ahead but few acknowledged the so-called elephant in the room: since the 1970s, food security policy has consistently failed. While the proportion of hungry people in the world has decreased since the 1970s (Figure 1), the number of people suffering has increased (Figure 2). At the same time, 2008 figures estimate more than 1.4 billion people to be overweight (WHO 2012).

Post-crisis analysis suggests that in response to rising food prices, countries adopted different net trade positions (e.g., exporter, importer) and different policy responses to the price and income shocks, leading to a broad range of outcomes (FAO 2011:8). Larger countries were able to insulate their markets from the crisis through the implementation of restrictive trade policies and safety nets, but these policies had the negative effect of increasing prices and volatility on international markets (FAO 2011:8). Countries most vulnerable to food swings on the international market are typically poor, net-food importing, lacked capacity to restrict exports, and had few food reserves and inadequate funds to procure food at the higher prices (FAO 2011:8). In 2008, for example, the food import bill for low-income food-deficit countries

increased by about 35 per cent from 2006 (FAO 2012f). These countries, the majority of which are in Africa, bore “the brunt of the crisis, and staple food prices rose substantially in these countries” (FAO 2011:8). In Asia, the number of people suffering from undernourishment, while higher than the numbers suffering in Africa, has been decreasing and the impact of the 2007-8 food price spikes was not as significant as it was in Africa (Figure 3).




Figure 3: Undernourishment in the world: two very different trends after the crises (FAO 2011b:8)

Across the African continent, an additional 28 million people went undernourished as a result of the food price spikes (FAO 2011b) (see Figure 3). Food riots broke out in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Mozambique, and Somalia leading governments to increase military presence and to take emergency policies measures (FAO 2008c). In East Africa, more than 17 million people faced serious food insecurity as a result of low harvests, high food prices and conflict (FAO 2008c). In West Africa, high food prices negatively affected access to food as the price of staples such as sorghum, millet, rice and maize increased. The FAO (2008c) estimates that in Southern Africa high food prices impacted over 8.7 million people.

In 2007 alone, forty-one million additional people in Latin America and the Caribbean were added to the rapidly growing number of undernourished people worldwide (Figure 4). Prior to the food price spikes, Latin America has implemented far-reaching economic reforms geared towards trade liberalization and was “considered relatively stable and capable of absorbing external shocks, thanks to its higher foreign exchange liquidity; decreased public sector and external borrowing needs; exchange rate flexibility; lower exposure to currency, interest rate, and rollover risks in public sector debt portfolios; and improved access to local-currency loans” (Robles and Torero 2010: 117). Robles and Torero (2010:118) note that prior to the 2007-8 price spikes, countries in the region were generally on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving the proportion of hungry people by 2015. This success is no longer guaranteed. The Latin American case serves to highlight the fragility of “emerging economies” and the impact of rising food prices on vulnerable populations, as illustrated by the large regression in development targets.




Figure 4: Additional number of undernourished in 2007 number of people (million) (FAO 2008a, ammended by author)

Having examined some of the impacts of the food prices spikes and the resulting crises, attention now turns to a review of the main triggers of the price spikes.

1.3. Triggers of the 2007-8 Food Price Spikes

After decades of historic lows, the food price rise of 2007-2008 sparked a new era of higher food prices and extreme food price volatility (High Level Panel of Experts 2011:9) (Figure 5 and Figure 6).⁴ While food prices peaked in the summer of 2008, they actually started to rise in late 2006 along-side rising oil prices, illustrating the interconnectedness of the two sectors (Figure 7). Some claimed that high prices presented an opportunity for producers of agricultural commodities, however the cost of agricultural production rose at the same time due to higher energy and fertiliser prices (DEFRA 2010:9) often nullifying any potential gains from increased market prices.

⁴ It is important here to note that volatility is the normal state of agricultural markets, but what is new are the extremes highs and lows.




Figure 5: Monthly Food Prices (1990- 2012) (2002-2004 = 100) (FAO 2012d, ammended by author)⁵




Figure 6: Monthly Food Price Indices (2006- 2012) (2002-2004 = 100) (FAO 2012d, ammended by author)

⁵ The FAO Food Price Index is a measure of the monthly change in international prices of a basket of food commodities. It consists of the average of five commodity group price indices (representing 55 quotations), weighted with the average export shares of each of the groups for 2002-2004.




Figure 7: Commodity Food Price and Fuel (energy) Index (Monthly Price January 2007-January 2012) (IMF 2012, ammended by author).⁶

The food crisis sparked by the food price spikes did not spontaneously appear. For thirty years leading up to the current era of extreme food price volatility, agriculture – especially smallholder agriculture (McCreary 2011:18) – had been subject to disjointed agriculture policies at the national and international level resulting in distortions in trade and limited policy coherence at the national and international level (Ahmad 2011:1). In 2007 and 2008, it was the timing and combination of several factors that developed into what some have referred to as a “perfect storm” (Headey et al. 2009).

While several factors contributed to the food price spikes, DEFRA (2010:10) notes:

Attributing significance to one factor or another in the price spike is very difficult (and attributing robust percentages, arguably impossible), given the complex way that the various issues combine. Take away one or other of several of these factors and it may well be that there would have been no price spike, but that does not mean then that each of these was the cause of the event.

There is general agreement that contributing factors on the supply side included increases in the cost of oil, poor harvest – especially of wheat – and decreased production due to drought (Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner 2008; Baffes and Haniotis 2010; Collins 2008; DEFRA 2010; FAO 2008b, 2008d; Gilbert 2008; Trostle 2008; Wiggins, Compton, and Keats 2010a; Zaman et al. 2008). On the demand side, and from a financial perspective, inflation from world economic growth is a commonly accepted factor. Policies, including export bans and restrictions as well as the reduction of import tariffs, also played a role. The depreciation of the US Dollar led to an increase in prices tied to the US Dollar, resulting in higher costs across the food supply chain

⁶ Commodity Fuel (energy) Index, 2005 = 100, includes crude oil (petroleum), natural gas, and coal price indices. Commodity Food Price Index, 2005 = 100, includes cereal, vegetable oils, meat, seafood, sugar, bananas, and oranges price indices.

(Demeke et al. 2009; OXFAM 2012; Sharma 2010; Wiggins, Compton, and Keats 2010b). Speculation on futures markets also played a role in the price spikes (FAO 2008b, 2011a; Gilbert 2008; OXFAM 2012; Sharma 2010; Wiggins et al. 2010b). These factors are summarized in Figure 8.

Supply Side	Demand Side	Policies	Economy/Finance
Poor harvest (esp. wheat)	Rising demands from emerging economies (esp. India and China)	Restocking	Depreciation of the US dollar
Low grain stocks	Diversion of grains for biofuels and animal feed	Reduction of import tariffs	Speculation on futures markets
Rise in oil price	Inflation from rapid growth of world economy	Export bans and restrictions	
2000-2004 consumption of cereals exceeded production worldwide (Wiggins et al. 2010b)		Slowdown in production of cereals	
		Price controls & price subsidies on basic foods	

Figure 8: Summary of causes of international food price spikes by category (2007-8) (Duncan 2013)

Changes in supply and demand fundamentals cannot adequately explain the price spikes (Robles and Torero 2010:122). As David Barling (2012) notes, trying to categorise challenges in these terms can prove problematic in agriculture and food policy and some elements are central to both supply and demand. Barling (2012:5) uses the example of land as

both a demand and supply factor, as demand for good fertile land for production is often in heavily populated coasted and estuarial areas and river valleys and plains where there are residential demands. Equally, land is a prerequisite for food production while competing with a range of other demands, not least other non-food crops such as large scale production of biofuels to meet the competing demand for new energy sources.

Similarly, ad hoc trade policy interventions and excessive speculation in the commodity futures market also fall outside of a simple supply and demand equation (Robles and Torero 2010:122). Attempting to understand the reasons for these spikes through such a model inevitably frames solutions with the same perspective, reinforcing an approach which may not warrant reinforcement.

1.4. Crisis Repeating: Era of food price volatility

After the food price spikes of 2007-8, food security, and agriculture more broadly, remained on the international agenda as we shifted into the predicted era of food price volatility. And, as the name would suggest, food prices spiked again in 2010. Global figures on hunger from 2010 suggest that the number of hungry people had decreased to 925 million, in part to economic growth and a reduction in international food prices from the 2008 highs (FAO 2012h). However, between July and September 2010, the price of wheat increased from sixty to eighty

per cent, a reaction to crop losses due to a period of drought in Russia and a subsequent export ban imposed by the Russian Federation (FAO 2012f). Rice and maize prices also rose during this period.

The food system remains in a state of crisis: food markets remain remarkably volatile. In the spring of 2011 international food prices were on the rise for the second time in three years. In February 2011, the World Bank Food Price Index reached its 2008 peak, after rising by 47 per cent from June 2010 (World Bank 2011:i).

In 2012, in the United States, a large proportion of agriculture was located in areas affected by drought. In July 2012, 88 per cent of US corn, 44 per cent of cattle production and 40 per cent of soybean production was being grown in regions affected by drought (OXFAM 2012). Russia faced dry weather and severe flooding (in the south) that seriously reduced its grain harvests and caused damage to unpicked and stored grain (OXFAM 2012). Ukraine and Kazakhstan were also impacted by dry weather which will in turn impact their 2013 harvests. Ukraine was the world's third largest exporter in 2011. India, which relied on monsoon rains as the main source of irrigation for 55 per cent of its farmlands, received rainfall 19 per cent below average (OXFAM 2012). In July 2012, maize and soybean prices reached all-time peaks, following high temperatures and lack of rainfall in the United States and Eastern Europe (World Bank 2012: 1). During this time, prices of wheat and rice remained below their historical peaks, but hovered at levels comparable to the 2011 spikes (World Bank 2012:1).

Food price volatility presents significant challenges for food security and has a disproportionate impact on the poor and vulnerable. The post-2008 crises had differentiated features when compared to the 2007-8 crisis but shared at least four similarities (World Bank 2011b:1). First, global grain stocks remained low. Second, the cost of oil remained high and unrest in the Middle East and Africa added a new level of uncertainty in oil markets. Third, the US Dollar continued to depreciate against other currencies.⁷ Finally, financial investment in agricultural commodities remained high.

Food price volatility witnessed in 2010 and 2012 showed price increases were more widespread across agricultural commodities and production shortfalls due to poor weather were more prevalent. Policy responses did impact grain price spikes in 2011, but not to the extent they did in 2008 when policy responses to grain shortages came as a surprise and greatly impacted prices and shortages (World Bank 2011b:1). The implications of on-going food price volatility remain significant for poor and developing economies. High food prices pushed the global food import bill for 2011 over a trillion dollars (USD), further illustrating not only the failures of global food

⁷ This is not clear cut. In 2008 the dollar was trading lower than in the summer of 2012: in April 2008 it was \$1.55 against the euro, \$1.98 against the pound, while in July 2012 it was \$1.23 against the euro and \$1.56 against the pound (OXFAM 2012: 3). The higher the dollar value meant higher costs for food-importing countries and many low-income countries are net food importers (Ng and Aksoy 2008).

security governance but also that the policies guiding agricultural development and food security are deeply flawed.

1.5. Multilateral Reaction to the 2007-8 Food Price Crisis

Given the triggers of the 2007-8 food price spikes, food security policy now necessitates the introduction of added layers of complexity (e.g., price volatility, commodity speculation, investment in agricultural land) to an already complex and multi-faceted concept. Because of the causes and reactions to the crisis, there has also been widespread agreement on the need for improved coherence and cohesion at the global level. These changes suggest recognition of the interconnectedness of food security issues and the need for multilateral action to reduce food insecurity, and start building linkages for a strengthened global policy arena, not only around food and agriculture, but across sectors and industries.

However, despite the rekindled interest, scepticism around efficacy and political will remains warranted. Twice in the ten years leading up to the food price crisis governments of the world had come together to declared their commitment to ending world hunger, First in 1996, with the Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World Food Summit Plan of Action they agreed to cut the number of hungry in the world in half by 2015 (paragraph 7). Four years later, in the UN Millennium Declaration, States pledged, more modestly, to halve the proportion of the hungry by 2015. Yet, 870 million people remain chronically undernourished in 2010–12 (FAO 2012g).

This time, actors have steered away from quantifiable commitments and targets, although existing commitments were reiterated at various international meetings (e.g., Declaration of the High Level Conference on World Food Security: Challenges of Climate Change and Bioenergy (June 2008)). Policy makers and development practitioners continue working towards the achievement of food security yet few appear to be contemplating whether food security is indeed the most appropriate way to be framing the very real challenge of ensuring healthy, culturally appropriate, sustainable diets to a growing world population.

What follows is a chronological overview of multilateral activity sparked or spurred on by the sharp rise in food prices in 2007 and 2007, on-going food price volatility or the resulting impacts of these. The presentation is not comprehensive and insofar as it is focused primarily on global-level, state-led initiatives. It does not consider initiatives undertaken at the regional and national levels, as well as those undertaken globally by civil society organizations, the private sector or philanthropic bodies. The reasons for this is that this research is particularly interesting in understanding how states are working multilaterally to address an issue that has international targets and commitments and is acknowledged to be global in scale and yet remains a national-level responsibility.

In what follows major multi-lateral, globally-focussed initiatives that that explicitly targeted or reacted to the post-crisis food security policy environment are reviewed chronologically. This

highlights the high-level interest, the types of reactions and the key actors involved. In doing so, this section lays the ground work to be able to answer the research question – Who are the main actors and what are the dominant initiatives within the changing architecture of food security governance? — and in doing so, maps out the broader transnational policy space within which the Committee on World Food Security operates, including not only opportunities but also challenges with respect to competition for legitimacy and leadership.

1.6. Chronology of Key Events in Global Food Security Governance (October 2007-October 2012)

As the estimated number of malnourished in the world surpassed one billion and food riots broke out around the globe in response to rising food prices, international actors reacted with a flurry of declarations, statements, high-level meeting, the creation of new organizations and the reformation of old ones. What follows is a chronological review (for a summary see Figure 9) of key multilateral meetings designed to address food security at an international level. The aim is to provide an overview of the transnational multilateral space within which the architecture of global food security governance is being reshaped. While analysis is limited in this first section – in favour of establishing a clear chain of events – what becomes clear is an obvious contradiction between the large number of meetings and overlapping mandates, all in the name of policy cohesion and cooperation.

Who	What	When
World Bank Group	World Development Report on Agriculture for Development	October 2007
World Economic Forum	Annual Forum	January 2008
International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD)	Results and conclusions ratified during the Intergovernmental Plenary Meeting	April 2008
UN	High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis	April 2008
UN Economic and Social Council	Special Meeting on the Global Food Crisis	May 2008
FAO	High-Level Conference on Food Security and the Challenges of Bio-energy	June 2008
G8	Leaders Statement on Global Food Security	July 2008
World Bank Group	Global Food Crisis Response Program	May 2008
UN	High Level Meeting on Food Security for All	January 2009
World Bank Group	Implementing Agriculture for Development, World Bank Group Agriculture Action Plan: FY2010-1	July 2009
G8	L'Aquila Joint Statement on Food Security	July 2009
Rome-based Food Agencies	Joint Food Security Strategy	July 2009
G20	Pittsburgh Summit: proposal for GAFSP	September 2009
UN + USA	Partnering for Food Security	September 2009
FAO	High-Level Expert Forum, How to Feed the World in 2050	October 2009
Committee on World Food	35 th Session: Agreement to reform	October 2009

Security		
People's Food Sovereignty Forum	Mobilization around CFS reform and civil society mechanism	November 2009
FAO	World Summit on Food Security.	November 2009
WB (Sustainable Development Network)	Framework Document for a Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP)	December 2009
FAO	Summit of World's Regions on Food Security	January 2010
FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD, World Bank	Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources	January 2010
Global Forum for Agricultural Research	First Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development	March 2010
Scaling-Up Nutrition	Framework for Action to Scale Up Nutrition	April 2010
Concern Worldwide, High-Level Task Force and the Government of Ireland	Consultation on the Comprehensive Framework for Action	May 2010
High Level Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly	Outcome Document promoting national food security strategies	September 2010
Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement	A Road Map for Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN)	September 2010
CSO Forum for the CSM	Approval of the Civil Society Mechanism	October 2010
Committee on World Food Security	36 th Session, first of the reformed CFS	October 2010
APEC	Ministerial Meeting on Food Security	October 2010
G20	Multi-Year Action Plan on Development	November 2010
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food	Agroecology and the right to food	March 2011
G20 Agriculture Ministers	Action Plan on Food Price Volatility	June 2011
Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the International Food Policy Research Institute	International Conference on Climate Change and Food Security	July 2011
FAO	Regional Conferences	March/April 2011
Committee on World Food Security	Extraordinary 38th Session to endorse the Voluntary guidelines on the responsible governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests in the context of national food security.	May 2012
G8	New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition	May 2012
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs	UN Conference on Sustainable Development	June 2012
FAO	High level forum on food insecurity in protracted crisis	September 2012
Committee on World Food Security	39 th Session, adoption of the First Version of the Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition	October 2012

Figure 9: Chronology of Key Moments in Transnational Food Security Policy (Duncan 2013)

The review begins in October 2007 when the **World Bank Group** released its annual World Development Report for 2008 which focused on Agriculture for Development. The World Bank is an international financial institution tasked with providing loans to developing countries to support various programmes. Since the onset of the food price spikes, they have played an active role in reshaping food security governance, returning to the role it played in the 1980s as a donor and coordinator for agriculture and rural development. The 2008 report, which one World Bank Agricultural Expert called “the most authoritative source on the Bank’s position [on agriculture]” (Interview (World Bank Agricultural Expert), March 2012, Rome), marked the first time in a quarter century that the World Bank had focused its annual research report on agriculture, highlighting an important shift in the Bank’s international focus.

This focus was mirrored in January 2008 when the **World Economic Forum** met for its annual invitation-only meeting in Davos. At this meeting a Network of Global Agenda Councils comprised of Councils on key topics of global economic importance, including one for food security, was established.⁸ The Councils bring together experts on key themes and work to integrate outcomes of thematic discussions across the network and beyond to international decision-making fora.

A few months later, in April 2008, in Johannesburg, at the Intergovernmental Plenary Meeting of the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) the results and conclusions of the project were reviewed and ratified. The IAASTD process began in 2005, when the World Bank initiated an international effort to evaluate the relevance, quality and effectiveness of agricultural knowledge, science, and technology, and the effectiveness of public and private sector policies and institutional arrangements. The IAASTD was launched as an intergovernmental process, under the co-sponsorship of the FAO, Global Environment Facility (GEF), UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, the World Bank and WHO. It was composed of one Global Assessment and five Sub-global Assessments based on the same frameworks which assess the impacts agricultural knowledge, science, and technology on hunger, poverty, nutrition, human health, and environmental and social sustainability in the past and the future. The Global and Sub-global assessments were peer-reviewed by governments and experts, and approved by the Panel of participating governments. The process included a global consultative process involving 900 participants and 110 countries from all regions of the world. The Executive Summary of the Synthesis Report was approved by 58 countries.

8 The council is made up of familiar actors such as David Nabarro, Chair of the UN High Level Task Force on the Food Crisis; Jane Kakuru, President of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa; Kanayo Nwanze, President of the International Fund for Agricultural Development; Shenggen Fan, Director-General of the International Food Policy Research Institute; Kavita Prakash-Mani, Head of Food Security, Syngenta.

In April 2008, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, in accordance with the UN Chief Executives Board, named a **High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis** (HLTF), bringing together the twenty-two UN agencies, the World Bank, IMF, WTO, and OECD. Civil society is notably absent from the Task Force. Assistant Secretary-General, David Nabarro, was charged with leading the task force and soon became the Special Representative for Food Security and Nutrition. After some concern about the limited role of the FAO on the Task Force, the Director General of the FAO was made vice-chairman of Task Force. The HLTF's main role was to develop a Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA), "designed to encourage concerted responses to the food price crisis with actions to respond to the immediate needs of vulnerable populations and contribute to longer-term resilience"(High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis 2010:xi). The High Level Task Force aims to achieve its objectives through improved coordination at the international and country level without creating any bureaucratic structures or inter-governmental layers. Initially, the Rome-based Agencies⁹ supported the High Level Task Force as a short term mechanism for raising awareness, resources and improving collaboration and efficiency and provided staff and material assistance.

In May, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) hosted a **Special Meeting on the Global Food Crisis** in New York to respond to the growing calls for immediate action. The President of ECOSOC released an official statement on the occasion of the special meeting of the Council on the global food crisis in June 2008 to the General Assembly of the United Nations outlining "the basic elements that constitute the basis for effective and sustained global action" (ECOSOC 2008:2).

In June 2008, the FAO hosted the **High-Level Conference on Food Security and the Challenges of Bio-energy** which resulted in a Declaration on the Challenges of Climate Change and Bioenergy. Here a draft of the UN's High Level Task Force on Global Food Security Crisis' Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA) was also presented for comments with the caveat the CFA represents the consensus view of the HLTF but it is not an intergovernmental document. The aim of presenting the CFA at the conference was for it to be a catalyst for action as well as a synthesis of policies and priorities.

9 The Rome-based agencies are the three UN food-related agencies headquartered in Rome: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); and, the World Food Programme (WFP). These three organizations have a history of collaborating on projects that share their overlapping mandate of working towards eliminating hunger and poverty. Together, the Rome-based Agencies coordinate over four hundred activities involving more than seventy countries. During serious food emergencies, FAO and the World Food Programme jointly carry out Crop and Food Security Assessment Missions (CFSAMs) which aims to distribute reliable information to inform policy and action. When food prices started to rise, the FAO and WFP began collaborating on a global information early warning system on food and agriculture (GIEWS) with the intension of ensuring continuous review of the world food situation, to share information to this effect, and to provide early warning of possible food crises at the country level.

In July 2008, at the height of the food crisis, **G8 Leaders** meeting in Hokkaido Toyako, Japan issued a **Leaders Statement on Global Food Security**. The G8, or Group of 8, is a forum for eight of the world's most industrialized nations. The presidency of the G8 rotates through member states in the following order: France, United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Canada. The European Union is represented within the G8 but cannot chair or host summits. G8 can refer to collection of these states and the annual summit meetings of the heads of government, as well as thematic meetings of G8 ministers.

The G8 has no headquarters, no budget and no permanent staff. The G8 is often criticized for their promotion of neoliberal globalization and for representing the interests of an elite group of industrialized nations to the detriment of poorer countries. Fast-growing economies such as India, China and Brazil are not represented and there are no African or Latin American members.¹⁰ Since the financial crisis, the annual summits have tended to focus on stabilizing the world economy and stimulating economic growth however they have also addressed food security and consequently the G8 is now a key actor in the developing architecture of global food security governance. Since 2008, food security has been on the agenda of each annual summit and has remained a priority for 2013 under the UK presidency.

In the Leaders Statement on Global Food Security, G8 leaders expressed their on-going commitment to pursue all possible measures to ensure global food security, noting that since January 2008, they had committed over \$10 USD billion to support food measures to increase agricultural outputs in affected countries. The Statement emphasized the urgency of short-term needs (e.g., access of small-holder farmers to fertilizers), a commitment to increase food aid and investment and recognised the coordinating role of the UN through their support for the High Level Task Force on the Global Food Crisis (HLTF). They also encouraged countries with surplus to released food stocks and called for the removal of export restrictions (G8 2008).

The G8 made reference to the development of a global partnership:

... we will work with the international community in forming a global partnership on agriculture and food, involving all relevant actors, including developing country governments, the private sector, civil society, donors, and international institutions. This partnership, strengthening and building on existing UN and other international institutions, could provide efficient and effective support for country-led processes and institutions and for local leadership, draw on the expertise in existing international organizations and, in particular, ensure monitoring and assessment on progress. The UN should facilitate and provide coordination. As part of this partnership, a global network of high-level experts on food and agriculture would provide science-based analysis, and highlight needs and future risks (G8 2008:para 4).

Importantly, the G8 here states that the UN is the appropriate forum for facilitation and coordination of such an initiative and that the partnership should build on existing institutions.

10 As explained below, this is somewhat addressed with the strengthening of the G20.

In May 2008, the World Bank established the **Global Food Crisis Response Program** (GFRP) to provide immediate support to countries significantly impacted by rising food prices. The GFRP used the World Development Report as its framework and implemented processes to expedite the funding of projects up to an initial \$1.2 billion, so as to ensure timely a response. By April 2009, the World Bank had increased the GFRP to \$2 billion. When food prices continued to rise through the summer of 2011, the Board of the Fund extended accelerated processing to June 2012, specifically targeting projects aimed at feeding children and other vulnerable groups, nutritional supplements to pregnant women, lactating mothers, infants and small children, meeting additional expenses of food imports, and buying seeds (World Bank 2011a). Beyond the GFRP, the WB has made funding available through external-funded trust funds. Specifically, a “Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) has received contributions of AUD 50 million from the Australian government, €80 million from the government of Spain, 7.6 billion Korean Won from the Republic of Korea, CAD 30 million from the government of Canada, and \$0.15 million from International Finance Corporation (IFC)” (World Bank 2011a). As of September 2011, the GFRP had approved \$1,502.5 million of funding for various projects. According to the World Bank, through the GFRP, nearly forty million vulnerable people in 44 countries have been helped (World Bank 2011a). Yet, far from progressive, the Bank’s proposals continue to push for a productionist paradigm based on neoliberal principles of increased market access and improved technology, suggesting a lack of critical reflection on not only the causes of the 2007-8 food price crisis, but also with respect to integrated solutions for improving food security.

In January 2009, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Spanish Prime Minister Rodriguez Zapatero convened the **High Level Meeting on Food Security for All** in Madrid, Spain, to follow up on the FAO High-Level Conference. The aim of this meeting was to assess progress made since the High-Level Conference on Food Security and the challenges of bio-energy, as well as to establish priorities and commitments for moving forward. There was also emphasis establishing a framework for the global partnership for agriculture and food security. The aim of this global partnership for food security was to bring together governments, regional bodies, international agencies, civil society, development banks and donors and businesses to develop coherent strategies against food insecurity.

The meeting was well attended, with almost sixty ministers present, the European Community, as well as heads of all Rome-based Agencies (FAO, IFAD, WFP), UNICEF, representatives from the World Bank, regional banks, donors and bilateral agencies, farmer organizations, civil society, the private sector and philanthropic organizations including the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation.

At the meeting there was agreement on the importance of an inclusive and broad process of consultation on options leading to the establishment of a Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition and that consultations should be open to the full range of

stakeholders. It was agreed that states have a primary responsibility to promote the right to adequate food, especially for children under five years of age, women and other vulnerable groups. There was agreement of the need to identify financing gaps and the additional resources needed for existing anti-famine mechanisms, including for food and nutrition assistance and social protection programmes, and for supporting smallholder agriculture. There was acknowledgement that such programmes would only be effective if led by the countries with broad participation of stakeholders, including civil society. Sustainable rural development was listed as a policy priority, this focus along the entire agro-value chain and with consideration of relevant policy environments, linking to the theme of coherence.

Expanding on the productionist discourse, the meeting acknowledged that to address food security is to go beyond increasing production and to look at the development of social protection systems and competition-distorting subsidies so as to promote fair agricultural trade. Far from radical, these outcomes do bring forward the more progressive discursive themes such as inclusion, cooperation and fair playing field. This is in many ways due to the different forum within which discussions were taking place. A UN-led meeting is open to all UN member countries, not just the economic elite. There are clear rules around transparency, consultation and each country has equal say, meaning that policy objectives of developing countries are included in the debate, and are not simply the subject of debate.

At this meeting, there was widespread support from countries for the CFA's twin-track approach. There was consensus on the immediate need for better coordination of resources and agreement around the value of expanded engagement of all stakeholders, including civil society. However, as we will see, there is often a division between rhetoric and action.

The FAO, the Latin America government regional grouping, CSOs were clear that any process to establish the Global Partnership must be driven by the newly reformed and strengthened Rome-based agencies (FAO, IFAD, WFP). Moreover, these actors demanded commitment to a UN principle of "one country, one vote", as well as broad consultation and participation of organizations of small-scale food producers.

July 2009 was a big month for food security. The World Bank released its Agricultural Action Plan: Implementing Agriculture for Development FY2010-1. At their summit in L'Aquila Italy, the G8 issued **the L'Aquila Joint Statement on Food Security** that expressed on-going concern "about global food security, the impact of the global financial and economic crisis and last year's spike in food prices on the countries least able to respond to increased hunger and poverty" (G8 2009:para 1). The statement identified the role of "longstanding underinvestment in agriculture and food security, price trends and the economic crisis" (G8 2009:para 1) in increasing poverty and hunger and noted the urgent need for decisive action.

That same month, the three UN Rome-based Food Agencies developed a **Joint Food Security Strategy** with four pillars of cooperation so as to better address the outcomes of the food price crisis. The pillars are: policy advice, knowledge and monitoring; operations; advocacy and

communication; administrative collaboration. Through this plan, they agreed to take joint action at the global, regional, national and local levels with a focus on enhanced collaboration to support transition from relief to development in selected countries, joint advocacy to support the MDGs, and aligning early warning and monitoring information to improve food security reporting. Central to the Joint Food Security Strategy was coordination around the 1 Billion Euro E.U. Food Facility and addressing overlaps so as to become more efficient.

In September 2009, G20 leaders came together at the Pittsburgh Summit and backed the G8's L'Aquila Food Security Initiative. They also called on the World Bank to establish the **Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme Fund (GAFSP)** to facilitate disbursements (G20 2009). The Group of Twenty, or G20, emerged in 1999 when the finance ministers and central bank governors of advanced and emerging countries met in Berlin, Germany, for an informal dialogue on key issues for global economic stability. The meeting was in response to the financial crises of the 1990s with growing recognition that some key countries were not adequately represented in global economic discussion and governance. From 1999 to 2008, the G20 Finance Ministers maintained annual meetings. During the 2008 financial crisis, U.S. President George W. Bush convened a meeting of G20 Leaders (i.e., heads of states) in Washington, D.C. Here, the Leaders agreed to implement an Action Plan with three main objectives: restoring global growth; strengthening the international financial system; and, reforming international financial institutions.

Since the first Leaders' Summit, the G20 has emerged as a forum for international cooperation around the international economic and financial agenda and brings together the world's major advanced and emerging economies. The G20 is made up of nineteen member countries and the E.U.. Informal and Leader-driven, the G8 is focused on building political consensus between nineteen country leaders and the European Union.

At the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit, G20 leaders agreed that the G20 would be the foremost forum for their international economic cooperation, effectively positioning the G20 ahead of the G8 in terms of coordinating bodies. However, the G8 has continued to move ahead with new initiatives, like the New Alliance, with no link to the G20. There were also concerns related to the growing power and influence of informal governance bodies like the G8 and G20 in food security.

The G20 Pittsburgh Summit drew attention to an important trend: the rise in prominence of philanthropic and private sector actors in food security, agriculture and development. The G20 Statement states that their approach "is to use development assistance to explore synergies with private philanthropy and private sector actors"(G20 2009:2). The Gates Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Hewlett Foundation, Rabobank foundation, World Economic Forum and the Initiative for Global Development are listed as key partners.

That same month (September 2009), at the 64th Session of the UN General Assembly, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton co-hosted the side-

event called “**Partnering for Food Security**” to focus on the five principles of the G8’s “L’Aquila” Initiative.

In October 2009, the **High-Level Expert Forum, How to Feed the World in 2050**, was held in Rome in advance of the World Food Summit. The goal of the Forum was to examine policy options that governments should consider adopting to ensure that when (or if) the world population reaches the estimated 9.2 billion by 2050, people will be fed. There was agreement on the part of participants that there is enough food to feed everyone in the world and yet, in line with a seemingly blind commitment to productionism, the debate remained focused on issues of production, failing to address key structural issues such as consumption, distribution and access. While production is important as the population is set to grow to a number we certainly cannot currently feed, such discussions are in vein if issues related to production, distribution and ecological capacity were not addressed. It is thus not surprising that there was disappointment at the failure of the Forum to address the root causes of the food crisis, including the structure of markets and climate change.

That same month, at its 35th Session, the **Committee on World Food Security (CFS)** agreed on a wide ranging reform to make the CFS the foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental platform dealing with food security and nutrition. The reform was a deliberate effort to position the CFS as a central actor in the emerging Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition.

One month later, in November 2009, civil society organizations gathered in Rome for the **People’s Food Sovereignty Forum**. The Forum sought to engage people in new possibilities for engagement made possible through the reform of the Committee on World Food Security and to coordinate actions around World Summit on Food Security. The following week, world leaders gathered in Rome for the **World Summit on Food Security**. At the World Summit for Food Security, FAO Director-General, Jacques Diouf reflected on the global food system, calling it “our tragic achievement in these modern days.” He went on to stress the need to focus efforts and production where the poor and hungry live and to increase agricultural investments in these regions. At the Summit the international community adopted the Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security (FAO 2009a), pledging to “undertake all necessary actions required at national, regional and global levels and by all States and Governments to halt immediately the increase in – and to significantly reduce – the number of people suffering from hunger and food insecurity”. The Declaration also pledged renewed commitment to eradicate hunger in a sustainable and timely way. Countries agreed to reverse the downward trend in agricultural funding at the domestic and international level and to promote investment in the sector. They also agreed to improve global food governance in partnership with relevant actors, and to address the challenges of climate change to food security. At this meeting, FAO member countries also endorsed the reform of the Committee on World Food Security.

In January 2010, the FAO hosted the **Summit of World's Regions on Food Security** in Dakar, bringing together representatives from local authorities, national governments and international organizations to propose innovative solutions to tackle food insecurity. The Summit was organized on the basis of a questionnaire sent to the world's regions to collect information on food-related issues. The aim was to identify specific areas where cooperation between regions could provide added value to national and international initiatives.

The same month (January 2010), FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD and the World Bank released a rather controversial discussion note: **Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment** that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources. The Principles were based on preliminary evidence from empirical evidence collected by the World Bank in 2009 through in-depth studies – Large-Scale Acquisition of Land Rights for Agricultural or Natural Resource-based Use – in twenty countries, as well as the experience of a broad set of experts.

The seven principles can be summarised as follows:

Principle 1: Existing rights to land and associated natural resources are recognized and respected.

Principle 2: Investments do not jeopardize food security but rather strengthen it.

Principle 3: Processes for accessing land and other resources and then making associated investments are transparent, monitored, and ensure accountability by all stakeholders, within a proper business, legal, and regulatory environment.

Principle 4: All those materially affected are consulted, and agreements from consultations are recorded and enforced.

Principle 5: Investors ensure that projects respect the rule of law, reflect industry best practice, are viable economically, and result in durable shared value.

Principle 6: Investments generate desirable social and distributional impacts and do not increase vulnerability.

Principle 7: Environmental impacts due to a project are quantified and measures taken to encourage sustainable resource use while minimizing the risk/magnitude of negative impacts and mitigating them (FAO et al. 2010).

March 2010 saw the **First Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development** organized by the Global Forum for Agricultural Research in collaboration with CGIAR among others. The Conference sought to provide a global action plan and strategy for improving agricultural research in order to maximize the impact on development, especially of the poor. This plan and strategy was to be established through consultations with representatives from a wide range of agricultural research stakeholders around the world.

In April 2010, a **Framework for Action to Scale-Up Nutrition** was released and endorsed by more than one hundred entities including national governments, the UN system, civil society organizations, development agencies, academia, philanthropic bodies and the private sector. Throughout 2009 and 2010, a group of stakeholders from Governments, donor agencies, civil society, the research community, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations and development banks met at intervals to develop a Framework for Scaling up Nutrition which was presented during the 2010 spring meetings of the World Bank and IMF. In June 2010, the Mayor of Rome and the World Food Programme, hosted a meeting to endorse the Framework for Scaling up Nutrition.

In May 2010, Concern Worldwide, the UN's High-Level Task Force and the Government of Ireland co-hosted a two days meeting in Dublin to provide an opportunity to exchange views on the changes required to better reflect the current context of food and nutrition insecurity and to consult on the **Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA)**. The result was an Updated CFA.

In September 2010, the **High Level Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly** produced an outcome document which promoted national food security strategies that strengthen support for smallholder farmers and contribute to poverty eradication. That same month, the Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN) Road Map Task Team released the first edition of **A Road Map for Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN)**. The Road Map emerged from the May 2010 World Health Assembly resolution 63.23 on infant and young child nutrition and based on guiding principles developed by the Standing Committee on Nutrition in 2009 in Brussels. Framed as a movement, SUN brings together national leaders who prioritizing efforts to address malnutrition. The aim is for states, organizations and individuals working to scale up nutrition while recognizing the multiple causes of malnutrition.

In October, in advance of the 36th Session of the **Committee on World Food Security**, civil society organizations met to adopt the autonomous International Civil Society Mechanism for Food Security and Nutrition to facilitate engagement in the reformed Committee on World Food Security. The following week the 36th Session of the Committee on World Food Security took place. It was the Committee's first session as a reformed body.

On the last day of the CFS Session, the first Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ministerial Meeting on Food Security was hosted and resulted in the **Niigata Declaration on APEC Food Security**. The overlap suggests a disregard for the CFS process. The Declaration instructed APEC Senior Officials to monitor the implementation of the APEC Action Plan on Food Security, to report progress on its implementation to APEC Ministers on an annual basis, and to compile an assessment report on overall achievements following the completion of the Action Plan.

In November, 2010, G20 Leaders met in Seoul,¹¹ where, under the leadership of French President Sarkozy, the G20 developed a **Multi-Year Action Plan on Development** with work to be undertaken by the Development Working Group, also charged with monitoring and reporting on the progress. Here, the G20's food security agenda was more clearly fleshed out.

In March 2011, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food presented a report "**Agro-ecology and the right to food**" before the UN Human Rights Council. The report demonstrates by way

¹¹ The Seoul Summit and resulting declaration were discussed in Chapter 2 as marking a shift from the Washington Consensus (rolling back) to the Seoul Consensus (rolling out) signalling adaptation and shift not unlike Karl Polanyi's description of a double movement and also illustrative of the nature of hegemony to shift in ways that address contestation and critique while maintaining the interests of the elite.

of an extensive review of recent scientific literature that agroecology, if appropriately supported, can double food production in regions within ten years while mitigating climate change and alleviating rural poverty. The report called on states to undertake a fundamental shift towards agro-ecology and was widely supported by civil society organizations.

In June 2011, G20 Agriculture Ministers met for the first time and issued an **Action Plan on Food Price Volatility**. As will be explored in Case Study C, this Action Plan had an important influence on the policy processes that took place in October 2011 at the 37th Session of the Committee on World Food Security. The following month the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) jointly hosted the **International Conference on Climate Change and Food Security (ICCCFS)** in Beijing, China. The conference resulted in a series of recommendations from leading scientists in the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), Indonesia and the United States for the UNFCCC Delegates meeting in Durban at the end of 2011. Recommendations were focused around a need to strengthen agricultural research and increase availability of spatial data.

The FAO Regional Conferences are held every two years and are the highest governing body and forum of the FAO in the regions. The round of conferences held in 2012 marked an important change in the structure and impact of the conferences insofar as the priorities set by the countries at the spring conferences would now be included on the agenda of the technical and political governing bodies of FAO at the global level. Regional conferences would no longer be technical and advisory in nature, but now their decisions would guide FAO actions as part of an effort to decentralize power at the FAO.

Importantly, the Latin America and Caribbean meeting requested that the FAO “organize a wide-ranging and dynamic debate with the participation of civil society and academia to discuss the concept of food sovereignty, whose meaning had not been agreed by FAO Member Countries or the United Nations System” (FAO 2012i:para 25). This call to discuss food sovereignty within the FAO and the Committee on World Food Security remains controversial but suggests the growing awareness and acceptance of a term that emerged from a peasant social movement in opposition to neoliberal hegemony.

In May 2012, the Committee on World Food Security met for an extraordinary session (39th) to endorse the **Voluntary guidelines on the responsible governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests in the context of national food security**. That same month, the G20 announced the launch of the **New Alliance** for Food Security and Nutrition, a partnership programme between African governments, members of the G8, and the private sector to work together to accelerate investments in agriculture to improve productivity, livelihoods and food security for smallholder farmers. This New Alliance aims to raise 50 million people out of poverty over the next 10 years through sustained and inclusive agricultural growth. Commitments to coordinating through the G20 had evidently been pushed aside along with a commitment of

developing a Global Partnership coordinated within the UN and inclusive of a wide range of stakeholders. President Barak Obama unveiled plans for the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa at a time when only half of the L'Aquila pledges had been disbursed. With regards to the L'Aquila commitments, the New Alliance notes that since the L'Aquila Summit, they have increased their bilateral and multilateral investments in food security and changed the way we do business, consistent with core principles of aid effectiveness. Based on the findings of the 2012 G8 Accountability Report and consistent with the Rome Principles on Sustainable Global Food Security, the G8 have agreed to promptly fulfil outstanding L'Aquila financial pledges and seek to maintain strong support to address current and future global food security challenges, including through bilateral and multilateral assistance (Office of the Press Secretary 2012).

In June 2012, the **UN Conference on Sustainable Development** (Earth Summit or Rio +20) was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The conference was organized in pursuance of General Assembly Resolution 64/236 (A/RES/64/236). It marked the 20th anniversary of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), in Rio de Janeiro, and the 10th anniversary of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg. The conference was organized around two main themes: a green economy in the context of sustainable development poverty eradication; and the institutional framework for sustainable development. In preparation for the Conference, seven priority areas were identified: decent jobs, energy, sustainable cities, food security and sustainable agriculture, water, oceans, and disaster readiness. The Conference produced a report and an outcome document called “The future we want”. The document recognised “that farmers, including small-scale farmers and fisherfolk, pastoralists and foresters, can make important contributions to sustainable development through production activities that are environmentally sound, enhance food security and the livelihood of the poor and invigorate production and sustained economic growth” (UN General Assembly 2012b:para 52). The right to adequate food as a fundamental right was recognised and governments reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing food security and access to adequate, safe and nutritious food for present and future generations in line with the Five Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security (UN General Assembly 2012b:para 105). They also reaffirmed the important work and inclusive nature of the Committee on World Food Security, “including through its role in facilitating country-initiated assessments on sustainable food production and food security”, and encouraged “countries to give due consideration to implementing the Committee on World Food Security Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security” (UN General Assembly 2012b:para 115). They took note of the discussions on responsible agricultural investment in the framework of the Committee on World Food Security, as well as the principles for responsible agricultural investment.

In September 2012, the FAO held a **High level forum on food insecurity in protracted crisis**.

The Forum provided a space for consultation and policy dialogue to increase understanding and strengthen collaborative efforts among stakeholders. A key outcome of the Forum was establishing the basic elements of an Agenda for Action for Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises (CFS 2012d). The elements of an Agenda for Action and a plan for consultations and negotiations on the Agenda were then presented at the **39th Session of the Committee on World Food Security** in October 2009. At the 39th Session, the Committee considered a presentation on the State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012 (SOFI), entitled “Economic growth is necessary but not sufficient to accelerate reduction of hunger and malnutrition” and welcomed the new methodology for estimating hunger. The Committee considered an in-depth review and discussions of the meaning and different uses of the terms "Food Security", "Food Security and Nutrition", "Food and Nutrition Security" and "Nutrition Security but came to no conclusions on which terms to use. Importantly, the CFS adopted the **First Version of the Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition**, an overarching but non-binding framework and a single reference document with practical guidance on core recommendations for food security and nutrition strategies, policies and actions validated by the wide ownership, participation and consultation of the CFS.

The number of international meetings dedicated to addressing food security in the wake of the food price spikes illustrates the importance governments placed on rising food insecurity. New actors and old have been actively reshaping the architecture of global food security governance. However, policy discussion and high-level declarations do not necessarily amount to action. As the chronology of events illustrates, there is overwhelming overlap both in terms of actors and policies. Of central importance is that the CFS was approved by governments as the foremost platform for discussions on food security and yet post-reform, actors continue to host discussions in alternate fora thereby undermining the CFS.¹²

1.7. Structure of the Thesis and Research Questions

Prior to the 2007-8 food price and financial crises, it was perhaps more easily argued that food security and price stability could be assured by way of trade liberalization. However, the price spikes illustrated the limited capacity of them market to adapt when challenged. In practice then, the 2007-8 food price crisis placed the global food and financial system under-pressure and the poor ended up being the release valves. As a result, post-crisis, trade was put back into question. Poor countries that were unable to implement defensive policies lost confidence in the international markets and many are now implementing or complementing national and regional

¹² Given the large number of actors, meetings, initiatives and policy outcomes to emerge in reaction to the food price spikes, a decision was made to focus on multilateral actors. This research thus concentrated on the policies of the following actors: The UN High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, the World Bank Group, the G8, the G20, the FAO, the Committee on World Food Security. The rationale and method for selecting these organizations is explained in Chapter 3 and illustrated in a table contained in Appendix 1.

strategies to overt risky international markets. The on-going volatility of markets is not helping the situation (Arusa 2011; High Level Panel of Experts 2011b). Moreover, stable international markets may provide a preferable policy environment for governments to deal with food security but trade requires stocks, which are at record lows.




Figure 10: Complexity of the Crisis (Duncan 2013)

The food price crisis, as it is understood and described above (Figure 10), was sparked by market fears linked to low world stocks. The declines were the result of several factors,

including policies to reduce stock holdings, weather shocks which led to drastically reduced yield, increased demand for biofuels, increased demand for energy costs and animal products, which created increased demand for oil and animal feed. The global financial crisis shook confidence in global markets and a depreciated US dollar left many countries with tied currencies unable to afford food. Countries reacted with export restriction policies that sought to protect people but inadvertently led to more market stress, and increased food price volatility for others. Some speculators saw an opportunity to increase profits and some, as a way of securing food or increasing income, began acquiring large parcels of land in what some have called a new global land rush (Arezki, Deininger, and Selod 2012). The impact was that millions more people were pushed into poverty and hundreds of millions added to the already appallingly high number of undernourished people worldwide (FAO 2008d). Lost faith in markets illustrates a point of rupture in the common-sense (hegemonic) ordering of the governance of food security and arguably the wider economy.

This thesis starts from this point of rupture: a noted disjuncture in the normal ordering of the everyday world (Smith 1993). The food price spikes and ensuing crises represent a point of rupture in the logic of the global food system and in global governance more broadly. The system failed. Reflecting a profoundly sad and problematic reality of the food system, what caused this rupture was not the increase in the number of hungry and poor, but rather the significant challenge to the tenets of trade liberalization as countries enacted protectionist measures leaving wealthy countries that have spearheaded the global neoliberal project scrambling to pick up and glue back together the pieces. Simply put, reactions to the food price crisis represent a challenge to the hegemonic global project of neoliberalism (Cerny 2008, 2009, 2010b; Duncan and Barling 2012; Harvey 2005; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Peck 2010).

This research is interested in how the global architecture of food security governance is re-arranging itself as actors work out how to recover from the series of integrated world crises. Particularly, this research analyses how the UN's Committee on World Food Security has adapted to these shifts and whether or not it can achieve its reform mandate within the new architecture.

To historicise the research, the evolution of food security since its entry into global policy processes in 1974 is presented, with particular focus on food security as discourse. The emerging architecture of global food security governance is then reviewed with particular focus on multilateral initiatives launched in response to the food price spikes or on-going food price volatility. In this analysis, key actors and initiatives are identified and their policies analysed so as to provide a map of the current architecture of multilateral actors in global food security governance. Focus then shifts to the reformed Committee on World Food Security as the foremost international and intergovernmental body for the discussion and coordination of food security policy at the global level. The reformed Committee on World Food Security is now recognised by the international community as the foremost platform for promoting policy

coherence and discussion around food security,¹³ but the process of achieving this consensus has been hard fought and is not set in stone. The capacity and authority of the CFS are continuously challenged by the reorganization of power. This forms the crux of the research problem. Understanding this, research questions are identified as:

RQ1: To what extent is the reformed CFS realising its reform objectives?

RQ2. Who are the main actors and what are the dominant initiatives within the changing architecture of food security governance?

RQ3. How does the CFS relate to the changing architecture of global food security governance and what are the impacts?

RQ4. How do these findings contribute to the literature on, and understandings of, global governance and global food security governance?

This thesis is organised as follows. A theoretical framework that takes predominantly from global governance theory is introduced to help make sense of processes underway in the ever changing architecture of global food security governance. This is followed by a review of the research methods. To answer these questions this research undertook data collection by way of desk research, participant observation, and interviews. Data analysis was in turn supported by the theoretical framework. Given that the international reaction to the crisis was framed through a food security lens, the evolution of food security as a policy discourse in multilateral policy processes is examined. From there, the history and reform of the CSM is presented followed by three case studies that focus on three key reform objectives: participation; policy outputs; and cohesion. These case studies provide empirical insights into how the CFS is achieving its reform objectives. They confirm not only the value of enhanced participation of civil society actors in policy making processes but also how the CFS is emerging as an effective and innovative model to address key limitations that exist in global governance fora. These limitations are discussed in Chapter 2.

However, to examine the CFS as a stand-alone committee is inadequate as the CFS is but one part of a changing and contested institutional architecture. Its impact and influence are tied to the role it plays in broader transnational processes. Understanding this, attention is paid to the way in which other multinational actors are responding to the on-going food security crisis. These include policies advanced by: the UN High-Level Task Force on the Global Food

¹³ This was recently reaffirmed in the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) negotiated outcome document “The Future we Want” where member countries reaffirmed: “the important work and inclusive nature of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), including through its role in facilitating country-initiated assessments on sustainable food production and food security” (UN 2012:Para. 115). It was also mentioned in the Declaration from the first meeting of G20 Agriculture Ministers which expresses a commitment to work closely with the CFS to promote greater policy convergence and strengthen policy linkages at the global level (G20 2011). Finally, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food has recently argued that one of the most significant outcomes of the 2007-2008 global food price crisis was a new commitment by the international community to improve the governance of global food security, in particular through the reform of the Committee on World Food Security (De Schutter 2012).

Security Crisis, the World Bank Group, the G8, the G20, and the FAO. This research will show that the CFS is producing the most comprehensive policies in a consultative and participatory way (i.e. democratically) but that it is also being systematically undermined by other actors. The thesis concludes by summarising the outcomes of the research, identifying areas for future research and considering implications for global governance and global food security.

2. Theorizing Global Food Security Policy Change: Global governance and embedded neoliberalism

2.1. Introduction

The food price spikes and resulting crisis reinforced the need to reform the architecture of governance for agriculture, food and nutrition at the global level to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. The international community recognised this: old institutions were reformed and new ones were launched to support policy cohesion and tackle food insecurity through improved international cooperation. To begin to make sense of the changes that took place across the architecture of global food security governance in response to the food price crisis, a theoretical framework has been developed. The framework draws from a wide range of academic sources as well as primary materials.

This chapter begins by reviewing the literature on global governance, reflecting on the term as both an observable phenomena and a political project. This is followed by a review of key challenges and critiques, including issues of accountability, participation and categorization. Understanding global governance as project and phenomena is important but what is needed to advance the research is a theoretical framework to provide the tools with which we can begin to unpick the complexity that has been observed. Philip Cerny's (2008, 2009, 2010) work on embedded neoliberalism which is used as the overarching theoretical framework for this project. To understand how actors respond to and interact within a context of embedded neoliberalism and how actors are made objects and subjects of food security policy processes, the concept of governmentality is introduced. Governmentality also provides a way of making sense of the shift in food security policy outlined above as well tools to deconstruct the use of scientific discourse to discredit specific types of knowledge and expertise. The chapter concludes with a summary of the theoretical framework.

2.2. Defining Governance

In an early edition of the journal *Global Governance*, Lawrence Finkelstein (1995:368) rather boldly stated that “‘Global Governance’ appears to be virtually everything” and that “we say ‘governance’ because we really don’t know what to call what is going on”. Despite the wealth of literature and analysis that has since been dedicated to the topic, there remains little consensus as to what is meant by global governance. However, rather than a paucity of definitions, we are grappling with too many (Dingwerth and Pattberg 1996; Kersbergen and Waarden 2004), leading one scholar to state that global governance is “contested terrain”: a term that obscures more than it describes (Woods 2007:28).

To help make sense of this multifarious concept, it is useful to begin by defining governance. According to Thomas Weiss (2000:795) “[m]any academics and international practitioners employ ‘governance’ to connote a complex set of structures and processes, both public and

private, while more popular writers tend to use it synonymously with ‘government’.” Similarly, Brown and Ainley (2009:129) explain that governance, originally synonymous with government, “has been pressed into service as a convenient term for the collective impact of the various disparate quasi-governmental institutions that have proliferated (internally and externally) over the last century or more” (see also Rosenau and Czempial 1992). Yet at a time marked by “shifting boundaries, relocated authorities, weakened states, and proliferating nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at local, provincial, national, transnational, international, and global levels of community,” scholars have tended to turn to global governance as a way of starting to “confront the insufficiency of our ways of thinking, talking, and writing about government”(Rosenau 1999:287).

Tim Lang et al. (2009:75) contrast governance to government, explaining that “governance implies more indirect, softer forms of direction from the state than command and control, and reflects collaborative outcomes, involving a wide range of actors often from the private sector, as well as from government bureaucracy, as much as deliberate interventions by the state.” They (Lang et al. 2009: 81) continue that governance is “an interactive process of state and public laws and policy with private interests and actors.”

In their book *Governance and Performance: New Perspectives*, Carolyn Heinrich and Laurence Lynn (2000:4) state that governance “implies an arrangement of distinct but interrelated elements – statutes, including policy mandates; organizational, financial, and programmatic structures; resource levels; administrative rules and guidelines; and institutionalized rules and norms – that constrains and enables the tasks, priorities, and values that are incorporated into regulatory, service production, and service delivery processes.”

To summarise then, governance broadly refers to the management functions of societies – formal and informal – that are generally focussed or coordinated around the state or government institutions but include diverse actors, including civil society and the private sector. It reflects two complementary dimensions: purpose (guiding and directing) and regulating (restraining, managing and controlling) while highlighting the “deeper purposes that groups and societies pursue” (Dahlberg 2001:136).

Common characteristics of governance, taken from across the literature (i.e., Cardoso 2003; Jessop 1998; Kersbergen and Waarden 2004; Rosenau 1999, 2002; Smouts 1998), suggest that governance implies measures of control, orderliness and manageability but at the same time is made up of intersubjective norms, rules, and principles. Moreover, governance reflects a process more than a system of rule or an activity. It appeals to accommodation over domination and is thus dependent on participation, negotiation and coordination. In lieu of a formal institution, or perhaps working in tandem with them, governance relies on continual interactions between formal and informal networks, partnerships, projects and consensus. Governance is pluricentric rather than unicentric but there is emphasis on functioning administrative capacities, accountability and responsiveness to those the regime serves and ideally, transparency.

Following this, networks play an important role in governance and these networks function to organize relations between relatively autonomous but interdependent actors. Finally, within contemporary governance systems relations between actors pose risks and uncertainties and correspondingly, different sectors have developed institutions¹⁴ to support cooperation and reduce risk. As will be shown later, these characteristics are all present in the changing global food security policy arena.

2.2.1. Global Governance

The concept of global governance emerged alongside governance as a way of conceptualising the rapid changes to global economics and politics brought about by processes of globalisation. Such processes and resulting forces have changed the political, economic and social landscape (core principles of the international order) leading to a redistribution of “power within the international systems away from the nation-state to new international non-state actors” (Muldoon 2004:4).

The term global governance is often criticized for suggesting that governance is global in scope, or that the globe is in some way governed.¹⁵ However, the concept is not to be equated with global rule but rather with multilevel governance, referring to multiple and interconnected levels of governance taking place at national, international, subnational, regional, and local levels (Brühl and Rittberger 2001:2). As such, for example, it demands asking how World Trade Organization rules impact specific communities and how local initiatives in turn impact national or regional or even global initiatives. Given that this project considered global-level governance, that food security aims to end hunger, and that hunger is experienced first and foremost at the individual level, a global governance approach presents a useful starting point.

There have been important efforts at developing definitions of global governance. One widely used definition was presented by the UN Commission on Global Governance in their report “Our Global Neighbourhood” (Commission on Global Governance 1995:7):

At the global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), citizens' movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market. Interacting with these are global mass media of dramatically enlarged influence.

This definition, while useful in so far as it introduces new actors and media, remains rather limited and inadequate. Yet, as Compagnon (in Overbeek et al. 2010:711) notes, “reflecting on global governance should not be a gratuitous and vain search for the ‘right’ definition: rather, it

¹⁴ Here, institutions are understood as “the rules of the game that, either formally or informally make up the policies, procedures, laws and agreements” that shape a network (Ishii-Eiteman 2009:219).

¹⁵ In an attempt to avoid these limitations, scholars have forwarded other terms such as “polyarchy” (Brown 1995), “panarchy” (Sewell and Slater 1995), “collibration” (Dunsire 1993), and “fragmentation” (Rosenau 1999), but none have been widely adopted in the global context.

should become an exploration of the specific historical context – multidimensional globalisation – in which it is nested.”

Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg’s (2006) survey of the academic literature has led them to conclude that there are two dominant applications of global governance as a concept: global governance as observable phenomena; and, global governance as political programme. These approaches to global governance are not necessarily applied exclusively and most academic applications tend to combine both approaches: analytic-institutionalism (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006:195). However, here, for clarity, an attempt will be made to qualify each approach separately, while recognising that there is often overlap between the two.

2.2.2. Observable Phenomena

The development of global governance is made visible through the proliferation of international organizations and their increasing influence and the increasing interconnectedness of local and global events. Seen as an observable phenomenon, global governance tends to be understood as part of a continuum: an evolution from international relations. Building on this tradition, global governance is seen to be the domain of three primary actors: government (political domain), markets (economic domain) and civil society (socio-cultural domain) (Muldoon 2004:9; UNDP 1997:14-18). These can be conceptualised as three pillars of global governance (see Figure 10). Each pillar has distinct institutions and organizations that operate on three different levels of support (international, national and community) and in turn support the system as a whole. Muldoon (2004:9) argues that the interaction between levels results in the integration and differentiation within and between organizations and institutions. Yet, with the onward march of globalization, and the expansion of global governance, the analytic lines that previously existed have been blurred or started to disappear.

To help make sense of these pillars and changes, Muldoon developed two figures (see Figure 10) as a way of demonstrating the shift in ordering as we move towards from international relations to global governance while highlighting four key aspects of global governance. First is the recognition that non-governmental and governmental mechanisms have influence on how the global system is governed. Second, there are a diverse range of actors involved in the formation of instruments of global governance. Third, global governance infers the increasing integration of the three pillars and the fragmentation of the world order as a result of transitory and contested spheres of authority (Rosenau 1997). Finally, the architecture of global governance operates at multiple levels and is not inherently hierarchical.




Figure 11: Organizations and Institutions of Global Governance (Muldoon 2004:10, 273, adapted by author)

Moving on from the interactions between the actors and levels of support, Muldoon (2004) identifies several common characteristics. First, global governance is multilayered in that it is constituted by and through the structural enmeshment of key infrastructures of governance with the national government folded in between each of the layers. Muldoon (2004:7-8) refers to this as the multipolarity of power and decentralization of authority which he argues is a critical aspect of the transformation of the international system to the global system. Second, there is no single locus of authority and political authority is fragmented. It is thus often described as polyarchic or pluralistic. A third characteristic is that the architecture of global governance has a variable geometry, meaning that the political significance and the regulatory capacity of these infrastructures vary considerably. Here, Muldoon (2004:8) highlights the role of structures: global governance requires institutions, regimes and organizations that work as intermediaries to tie together different components of social systems. These social structures are “historical realities in that their composition, *raison d’être* and manifest purposes are derived through social experiences and evolve out of earlier structures and forms” (Muldoon 2004:8).

Muldoon (2004:7-8) argues that through transformation international organizations are likely to maintain many of the features that define them and add new features as needed to address particular demands of the global system. Part of Muldoon’s rationale for this stems from what he sees as a need for stability within the global system: “governance structures only survive if they promote stability in the system” (Muldoon 2004:9). This process of change is addressed in more detail below in relation to Antonio Gramsci’s work. A fourth observation is that systems

of global governance are structurally complex and composed of diverse agencies and networks with overlapping jurisdictions and maintain differential power resources and competencies. Finally, within the architecture of global governance national governments have become increasingly crucial sites for stitching together the various infrastructures of governance and legitimizing regulation beyond the state, an underlying premise of international relations as well.

Beyond common characteristics and established understandings of global governance, the literature identifies common shifts within governance structures that happen vertically, horizontally and both vertically and horizontally. Vertical shifts refer to changes – be they of power, responsibility or coordination – between nation-states and international institutions with supranational characteristics (known to as upwards shifts) or to shifting of responsibility and power from national or international bodies to sub-national or regional level (referred to as downward shifts). A downward shift is related to internationalisation wherein international bodies rely on local agencies to implement or enforce their regulations thereby potentially strengthening local bodies (Kersbergen and Waarden 2004:153).

Network governance is a key trait of horizontal shifts in global governance. As Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004:149-150) point out, such horizontal shifts are part of a broader tendency of increased juridification of social relations, wherein once informal relations are becoming increasing formalised via agreements. Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004:155) also note that these types of shifts in governance lead to a rise in the popularity and usage of information comparison, such as benchmarking and best practices. This process has become quite pronounced in the reformed CFS where sessions are now dedicated to case studies and sharing of best practices. For example at the 37th Session (October 2011), the CFS considered country case studies on mapping initiatives to enhance “global coordination and support for national processes”(CFS 2011:7).

One implication of horizontal shifts is that governance decisions are being made through increasingly complicated networks. Network governance has two origins: International Relations Theory (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997) and Comparative European Public Policy Analysis (Bulmer 1998; Moravcsik 1993, 1998; Peterson and Bomberg 1994; Wallace and Wallace 1996). A network governance approach sees governance as relating to both power relations resulting from rules and substance of policies, whereas multilevel refers to the engagement of different levels of government (regional, national and sub-national) as well as the involvement of private and public actors at these levels (Kersbergen and Waarden 2004:149-150).

Chris Brown and Kristen Ainley (2009:129) suggest that in the absence of a world government, due to the unwillingness of states to surrender their juridical status as sovereign, among other things, efforts at ruling and the exercise of political sovereignty has led to the creation of extensive networks of global governance. The development of these networks effectively

changes the location of decision making, policies, regulation, as well as the rules of production and enforcement leading to shifts in governance styles (Kersbergen and Waarden 2004:155). The result, as Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004:153) point out, is increasingly complicated network structures wherein traditional approaches of command, control and enforcement are no longer efficient or effective.

In the context of increased globalization and fragmentation, Keohane and Nye (2000:37) note that any emerging pattern of governance will have to be networked rather than hierarchical and must have minimal rather than highly ambitious objectives. As will be explored in this thesis, evidence suggests that in the shifting architecture of global food security governance, networks are playing an increasingly important and influential role. For Rhodes (2000:61), networks are self-organising, resistant to government intervention, develop their own policies, shape their environments, share or exchange resources and rely on trust and shared rules that are negotiated and agreed upon by network participants. Rhodes is referring to the national level within the UK and the situation at the global level is arguably different. Governance in and by networks, as identified by Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004) can be separated into networks of public organizations, private organizations and mixed public and private organizations. Within each of these, networks are conceptualised as pluricentric forms of governance, as opposed to multicentric (market) and unicentric (state or hierarchy) (Kersbergen and Waarden 2004:148).

Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004:149) add that the primary mode of interaction between networks is negotiation. However, as we will see, from the perspective of social movement, civil society and NGO networks, the interactions tend to be based more on communication, information sharing and strategic alignments to forward similarly held positions or shared objectives.

Within the Reformed CFS, networks play a fundamental role. Not only can the Reformed CFS be seen as a network in and of itself, but it can also be seen to be comprised of various other networks. CSO and NGO networks, private networks, networks of philanthropic organizations, research networks, state networks and various cross-sectoral and interconnecting networks play a key role in the debate, negotiations, development of policies as well as consultation and evaluation. Indeed, this increasingly networked structure is in part a reason for the excitement and potential of the Reformed CFS to emerge as a political body with the potential to improve global food security (as will be explored later). At the CFS, shift in governance can be witnessed as CSOs and other actors begin to play a formal role as participants, all while maintaining decision making at the state level (one-state-one-vote). At the same time, the national delegations are not simply state-representatives. National delegations at the CFS are comprised of civil servants but often include non-state actors, including the private sector, NGOs and researchers. We thus have networks within networks within networks informing global food security governance.

Up to this point, the description provided of global governance fails to describe why it has been taken up to the degree that it has within academic and beyond. Bob Jessop (1998) identifies four possibilities: expansion of the governance discourse; persistence of ‘governance’ mechanisms in contract to markets or hierarchy; the cycle of modes of coordination; and a fundamental secular shift in state-market-society relations. This final reason, which recalls Muldoon’s pillars of global governance, is also most visible in the relations that are of interest to analyses of global food security governance: mainly, that there has been a fundamental secular shift in state-market-society relations which imply new economic and social conditions and address related problems which cannot be managed or resolved by top-down state planning or market-mediated anarchy. As we will see however, despite the shifts towards governance models, the tendency in food security remains state-centric in terms of accountability and policy-making.

2.2.3. Political Project

Having reviewed global governance as observable phenomenon, we can now consider the implications of this phenomenon by considering global governance as a political project. There are several ways that global governance as political project is taken up, including: global governance as a way of solving the world’s collective problems; global governance to re-democratise in the face of globalisation; and, global governance as advancement of a neoliberal project. As this suggests, global governance is often referenced in the context of a broader vision of how we might begin to address some of the world’s most pressing problems. Here language related to the coordination of multiple actors to solve economic, environmental and broad social problems is invoked. A prime example can be seen in throughout the 1990s at the series of World Summits. From this perspective, enhanced global governance is needed to begin to adequately address global problems. The perspective tends towards long-term projects of global integration, often modelled on the United Nations and the European Union (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006; Gordenker and Weiss 1996). The approach enacts language of communal efforts often through diplomatic rallying cries. For example, in advance of the 36th Session of the Committee on World Food Security, the FAO Media Centre issued a statement proclaiming that “as the cornerstone of the global governance of agriculture and food security, the CFS will be more effective in facing challenges to food security” (FAO 2010). The sentiment suggests that the UN provides the appropriate and necessary space to tackle the pressing problem of food insecurity and proclaims its position as the leader in this process: “the CFS has been undergoing a major reform with the aim of making the Committee the most inclusive international and intergovernmental platform for all relevant stakeholders to work together to ensure food security and nutrition for all” (FAO 2010). Indeed, as we will see, this logic permeates the reform of the CFS as well as rationales for why it should be leading policy debates on global food security. The rhetoric of coming together to solve problems is also taken up by groups like the Group of 8 (G8). Their 2012 Camp David Declaration makes use of similar language:

For over a decade, the G-8 has engaged with African partners to address the challenges and opportunities afforded by Africa's quest for inclusive and sustainable development. Our progress has been measurable, and together we have changed the lives of hundreds of millions of people. International assistance alone, however, cannot fulfil our shared objectives. As we move forward, and even as we recommit to working together to reduce poverty, we recognize that our task is also to foster the change that can end it.

Global governance as political project is also linked to a re-democratization of politics in the wake of a wave of globalization defined by increased corporate engagement and a shift in state responsibilities towards facilitation (be it through policies or infrastructure). As Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006:195) explain, from this perspective, it is argued – perhaps overly optimistically – that “the goal of global governance lies in regaining society’s control over market forces which [have] been lost in the wake of globalizations.” Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006:195) provide an illustrative example from a German Study “Globalization of the World Economy – Challenges and Answers”:

As the world becomes increasingly globalized and economic activities grow beyond national regulatory frameworks, it becomes more necessary to politically shape economic, social and environmental processes on a global scale. How the global challenges can be democratically managed has recently begun to be discussed under the heading of “global governance” (Bundestag 2002:67).

Similarly, La Via Campesina, the world’s largest peasant movement, forward a food sovereignty framework as a direct challenge to neoliberal globalization. From the perspective of La Via Campesina (2012),

The advance of the capitalist system that has reached unprecedented dimensions in the past two decades is resulting in crises that are of equally unprecedented dimensions. The financial, food, energy and environmental crises are phases of the structural crisis of capitalism, which has no limits in its search for more profits. And, as in other structural crises, it impacts the peoples of the world and not the elites. ... [T]o say that capitalism is in crisis does not mean that the system is in retreat. On the contrary, it is precisely in this moment that it advances with more intensity because the corporations take advantage of the crisis to extend their domination over territories that have not yet been conquered.

La Via Campesina is increasingly engaging in formal and informal processes of global governance and moderating their participation through a food sovereignty framework (discussed in greater detail below). La Via Campesina are an example of how global networks are seeking to redefine global governance by forwarding a framework for the re-democratization of governance systems. Their challenge to the ordering of global governance also serves to illustrate ways in which global governance as political project is also visible as a neoliberal project.

Henk Overbeek (Overbeek et al. 2010:702) cautions that what is often referred to as global governance is in fact “*neoliberal* global governance, serving the freedom of capital to accumulate around the planet.” Indeed, the pursuit and maintenance of neoliberal hegemony is not absent from global food security governance, and in fact, is often a key motivating and rationalizing factor in world food security policy, arguably to the detriment of the eradication of hunger (Busch and Bain 2004; Duncan and Barling 2012; Lang et al. 2009; Lawrence,

Lyons, and Wallington 2010; McMichael 2000; Pechlaner and Otero 2008; Peine and McMichael 2005). Overbeek (in Overbeek et al. 2010:702), lamenting the loss of its initial reference to a radical restructuring of the global economic order, suggests that global governance is now applied as a reformist concept to accommodate the interests of neo-liberal globalization with only the most necessary reforms to keep the system running (a good example of analytic institutionalism: global governance as political project and observable phenomenon). He suggests that by presupposing common interests instead of questioning the existence of common interests and a willingness to work together, most definitions of global governance effectively depoliticize the debate about world order. Furthermore, as Ulrich Brand (2005) illustrates, global governance, understood as a discourse, is often articulated in ways which legitimize shifts and developments so as to forward and maintain neoliberal globalization. This builds on Muldoon's (2004) concern that transformation of international organizations are likely to take place in ways that adapt to particular demands of the global system rather than provide structural change.

From this critical theory perspective, global governance is not so much an answer to state failures in the globalization process as it is a hegemonic discourse invoked to disguise the negative effects of neoliberal economic development on a global scale. In the words of Ulrich Brand (translated and cited in Pattberg 2006), "the discourse of Global Governance . . . serves as a means to deal more effectively with the crisis-prone consequences caused by [postfordist-neoliberal social transformations]". The prevailing neoliberal logic steering policy processes beyond the state are deeply embedded in a broader political trend towards reregulation of the world economy in ways that obscure the negative tendencies of late capitalism. Neoliberal approaches to global governance and the policies that result are advanced to maintain or reclaim political influence in order to stabilise the institutional landscape of world politics. Through these processes, neoliberalism becomes so deeply embedded in their logic and rationale that it emerges as an ideological companion to globalization. We return to this process later.

2.3. Challenges and Critiques to Global Governance

The concept of global governance is not without critique or challenge, both in terms of global governance scholarship and processes. For Overbeek (in Overbeek et al. 2010), given the multiplicity of uses, definitions and applications, the term global governance is not only not useful, it is also misleading. He argues that the three largest weaknesses facing applications of global governance are that analysis tends to be ahistorical, necessarily pluralist in so far as they tend to take the plurality of actors, interests and structures as essential, and apolitical in so much as power is often removed from analyses. Dingwerth and Pattberg (in Overbeek et al. 2010) agree with Overbeek on the apolitical nature of global governance scholarship and forward two other limitations: that global governance assumes globality and, non-governance is ignored. However, they argue that global governance studies also present a way of examining diverse

power relations at the global level. For example, they argue that despite structural imbalances in the distribution of power and resources in the global political economy, countries from the South have not lacked influence in transnational politics. Towards this end, Compagnon (in Overbeek et al. 2010) argues for more nuanced and fact-based assessments of global governance and the inclusion of multiple actors in global governance research.

Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg (in Overbeek et al. 2010:708) note, in most cases, researchers evoking global governance do not extend their analysis beyond relevant steering mechanisms that exist in relation to the respective issue within the world. Correspondingly, efforts to make sense of a specific field of global governance often start by establishing a list of relevant regulatory mechanism. However, if this is the way that scholars approach global governance, then, according to Dingwerth and Pattberg (in Overbeek et al. 2010) it is important to anticipate some potential blind spots. First, avoid the temptation of over estimating the amount of rule-based coordination that exists in the political world. Second, it follows that global governance research has a tendency to adopt a narrow focus on the rules that can be most easily identified (for example, written rules, legal texts and codes of conduct).¹⁶ Third, global governance research is likely to concentrate on issue areas with dense formal rules resulting in a paucity of investigation into less institutionalized, but not necessarily less effective, areas of global governance. Finally, there is little clarity or consensus on what constitutes a global policy problem, how one is recognised and why some issues are constructed as global problems while others are left as domestic challenges. With respect to food security, there is general agreement on what constitutes food insecurity and that it is indeed a global problem. Definitions and methodologies for defining and quantifying the number of food insecure people around the world have been intergovernmentally negotiated, scientifically reviewed, and subject to critique by civil society and private sector actors. Thus, the challenge with food security and global policy processes is less one of defining the problem, but rather solving the problem. Despite myriad attempts through a variety of policy programmes, food insecurity remains prevalent and there are clear differences and divergences in how to address the issue. Furthermore, as will be seen throughout the thesis, more often than not, the proposed solutions comprise part of the problem (Holt-Giménez and Altieri 2013). This leads to concerns about global governance processes.

Marie-Claude Smouts (1998:88) argues that global governance processes are based on eirenic representations of social life and disregard situations of outright domination as well as questions arising from un-governability. An even larger challenge stems from an underlying criteria of global governance – effectiveness – and a lack of a world government. Global governance

¹⁶ Dingwerth and Pattberg (in Overbeek et al. 2010:708) point out that the method of “inventorization” runs in opposition to Rosenau’s claim that global governance research is interested in examining the “literally millions” of rule systems with transboundary repercussions (Rosebay 1995:13).

emerges and evolves to effectively manage an issue or a problem to be resolved by way of accommodation of mutual interest. At present, the sole regulator acting at the global level that cuts across interacting social and sub-systems is the international market. Smouts (1998:88) warns that in this respect, global governance could effectively conceal “the most devious type of economic liberalism”. Aware of these limitations, efforts have been made to ensure that processes of domination are not ignored and that the analysis of how multilateral actors seek out effectiveness in global food security policy does not serve to mask efforts to promote economic liberalism. Indeed, the theoretical framework developed in this chapter actively serves to uncover such processes.

Before moving on, a review of the dominant challenges and critiques of global governance processes and institutions as identified in the literature is presented. These include participation, accountability, legitimacy, and categorisation and are introduced so as to flag some of the key challenges that are likely to arise within the changing architecture of global food security governance.

2.3.1. Participation

Middendorf and Busch (1997:45) argue that “a closer approximation of the ‘public good’ can be achieved by encouraging the participation of the fullest range of constituents”. The call for public participation in policy processes is not new. For example, Carole Pateman (1970) argued that the development of the ability and desire of people to participate is crucial to democratic societies.

When it comes to food, meaningful public participation is central and “[w]hile creating opportunities for participation does not guarantee that the best possible decision will result, at least it does appear to increase the possibility of better decisions that are more responsive to the needs and desires of the broader public” (Middendorf and Busch 1997:54). Acknowledgment of the complexity of agriculture, food and development policy should not be used as a rationale for restricting involvement. By arguing that global food security policy is too complex to involve a diversity of players, we end up forwarding a system that encourages decision making without consideration for broader implications (Middendorf and Busch 1997:48). Furthermore, technical decisions have real social implications.

Middendorf and Busch (1997) provides a rationale for public agriculture research, if we accept that all technical changes are also social changes. The arguments can be adapted and applied in support of public participation in agri-food governance and policy-making processes. First, increasing participation in decision-making at the global level is compatible with the democratic principles of participating nations. Second, while not guaranteeing it, “broad public involvement in decision making will increase the chances of better decision making... because a broader range of values is likely to be represented and the probability of error may be reduced” (Middendorf and Busch 1997:46).

2.3.2.Accountability

As new forms of governance render traditional mechanisms for checks and balances less effective, or even obsolete, new understandings and mechanisms for accountability are emerging. Questions related to accountability tend to ask which entities or actors are, or should be, accountable, to whom and how. From the perspective of food policy, it is also important to consider what the answers to these questions mean for accountability gaps; that is where practices differ from the desired outcomes. Furthermore, there is need to consider who is accountable not just for policy development, but equally for implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

An immediate challenge is defining what is meant by accountability. Some define accountability as a relationship “in which an individual, group or other entity makes demands on an agent to report on his or her activities, and has the ability to impose costs on the agent” (Keohane 2002:13). For Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004:156) accountability is linked to governability – that is, the capacity to solve urgent societal problems and to develop systems to control the exercise of power, or to hold power holders accountable – and consequently, governability and accountability need to develop together. Others argue that democratic accountability in world politics is a hypothetical system wherein the action of agents have to be reported to those people whose lives are impacted by them (Held 2002:27). In a similar vein, Keohane (2002) argues that accountability need not be democratic and often, systems of accountability – most visible perhaps within constitutional democracies – are democratic, hierarchic (subordinates accountable to superiors) and pluralistic (different branches of government are accountable to one another).

For this study, questions of accountability loom large. As the architecture of global governance shifts and opens up to include new actors questions of who is accountable in negotiations, implementation, follow-up and evaluation, and why emerges as a highly sensitive and political question and one that will be addressed later on in discussions of the reform of the CFS.

2.3.3.Legitimacy

Governance, in any form, requires legitimacy. Following from James Rosenau (2003), legitimacy is understood as a relational concept which implies that the legitimacy of an actor’s actions can only be understood in relation to the perception of all relevant stakeholders (see also Boström and Hallström 2010; Hallström and Boström 2010). Achieving and maintaining legitimacy requires convincing actors that there is a value-added component of the rules or policies established by the organizations (Boström and Hallström 2010:10). New regulatory arrangements which are constructed and organized around horizontal non-state relationships are subject to structural drawbacks as they cannot rely on the presumed legitimacy of the nation state as well as traditional enforcement capacities (Bernstein and Cashore 2000; Boström and Hallström 2010).

Within multi-stakeholder organizations where non-state actors play an active role, questions of legitimacy are inevitable. In these circumstances, non-state actors must achieve active approval from a broad group of stakeholders, including state actors (Boström and Hallström 2010). These actors are normally not democratically elected and are, in many instances, self-elected. Achieving legitimacy entails working to gain broad support for their activities which often involves developing partnerships (Boström and Hallström 2010:10). To further complicate things, in these networks, each actor will hold a different view on legitimacy and who and what is considered to be legitimate. Furthermore, as Boström and Hallström (2010:15) remind us, legitimacy is not a stable condition but something fluid that must be repeatedly created and recreated. Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004:158) note that multilevel governance theorists often distinguish between input legitimacy and output legitimacy with the former relating to political systems and specific policies which are legitimated by established rules and processes (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999:255) and the latter referring to political systems and policies which are legitimated by their success.

Without a representative mechanism at the global level (and often even with these), political choices are made by unaccountable executive agencies (extra-national and national), including powerful lobbies, organizations or private subjects (such as multinational corporations) (Benvenisti and Down 2007). As a result, there is a very real risk that opinions which conform to dominant ideologies or highly influential interests will prevail over underrepresented interests. Within the field of global governance the use of executive powers in a world-wide legal space is increasing incrementally, arguably in part to find ways to legitimise global governance systems. One way this is being made visible is through global law.

Sabino Cassese (2008:10) suggests that global law “is generated through a process of accretion and accumulation, and the cooperative dialogue between regimes means that the principles of each should not be interpreted and applied in a vacuum.” He explains that it “is in this process that some have recognised the emergence of a general body of law at the global level.” This global public law involves the development of several legal tools (e.g., treaties, general principles, rules, standards, institutions, and procedural mechanisms) established beyond national borders either by states, or by other bodies (often international), with the aim of delivering services, establishing standards and guidelines for national authorities, monitoring compliance, or acting as “clearing houses”. At present, there are at least two thousand global legal regimes whose administration and judicial bodies (where these exist) are linked to other regimes through dialogue, cooperation and division of labour (Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart 2005). This process, also defined as “juridical globalization” (see for example Kingsbury et al. 2005), and examples of such bodies are prevalent across the architecture of global food security governance as illustrated in Chapter 4.

The international legal system is still highly fragmented¹⁷ and heterogeneous, appearing as the “aggregate of the legal norms governing international relations” (Guggenheim 1967:1). There are not only problems of conflict between states, but also of conflicts between different interests, such as health, environment and trade. Alternative mechanisms of democratic political orientation and of popular education and collection of preferences are at too rudimentary stage and currently favour strong market-based interests (Beck 2005). In practice this results in a tendency to neglect the protection of social interests in favour of economic conditions (Harvey 2005) which in turn culminates into a ‘race to the bottom’ in the protection of the general interest.

Like accountability, the legitimacy of actors – who has the legitimacy to speak on behalf of others – is an increasingly important factor as global governance opens up to new actors and as these actors stake their claim to being “legitimate” actors. This research considers what and who is considered legitimate in global food security policy negotiations, not only across institutions, but also across issues (see for example the case studies on the Civil Society Mechanism and the Voluntary Guidelines).

2.3.4. Categorization

Multi-stakeholder organizations are, by definition, comprised of different types of actors. Within International Relations theory, political strategies are stabilised through established categories (notably, national actors). However, at the transnational level, there is a need to establish new actor categories so as to distinguish amongst participating stakeholders (Beck 2005; Pattberg 2006). To establish these categories is a challenge in and of itself as they cannot be negotiated amongst stakeholders because stakeholders must first negotiate who is to be recognised as a stakeholder (Boström and Hallström 2010:7). Furthermore, categorisation is an exercise in power and a process that’s often invisible. Moreover, categories, once adopted, tend to be taken for granted or go uncontested (Boström and Hallström 2010:7). This is problematic as power relations become embedded in organizational arrangements which can make it easier for some stakeholders to consolidate power due to their categorization (Davis et al. 2005). There is also the issue of the symbolic implications of how categories influence stakeholders’ perception of self and others and how they are in turn perceived (Boström and Hallström 2010:9). Finally, categories can restrict diversity and by grouping organizations together present problems of representation and are subject to simplifications and will inevitably group organizations together in ways that some may find problematic. These issues of categorization come up most obviously in the analysis of the International Food and Nutrition Civil Society Mechanism to the Committee on World Food Security (see chapter 5) where constituencies have been developed in an attempt to develop representative categories of global civil society.

¹⁷ Fragmentation has recently been defined by Koskenniemi (2007) as “the breakdown of the *substance* of general international law into allegedly autonomous, functionally oriented, ‘self-contained’ regimes.”

This process of categorization across the CFS, and the global architecture of global food security governance more broadly, warrants consideration.

2.3.5. Summary of Global Governance

Based on the descriptions provided above it is here argued that despite the limitations, global governance literature provides a useful starting point from which to begin to frame this inquiry insofar as it devises techniques for managing joint affairs (Smouts 1998:86) and accords place and space to a multiplicity of rationalities and differing forms of legitimacy. Global governance proposes reference points for describing processes and provides a way of viewing power in the establishment of international policy and practice. With the application of a global governance approach, the aim becomes to identify how the mechanisms of joint regulation develop through a permanent scenario of exchanges, negotiations and reciprocal adjustments (Smouts 1998:86). This in turn leads to the articulation of issues in terms of strategic interactions with traditional questions of public policy: in the case of this research, how international food security policy is being constructed.

2.4. Embedded Neoliberalism

2.4.1. Neoliberalism

To suggest that we live in a neoliberal era is both correct and incomplete given the multiplicity of definitions attributed to the term. Some have suggested that due to multiple applications more precise terms should be used (Clarke 2008; Ferguson 2009). Susan Watkins (2010:7) has proclaimed that neoliberalism “is a dismal epithet... imprecise and overused”. Peck (2010:14-15) warns against “adjectival promiscuity” that surrounds neoliberalism. He warns that “*neoliberalism* seems often to be used as a sort of stand-in term for the political economic zeitgeist, as a no-more-than approximate proxy for a specific analysis of mechanisms or relations of social power, domination, exploitation, or alienation. Peck (2010:15-16) argues that “for all its doctrinal certainty, the neoliberal project is paradoxically defined by the very *unattainability* of its fundamental goal – frictionless market rule”. It follows that clean or precise definitions of neoliberalization are simply not possible; instead, Peck argues “concretely grounded accounts of the process must be chiselled out of the interstices of state/market configurations”. In some respects, this research undertakes such a process in the analysis of the CFS and relevant policy recommendations to emerge from multilateral groups and organizations in reaction to the 2007-8 food price crisis.

However, it is here argued that the diversity of meanings reflect the different perspectives of actors who have been trying to make sense the world as they see it. Thus, neoliberalism is here used as a starting point and consequently will be presented in a number of ways, each one with the aim of helping to make sense of global food security policy and governance. This is by no means a novel approach. Wendy Larner (2000), for example, engages with neoliberalism as ideology, policy and governance.

Within this thesis, the “neoliberal” is understood in at least five ways, each of which provides unique insights into the functioning and tensions of food security governance at the global level. First, it is explored as a discursive formulation with forms of reasoning and discourse enacted as neoliberalism. Second, it is reviewed as a project (the extension of liberalism) advanced to enhance trade through minimizing barriers as made visible through trade liberalisation. Third, neoliberalism is considered as a product that leads to the development, rationalisation and maintenance of particular food structures. Fourth, it is examined as a process that is mediated primarily through a state complex and plays out as neoliberalization. This process is mapped out in Chapter 4 on the evolution of food security. Finally, neoliberal is considered as a strategy which is implemented through processes of food governance to maintain status quo. These manifestations of the neoliberal are not discreet categories and are in fact densely interconnected, full of personal, organizational, social and/or dispersed networks.

When approached from the perspective of food systems, and food policy more specifically, the inherent contradictions of the neoliberal are made obvious. The most blatant contradiction is arguably between trade liberalisation which involves reducing barriers to trade (neoliberal as project) and food governance (neoliberal as strategy) which involves the regulation of trade. This tension is not new. In 1944, Karl Polanyi (2001) wrote about a “double movement” where economic forces place demands on the broader social formation in which they are located. This double movement refers to the ways in which economic forces come to dominate but are then coerced or calmed by resistance from social formations. This should recall Muldoon’s (2004) and Brand’s (2005) discussions of change within systems of governance.

David Harvey (2005:2) explains that neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practice that:

proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.

For Cerny (2010:128), the development of neoliberalism since the 1980s has led to a “complex, flexible, fungible and increasingly variegated set of discourses that have proved particularly useful to a diverse range of actors in a globalizing world”. Neoliberalism reflects the current of ideas and formulations developed predominantly from U.S. trade and foreign policy through the late twentieth century. However, Jessop (2002) reminds us that neoliberalism is only one of a number of orientations accessible to social formations. Others include neostatism, neocorporatism, or neocommunitarianism. Indeed, neoliberalism should not be seen as a fully comprehensive and self-contained rational doctrine. It is, rather, a social construction that reflects political, and above all, economic forces. Neoliberalism arose most recently as an expression of a capitalist project promoted by specific corporations and mediated by specific state complexes. In the process there has also been criticism and resistance.

Neoliberal models of government are characterized by the capacity for direct intervention by means of empowered and specialized state apparatuses and indirect techniques for leading and controlling citizens without at the same time being responsible for them (Lemke 2001:201). More broadly within neoliberal governance, the role of the state remains fundamental, despite Liberal rhetoric of minimized state influence and power.

Philip Cerny (2010:129-30) provides a useful description of neoliberalism in the context of increased globalization which deserves to be quoted at length:

[N]eoliberalism is not a seamless web doctrinally and discursively. It is not only a contested concept in theoretical terms but also a highly internally differentiated one, made up of a range of politically linked but potentially discrete and freestanding subcategories and dimensions. These can be manipulated and orchestrated in different ways by political actors, leading to a much larger spectrum of strategic options, policy prescriptions, and de facto practices than the original conservative version would suggest – including what are here called regulatory, managed and social neoliberalism. In this way, a wide variety of interest and value groups, as well as political actors, can latch onto specific parts of the package and claim them for diverse political projects.

By extension, neoliberalism, as a political rationality, tries to render the social domain economic and to link a reduction in state services to increased calls for personal responsibility. It is maintained through tensions inherent to liberal democracy: Totalizing bureaucratization competes with the primacy of the individual (Cerny 2010b; Mouffe 2000). Indeed, a central feature of neoliberal rationality is the search to achieve congruence between the responsible and moral individual and the rational-economic actor (Lemke 2001:201). Here, the aspiration is “to construct prudent subjects whose moral quality is based on the fact that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain act as opposed to other alternative acts” (Lemke 2001:201). The choice of action is made based on the free-will of actors (in line with liberal logic) and the consequences of the actions are borne by the subject who is solely responsible for them. When it comes to CSO engagement in food governance, especially at the global level, we see the expectation of liberal democracy support the development of spaces to facilitate their engagement. However cynical this may sound, it is not explicitly meant to be so. But it should be noted that this tendency to opening up participation could be a double-edged sword. While there is the potential for transfer of responsibility, especially of enforcement onto civil society actors, there is also a widening of debate and, as discussed above with reference to Middendorf and Busch (1997), participation has important implications for food policy.

With relevance to food security, an example of neoliberalism as project can be seen through various forms of high level “consensus”. In recent years there has been a shift from a broad policy commitment to “rolling back” (as evidenced in the retreat from agricultural funding and programmes, for example) towards a “rolling out” which is marked by more government intervention and private-public partnerships. The term “Washington Consensus”, coined by Williamson (1999:2), summarizes this “roll back” perspective. The “Washington Consensus” reflected neoclassical economic policy that stressed the importance of economic openness to

enhance development through increased mobility of goods, capital and workers. Williamson identified ten key features:

fiscal discipline, redirection of public expenditure, tax reform, interest rate liberalisation, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalisation, liberalisation of foreign direct investment, privatisation, deregulation of trade barriers, and secure property rights.

This approach is congruent with the IMF and World Bank's view that development is best achieved through market and export-led industrialization. In the 1990's these views were challenged by a number of events including the Asian financial crisis and anti-globalization protests such as those against the WTO Ministerial in Seattle in 1999 and later in 2001 with protests in Quebec City against the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Cracks in the logic of the neoliberal project resulted in attempts to modify and extend neoliberalism by amending state institutions, reducing poverty, enhancing social capital and creating more equitable international governance, in an effort which can be called the "post-Washington Consensus" (Sheppard & Leitner, 2010: 186-188). The food and financial crises of the late 2000s expanded those cracks. A framework for the post-Washington Consensus was laid out in a document developed by G20 Leaders. With the financial crisis of 2008, G20 nations came together with other global actors to develop the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth. From this consensus the "Seoul Action Plan" was developed (G20 2011b). The document focuses on Low Income Countries rather than the broader category of developing countries. The Plan notes that Low Income Countries should: stress inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth; be treated as equal partners who take ownership of their national development; and that the G-20 members should: turn their focus to regional issues; avoid duplication of efforts of other members; and focus on measures that will lead to outcomes (G20 2011b). The Action Plan focuses on a global financial safety net that alludes to a commitment to structural reform of financial institutions that will increase flexibility. The plan also includes a commitment to direct negotiators to "promptly bring the Doha Development Round to a successful, ambitious, comprehensive, and balanced conclusion" (G20 2011:3).

The Seoul Consensus identifies nine pillars where action is necessary to "resolve the most significant bottlenecks to inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth in developing countries, LICs [low income countries] in particular"(G20 2011b:12). Food security makes the list after infrastructure, human resource development, trade, private investment and job creation.

One interesting point of note is the shift from Washington (the US hegemon) to Seoul. This reflects a changing geopolitical relationship that is influencing contemporary neoliberalism. It illustrates the important role of emerging political and economic powers, especially across Asia. It is also another example of the neoliberal system of governance adapting to address global pressure without pursuing any structural change. What is also important here is the shift from the "roll back" mentality that dominated the 1990s and early 2000s and the evolution, still within a neoliberal paradigm, to a rollout approach to maintain hegemony within a new

economic reality. Neoliberalism, in its current form is thus not only a “political and ideological manifestation of economic structural change and public policy innovation at national level” but also a shifting “ideational driving force behind the politics of globalization” (Cerny 2010:129). The methodological challenge of uncovering neoliberalism in its various moments of actualization, failure, normalization and adaptation, is a geographical one, argues Peck (2010:33). It is, for Peck (2010:33-4) “a matter of determining the relational location of specific events, actors, and claims on the broader terrain of socioregulatory restructuring”. The result of this becomes a series of traverses and triangulated readings across shifting landscapes. But what does this mean for projects that are focussed at the global level? Cerny’s work on embedded neoliberalism addresses this, and will be discussed below. However, given Peck’s concerns, it is useful to reflect on neoliberalism less as a noun and more as a verb- the process of neoliberalization. Peck (2010:19) argues that process-focused definitions of neoliberalization are preferable to static and taxonomic renderings of neoliberalism, since the latter tend to rely too heavily on regime-like conceptions, bracketed in time and space”. “Neoliberalism” he continues, “defies explanation in terms of fixed coordinates”. Neoliberalization, in turn, refers to a contradictory process of market-like rule, principally negotiated at the boundaries of the state, and occupying the ideological space defined by a (broadly) sympathetic critique of nineteenth-century laissez-faire and deep antipathies to collectivism planned and socialized modes of government, especially those associated with Keynesianism and developmentalism (2010:20). Neoliberalism has evolved through processes of shape-shifting, and uneven open-ended mutations and cross-referential development (Peck 2010:30). As a process, neoliberalization encourages individuals to give their lives a specific capitalist form and by extension, policy makers to give their policies specific capitalist forms. Neoliberalism generalizes the scope of the economic order and in doing so, successfully generalizes social activity in relation to economy and evaluates all activity by way economic analysis or with respect to market concepts (Lemke 2001:198). The existing worlds of neoliberalism are “institutionally cluttered places marked by experimental-but-flawed systems of governance, cumulative problems of social fallout and serial market failure” (Peck 2010:31). Embedded neoliberalism-cum-liberalization provides a framework, or outlines the logic, with which these processes of global governance take place. This proves useful for starting to frame analysis into global food security governance.

2.4.2.Embedded Neoliberalism

For Philip Cerny (2010:128), the development of neoliberalism since the 1980s has led to a “complex, flexible, fungible and increasingly variegated set of discourses that have proved particularly useful to a diverse range of actors in a globalizing world”. Neoliberalism, in its current forms, represented not only a “political and ideological manifestation of economic structural change and public policy innovation at national level but also into the ideational driving force behind the politics of globalization” (Cerny 2010:129). To reflect the hegemonic

nature of neoliberalism, Cerny advances the concept of embedded neoliberalism. Processes of neoliberalization have become “embedded in twenty-first century institutional behavior, political processes, discourses and understandings of socioeconomic realities” (Cerny 2010:129). Through this processes of embedding, neoliberalism has become the “shared mental model” (Roy, Denzau, and Willett 2007) of the evolving art of governmentality (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991; Foucault 2008): the contemporary Gramscian “common sense” notion of what is expected and/or taken for granted.

Writing from a fascist prison between 1925 and 1935, Gramsci was broadly concerned with the problem of understanding capitalist societies and the possibility of creating alternative types of states or societies based on the working class. Of prime interest to Gramsci were: the state, relationships of civil society to the state, and relationships of politics, ethics and ideology production. Concerned by the economic determinism of Marx’s model, and informed by his own experiences, Gramsci (1971) developed a similar dialect to Marx, in so far as the interacting elements create a larger unity. But, Gramsci introduced social relations into the level of superstructure and articulated how these relations can reinforce or undermine the material basis. At the level of superstructure, key actors (the state and civil society) engage in spheres of authority. Gramsci introduces political, ethical and ideological spheres of activity into his model.¹⁸ The economic structure and coalitions at the level of the superstructure (social and political) form organic – implying long term – orders for Gramsci. The caretakers of this order are the dominant class who control the economy and permeate the state, thereby maintaining hegemony over civil society.

Hegemony is perhaps most commonly used to refer to the dominance of one group over another without the threat of force. However, in the current era of late capitalism, hegemony is increasingly understood as “organizing consent to the ruling relations of capitalism” (Carroll 2006:10). Hegemony, much like neoliberalism is a concept that has suffered from adjectival promiscuity. It is here used to describe an intricate and multifaceted process; a process that Canadian cultural historian Ian McKay (2005:61) likens to a dance; one in which the lead dancer manoeuvres the partner, gently coaxing the partner to glide, turn and dip in response to the leader. With practice, the partner’s actions, despite being controlled by the lead, begin to feel natural to the extent that they forget they are being led. By way of this process, the actions and language of the hegemonic group (the lead) are normalized and society (the partner) learns to follow to the extent to where followed actions are also normalized and feel natural and autonomous. Robert Cox (Cox 1993:63) uses a less subtle but equally effective metaphor to define hegemony: “Hegemony is like a pillow: it absorbs blows and sooner or later, the would be assailant will find it comfortable to rest upon.” The relational nature of hegemony recalls

¹⁸ Gramsci fails to account for environment in his model of spheres of activity. The inclusion of the environment into this approach could prove valuable for food policy research.

similarly relational nature of power and is fundamental to understanding embedded neoliberalism.

Embedded neoliberalism reflects not only an emerging neoliberal consensus developed “as market forces and transnational interpenetration constrain institutions and actors to behave in certain ways,” (Cerny 2010:148) but also a political construction, given shape in the everyday world by political actors and interest groups seeking political legitimacy. Central to this idea is the understanding that the “scope and significance of neoliberalism has been transformed not merely into the political and ideological manifestation of economic structural change and public policy innovation at national level, but also into the political driving force behind globalization itself” (Cerny 2010:3).

This is similar to what Emelie Peine and Philip McMichael (2005) have described as market rule; the act of states incorporating multilateral or bilateral protocols into national policy. This process is ideologically maintained by giving “primacy to increased investment, production and trade over social concerns,” and wherein “national and international spheres are represented as mutually exclusive categories in an attempt to “encourage domestic policies, such as farm subsidies, that artificially cheapen commodity process and ultimately serve agribusiness interests” (Peine and McMichael 2005; see also McMichael 2000; Duncan and Barling 2012).

The introduction of the idea of a “neoliberal era” advanced at the beginning of this section reflects the fact that contemporary social formations revolve around the leadership of a power structure that operates through the use of coercion and the organization of consent within a social formation. This process is by no means stable and is often the site of antagonism and resistance, as the example above suggests. A hegemonic arrangement within a population is thus in part achieved when a population comes to be dominated partly through its own consent. However, hegemony “cuts both ways” since the processes of organizing consent may also create opportunities for constructing counter-hegemonic movements and resistance (Carroll 1990:393). With respect to food security, many farming and food social movements actively and publically challenge the neoliberal logic that informs global institutional direction of national production and push localised peasant agricultural systems to compete in volatile global markets that do not favour smallholder producers. For example, in response to the G8’s proposal for a New Alliance on Food Security and Nutrition, which forwards strengthened partnerships with African governments and the private sector with an aim to increase food security, the leader of the West African Peasant and Food Producer’s Network, ROPPA (Le Réseau des organisations paysannes et de producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest), issued a letter to the leaders of African Union countries, which was then co-signed by fifteen farming groups across the continent. He wrote:

At the moment in which the President of the United States, acting in good faith I am sure, has decided to organize a Symposium on food security on 18-19 May 2012 in Washington on the eve of the G8 meeting in Camp David, I address myself to you, as President of the African Union, and through you to all of the African

Heads of State. I ask you to explain how you could possibly justify thinking that the food security and sovereignty of Africa could be secured through international cooperation outside of the policy frameworks formulated in an inclusive fashion with the peasants and the producers of the continent... I would simply like to recall that food security and sovereignty are the basis of our general development, as all of the African governments underline. It is a strategic challenge. This is why we must build our food policy on our own resources as is done in the other regions of the world. The G8 and the G20 can in no way be considered the appropriate fora for decisions of this nature (Cissokho 2012).

This critique builds on theme that has been developing throughout the course of the chapter: change. A major challenge of neoliberalism within late capitalism is that by virtue of being common-sense, resistance, while omnipresent, is easily thwarted, dismissed or reintegrated into the dominant model. An example of this is the shift of the organic food movement from a grassroots eco-health movement to a multinational industry now monitored and mediated by the agri-business players it originally worked to resist. Another example has already been mentioned above: increased engagement of civil society actors in global policy could serve to legitimise processes while providing a way for governments and the private sector to pass on/along key responsibilities.

First, it is important to note that within the framework of embedded neoliberalism, contemporary neoliberal logic at the global level embodies a structural tension left over from the Enlightenment era. Cerny (2010) identifies the two poles of this tension as institutional hierarchy and the liberal primacy of the individual. The former – the polity – involves a totalization of modern bureaucratic institutions, and the latter – the economic component – the individuation of people via capitalism. This individuation is expressed in part through the primacy of the individual and the role of personal consciousness. This tension is visible, for example, through liberal democracy which Chantal Mouffe (2000) explains has an inherently conflictual nature: the tension of democracy and liberalism.¹⁹ This individuation is expressed in part through the primacy of the individual and the role of personal consciousness, a process evident in the development of food security policy through a shift from global cooperation to increase production in the 1970s to a focus on individual and household livelihoods throughout the 1980s (Maxwell and Slater 2003; Maxwell 1996; Mechlem 2004; Sen 1981; Shaw 2007).

This process of authoritative direction and control at the global level is creatively managed by through the art of governmentality (Cerny 2010b). Thus, the dynamic process of governmentalization, managed through the art of governmentality results in systems of global governance which “include systems of rule at all levels of human activity—from the family to the international organization—in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has

¹⁹ Mouffe critiques deliberative democratic theory for their attempts to reconcile the liberal tradition with the democratic tradition, seeing this as an attempt to erase the tension in a way that leaves them unable to address the conflictual reality of democratic politics.

transnational repercussions” (Rosenau 1995:13). In this sense, global governance becomes less a process than a reference to the international superstructure of world politics (Cerny 2010:186). Finally, it is necessary to reflect on processes of transnational neopluralism. As Cerny (2010b:130) explains “[n]eoliberalism is proving to be eminently flexible and politically adaptable – a discourse that increasingly reflects the process of transnational neopluralism”. Correspondingly, an understanding of transnational neopluralism is fundamental to understanding how various actors have sought to reconstitute political authority in the wake of the 2007/8 food price spikes. This is true in so far as the changing architecture of global food security governance represents an increasingly dynamic transnational food security policy space wherein actors forward various, sometimes overlapping, perspectives on issues of trade, aid, nutrition, development, the right food, food sovereignty, research, aid and biological diversity to name but a few.

It is perhaps most logical to begin by defining neopluralism before returning to transnational. Building on Robert Dahl's (1961) model of pluralism which he developed from a study of a community power in Connecticut, U.S.A, neopluralism evolved notably through the study of American politics, adding new focus on “agenda building, the logic of collective action, special-interest subgovernments, social movements, advocacy coalitions, and the theory of political processes” (McFarland 2007:45). Neopluralism expects complexity in policy systems and as described above, this complexity is currently predominantly organized in such a way so as to give preferential status to economic interests, in line with understandings of neoliberal hegemony described above. As Cerny (2010b:3–4) notes, a neopluralist approach is concerned with the outcomes of various political processes involving a range of actors operating at all levels. Importantly, “these actors have very different levels and kinds of power resources, understandings of how to use that power, material interests, normative values, political projects and, of course, the determination to pursue their interest, values, and projects in a range of public and private arenas” (Cerny 2010b:4). These actors have competing as well as common interests and “they engage in processes of conflict, competition, and coalition building to pursue those interests”. This becomes a fundamental point for an inquiry into global food security policy wherein the actions of actors cannot be reduced to perceived or assumed ideologies but rather must be examined as nuanced actions embedded within their negotiations of complex political processes. Given that these processes take place within transnational spaces, for example across transgovernmental networks or through multilateral fora, for this research neopluralism is most appropriately understood to be transnational.

The concept of transnational relations has existed as long as international relations, yet the despite its frequent application, theorizing on the concept remains limited (van Apeldoorn 2004:142, Nöelke 2003). Within the context of globalizations, attempts to “reconstitute authority require states to cooperate with one another in ever increasing ways” (Coleman 2002:1). The interactions of these actors also contribute to the growth of “densely networked

transnational policy spaces” (Coleman 2002:1). ‘Architecture’ and ‘space’ are terms that build on the “epistemological position that borders and boundaries are variable and are being created and recreated in response to globalizing processes” (Coleman 2002:2). These spaces where the processes of global governance take place are transnational insofar as states come to engage and act in more coordinated ways where they pool sovereignty to achieve policy objectives. This is what Cerny (2010a) describes as a turn towards *raison du monde*, and corresponds to what Grande and Pauly (2005) refer to as the “transnational cooperation state,” and Cox (1987) calls the “internationalization of the state”. It is important to remember that within the contours of this architecture of global food security policy, understood as a transnational policy space where policy institutions are constructed and activation, there are multiple interactions involving networks of coalitions of actors (Tsing 2000:330). Neopluralism accepts these multiple interactions and seeks to uncover the structure of power and policy making with public policy (McFarland 2007).

A commonly advanced description of transnational relations defines them as “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or of an intergovernmental organization” (Risse-Kappen 1995:3). However, this definition advances an actor-centred approach, presenting the “actor” as an autonomous entity ignoring that the actor is embedded in, and constituted by, transnational structures (van Apeldoorn 2004: 148). This is an important point for this research, as what is of interest is elucidating the relations between actors: how actors are defined, and how they identify their roles and responsibilities, in relations to others.

Central to understanding transnational relations is recognizing the very multi-levelled nature of interactions: transnational actors operate at a level above the state, outside the state, and importantly across several national contexts simultaneously (and not, as the literature often suggests, outside of the context of territorial borders) (van Apeldoorn 2004: 145). Not unlike the term “global”, “transnational” does not constitute a level but is instead to be understood as a phenomenon that extends and links across different levels (van Apeldoorn 2004: 144). As such, the transnational includes “state, supra-state and sub-state in a multi-level conception which can also accommodate *non-territorial phenomena*” (Anderson 2002:16).

Applied to the architecture of global food security governance, we can see a transnational policy space emerge that is heavily mediated by international relations. Within this space, actors, engaged in transnational politics, introduce, define, context and redefine key issues related to their understandings of food security.

Coleman et al. (2004:140), theorizing the changing nature of agriculture amidst processes of globalization note that the transnational policy space in agriculture has come to be populated by various domestic, regional and global actors, the most important of which remains nation states. For Coleman et al. (2004), transnational spaces require the willingness of states to cooperate for governance to occur, which further requires that states have the capacity to engage in

cooperative policy making with other states (see also, Reinicke 1998). This is a guiding assumption of the Committee on World Food Security, as a United Nations committee that upholds the principle of one-country-one-vote. Indeed, as one Diplomat noted in an interview: “without Governments, the CFS is nothing” (Interview (UK Diplomat), Date withheld to protect anonymity, Rome), suggesting that despite the reform, which opened up the CFS to transnational actors (exemplified perhaps most obviously through the civil society mechanism), the CFS is dependent on the capacity of governments to take decisions and implement them and as such the legitimacy of the CFS remains tied to governmental buy-in.

Philip Cerny (2010) expands the notion of transnationalism by advancing the concept of transnational neopluralism. For Cerny (2010:106): “The central hypothesis entailed by the transnational neopluralist approach is that those actors who will be most effective at influencing and shaping politics and policy outcomes are those who possess the most transnationally interconnected resources, power, and influence in a globalizing world.” More specifically, Cerny identifies three matrices which lead to actors being influential in transnational processes: ideational, political-sociological, and institutional. Within an ideational matrix, actors “perceive and define their goals, interests and values in international, transnational, and translocal contexts”. The political-sociological matrix suggests the capacity to build cross-border networks, coalitions, and power bases among a range of potential allies and adversaries. Finally, the institutional matrix focuses on the ability to coordinate and organize “strategic action on a range of international, transnational, and translocal scales in such a way as to pursue transnational policy agendas and institutional bricolage” (Cerny 2012:106).

2.4.3. The State

Within the international superstructure of world politics, the nation-state remains “the central and predominant political organization of the modern era (Cerny 2010:167), despite processes of “hollowing out” (Jessop 1997) and longer-term efforts to privatize the public sphere (Lake 1999; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961). Neoliberalisation advances a more condensed and decentralized state and through this process of reorganization of the state a functioning contradiction has emerged: on one hand states have taken, on as a primary focus, international politicisation to advance a corporate transnational agendas and on the other, states have advanced the development of administrative techniques for population control through coercive measures and consent management.

With respect to this research, states play a significant role in so far as within the Committee on World Food Security, states are the decision-makers and are held accountable for the decisions made by the Committee. It is important to note that a state-centric approach is not being advanced herein, even though state-centric theory can be useful as a pragmatic tool and insofar as it can capture the systemic effects of international relations that may escape domestic theories (Lake 2008). Instead, an attempt is made to contextualise the contemporary state within the context of embedded neoliberalism.

The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933) is widely regarded as the classic legal definition of the state, identifying specific qualifications that states must possess, including a permanent population, a defined territory and a government capable of maintaining effective control over its territory and of conducting international relations with other states. Panitch (1977), writing about the role of the state in an industrial capitalist society, identified key functions to be: accumulation through the creation of conditions for profitable capital accumulation; legitimization by way of provisions of social harmony through programs such as supports that enhance the legitimacy of its activities in relation to accumulation; and coercion through programs and policies to reflect the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force to impose social order. Above all, and fraught with layers of complexity and the influence of multiple actors, the state is the primary site of governance for a territory — in the most inclusive sense — involving the provision of purpose, the regulatory agencies and the political processes by which various parties pursue their interests in that area (Dahlberg 2001). However, because of this role, the state is also a site of contestation between various actors (organized and fragmented) within its borders and organizations or power blocs (to borrow from Gramsci) that operate in and around it. For example, Busch and Bain (2004) observe that almost every government is surrounded by a cluster of agencies created to deal with food safety, animal and plant health, the environment and labour standards. These clusters of actors come to form arrangements which vary from one country to another but are often referred to as the “state complex”.²⁰ These arrangements have important implications for food security governance and in the way food security policy is negotiated at the global level.

2.5. Summary: Articulating a theoretical framework for food security policies

The theoretical framework advanced in this thesis is introduced here not as a hypothesis to be tested, nor as a final conclusion, but is instead presented as a way of approaching, making sense of, and therefore better understanding, processes encountered during the field work and across the literature. The theoretical framework does just as the label would suggest: it frames the analysis and provides the parameters and structure within which these processes can be elucidated. As such, it makes up the analytic toolbox that helps answer the research questions. This toolbox is comprised of component parts that come together around what Philip Cerny (2010), drawing heavily from Gramsci and Foucault, calls “embedded neoliberalism”.

To summarise, global governance literature provides insight into the organization of actors as well as a way of grouping the range of actions taken by these actors across different geo-political contexts. The literature flags issues that are likely to emerge as challenges within the

²⁰ Dahlberg (2001) provides a valuable account of how the evolution of the state complex in relation to the food systems. He argues that this transition has led to a decline in natural and cultural diversity and unsustainable growth that require a further transition to post-fossil fuels.

changing architecture of global food security governance, and the reformed Committee on World Food Security more specifically. In turn, the literature provides a baseline against which the reformed CFS can be assessed.

The literature also provides insight into an overarching trend pattern in world politics: “transnational neopluralism”, which is “driven by the competition of increasingly crosscutting, transnational interests” and “internalised through the new governmentality of *raison du monde*” (Cerny 2010b:8). These processes are guided by contested and changing norms of neoliberalism. The neoliberal narratives are built around market competition, downsizing, corporatization and privatization. Never static, neoliberalism as hegemonic undergoes constant reform but remains socially and institutionally embedded and thus continues to define the parameters of the political playing field.

Embedded neoliberalism is thus a framework that defines global governance processes by describing how the various formulations and enactments of the “neoliberal” come to form a boundary of sorts – rigid but not impermeable – within the context of a neoplural transnational space. Embedded neoliberalism makes space for the agency of actors, including those who resist and act against neoliberalism and push its boundaries from within and from outside. This is important for this research which is particularly concerned about the implications of the inclusion of civil society actors into CFS policy negotiations (see in particular Chapter 6).

However, recognising the importance of agency, especially in an effort to avoid the aforementioned tendency of global governance scholarship to de-politicise highly political processes, the hegemonic, or deeply embedded nature of neoliberalism restricts the agency of those promoting non-hegemonic action. Following Gramsci’s logic it is understood that constant contestation of the status quo results in elite actors making concessions that allow them to maintain power. Consider for example the rise in discourse about small-holders, gender- and nutrition-sensitive approaches, and sustainability, themes taken up in almost every policy document released in response to the food price crises. By incorporating these into the dominant definitions of food security, much of the resistance and opposition is appeased, effectively diffusing efforts to fundamentally shift the trajectory or logic of global food security policy.²¹ In practice, this means that many policy recommendations being advanced are in fact more often than not linked to the causes of the crisis (Holt-Giménez & Altieri, 2013:90). This is not surprising given that the discussions and negotiations for global food security policies take place in elite spaces that have developed in ways that serve to reinforce neoliberal objectives. One must then ask: does the CFS exist as an example of the counter-hegemonic action – the hegemony of hegemony – promoting change that will ultimately serve to reinforce neoliberal hegemony? Or, can the CFS emerge as a non-hegemonic actor, engaged in what Richard Day

²¹ This is a key example of why Richard Day (2005) claims that “Gramsci is dead”.

(2005) calls “affinity for affinity”: “non-universalizing, non-hierarchical, non-coercive relationships based on mutual aid and shared ethical commitments”?

3. Research Design and Methods

3.1. Introduction

This chapter introduces the methods used to conduct the research. The Chapter begins by reviewing the research questions originally introduced at the end of Chapter 1. Focus then moves to a review of the literature on research design, followed by an explanation of the specific research design employed for this project. A summary of the data collection process, with reflection on the scope of the research project, is then provided. The case study as a method is then reviewed and rationalised as a relevant and useful approach. Here, the three case studies into the activities and operations of the CFS (Chapters 6-8) are discussed and a rationale is provided for their selection. This is followed by a review of the methods employed for desk research, including the way in which documents were identified and selected for in-depth analysis. Finally, a description of the ethnographic approach to field work – notably participant observation and interviews – is provided followed by a reflection of relevant ethical considerations.

3.2. Research Questions

This research is concerned with understanding how the Committee on World Food Security is reorganising to meet its reform objectives and how it is situated within a changing transnational policy space. Given the potential of the CFS and the challenges it faces, the following research questions were proposed:

RQ1: To what extent is the reformed CFS realising its reform objectives?

RQ2. Who are the main actors and what are the dominant initiatives within the changing architecture of food security governance?

RQ3. How does the CFS relate to the changing architecture of global food security governance and what are the impacts?

RQ4. How do these findings contribute to the literature on, and understandings of, global governance and global food security governance?

In what follows the research design is introduced. From there, methods employed for data collection are presented with a description of the research process.

3.3. Research Design

Research design is a structure of inquiry that “deals with a logical problem and not a logistical problem” (Yin 1989:29). The purpose of the research design is to provide a structure to develop and appropriately answer research questions. This research project was designed around somewhat chronological but certainly fluid and overlapping phases (see Figure 11). A summary of the process will be provided followed by a more detailed review of each step.




Figure 12: Research Process (Duncan 2013)

The first phase in the research design identified the problem. As articulated in Chapter 1, the architecture of food security governance was changing rapidly in response to the food price spikes of 2007-8. Amidst the restructuring, the reformed Committee on World Food Security emerged as a key player engaged in innovative practices and was thus selected as the focus of the research. The reformed Committee on World Food Security had been given the mandate of being the foremost platform for discussion on food security policy at the global level and the reform presented potentially important implications for global food security policy and global governance theory more broadly.

As outlined in Chapter 2, literature on global governance and embedded neoliberalism informed the development of the theoretical framework which served to structure the research and

provided tools to make sense of what was being observed. Appropriate research methods were then identified. The Committee on World Food Security made for a good case study and data was collected through ethnographic approaches, notably participant observation and interviews. This was supported by desk research. These methods are described in greater detail below. With the problem, scope, and methodologies identified, research questions were finalised (listed below, as well as at the end of Chapter 1).

Given that food security emerged as a dominant policy frame through which the food crisis was addressed, it was deemed important to historicise the evolution of global food security policy discourse. The review (presented in Chapter 4) examined the trajectory of food security policy, understanding that food security policy is complex, discursive and contested.

Four research questions were eventually identified. It was deemed important not just to understand how the CFS was operating and achieving its reform objectives but also how the Committee was situated within a broader transnational space. The CFS was positioned within the contemporary transnational architecture of global food security governance (Chapter 4) and then focus turned to examining the evolution and reform process (Chapter 5). This was followed by three case studies (Chapters 6-8) selected to illustrate not only how the reformed CFS works in practice, but also to provide insight into how key aspects of the reform – mainly participation, policy guidance, and policy cohesion – were being addressed.

3.4. Data Collection

Figure 12 provides a chronology of the data collection and research process. It highlights the overlapping nature of the phased approach and notes relevant outputs from the various phases of the research.

3.4.1. Scope of Research

Before starting the process of data collection the scope of the research was defined to ensure that the research questions would be addressed, and that the research remained contained and focused. Given the research questions, time frame, and resources available, focus was placed on collecting data related to Committee on World Food Security, extending to the broader transnational space within which the CFS operates. The time period for field work was October 2010 to October 2012. This period covers the first Session of the reformed CFS (36) through two more Sessions (37, 39) and an extra-ordinary Session (38) in May 2012 to endorse the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security. The research and resulting analysis provides insight – a snap shot of sorts – into a watershed period in the organizing of global food security governance.

Phase	Time Frame	Desk Research	Field Work	Output
- ID Problem - ID Data Sources - Data Collection - ID Methods	Oct-Dec 2010	- International Relations - Global Governance - Development - Reports on Food Security (post crisis) - CFS documentation - Methods	- Civil Society Consultation CFS 36 - GGWP	- Peoples' Food Policy - IFAD report on GGWP - ILC- policy briefs - VSF- global governance and food sovereignty
- ID Problem - ID Theory - Data Collection	Jan-Sept 2011	- Participation - Deliberative Democracy - CFS documentation - Food security, hunger (history) - Embedded neoliberalism	- GSF Draft 1 - Coordination Committee meeting - Indigenous Terra Madre	- ESRS Presentation - Ubuntu Forum on GG and Food Democracy
- ID Methods - Data Collection - Analysis	Oct-Dec 2011	- Methods - Rights literature - Framework Analysis	- Civil Society Forum - CFS 37	
- Data Collection - Analysis	Jan-Sept 2012	- Theory cont. - Methods cont.	- CSO WG VG - CFS Negotiations on VGs - CSO WG GSF - CFS Consultation on GSF	- IJSF Article - Global Studies Presentation - RGS Presentation - Transfer doc - Questions finalized
- Data Collection - Refine methodology - Analysis	Oct 2012-Oct 2013	- Finalise data collection - Analysis	- CSO consultation - CFS 39 - Relevant meetings	- Multiple public presentations - Academic papers - Food Chains article - Thesis

Figure 13: Chronological Summary of Research Process (Duncan 2013)

3.4.2. Case Studies

Robert K. Yin (1989:23) defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that uses multiple sources of evidence to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context where the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not necessarily evident. Following from this description, a case study approach was deemed appropriate for organizing data collection and analysis while ensuring that the research questions were addressed.

The case study, originally championed by Sigmund Freud, is commonly used in anthropology, economics, psychology, sociology. Broadly defined, a case study is an “in-depth, multifaceted

investigation using qualitative research methods of a single phenomenon” (Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg 1991:2). A case study presents data and a description regarding a single event and can employ a combination of research methods including literature review, discourse analysis, questionnaires, interviews and observation. These studies have the advantage of being drawn from, and thus applicable to, contemporary, complex real-world situations and provide insight into specific events.

A wealth of literature provides a strong defence against now antiquated critiques of case studies as being unconnected, atheoretical, untranslatable, and ideographic (Flyvbjerg 2006; Orum et al. 1991; Yin 1989). Case studies “follow an increasingly standardized and rigorous set of prescriptions and have, together with statistical and formal work, contributed to cumulatively improving understandings of world politics” (Bennett and Elman 2007:170). Flyvbjerg (2006) defends the generalizability of case studies. However, with respect to this research, while there may be opportunities to contribute to wider debates on global governance and participation, the aim is not to reproduce generalizable results but rather to provide a clear explanation and analysis of the reformed Committee on World Food Security in the first three years of post-reform operation and within the context of a shifting architecture of global food security governance. This research cannot be replicated given that the majority of data is collected through participant observation, which is by definition subjective. However, the reliability of the method can be enhanced through the detailed use of case study protocol (Yin 2004). These processes create ways of making as many steps in the research process as operational as possible.

In his authoritative book on case study research Robert Yin (1994) identifies four major types of designs for case studies. The four types are presented in pair categories: single-case and multiple-case design; and, holistic and embedded. The latter pair can occur in combination with either of the first pair. This research employs a single-case embedded approach with the CFS making up the main unit of analysis. Yin (1994:44) explains that the single-case study design is most justified when a case represents a critical test of existing theory, where the case is a unique event, or where the case serves as a revelatory purpose. A central step in designing case study research is to define the unit of analysis. Yin (1994:22) provides a general definition of a unit of analysis as being “related to the way the initial research questions have been defined”. For this research the inquiry focuses on a unique event: the reform of the CFS sparked by a turning point in global food security governance. The CFS is thus the unit of analysis. The CFS as case study serves to not only test existing theories of global governance and embedded neoliberalism but also has a revelatory purpose insofar as it documents and analyses the workings and changes of a key food security organ during an important moment in the evolution of global food security governance. Yin (1994:24) also recommends that the research design contain specific boundaries to define the beginning and end of the case. As noted above, the research is focused

on the time from the first session of the reformed CFS (36th Session, 2010) to the end of the 39th Session of the CFS (2012).

In a single-case study the addition of subunits can add significant opportunities for extensive analysis and serve to enhance insights into the single case. Attention needs to be paid to ensuring that research into the subunits does not shift the orientation of the research away from the main case. In this research, there are three specific subunits: the Civil Society Mechanism; the Voluntary Guidelines of the Responsible Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security; and, the Global Strategic Framework. For the purpose of clarity, the sub-units of analysis will be referred to as case studies in their own right, but are developed with the intention of supporting the main case study: the operation of the reformed CFS.

For this research, each subunit case study seeks to:

1. Define the relation to the problem and the research questions;
2. Articulate the processes involved;
3. Examine the instruments and interventions that were proposed and discussed with consideration of the themes and actors that were included and excluded;
4. Identify the range of positions in terms of defining the issues and proposing the instruments;
5. Identify where decision-making authority was located;
6. Identify policies, mechanisms and actions along with who is responsible for enacting, monitoring and assessing them; and,
7. If possible and appropriate, map the implementation.

Analysis and comparison of the case studies will provide a better understanding of the capacity and authority of the CFS, as well as the relations of power therein, and help answer the research questions. What follows is a short introduction to and rationale of the selection of the case studies.

International Civil Society Mechanism for Food Security and Nutrition (CSM)

Central to the CFS's claims for legitimacy in the new architecture of global food security governance is the inclusion of multiple stakeholders, including civil society organizations, as official participants. Thus, evaluating participation is central to accessing the capacity and success of the CFS. Moreover, the CFS offers unique insight into how civil society organizations, traditionally on the periphery of policy making, are organising themselves to shift towards the centre.

The Reform Document of the CFS states:

“Civil society organizations/NGOs and their networks will be invited to autonomously establish a global mechanism for food security and nutrition which will function as a facilitating body for CSO/NGOs consultation and participation in the CFS. Such mechanisms will also serve inter-sessional global, regional and national actions in which organizations of those sectors of the population most

affected by food insecurity, would be accorded priority representation. Civil society organizations/NGOs will submit to the CFS Bureau a proposal regarding how they intend to organize their participation in the CFS in a way that ensures broad and balanced participation by regions and types of organizations keeping in mind the principles approved by the CFS at its Thirty-Fourth Session in October 2008 (CFS: 2008/5; CL 135/10: paragraph 15).” (CFS2009/2Rev.2, para 16).

A Civil Society Mechanism was developed to coordinate the autonomous participation of civil society actors and to facilitate communication amongst them. The mechanism is novel not only in so far as it has managed to bring together a broad range of perspectives from across constituencies and regions but also as it can be replicated at the regional and national level and across issues.

Understanding the CSM is central to this thesis. First and foremost, from a methodological perspective, participant observation was situated within, and often in solidarity with, their field of relations. Therefore observation and analysis has been facilitated and also influenced and informed by these actors. Secondly, the CSM has emerged as an innovative mechanism for coordinate civil society actors and is now widely being considered for other for a across the UN. Finally, the successful inclusion of CSOs as participants in the Committee on World Food Security is now a best practice in global governance with other agencies and organizations looking to it for guidance.

Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGTs)

The governance of tenure is a crucial factor in determining rights and associated duties to use and control land, fisheries and forests and fundamental to food security. Many tenure problems arise as a result of weak governance which in turn adversely affects social stability, sustainable resource use and the economy. The FAO began the process of developing voluntary guidelines for land tenure after receiving several requests for policy support from member countries. The process, which began before the reform of the CFS, was diverted through the CFS after a decision made at the 36th Session. During the policy roundtable on Land Tenure and International Investment in Agriculture, it was decided that:

26. The Committee:

i) encouraged the continuation of the inclusive process for the development of the Voluntary Guidelines (Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land and Other Natural Resources – VG) building on existing regional processes with a view to submitting the guidelines for the consideration of the 37th session of CFS and decided to establish an open-ended working group of the CFS to review the first draft of the voluntary guidelines (CFS:2010/Final Report).

The negotiations did not conclude in advance of the 37th session, and so an additional session was added in March 2012, where negotiations did conclude and a special Session (38th) of the CFS in May 2012 for member states to endorse the VGGTs.

The VGGTs are inarguably the most influential and important outcome of the reformed CFS which in and of itself make them worthy of study. However, the process of negotiations also provides insight into the workings of the Committee. When the VGGTs were conceived by the

FAO, staff assumed the guidelines would be a technical document aimed at policy makers and field workers. By bringing them into the CFS, the nature of the guidelines shifted from a technical process to a political one and correspondingly, influence and interest of stakeholders increased. A major rationale for negotiating the guidelines in the CFS was to give them this additional level of influence and standing. An analysis of the negotiation process and the outcomes serve to illustrate the effective and beneficial role of participative and consultative processes but also highlight continued efforts by specific governments to undermine the process.

Global Strategic Framework

In part II of the CFS reform document, under Vision and Role, it states that the CFS will:

- iii) Develop a Global Strategic Framework for food security and nutrition in order to improve coordination and guide synchronized action by a wide range of stakeholders. The Global Strategic Framework will be flexible so that it can be adjusted as priorities change. It will build upon existing frameworks such as the UN's Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA), the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), and the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security (CFS:2009/2 Rev.2: 2.B.6.iii).

The GSF is intended acts as a single reference of core priorities for food security and nutrition by drawing on existing frameworks and the decisions of the CFS.

The development of the GSF was fundamental to the CFS advancing its goals of increased policy coordination and cohesion. Analysis of the negotiation of the GSF and of the first version of the document illustrates the comprehensive outputs derived from CFS policy processes, in turn illustrating the value of the reformed Committee. The case study also highlights points of tension and opposition that continue to block progress on stronger and more coordinated food security policies.

3.4.3.Desk Research

Understanding the operations of the CFS during the initial post-reform years is instructive, however the utility of such an analysis is limited if it cannot be understood within the broader context of global governance within which it operates and from which it has emerged. This has been addressed through a review of the evolution of global food security policy presented in Chapter 4. Here, the changing architecture of food security policy and governance after the food price spikes is mapped out.

The research involved a detailed literature review and data collection from public documents, reports and websites. Relevant documents were collected and analysed over the course of the data collection period. Central to this process was setting up Google Alerts for “food security” and “the Committee on World Food Security”. Google Alerts are email updates of the latest relevant Google results (web, news, etc.) based on desired queries. The programme provides a daily monitor of activity related to the key words. Participation in relevant listservs also proved fundamental for ensuring that all relevant processes and documents were considered while

adding a useful opportunity to cross-reference analysis and to learn what civil society organizations were primarily concerned with. Relevant lists were coordinated by organizations such as the UK Food Group, the Civil Society Mechanism (including various working groups), NGO including Oxfam, Save the Children, Action Aid, War on Want, Sustain and World Development Movement), and research institutes (for example, Overseas Development Institute, Institute for International Economic Policy, and Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy). Frequent visits to the media and communication pages on the websites of the Rome-based agencies, the G8, G20, African Union, and the World Bank were also key. Finally, to ensure that all relevant documents were collected, lists were cross-referenced with literature emerging on the new structure of global food security governance (Cohen and Clapp 2009; Holt-Giménez and Altieri 2013; McKeon 2011; De Schutter 2012; Wise and Murphy 2012).

Given the broad scope of the emerging architecture of global food security governance, parameters were established to manage the data. The parameters included consideration of meetings, documents, organizations and institutions that:

- Sought to address food security, not simply analyse the crisis but advance policy recommendations;
- Responded to the food security situation post- food price spikes;
- Contributed to broader (extra-organizational) food security policy debate;
- Were multilateral in nature;
- Included multiple stakeholders; and
- Were global in scope in so far as an effort was made to address or influence issues of international policy cohesion or international policy initiatives.

Appendix 1 provides a complete list of documents included in the analysis and illustrates how the criteria were applied. Figure 13 summarises the policy documents that came to form the core of the analysis of the policy mapping.

Actor		Policy/Framework
1	UN High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis	Updated Comprehensive Framework for Action (UCFA)
2	World Bank Group	Agriculture Action Plan: FY2010-1
3	G8	L'Aquila Joint Statement on Food Security
4	G20/WB + poorest countries	Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) Framework
5	FAO	Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security Principles
6	G20	Multi-Year Action Plan on Development: Food Security
7	CFS	Global Strategic Framework

Figure 14: List of policy documents that make up the focus of the analysis (Duncan 2013)

Within this research, the CFS and CFS-related activities were the primary site of inquiry, meaning that all CFS documents and CFS meetings became key sites for data collection. Moreover, events organised around the CFS, such as meetings of the International Civil Society Mechanism for Food Security and Nutrition for the CFS, and documents referencing or meant to influence the CFS were also included in the data set. Understandably, it was not possible to attend every meeting, but every effort was made to get the notes and reports of meetings that were missed.

3.5. Field Work

Fieldwork is contextual, relational, embodied and politicised (Sultana 2007:383). The field presents a context of “multiple axes of difference, inequalities, and geopolitics, where ethics and politics involved in research across boundaries and scales need to be heeded and negotiated to achieve more ethical research practices” (Sultana 2007:374). Sultana (2007:375) argues that “ethical research is produced through negotiated spaces and practices of reflexivity that is critical about issues of positionality and power relations at multiple scales”. It is important to recognise that the “field” is not an objective place but rather a site of reciprocal and contested relationships (Domosh 2003). The field is a site where actors co-construct meaning through various forms of interaction. These meanings are not static: they are continuously constructed, reconstructed, deconstructed, and enacted through interactions (or lack of thereof). It is important not to assume that shared experience results in shared meaning.

There are almost inevitable tensions and contradictions between academic and non-academic realms, especially with respect to voice, authority and representation (Nagar and Ali 2003; Ortner 1995; Spivak 1988). Conducting international fieldwork necessitates “being attentive to histories of colonialism, development, globalization, and local realities, to avoid exploitative research or perpetuations of relations of domination and control (Sultana 2007:375). Central to the process is deep self-reflection on the part of the researcher. Following many feminist and critical scholars, in this research there was a great deal of reflection on how the identity of the researcher intersect with institutional, geopolitical and materials aspects of their positionality (Nagar and Ali 2003). During the field work the researcher was an insider, an outsider, both and neither, and sometimes two or more simultaneously. This is by no means a unique experience (Gilbert 1994; Mullings 1999; Sultana 2007), which is not to suggest that frequency erases complexity.

The Committee on World Food Security represents the dominant field and sites where data were collected included: CFS session and inter-session activities; meetings with delegates, technical staff, civil society organizations and the private sector; discussions and consultations; gatherings on farms in rural India; strategy meeting in convents in Rome; and, discussions in the halls of Parliament in London.

The majority of the participation observation took place within fields of relations defined by the Civil Society Mechanism. Correspondingly, the perspective taken up in this research is often informed by position of civil society organizations. For ontological reasons, the research and analysis is also often aligned with these actors. In this respect, this research takes up the spirit of solidarity research which understands that social movements produce knowledge and that they are conducive sites to privilege meaning-making as their activities foreground resistance to dominant norms and institutions (Kurzman 2008). Taking on this standpoint raises greater possibilities of alternative world-views which challenges those engaged to rethink hegemonic meanings which are by definition often taken for granted. Undertaking solidarity research does not restrict the ability to critically engage with the ideas of civil society but it does commit to producing knowledge that is relevant to their struggle (including critiques) but that does not harm or undermine them. Alongside a commitment to informants, understanding the influence of civil society organizations as new participants in the Committee on World Food Security is central to the CFS's innovative model of governance and claims to legitimacy. As Tsolidis (2008:271) reminds us, "it is the ethnographer's responsibility to account for their situationality and authorial power through reflexive [and we can add, positional] research practices."

3.5.1. Participant Observation

Participant observation revolves around what James Clifford (1997:56) refers to as "deep hanging out" and forms a critical part of ethnographic research (Atkinson and Hammerslet 1998). It is a learning phenomenon that "literally entails observing through participating such that the self becomes the primary research tool" (Evans 2012:3). The aim is to gain insight into different ways of experiencing the world and to question what is taken for granted or assumed to be common sense. Within the research context, participation demands that the researcher develop situational and material expertise through doing, which leads to a better understanding of existing social relations. This is key as the emerging architecture of global food security governance, and the reformed CFS more specifically, is constructed through meaning-making interactions (Kurzman 2008) between actors uniquely situated in and across multiple contexts. Understanding this architecture in many ways necessitates participating in it and becoming a "knowing member of the community" (Blommestein 2006:22 as cited in Brockmann 2011:232). However, it is important not to assume that shared experience results in shared meaning. As Brockman (2011:232) explains, participant observation provides the basis for "co-constructing meaning through dyadic relationships" but the meanings that are constructed are not static. Following the same logic of hegemony described in Chapter 2, they are instead continuously constructed, reconstructed, deconstructed, and enacted through interactions (or lack of thereof). Participant observation approaches inquiry through various sites (geographic, social, and electronic) often at the junction of complex sets of intersecting situations where various kinds of interactions take place. This comprises the field. Of interest to the ethnographer is not only capturing the constant unfolding of social interactions across the field or fields, but more

importantly, the significance and meaning of it (Evans 2012:3). Towards this end, researchers entering the field usually do so with a set of initial questions: what is happening? Who is involved? What counts as competency? Who are the experts? Who is excluded from action and why? How is the boundary on participation maintained? Who contests what counts as participation and what is the consequence of resistance? Who are the novices? What are the spatio-temporal arrangements/limits of the interactions? How are social relations organized and structured through this practice? What cultural values and ethical dispositions emerge from the practice? What are the tensions and conflicts? How can I take part? (Evans 2012:4).

As such, the process can involve a great deal of uncertainty and the research plan is often shaped and reshaped as the researcher progresses through their fieldwork. Indeed, access to particular sites, unwillingness of research subjects to discuss specific topics, along with unpredicted events and developments, provide unforeseen but often insightful and compelling windows onto unfamiliar territory. At times, the demands of participation can leave little time for proper note-taking and/or reflection or can pull the research in directions that steer them away from their research questions. However, the advantages of this approach are that when done well, researcher can begin to see the world from new standpoints as they start to experience what the group experiences. This in turn provides rich and nuanced empirical accounts of social and political processes.

Date	What	Where
October 2010	Civil Society Consultation	Rome, Italy (IFAD)
October 2010	36th CFS	Rome, Italy (FAO)
November 2010	Global Gathering of Women Pastoralists	Mera, India
May 22-25, 2011	CC Meeting Cordoba	Cordoba, Spain
September 2011	GSF Meeting (with emails from Working Group)	Rome, Italy
October 15-16 2011	CSM Consultation	Rome, Italy (IFAD)
October 17-22 2011	37th CSM	Rome, Italy (FAO)
March 3-4, 2012	CSM WG on VG	Rome, Italy
March 5-9 2012	VG Negotiations	Rome, Italy (FAO)
March 26, 2012	EU Commission Meeting on Policy Coherence for Development	London, UK
March 27, 2012	UK Food Group Meeting	London, UK
March 29-30, 2012	FAO Expert Meeting on VG in Academia	London, UK
June 25-26, 2012	CSM WG on GSF	Rome, Italy
June 27-29, 2012	GSF Consultation	Rome, Italy (FAO)
October 12-14, 2012	CSM Consultation	Rome, Italy
October 15-21, 2012	38th CFS	Rome, Italy (FAO)
*June 8-10, 2013	Policies Against Hunger: Land Ahead	Berlin, Germany
October 2010-October 2013	Listserves, websites, mailing lists, personal correspondence	Global

Figure 15: Record of participant observation (Duncan 2013)

Gillian Evans (2012) presents a number of key questions to take into consideration when approaching participant observation. Before starting the research, each of these questions was considered in the context of the research. The results of the process are reflected in Appendix 2. As noted above, the field work took place from October 2010 to October 2012, spanning the first session of the reformed CFS (37th) through two more sessions and an extra-ordinary session (39th) in May 2012 to endorse the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security. The fieldwork provides empirical evidence of a moment of transition in the ordering of food security policy at the global level and a window into the reform and functioning of the CFS.

During the field work, extensive notes were taken. The notes focused on what was happening, what was being said, and what linkages or tensions existed, both explicitly and implicitly. Notes were collected in a series of fifteen labelled notebooks as well as in numerous word documents. As noted above, initial access to the field was gained through the Civil Society Mechanism. Note taking was exchanged for access, and served to build trust. While taking notes, if something was noted as interesting or useful, it would be noted in capital letters in the draft of the notes. The annotated copy would be saved in a field work file and a “clean” copy would be sent to the Secretariat. This process provided an opportunity to review the notes immediately after the meetings and to include additional reflections. After the meetings, reflections on the events would be summarised in the field work notebooks. These notes came to form a major part of the data for this research. A summary of field sites is provided in Figure 14.

3.5.2. Interviews

In ethnographic research, participant observation is normally coupled with interviewing. This research project used semi-structured interviews with a purposive sample of key informants including actors working with relevant social movements and NGOs, policy makers and negotiators as well as technical staff linked to the Committee on World Food Security and other multilateral organizations.

Generally, the interviews functioned to clarify or answer questions about how the CFS works in its reformed capacity along with the challenges and opportunities it faces. The interviews also provided a deeper understanding of how actors understood the reformed CFS and the changing architecture of food security governance by providing alternative and/or new accounts and insights into the activities of various key actors and their roles across policy spaces. Data collected through these interviews supplemented the desk research and participant observation and shed light on the tensions, opportunities and challenges for the CFS in the architecture of global food security governance.

The interview style allowed for a conversational discussion concerning the issues surrounding the reformed Committee on World Food Security. The majority of these interviews were done in person, with follow-up by email, phone, Skype or face-to-face. Participants were given consent forms to read and sign before the interviews. Some of the interviews were recorded and

the transcripts were included as part of the data set. Transcripts of the interview were sent to the participant for review. In cases where the interviews were not recorded notes from the interview were sent.

Interviews were purposive and individuals were selected identifying on the basis of having important insights and/or perspectives that could enhance or shed light on what was being observed solicited. Interviews were solicited in a cold-call fashion which involved the researcher approaching potential informants at the meetings with a request for an interview. When possible, gatekeepers or interlocutors were used to provide introductions and vouch for the legitimacy of the project. Often contact information was exchanged at the first meeting and later a date and time for the interview was set. Given the rather small population active in the CSM, the researcher was known, at least by sight, to most of the individuals approached for interviews. Not everyone who was approached agreed to be interviewed. Notably, representatives from Latin America and Asian member countries, and to a lesser extent African member states would often initially agree to interviews and then not come to the interview or would agree in principle and then never reply to follow-up requests. There are also issues related to language barriers, and lack of availability due to the fact that these missions tend to be small placing time pressure on representatives and general unwillingness. This helps to explain the EU bias in the sample. Another reason for the EU bias is that in the first few years of the reformed CFS, the most active member states tended to be from wealthier nations, although this is changing. Given that the aim of the interviews are to provide additional insights, especially into activities where access was more limited, the interviews were not meant to be geographically representative or necessarily equally distributed across key actor sets. For example, proximity and engagement with civil society resulted in greater awareness and understanding of their positions and therefore less need to interview. At the same time, this greater engagement with CSOs meant that they were over-represented in analysis (see Appendix 3). Having described the methods for collection data, attention now turns to how the data was analysed.

3.5.3. Inclusion of Interviews and Field Work in the Thesis

Research Ethics' protocols ensured the anonymity of all research participants. The identities of all informants have been concealed to maintain anonymity. A summary of the titles attributed to participants as well as breakdowns of participant categories are listed in Appendix 3.

At first glance, CSOs appear over represented in terms of what was actually included in the thesis. However, this speaks to not only the diversity across CSOs but it is also illustrative of the positionality taken up during participant observation. Furthermore, given that a key aspect of the CFS's reform was the inclusion of CSOs, understanding their engagement is central to answering the research questions. Reflecting on the regional breakdown of who was included in the thesis, the EU bias remains. The reasons listed above hold true here as well. Furthermore, most field work took place in Europe. Within the Civil Society Mechanism, the majority of

leaders were European. These individuals thus had the insights and experiences that needed to be captured in the thesis. At the same time, for linguistic and cultural reasons, their interventions were admittedly easier to take note of and conformed more easily to a western and academic thought process. As explored in the Civil Society Mechanism Sub-Case Study, understanding social movement and their interjections requires a level of cultural fluency and sensitivity. This developed over the course of the field work and with greater engagement with social movements but remains a challenge and limitation. It is important to reiterate that while these figures do not represent the entirety of the data analysed, it only reflects quotes that are attributed to individuals within the thesis.

With respect to gender breakdown, it is also perhaps not surprising that men outnumber women. This reflects the reality that the CFS remains a forum that is predominantly male, both in terms of leadership but also in terms of member state representatives. This is not to suggest that women are not present or are inactive, they are just less represented. Similarly, within the field work, focus was placed on financial issues which tend to be dominated by men, in lieu of gender and nutrition, areas which tend see more female engagement. This again helps explain the over representation of men in the final selection. The results of the sample of participants explicitly used in the thesis continues to reflect the composition of both the Committee on World Food Security and the Civil Society Mechanism, at least in terms of leadership and participation. It is however important to note that this is changing.

Finally, much of the field work took place in public settings, including open meetings and Committee on World Food Security Sessions. Both the Committee on World Food Security and the Civil Society Mechanism accredit observers, including researchers and in both cases participants are made aware of their presence. During the field work, notes were kept detailing the specific engagements and interactions of country representatives and other CFS participants. Given the public nature of the meetings, and the democratic and analytic implications of interventions made by representatives of member states, a decision was made to attribute statements to country representatives. This is important in so far as it helps to map out the geographic alliances and tensions that exist within and across the reformed CFS.

3.6. Ethics

The commitments and processes outlined within the ethics proposal have been upheld. With respect to issues of consent, especially during participant observation, efforts were made to ensure that the participants were aware of my identity and purpose among the group through one-on-one interactions, name tags/badges and announcements. Participants were made aware that any of our interactions may constitute some form of data. Permission to participate as a researcher was always requested from the group leaders or spokespersons. They would then announce my identity, purpose and method. All participants have remained anonymous with the exception of quotes taken from public meetings where the participant was acting in an official

capacity and addressing a public audience. With regards to the interviews, and when acceptable to the participant, interviews were recorded and transcribed and all identifying information removed. Informed consent was obtained from interviewees (see Appendix 4 and Appendix 5). While engaging in participant observation every effort was made to recognise the wide range of relationships that exist between and within the study population, such as power and educational differences as well as degrees of formality. This was particularly important when moving from civil society meetings to more formal diplomatic or UN meetings. Power differentials based on class, gender and health, religion, among others, required a great degree of sensitivity. There was also awareness of the need for constant reflection on the changing role and relationship of the researcher within these various settings to avoid ethical issues.

Throughout the research process, every effort was made to remain conscious of the variety of roles and statuses held by researchers, with particular sensitivity paid to differences in age, gender, class, health, culture, religion that may raise ethical issues during the course of observation. The primary consideration, when undertaking field work and writing up the analysis, was to respect the primary ethical obligation to the people being studied and potentially affected by the study.

The issue of the importance of protecting the research participants was not taken lightly. To date, at least three people involved in the research have received death threats in their home countries as a result of their activism and work (with absolutely no relation to their involvement in this research). Others live in exile from their countries. Interestingly, the networks within which my participation was predominantly situated were used to protect people at risk. For example, the Civil Society Mechanism networks were used to try to raise awareness of death threats made to Herman Kumara, a leader in the World Forum of Fisher People (WFFP). On March 1, 2012, the Secretariat of the Civil Society Mechanism sent out an email with the subject “Please show your support for our friend Herman Kumara”. The email read:

Dear All,

Please circulate the attached urgent appeal that was sent to the Asia Human Rights Commission, after Herman Kumara, fisherfolk leader (WFFP) received death threats after helping fellow fisherfolk in protest against the rising fuel prices in Sri Lanka.

Suggested action: You will find a sample letter in the attached appeal, please send this letter to the intended recipients (contact details also in the appeal) to show your support.

You can also view an article that was published in the BBC here: http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2012/02/120226_herman_hiding.shtm

In solidarity,

The Secretariat International Food Security and Nutrition Civil Society Mechanism

This example serves to highlight not only the very real risks involved in such research but also as the strengths of such networks. It is also a sober reminder that many actors who participate in

the CFS often do so at great risk to themselves. Despite the often safe and sterile environment of the FAO and the UN, the local struggles waged around issues of food security have potentially serious consequences and nothing in this research should compromise the safety of these actors.

4. Evolution of Global Food Security Policy

4.1. Introduction

Food security is a complex, contentious, contested and politically loaded term whose usefulness as a policy approach has been called into question (Devereux and Maxwell 2001; Maxwell and Slater 2003; Shaw 2007). In spite of this, or perhaps despite it, food security, in all its forms and limitations, remains the primary frame through which hunger and nutrition are defined and addressed at the level of international policy making.

What ensues in this chapter, and the proceeding four chapters, reports on what was uncovered using the methods set out in Chapter 3. In this chapter, the evolution of food security policy is considered. Building on the theoretical framework (see Chapter 2), this chapter begins with a review of the literature on shifts in discourses of food security. Focus then turns to an analysis of the evolution of global food security policy. Here, major events and policy approaches related to food security are traced through to the World Food Summit in 1996 where the “gold standard” definition of food security was intergovernmentally negotiated and adopted. Particular focus is placed on the evolution of food security as discourse and the factors that prompted changes to status quo understandings. Finally, global food security policy in a post-2008 world is reviewed, building on the chronology of international reactions outlined in Chapter 1. Chapter 5 introduces the Committee on World Food Security, exploring the evolution of the CFS through to its reform. Here, the reform objectives are identified. Following from this, three cases studies are presented, each providing insight into the operationalization of one of the CFS’s key reform objectives. The results and implications of the research are summarised in Chapters 9 and 10.

4.2. Shifts in Food Security

Since its introduction at the World Food Conference of 1974, the concept of food security has evolved, multiplied, diversified and left us with a term that now represents “a cornucopia of ideas” (Maxwell 1996:155).²² This cornucopia has developed through a series of phases. By no means uncontested, these phases allow us to rather broadly define the dominant themes that inform and rationalise status quo food security research, policy, and practice at a certain moment in time. It is important to understand these phases and how they came about. It is also important to recognize that food security has been taken up by development practitioners, notably aid agencies and NGOs, in multiple ways. In this research, analysis is limited to global-level (multilateral) food security policy (as outcome) and does not explicitly tackle the various

²² More than 200 definitions and at least 450 indicators for food security have been presented (Mechlem 2004; Sage 2002; Maxwell 1996).

ways these policies translate into actionable programmes. Neither does it detail the methodologies used to calculate or assess food security.

Simon Maxwell's (1996) tri-phased approach is the most commonly cited version of the evolution of food security. The three categories presented are useful for beginning to sketch out the evolving nature of food security in global policy making and to start to piece together this contemporary cornucopia. For Maxwell, food security policy, since the 1970s, can be defined by three paradigms that represent shifts in policy outlooks: a shift from global and national level policies to the household and individual level (1975-1985); a move from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective (1985 onwards); a shift from objective indicators to subjective indicators (1980s onwards). Maxwell argues that collectively these shifts have brought food security theory and policy "progressively closer to 'real' food insecurity" (Maxwell 1996: 156, see also Hewitt de Alcantra 1993). There is evidence to suggest the evolution from a global and national policy approach to food security towards one that focuses on a livelihood perspective at the household level, in line with a greater embedding of neoliberal policies and practices. However, Mooney and Hunt (2009:472) note that these shifts are not as humble as Maxwell (1996) suggests and each shift "might be seen as distinct dimensions of a single shift towards an individualization that privileges a subsequent affinity with, or focus on, livelihood and subjectivity." Indeed, the paradigm shifts end in the mid-1980s and corresponding phases of food security emerge less from changes in ideologies and more from shifting political needs (food aid) of broader social focus (famine in Africa). There is less evidence at the level of global food security policy to support the third shift Maxwell identifies as a move towards subjective indicators. Instead, it is here argued, that by the mid-1980s food security had become aligned with wider neoliberal objectives and consequently food security policy merely adapted and altered to address contestation and change, in line with definitions of hegemony. This led not to new phases or paradigms but instead to variations or extensions of the same project. However, a third phase in the evolution of food security policy at the global level can be identified by the 1996 World Food Summit where the most influential and used definition of food security was negotiated.

Seven years after the publication of "Food security: a post-modern perspective" where Maxwell presents the three paradigm shifts as sharpening programmatic policy and making it more relevant, he changed his tone. In a 2003 article "Food Policy Old and New" co-authored with Slater, he argues that "a preoccupation with food security is no longer sufficient" (Maxwell and Slater 2003:533) as too many "other issues" have infiltrated food security policy. Instead of focusing on food security policy, they argue we need to return to food policy.

Maxwell and Slater (2003) define food policy "old" as being focused primarily on rural populations, with concern for agriculture-based employment and food productions. The major actors in food marketing were traders (especially grain traders) and supply chains were relatively short. With respect to consumption, policy was designed to address at home

consumption of food, purchased in local shops or open markets. The main nutritional concerns were under nutrition, with a focus on calories and micronutrients. The food insecure were understood to be peasants. Food shocks at the national and household level were predominantly linked to poor rainfall and other production shocks and the remedy for household food shortages was food based-relief and safety nets. Food policy “old” was focused in the ministries of agriculture and health as well as relief/rehabilitation ministries and focused on agricultural technologies, parastatal reform, supplementary feeding and food for work.

By comparison, food policy “new” is concerned mostly with urban populations. With respect to employment the focus is no longer on agricultural jobs but rather on food manufacturing and retail with food companies emerging as main actors in food marketing. The supply chains are longer with a large number of food miles. Food policies for consumers are geared towards a population that eats a high proportion of prepared meals, including food eaten outside of the home. Nutritional policy is focused on chronic dietary diseases including obesity, heart disease and diabetes linked to higher consumption of fat sugar and salt. The food insecure are understood to be the urban and rural poor. The sources of food shocks shift from production issues to international prices and trade issues at the national level and income at the household level. Food policy “new” is the domain of the ministries of trade and industry, consumer affairs, finance as well as food activist groups and NGOs. Food policy “new” is focused predominantly then, according to Maxwell and Slater (2003), on competition and rent-seeking the value chain, industrial structure in retail, futures markets, waste management, advertising, health, education, and food safety. With food policy “old” the key international institutions were the FAO, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, CGIAR. With food policy “new”, FAO and WHO remain key institutions but the rest are overlaid with UNIDO, ILO and the WTO.

Lang et al.’s (2010) critique of “new” food policy argues that it fails to properly historicize food security and assumes its development arises almost from thin air in the 1970s. This critique can be extended to Maxwell’s three paradigms. As will be discussed below, the evolution of food security is indeed rooted in the experiences of the first half of the twentieth century and key changes in science and technology and geopolitics. The tension is that food security “new” calls for a rejection of food security policy in favour of food policy. But we can see food security policy emerging as a sub-sector- or a thread – of a more complex food policy. What is of interest is the way that food security policy is being developed, framed and then how it relates to food policy more broadly.

At this point, the call to abandon food security policy for food policy will be ignored. Despite the complex and expansive definitions and acknowledging the repetitive failure of policies and processes, the current high-level renewed interest in food security suggests that the term and associated policies will remain relevant for the foreseeable future and for this reason need to be further examined and analysed.

The FAO (2006) suggest that concepts of food security have evolved to reflect changes in official policy thinking, but provide few hints as to what these changes were or how they came about. They do usefully outline key eras in the development of the concept, starting in 1974 when food security was defined in terms of supply. By the 1980s focus had moved to access at the individual and household level. With the 1996 World Food Summit, the multi-dimensional nature of food security was acknowledged. For the FAO (2006:1) “as the link between food security, starvation and crop failure becomes a thing of the past, the analysis of food insecurity as a social and political construct has emerged.”

This shift to the social and political nature of food security can be examined through an attempt to uncover the nuances and competing understandings that make up and challenge hegemonic definitions. Mooney and Hunt (2009) introduce the notions of frames and keying as two concepts that help to articulate variations and their implications for agriculture, hunger, and the organization of food security policy at the global level. They set out to analyse the process of frame elaboration by examining food security as a potent form of master frame that produces several distinct claims to ownership over a term for social problem that has developed multiple meanings. They are inspired by Snow and Byrd (2007:130) who articulate the process of “frame elaboration” as a means of accenting certain beliefs or issues in service of a newly articulated “alignment of events, experiences, and strands of moral codes”.

Relying on Goffman’s loosely musical theory, Mooney and Hunt (2009:471) build on collective action framing by considering the frames in relation to what Goffman (1974) called keying, that is, “a process that may yield multiple interpretations within each of these collective action frames.” One reason for focusing on collective action frames is that variations between and within the food-security-collective-action-frames are linked to the ways in which distinct interests align themselves in the multi-organizational field (Mooney and Hunt 2007:471).

Mooney and Hunt (2007:471) illustrate that food security frames can each carry a flat keying that “reinforces extant dominant interpretations and practices, usually advanced by power holders” and a sharp keying “that offers interpretations and practices” which tend to offer “critical alternative interpretations and practices usually voiced by challengers”. To use language presented in Chapter 2, we can see flat keying as hegemonic and sharp keying as counter-hegemonic.

In their analysis, Mooney and Hunt (2009:470) explain that the successful elaboration of the term “food security” is “due, in part, to a resonance that does not immediately engender oppositional claims, making it difficult to mobilize opinion in favour of alternatives.” They argue that it would be challenging and “strategically dysfunctional” to mobilise a movement in favour of “food insecurity” or “unsustainable development” even for those seeking objectively insecure or unsustainable outcomes. Even in the most oppositional discourses around food security, such as those forwarded by food sovereignty activists, food security is rarely rejected outright and is often framed as part of the end goal. Indeed, discourse is now very much

intertwined and dependent on food security if for nothing more than a starting point for discussion. At the same time, producing definitions or frameworks with the capacity to mobilise are needed to unify resistance, support the building of coalitions and guiding the work needed to change the dominant food system (Mooney and Hunt 2009:471; Stevenson et al. 2007:51).

Mooney and Hunt (2009:470), building on the work of Gamson (1995), argue that “nonreflexive consent to the values and objectives signified by terms such as “security” and “sustainability” can be usefully conceptualized as a ‘consensus frame’.” They offer broad support for the idea that the goals of a social movement can engender opposition with respect to how those goals are translated into “action imperatives”. Mooney and Hunt (2009:470) argue that within consensus around the term “food security”, there is contested ownership and that “‘food security’ functions as an elaborate master frame encompassing at least three collective action frames”. It is by uncovering the diversity of collective action frames that we can “recognise the dynamic processes underlying discursive work in the field of organization and social movements” (Mooney and Hunt 2009:470, see also Snow and Byrd 2007). Collective action frames “remain in a field of contested ownership of the concept, reflecting variations in power and shifts in political opportunity structures” (Mooney and Hunt 2007:472).

Mooney and Hunt’s approach is useful in terms of unveiling key motivations of actors engaged in global food security governance. At the same time, there are limits to creating strict labels and categories for the various discourses at play. The frame approach fails to make space for the process of negotiation and contestation and consent at play in the global governance of food security. Policy makers, the private sector and social movements are not static in their position and a frame analysis can mask the complex strategies adopted by actors in global level negotiations which often mean sacrificing key issues to gain in other areas.

Michael Carolan (2013) presents a phased history food security derived from an examination of the stated and implied aims of agrifood policies since the 1940s.²³ He argues food security was originally imagined in the context of freedom from want, mirroring the proclamations of U.S. President Roosevelt’s influential four freedoms speech. Following from this so-called “original intent” Carolan identifies three overlapping and cumulative foci across food security policy. First is the calorie-ization of food security (1940s to present) where focus is on increasing agricultural output, characterised best by the Green Revolution. Second is the neoliberalization of food security (1970s to present), marked by a push for trade liberalization and market integration. The final focus is the empty calorie-ization of food security (1980s to present) where for factors including foreign direct investment and the liberalization of marketing led to a proliferation of processed foods across national food systems. Carolan’s (2013:6) contention is

²³ To be historically accurate, the focus here is on ‘modern’ food policy discourse on food security. Arguably, Western debate begins at a serious level with Joseph Malthus’ (1798) essay on the Principle of Population. James Vernon (2007) goes back even further.

that measured against the food security yardstick of security of food (in contrast to security through food), agrifood policy has been a success: “the world has never seen such abundance of cheap calories”. However, the cost of these “gains” have been great and have come at a cost to the environment, individuals, communities, health and the sovereignty (food or otherwise) of nations).

Importantly, Carolan (2013:7) points out that “the fact that countries with clearly oversized ecological food-prints (the ecological food print of an entire food system) are simultaneously lauded for their levels of food security is as unfortunate as it is telling”. To get food security back to its original intention – freedom from want – Carolan proposes broader uptake of the Food and Human Security Index which takes into consideration indicators for individual and societal well-being, ecological sustainability, potential for food independence, nutritional well-being and freedom in the agri-food chain. For Carolan (2013:8), food security is not an end in itself, but rather “a process that ought to make people and the planet better off”.

This research acknowledges the foci identified by Carolan across agrifood policy but does not agree about the origins of food security or the appropriateness of mixing agri-food policy with food security policy, especially after the mid-1980s. As the review below will illustrate, food security emerged as a concept not with the inception of the FAO in 1945 but rather as a reaction to the 1970s food price crisis, although the history leading up to the launch of the FAO through to the 1974 World Food Conference is acknowledged. In this research, and in slight contrast to Carolan, the concept did not emerge from a position of securing freedom from want, but rather securing grain markets. Second, and notably since the 1980s when food security policy shifted focus from global and national-level policies towards household and individual indicators and poverty-reduction, it has been framed as a development discourse and has not been part of a wider agri-food strategy. In contrast to a narrowing of food security policy to the development discourse, agri-food policy was internationalising. While both food security and agri-food policy have focused on productionist policies, they have been imagined and framed by different policy objectives that should not be conflated. That said, they are certainly worthy of comparison and inarguably developed in relation to one another and within a broader neoliberal policy environment. Given the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2, this comparison takes place throughout the Part 2 of this thesis.

Food security in its various manifestations is contentious and problematic. The paradigm shifts outlined by Maxwell represent shifts in hegemonic definitions of food security informed by a productionist paradigm within an increasingly neoliberal/corporate food regime. The complexity that arises at the confluence of food, agriculture, aid, trade, labour, environment, health, nutrition, rights and justice, where food security and insecurity emerge, necessitates a sufficiently comprehensive policy process capable of a systems approach that tackles the root causes of food insecurity.

4.3. Food Security: A summary of policy developments since 1945

As noted above, the term “food security” came into widespread policy use with the World Food Conference in 1974 but the beginning of modern interest in food security is often located in World War II, “which demonstrated that localised hunger and instability could escalate into problems of global significance” (McDonald 2010:12). Friedman and McMichael (1989), and Lang and Heasman (2004), both conclude that the triumph of the Mercantile-Industrial Food Regime, and the Productionist Paradigm respectively, is rooted in the experience of food shortages, meal distribution and starvation that effected many countries in the early twentieth century. It is thus useful to start the analysis at the point where the international community came together to begin to address these problems.

In 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt hosted the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture in Hot Springs, Virginia. The use of “United Nations” in the conference title was reference to the forty four nations²⁴ that attended the conference (FAO 1981). The aims of the conference were summed up in the opening sentence of the Declaration adopted by the Conference:

This Conference, meeting in the midst of the greatest war ever waged, and in full confidence of victory, has considered world problems of food and agriculture and declares its belief that the goal of freedom from want of food, suitable and adequate for the health and strength of all peoples, can be achieved (FAO 1981).

There was clear agreement on several issues at this conference, and the foundation for the future of food security was laid down. The Conference agreed that there was not, nor had there ever been, enough food to eat. They noted “at least two-thirds of its people are ill-nourished; many face periodic starvation; and this in spite of the fact that two thirds of the world's people are farmers” (UN 1947:685). Advanced in science, and the promotion of scientific outcomes coupled with scientific rationalisation were highly prevalent in development of the FAO. As noted above, the development of a scientific discourse is entrenched in the embedding of neoliberalism. Developments in the science of nutrition led the Conference to agree that access to the right kinds of food would raise levels of health and well-being. Faith in the modern science of production was also referenced as having the solution for how to “produce enough of the right kinds of foods” (UN 1947:685). There was agreement that issues of distribution must be addressed to raise the levels of consumption of those who do not have enough. The UN Year Book noted that they required a prerequisite of “an expanding world economy, in which each nation will play its own part, but all will act together” and that “[o]nly by acting together can

24 The countries were: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. In addition, an official from Denmark was present in a personal capacity (FAO 1981).

nations, in the close-knit modern world, achieve peace, prosperity and rising standards of living” (UN 1947:685). This cooperative tone foreshadowed the ideals of the post-war world, where nations worked together to solve problems and ensure a stable future.

On recommendation of the Conference, in July 1943 the United Nations Interim Commission for Food and Agriculture was set up with representatives appointed by each of the governments that attended the Conference. The role of the Commission was to plan for a permanent organization to deal with food, agriculture, forestry and fisheries. The Commission, financed by contributions of member governments, had the support of a small international secretariat as well as international technical committees. The Commission drafted a Constitution for the UN Food and Agriculture Organization which more than twenty governments accepted. This fulfilled the terms of the Constitution and made the establishment of the FAO possible. The FAO came into being on October 16, 1945 with the signing of the constitution. This ceremony took place at the opening meeting of the first session of the Conference, held in Quebec, Canada, from October 16 to November 1, 1945 (UN 1947:685).

The vision and approach of the FAO were clearly laid out in the preamble to the Constitution:

The Nations accepting this Constitution, being determined to promote the common welfare by furthering separate and collective action on their part for the purposes of raising levels of nutrition and standards of living of the peoples under their respective jurisdictions, securing improvements in the efficiency of the production and distribution of all food and agricultural products, bettering the condition of rural populations, and thus contributing toward an expanding world economy, hereby establish the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

The focus on nutrition, improving production, securing rural livelihoods and supporting a world economy are strong threads that run through the organization and frame its work to this day.

Three years after the launch of the FAO, the right to food was formally recognized by the United Nations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948), as a part of the right to a decent standard of living. Article 25 of the UDHR Article states:

Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

While the UN was adopting the UDHR, a process of decolonization was underway.²⁵ When the UN was founded in 1945, it was estimated that 750 million people, nearly a third of the world’s population, lived in territories held by colonial powers (UN 2013). The post-colonial integration of developing countries into the global trading system, and in post-World War II development assistance programs have been linked to the genesis of neoliberalism (Gonzales 2007). Gonzalez (2007:7) identifies the origin of the inequities in the global trading system within the colonial division of labour that “relegated the colonized ‘periphery’ to the production of primary

25 Remarkably, discussions of decolonization are absent in the bulk of the literature on food security but is referenced in food regime literature (e.g. Friedmann and McMichael 1989).

agricultural products for the benefit of the colonizing ‘core’”. As many European countries lost control over their colonies, they focused on outsourcing their production to support the emerging upper classes with food products from former colonies. The implementation of new liberalized models of trade with emerging economies (many of them from former colonized areas) and market advantage through heavily subsidized agricultural production, allowed for economic domination by the West.

The 1960s reflected an era of hope. The Green Revolution was leading to exciting innovations in crop-breeding, especially around new varieties of rice, and there was a great deal of confidence that advances in tropical agriculture would lead to increased self-sufficiency and productivity amongst the world’s poorest farmers. In the 1950s and 1960s, developing countries expanded their agricultural outputs at a similar rate to developed countries (Shaw 2007:117-118). What differed were differences in rates of growth in demand (3.5% per annum in developing countries compared with 2.5% in the so-called developed world) (Shaw 2007:118). However, to suggest that growth was evenly distributed across regions would be misleading. For example, while agricultural performance rose in India under the influence of the Green Revolution, agricultural productivity stagnated in sub-Saharan Africa. At this time, “the need for food imports rose markedly in developing countries at a time when their ability to purchase them on commercial terms did not increase commensurately” (Shaw 2007:118). While food production was increasing, the total number of hungry people increased (FAO 1974:55; Shaw 2007:118). As we will explore later, availability of food does not correspond to accessibility, a statement that holds true at the international level down to the household level. Part of the problem was that two-thirds of the developing world’s population lived in countries where food outputs had risen more slowly than the demand for food. Large grain reserves (notably those held by the US, Canada and Australia) served to buffer prices and stabilize markets (Headley and Fan 2010).

By 1970, despite 400 million people estimated to be suffering from malnutrition, there remained a feeling of communal optimism that the problem of world hunger could be addressed. This all changed in the early 1970s. As Shaw (2007:118) writes, the emergency of 1972-1974 “was the first intimation of what might become a recurring manifestation of an underlying basic imbalance.” The 1970s food crisis was marked by the threat of mass starvation and half a million people were estimated to have died as a result of food shortages, high prices and inadequate emergency distribution. Many more suffered malnutrition resulting in important longer-term impacts. Not unlike the 2007-2008 food price spikes, the 1970s food crisis occurred in conjunction with a weakened US dollar, high energy prices, short-term climatic shocks, concerns over market information and growing export demand from transitioning economies (in that time, Spain, Korea and Taiwan) (DEFRA 2010:12). It was also impacted by changing consumption patterns.

In a speech at the National Agricultural Outlook Conference held in Washington, D.C, in December 1973, Assistant Director-General to the FAO, E. M. Ojala explained:

The events of 1972/3 were very disturbing. The international community has become accustomed to personal surpluses of wheat and other grains in North America, which the two governments of this region had generously made available through two decades to poorer nations with food deficits. Not enough attention was paid to the more recent statements of these governments to the effect that North America could no longer be expected in the future to maintain what had amounted in practice to the entire world's food reserves. Meanwhile, the world's wheat consumption has risen dramatically. Thus, North American stocks which represented 10 weeks of world consumption in the early 1960's constituted only 5 weeks supply in the early 1970's. This diminution in the world's food security was only mildly noted, is at all, until it was starkly revealed by the events of 1972/1973. But wheat prices trebled. And experts estimated that it would take two years of more of good crops to replenish stocks. Meanwhile [sic.], the world's population was exposed more dangerously than in the past to the recurrence of shortage situations (Ojala 1973:4).

While there are important natural events that contributed to low yields, as Dereck Headley and Shenggen Fan (2010:82) argue, the 1972–74 crisis can be linked to “U.S. production and trade conditions, especially with respect to wheat and other coarse grains”. In the 1930s North America exported 5 million tons of grain, and by 1966 North American grain exports had increased twelvefold to reach nearly 60 million tons, while the Communist countries went from a 5 million ton surplus to a 4 million ton deficit. At the same time Asia moved from a 2 million ton surplus to a deficit of 34 million tons (Headley and Fan 2010:82). The U.S. clearly dominated international grain trade and production and held the power to impact international prices and by extension, global food security. To this end, it has been argued that one of the main contributing factors to the 1970s food crisis was U.S. policies regarding wheat production (Destler 1978; Headley and Fan 2010; Johnson 1975).

In the 1960s, due to policies that supported prices above market-clearing levels, the US Commodity Credit Corporation had accumulated a large amount of grain stocks and distributed the grain through cheap exports and food aid. However, there are important costs associated with storing grain, especially when income from selling grain does not cover those costs. Thus, in the early 1970s, the US government (along with Canada and Australia) set about to reduce the large stocks of wheat they had amassed and reduced production of wheat by one-third between mid-1970 and mid-1972, effectively cutting their global share of world grain production to 10 percent from 15 percent (Headley and Fan 2010; Johnson 1975). As a results of those policies, by the 1970s grain reserves has been largely depleted and international grain markets became vulnerable to extreme fluctuations in price (Headley and Fan 2010; Hopkins and Puchala 1978) leading to an increasingly fragile trade regime for grains.

The US liberalization of grain exports to China, the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, and the large amount of grain purchased by the U.S.S.R. in 1971 saw a further depletion of North American stocks leading wheat export prices to jump from 1.68 USD per bushel in July 1972 to 2.40 USD per bushel just one month later.

4.3.1. World Food Security as a Problem of Global Supply

This was the situation which led the General Assembly of the United Nations to convene the World Food Conference with an aim to develop “ways and means whereby the international community, as a whole, could take specific action to resolve the world food problem within the broader context of development and international economic co-operation” (UN 1975). The Conference was important not only insofar as it led to the creation of the World Food Council and the Committee on World Food Security but also because it launched the International Undertaking on World Food Security.

At the 1974 World Food Conference, governments examined the global problem of food production and consumption, and proclaimed that “every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop their physical and mental faculties” through the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition (1974). The Declaration also clarified the responsibility of governments to work together to ensure increased production and equitable distribution, stating that food problems need to be tackled through national plans and that states must remove obstacles and provide incentives for food production. In some ways, the Declaration is more progressive than more recent declarations on hunger and food security, due to its assertion of the importance of waterways and waste prevention as well providing technical and financial assistance free from conditions to least developed countries, conservation of natural resources, and national policies to prioritise food production. Within the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, there is no explicit mention of the private sector but there is a call for governments and NGOs to work together to end hunger, highlighting the important role NGOs were starting to play in food security policy.

The Declaration does not provide a definition for food security. However, Annex 1 of the final report, which outlines the International Undertaking on World Food Security, reaffirms “the urgent need for effective international action aimed at ensuring the availability at all times of adequate world supplies of basic foodstuffs, so as to avoid acute food shortages in the event of widespread crop failure, natural or other disasters, to sustain a steady expansion of consumption in countries with low levels of per caput intake, and offset fluctuations in production and prices.” Food security is here defined in terms of supply and price stability of basic foodstuffs at the national and international level (FAO 2006). More specifically, we can identify three key components of an emerging definition of food security: Food security as a supply problem, a global problem, and a natural problem.

Hunger, which had been framed as a supply issue prior to the World Food Conference, continued to frame the discourse of food security afterwards. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Keynesian logic still dominated and debate focused on the transfer of goods and a strong state. By the 1970s, when the World Food Conference takes place, Keynesian theory was being replaced by neoclassical economic theories of growth which advanced a move towards

microeconomics, foreshadowing a shift that would take place in food security discourse in the following decade. But in this period of transition, the emphasis for food security was clearly on “strengthening the food production base of developing countries” (FAO 1974: annex to resolution 1/64, I.2) directly in line with the productionist paradigm.

A second aspect of the emerging definition of food security was recognition of hunger as a global problem. The text makes reference to the international community and to adequate world food supplies (not national food supplies). This international community is encouraged to rally to increase production and stabilise prices. However, the solutions need to be applied at the national level and are targeted towards developing countries. Here then, food security becomes defined in terms of global and national priorities linked to availability based on objective indicators.

Finally, in that definition, the world food problem is constructed as a natural problem, echoing the Malthusian rhetoric that was dominant at the time. The framing of the food crisis as a natural problem conveniently ignores a series of policies that preceded the food crisis, including the U.S.’s policy of stock reduction, unforeseen large-scale grain imports into the U.S.S.R., or the high cost of oil following supply cuts by OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) in 1973. By constructing food security as a natural problem, the emerging definition of food security skirts politics. Instead of a shift in policies affecting food production and distribution, international cooperation was needed to conquer natural problems: it was states against nature. Winning this battle required increasing production in the developing world and finding places to store the outputs in the form of international grain reserves. Achieving this meant handing over policy making to technocrats and scientists with the knowledge and skills to control nature and increase agricultural production. Thus from the get go, food security was defined apolitically and through technocratic language. Indeed, despite evidence highlighting the role of trade and stock policies on the food crisis, the political discourse faithfully maintained its allegiance to natural causes. The FAO Conference in 1973 notes that “cereal supplies in 1973/4 were dependent almost entirely on the result of the 1973 harvests and were thus vulnerable to the uncertainty of one season’s weather”. Yet as explored above, and albeit with the advantage of hindsight, the crisis was very much linked to grain and trade policies and while discussions of food security at the time did reflect this, solutions were not found.

At the Sixtieth Session of the Council of the FAO, the Director General was requested to develop “a proposal for ensuring a minimum level of world security against serious food shortages and for international action to assume adequate basic food stocks” (FAO, 1973: para. 1). At this time, the framing was very much around the problem of world security: “the problem of world security against food shortages has become increasingly serious following important changes in the world cereal supply situation in the past season (FAO, 1973: para. 2).

With recovery from the 1970s world food crisis, and as a result of difficulties negotiating a new international grain agreement, focus drifted towards more national-level measures (Mechlem

2004:634). In 1979, the FAO Council adopted a “Plan of Action on World Food Security” urging governments to “take full advantage of the relatively ample world supply situation for cereals in order to build up stocks” and to “adopt and implement national cereal stock policies, and targets of objectives”. Global food security was increasingly understood to be contingent on national-level programmes and remained focused on increasing the amount of food available. Food security was still framed as a production problem defined by a lack of available food and remained disassociated from the political and economic decisions that impacted hunger and food availability. The policy responses were geared towards addressing fluctuations in the food supply and interventions were developed to buffer against fluctuation, which, in line with technological advancements and shifts in modes of labour, lent itself well to the advancement of the productionist paradigm (Lang and Heasman 2004). However, this logic was proving inadequate for dealing with new food security challenges, including periods of mass starvation and famine (e.g., Ethiopia and Bangladesh) that marked the early 1980s. This period marks the shift from Maxwell’s (1996) first paradigm of food security as global and national level policies towards a policy focus on households and the individual.

4.3.2. Embedding Neoliberalism in Food Security Policy: Food security as access

Throughout the 1980s food security practitioners, analysts and policy makers had to grapple with the increasingly “complex relationships between chronic, seasonal and temporary food insecurity, peoples’ coping strategies, their priorities when making choices as to how to spend overall insufficient resources, food security as part of a wider livelihoods concepts, and the relationship between household and individual food security” (Mechlem 2004:635). At the same time, the IMF and World Bank were promoting structural adjustment policies by way of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). Much has been written on SAPs and the implications for food security (See for example, Fan and Rao 2003; Loewenson 1993; Uvin 1994) and they are mentioned here only to highlight the shift towards neoliberal policies at the multilateral level. SAPs had the stated goal of reducing a borrowing country’s fiscal imbalance by reorienting the borrowing country’s economy toward trade and export production as a way of strengthening their economy. The rationale was that open markets and strong specialized export economies would ensure food security through international cooperation and trade. Countries could ensure access to food by strengthening their economies, specializing in exporting crops, and importing national foodstuffs. It was at this time that “donors developed an enthusiasm for national food security planning, partly as a ‘proxy for poverty planning during the darkest years of structural adjustment’” (Hindle 1990). As we will see, this focus on national food security planning will re-emerge as a policy priority after the 2007-8 food price spikes, but with emphasis on public-private partnerships.

While SAPs are credited with improving economic growth in Asia and Latin America (Fan and Rao 2003) they proved detrimental across Africa. The evidence indicates that SAPs have been associated with increasing food insecurity and under-nutrition, rising ill-health, and decreasing

access to health care in the two-thirds or more of the population of African countries that already lived below poverty levels (Loewenson 1993:717).

In 1981, Amartya Sen, an Indian economist who later won the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1998 for his contribution to welfare economics and social choice theory, published *Poverty and Famines*, which dismantled the idea that food insecurity was due to a lack of availability of foodstuffs. Sen suggested that an individual's food security depended on their ability to access food or, in Sen's words their ability to "establish entitlement to enough food". Entitlements, for Sen (1984:497), are defined as "the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she faces". An entitlement approach to poverty and famine works to describe all legal sources of food which Sen (1981:2) outlines through four categories: "production-based entitlement" (growing food); "trade-based entitlement" (buying food); "own-labour entitlement" (working for food) and "inheritance and transfer entitlement" (being given food by others). Starvation thus occurs when people's full entitlement set does not provide them with adequate food for subsistence. With the publication of Sen's work on entitlements, food security policy shifted focus from states securing adequate supplies of food for their populations to a focus on the household and individual having access to food.

The value of Sen's thinking, which was not new but which Sen successfully brought to the centre of development thinking, was the shift away from Malthusian claims that hunger was the result of too many people and too little food and towards a focus on the inability of people to acquire food. From this perspective, food security is linked to access and food insecurity and famine can occur irrespective of food availability (Devereux 2001:246). Indeed, Sen (1981:8) showed that some of the worst famines in the world had taken place due to entitlement shifts with no significant decline in food availability per capita.

The limitations of this approach, as identified by Sen (1981:48-50), are the ambiguities in the specification of entitlements; the focus on legal rights disregards the fact that the transfer of entitlement relations can involve the violation of these rights (e.g., looting); the actual food consumption of people may fall below their entitlement; and, starvation is not the same as famine. Stephen Devereux (2001:246) also points out that Sen's analytic approach is limited insofar as it appropriates a normative term like "entitlement" and strips it of all ethical and political connotations.

Despite these limitations, and with good reason, Sen's concept of entitlements gained currency as public and political focus shifted to addressing the growing famine in Africa and while UNICEF sought to put a human face to hunger (Shaw 2007). In 1983, the FAO revised the concept of food security to include a third dimension to the established dimensions of ensuring adequate food production and maximizing the availability of food supplies: "security of access to supplies on the part of all those who need them" (FAO 1983:15). This third dimension sought to balance the supply and demand side of food security (FAO 2006:1; Shaw 2007:349). This

definition was later revised to include the individual and household level as well as regional and national level of aggregation in food security analysis (FAO 2006).

In 1985, the World Food Security Compact (FAO 1985; see also Mechlem 2004:635), adopted by the FAO Conference to collect principles and suggestions for action at the governmental, organizational and individual level, made reference to food security at the national, household and individual level, a clear shift from the 1974 definition of food security as a the “availability at all times of adequate world food supplies”. This Compact also pushed forward the link between food security and poverty, recognizing that the “achievement of the ‘fundamental right over everyone to be free from hunger’ depends ultimately on the abolition of poverty” (FAO 1985: Para. 2).

At the same time, the food security agenda expanded to include chronic hunger (Clay 1997:7; Mechlem 2004:635). The World Bank (1986:v) led the trend, placing people’s needs as the starting point in their definition of food security as “access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life” (see also Mechlem 2004:635). The focus is shifted from availability to access and also foreshadows the health discourse that will come to influence food security policy. The World Bank report *Poverty and Hunger* disregarded the availability question and reframed the debate around access in economic terms. “The world has ample food” opens the report:

The growth of global food production has been faster than the unprecedented population growth of the past forty years... Yet many countries and hundreds of millions of poor people do not share in this abundance. They suffer from a lack of food security, caused mainly by a lack of purchasing power (WB 1986:1).

The report takes the complexity of Sen’s argument and reduces it to a grossly simplified discussion of purchasing power. The World Bank’s report (1986:v) argued that economic growth would provide people with the income needed to acquire adequate amounts of food, illustrating absolute faith in the trickle-down theory of economics. Yet, despite rejecting the old tenant that supply is the main challenge for achieving food security, the report suggests that supply, production and trade are central to ending world hunger. *Poverty and Hunger* served to frame food security through an economic development discourse linked to income growth as a means for ending poverty.

Having established the link between famine and poverty and the need for focus to be at the household and individual level, the World Bank was then able to take the next step and link food insecurity to lack of purchasing power, again diverting the political, social, cultural and environmental factors that also contribute to food insecurity. However, this is arguably a misrepresentation of Sen’s work. Sen (1981:166–7) argued while that income is relevant, especially in areas affected by famine, such an approach is inadequate. He also noted that:

[T]he inadequacy of the income-centred view arises from the fact that, even in those circumstances in which income does provide command, it offers only a partial picture of the entitlement pattern, and starting the story with the shortage of income is to leave the tale half-told (Sen 1981:156).

Poverty and Hunger was published at the end of a major humanitarian food crisis and at a time where structural adjustment programmes were showing signs of promoting economic growth and development. The launch of report, which built on the momentum of the Sen's work, established the World Bank as a key actor in food security and in doing so presented a challenge the FAO's unilateral authority on the issue. These developments changed status quo understandings of food security. No longer the collective responsibility of the international community, food security is now an output of economic growth. This mirrors wider processes of neoliberalization underway across other sectors. From a food security perspective, this move facilitates blame towards the poor as much as it facilitates a stepping away not only from international commitments, but also from international factors that aggravate food insecurity. Here again, food security is made apolitical. It is defined by technocrats who are constructed as technicians and rational-decision makers, free of ideology and thus most suited to make decisions and guide policy. A further consequence is that agricultural experts (including farmers and all other food producers) are further removed from decision-making.

The shift from world food supply to household access illustrates the downward focus of this era of food security policy: no longer were States responsible for solving challenges of global supply and distribution, instead, the focus was on ensuring access at the household level through poverty reduction and increasingly open and international markets. Importantly, changing how food security is defined, changes who should be consulted about it. If production is no longer an issue, then agricultural specialists are no longer the authoritative voice informing policy. They must be replaced by social scientists and economists who can address issues of access and markets. This represented a challenge for the FAO which had established itself, its reputation and its legitimacy as the primary actor in food security on a foundation of research and knowledge. This challenge only amplifies with the acceleration of globalization through the 1990s into the 2000s.

4.3.3. World Food Summit: Food security as development

The 1990s were marked not only by a deeper embedding of neoliberal logic in international policy processes but also by a new era of globalization. The European Union was formally established when the Maastricht Treaty came into force on 1 November 1993. The USA, Canada and Mexico signed a continental free trade agreement which came into force in 1994. In 1996, the World Trade Organization (WTO) emerged as the result of pressure through the 1980s to formalise the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). The WTO, established during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (1986-1994), subsumed the GATT and transformed it into a formal international organization with a broad mandate to address issues once reserved for nation states, such as subsidies, food safety, agriculture, intellectual property. Amidst this economic reordering were a series of World Summits which added another layer to globalization: global-level problems required global solutions. At most of these Summits,

poverty was forwarded as the major cause of hunger, framing food security as a development issue. A notable example was the 1992 International Conference on Nutrition. The conference:

focused on food security at the household and community levels and helped to make more explicit the linkages between nutrition and agricultural development. FAO is promoting agricultural development to increase food consumption and provide income to reduce poverty. In light of the challenges facing countries and the international community in their efforts to obtain lasting food security for all, FAO will convene the World Food Summit in 1996, at which heads of State will deliberate the pragmatic and concrete measures needed to achieve this goal at the national, regional and global levels (FAO 1992).

In a similar spirit, the World Food Summit was proposed by Jacques Diouf, following his election as Director-General of FAO in 1994. The aim was to use the Summit to launch changes in FAO related to programmes, structure and policies (FAO 1994b; Shaw 2007:347). Diouf took over the position of Director-General of FAO at a time when 800 million people were without adequate food. Referencing the FAO's constitution in his proposal, Diouf reminded member states that they had "made a solemn pledge to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living and thereby contribute towards ensuring humanity's freedom from hunger" (Shaw 2007:345).

The 1996 World Food Summit resulted in a major shift in the concept of food security (Shaw 2007:348). At the Summit, consensus emerged around a new, highly negotiated definition: food security exists "when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life." It was also understood that these dimensions could be undermined by root causes of food insecurity, including natural disaster, war, "inappropriate national policies; inadequate development, dissemination, adaptation and adoption of agricultural technologies, poverty, population and gender inequalities; and poor health" (Shaw 2007:349).

Food security was thus understood to be based on four pillars:

- **Food availability:** The availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports (including food aid).
- **Food access:** Access by individuals to adequate resources (entitlements) for acquiring appropriate foods for a nutritious diet. Entitlements are defined as the set of all commodity bundles over which a person can establish command given the legal, political, economic and social arrangements of the community in which they live (including traditional rights such as access to common resources).
- **Utilization:** Utilization of food through adequate diet, clean water, sanitation and health care to reach a state of nutritional well-being where all physiological needs are met. This brings out the importance of non-food inputs in food security.
- **Stability:** To be food secure, a population, household or individual must have access to adequate food at all times. They should not risk losing access to food as a consequence of sudden shocks (e.g. an economic or climatic crisis) or cyclical events (FAO 2006).

This definition has since remained the "gold standard". The definition does not start anew but rather builds on the concept's evolution. The definition, which includes issues of availability,

production and supply through “physical access” and “economic access”, highlights Sen’s contribution as well as that of the World Bank. Nutrition, preference and healthy life speak to livelihoods and hint at social access. The discourse of food security at the international level remains framed as a development issue. The inclusion of preference illustrates cultural sensitivity but fails to explain how preferences of wealthy consumers, or consumers in wealthy countries, impact the food security of others. The FAO (2006:1) argues the new definition “reinforces the multidimensional nature of food security” and “has enabled policy responses focused on the promotion and recovery of livelihood options. It is at this point that analysis of food security as a social and political construct begins to take hold (FAO 2006:1).

While two years earlier, there was fear of a growing food crisis necessitating humanitarian, political and economic engagement in North Korea and Somalia, by the time the World Food Summit came around the world food situation appeared to have stabilized. Unlike the world food crisis of the 1970s, the food problems of the 1990s were informed by a mutated version of Sen’s theory and understood to be linked to poverty, purchasing power and food insecurity and consequently, a geographically concentrated problem (Shaw 2007:348). As Shaw (2007:348) highlights, by the “FAO’s own assessment of the world food security situation”, there had only been “a modest deterioration [in world food markets] in 1993/1994 compared with the previous year” (FAO 1994a).

Shaw (2007:348) argues that the World Food Summit was poorly scheduled, organized at the end of a series of international conferences that dominated the first half of the decade and that there was a “distinct feeling of conference fatigue” in the lead-up to the summit. Shaw also highlights a growing concern within official circles of a saturation of institutional arrangements with too many bodies grappling with overlapping mandates and responsibilities. The World Food Summit came on the eve of the first meeting of the newly established WTO and in the midst of presidential elections in the United States, while at the UN energy was focused on the election of a new secretary-general and the FAO was particularly preoccupied with an outbreak of a large-scale human-made disaster in central Africa (Shaw 2007:348). There was also concern over the aims of the summit and in a position paper the USA argued that the WFS was designed to review ways of achieving food security and was not to be a venue for pledging new resources, creating new financial mechanisms, institutions or bureaucracies or re-examine previous agreements (Shaw 2007:348).

One outcome of the World Food Summit was the Plan of Action which articulated the objectives and actions around food security. The Plan of Action called on every nation to “adopt a strategy consistent with its resources and capacities to achieve its individual goals and, at the same time, cooperate regionally and internationally in order to organize collective solutions to global issues of food security” (FAO 1996: Para. 1). It continued that “[i]n a world of increasingly interlinked institutions, societies and economies, coordinated efforts and shared

responsibilities are essential.” The Plan of Action listed a series of commitments with related objectives on how to achieve food security:

1. We will ensure an enabling political, social, and economic environment designed to create the best conditions for the **eradication of poverty** and for **durable peace**, based on full and equal **participation** of women and men, which is most conducive to achieving sustainable food security for all.
2. We will implement policies aimed at **eradicating poverty** and inequality and improving physical and economic access by all, at all times, to sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe food and its effective utilization.
3. We will pursue **participatory and sustainable food, agriculture, fisheries, forestry and rural development policies** and practices in high and low potential areas, which are essential to adequate and reliable food supplies at the household, national, regional and global levels, and combat pests, drought and desertification, considering the multifunctional character of agriculture.
4. We will strive to ensure that food, agricultural trade and overall **trade policies are conducive to fostering food security** for all through a fair and market-oriented world trade system.
5. We will endeavour to **prevent and be prepared for natural disasters** and man-made emergencies and to meet transitory and emergency food requirements in ways that encourage recovery, rehabilitation, development and a capacity to satisfy future needs.
6. We will promote optimal allocation and use of **public and private investments** to foster human resources, sustainable food, agriculture, fisheries and forestry systems, and rural development, in high and low potential areas.
7. We will implement, monitor, and follow-up this Plan of Action at all levels in cooperation with the international community (FAO 1996: Para. 1, emphasis added).

The commitments reinforce the updated definition and draw attention to poverty eradication, participation, stronger markets and better investment. This changes little from status quo definitions of the 1980s. What we can note is a new focus on participation. This can be traced back to the participatory turn in global governance that marked the world summits.

4.4. Global Food Security in an Era of Food Price Volatility: 2008-2013

As the above review of literature and policy evolution of food security illustrated, large-scale food crises have prompted empirical shifts in the discourse of food security policy (e.g., 1974 food crisis, 1983-5 famine, 1990 famine). The 2007-8 crisis is no exception. At the same time, it is recognised that since the 1980s food security policies have not so much as shifted ideologically, but rather have evolved alongside wider neoliberal trends. In the wake of the neoliberal turn, arguably marked by launch and subsequent influence of the World Bank’s 1986 report *Poverty and Hunger*, food security policy has incorporated critique and contention but

failed to systematically shift or reform in ways that would disrupt the logic of neoliberalism, despite on-going failure of food security policy to address hunger and malnutrition and increasing evidence that these policies are in fact responsible for much of the problem (Wise 2009).

The definition of food security negotiated at the World Food Summit remains the preeminent and predominant definition. Despite the many weaknesses and limitations of the definition, it has ensured intergovernmental agreement around what is meant by food security in the context of multilateral processes. That said, causes of food insecurity and solutions remain key sites of contention and contestation.

Since 2008, food security has been a fixture on the international agenda. The nature of contemporary food systems now demands that policy makers come to terms with increased complexity including the inclusion of new actors and a push for more integration, systems approaches, inclusivity and varied knowledge systems. Critiques of food security as a concept (as a process within global governance) and as a serious problem for close to 1 billion people (as observable phenomenon within global governance) are being advanced to contest inadequate hegemonic definitions of food security in an effort to change status quo. As can be expected, and as will be illustrated throughout this thesis, overwhelmingly, elite actors are working to maintain status quo, while others are calling for the concept of food security to be enhanced, for example through the addition of explicit reference to nutrition (CFS 2012a). Others, like the UN's Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food and FIAN International are fighting for it to be reframed within a Human Rights discourse. Others, most notably La Via Campesina, are in favour of a new approach like food sovereignty. In practice, these actors are staking claims that will certainly influence and construct the next variation of food security policy and by defining the problem, they will also set out parameters for solutions. The result is a discursive turf war which is taking place amidst a restructuring of the global architecture of global food security governance. Importantly, these points of contestation are rich sites of inquiry and will help to articulate and uncover emerging trends and future directions of food security policy and governance at the global level.

The battle over the global governance of food security is reaching a climax with one billion hungry people, increased water scarcity, increased land-grabbing in poor nations by wealthy nations to enhance domestic food security, climatic variability and growing populations. This battle for leadership is being waged by the several key actors including the G8, G20, the UN Secretary-General and the Rome-based food agencies (FAO, WFP and IFAD), networks of civil society organizations, the private sector and philanthropic foundations. The stakes are high: the winner will decide who eats, and how.

4.4.1. Interconnection of multilateral actors in global food security policy

Recalling the chronology outlined in Chapter 1, the relationship, or interconnectedness, of the main multilateral actors in global food security policy can be summed up as follows. The G8

developed the five *L'Aquila Principles* which were adopted as the five *Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security* at the FAO hosted World Food Summit. At the L'Aquila Summit countries also made pledges to increase funding for food security and agriculture programmes. The G20, many of whom are G8 members, proposed a Fund (the *Global Agriculture and Food Security Program* (GAFSP) to manage the pledges made by the G8. The World Bank was made the trustee of the GAFSP. The World Food Summit reinforced the reform of the CFS as the forum for discussion about food security in the UN. The UN Secretary General launched a High Level Task Force on the Global Food Crisis and tasked them with developing a Comprehensive Framework for Action to guide countries on food security policies. The World Bank is a member of the High Level Task Force. The Updated Comprehensive Framework for Action later informed the CFS's Global Strategic Framework. The CFS included the Standing Committee on Nutrition as member of the Advisory Group where the World Bank was already a member along with civil society actors, the private sector and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. This rather abstract review illustrates a level of coherence and cooperation, but it also highlights a great deal of overlap, inefficiency, and a process of decentralising influence and focus, even after countries agreed on the function and responsibility of the reformed CFS.

Taking this analysis a step further, a careful review of key multilateral policy documents and initiatives developed by these actors to address food insecurity after the 2007-8 food price spikes helps to map out the contemporary policy landscape. The picture that emerges is one of tensions and fragmentation: far from the unanimous calls for improved coordination and cohesion. For example, the FAO promotes increased agricultural production while the G8 is concerned with financial markets, notably market growth. The G20 provides a broader perspective and extends beyond, or at the very least dampens the market-driven imperialism of the G8, showing greater awareness of and for the challenges of emerging markets, highlighting the need for not just investment but also financial support in their policy proposals and directives. The World Bank is focused on poverty; presenting agriculture and food security as a way of reducing poverty. Following from this, it is noted that across the transnational policy space, the means and the ends of the policy frameworks differ. For the World Bank agriculture and food security are the means to reducing poverty. For the G8, food security supports stable markets while in turn stable markets support food security.

Understanding the various ways that food security is understood and enacted at the global level provides insight into the future direction of food security and allows for better understanding of the current phase or era in policy development. What it also illustrates is that when compared to other actors seeking leadership of global food security governance, CFS stands apart. The structure of the reformed Committee and the commitment of actors opens up spaces for new ideas which is in turn supported by a wide acceptance of "learning by doing". As will be illustrated in the next chapter, the CFS's commitment to discussion in lieu of a reading of

political statements, and the inclusive nature of these discussions, opens up the dialogue and provides space for contestation of assumptions and the introduction of alternatives.

4.5. Summary

As noted above, since the mid-1980s food security has been deeply embedded within a neoliberal logic. Prior to the 2007-8 food price and financial crises, it was perhaps more easily argued that food security and price stability could be assured by way of trade liberalization. However, the price spikes illustrated the inelasticity of the market and its capacity to adapt when challenged. In practice, the 2007-8 food price crisis placed the global food and financial system under-pressure and the poor ended up being the release valves. As a result, post-crisis, the logic of international trading systems was put back into question as confidence in the international markets was challenged. In response, many poorer nations have begun adopting national and regional strategies (such as food reserves) to by-pass or lessen risky international markets and on-going price volatility.

Examining the international reaction to the food price spikes, it becomes clear that there has not been a shift to a new era of food security nor has there been an emergence of a new paradigm. However, food security policy discourse is increasingly contested terrain and multiple actors are now seeking out ways to redefine it. Reflecting back on the theoretical framework, some (notably the G8 and the World Bank) are seeking to maintain status quo while offering up small concessions (e.g., gender-sensitive approaches, a focus on small-holders, public-private investment programmes). Others (e.g., food social movements) are pushing for structural level changes. As the following chapters will show, the CFS is one location where these debates are playing out. Does the inclusion of new actors into the CFS lead to new ways to meaningfully challenge hegemony? Or, is the reformed CFS an example of a concession: a minor course diversion to accommodate social and economic change and critique, just as a ship may alter course to avoid rough waters, never losing sight of the end goal.

5. The Committee on World Food Security

5.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the history and evolution of the Committee on World Food Security, from its conception at the 1974 World Food Summit through to its reform. The rationale for the reform and the process of consultation and planning that led to the reform structure are reviewed in detail. Following this, the organization of the reformed CFS is presented with particular attention given to the actors that make up the Committee. Of note in this section are the roles and responsibilities secured by a new group of participants that include civil society organizations and the private sector. To conclude, a review of key post reform activities serves to shed light onto the operation of the reformed CFS and situates the three proceeding case studies.

5.2. Leadership and legitimacy in global food security governance

In October 2009, Jacques Diouf, then Director-General of the FAO, declared that “[t]he food crisis of 2007-2008 highlighted the inadequacy of current governance of world food security” (CFS 2009b:12). His comments reflected a trend: amidst all the changes and new initiatives launched in response to the 2007-2008 food price crisis there was widespread recognition of the need for enhanced global governance and coordination around food security policy (Committee on World Food Security 2009, 2012b; Duncan and Barling 2012; European Commission 2010; FAO 2009b, 2012; G20 2009; G8 2008, 2009; IFPRI 2013; Macmillan 2010; McKeon 2011; De Schutter 2012). While there was consensus on the need to coordinate around global food security policy, understandings and approaches of how international coordination should be organised took various forms. Two approaches emerged as the most likely contenders: a Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition and the Reformed Committee on World Food Security. While often juxtaposed, the Global Partnership and the reform of the Committee on World Food Security began as complementary processes. The idea for a global partnership came in June 2008 at the High-Level Conference on World Food Security at the FAO in Rome, when the President of the French Republic proposed the idea of a global partnership for agriculture, food security and nutrition based on three pillars: governance, knowledge and finance. According to a report released by the French Government two years later, the global partnership sought to insure “coherence among policies that have an impact on food security, mobilising expertise and research to ensure food security and reversing the downward trend of food security funding” (République Française 2010:3).

In an interview with an EU delegate, it was noted that the idea was perhaps exposed before its time (Interview (EU delegate), October 2011, Rome) As it was explained, French President Sarkozy was en route to a G8 meeting at Hokkaido and needed something to present. France was gearing up to take over the G8 and G20 Presidencies in 2011 and was keen to demonstrate strong leadership. The President’s office contacted the Government’s food security experts who

were asked to provide a brief of their activities. It was mentioned that they were drafting a proposal for a global partnership that would help to enhance coordination and collaboration on food security policy. This apparently struck a cord and the process was accelerated. It was, by the accounts of one French civil servant, not ready to be presented to the public at that stage. But the idea had traction and presidential backing.

The idea was presented to the Madrid High-Level meeting on food security for all (January 2009), although interestingly, this meeting was left out of the Global Partnership report released by the French Government in 2010, perhaps because the meeting failed to deliver on any outcomes or due to the backlash caused by the introduction of the idea of the Global Partnership. However, at the High-Level meeting in Madrid, participants “agreed on the importance of an inclusive and broad process of consultation on options leading to the establishment of a Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition, which starts at the Madrid High Level Meeting” (UN 2009).

Concerns were raised by some countries and participants about the launch of the Global Partnership and the Contact Group. In a statement at the closing plenary CSOs expressed their opposition to the top-down approach that was being forwarded and the lack of consultation and consensus involved in setting up the Global Partnership. Many CSOs rejected the entire process and saw it as a strategic move by wealthy countries and private interests to usurp power and legitimacy from a parallel process of reforming the UN Committee on World Food Security that was happening in consultation with CSOs and all UN member countries, not just the wealthiest. There was serious concern that the Global Partnership would promote the models of production and development that produced the problems governments were now trying to solve: depletion of natural resources, high-input dependency, reliance on fossil fuels for production and distribution and maintained focus on external markets. There was also concern that the Global Partnership did not build on existing institutions, but starting from new. In a statement to the Plenary, Louis Michel, the EC Development Commissioner, stated "We should not reinvent the wheel: we do not need new mechanisms."

Seven months later, in July 2009, at their Summit in L'Aquila, Italy, the G8 pledged to advance “the implementation of the Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food Security” consistent with their “other actions aimed at an improved global governance for food security”. They continued that the mission of the Global Partnership would include “enhancing cooperation in achieving global food security, promoting better coordination at the country level and ensuring that local and regional interests are duly voiced and considered” (G8 2009:para 9). It is interesting to note that “nutrition” had been dropped from the title of the Global Partnership.

In the Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security (November 2009), participants voiced support for the G8’s initiative with a decision to join “efforts and expertise to work in the Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition – building on existing structures to enhance governance and cooperation – promote better coordination at global,

regional and national levels and ensure that national and regional interests are duly voiced and considered”(FAO 2009a:para 7.2). Again, many rejected the Global Partnership which was widely perceived to be G8-led, at the exclusion of others. Those nations and organizations that opposed the Global Partnership pushed instead for the international community to do what the Global Partnership was claiming it wanted to do and make use of existing institutions, notably, the Committee on World Food Security.

The Committee on World Food Security is a forum in the United Nations System for review and follow-up of food security policies. Weeks prior to the World Summit on Food Security, intergovernmental agreement amongst the 123 member states had been reached: the CFS would reform to position itself as the foremost international forum for dealing with food security and nutrition. The Committee had adopted a reform document that aimed to ensure that the CFS would “fully play its vital role in the area of food security and nutrition, including international coordination” (CFS 2009b:Appendix H, para 2). This was after the Director-General of the FAO declared that one of the main reasons why “the CFS has [previously] been unable to fully accomplish its mission of monitoring food security” was due to a lack of “authority to evaluate and coordinate policies affecting world food security, in particular as regards production, agroindustry, trade, social safety nets and financing” (CFS 2009b:12). The new vision of the CFS was however defined within the emerging new architecture of global food security governance as a key part of the Global Partnership:

The reformed CFS as a central component of the evolving Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition will constitute the foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental platform for a broad range of committed stakeholders to work together in a coordinated manner and in support of country-led processes towards the elimination of hunger and ensuring food security and nutrition for all human beings (CFS 2009b:para 4).

This particular statement is politically laden and the result of intensive negotiations amongst CFS member states. The statement declares that the CFS will constitute “the” foremost platform. As one active negotiator from a G20 country explained in an interview:

The negotiations between “the” and “a” in the Summit Declaration – “the foremost” or “a foremost” – was huge and [some countries] couldn’t accept “the”, never. Perhaps they are now saying “the” just in their speech, but we have moved beyond that, because what other platform is there? There is no alternative unless we work with the institutions we have (Interview (negotiator from a G20 country), October 2011, Rome).

By 2013 there was widespread recognition that the reformed Committee on Food Security was *the* international platform for the discussion and coordination of food security policy. The G8 stated its support for the “fundamental” reform process in the “‘L’Aquila’ Joint Statement on Global Food Security”. The Declaration from the first meeting of G20 Agriculture Ministers expressed a commitment to work closely with the CFS to promote greater policy convergence and strengthen policy linkages at the global level (G20 2011). The UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) negotiated outcome document “The Future we Want” reaffirmed: “the important work and inclusive nature of the Committee on World Food Security

(CFS), including through its role in facilitating country-initiated assessments on sustainable food production and food security” (UN General Assembly 2012b:para 115). Most recently, at the 67th Session of the General Assembly (December 2012), in the report on Agriculture Development and Food Security, the General Assembly recognised “the important role and inclusive nature of the Committee on World Food Security as a key organ in addressing the issue of global food security, including in the context of the global partnership for food security” (UN General Assembly 2012a:para 26). While admittedly a “key organ” falls short of the reform vision of being the foremost platform, the quotes above suggest that at least rhetorically, and procedurally perhaps, the CFS is increasingly recognised as the intergovernmental and international platform for coordinating international food security policies.

However, to say that the CFS won the battle for leadership over varied attempts (explicit and implicit) by the G8 and G20 to usurp authority would be misleading and even naïve. A major loss in the battle for legitimacy between Rome-based agencies and New York-based agencies was the CFS’s failure to secure control over the financial arm of the restructuring of the architecture of global food security governance. On the eve of the French G8/G20 Presidency, a report noted that “[m]ore can be done to modernize global food security governance” and that the “CFS reform decided in 2009 is only one step” (République Française 2010:5). The Global Partnership faded from the political agenda only to be reimagined and re-launched in several different ways, for example through the G8’s New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. Yet, despite these challenges, the CFS continues to play a revitalised and central role in the emerging architecture of global food security governance.

In this chapter, the reformed CFS is reviewed with the aim of answering the primary research questions: To what extent is the CFS realising its reform objectives? To do this, a history of the CFS is presented. This is followed by a summary of the reform process and post-reform activities with a focus on the specific roles of the reformed CFS as outlined in the reform document, including: coordination at global level; policy convergence; support and advice to countries and regions; coordination at national and regional levels; and, promoting accountability and share best practices at all levels (CFS 2009a:para 5).²⁶ To gain greater insight into the workings of the CFS, two case studies are presented addressing civil society participation; policy roundtables; and, negotiations on the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security. The inquiry is informed by analysis of key documents, and data collected through field work and interviews.

26 The final role of the CFS reform (Phase II) was to develop a Global Strategic Framework for food security and nutrition. This is reviewed in detail in Chapter 8.

If the parable of the tortoise and the hare holds true for food security policy, the CFS may have the slow and steady advantage. Currently, the CFS has legitimacy and steady momentum. What it lacks in reaction time, high-level political interest and implementation capacity, it makes up for in experience, meaningful discussion and policy making, and innovative, transparent, participatory governance. However, in politics, races are not won by steady determination. As this section will illustrate, for the CFS to cross the finish line it will require more funding, the ability to broaden discussions to issues of trade and the environment, and the capacity to hold governments accountable for the decisions they make in the Committee. It also requires other actors to recognise its role and to respect the processes underway. This however raises the question of whether the world has the luxury of moving at a slow pace when it comes to addressing the pressing nature of food insecurity?

5.3. History of the Committee on World Food Security

As outlined in Chapter 4, the early 1970s were marked by a large-scale food crisis that prompted the organization of the 1974 World Food Conference. Upon recommendation of that Conference, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) was established as a Committee of the Council at the Eighteenth Session of the FAO Conference the following year (1975, Resolution 21/75). At the conference Member states

agreed on the need to establish a Committee on World Food Security as a standing committee of the Council, in order to provide a forum for regular intergovernmental consultations and to carry out the functions proposed by the World Food Conference ... The new Committee should, inter alia, keep under review the progress achieved towards an effective international grains arrangement and the degree to which it was likely to accelerate implementation of the principles of the Undertaking. The Conference also recommended that at its first session the Committee on World Food Security review the actions being taken by interested governments to implement the Undertaking [on World Food Security] as well as the further steps required (FAO 1975: IV.43).

The CFS was thus originally envisioned not only as a forum for consultation but was also tasked with a monitoring function through the review of the international grains arrangement as well as policies supporting the International Undertaking on World Food Security including: current and prospective demand; supply and stock position for basic food-stuffs; periodically evaluating the adequacy of current and prospective stock levels in exporting and importing countries; and, reviewing steps taken by governments to implement the International Undertaking on World Food Security.

The constitution of the FAO further described the role of the CFS as being to assist the FAO conference. While the Terms of Reference and composition of the CFS were also to be governed by the FAO Conference, reporting of the CFS was to be to the Conference and to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (Article III.9). The reporting to the UN General Assembly is important as it extends the mandate and reach of the CFS beyond the FAO.

Historically, the CFS played a relatively minor role in international politics and was generally ineffective and inactive due to a lack of interest and buy-in from member states and an insufficient budget (Shaw 2007). Echoing these sentiments and going a step further, at the time of the reform in 2009, the Director-General of the FAO noted that despite “its intergovernmental nature as a forum of sovereign States, its universal composition and its neutrality” there are at least five reasons why the CFS failed to achieve its mission of monitoring food security:

- i) it lacks a high-level international policy-making body in the sectors of international cooperation and of food and agriculture; ii) it lacks an integrated framework for short-, medium-, and long-term sectoral scientific advice on hunger; iii) it lacks authority to evaluate and coordinate policies affecting world food security, in particular as regards production, agroindustry, trade, social safety nets and financing; iv) it lacks an effective mechanism to track food security decisions and actions at national and regional level; and v) it lacks the financial resources needed to carry out its mandate (CFS 2009b:13).

These limitations will be revisited in the conclusion of this section to assess whether they have been addressed through the reform process.

5.4. Original Structure and Mandate: Pre-reform (1974-2008)

The CFS emerged as a Category 1 governing and statutory body, meaning that it hosts intergovernmental meetings to which Member Governments send official delegations. The terms of reference of the Committee are outlined in Rule XXXIII of the General Rules of the Organization (GRO) with the 2009 reforms outlined in the CFS Reform Document (CFS: 2009/2 Rev.2) incorporated in Part Q of Volume II of the Basic Texts of FAO. The points that make up the Rule were laid out in 1976 and amended in 1997 after the World Food Summit. The Rule clarified that the CFS would be open to all Member Nations of the FAO and UN and states wishing to become members of the CFS needed to notify the Director-General in writing of their intention to participate in the work of the Committee. Rule XXXIII also stipulates that consultants may be used by FAO to assist the Secretariat in various ways, including the introduction of agenda items. In accordance with the General Rules of the FAO and with the "Principles" set out in Volume II of the Basic Texts, meetings of the CFS could be attended by observers from Member Nations, non-Member Nations, and international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations having established relations with FAO.

In 1997, the objective of the CFS was renewed to bring them in line with the outcomes of the World Food Summit. The updated objective was listed as being to “contribute to promoting the objective of world food security with the aim of ensuring that all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”.

Other changes made to the Rule in 1997 are instructive. For example, in the 1976 versions, point five notes that:

5. The Committee shall: a) Keep the current and prospective demand, supply and stock position for basic foodstuffs under continuous review, in the context of world food security, and disseminate timely information on developments; b) Make periodic evaluations of the adequacy of current and prospective stock levels, in aggregate, in exporting and importing countries, in order to assure a regular flow of basic foodstuffs to meet requirements in domestic and world markets, including food aid requirements, in time of short crops and serious crop failure; c) Review the steps taken by governments to implement the international Undertaking on World Food Security; and d) Recommend such short-term and longer-term policy action as may be considered necessary to remedy any difficulty foreseen in assuring adequate cereal supplies for minimum world food security.

This changed in 1997 to read:

5. The Committee shall contribute to promoting the objective of world food security with the aim of ensuring that all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.

In the revised rule, the monitoring and evaluation functions of the Committee were dropped along with requirements to report to the World Food Council and to encourage the participation of the International Wheat Council. Instead the CSF was to provide regular reports to ECOSOC, to work more closely with the other Rome-based food agencies and “invite relevant international organizations to participate in the work of the Committee and the preparation of meeting documents on matters within their respective mandates in collaboration with the secretariat of the Committee” (FAO 1997).

The changes made to point 6 of the Rule placed emphasis on the CFS “as a forum in the United Nations system for review and follow-up of policies concerning world food security” that will “in particular examine major problems and issues affecting the world food situation, examine the implications for world food security relating to the supply and demand of basic food stuffs and food aid and recommend such action as may be appropriate to promote the goal of world food security” (FAO 1997).

Whereas the CFS was originally meant review the steps taken by governments to implement the International Undertaking on World Food Security, after the World Food Summit the focus of the Committee shifted to monitoring the implementation of the Plan of Action adopted by the World Food Summit in accordance with the relevant commitment of the Summit.

Considering the evolution of the CFS in relation to the evolution of food security policy described in Chapter 4, discrepancies arise. Maxwell’s (1996) paradigms that saw the objectives of food security shift from global and national focus to household level focus; from a food first approach to a livelihoods approach; and from objective indicators to subjective indicators. Similar observations can be made when reflecting on other evaluations of the evolution of food security (Carolan 2013; FAO 2006). Changes made to the structure of the CFS between 1974 and 1997 suggest that the very little had changed at least with respect to status quo understandings of the problems, solutions and the role of the UN therein. After the World Food Summit, the CFS remained focused at the global and national level with a commitment on production and objective indicators. Perhaps this reflects a stagnation in global policy processes,

where development, agrifood and agricultural practitioners have moved ahead. It also suggests that Maxwell's genealogy of food security up to the mid-1990s is not relevant to the institutional reform and evolution of the CFS.

Despite changes to the Rule, for reasons listed above, the CFS remained politically inactive and increasingly benign, despite on-going support of various CSOs – notably the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC) – that had been increasingly active in the CFS and saw the potential and value of a UN Committee to coordinate global food security policy.

5.5. Reforming the CFS

Faced with rising hunger, a poor history of performance, and threats to FAO leadership in the area of food security, CFS member states agreed at the 34th Session in October 2008 to undertake a reform “so that [the CFS] can fully play its vital role in the area of food security and nutrition, including international coordination” (FAO 2013a:207). The FAO Council considered “the CFS reform to be crucial to the governance of world food security, with a view toward exploring synergies with the emerging Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition” (FAO 2009c:para 29). There were several factors that contributed to the reform for the CFS. The Reform Document specifically referenced rising hunger, weak performance, and the need to “fully play its vital role in the area of food security and nutrition, including international coordination” as key motivations (CFS 2009a:para 2). Alongside these factors, it is important to recognise that the seeds of reform had been planted well before the food price spikes. This point was reinforced in the final report of the civil society consultation:

For the last decade, civil society, people's/social movements and NGOs have been working not only to have civil society recognized as official participants in the CFS process but also to ensure that they are able to organize autonomously and give priority to those most affected by hunger. In particular, since the 2002 World Food Summit: Five Years Later, the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC) has been working towards such efforts, acting as a facilitating network to bring local struggles of marginalized groups into global debates (Duncan and Von Anrep 2010:5).

The IPC is an international network that brings together several organizations representing farmers, fisherfolk, and small and medium scale farmers, agricultural workers and indigenous peoples, as well as NGOs. It plays the role of facilitating the discussions between NGOs, social organizations and movements, as well as facilitating the dialogue with FAO. The IPC formalised in preparation for the June 2002 World Food Summit: Five years later. In January 2003, the IPC and FAO co-signed an Exchange of Letters which laid out a programme of work in follow-up to the Summit and the Forum in four priority areas: the Right to Food; agro-ecological approaches to food production; local access to and control of natural resources; and agricultural trade and food sovereignty. This network played a fundamental role not only in advancing the reform of the CFS but in discrediting the proposal for a Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition. Many of the leaders within the IPC came to play a

key role in the development of the International Civil Society Mechanism to the Committee on World Food Security (described in more detail in Chapter 6).

The process for developing the reform document was tasked to a Contact Group, established by the CFS Bureau. The Contact Group was structured in a novel way, giving full participation to civil society organization. This meant that in practice CSOs had the right to table and respond to reform proposals through the Contact Group's website and to attend and intervene at meetings. Through this process, it was widely recognised by member states that civil society participation was fundamental not only to a successful process but also to the vision of the final document.

Work within the Contact Group was divided across four Working Groups that focussed on key sections of the reform process: role and vision of the renewed CFS; membership and decision making; mechanisms and procedures; and High Level Panel of Experts. The Contact Group met in person a total of seven times between their first meeting in April 2009 and the adoption of the reform document in October 2009. They also communicated online. Over these months, the reform document went through a number of drafts.

The reform of the CFS involved eight months of negotiation between the Committee's Bureau and an interim Contact Group, which included civil society representatives. Thus, from the very start of this phase, civil society participated in the reform process. However, their engagement was based on at least three key factors: the broader and longer-term participatory turn that had already infiltrated the FAO and the Committee; a history of lobbying on the part of CSOs; and, a sympathetic Chair. As one negotiator from a G20 country explained in an interview:

In the beginning of 2009... the new chair of the CFS... got a mandate to reform but they didn't know where to go or what to do, and she called that meeting ... to propose to countries to create the contact group for the reform of the CFS... And in the end people decided to compose this loose Contact Group that would include people from civil society, and then the precedent was set and this Contract Group moved things away from the usual bureaucracy of FAO (Interview (negotiator from a G20 country), October 2011 Rome).

In October 2009, at the 35th Session of the CFS, the then 123 member countries approved the final version of the reform document, thereby agreeing to reform the Committee with the aim of making it the foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental platform for a broad range of committed stakeholders to work together in a coordinated manner and in support of country-led processes towards the elimination of hunger and ensuring food security and nutrition for all human beings (CFS 2009a:para 4).

The Reform Document outlined specific terms of reference for the Committee on World Food Security designed to roll out in two phases. Phase I concerned coordination at the global level, policy convergence and support for countries and regions. The goal was to ensure that the CFS "provide a platform for discussion and coordination to strengthen collaborative action among Governments, regional organizations, international organizations and agencies, NGOs, CSOs, food producers' organizations, private sector organizations, philanthropic organizations and other relevant stakeholders, in a manner that is in alignment with each country's specific context

and needs.” The focus on collaboration reinforced the CFS as an inclusive forum and making linkages to the national context to ensure relevance and applicability. For Phase II the CFS was to gradually take on additional roles of national and regional level coordination by serving as a “platform to promote greater coordination and alignment of actions in the field, encourage more efficient use of resources and identify resource gaps,” promote accountability and share best practices at all levels; and, develop a Global Strategic Framework for food security and nutrition “to improve coordination and guide synchronized action by a wide range of stakeholders” (CFS 2009a:para 6). By 2013, the CFS had begun to share best practices through plenary presentations as well as voluntary guidelines, and adopted a Global Strategic Framework. With respect to regional and national coordination, this is arguably well outside the scope and capacity of the CFS. The CFS has been active in the FAO regional conferences and does have a key role to play ensuring coordination and cohesion around food security policy at the global, regional and national levels. There is also recognition that for the CFS to be effective, the policy recommendations and guidelines endorsed by the Committee will need national and regional-level uptake.

The phased roles of the reformed CFS mirror the Committee’s 1974 objectives with expanded participation and less responsibility for monitoring. As a reminder, the original resolution established the CFS to provide a forum for regular intergovernmental consultations, review progress achieved towards an international grains agreement while also reviewing the actions taken by states towards advancing the Undertaking on World Food Security. It is indeed fundamental to recognise that there was a specific political context that allowed for the CFS reform.

5.6. Actors in the CFS

The reformed CFS includes the Plenary of the CFS; the CFS Bureau and its Advisory Group; the High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) and the Secretariat serving the CFS (Plenary, Bureau and its Advisory Group, and HLPE).

5.6.1. Plenary

According to the Reform Document (CFS 2009a:para 20):

The Plenary is the central body for decision-taking, debate, coordination, lesson-learning and convergence by all stakeholders at global level on issues pertaining to food security and nutrition and on the implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security. It should focus on relevant and specific issues related to food security and nutrition in order to provide guidance and actionable recommendations to assist all stakeholders in eradicating hunger.

The Plenary meets annually in Rome but can come together for extra-ordinary sessions when deemed necessary. The Plenary is made up of member states, participants, including representatives of UN agencies and bodies with a specific mandate in the field of food security and nutrition; Civil society and non-governmental organizations and their networks with strong relevance to issues of food security and nutrition with particular attention to organizations

representing smallholder family farmers, artisanal fisherfolk, herders/pastoralists, landless, urban poor, agricultural and food workers, women, youth, consumers, Indigenous Peoples, and International NGOs; International agricultural research systems; International and regional Financial Institutions; and, representatives of private sector associations and private philanthropic foundations active in the areas of concern to the Committee (CFS 2009a:para 11).

5.6.2. Member States

Questions of legitimacy loom large over multilateral fora and part of the CFS's claim to legitimacy has been based on the opening up of participation within the Committee. While the Global Partnership was perceived by many to be creating a new institution behind closed doors and under the leadership of a small group of elite nations, in contrast, the CFS worked to enhance transparency and participation. This sentiment is affirmed in the Reform Document:

the process of defining strategies and actions to be adopted by Members should be transparent and take into consideration the views of all participants and stakeholders to the fullest extent possible in order to foster ownership and full participation during implementation of these strategies and actions (CFS 2009a:para 18).

This, along with the commitment to UN principles of consensus decision-making, one-country-one-vote, and recognition of the need to support the autonomous participation of civil society organizations, the private sector and philanthropic foundations, was pivotal in distinguishing the CFS from other initiatives, such as the Global Partnership.

The language around inclusiveness, especially with reference to “those most affected by food insecurity” is important. This language reflects not only the recognition of the historic and important role of CSOs in and across the work of the FAO and the CFS, it also conforms to a trend in global governance towards increased participation. Another important thing to note about Paragraph 7 of the Reform Document is the focus on “effectiveness” which is backed up by the description of “inter-sessional activities”. In order to make the CFS more effective, it was agreed that the Committee needed to be active throughout the year, and not just at the annual sessions. To support this work, the CFS established Open-Ended Working Groups (OEWG) and Task Teams (TT). Examples of this include:

- OEWG on the Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Forests and Fisheries (VGs);
- OEWG on Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investments;
- Task Team on How to Increase Food Security and Small-holder Sensitive Investment in Agriculture;
- Task Team on Food Price Volatility;
- Task Team on Gender, Food Security and Nutrition;
- Task Team on the Global Strategic Framework; and,
- Task Team on the Mapping of Food Security and Nutrition Actions and Country Level.

The implication of the inter-sessional focus, which comes through in the wider analysis of the reformed CFS, is an increased workload but also increased output. Furthermore, the CFS opted to focus on building linkages at the regional and country level, as it is “crucial that the work of the CFS is based on the reality on the ground”(CFS 2009a:para 23). This is central to the reform strategy to increase communication and to ensure that results of deliberations of the Plenary are disseminated. Indeed, as noted above, food security is a national responsibility and within the CFS, member-states remain decision makers. It is thus fundamental that the outcomes of the CFS are relevant and applicable at the national level.

Members of the CFS have the right to intervene in plenary and breakout discussions, approve meeting documents and agendas, submit and present documents and formal proposals, and interact with the Bureau during the inter-sessional period. They also have the exclusive right to vote and take decisions, including drafting the final report of CFS Plenary sessions. The membership of the Committee is open to all Members of FAO, WFP or IFAD, or non-member States of FAO that are member States of the United Nations.

At the 39th Session of the CFS (2012), 116 member countries were represented by delegations along with 15 non-Member States of the Committee. Amongst these delegations, 24 ministers were registered. Also in attendance were 11 UN agencies and bodies, 111 CSOs, two international research organizations, three international and regional financial institutions, 46 private sector associations and private philanthropic foundations and 32 observers. In 2013, there were 121 member nations, down from 123 at the time of reform in 2009. Between 2009 and 2010, Latvia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Togo left the CFS but many countries joined, bringing the number of member nations up to 126. New countries were: Central African Republic; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Djibouti; Oman; the former Yugoslav; and Republic of Macedonia.

Other Countries that were involved in the reform but have since left the Committee are: Azerbaijan; Croatia; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; Lithuania; Mauritius; Namibia; Niger; Republic of Moldova; Serbia; and, Tunisia. However, many countries have joined or re-joined the CFS since 2009: Burundi; Chad; Israel; Liberia; Libya; Mauritania; Togo; and Syrian Arab Republic.

Ensuring the engagement of Member States is fundamental to the success of the CFS. As one leading human rights campaigner noted:

The CFS has not demonstrated itself to be the alternative for the governments. What is the role of the CFS as a platform? It is the multiplatform space that the governments have to choose as the main mechanism to govern food security and nutrition but if we look at the G20 and the G8 they continue to talk about the global partnership which is a process led by the private sector. The CFS needs a mandate to promote international policy coherence and they need governments to be in the seat where they can make decisions (field work May 2011, Rome).

This statement was later reinforced by a representative of a large International NGO active in the CSM since the beginning, who noted “the CFS is nothing without governments” (Interview (Representative of a large International NGO), June 2012, Rome).

Member States are “encouraged to participate in Committee sessions at the highest level possible (Ministerial or cabinet level is desirable), insofar as possible representing a common, inter-ministerial governmental positions” (CFS 2009a:Para 9). Ministerial engagement in the CFS has been limited but the engagement of ministers can be interpreted as a double-edged sword. While low-level political engagement in the CFS results in a host of challenges and places the CFS low on the list of political priorities, the lack of high-level engagement also gives the CFS the ability to work on more controversial issues. From observing CFS Sessions it is clear that Ministers come and deliver speeches, often focused on initiatives underway in their countries. This supports the CFS goal of sharing best practices but these interventions often fails to tie into the broader work underway at the CFS. These are political speeches and not contributions to discussion. The reformed CFS seeks to be a platform for discussion. Indeed, throughout the first few post-reform sessions, many diplomats presented political speeches instead of providing contributions to the discussions, however, by the 39th session, most had begun to understand the new format and grandiose statements about local initiatives were increasingly rare. If the CFS was to gain greater political clout it is likely that there would be increased ministerial interest and by extension, ministerial presence in Plenary. Almost paradoxically, this increased high-level interest could threaten the CFS insofar as it would likely result in a regression to political speeches, moving away from the very important, engaging and inclusive discussions that now mark the plenary sessions. This observation and analysis was correlated in many interviews.

As a negotiator from a G20 country explained:

I think the most appropriate level for the CFS... is just under the minister level, the national secretary level that we have there [in the negotiator's country]. It's a high-level office that has the power to ... these are the guys that run the government programmes. They report to their Ministers. They have a lot of capacity to sell ideas to their Ministers, if they want. They are pretty high-level, but still they don't require to be there and give general statements and that kind of thing. Whenever a minister comes, their delegations are only worried about taking care of the minister... so I don't think it's also healthy for it to be only the permanent representatives. I think that is also a failure. People have to come from the capital. Also, the officers involved with the policies and so on. It may be different for each country. In developing countries, maybe those who are running food security programmes. For Canada, maybe the head of the food security and development agencies (Interview (negotiator from a G20 country), October 2011, Rome).

When asked what role relevant Ministers should play, they responded:

The conference, the FAO conference, is political, where the ministers come. In one room, they are representing everything that comes from the sub-committees of the FAO. That is done by the same people [representing member states in the CFS]. In the other room, in the Plenary, there is scheduled of time for general statements by the ministers over the whole week (Interview (negotiator from a G20 country), October 2011, Rome).

5.6.3. Secretariat

The CFS Secretariat is meant to remain small and permanently located within the FAO. However, the reform document stipulates:

For the biennium 2010-2011, the Secretariat will be headed by a Secretary from FAO and include staff from the other Rome-based agencies (WFP and IFAD). Further arrangements regarding the Secretary, including possible rotation among the three Rome-based agencies, and the inclusion in the Secretariat of other UN entities directly concerned with food security and nutrition, should be decided by the CFS plenary in 2011 (CFS 2009a:para 34).

Internal discussions and letters sent to the CFC Chair suggest that the FAO was actively trying to maintain control of the Secretariat whereas the World Food Programme was trying to gain more authority, and, importantly backing up their proposals with funding. The FAO's position expressed in a letter from the Director General of the FAO, was that given the multi-disciplinary nature of the activities of the CFS, there was a requirement of involvement from numerous FAO Departments and Divisions, as well as substantive and organizational contributions. Given the "exigencies of the function" of the Secretariat, the FAO argued that the Secretary of the Committee be a FAO senior staff member. They further rationalised this by stating that the Chair was a Division Director and had played a key role mobbing the CFS reform forward. Importantly, the FAO argued that "changing the Secretary at this juncture would be ill-advised and would not be a strategic move as it may very well jeopardize the achievements made to date".

The FAO rejected the argument for a systematic rotation of the Secretary, arguing that "ownership involves primarily a common sharing of the vision and goals of the Committee, translated in common work". They continue "a system where the Secretary would have to rotate every two years would create unnecessary discontinuity and disruption and have a negative impact on the substantive work of the Committee."

The Executive Director of the World Food Programme disagreed. In her letter to the Chair, she noted that the "WFP is of the opinion that the rotation of the function of the Secretary of the Committee is fully in line with the vision and the spirit of the CFS reform process." She continued that the rotation of the function of CFS Secretary would "be among the next steps to complete the reform process. Noted benefits of the rotation for the WFP included further consolidation of the identity of the CFS as a central UN political platform and the addition of new perspectives to the CFS, including further emphasis on national and household food security and nutrition concerns. The WFP proposed modalities of operation for the CFS Secretariat to be reflected in a revision of the Rules of Procedures of the CFS. First, the CFS would remain physically located in FAO, as per the reform document, meaning that FAO would continue to provide office space. The Secretary post should be full time and the WFP was willing to provide a staff member at the level of Director to assume the function of the CFS Secretary on a rotational basis for two years. The incumbent would be identified following WFP's internal selection procedures with the staff cost registered as in-kind contribution to the

core CFS Secretariat budget. The WFP-appointed CFS Secretary could manage WFP, FAO and IFAD staff who would remain the original contractual status of their respective agencies. In support of these proposals, WFP noted it was willing to increase its financial participation in the CFS to cover a third of the total CFS Secretariat operating costs, increasing their contributions from \$900,000 USD per biennium to around \$1.4 million USD for the 2012/2013 biennium. By the 39th Session in October 2012, the CFS decided to mandate the “Bureau to develop the selection procedures, including the required qualifications and the terms of reference, for the position of the CFS Secretary, together with modalities and requirements for inclusion in the Secretariat of other UN entities directly concerned with food security and nutrition, with a view to submitting proposals to the Committee during its plenary session in October 2013” (CFS 2012b:para 43).

5.6.4. Chair, Bureau and Advisory Group

The Chairperson role has been fundamental to the success of the CFS and indeed the individuals who held the role of Chair during the reform and for the first two sessions of the reformed CFS played critical roles in the evolution and success of the reformed Committee. It was the Argentinian chair, Alternate Permanent Representative of Argentina to FAO who, during the reform process, encouraged the inclusion of civil society as official participants. The Chair that presided over the first two Sessions of the reformed CFS exemplified a deep understanding of and respect for process. He was able to enforce the process when members steered away and reinforce the rights of participants to engage in the process in accordance with the terms of the reform document.

At the 39th Session of the CFS, the Committee examined document CFS 2012/39/12 Rev.1 “Proposed Amendments to the CFS Rules of Procedure and to Rule XXXIII of the General Rules of the Organization” and proposed an amendment. By exceeding the required two thirds majority of votes cast, the Committee approved the amendment:

The Chairperson shall be elected for a period of two years on a rotational basis among regions and on the basis of individual qualifications and experience relevant to the mandate of CFS. He or she shall not be eligible for election for two consecutive terms in the same office. His/her term of office shall expire at the end of the Committee meeting where the elections of a new Chairperson is held.

The results of the vote were 88 votes for, one against and zero abstentions although the Member State which voted against indicated that it did so by mistake and that its intention was to vote for the amendments. The biggest issue on the new Rules was that the Chairperson can be elected for a period of two years on a rotational basis of individual qualifications and can only hold the term two times (total of four years).

The Chair of the first two Sessions of the reformed CFS, had been seconded by the Department of Agriculture of the Philippines as Agriculture Attaché to Philippines Permanent Representation to FAO. From 2003-04 he served as Co-chair in the Intergovernmental Working Group that formulated the Right to Food Guidelines. In 2009, he was elected to serve as the

Chairperson of the CFS and successfully guided the Committee through the implementation of the CFS Reform. Importantly, this chair was not a diplomat or a negotiator, he was technically oriented with field experience and experience facilitation participatory processes.

The election of the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Nigeria to FAO as CFS Chair in 2011 was important insofar as it motivated many African Nations to become more involved, a feeling confirmed in many of the interviews. For example, it was noted that country representatives are more likely to get involved in the CFS if the Chair comes from the same region as they feel that they will be better represented. Given that there have only been two chairs since the reform, it is hard substantiate this observation. That said, the new Chair, the Africa Group has become more engaged. It is perhaps more likely that the issues being addressed by the CFS (such as land tenure and investment in agriculture) explain this. However, when asked about participation of Asian countries in the CFS, a representative of an international NGO based in Rome, noted that:

over the last few years we had a chair that was from the Philippines, so I think they [Asians] felt like they were represented. They needed... they were a bit more there, to support the chair. Now, an African is Chair and so there has been a change (Interview (Representative of an international NGO), October 2012, Rome).

There was also concern, especially amongst CSOs, that replacing someone with technical expertise with someone with a political mandate could potentially challenge a fragile CFS.

The importance of a strong chair was identified by many to be central to the success of the CFS, not only to ensure legitimacy but also to enhance participation. One UK Diplomat noted that:

I think finally, and most importantly, I think people are central. I think it is really, really important to have a good chair of the CFS, who not only can act as an ambassador of the CFS, but also is able to coordinate and bring these functional elements together in order so that they may work together. I think that is absolutely key. So, what the UK has been pushing, and it hasn't got a lot of traction yet, obviously politics gets in the way, is to have a Chair's Terms of Reference for the role of the Chair of the CFS. It should not just be a political appointment but be based around a rotation between G77, OECD or Europeans, Africans, etc. You should have to be competent to qualify as a person who can do the job and deliver the mandate, and once to start writing out terms of reference, or a job description, you automatically start disqualifying a lot of potential candidates (Interview (UK Diplomat), date withheld to protect anonymity, Rome).

The Bureau is the executive arm of the CFS responsible for its administration. It is made up of a chairperson and representation on the Bureau is regionally organised with members drawn from twelve member countries: two from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Near East, and one from both North America and South-West Pacific.

The Advisory Group aides the Bureau to advance the objectives of the CFS, particularly to ensure linkages with stakeholders at all levels to support information exchange and provide outreach at the local level. The Advisory Group is made from representatives from UN bodies as well as four civil society representatives, one representative from international agricultural research bodies, one representative for the private sector, and one representative from philanthropic bodies. Presently, the private sector is lobbying to get an equal number of seats on

the Advisory Group as civil society. Their central argument has been that farmers are part of the private sector. Their attempts thus far have been unsuccessful.

5.6.5. Participants

The reformed CFS is open to participants who are representatives of UN agencies and bodies with a specific mandate in the field of food security and nutrition such as FAO, IFAD, WFP, the HLTF; civil society and non-governmental organizations and their networks; international agricultural research systems; international and regional financial institutions; and representatives of private sector associations and private philanthropic foundations active in the areas of concern to the Committee. The history of this trend is outlined in Case Study A.

When questioned about where the mandate for reforming the CFS came from, a negotiator from a G20 country said:

The mandate came from the CFS itself, the previous one, after the food crisis. So the food crisis was the start, and there was talk within the EU and Sarkozy, the French President and others, about that so-called global partnership, that no one quite knew what it was, and there was ... a resistance on the part of many G77 countries, and from FAO itself. They were feeling estranged by this talk of global partnership. And they said, look, you can do a global partnership for agriculture and food security, but we have an organization called Food and Agriculture here and everything should be done inside its premises, and look we have the Committee on Food Security. So it was the first defensive answer by FAO, led by FAO and fought by the developing countries that this proposal that came from some developed countries, because they didn't know what they were trying to get at (Interview (Negotiator from a G20 country), October 2011, Rome).

Civil society organizations played an active role in the reform process and managed to secure the right to facilitate their participation in the CFS through an autonomous Civil Society Mechanism (CSM). Their inclusion as participants on the Committee presents opportunities for more meaningful and active engagement in the procedures and debates leading up to final decision-making in the CFS, while final voting authority remains with the nation states. The term "civil society organizations" (CSOs) is used as an umbrella term to refer to both social movements and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs are understood to be organizations that represent a specific issue or theme or the interests of certain social groups. Social movements are defined here as self-organized social actors with a shared identity that have come together to represent their own interests and in the case of the CSM are from the developing world and live predominantly on the front line of food insecurity (Duncan and Barling 2012).²⁷

27 The FAO's (2013b) Strategy for Partnerships with Civil Society Organizations, the FAO proposes different definitions. Here, social movements are defined as a category that includes "platforms, committees, mechanisms, federations and networks of advocacy-based and policy-oriented organizations related to FAO's mandate on food security and nutrition, which promote claims or rights of specific constituencies. It then goes on to state "FAO has collaborated with various social movements working in food security including: the Civil Society Mechanism and the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty". The CFS CSM is in no way a social movement: it is a facilitation mechanism that plays a communications role to help civil society actors participate in the CFS.

The private sector also developed a mechanism outlined in a document titled “Proposal for Modalities for Private Sector Participation in the Committee for World Food Security [sic] (CFS 2011c). The Private Sector Mechanism is open to all private sector food actors who want to participate with a particular emphasis on those active in the area of food and nutrition at any level, particularly those that represent food producers, input suppliers, agro-retailers, grain traders, food manufacturers and retailers and other actors directly involved in producing and selling.

The Private Sector is represented by the International Agri-Food Network, an informal coalition of international trade associations involved in the agri-food sector at the global level created in 1996. The aim of the network is to facilitate informal liaison among the professional organizations and towards international organizations in the agri-food chain at global level. Currently, one person serves as the private sector representative at CFS. She has been responsible for coordinating the input business entities through the private sector mechanism, on behalf of the International Agrifood Network. She is directly affiliated with the International Fertilizer Industry Association where she holds the position of Director of Communications.

Interestingly, the Private Sector was supported by the Government of the United Kingdom for a year. In 2010, for the first session of the reformed CFS, the UK paid for the Chair of the CFS to have an assistant who provided procedural support. The following year, for the 37th session, the support to the Chair was dropped in favour of a position “Senior Private Sector Advisor” to the Secretariat of the Committee on World Food Security. The position was filled by a former consultant on private sector finance with experience working in the Trade and Markets Division of the FAO. The UK provided no support to the Civil Society Mechanism.

However, that the UK has engaged at all in the CFS is telling. As one UK diplomat explained in an interview:

The UK wasn’t engaged in the CFS at all until 2010. As part of the FAO reform, we pushed very strongly for the CFS reform. And the new structure of the CFS, to be a more inclusive body, is an approach that we value a lot. In terms of how it’s progressing from 2010 to 2012, it remains to be seen (Interview (UK diplomat), date withheld to protect anonymity, Rome).

That said, they remained focused on engaging the private sector, noting that they “would like to see more contribution from the private sector”. When questioned about their satisfaction with their investment, a UK Diplomat explained:

Answer: It was a small investment.

Question: Like \$1,000?

Answer: 60,000 pounds. Yes and no. No, probably because there is a point of re-education amongst the member states to identify what the value of having the private sector there was. There is a real suspicion within the FAO of the private sector and of how to work with them, so. That was one negative. So, he [the consultant] couldn’t get as much traction as he wanted. Then there was an issue

with Agri-Food Network. They had a very different perception of how to work and it was quite difficult to manage. And the previous Chair didn't manage it as well as he could. But, as a positive, it put the private sector on everyone's radar. Because people have been hammering on about it. They have been saying it without knowing what it means. The next step is to have a definition of where the private sector comes in. And coming back to your point about small-holder farmers and where they fit it, they fit in civil society as well as the private sector, so (Interview (UK diplomat), date withheld to protect anonymity, Rome).

The reference to the re-education of member states about the value of the private sector is illustrative of a tension between many states: those who actively advance a neoliberal agenda in the fight against hunger, and those who seek out alternatives, normally grounded in a strong state. This is illustrative of the tensions between the Washington Consensus and Seoul Consensus described in Chapter 2. The statement also highlights the key role of the chair in ensuring the functioning of the CFS, an issue discussed above. The issue of challenges between the consultant and the Agri-Food Network that represents the private sector at the CFS is illustrative of tensions between experts and self-organising mechanisms within the CFS. The statement also highlights the importance of timing which comes up in the case studies.

Reflecting on this statement made in the name of the UK Government, it is surprising to read about the perception of "real suspicion" of the private sector on the part of FAO staff. While it is very likely that individuals across the FAO are cautious when it comes to engaging with the private sector, there are also many examples of the FAO partnering with the private sector. The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, has argued that that despite arguably legitimate objectives, there is a "lack of transparency over the conditions of deliberation, acceptance or finding of certain past partnerships and initiatives" between the FAO and the private sector (de Schutter 2013). Given the increase in private sector interest in agriculture since the 2008 food price crisis, and the corresponding interest in activities of the FAO, the Special Rapporteur questions "whether the FAO will remain credible as a guardian of the public interest and as an impartial body when it intervenes to share global responses to food insecurity" (de Schutter 2013:para 54).

In an interview with a UK Diplomat, a discussion came up about make-up of the Advisory Group and a question was put forward by the Diplomat:

Diplomat: What do you think about the inclusiveness of the CFS? How do you feel about the idea that there should be more representation from the private sector or from the Civil Society Mechanism?

Interviewer: I don't think that they [the private sector] need more representation ... the role of civil society, through the mechanism, is to represent or communicate the views of a wide diversity of constituencies. That is not the aim of the private sector. The main role of CSOs after contributing to debate within the CFS is accountability. Their main job is to ensure that governments are doing what they said they are going to do. And this is not the role of the private sector... So I don't see the need for four representatives from the Private Sector on the Advisory Group to the Committee on World Food Security. There is a real need for a strong single representative, but I don't know what value it would add, having four representatives.

Diplomat: I think having a more representative role of the private sector, having the Agri-Food Network as one representative trying to represent all the private sector is ridiculous. It's silly (Interview (UK diplomat), date withheld to protect anonymity, Rome).

Cohesion aside, the CFS benefits from private sector engagement in so far as it demonstrates wide participation across stakeholder groups. Forty-six private sector representatives attended the 39th Session of the CFS. Yet, far from engaged in the negotiations – a responsibility delegated to the Private Sector Focal Point – they were most visible at the side events, often giving presentations.

There has been widespread recognition across the CFS that because CSOs represent the voices of those most affected by food insecurity, because they also represent the largest group of food producers, and because of existing relations of power and access to resources, they should hold more seats on the CFS Advisory Group than the private sector or philanthropic foundations. However, mechanisms to ensure inclusion do not inherently ensure inclusion, both in terms of who can engage (as seen in the example of the food price volatility roundtable) but also in terms of who tries to engage. With respect to the latter, the private sector has developed a mechanism and have been present and relatively active in negotiations. The same cannot be said for philanthropic foundations.

In an interview with a UK Diplomat it was noted:

Answer: The last conversation I had [with the Gates Foundation] about the CFS was very telling. And it was not a very positive conversation. They were reconsidering their engagement and assessing what the value of the CFS was. And if you have a stakeholder like the Gates Foundation “saying what is the value of this body? We are not going to engage anymore”, it has a political domino effect ... To paraphrase their view last year, it was, “we don't need the CFS: we can do it ourselves”. But their idea was that there doesn't need to be a policy coherence and coordination mechanism. Well, for them, they think it already exists. It is an interesting way of looking at it. Also, they have got...they attend Davos, they attend the G8, they attend the G20, and so they think there are a huge number of bodies out there trying to coordinate around agriculture, food security and nutrition and the value of the CFS only recently came out (Interview (UK diplomat), date withheld to protect anonymity, Rome).

The point about the Gates Foundation, which has a seat on the CFS Advisory Group, is an important one. The issue, from the perspective of CFS supported is that to by-pass the CFS, or to withdraw, the Gates Foundation is taking itself out of the legitimate, democratic forum for discussions and sharing of best practices on food security policy. It could be argued that given the work they do, the projects they fund, and the influence they have, it would be irresponsible of them to withdraw their participation and would suggest that they assume they can act unilaterally, outside of consultative and informative discussions on food security. This is highly problematic. Unfortunately, for reasons of time and space, this research does not delve into the complexity and changing influence of philanthropic foundations in the CFS or the multilateral transnational food security governance space. However, it recognises that without meaningful

participation from one of the world's largest donors to agriculture projects, the CFS will not be able to secure its position as the foremost inclusive platform for food security.

5.6.6.High-Level Panel of Experts

The CFS reform sought to position the CSM as a decision-making committee whose decisions “gain resonance and efficiency on the ground” (HLPE 2013:1). Decisions are often expected to be taken on issues where uncertainty abounds, both with respect to the knowledge base as well as the potential impacts of policies. Furthermore, with increased participation from diverse actors comes a welcomed widening of perspectives which can exacerbate already divergent positions. Aware of this tension, during the Reform process the CFS decided that decisions taken in the CFS should be informed by shared, independent and comprehensive advice. The High Level Panel of Experts for Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE) was thus created as the scientific and knowledge-based pillar of the Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE 2013:1).

The design of the HLPE process, its rules and procedures, and the composition of the Steering Committee were decided on by the CFS. The HLPE reports to the CFS to “ensure the legitimacy and relevance of the studies undertaken, and their insertion in a concrete political agenda at international level” (HLPE 2013:2). The HLPE has a two-tier structure composed of a Steering Committee of fifteen internationally recognised experts in food security and nutrition-related fields. The experts were appointed by the Bureau of the CFS following a call for nominations and the review of candidatures and a proposition by an ad-hoc technical selection committee comprised of members of FAO, WFP, IFAD, Bioversity International (for CGIAR) and a CSO representative. The Steering Committee is supported by Project Teams that are compiled and managed by the Steering Committee to analyse and report on specific issues. The HLPE is exclusively funded through a voluntary trust fund held in the FAO. The Fund covers the costs of the preparation of reports, Steering Committee and Project Teams meetings, translation and publication of reports, and Secretariat support.

The HLPE does not conduct new research. Instead, the reports are summaries of their review of existing research and knowledge with the value-added of global, multi-sectoral and multidisciplinary analysis and recommendations. These recommendations combine the extensive literature review with grounded experience from the field. Importantly, the HLPE has a commitment to reviewing and incorporating many forms of knowledge and best practices, much of which comes from local and global experiences and best practices. This commitment extends to the Steering Committee which has a civil society representative acting as co-chairperson.

The HLPE's role it is to provide advice on policy as well as technical and scientific issues upon the request of the CFS. The reports are meant to inform policy debates and improve the quality, effectiveness and coherence of food security and nutrition policies at all levels. A member of the HLPE Steering Committee explained:

If they [the CFS] want effective space for global policy discussion, coordination and decision making, they need special expertise and if only left to governments to make documents, the results are very weak. The idea is that an expert panel, which is not political, may help support better decision making. This is quite unprecedented. It is not normal for a global committee to have its own expert committee and there is recognition that there are various types of expertise (Field Work, October 2010, Rome).

These themes of the reports are decided upon during the Sessions of the CFS with input from all participants and the HLPE. The themes of the studies become the themes of the policy roundtables that take place during the Sessions. Once the themes are decided upon, the Steering Committee compiles a project team following an open call for interest of experts, and the reports are then produced following topic and time restrictions. The work then follows clearly defined stages “separating the elaboration of the political question and request by the CFS, its scientific formulation by the Steering Committee, the work of the time-bound and topic-bound Project Team, external open consultations to enrich the knowledge base, and an external scientific review” (HLPE 2013:2). The process aims to promote a scientific dialogue between the Steering Committee and the Project Team throughout the project cycle.

Within the project cycle, the HLPE coordinates two external consultations per report. The first focuses on the scope of the study and the second on a first draft (V0). This provides an opportunity to open the process to the public as well as to the HLPE roster of experts, which currently numbers over 1200. This process also provides important contributions and input which in turn allows the HLPE to further expand its knowledge base while being receptive to a diverse range of stakeholder perspectives.

According to a UK diplomat:

Another advantage of the CFS is that most of its policy products tend to be evidence-based because of the High-Level Panel of Experts. For example, the recent paper on Climate Change, in a way it's very good because it identifies and articulates a role for multilateral bodies working around climate change and food security, trying to really give us a way to go about it (Interview, March 2012, Rome) (Interview (UK diplomat), October 2012, Rome).

Since its reform the CFS has made annual requests to the HLPF. At its 36th Session (October 2010) the CFS requested the undertaking of studies and the development of policy recommendations in accordance with the CFS reform document, and the Rules and Procedures for the work of the HLPE. The topics of studies were: Price volatility and food security; Land tenure and international investments in agriculture; Climate change and food security; Social protection and food security.

For Price Volatility, the CFS specifically requested that the HLPE research:

All of its causes and consequences, including market distorting practices and links to financial markets, and appropriate and coherent policies, actions, tools and institutions to manage the risks linked to excessive price volatility in agriculture. This should include prevention and mitigation for vulnerable producers, and consumers, particularly the poor, women and children, that are appropriate to different levels (local, national, regional and international) and are based on a review of existing studies. The study should consider how vulnerable nations and

populations can ensure access to food when volatility causes market disruptions (HLPE 2013:9).

With respect to land tenure and international investment in agriculture, the HLPE was requested to examine the respective roles of large-scale plantations and of small-scale farming, including economic, social, gender and environmental impacts; review the existing tools allowing the mapping of available land; and, undertake a comparative analysis of tools to align large scale investments with country food security strategies.

These two reports on price volatility and food security and on land tenure and international investments in agriculture were finalized and published in July 2011. They served as background papers to the 37th Session of the CFS (October 2011) and are reviewed more extensively in Chapter 7.

The reports on climate change and on social protection, finalized and published in June 2012, informed discussions at the 39th Session of the CFS (October 2012). The HLPE was also requested to undertake studies on “biofuels and food security” as well as “constraints to investment in smallholder-farming” which were published in June 2013 in advance of the 40th Session of the CSF. At the 39th session (October 2012), the CFS also decided that the HLPE should undertake studies on “the role of sustainable fisheries and aquaculture for food security and nutrition”, and “food losses and waste in the context of sustainable food systems” which are expected for October 2014.

The reports of the High Level Panel of Experts have failed to have the impact that they were originally designed to have. The first indication of this came at the 37th Session when background session documents included not only HLPE reports but also reports by other actors. The concern here was that the HLPE was developed to provide the CFS with an independent, expert-led analysis of the state of the art on key issues and to develop appropriate recommendations. The process of developing the reports were not only independent and scientific but also consultative and paid attention to the inclusion of multiple forms of knowledge. In lieu of starting from the shared position of CFS commissioned research, the reports used in the preparation of the background documents for the Policy Roundtables at the 37th session included: The State of Food Insecurity in the World (SOFI) 2011 “How does international price volatility affect domestic economies and food security?; The State of Food and Agriculture (SOFA) 2011 “Women in agriculture: Closing the gender gap for development”; The World Bank World Development Report 2012 “Gender Equality and Development”; United Nations System Standing Committee on Nutrition (2010) “Sixth Report on the World Nutrition Situation”; “Addressing High Food Prices – A Synthesis of FAO Policy Consultation at Regional and Sub-Regional Level”; and, the G20 “Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture”. The inclusion of these reports as background documents illustrate the scope of the CFS and highlight links to other processes which does potentially advance the CFS’s goal of improved policy cohesion. At the same time, their inclusion diminishes the

research and reporting undertaken by the Committee's own Panel of Experts and provides an example of ways in which the CFS is potentially being undermined.

Despite these setbacks, the HLPE has maintained broad support from civil society organizations, facilitated in great part by the co-Chair of the Steering Committee, who represents civil society. The HLPE did however face critique with the publication of the report "Land tenure and international investment in Agriculture" (High Level Panel of Experts 2011a) when controversy was sparked around definitions of agro-ecology. Within Appendix 1, the Report noted:

Many processes affect crop performance, but a few have a major impact. They include processes helping plants use radiation, water and nutrients efficiently and evenly for crop growth (Monteith, 1990; Sinclair, 1990), those contributing to the soil water balance, and those affecting soil fertility. 'Optimum growth conditions' means agro-ecological conditions where crops have all the water and nutrients they need for growth and are protected against pest, diseases and weeds. We focus on primary plant production as it also determines secondary animal production (High Level Panel of Experts 2011a:53).

The definition included in the report reflected a productionist approach and it was felt that the definition included in the report could be easily applied to industrial modes of production that did not uphold agro-ecological principles. CSOs challenged this definition of agro-ecology arguing instead that the definitions outline in the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD 2009) would have been more appropriate and reflective of international consensus. They argued that IAASTD was a major global consultative process involving 900 participants and 110 countries from all regions of the world. The Executive Summary of the Synthesis Report was approved by 58 countries.

To summarize, a key part of the CFS's claim to legitimacy is the work of its independent Panel of Experts. Given the political nature of the negotiations, it is expected that some governments will not approve all of the recommendations. However, a strong HLPE is fundamental for a strong CFS and enforces the reform objectives and claims to legitimacy. As a final point on the HLPE, it is important to note that the topics undertaken by the HLPE upon request of the CFS are in no way simple or uncontroversial. Indeed, in the last four years, the HLPE has tackled some of the most controversial issues in food policy.

As a representative of a large International NGO active in the CSM since the beginning noted in an interview:

Another positive element is that I think that the CFS, they didn't choose necessarily the easy way and I think that they have chosen issues that were relevant. So they didn't escape the difficult debates. The member states, they didn't want to discuss food price volatility, but at the same time, the CFS is able to put issues on the agenda which are contentious (Interview (International NGO active in the CSM), June 2012, Rome).

This is illustrative of the willingness of the CFS to address some of the "big questions" that loom over food security policy. Whether the CFS can be, or even should be, effective beyond its function as a platform discussions is explored throughout the case studies.

5.7. Post-Reform Activities (2009-2013)

Post-reform, the CFS is facilitating increasingly participatory policy-making processes, offering potential solutions to many of the concerns about multi-lateral policy processes such as inclusivity, legitimacy, accountability, transparency, legitimacy and representation. Since undergoing reform, the CFS has taken a number of important decisions and has managed to implement many of them.

At the 36th Session there was a decision to have a roundtable to review methods used to estimate the number of hungry. The round table was held and findings were presented at the 37th Session. The following year, the FAO used the new methodology in its State of Food Insecurity report. At the 36th Session, the CFS invited submissions of progress reports on initiatives linked to global developments relevant to food security and nutrition. At the 37th Session, there were updates on global and regional initiatives and linkages with the CFS and at the 39th Session there was a panel on global initiatives. The CFS made a decision to strengthen and maintain linkages with regional initiatives in the intersessional period. Towards this end, the CFS Chair has participated in FAO Regional Conferences, hosting CFS side events to discuss possible linkages and strengthen regional multi-stakeholder mechanisms.

There was a decision to explore the possibility of organizing a High-Level Expert Forum on Protracted Crises with a view of discussion the elaboration of a new “Agenda for Action for Food Security in Countries in Protracted Crises” in collaboration with other specialized agencies and humanitarian partners. The preparatory work began in 2011, including a review of existing programmes and initiatives and to determine the value of such an event. A concept note was prepared and submitted to the CFS Bureau and Advisory Group for consideration at the 37th Session. A policy roundtable “Addressing food insecurity in protracted crises” was organised and from these discussions the CFS requested that the possibility of organizing a High-Level Expert Forum on Protracted Crisis no later than 2012 be explored with the aim of discussion the elaboration of a new Agenda for Action for Food Security in Countries in Protracted Crises in collaboration with other specialised agencies and humanitarian partners (CFS 2011b:para 25v). The CFS also agreed that an addendum be added to the 2010 State of Food Insecurity Report on Food Security in Protracted Crises that would include a revised table to include all countries and territories in protracted crisis and that the list include Palestinian territories, West Bank and Gaza strip. The addendum was later published online.

The CFS completed negotiations on the Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the context of national food security and endorsed them at an extra-special session of the CFS. The CFS has also advanced with the consultations on CFS Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment and have hosted two policy roundtables addressing smallholder producers and investment.

By the 40th Session in October 2013, the High Level Panel of Experts had completed six reports on issues that were subsequently discussed in policy roundtables. The CFS completed and

endorsed the first version of its Global Strategic Framework which aims to enhance policy cohesion and make all policy decisions taken by the CFS easily accessible to policy makers. Decisions arrived at by the CFS through the policy roundtables were all included in the first version.

As noted above, during the reform process the Director General of the FAO (CFS 2009b:13) highlighted five key limitations that prevented the CFS achieving its mission of monitoring food security. It is important to note that the mandate of the CFS now extends well beyond the monitoring of the World Food Summit but it is a valuable exercise to examine how the CFS has addressed these limitations through the reform. The first challenge was that prior to the reform, the absence of a high-level international policy-making body in the sectors of international cooperation and of food and agriculture. In effect, this is what the CFS has sought to become and is working towards this with the recommendations and actions of the policy roundtables, the Global Strategic Framework and Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security. The second limitation of the CFS was that it lacked an integrated framework for short-, medium-, and long-term sectoral scientific advice on hunger. This has been remedied again through the policy roundtables which build on the research, analysis and recommendations of the independent High-Level Panel of Experts. This is further supported by the inclusion of a range of actors who can contribute various perspectives. The third challenge was the lack of authority to evaluate and coordinate policies affecting world food security, in particular as regards production, agroindustry, trade, social safety nets and financing. As will be illustrated through the case studies, this remains a limitation of the CFS. While the capacity and legitimacy exists to coordinate a wide range of policies related to food security, the will to allow it to do so remains limited (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, the CFS remains weak on evaluation. As will be described below, the CFS has started to address issues related to monitoring and evaluating its own impact. However, the nature of the Committee, and the etiquette of diplomacy suggests that the evaluation of policies emerging from outside of the CFS will remain off-limits. That said, the CFS has offered countries the opportunity to present their food security programmes and policies as case studies during CFS Sessions. The fourth challenge related to the lack of an effective mechanism to track food security decisions and actions at national and regional level. Since its reform the CFS has been working on a mapping initiative that sought to profile actions (policies, programmes, strategies, plans and projects) that support food security and nutrition objectives and to then chart the “linkages of these actions to domestic and donor resources, implementing institutions and beneficiary population groups” (CFS 2012e). The overall purpose of mapping actions was to provide policy makers and other users with better information to support decision making around national and regional policies, strategies and programmes. For donors, the mapping tool could also help identify where to allocate resources. The CFS launched an Actions Mapping Task Team to advise and provide guidance. They proposed the

development of a mapping tool that builds on existing tools and methods and on-going country experiences. A demonstration web-based version of the tool was launched for the 39th Session of the CFS but is no longer functional. The fifth constraint facing the pre-reformed CFS was a lack of financial resources to carry out its mandate. This continues to be a problem but hopefully as the CFS continues to prove itself, donor countries and UN Agencies will be more willing to finance its work.

Following the case studies, Chapter 9 introduces the CFS's Results-Based Framework and uses the roles outlined in the reform document to assess how the CFS has progressed towards achieving its goal of eradicating hunger functioning as the foremost international and intergovernmental platform for food security and nutrition.

5.8. Summary

Despite the limited high-level buy in for the CFS and its limited resources, it has managed to take a broad range of decisions related to global food security policy in a relative participatory and transparent manner. Furthermore, the CFS has followed up on the majority of the tasks it has assigned itself. In doing so it has steadily gained recognition as the foremost platform for food security at the global level. It has also garnered interest from other multilateral fora seeking to increase the participation of stakeholders. Yet alongside these successes, the CFS has faced considerable challenges.

In what follows, three case studies are presented to provide greater insight into the workings of the reformed CFS with the aim of better understanding how the CFS is achieving its reform mandate. Particular attention is paid to the tensions, challenges and opportunities that exist across the work plan of the reformed Committee.

The first case study presents and analyses the International Civil Society Mechanism (CSM). The CSM is presented first for two reasons. First, the research into the CFS was situated within the CSM, meaning that the researcher gained access and participated in CFS activities through the Mechanism. The research thus begins from a civil society standpoint and in many ways maintains an ethical commitment to their struggle in line with solidarity research (described in Chapter 3). Second, starting with the CSM aligns the analysis with the reform goal of making the CFS inclusive and sensitive to the challenges faced by those most affected by food insecurity. In this case, the history of engagement, the struggle for inclusion, the development and structure of the coordinating mechanism, and key internal challenges are identified.

The second case study reviews and analyses the negotiations of the Voluntary Guideline on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT). The Guidelines in many ways represented a litmus test for the reformed CFS and the most significant accomplishment and contribution of the reformed CFS to date. The process of consultation and negotiation that informed them is certainly a best practice in global governance.

The third case study considers the development of the Global Strategic Framework, a single reference document of core priorities for food security and nutrition. The Global Strategic Framework offers guidelines and recommendations for coherent action at the global, regional and country levels by the full range of stakeholders, while emphasizing the central role of country ownership of food security programmes. As such, it is fundamental to the CFS's work on policy coordination and cohesion.

The three case studies provide empirical insights into the working processes of the newly reformed CFS, including how the Committee functioned in practice. Importantly, they illustrate the complexity of actors' positions and highlight a limitation in the literature on global food security governance: the tendency to put actors into ideological boxes and to assume (wrongly) that they do not stray from these negotiation positions. They also highlight the way actors strategize and give-and-take in the spirit of compromise and how coalitions are being built around specific issues, and not necessarily following traditional alliances.

6. Case Study 1: International Food Security and Nutrition Civil Society Mechanism

6.1. Introduction

In the reform document of the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS), Member States recognised that while the CFS is an intergovernmental Committee,

[i]t will be composed of members, participants and observers and will seek to achieve a balance between inclusiveness and effectiveness. Its composition will ensure that the voices of all relevant stakeholders – particularly those most affected by food insecurity - are heard (CFS 2009a:para 2).

Towards this end, member states also agreed that civil society organizations had the right to “autonomously establish a global mechanism for food security and nutrition which will function as a facilitating body for CSO/NGOs consultation and participation in the CFS” (CFS 2009a:para 7). A proposal for the establishment of such a mechanism was developed and endorsed by civil society organizations (CSOs) at a Civil Society Consultation held in Rome in October 2010. It was later presented to the CFS at the 36th Session and acknowledged by CFS Member States during the 36th Session of the CFS. Following the Reform Document, the purpose of the Civil Society Mechanism (CSM) is to facilitate civil society participation in agriculture, food security and nutrition policy development at national, regional and global levels in the context of the CFS (CSM 2012:3).

In this case study the process of developing the Civil Society Mechanism is reviewed and the final organizational structure is presented. This leads to a review of the internal challenges facing the CSM including issues of time, representation, consensus, trust, decision making and ensuring the engagement of social movement actors. From there, focus turns to a review of how the CFS interacts with the CFS by highlighting key challenges and successful strategies for meaningful participation. The case study concludes by reflecting on the potential of scaling-up the CSM to other intergovernmental fora.

6.2. Civil Society Organizations in the Committee on World Food Security

In 1997, a year after the World Food Summit, in an attempt to modernize the CFS’s Terms of Reference, and responding to changes in the institutional organization of the UN system²⁸, the Committee amended its General Rules of the Organization. Under the amended rules, the members of the CFS remained interested FAO or UN Member States. However, reference was made to inviting “relevant international organizations to participate in the work of the Committee and the preparation of meeting documents on matters within their respective mandates in collaboration with the secretariat of the Committee” (FAO 1997:Res 8/97:Rule XXXIII:12). At this time, CSOs attending the CFS had observer status, and their ability to

28 One such change was the replacement of the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes by the Executive Board of the World Food Programme.

engage in processes lay with the discretion of the Chair. Two years later, during the 25th Session (1999), the CFS made broadened participation of civil society and other partners a main agenda item. The background paper provided suggestions for broadening the participation of civil society organizations in the work of the CFS and the World Food Summit implementation process (CFS 1999:Para 5.1). The proposals included enhanced information exchange, contributions to technical documents, participation in CFS meetings, and enhanced dialogue. It also provided possibilities for enhanced CSO engagement in the CFS, including having the Chair ask CSOs to appoint designated spokespersons to intervene in debates; grant CSOs the right to make one intervention per topic; and, allow CSOs to present consolidated reports of their conclusions and findings on achievements and lessons learned.

CSOs were proving themselves to be useful allies to Committee members who, in the wake of the World Food Summit, had been tasked with monitoring the implementation of the resulting Plan of Action. This also helped to pave the way for increased CSO participation in the Committee. Yet, beyond the role of observers, their engagement continued to be needs-based or subject to sympathetic Chairs. At the 32nd Session of the CFS, various stakeholders, including CSOs, were engaged in a dialogue on progress made towards attaining the World Food Summit Goals. At this point, some members of the CFS “requested that options for continued engagement of multi-stakeholders in future years be discussed at the next Session of the CFS” (FAO, 2006: CL 131/REP par. 31).

At the 33rd Session of the CFS (2007), the Secretariat followed up by providing background information on current practices of multi-stakeholder engagement and highlighted four potential options for the continued engagement of CSOs including: interventions by observers, CSO reports on the World Food Summit Follow-Up to be presented at the CFS Sessions, multi-stakeholder dialogues with the Chair, and, Informal Panels (CFS 2008: para 3). The Committee requested the Secretariat to prepare a document outlining these and other possible options to be discussed at the 34th Session of the CFS. The resulting paper – “Participation of Civil Society/Non-Governmental Organizations (CSOs/NGOs)” – listed best practices adopted in other FAO bodies and a suggestion that they could be applied to the CFS. These practices included allowing CSOs to organize side events; seeking CSO input into documents; encouraging CSO caucusing; permitting CSO presence during the drafting of outcomes; promoting direct dialogue between governments and CSOs; and, formalising and communicating procedures for engagement (CFS 2008: para 18). Principles of participation were also outlined along with specific measures to improve interactions between the CFS and CSOs. However, the actual reform process proved much more radical than the Secretariat had envisioned. Comparing the Secretariat’s paper on participation to the results of the reform process, one negotiator from a G20 country noted:

There is a background document with the options and proposals that were put forth by the secretariat for the reform of the CFS. That was like the options that would be possible goals to get at, at the end of the reform process. Look at those options.

They are so petty, they are so small. And you see this is what they were trying to achieve with the reform (Interview (Negotiator from a G20 country), October 2011 Rome).

They went on to explain how the reforms had managed to surpass these initial suggestions.

This could have started as bad and ended as bad in the usual: 'let's say we change something to keep doing what we always did'. But at some point, the Chair being who she was, and that Contact Group being created, things got out of hand for FAO itself. So this was the fascination of the process, because the reform that I thought usually would come up... business as usual... it got out of hand, in a good way, and developed into a much stronger version of the CFS (Interview (Negotiator from a G20 country), October 2011 Rome).

The reformed CFS offers an official space where an increasingly diverse group of civil society actors can congregate. These actors have, over time, been able to secure greater and more meaningful involvement in planning, research, debate and policy making. CSOs have created a mechanism to ensure that this engagement is coordinated and that the social actors, who have traditionally been on the perimeter of these processes, are not just brought in, but are meaningfully contributing to them.

6.3. The International Food Security and Nutrition Civil Society Mechanism

In the reform process CSF Member States recognised the right of CSOs to autonomously establish a global mechanism to facilitate CSO participation in the CFS. Civil society actors endorsed the Mechanism at a Civil Society Consultation in Rome in October 2010 and later that month, after a presentation to the Plenary, the CFS acknowledged the Mechanism. Through the Civil Society Mechanism, CSOs have become involved in various aspects of the Committee on World Food Security, including as: member of the Advisory Group, CFS Task Teams and Open Ended Working Groups, and most obviously, in the CFS plenary discussions. In the CFS activities, the CSM has facilitated CSO proposals, suggestions and dissent, up to the point where member states achieve consensus.

6.3.1. Designing the Mechanism

As noted above, the reform document of the Committee on World Food Security invited civil society organizations to autonomously establish a global mechanism to facilitate their participation in the CFS. Several groups submitted proposals requesting leadership of the process but the successful proposal was one jointly written and submitted by the Governance Working Group of the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC), Oxfam and Action Aid International, with the support of a methodology group made of reference people. Discussions with actors in the CFS and FAO revealed that the reason this proposal was chosen over the others was because it extended beyond the interests of the coordinating organizations, had principles to ensure transparency and sought to be globally inclusive. It was, overall, the most sophisticated mechanism to be presented.

The Civil Society Mechanism builds on the extensive experience and networks of civil society organizations across a range of policy areas as well as from existing mechanisms, notably the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC), the Farmers' Forum and the

Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. This history is not lost on those involved in the broader CFS process. At the first meeting of the Coordination Committee, one FAO representative acknowledged that:

This meeting is historic, the fruit of many years of hard preparatory work, from social organizations comprised of many social groups and social movements and other movements who have been advocating and affecting change for many decades. The engagement of CSOs as participants in the CFS process builds on the collective experience of this group. Contributions to the World Food Summit, World Food Summit +5, development of the IPC, inception and adoption for the guidelines for the realization of the right to food (Field notes, Cordoba, June 2011).

This recognition of the history and knowledge of the process and actors involved has been fundamental to the ordering, structuring and functioning of the CSM over the first years of operation. At the same time, the CSM is an innovative mechanism that is adapting to the changing governance architecture of food security. As such, throughout the development and implementation of the CSM, there has been recognition that the process will not be perfect. What has been stressed is the need for transparency, to follow the established processes and to maximise communication (CSM, 2010).

The process of drafting the Mechanism took time. A core group, led by ActionAid International, the Governance Working Group of the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty and Oxfam began work on it in 2009 and distributed a Zero Draft in March 2010 through networks. A First Draft, building on the feedback on the Zero Draft was distributed in July 2010 and a Second Draft was written up by the end of August. A Final Draft was released on September 15, 2010 and aimed to include all compatible recommendations collected during the consultations.²⁹

Many of the people active in developing the mechanism came to form the “Methodology Group” that acted as de facto leadership while the CSM was developing. Within the Methodology Group there was a high level of reflexivity and awareness of the need for an eventual hand-over of power to the CSM Coordination Committee. This was made visible not only in the way that the CSM was structured but also in the way that CSM meetings were coordinated. As one member of the group, a representative of a large International NGO active in the CSM since the beginning, explained:

So I was involved in the Methodology Group, which was also kind of uneasy, because it had no real mandate but at the same time, it was taking important decisions, in terms of programming. But now, with the new Coordinating Committee, well, I think roles are clear, so there is no methodology group anymore... (Interview (International NGO active in the CSM), Rome, June 2012).

At a Civil Society Consultation held in Rome in October 2010, the Chair of a Plenary Session presented those in attendance with the Final Draft of the Mechanism and encouraged the delegates to endorse the Mechanism. On a methodological note, the meeting was open to all

29 It is interesting to note that the CSM process mirrors the CFS process for consultation and drafting (see Case Study C on the Voluntary Guidelines for example).

CSOs but delegates has to be nominated from constituencies and sub-regions. In selecting delegates, balance was sought across constituencies, regions, and gender. At the consultation, decision-making processes were to be consensus-driven where possible but only delegates had decision-making authority. Thus observers could participate but did not have decision-making authority. Facilitators sought to maintain an open forum for discussion and open processes for clarification and discussion. Everyone was asked to speak slowly and to be concise to facilitate interpretation and translation. This was particularly important as the final draft of the Mechanism had not been translated into French and Spanish, the two other working languages of the CSM. This in turn limited who could fully comprehend and assess the Mechanism, and in particular excluded social movement actors from West Africa and Latin America. Organisers of the consultation noted that the FAO had failed to provide timely support with respect to translation.

Developing a mechanism capable of facilitating the participation of the voices civil society, particularly of “those most affected by food insecurity” is a daunting task to say the least. However as one leader of a European farming social movement explained:

We have fought of the autonomous and independent organization of civil society. The identified constituencies and geographically distant-demographics, to have their voice here in Rome implies a great deal of work based on respect, understanding of difference, working together. This is a complicated process but the biggest challenge we are facing is to show the governments that we are capable of self-organizing even if they are 198 and we are 198,000 (Field notes, Rome, October 2010).

Furthermore, at the CSO consultation, the Chair, a leading human rights campaigner, noted:

The drafting team knows this is not a perfect document because it would be impossible with such restrictions... time and money. A great effort was made. There has never been an attempt to draft this type of document: with this type of work, it is one step forward... This mechanism isn't aimed at representing involved organizations. The goal is to facilitate involvement in decision making processes. This ensures this is an independent process that cannot be interfered with by power interest (Field Notes, Rome, October 2010).

These comments made early on in the development of the mechanism introduce key themes and challenges that loom over the development of the CSM, notably, decision-making, learning while doing, power relations and representation. These are all discussed below.

At the Consultation many delegates stood and expressed their support for the Civil Society Mechanism as a positive first step and highlighted changes and considerations to consider over the next year. Many spoke in favour of the organizing principles and the structure the mechanism which took into account inclusiveness, transparency, and openness. However, others drew attention to potential limitations. Some noted that the inclusivity, accountability mechanisms still needed work. Related to this, there was a call to clarify the decision-making processes in the Mechanism, for example, by defining what is meant by consensus in this context. People requested for all documents to be translated in advance of meetings which in turn raised questions of resources. Finally, there was a call to ensure that work continued at the national and regional levels and that the CSM not be restricted to what happened in Rome.

Many of these potential limitations were addressed or ironed out within the first few years of operation. However, as will be discussed below, the issue of accountability and decision-making were not adequately dealt with and could be emerging as a significant challenge.

At the Consultation it was decided that the CSM's Terms of Reference would undergo formal review in one year's time, at which point changes and improvements could be made. The review never happened. This was in part due to a delayed start to the functioning of the Coordination Committee. Identifying constituency and sub-regional focal points through approved processes took more time than anticipated and by the end of the first year not enough had been accomplished within the operation of the CSM to warrant evaluation and review. Another reason was resources. A third and on-going reason ties to power: there is no incentive for those currently in power to review the Mechanism.

6.3.2. Organizational Structure of the CSM

The CSM is open to all civil society organizations working on issues related to food security. It is made up of the general membership, a Coordination Committee, Working Groups and a Secretariat.

CSM Executive

The Coordination Committee acts as the executive of the CSM. In theory there should be 41 Coordination Committee members: one focal point per sub-region and two focal points per constituency, with the exception of smallholder farmers who get four seats. The reasons given for this were that farmers do the work of providing food but they are also disproportionately food insecure. A focus on farmers helped ensure that those most affected by food insecurity were engaged in CFS processes. Figure 15 outlines the sub-regions and constituencies that make up the CSM.

The processes through which each sub-region and constituency select their focal points to the Coordination Committee is determined by each group in recognition of the diversity of histories, realities and experiences. At the CSO Consultation, delegates began to plan the selection process, working first by region and then by constituency. Some regions opted to join together. A Latin American regional group was formed as was an African group. There was a joint South and South East Asia group, and Europe and North America also formed a group. The sub-regions themselves opted for these groupings not only because numbers were low but also because in many cases they were already working together at a regional level and their situations were comparable. Groups were assigned a list of questions requesting reflection on the context, key actors to be involved, strengths, weaknesses and barriers and available resources. Groups were then encouraged to develop processes for the selection of the Focal Point (each region is able to forward one nominee). After the sub-regional working groups, the constituencies met and worked on the same task with the same questions, the difference being

that constituencies are able to forward two Focal Points (members) to the Coordination Committee, with the exception of small-holder family farmers who forward four Focal Points. Across both processes, the goal was not to select focal points, although some groups did. Rather the aim was to establish a clear, transparent and open process with people identified to move the process forward. This was important as many individuals and delegates were missing due to inabilities to get visas or tickets to attend the forum.

<u>Sub-Regions</u>	
Total of 17 (1 member per sub-region)	
North America	South East Asia
Central America & Caribbean	Central Asia
Andean Region	Oceania
Southern Cone	Southern Africa
Western Europe	West Africa
Eastern Europe	East Africa
West Asia	Central Africa
South Asia	North Africa
Pacifica	
<u>Constituencies</u>	
Total of 24 (2 members per constituency, smallholder farmers have 4)	
Agricultural & food workers	NGOs
Artisanal fisherfolk	Smallholder farmers
Consumers	Urban poor
Pastoralists	Women
Indigenous Peoples	Youth
Landless	

Figure 16: Constituencies and Regions within the CSM Coordination Committee (Duncan and Barling 2012).

Coordination Committee member held the function of 12 months during the interim period of 2010/11 after which focal points were selected for a period of two years (2011-2013). The roles and responsibilities of the Coordination Committee are outlined in Terms of Reference. First, the Coordination Committee is to ensure that the functions of the CSM are carried out as effectively as possible and according to the organizing principles contained in the CSM proposal. These principles include inclusivity; diversity; pluralism, autonomy and self-organization; gender and regional balance; and, cooperation. Another key organising principle is for “self-organized groups to speak for themselves in the CSM and have a greater representation in the mechanism” (CFS 2010b:FN 2). In practice, this means prioritising the voices of social movement actors. Officially, the Coordination Committee has the role of facilitating participation of CSOs in CFS processes, including overseeing the work of civil society members of the CFS Advisory Group and the Secretariat of the Mechanism, as well as ensuring accountability of finances of the Mechanism, although in practice this falls to the Secretariat. In practices, the accountability of finances falls under the responsibility of the Finance and

Administrative sub-working group (FWG) of the Coordination Committee. The Coordination Committee are to ensure, to the best of their ability, effective two-way communication with CSM members and broader networks. With respect to decision-making, the Coordination Committee is responsible for clarifying criteria for participation in the Mechanisms, quotas for participation (including speaking) at the CFS Plenary,³⁰ selecting civil society members of the Advisory Group, providing support to the CSO Advisory Group members, and assisting in the organization of the civil society forums related to the CFS. In practice, there is an ad-hoc organizing committee made up of approximately five to eight Coordination Committee members representing different regions acting with the support of the Secretariat. Members of the CSM, including members of the policy working groups, communicate views to the CFS during the various sessions (apart from AG meetings). The Coordination Committee is responsible for communicating the range of divergent positions held by participants in the Mechanism when providing views to the CFS and at the Advisory Group. In the original terms of reference the Coordination Committee also had the responsibility to dialogue with the CFS Bureau regarding the allocation of civil society seats and speaking slots in the annual CFS Plenary Sessions.

A major limitation in the design of the CSM is that there is no incentive for those who currently sit as focal points to review the process, nor is there any incentive for them to develop accountability mechanisms or to find ways to improve decision-making from a transparency and efficiency perspective. Furthermore, the way that the Coordination Committee is currently structured, those who are least efficient in their work as communication focal points are potentially most likely to retain their position as there is less chance that they have adequately informed and engaged others able to fill the position. At the same time, having a complete change-over of the Coordination Committee could be potentially devastating to the functioning of the Mechanism. The CSM would have been well advised to develop a rotational mechanism when this problem first was first anticipated. For example, at the 2010 CSO Consultation a proposal was made suggesting that each region and constituency create a committee that rotates members every two years. This would provide the benefit of support, training and knowledge transfer to members on the committee while working to ensure better diversity and sharing of power. The proposal was not taken up meaningfully by any of the groups.

At that same meeting, a key actor in the CSM noted that:

there are still issues that need to be addressed: inclusivity, accountability mechanisms. Reviewing constituencies and making sure no one is falling through the gaps. Clarify the decision-making processes in the mechanism. Ensure gender is addressed through the mechanism. What are the criteria for membership? How will we ensure documents are translated? How do we make sure this is working at

³⁰ In practice, policy working groups mostly do this but under the "guidance" of the Coordination Committee members

the national and regional levels... we need to build on this good start, keep moving forward so that in one year we are more organised and more inclusive and working together (Field Notes, Rome, October 2010).

Unfortunately, these calls were set aside in lieu of focused discussions on process which came to dominate the discussions amongst the Coordination Committee. Actors newly engaged in the CFS have identified the CSM's focus on structure as limiting and have expressed this publically in CSM meetings. The CSM is a young and innovative mechanism and participants are conscious of the continuing need to develop, adapt and ameliorate its governance structure. However, the initial focus of CSM leadership on structural issues led some participants to view it as limiting the ability of the CSM to adequately address technical or political issues. As one participant from a prominent rural network lamented during the 2011 Civil Society Forum in advance of the 37th Session of the CFS:

I feel like this is a waste of time. I came here to talk about issues, about solutions, and they spent the whole meeting talking about how they will organize themselves. I don't have time for that (Interview (Participant from a prominent rural network), October 2011, Rome).

The Coordination Committee also began organizing meetings in camera, excluding many of the individuals who had worked to develop the mechanism, many of whom had raised concerns around accountability and decision-making. At times, they also exclude the Secretariat. While this does raise worrying questions about transparency and legitimacy, this is not necessarily negative. Instead, despite the growing pains, these actions can be seen as social movement actors coming to own the process and the mechanism and working through the issues in a way they deem appropriate.

That said, the structure of the executive remains such that those in power are in charge of making decisions to limit their power and very few are willing to do this. As one EU-based food security analyst noted: "The Terms of Reference of the CC [Coordination Committee] talks about what the collective does but not the responsibilities of the individual CC members when they go back" (Field Notes, Cordoba, June 2011). Those who have expressed a recognition of the need to step back and a willingness to do so have predominantly been from wealthy countries and/or more internationally established organizations suggesting at least two things. First, there is arguably greater awareness in and across these regions and constituencies about the CFS and the CSM as well as opportunities for leadership through the Coordination Committee. Second, it illustrates the power and influence that such a position can bring to civil society actors, especially in the global South. Frequent paid trip to international locations brings legitimacy to social movement actors in their local communities. Problematically, by bringing these actors out of their communities, and re-focussing their work on global issues, their ability to engage at the community level – a main reason for their selection is the first place – becomes restricted. Furthermore, once actors begin to represent their constituency in multilateral fora, they often get invitations to speak at other events, which forms them into "UN-tourists" of sorts.

A lack of consideration and processes around monitoring, accountability (how to ensure focal points are actually consulting and communicating with their regions or constituencies), and a lack of measures for recourse against those who do not fulfil their roles are all potentially significant challenges and limitations in the operation of the CSM. Time will tell if the Coordination Committee is able to develop, implement and then uphold such measures and if they find a way to rotate Coordination Committee members.

CSM Member to the CFS Advisory Group

Civil Society actors have four seats on the Advisory Group to the CFS's Bureau. The CSM facilitates the selection of civil society actors from the Coordination Committee to sit on this Advisory Group. It is the responsibility of the CSO Advisory Group members to ensure that the views of civil society are heard by facilitating two-way communication between civil society and the CFS Bureau. Within the CSM it was decided that eight focal points would rotate in the four allotted seats. This was in part because of the difficulty of making a representative selection with only four people. This also reflects the fact that many of the actors selected to hold the Advisory Group seats are unable to travel at certain times because of existing commitments (e.g., harvest). These Advisory Group members are accountable to the Coordination Committee.

Advisory Group Members 2010-2011	Advisory Group Members 2011-2013
NGO Coordination Committee Member (Oxfam then FoodFirst Information and Action Network (FIAN)) (male then female)	Indigenous Coordination Committee Member (2011-12) (male)
Small-Scale Farmer Coordination Committee Member (male)	Fisherfolk Coordination Committee Member (2011-12) (female)
IPC Representative (female)	Pastoralist Coordination Committee Member (2011-12) (male)
Youth Coordination Committee Member (male)	2 Youth Coordination Committee Members (2011-12 and 2012-13) (male and female)
	Agricultural Workers Coordination Member (2012-13) (female)
	Small-Scale Farmer Coordination Committee Member (2012-13) (male)
	Latin American Coordination Committee Member (2012-13) (female)

Figure 17: Makeup of the Coordination Committee Advisory Group Members as of September 2013 (Duncan 2013)

Given the scope and diversity of the Coordination Committee, as well as challenges that span linguistics, connectivity, time zones and various levels of engagement, decision-making in the CSM have proven challenging. Processes are underway to re-evaluate how this is done. One approach which has proved rather successful is the creation of smaller groups tasked with specific decisions, such as deciding on which CSO proposals should be selected for the CFS side events. While there is widespread acknowledgement that there is more work to be done on the operational processes within the Coordination Committee, the CFS has found great success

in the coordination and functioning of specific working groups. The CSO Advisory Group members, at least in practice, now exert a great deal of influence, because they interact directly with the CFS, putting them at the junction of the CFS-CSM interface. Given the reality of decision-making, these Advisory Group members at times have to take important decisions without time for proper consultation. This may counter the operating principles of the CSM but responds to the reality of the way the CFS works. At the same time, the CSM has not lost sight of the reality of having to make quick and informed decisions.

Thematic Policy Working Groups

To better coordinate civil society efforts in relations to the CFS's Open-Ended Working Groups and Task Teams, the CSM has established Working Groups – building where possible on established Working Groups – to organise civil society engagement and inputs into the CFS. The role of the CSM Working Groups is to circulate relevant information on specific policy issues, provide a space for dialogue and the exchange of views amongst CSOs on the issues under consideration, provide a space for CSOs to develop strong and well-articulated civil society positions, and to provide inputs back to the CFS. The thematic policy Working Groups of the CSM are open to all interested civil society participants. The aim is to promote dialogue and common policy positions amongst CSOs on issues being discussed and worked on in the CFS. These Working Groups help to ensure “effective, diverse and expertise-driven civil society inputs into the policy discussions and negotiations” (CSM 2012:5).

In 2013 there were 12 policy Working Groups responding to the CFS work agenda including, land tenure, agricultural investment, Global Strategic Framework, gender, nutrition, price volatility, protracted crisis and conflict, monitoring and mapping, social protection, climate change, biofuels, and, CFS programme of work. In line with “the mandate of the CSM, working groups prioritise the participation of, and inputs from small food producers, and other people most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition, whilst ensuring civil society participation during meetings are representative of a regional, gender and constituency balance” (CSM 2012:5). The Secretariat of the CSM tracked the number of active members in the working groups that operated in 2012. They qualify active as follows:

For most instances, “active” members of the working groups represent an entire network of CSOs, whereby they reach out and collate policy positions from a wider range of CSOs. Therefore, it is difficult to accurately account for and quantify the hundreds of civil society representatives who provide their expertise and inputs into the WGs on a collective basis (CSM 2012:5).

What is included in the tally is the individual number of people who have requested to participate. This does not mean that they necessarily contribute or communicate back to their constituents. However, the numbers break down as follows:

- Land Tenure: 75 active Working Group members
- Global Strategic Framework (GSF): 64 active Working Group members
- Responsible Agricultural Investment: 100 active Working Group members

- Climate Change: 40 active Working Group members
- Social Protection: 16 active Working Group members
- Protracted Crises: 94 active Working Group members
- Nutrition: 15 active Working Group members

There is no explicit hierarchy or decision making structure when it comes to the Working Groups, which could in part account for their success. Furthermore, the fact that they are issue based, rather than process and inwardly focused makes them more appealing to a wider range of actors.

In the working groups, tensions between social movements and NGOs, often prevalent in Coordination Committee processes tended to dissolve or at least soften. The Working Groups have coordinators and resource people. Normally, the coordinator is from a social movement and the resource person from an NGO. In cases where a social movement actors was not found to act as coordinator, NGO actors would step in. These NGO facilitators were conscious of the political responsibility entrusted to them. One NGO actor coordinating a Working Groups noted:

it is not the role of the NGO, as an NGO person, it shouldn't be my role and it's not what I wanted to do. But, also, I think that there was sufficient trust between each other and there was also kind of, I think a relatively good, how do you say that... reporting back and preparation and reporting back what the issues were ... I also felt that there was sufficient backing in terms of the positions that we defended, so it wasn't really a difficulty. There was kind of a mandate by a broader group. (Interview (Representative of a large International NGO), Rome, June 2012).

One way that some Working Groups have made use of the NGO/social movement divide has been to play on the strengths of each group. Not exclusively, but broadly, NGOs provide strong technical support and facilitation capacity and social movements provide the political legitimacy and grounded rationales when negotiations took turns counter to the approaches favoured by CSOs. This strategy was most obvious and effective in negotiations on the Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security. While the tensions between NGOs and Social Movements will not go away, nor should they necessarily, there is evidence that they are easing.³¹ A representative of a large International NGO active in the CSM since the beginning noted:

Where I think that the process of the constituencies, initially in 2006, 7, 8, 9, it was more a defensive position, by saying that the social movements have their own space. I think that we are in another process. For instance, I think the example of food price volatility, I think it worked well. So where, there were only NGOs present in the room, but the NGOs were really thinking, we are not here for our own agendas, but we do things more collectively and we do know, we try to incorporate the priorities of the social movements. So I think is a kind of, I am not sure for us maybe this is fairly big, but there is a certain, from most NGOs, I think, when you go to the regional meetings, it's very different, but I think most NGOs

³¹ They are possibly being replaced by regional or geographic tensions (e.g., North versus South, Asia versus Latin America).

involved in the process of the CSM have built a certain understanding and loyalty to the mechanism. You know, they know more or less what their role is, in terms of visibility or, you know, things like that. I am not sure it's a problem anymore. I think the CSM has gained a lot of maturity in that sense (Interview (Representative of a large International NGO), Rome, June 2012).

Despite this coming together, there is still concern and resistance on the part of social movement actors that NGOs will in some way co-opt the process and the tensions between the IPC and the CSM remain prevalent. This is discussed below.

*Funding*³²

Funding for the Civil Society Mechanism has been an issue since its inception and is likely to remain an issue. One social movement coordinator noted:

Financing is always a difficult issue ... Governments are usually surprised on how we participate with no resources. Oxfam has contributed human resources, how does it compare with the inputs of IPC? How far should we go in our contribution? Where does it end? ... It is difficult to find finances for the secretariat. Translation is another issue that has to be addressed. At this point the secretariat is conceptual as they are not funded... It is our collective responsibility for funding. It is important for us to dialogue with governments that normally give us money (Field Notes, Cordoba, June 2011).

The difference in funding for social movements and NGO funding has been a central tension. It is undeniable that Oxfam has more financial resources than the IPC. This raises important issues with respect to representation and the priorities of the CSM. These concerns were captured in the comments of one civil society representative who asked: "If there isn't sufficient funding, what do we do, send the NGO who can self-fund and give legitimacy to a process that is being seriously derailed?" (Field Notes, Cordoba, June 2011).

Eventually, the Civil Society Mechanism secured funds through donations from member states handled through a multi-donor trust fund administered the FAO. The CSM has been able to operate due to support of NGOs (Oxfam GB in particular) that have advanced funds and covered funding gaps in cash flow. Moreover, NGO resources donated to the CSM in 2012 provided needed reserve while the CSM waited for the release of funds in the multi-donor trust fund. The Coordination Committee members made a decision that partnerships with NGOs that manage funds should be rotational and that new NGOs should be brought in to help administer CSM funds. In 2013, the CSM decided to rely on the Italian NGO Firab for financial and administrative support, effectively ending the support received from Oxfam. Because Firab is a much smaller NGO, the CSM would not be able to rely on them to advance advancing resources and cover funding gaps (CSM 2013). The decision to move away from Oxfam was nothing but political with many social movement actors fearing that the international NGO held a disproportionate amount of power.

³² Given the political and sensitive nature of finances, a decision has been made to provide only a broad summary based on publically available information.

The CSM uses its fund to ensure the active participation of CSOs in CFS processes. For example, during the first quarter of 2012, the CSM spent 101,449 Euro on four CFS Advisory Group meetings (including preparatory teleconferences and meetings in all three languages, as well as the translation of briefing notes); CFS open-ended working group on responsible investment in agriculture CFS-rai) in January, including a two days preparatory meeting; along with other CFS open-ended working groups (i.e., monitoring, programme of work and priorities, and finance). The funding also goes to pay for office costs and salaries of the Secretariat (three staff people).

One significant cost to the CSM is translation. In 2012 the CSM spent 21% of its resources on interpretation and translation. During the first quarter of 2013 the percentage of these expenses rose to 31% of total expenditures (CSM 2013). Interpretation and translation are vital for ensuring the full participation of all actors in the CSM and the CFS, especially social movements. However, there may be a need for the Coordination Committee to reflect on how money is spent as more money spent on translation means less funds available to support direct participation in CSM and CFS meetings (CSM 2013).

6.4. Internal Challenges Facing the CSM

The CSM presents a radical new mechanism for coordinating the effective participation of a diversity of actors in multilateral governance processes, but there have been growing pains. Challenges related to establishing structures and processes related to the Coordination Committee have been reviewed above. In what follows, key internal challenges faced by the CSM in its first two years of operation are presented along with a review of how participants have sought to address them. The aim is to illustrate how diverse civil society actors are collectively managing their participation in the Committee on World Food Security.

Time

The development of the Coordination Committee has taken much longer than expected, and by the end of the second year, thirteen seats remained unfilled.³³ Reasons for this included lack of contacts or networks in specific regions and constituencies as well as failure of interested parties to undertake an appropriate selection process and to submit these processes for approval. These challenges serve to highlight the difficulties of widening participation to include actors who previously stood outside of the process or whose current struggles and focus are localised. Indeed, key groups that have been marginalised by, or worked outside of and/or against, these processes are now faced with the task of determining ways of moving into these circles

33 At the time of publication, the following positions remained unfilled: the two seats for the landless are not filled, the urban poor has one of two seats unfilled and the small-holder farmers have one of three seats empty. North Africa, Central Africa, South Africa, South East Asia, Central Asia, Pacific and Oceania are also not filled but some do have focal points that are in the process of undergoing a legitimate selection process.

(McMichael and Peine, 2005, p. 32). Central to this transitional process from outsiders to insiders is the development of trust, networks, new skills as well as working through issues of representation and legitimacy. At the same time, in other fora, and especially in local contexts, these actors continue to push and resist dominant governance structures, adding another layer of complexity.

Also related to time is the turn around on decision-making. Decisions taken by the Coordination Committee require translation, deliberation and consultation, both within the Coordination Committee and between the focal points and constituents. However, often the CFS does not give adequate time for this process and thus decisions are made without full consultation or even participation. There are also Coordination Committee members who despite having agreed to play a communication function do not respond to requests for decisions in a timely fashion, if at all. The same time challenges exist for the Working Groups who are often expected to provide quick feedback on proposals. CSOs have found ways of addressing this problem by building trust amongst participants, trying to maintain open and transparent communication, translating all documents where possible and ensuring that requests for feedback are accompanied by clear deadlines.

Participation versus Representation

One of the main functions of the Coordination Committee is to facilitate the participation of people from sub-regions and constituencies in the CFS. The Coordination Committee is not to be seen as a committee of people representing the views of their organization. Rather, they play a communicative and networking function: they are facilitators. The Final Report of the Civil Society Consultation in advance of the 36th session (Duncan and von Anrep 2010:8) explains:

The Coordination Committee is the backbone of the CSM. One of the Coordination Committee's roles is to work hard to facilitate the participation of those in subregions and constituencies. In no way is the CC to be seen as a committee of people representing the views of their organization. Rather, they play a communicative and networking function.

However, this is easier said than done. NGO and CSO participants are politically, intellectually and emotionally tied to the positions of their organizations and to separate themselves from their values, as well as potential opportunities, and the mind set of interest lobbying is a real challenge. However, the fact that this conversation has happened within the CSM points to an awareness of the roles and responsibilities of civil society as well as potential critics.

Another important issue to consider is the implications of participation. In order to effectively participate in the CFS, civil society actors have had to undergo a process of internalizing not only the values of liberalism and neoliberalism (for example through the promotion of right-based approaches to food security policy) but also the logic of bureaucratization (evident through their fluency in UN processes and language). This is not to suggest that CSOs have become pawns of the process. Indeed much of their engagement is strategic and well deliberated. Furthermore, resistance can emerge from actors putting into question social norms

and the identities ascribed to them by way of these norms (i.e., “peasant farmer”; “poor African”). Indeed, resistance begins by challenging these socially prescribed identities and by choosing to transform their subjectivity. An example of this can be seen in the way in which La Via Campesina has effectively challenged the discourse and social construction of the peasant. For members of La Via Campesina, peasants are not poor, powerless, antiquated farmers: they are a coalition of savvy producers with a great deal of traditional and localized knowledge who are not on the fringes of industrial production but in fact make up the dominant food system. Within the CFS, civil society and governments from the global South are increasingly aware of the power of influence and legitimacy that can be summoned up by drawing on lived experience of oppression, poverty and injustice. This presents yet another example of a double-edged sword: as global governance discourse moves towards increased participation and new definitions of expertise and knowledge, new experts can rise up and claim authority and legitimacy based on their lived experience, yet they do so within a governance framework that seeks to maintain the influence of the dominant system which created the oppression in the first place.

Consensus versus Maintaining Diversity

With respect to this, the CSM works to find points of agreement so as to forward united positions and statements that conform to the common good as agreed upon by way of deliberation and consensus by all participants. Second, the CSM accepts diversity, difference and disagreement. In instances where opinions differ, the various perspectives are presented as the CSM position. At the same time, there is pressure to speak with a united voice. For example, at a plenary session of the 37th Session of the CFS (October 2011), the Chair encouraged civil society participants to speak with a unified voice. One government delegate noted that from his perspective, a united CSO endorsement of a specific recommendation carries more weight than that of some member states. While there is recognition of the diversity of perspectives across civil society organizations represented at the CFS, there is also awareness of the political impact gained through united positions. Hence, CSOs, facilitated through the CSM, have worked to develop joint positions wherever possible. Arriving at a point of consensus often involves long discussions and processes of compromise on the part of all actors thereby moving them away from their original objectives. Chantal Mouffe (2000:17) warns that often this process of consensus building can reflect “a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of power” and is a process that “always entails some form of exclusion”. Thus, while these processes of deliberation and consensus building form a fundamental part of the CSM, and the UN decision-making process more broadly, they also inevitably result in a form of social exclusion where the ideas of some actors are left on the cutting room floor.

Process

Coming to consensus has proved challenging not only for lack of shared approaches but also for lack of engagement. As noted above, the executive of the Civil Society Mechanism is a Coordination Committee with forty-one members. A committee of that size, spanning the world, with varying levels of commitment, connectivity and three working languages has proven, not surprisingly, hard to manage, especially for the Secretariat. Getting the Coordination Committee to come to consensus (note that in the structure of the CSM, silence is not taken as agreement) on issues in a timely fashion has meant frustration, delays and sometimes moving ahead without consensus as often the CSM is only given a few days to react to documents or prepare for meetings. Here again, the commitment to transparency and the development of strong relations of trust are key to the successful operation of the CSM.

Decision Making

In an attempt to address decision-making within the CSM, and responding to the challenges raised above, there has been a shift of power from the Coordination Committee to the Advisory Group members. It is the responsibility of these Advisory Group members to facilitate two-way communication between the CSM and the CFS. With the launch of the CSM, it was decided that the four CSO Contact Group members, who had represented civil society throughout the CFS reform process, would become the interim CSO members on the CFS Advisory Group. These original CSO Advisory Group members were three male and one female representative from Le Réseau des organisations paysannes et de producteurs de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (ROPPA), the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC), Oxfam International and the Mouvement International de la Jeunesse Agricole et Rurale Catholique (MIJARC). Under this arrangement they would serve for one year (2009-2010) and new focal points would be chosen from and by the Coordination Committee in 2011, once the Coordination Committee was up and running. However, at the Coordination Committee meeting in May 2011, it was decided that the CSO Advisory Group members would continue in their roles until October 2011. This was, in part, in recognition of their historic role in the process and because it was deemed important that the CSO Advisory Group members be able to work with the restrictions of limited time and resources, and be highly attuned to the politically sensitive nature of the work while maintaining a high degree of knowledge and political fluency. It also reflected challenges faced by the CSM in establishing the Coordination Committee. In turn, when the Northern NGO constituency Advisory Group member left their NGO to work for the CSM Secretariat the seat was filled by the female Southern NGO Coordination Committee member providing more gender balance and Southern representation.

Trust

Whereas the first CSO Advisory Group members had legitimacy and trust based on their historical participation, in October 2011, eight new members were elected by and from the

Coordination Committee for a period of two years on a rotational basis; with the acknowledgment that the eight CSO Advisory Group members will share responsibility and participate in the meetings. The newly elected Advisory Group members have legitimacy based on their being elected, however, they lack the historical experience and knowledge of their predecessors. They do however represent a far more diverse set of interests (see Figure 16) although again, their function is not one of representation but rather facilitation.

Language

As noted above, one the largest expenses of the CSM is translation and interpretation. Across the CSM, within the Coordination Committee and amongst the CSO Advisory Group Members, language is an issue. The linguistic challenges extend beyond spoken language to the ways in which different actors speak, and who they are speaking for. There are also differences in how people speak that impact communication.

Consider that in one discussion, a peasant farmer from Argentina spoke about the wisdom of potatoes and the importance of listening and learning from potatoes (Field notes, Jokkmokk, August 2011). For many, such a statement is immediately interpreted as quaint at best and is widely dismissed. However, the meaning behind what was being said relates to specific technical knowledge about plant health and changing ecological conditions with important implications for the discussion. Because of the narrative way in which the issue is presented, the “policy impact” is overlooked or missed entirely. This amounts to cross-cultural misunderstandings that extend beyond linguistics. It also illuminates the contrast between the very engaged and grounded processes undertaken by many social movements through their gatherings, and the sterile and bureaucratic nature of the CSM which has to conform to the working processes of a UN Committee.

The Voices of Those Most Affected by Food Security and Nutrition

The CSM remains committed to ensuring the participation of those most affected by food security in the CFS. This is reflected in the makeup of the CSM Coordination Committee and in the structure of the Working Groups as well as in the discourse of CSM participants. For example, in the 2012 Annual Report (CSM 2012:4) this point is made explicit: “At the core of the CSM is the understanding that those most affected must be the agents of their own development and change”. Towards this end, there is a widely held view within the CSM that NGOs participating in the CFS have a key role to play in supporting social movements. As key actor in the CSM noted:

Now we have the opportunity, through the CFS reform and the CSM, we have an opportunity to make change. We have a process and structure in place to engage people. It is important for NGOs to support the CFS process and broad engagement by civil society (Field Notes, Rome, October 2010).

Later, this actor clarified why the NGO they were involved with supported the CSM.

One, the organising principles that are laid out and the structure of the mechanism: inclusiveness, transparency and openness. Two, because there is now a mechanism

to ensure that it [participation] is broad, inclusive, etcetera. They [the drafting committee] took a look at these principles and tried to reflect these principles. This means some of the traditional leaders took a step back and let others move forward because this is fundamental if the mechanism is to succeed (Field Notes, Rome, October 2010).

However, tensions do exist between social movement actors (those who fight directly for their rights) and NGOs (who work on behalf of others) and have existed from the beginning. At the CSO Forum in October 2010 a suggestion was made that a prominent social movement be given the responsibility of electing member of the Coordination Committee which would certainly give them a disproportionate amount of power.

The tension was most visible in the selection of CSM Advisory Group members where there was a noted desire to keep power with the social movement, and not with NGOs, despite the fact that many NGOs work in Rome and have the capacity to function effectively in the role.

At the first meeting of the Coordination Committee, a key actor in the CSM noted that:

The IPC Secretariat has vast experience and it is important to draw upon this, but the Terms of Reference state that the CSM is to be politically neutral and a facilitation mechanism. The IPC remains a facilitation mechanism, but along very political lines (Field Notes, Cordoba, May 2011).

The IPC is a network that brings together organizations of food producers together to mobilise in ways that connects local struggle with global debate while broadening opportunities for political negotiation within the FAO (International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty 2009). By contrast, the CSM has the mandate to facilitate the participation of civil society organizations in the work of CFS. The situation is complicated as many of the IPC members are active in the CSM and even sit as Focal Points on the Coordination Committee. This tension is also acknowledged by actors involved in both processes. As one member of the IPC noted:

The IPC is a facilitating mechanism. The Main role of the IPC is to start moving with the change. The members of the IPC are involved in regions and constituencies and as part of the CC. There are IPC members that have been elected through the selection process who will work to represent their constituencies and sub-regions. IPC has broader work to do and will continue their work. This is a broader facilitation task for IPC. The IPC now has to determine how it will link to the CSM, and how to disassociate itself from the CSM (Field Notes, Cordoba, May 2011).

Tension remains as the CSM and the International Planning Committee on Food Sovereignty clarify their “turf” within multilateral food security processes, especially within the UN system.

One member of the Coordination Committee from the Global South noted that there was an:

organic process at work with the IPC and the CSM; they are non-hierarchical unlike governmental processes. Where there are elements emerging, then it is the responsibility of all of us to work out the responsibilities. Because things are emerging without a clear or distinct plan, we must come to a point that those who have come before you do not necessarily owe you the answers, it is your responsibility to ask questions and inform yourself. The process between the IPC and the CSM needs to be made explicit by clarifying the roles and putting it out on paper. This is something to celebrate and not get upset about (Field Notes, Cordoba, May 2011).

This tension between NGOs and social movements more broadly permeates civil society engagement in food policy at all levels and raises a few key issues. First, NGOs do not need to

engage with the CSM to participate in the CFS and could easily avoid engagement all together. This would effectively serve to challenge the legitimacy of the CSM as the facilitating mechanism for the CFS. The fact that they do engage is illustrative of their commitment to the values of the CSM. Second, NGOs have provided important technical support in the development of the mechanism and continue to provide support in the Working Groups and in the development of political strategies. Third, some financial support for the mechanism has been provided by supportive NGOs. For example, Canadian Foodgrains Bank, Oxfam, Action Aid and Welthungerhilfe have all supported the CSM financially. Finally, attempts to exclude a constituency of the Coordination Committee from positions of power is also cause for concern. Yet, it continues to highlight an on-going lack of trust on the part of social movement actors to previous formulations of power within the CSM (which relied, at times heavily) on technical and methodological support from Western NGOs while firmly entrenching the value of ensuring that those most affected by food security are not simply engaged but are leading the process.

6.5. Engaging with the CFS

As explained above, the CSM is a facilitation mechanism that supports the engagement and participation of CSOs in the activities of the CFS. CSOs participate in Plenary, on the Advisory Group, on Task Teams and Open-Ended Working Groups and in consultations. These interactions are illustrated in Figure 18.



Figure 18: How the CSM engages with the CFS (CSM 2013a)

The engagement of Civil Society in the CFS has been positively received. In interviews with various delegates the support for civil society engagement was evident:

As one UK Diplomat noted:

My last telegram to the rest of the embassies... E-grams... well, there was a sense of optimism from the UK to say that the CFS actually is inclusive. We think that the management of the CFS needs to be improved, but the principles and the tenets of the CFS are sound. What we really valued in 2010 was the inclusion of the Civil Society Mechanism. (Interview (UK diplomat), date withheld to protect anonymity, Rome).

When asked about the role of civil society in the CFS, one negotiator from a G20 country responded:

I think it was fundamental because it was the momentum and the push, the voices, the voices were clearly articulated and powerful and also getting at the right points. That helped move the process along. I think they were vital and I think that lots of things would not have turned out the way they did if lots of factors weren't in place at that moment. So it was not taken for granted at all (Interview (Negotiator from a G20 country), Rome, October 2011).

However, the influence and value of actors who were traditionally engaging from the periphery extended beyond CSOs. As a representative from a major international NGO based in Rome reflected:

This is the important role of civil society, because civil society is reducing, in a sense, power inequalities, because of the openness and transparency of the process. In a closed-door thing you can have just the big powerful countries that go and just shut out countries, and that's it. But in something like the CFS, you cannot do that, because everything is about agreement and the linkage with food security. You show that it is good for food security, and also you can kind of empower Africa, because they are the most affected and so they are the ones that know more what they need. And this kind of change in power dynamics at the negotiations, and you can have even really small countries making a lot of impact (Interview (Major international NGO based in Rome), Rome, October 2012).

This view was shared by the negotiator from a G20 country responded:

Sometimes the benefit is that we push things that perhaps wouldn't be pushed for if civil society wasn't there. The other benefit, once you give people an opportunity to really engage and be part of the decision-making process – come countries object to that — civil society is part of the decision-making process, just not of the decision-making itself: The decision-making, yes, not the decision. But if people are part of the decision-making process, it's much more difficult to then just say no to everything and to come in with radical positions. You are extending a hand to them and inviting them to get in the process and as a result you benefit from much more reasonable positions from both sides.

But also, it would help to moderate and articulate and make more reasonable the positions and the views of civil society. Some in civil society would view this as co-option ... But is it a co-option or is it people getting together to understand the reasons behind some proposal and trying to find a way around it and so on and so on? (Interview (Negotiator from a G20 country), Rome, October 2011).

Yet, civil society actors did not take this for granted and recognised the looming potential for things to revert to how they were. This issue is raised as an important tension in the Case Study on the Voluntary Guidelines, but it was also reiterated frequently at CSM events. For example, at the first meeting of the Coordination Committee, a key actor in the CSM stated: "There is a

constant battle to ensure civil society participation. We cannot just sit back and relax” (Field Notes, Cordoba, June 2011).

6.6. External Challenges and Barriers to Effective CSO Engagement

Participant observation and analysis of the civil society participation in the CFS has identified some challenges. These include language, the scope of issues addressed, coherence, power politics and limitations inherent to food security as a concept.

Language

One obvious challenge relates to language. While there is simultaneous translation into the six official languages of the FAO, when the CFS is negotiating text the working language is English. Consequently participants who do not read English are disadvantaged and unable to effectively participate. This issue extends beyond civil society and impacts many delegations.

Specifically for CSOs, there is the issue of gaining “fluency” in UN-speak while trying to maintain their own language. Beyond the different spoken languages and accents, and the technical language, social movements also speak, present and share ideas in a variety of different ways. Just as with the example of becoming sensitive to the “wisdom of potatoes”, becoming fluent in these modes of communication takes a great deal of time and is challenging in formal meeting settings, which often juxtapose the informal, democratic, participatory environments more familiar to civil society actors. Through their on-going engagement, CSOs have become increasingly fluent in the processes and mode of speech that result in effective communication in the UN forum. At the same time, country delegates are increasingly familiar and comfortable with words and communication styles put forward by civil society actors.

CSOs have become aware of the different ways they speak, and have started using these strategically. For example, in interventions, participants with technical skills (often from NGOs) will make technical interventions. If the negotiations appear to be veering away from the desired direction, a more political actor (usually a community or social movement leader) will intervene with a more impassioned speech, designed to refocus the Plenary and remind them of the grass-roots implications of the policies.

Scope

A welcomed move towards systems thinking when addressing food security has resulted in an expansion of the scope of food security policy. Such expansion is necessary for adequately addressing hunger, but a few challenges immediately emerge. First, the opening up brings in a broader range of actors and necessarily complicates issues. Another implication of expansion of the scope of food security and the increasing move towards a systems approach is turf wars. Through their work, actors enact ‘food security’ in very different ways, resulting in a complicated matrix of discursive tropes: food as commodity; food as safety; food as risk; food as health; food as politics; food as value(s); food as identity; food as opportunity; food as

boundary; food as enabler. The ways in which food security – a complex result of structures, concepts, values, objects and subjects – are perceived by actors within the CFS has implications for strategies and collaboration. While this diversity is necessary, there is a need of these actors to find ways of working together and developing a common language. There is the need to compromise on issues, but this process of compromise can present myriad other challenges (Mouffe 2000).

Coherence

One of the main aims of the CFS is to promote cohesion across food security policy internationally, regionally and at the national level and between all levels. Policies related to food security often contradict each other (for example trade policies may conflict with environmental policies and agriculture policies may clash with health policies). Food security would be well served by enhanced coherence across policies. At the same time, there is consensus generally with respect to the framing of issues and solutions. Neoliberal hegemony provides a cohesive link across sectors from the national through to the international. Challenging this hegemony is possible, but given the nature to which is embedded not only as common sense, but also as the most logical and rational ideology to inform policy, contestation proves challenging. Indeed, as illustrated in the review of the two policy roundtables, neoliberal logic permeates the policy decisions. In one case, the CSOs opted to walk out of the proceedings, an action that had little impact and certainly ensured that counter-hegemonic threads – contesting neoliberal logic or providing alternatives to it – were less likely to be included.

Power Politics

As elucidated in the review of the roundtable on Food Price Volatility, a major challenge facing the operation of the CFS and to CSO engagement therein stem from challenges of other groups seeking leadership in food security at the global level. Since the food price crisis of 2007-8, food security has consistently been on the agenda for G8 and G20 leaders' summits and new programmes, initiatives, alliances and frameworks continue to be advanced through processes that lack the same level of participation, transparency and engagement. Given the political and diplomatic power of G20 countries, and the high-level political engagement in the activities of the G20, it is no surprise when negotiators are left advancing the G20 agenda in other contexts: the CFS is, after all, striving for policy coherence. However, the implications of this, as illustrated through the review of the policy roundtable on food price volatility are that the world's twenty most powerful nations are dictating the process for the remaining 106 member

countries of the CFS: which hardly represents the democratic aspirations of the CFS or the UN more broadly.³⁴

At the same time, many country delegations lack the capacity and time to grapple with the ever growing list of tasks required for engagement in the CFS, not to mention all of their other work related to the Rome-based food agencies leaving wealthy countries and larger delegations at an advantage.

Limits of Food Security

One of the most obvious limitations is that the CFS negotiates and seeks to influence food security policies. Food security is a politically negotiated concept that reflects consensus of FAO member countries. It has evolved discursively and programmatically since its introduction in the 1974 World Food Conference in line with a broader international project of neoliberalism. However, it is applied as a way of qualifying issues linked to hunger, notably through access to food. Indeed, few disagree with the end goal of food security: the eradication of hunger however, the framing of the term and the approaches advanced to achieve it are hotly contested. However, given the genesis of the term (see Chapter 4), it will be very difficult to move discussion of food security policy beyond the productionist assumptions from which it emerged. Furthermore, achieving food security requires political engagement but relevant negotiations have been and continue to be dominated by the economic interests of states and while ecological and humanitarian aspects are introduced, they are rarely prioritized. As the next two case studies will illustrate, CFS processes and other multilateral discussions on food security policy are plagued by a lack of political will to reimagine and reform economic and trade systems in ways that can ensure the objective of food security. Attempts are being made to change or expand the definition of food security (CFS 2012a) however this could be for the worse, not better. A stronger definition that fails to achieve the international consensus that the 1996 World Summit definition currently holds, could serve to further fragment food security policy.

6.7. Successful Strategies for CSO Engagement with the CFS

A review of the above analysis, coupled with participant observation and interviews with key informants has led to the identification of key actions and strategies that have been successful in advancing the goals of civil society actors.

Technical Capacity/Knowledge

CSOs often have technical staff dedicated to researching key issues that relate to those negotiated at the CFS. By contrast, member states are often represented by diplomats skilled in

34 This is not to suggest that this is somehow a new phenomenon, but rather to highlight an on-going limitation of multilateral negotiations, inside and outside the UN system.

negotiation and politics but less knowledgeable on technical issues, and heavily reliant on technical civil servants working back in their capitals. CSOs have earned the trust and respect of many of the state delegations and the technical staff working with the CSM through their knowledgeable contributions. Related to this, and other strategies, was preparedness. Civil society actors arrived at meetings well prepared, often sharing their well-researched recommendations and thoughts in advance of the meetings. This preparation supported more strategic engagement in the roundtables.

CSOs are also extremely prepared, especially when compared to Member States. They are familiar with the texts, they develop priority areas to defend and key issues to introduce. They strategize on how to present these to the Plenary and how to lobby governments on the issue. The large amount of work that goes into their preparations is illustrative of a high-level of buy-in into the CFS process but it also ensure consistent, informed and articulate interventions which governments repeatedly acknowledge.

Growing Political Savvy

With growing experience participating in the CFS, civil society actors are becoming increasingly politically savvy in the processes and procedures of the Committee and are, as a result, becoming more influential and effective in negotiations. They are also increasingly fluent in reading and analysing UN texts, and following UN procedures. They are also more confident about what their rights are with respect to in the work and negotiations of the CFS. These skills are transferable to other multilateral fora where similar procedures are followed. While CSOs may not have participant status outside of the CFS, they will certainly have a better understanding of how the processes and mechanism are structured as well as the implicit and explicit “rules of the game.” Furthermore, the engagement with government representatives (e.g., diplomats, technical staff, policy makers and policy advisers) serves to enhance their networks and their lobbying reach on issues within and outside of the CFS.

Food Sovereignty as an Alternative, Comprehensive Policy Framework

Food sovereignty is the vehicle of a global social movement: it is a unifying element of a growing network of peasants defending their right to food through the right to define and control their food systems. However, food sovereignty is also a political framework, developed to politicise food security, grounded by the right to food and flexible enough to allow for the incorporation and framing of multiple issues. It effectively re-values food, the way it is grown and the communities of people that grow, raise, catch or gather it, process it and bring it to table and places small-scale food producers as key decision makers for food systems.

As a political framework, food sovereignty undertakes a rigorous political analysis of agricultural policies and programmes with a focus on relations of power and control of resources. It proposed solutions based on experiences of food producers and rooted in an approach that gives primacy to producer’s rights, community rights, healthy food systems –

through the promotion of agro-ecological production – and gender equality through a defence of the rights of women. Food Sovereignty seeks out the maximization of local food system but is not opposed to trade of exchange that is fair and respects agro-ecological principles and human rights. This framework guides the majority of CSO interventions and provides coherence while grounding interventions.

While the term “food sovereignty” is not often incorporated into the outcomes of the CFS, the principles have been included as a result of successful CSO lobbying. And while there is no consensus on food sovereignty, even amongst actors in the Civil Society Mechanism, the principles are overwhelmingly shared and provide an overarching objective and framework under which a diversity of actors can come together to develop joint strategies and positions.

Positive Approach

Presenting a positive outlook has been important to the success of CSOs in the CFS. Being positive can be a strategic political tactic. Barack Obama did not win the 2010 US presidential election campaign by declaring “no we can’t”. In late 2012, Oxfam launched an Africa Campaign aimed at changing public perceptions of Africa with images of breath-taking scenery accompanied by slogans such as “Let’s make Africa famous for its stunning countryside, not hunger”. The aim was to highlight improvements to food supply across the continent. Similarly, CSOs, through an application of the food sovereignty framework, present positive proposals that include practical and actionable solutions. This is another key benefit of the food sovereignty approach: it is inherently a positive framework. It is a pathway to achieving the world the social movements want.

This positive approach links to suggesting solutions. As the leader of a European farming social movement explained early on in the process, before the CSM had been presented to the CFS:

This reform only takes on the meaning if we come up with genuine contributions and solutions. The reformed CFS is not a space to forward demands but a space to put our recommendations on the table and to forward and negotiate our needs and move them forward with governments. It is not a list of what is not working. This has been done before. We need to push to have solutions we know will work forward. We need to forward solutions and make sure that they are implemented and that governments follow through (Field Notes, Rome, October 2010).

Another notable shift is the increasing interconnection between a Right to Food framework, which is a legalistic approach which emerged from a Western perspective, and the food sovereignty framework which is grounded in peasant struggle in the global south. In the CFS, and beyond, you see these two frameworks increasing informing one another and strong alliances and political strategies being built between these actors.

Linking Back to the CFS’s Mandate and the High Level Panel of Experts

Despite the limitations and challenges that come from using the term food security, CSOs were effective in shifting the terms of debate by linking their recommendations to the CFS’s focus on food security and smallholders. This often helped keep negotiations focused on food security

and limiting drift towards private investment frames or market solutions. It also helped to ensure that the needs of smallholders were more visible in policy recommendations. Moreover, despite the Committee's attempt to limit the impact of the High Level Panel of Experts' reports and recommendations, CSOs found it useful to reply on the reports to support their arguments.

Building Alliances

CSOs have been developing strong alliances with national representatives who increasingly acknowledge the technical knowledge as well as the local knowledge of CSO participants. These alliances have also worked in favour of the CSOs, especially when countries support their statements (as evidenced above). These alliances were strengthened through the development of a side-event and through meetings with country delegates and sharing positions in advance. These alliances were strengthened through the development of a side-event and through meetings with country delegates and sharing positions in advance. In an interview, one diplomat from a G20 country and active in the CFS explained that in his opinion, CSO statements or CSO support for positions advanced by governments now hold more weight in negotiations than those of some member countries, even though civil society does not vote (Interview (Negotiator from a G20 country), March 2012, Rome).

Legitimacy

Questions of legitimacy loom large in literature on civil society engagement in policy making, notably around issues of the legitimacy of non-elected actors to participate in democratic processes (Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Kersbergen and Waarden 2004; Thomassen and Schmitt 1999). However, as will be illustrated in the next two chapters, in CFS negotiations, the views of CSOs were often perceived to be legitimate on the basis lived experience as well as technical knowledge. Indeed, their legitimacy comes from their ability to speak to the impact of the policies from a personal perspective. This is backed up by a transparent participation process facilitated by the civil society mechanism. It must be noted however, that in contrast to smallholder investment, a policy issue geared towards smallholders, few CSO actors are economists and food price volatility, despite having a disproportionate impact on the world's poor, is framed as a matter of trade and economic and thus seen to require economic and trade-based solutions. Here, CSOs are clearly at a disadvantage and were unsuccessful in their attempts to reframe the debate in line with impacts and alternatives to an industrial globalised model that increasingly integrates agricultural, financial and energy sectors and leads to increasingly volatile markets. CSOs must continue to find ways to reframe the terms of debate in terms that support their positions.

6.8. Reflections on Scaling-up the CSM and CFS Models

Since the initial success of the CSM, CSOs have been considering whether the experience of the reformed CFS and CSM should be duplicated for other multilateral processes (in particular for

the UN Framework on Climate Change Convention). Two separate issues require reflection on these issues: institutional reform, and civil society mobilisation.

With respect to the first, the reform of the CFS came about due to a variety of factors that proved central to its success. First, there is the long history of civil society engagement in the FAO and the CFS. Furthermore, there is a history of civil society organizations working towards greater participation in the Committee specifically. This means that there was time for these relationships to develop and for the institution to adapt. In line with this, a direct challenges to dominant understandings of “expertise” within the Committee have been widely accepted, as made evident not only through the engagement of CSOs on the Advisory Group, as well as on Task Teams and Open-Ended Working Groups, but also in the structure and principles of the CFS’s High-Level Panel of Experts. These factors created a move favourable environment for this sort of reform.

A key point to consider is the importance of individuals. The reform of the CFS was successful in part because people involved truly believed in the importance of CSO engagement. The Chairs of the CFS have supported the engagement of CSO and now the Director General of the FAO is championing civil society engagement. It remains to be seen who at the UNFCCC who could be the champion of such a reform. The most obvious contender is the Climate Action Network.

While not the primary impetus for change, the reform of the CFS gained traction as a reaction to a major humanitarian crisis: one billion people hungry. The severity of the situation gave the reform political urgency. The acuteness of the crisis opened up space for institutional change. Another related point is that the CFS remains politically benign: especially as the G8-G20 and other “more influential actors” continue to focus on food security. Because the CFS cannot take binding decisions, there is little political risk of bringing CSOs to the table. However, this can also be seen as an opportunity: keeping the activities below ministerial level means that there is more flexibility, less politicking, and more space for creativity. However, it also means that the outcomes carry less weight. What has been interesting to watch is the way in which CSOs have dealt with this by linking policy recommendations back to international commitments.

A representative of a large International NGO active in the CSM since the beginning expressed further optimism:

I'd be a more positive on the potential of being politically relevant. I see the CFS creating the building blocks, as well as consolidating political processes (with the CSM, with intensive consultation processes, with an independent HLPE), that eventually will help to deliver politically. It is still a bit early to see how this will translate into national changes and international engagements (Correspondence, November 2012, email).

It is true that it is too early to properly assess now CFS policy recommendations and processes translate beyond the CFS, but evidence suggests that the CFS is consistently being undermined and remains obscure to those not directly involved, including FAO employees.

The stability of the Committee, which remains based in Rome is also an important and distinguishing feature. Unlike the UNFCCC which hosts plenary meetings in different countries, despite having the secretariat in Bonn, having the Committee in Rome and attended predominantly by Rome-based country representatives means that there are people in one spot, working on the issues, in contact with technical staff and each other. This is important for the lobbying work of CSOs, for consistency, for networking, and for getting people to the table.

At the height of the food price crisis the FAO was put on the defensive as they faced the threat of a loss of power and authority as new players (e.g., G8, G20, HLTF, World Economic Forum) began to seek out more prominent positions within the transnational policy space mediating global food security governance. This suggests that a widening of participation across the FAO and within the CFS was in part strategic: increasing participation allowed the Committee to tap into calls for increased transparency and participation, notably by G77 countries and CSOs. This conforms to broader participatory turn in global governance (Duncan and Barling 2012). This is also not to be construed as cynical as it also reflects a commitment and recognition of the need for meaningful consultation in policy development as well as the variance in what is considered expertise. However, in other multilateral policy spaces, there does not appear to be the same threat or sense of institutional urgency. This in part also links to the further financialisation of food security and development insofar as wealthy countries not only felt the threat of food insecurity with the 2007-8 price spikes but also saw opportunity for market expansion. There is no notable rush on the part of wealthy countries to tackle climate change (unfortunately). There is also the issue of mutual reinforcement between the FAO and the CFS, which can be seen in the use of regional FAO conference to address CFS agenda points.

A final issue comes down to decision-making, which remains the responsibility of member states. In the area of food security, there is relative cohesion and consensus around food security. This is not the case when it comes to climate change. This level of agreement in turn provides space for the voices of civil society. However, when it comes to climate change negotiations, the lack of agreement amongst member states makes it harder for them to come together and agree to give CSOs a voice, “knowing that it might contribute to shift power balances” (Representative of a large International NGO active in the CSM since the beginning Correspondence, November 2012, email).

The second level of analysis must consider the Civil Society Mechanism itself. The CSM worked well initially because it had a core group of politically astute and relatively well-paid (or at least financially stable, for the most part) people with a history of engagement who could dedicate time, on the ground to developing the proposal, conducting a consultation and presenting a document that could be endorsed by a broad range of civil society actors. What's more is that they had legitimacy, authority and trust for the most part and this was really important at the beginning. The IPC was clearly central in this (along with Rome-based NGOs).

Perhaps the Climate Action Network could fulfil this role for such a mechanism to facilitate engagement in the UNFCCC.

However it is important to note that the success of the CSM is due in large part to the recognition of the role of CSOs which came from the facilitation mechanism. As a representative of a large International NGO active in the CSM since the beginning noted:

Before the reform, CSOs participation was not so structured and did not bring a lot of added value (especially for the NGOs that had their own ways to lobby governments and institutions). This means that if the aim of CAN [Climate Action Network] is to reinforce the coordination between CSOs but without institutional recognition of that coordination mechanism, I'm afraid it might fail. (Correspondence, November 2012, email).

These comments speak to the value of the CSM as a strong facilitation mechanism. This also raises another point: the work of the IPC and others included a broad (although not uniform) commitment to a political framework and a positive vision of change (food sovereignty). This created a political grounding and a starting point that has served to unify a lot of the actors. Of course not everyone subscribes to food sovereignty as an approach or as a label, but there is widespread acceptance of the principles (such as human rights, people's choice, ecological principles, gender equality). So while there is a diversity of opinions within the CSM, there are few who disagree fundamentally with a food sovereignty approach. This has been fundamental to ensuring that infighting amongst CSOs remains limited. A mechanism to address issues such as climate change, or biodiversity would benefit from a similar overarching framework, grounded in the struggle and realities of those most affected by the issues. There is also the issue of who should be engaged in the mechanism. The CSM relied on categories defined by the FAO, it is not clear how such categories could be defined in other fora.

Along these lines, a key strength of the CSM is its commitment to facilitating the inclusion of the voices of those most affected by food insecurity. This build on the longer-term experience of CSOs working through the IPC. At the same time, the IPC has had to open up its own mechanism to other CSOs working on food security including larger NGOs and nutrition groups. This can be seen in the way in which the IPC initially facilitated the CSM process but also in the development of IPC+ which brings together the farmers' organizations and social movements active in the IPC as well as NGOs. Reflecting on the UNFCCC process, the facilitating network would need to be open to working with civil society actors who do not necessarily understand the issues in the same way.

In summary, while the expansion of civil society engagement in multilateral policy fora should be welcomed and encouraged, the political and historic realities that bring about institutional change must be carefully considered. Given this, it may be wise to begin by developing new mechanisms, for example a civil society mechanism for climate change, in an open and transparent way, following the examples and lessons learned from the CSM. With a strong facilitation mechanism in place, that functions to facilitate participation and not to engage in politics, work on institutional change can begin. During this process there will need to be

widespread commitment from CSOs to follow and participate in the singular process and to ensure that the process remains open and transparent.

6.9. Summary

The CFS, with its vision of constituting “the foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental platform for a broad range of committed stakeholders to work together in a coordinated manner and in support of country-led processes towards the elimination of hunger and ensuring food security and nutrition for all human beings”, represents a forum with the potential to change the way food security policy is framed by changing who defines the topics and who participates in the debates. The impact of civil society engagement has been felt and has broadened the scope of debate within the CFS and expanded the scope of policies coming out of the CFS (see chapters 7 and 8 for concrete examples). Through their engagement in the CFS, social movements are translating their struggles into broader political processes. This analysis is being fed back into the CSM with the aim of supporting the continuation of effective engagement in the activities of the CFS. There are also opportunities to extend the strategies and instructive practices to other fora where CSOs are engaging in policy negotiations and multilateral processes. However, given the unique nature of the CFS, more research is needed into the potential for transferral of instructive practices.

A summary of instructional or best practices can be summed up as a series of key point. These points have been identified through the analysis of the operation of the CSM and include:

1. Ensuring enough time for meaningful consultation and development: this will be a slow process and will take time;
2. Maintaining communication between CSOs, between the various levels of the mechanism (e.g., Coordination Committee, Advisory Group members, wider participants, Secretariat);
3. Reducing language barriers and potential cultural barriers;
4. Maintaining interest of existing participants;
5. Attracting new participants and ensuring that the mechanism continues to open up;
6. Balance participation and representation;
7. Working towards consensus while respecting diversity;
8. Establishing clear, transparent decision-making and accountability mechanisms;
9. Building trust amongst the different constituencies represented;
10. Ensuring the sustained meaningful engagement of those most affected by food insecurity in all processes.

As noted above, these points relate to the analysis included in this case study but they are by no means extensive. They are a set of best practices that build on the challenges and successes of the CFS in what is inarguably its infancy. They can however provide a useful starting point for

others seeking to develop multi-stakeholder platforms or processes to engage civil society actors in multilateral policy making processes.

When a representative of a large International NGO active in the CSM from the beginning was asked why their organization decided to invest in the CFS over all the other things they could be doing, they replied:

I think the most important thing is the CSM as such. To have an international platform of ... its more than consultation, you know you confront, you try to understand, you discuss strategically... and even if everyone has their own autonomy. So it's an important place for us in that the potential short time conflict of interest are being overcome so that the road and framework of food sovereignty gets much more body related to concrete issues, so that it's not something abstract and that on the one hand, it can be translated into very concrete negotiation processes, hopefully that it is relevant also for, that there is a space that remains relevant for social movements. If they leave, it means that the CSM is not able to translate their own struggles into broader political forces. For me that is also an element. So, at the same time, it's trying to have a direct link back to the struggles people are being confronted and on the other hand, consolidating that other vision, or that other alternative. In terms of governance maybe, it's finding, or supporting, again from the CSM perspective, seeing if a more inclusive governance system, if it works. Give it a chance! (Interview (Representative of a large International NGO active in the CSM), Rome, June 2012).

Willems (1996) explains that one problem posed by the abstract character of social movements participating in the UN is that it “cannot relate to civil society as a whole or to social movements, because these are general, abstract collectivities”. With respect to the CSM, the opposite is true. The majority of civil society actors, including social movements, come together because they recognise the significance of the reformed CFS and, in turn, the CSM. While there are significant tensions, the majority of actors in the CFs subscribe to and defend a food sovereignty approach. Furthermore, within the working groups there is a move to work toward collective goals which then inform CSM interventions and negotiation strategies. To suggest that the UN, which is comprised of member states, somehow cannot comprehend complexity or is somehow homogenous is unfair. Instead, the membership of the UN in many ways is also an assembly of abstract collectivities. What's more is that through their collective struggle, many social movements advance a coherent policy framework (i.e., food sovereignty) which increasingly guides their analysis and recommendations. Others rely on a Right to Food approach. NGOs, at least within the CFS, increasingly understand their role to one of supporting social movement (“backing them up”) although outside of the CFS, solidarity between large international NGOs and social movements in the global south is certainly weaker.³⁵

35 These tensions were evident in the UK from evaluation a by social movement and smaller NGOs that strive to work in solidarity with CSOs from the global south of the “If” campaign. This campaign was launched in 2012 in the UK by the large international NGOs hoping to take advantage of the “golden moment” presented by the UK hosting the Olympics in the summer of 2012 and taking over the presidency of the G8 in 2013.

Finally, while enhanced participation of CSOs in the CFS is important in so far as it can expand the scope of debate and provide alternative approaches to achieving food security, there is a risk that the participatory nature can become “overly cognitivist or rationalistic and thus insufficiently egalitarian” by favouring the “educated and the dispassionate” and excluding “the many ways that many people communicate reasons outside of argumentation and formal debate, such as testimony, rhetoric, symbolic disruption, storytelling and cultural- and gender-specific styles of communication” (Bohman, 1999:410). These challenges are constantly addressed and evaluated within the CSM and attempts are made to build awareness and make space for different modes of communication. Where this becomes most problematic is through the interaction of the CSM with the CFS: the CFS is an established and formal governance space that operates under formal UN procedures. Thus while the CFS is in favour of including those most affected by food security, the organization structure, financial mechanisms and the political culture have yet to fully adapt to facilitate their involvement. Yet while there is a goal to engage those most affected by food insecurity, there is also realism: it will not always be possible to engage those most affected, but the priority is getting people who are affected and who can speak for themselves, and not to have people speaking on behalf of others: to allow the voices from the social movements to be expressed alongside the more established and NGOs participants.

The reform of the CFS and the implementation of the CSM mark a clear shift and expansion in understandings of participation and, as shown above, present a whole new set of complexities and challenges that are being addressed, through a variety of means, as they present themselves. These challenges are facing networks that have been expanded to incorporate actors who have predominantly been committed to deconstructing and contesting the logic of embedded neoliberalism as it appears in food security policy, most notably through the advancement of a food sovereignty framework. The awareness of these social movement actors of their position within the framework of embedded neo-liberalism was illustrated by a leader of a farmers’ movement in West Africa stated at the 37th Session of the Committee on World Food Security (October 2011) at a policy roundtable on food price volatility:

Instead of responding to the causes of our poverty and of price volatility, we have seen whole catalogues of projects and programmes financed in the name of the agricultural sector, billions of dollars are mobilized every year, but the truth is that more than half of the peasant families in the majority of our countries do not have access to money to buy a plough, a couple of oxen, a cart, or a donkey (Coulibaly, 2011).

The approach to food security programming and policy critiqued above exemplifies the deep entrenchment of neoliberalism within twenty-first century “institutional behaviour, political processes and understandings of socio economic ‘realities’” (Cerny 2008:3). As noted above, food security programme and agriculture policies have been transformed by and within this process. The farmers’ movement leader from West Africa also gave a personal reflection upon the process of neo-liberalism and its impact:

About thirty years ago I was in school and we were told that it was better to produce for external markets...We were then told that the state was inefficient and that more space had to be given to the private sector. At the same time, our states were forced to go even more into debt in order to re-establish macroeconomic equilibrium. We were told that any support to peasant agriculture — deemed to be non-performing—had to be cut...Then we were told to become competitive according to the criteria of international financial institutions, and that our states were not allowed to protect us any longer. All custom tariffs have been dismantled and our markets have been liberalized, food products produced elsewhere have started dumping into our markets at low prices, making us even more vulnerable to price volatility...However, none of these “solutions” that have been imposed on us moved us out of poverty. Worse, we became even more vulnerable. It is within this context that peasant agriculture is being asked to perform (Coulibaly, 2011).

Indeed, these farmers and peasants, pastoralists and fisher-folk, are faced with balancing their approach, their knowledge and their ideologies not only with other civil society actors, which has been the focus of this paper, but with nation states, the private sector, international financial institutions and the UN, many of which serve to maintain and strengthen the logic of neoliberalism.

7. Case Study 2: Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests

7.1. Introduction

Since its reform, the Committee on World Food Security has placed considerable emphasis on issues related to land, with particular focus on tenure and investment. At their 36th Session (October 2010), the CFS organised a policy roundtable on land tenure and international investment in agriculture. They also requested the High Level Panel of Experts produce a report which was later titled “Land tenure and international investment in agriculture” (see High Level Panel of Experts 2011a). At that same session, the Committee gave its support to what was then called the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land and Other Natural Resources, and decided to establish an open-ended working group of the CFS to review the first draft of the Guidelines with a view to submitting them for consideration to the 37th Session of CFS (October 2011)(CFS 2010a:para 26.i).

The Guidelines were not submitted to the 37th session for reasons that will become clear below. However in May 2012, the CFS did endorse the “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security” (VGGT) marking a key moment in the evolution of the reformed CFS. Since the endorsement, their implementation has been encouraged by the G20, Rio+20, the Francophone Assembly of Parliamentarians, among others.

On December 21, 2012, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on Agriculture Development and Food Security which “[e]ncourages countries to give due consideration to implementing the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, as endorsed by the Committee on World Food Security on 11 May 2012.” It also “[r]equests the relevant entities of the United Nations system, in accordance with their respective mandates and in the most cost-effective manner, to ensure the speedy dissemination and promotion of the Guidelines” (UN General Assembly 2012a).

On January 19, 2013, at the Fifth Berlin Agriculture Ministers’ Summit, Ministers from 80 countries issued a communiqué on responsible investment in food and agriculture that called on parties to confirm their intention to implement the “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security” in accordance with national priorities, and further called on business enterprises to comply with them domestically and abroad. The VGGTs have also become a priority for the FAO. By February 2013, the FAO had supported ten awareness raising workshops, seventeen country-level workshops had been requested and fifty-three briefings in thirty-three countries had been completed (Hilton 2013).

To say that the VGGTs represent a landmark in the evolution of the reformed Committee on World Food Security would not be hyperbole. According to the FAO, they represent “an

unprecedented international agreement on tenure governance” (Hilton 2013). This case study focuses on the development and negotiation of the VGGTs, analyses the outcomes and possible implications. Given that participant observation was situated within the civil society mechanism, there is an added focus on, and insight into, the role and impact of civil society actors.

It is important to reiterate that civil society actors do not necessarily speak with one voice. However, the Civil Society Mechanism’s working group on land tenure, aided by a strong facilitator, did manage to develop a strong engagement strategy and joint positions while making most effective use of the legitimacy and political skills of social movements and the technical expertise and capacity of non-governmental organizations. Their participation throughout the process strengthened the rationale for their inclusion as official participants in the reformed CFS.

This case study is organised as follows. First the issue of land tenure is introduced. From there, the process of negotiating Voluntary Guidelines on the governance of land tenure is presented along with the methodology for undertaking consultation on prepared drafts. From there, the content of the final version of the VGGTs is presented. This is followed by a review of the negotiation process that led from the First Draft to the final text. To provide insight into the process of negotiation at the CFS, discussions related to key or contentious paragraphs are summarised and analysed. The analysis highlights the fragmented nature of negotiations while illustrating how in the case of the VGGTs alliances were forced around issues and not necessarily along regional or historic lines. Tensions raised by language and culture are highlighted, as are challenges resulting from a disconnect between negotiators and technical staff in the national capitals. What is perhaps most apparent is the active role that civil society actors played in these negotiations and the way in which their contributions are taken on par with those of states and other CFS participants such as the World Bank, highlighting a shift in the operation of intergovernmental negotiations. The case study concludes with consideration of next steps and possible implications of the VGGTs.

7.2. Land Tenure and Food Security

Land is a fundamental resource that secures the livelihoods of many, especially the rural poor who often rely on access to and control over natural resources. Land provides food and shelter and is a key factor in economic growth (Behrman, Meinzen-Dick, and Quisumbing 2012; Deere and Leon 1997; Deininger, K., Jin, S., & Nagarajan 2007; Sietchiping 2010). While the notion of land is generally associated with surface and underground resources, land is also a physical object, an asset and the site of emotional, cultural, historic and spiritual practices. Ensuring sustainable land use and eradicating food insecurity is dependent upon how people and communities gain, maintain and control access to land. However, land is increasingly scarce as a result of a growing world population, environmental degradation, breakdown of customary

authority and climate change, and is in turn becoming subject to intensified competition (Harvey and Pilgrim 2011). This competition has been made visible through the rapid rise in land grabbing and large-scale land acquisitions (Borras et al. 2011; GRAIN 2008; Hall 2011; De Schutter 2011).

Access to land and other natural resources is defined and regulated in societies through complex systems of tenure. As such, tenure defines who can use which resources, the duration and the conditions of use. Tenure constitutes a web of intersecting interests and forms an important part of social, political and economic structures at the household, community and national level (FAO 2002). In a report on land tenure and rural development, the FAO (2002) defined land tenure in the following way:

3.1 Land tenure is the relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people, as individuals or groups, with respect to land. (For convenience, “land” is used here to include other natural resources such as water and trees.) Land tenure is an institution, i.e., rules invented by societies to regulate behaviour. Rules of tenure define how property rights to land are to be allocated within societies. They define how access is granted to rights to use, control, and transfer land, as well as associated responsibilities and restraints. In simple terms, land tenure systems determine who can use what resources for how long, and under what conditions.

3.2 Land tenure is an important part of social, political and economic structures. It is multi-dimensional, bringing into play social, technical, economic, institutional, legal and political aspects that are often ignored but must be taken into account. Land tenure relationships may be well-defined and enforceable in a formal court of law or through customary structures in a community. Alternatively, they may be relatively poorly defined with ambiguities open to exploitation.

This definition highlights the political, social and cultural significance of tenure while alluding to the diversity of ways in which these social norms are regulated. Tenure systems include informal and unwritten customary rights of access and use to land and natural resources as well as more “formal” arrangements (e.g., individual tiling, freehold and leasehold) mediated by written contracts, policies and laws. There are also secondary rights that include access to migratory routes and grazing lands. Formal and customary tenure systems often co-exist but customary systems are under threat as land scarcity increases. Insecure tenure rights enhance vulnerability, conflict, food insecurity and poverty and can lead to increased environmental degradation and conflict when competing users fight for control over the resources (FAO 2012e; Sietchiping 2010). The governance of tenure is a crucial factor in determining rights and associated duties to use and control land, fisheries and forests. Many tenure problems arise as a result of weak governance which in turn adversely affects social stability, sustainable resource use and the economy.

7.3. Establishing Guidelines for Tenure of Natural Resources

Cognisant of the centrality of tenure to food security, and in response to specific requests from member states for guidance on the governance of tenure, the FAO began a process of developing voluntary guidelines on the governance of land tenure in 2006. Voluntary guidelines set out principles and internationally accepted standards for responsible practices by providing a

framework that States can use when developing their own strategies, policies, legislation and programmes. Furthermore, they can be used by all actors to judge whether proposed actions (e.g., policies, investments) constitute acceptable practice. The VGGTs follow the format of other FAO voluntary instruments such as the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries; International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides; Responsible Management of Planted Forests: Voluntary Guidelines; and Fire Management Voluntary Guidelines: Principles and Strategic Actions.

The VGGTs also build on and support the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security, adopted by the FAO Council at the Hundred and Twenty-seventh Session (November 2004). The VGGTs are in fact grounded in a rights-based approach and list the realisation of the right to adequate food as a primary goal (FAO 2012k:para 1.1).

The Right to Food Guidelines make specific reference to access to resources and assets. They encourage states to facilitate stable and non-discriminatory access and utilization of resources and to protect the rights of individuals with respect to resources. They also encourage States to undertake land reforms consistent with their human rights obligations. Guideline 8B, which is specifically on the issue of land, states:

States should take measures to promote and protect the security of land tenure, especially with respect to women, and poor and disadvantaged segments of society, through legislation that protects the full and equal right to own land and other property, including the right to inherit. As appropriate, States should consider establishing legal and other policy mechanisms, consistent with their international human rights obligations and in accordance with the rule of law, that advance land reform to enhance access for the poor and women. Such mechanisms should also promote conservation and sustainable use of land. Special consideration should be given to the situation of indigenous communities (FAO 2005:para 8.10).

The VGGTs also build on the discussions and outcomes of the International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD) held in March 2006. ICARRD had established several commissions to tackle key issues around agrarian reform and rural development. Commission 1 was established to address Agrarian Reform and Access to Land: Challenges and Opportunities. The Commission's report highlighted the need to approach agrarian reform with a broad focus that includes participatory approaches to respond to diverse national contexts (ICARRD 2006:para 32). The Commission recognised the challenge of achieving balance between agro-business, foreign investment and the interest of small famers but reiterated that family agriculture should be a competitive enterprise.³⁶

Building on the findings of the Commission's Report, the final declaration of the ICAARD, adopted by 92 states, focused on the importance of secure and sustainable access to land, water,

36 Reflecting on the process of developing the VGGTs one participant in the negotiation process noted "at a later stage in the process, Brazil made it clear that the Voluntary Guidelines had to be understood as part of ICARRD follow-up, which was not the case at the beginning of the consultation process" (Seufert 2013:183).

and other natural resources. Specifically, it called for an increase in the participation of stakeholders in agrarian reform processes to develop efficient institutions to apply policies, and to respect the role of customary practices where they play a positive role in land management, especially common property management. The value of titling and registries as instruments for transparency and certainty of property were emphasised as was the importance of internal and external markets and market mechanisms. They also agreed that issues of land are related to conflict and must be addressed with prudence in the context of stakeholder participation. Interestingly, no reference was made to the Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food, although the final report “emphasized that policy-makers should give high importance to issues of food sovereignty and a rights-based approach to agrarian reform and rural development” (ICARRD 2006:para 59).³⁷

In 2009, the FAO’s Land Tenure and Management Unit issued a Discussion Paper titled “Towards Voluntary Guidelines on responsible governance of tenure of land and other natural resources” with the aim of seeking views and comments on Voluntary Guidelines on responsible governance of tenure of land and other natural resources (FAO 2009f). The paper provided examples of what could be included as guidelines, noting that the Guidelines would be prepared through a participatory process involving international organizations, governments and civil society.

When the idea for Voluntary Guidelines on land tenure was conceived, it was assumed they would be a technical document aimed at policy makers and field workers and that they would receive, at most, two hours of review in the CFS, be approved and then become a resource applied by the FAO (Interview (FAO expert), March 2012, London). A year after the release of the FAO’s discussion paper, at their 36th Session, the CFS

encouraged the continuation of the inclusive process for the development of the Voluntary Guidelines (Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land and Other Natural Resources – VGGT) building on existing regional processes with a view to submitting the guidelines for the consideration of the 37th session of CFS and decided to establish an open-ended working group of the CFS to review the first draft of the voluntary guidelines (CFS 2010a:para 26.i)

By bringing them into the CFS, the nature of the guidelines shifted from a technical to a political nature and their influence and interest increased. A major rationale, especially for CSOs, for the negotiation of the Guidelines within the CFS as to add an additional level of influence and standing. Many hoped that intergovernmentally negotiated guidelines would provide a counter-balance to emerging guidelines and principles on responsible investment, most notably the Principles for the Responsible Agriculture Investment. When questioned about the shift from a technical process to a political one, an FAO technical staff person suggested that

³⁷ These are not the only guidelines developed to address issues of investment and land tenure. A list of principles and guidelines related to investment in agriculture are listed in Appendix 6.

the move was viewed positively in so far as it gave the VGGTs far more political weight. It was noted that “we were lucky to have a CFS that was looking for something to do” (Field notes, Berlin, June 2013).

7.3.1. Bringing the VGGTs into the CFS

As mentioned above, at the 36th Session of the CFS there was agreement to establish an open-ended working group of the CFS to review the first draft of the Voluntary Guidelines. This particular decision was the result of a debate principally led by civil society actors who believed that beyond a clear need for guidelines on land tenure governance, the CFS needed to undertake a process to counter the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respect Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (PRAI). CSOs worked hard to block an endorsement of the then RAI, now PRAI, which were developed by the World Bank, UNCTAD, FAO and IFAD in 2009. The reasoning was that the PRAI was developed without proper consultation. The principles were not grounded in a rights-based approach and did not give primacy to goal of improving food security. Furthermore, PRAI lacked institutional legitimacy insofar as they were never submitted for approval by their respective governing bodies.

Civil society actors agreed that principles to address large-scale land acquisition and foreign investment in agriculture were needed, despite concerns that they could be seen as rationalizing land grab, and the problematic assumption that investments are not responsible: all investments should be responsible. However, civil society actors argued that before such principles could be identified, guidelines for the responsible governance of tenure were needed. Theirs was thus a chronological argument, with a rationale located in the reform principles of the CFS: promoting food security and supporting national governments to achieve the progressive realisation of the right to food. These tactics proved to be successful.

At the 36th Session, the FS held a discussion on land tenure with a view to endorsing the VGGTs and the PRAI. As is the procedure in the reformed CFS, there was a discussion between member states and participants to arrive at a decision. Figure 17 provides a comparison of the draft decisions presented to the CFS by the Secretariat and the final decisions taken by the CFS in the form of recommendations.

Throughout the negotiations on land tenure, the Committee moved away from endorsing the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respect Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (PRAI), opting instead to begin an inclusive process to consider them within the CFS and in line with the reform principles. This was a victory for civil society actors who had made a statement calling on the CFS to:

not endorse the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (RAI): the RAI is not an adequate instrument to regulate private investment; moreover, RAI principles have been formulated through an exclusive process without the participation of communities and constituencies most affected by agricultural investments, especially private investments. What is needed instead are nationally and internationally enforceable laws and public regulations on all investments pertaining to land, including

provisions on extra-territorial obligations of states to regulate and make private companies accountable for their operations abroad (Field notes, Rome, October 2010).

With respect to the Guidelines, key changes include a deadline for the submission of the Guidelines to the CFS and the removal of FAO governing bodies from the approval process. For the RAI process, the draft language calling for “endorsement” of their elaboration was weakened to “taking note”, after a long negotiation between member states but notably between representatives of the World Bank and La Via Campesina that went on past 2:00 am without language interpretation. As an aside, this meeting was a turning point for many: it was evidence of the willingness of member states to open up to the implications of participation. States had every right to reach consensus and stop the back and forth between the new participants, and end the negotiations much earlier. Instead they made a concerted effort to work through the differences and to move towards consensus. Many would suggest that perhaps this is further evidence of vertical shifts evident across global governance where states pass responsibility onto other actors, but those in the room, who engaged until the end, agree that this was much more. This was evidence of a concerted effort on part of all actors to enact the reform vision of the CFS.

In the third recommendation, governments replaced the FAO as the key actors to finalise both the Voluntary Guidelines and the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment, along with stakeholders. This move highlights an important shift in national involvement and illustrates the move from a technical process towards a political process. It is also illustrative of the refocusing on state-engagement as part of the roll-forward processes of the Seoul Consensus. Unfortunately, specific reference food security and poverty reduction objectives were lost but emphasis on consistency and complementary was retained, in line with the overall mandate of the CFS. The negotiations resulted in two additional points. The first point was a request to the High Level Panel of Experts to undertake a study into land tenure and investment. The final point encouraged member state support for capacity building toward effectively addressing land governance.

Draft Decision Box (August 2010)	Final Recommendations of the 36 th Session of the CFS (October 2010)
Endorsing the on-going inclusive process of development of the Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land and Other Natural Resources and requesting FAO to submit the Voluntary Guidelines for review and approval by CFS and FAO governing bodies	Encouraged the continuation of the inclusive process for the development of the Voluntary Guidelines (Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land and Other Natural Resources – VGGT) building on existing regional processes with a view to submitting the guidelines for the consideration of the 37 th session of CFS and decided to establish an open-ended working group of the CFS to review the first draft of the voluntary guidelines.
Endorsing the on-going elaboration of Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respect Rights, Livelihoods and Resources initiated by the World Bank, FAO, IFAD and UNCTAD and recommending that the consultation process be pursued and include all relevant stakeholders	Taking note of the on-going process of developing Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investments that Respect Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (RAI), and, in line with its role, decided to start an inclusive process of consideration of the principles within the CFS
Urging FAO and the other international organizations involved to continue ensuring the consistency and complementarity between the two processes and to keep focus on their food security and poverty reduction objectives.	Urged governments and other stakeholders involved in the drafting process of both the VGGT and the RAI to ensure consistency and complementarity between the two processes.
	Requested the HLPE to undertake studies, to be presented at the 37th Session of the CFS, on the following important issues, in accordance with the CFS reform document agreed in 2009, and the Rules and Procedures for the work of the HLPE: the respective roles of large-scale plantations and of small-scale farming, including economic, social, gender and environmental impacts; review of the existing tools allowing the mapping of available land; comparative analysis of tools to align large scale investments with country food security strategies.
	Encouraged member state support for capacity building toward effectively addressing land governance.

Figure 19: Outcomes of the Policy Roundtable on Land Tenure and International Investment in Agriculture (CFS 36) (Duncan 2013)

Methodology

The VGGTs set out principles and internationally accepted standards for responsible practices. Voluntary Guidelines are instruments structured as short framework document that can be used in the development of strategies, policies, legislation, programmes and other activities. For the VGGTs, a range of additional documents (e.g., supplementary guidelines that provide technical

details on specific aspects when necessary, training and advocacy materials, and strategies for implementation) are developed by the FAO to support uptake and application of the Guidelines (FAO 2012c).

The FAO and the CFS committed to ensuring that the VGGTs were developed in a consultative and participatory way and participatory policy making is necessarily a time consuming process. That said, the VGGTs managed to undertake widespread, meaningful consultation in a reasonable amount of time. The methodology used in the drafting of the Guidelines was applauded by all stakeholders for their participatory and consultative effectiveness. In total, ten regional, one private sector and four civil society consultation meetings were organized between September 2009 and November 2010. The FAO coordinated regional consultations in Brazil, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Jordan, Namibia, Panama, Romania, the Russian Federation, Samoa and Viet Nam. Four more regional consultations were held specifically for civil society in Africa; Asia; Europe and Central and West Asia; and Latin America. These meetings brought together almost 1,000 representatives from government institutions, civil society, private sector, academia, and UN agencies from across 130 countries. Each consultation meeting included an assessment to identify issues and actions to be included in the Guidelines in the context of governance of tenure. Building on the consultations, FAO technical staff developed a Zero Draft of the Guidelines. On April 15th 2011, there was a public reading in FAO of the Zero Draft. From April 18 - May 1, 2011, an electronic consultation on the Zero Draft was organized. Then, from July 12-15, 2011 the CFS hosted intergovernmental negotiations. It is important to remember that under the reform of the CFS, these negotiations were open to the participation of civil society and private sector actors, among others.

Following the electronic consultation on the Zero Draft, a First Draft was developed by FAO technical staff. It was written so as to be consistent with international and regional instruments that address human rights and tenure rights. It was also informed by the broad and inclusive process of consultation that took place from 2009-2010. In terms of including the outcomes of the consultation into the First Draft, it was noted that:

Some proposals were not included in this revised draft because they provided a greater level of detail than that which can be accommodated in an instrument of this nature, and they may be more suited for supporting material that will become available later. In other cases, several different views were put forward in ways that did not allow them to be reconciled into a single proposed change. The reconciliation of such different views will be addressed along with other matters during the CFS-led negotiations and open-ended working group meetings which are intended to lead to a final text of the Voluntary Guidelines in July 2011 (FAO 2012c:4).

The First Draft was submitted to the open-ended working group on June 1, 2011 and comments were compiled by the CFS Secretariat. From June 15-17 the open-ended working group tried to focus the discussion and prepare for the negotiations. From July 12-15, the Open-Ended

Working Group met in Rome to negotiate the text meeting but they were unable to come to consensus on all paragraphs and thus did not complete the process.³⁸. A second round of negotiations took place the week before the 37th Session. Still the negotiations did not conclude and a final session was added for March 2012. Yet despite the extended work plan, there was widespread and growing agreement of the value of the process and the potential of the outcome. Instead of endorsing the VGGTs, at their 37th Session, the CFS “recognized that additional time will be required to complete the process and endorsed its continuation and finalization” while also acknowledging that “substantial progress [had been] gained so far and recommended building on the solid base which has been achieved, while concentrating on remaining paragraphs and respecting and maintaining the spirit of understanding reached during the July and October negotiations” (CFS 2011d:paras 11 & 12).

The phrase “concentrating on remaining paragraphs and respecting and maintaining the spirit of understanding reached” was key. The open-ended working group had deliberated and facilitated intergovernmental negotiations that had led to consensus on the majority of the text and there was a great deal of concern that re-opening negotiations on specific paragraphs would at best slow down, and at worst derail, the process. That said, as the Canadian negotiators endlessly reminded the Committee, nothing decided in the Working Groups was final. Final decisions could only be taken by the Plenary and every government has the right to raise concerns in Plenary thereby blocking consensus. After an extended negotiation in March 2012, the Open-Ended Working Group reached consensus and an extra-ordinary meeting of the CFS was called in May 2012 for the CFS to endorse the VGGTs. The VGGTs were endorsed unanimously by 96 member countries.

Review of the First Draft

As will be shown below, the First Draft failed to adequately recognize the structural problems linked to land tenure and assumed weak tenure to be weak management. Furthermore, it failed to give sufficient weight to issues related to discrimination (e.g., race, class, ethnicity, wealth, and age) and related restrictions to access to land, and recognition of tenure or rights to land. However, it is here argued that the transition from Zero Draft to the final Guidelines is evidence of the value of meaningful and diverse consultation and participatory negotiations.

The First Draft contains several weaknesses. First, it started from the assumption that states own land and that they have the authority to distribute tenure rights, so long as the actions conform to a set of guidelines. Viewed this way, the guidelines are no longer a tool for responsible

38 Sections where consensus had been reached include: Preface; Section 1 (Objectives); Section 2 (Nature and scope); Section 3 (Guiding principles) up to and including 3B.6.; Paragraph 9.8 of Section 9 (Indigenous peoples and other communities with customary tenure systems); Paragraph 12.5 of Section 12 (Investments and concessions); Section 13 (Land consolidation and other readjustment approaches); Section 14 (Restitution); Section 15 (Redistributive reforms); Section 16 (Expropriation and compensation)

governance towards but instead a tool for states and/or elite groups to rationalize or legitimise control over natural resources. Framing land tenure this way opens the Guidelines up for potential tensions over the multiple uses and roles of land across contexts. The First Draft failed to live up to claims of being aligned with existing human rights instruments insofar as it did not uphold or reinforce existing rights such as those included in the UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). CSOs raised concerns that the Guidelines could be used to dilute existing rights. As evidence, they pointed to shifts in language from consultation to negotiation between the Zero and First Drafts. CSOs reminded the CFS that rights are not negotiable nor should people have to negotiate for their land. Talk of negotiation contradicts the UNDRIP commitment to free, prior and informed consent.

As another example from the Zero Draft, wording had changed from stating countries should act in ways that are “consistent with international and regional human rights obligations” to “consistent with their obligations and voluntary commitments to applicable international and regional human rights norms and standards”. While the inclusion of voluntary commitments is good, the revised sentence is arguably weaker overall. Given the voluntary and thus non-binding nature of the Guidelines, it is not likely that they could easily (if at all) undermine a UN declaration on rights. However, the fact that states were unwilling to ensure coherence between the pre-existing rights defined in UNDRIP and the Guidelines, and that they failed to use the Guidelines to strengthen the rights of vulnerable people, including Indigenous peoples, is telling.

The controversial issues of markets and investment remained highly problematic across both drafts. On this matter, CSOs consistently argued for the need to recognize that there are other types of land-based investment beyond agriculture that impact small-scale food producers (e.g. mining, development, military). CSOs also raised concern that the discourse of development could be used to rationalize changes in land tenure systems. They cited examples of the development of beach resorts for tourism, noting that such processes often disregard food producers and customary uses of, and rights to, these lands and resources. Land rights are also restricted by projects undertaken in the name of conservation, where communities are pushed off their land or their access to natural resources is restricted so as to protect a specific species of animal or biodiversity.

Some of these concerns were addressed between the First Draft and the final version of the VGGTs. Most notably, the final version of the VGGTs ground the VGGTs in a rights-based approach:

4.2 States should ensure that all actions regarding tenure and its governance are consistent with their existing obligations under national and international law, and with due regard to voluntary commitments under the applicable regional and international instruments.

A rights-based approach strengthens the VGGTs insofar as while they remain voluntary, the guidelines build on and take form existing international obligations and commitments.

Grounding the VGGTs in a rights-based approach was a direct outcome of strong interventions and negotiation by civil society actors and the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, who developed a strong strategy and rationale for grounding the document in a rights-based approach. Such an approach further strengthens the links between the VGGTs and the CFS which is meant to “strive for a world free from hunger where countries implement the voluntary guidelines for the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security” (CFS 2009a:para 4).

7.4. An overview of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security

The purpose of the VGGTs is to “serve as a reference and provide guidance to improve the governance of tenure of land fisheries and forests with the overarching goal of achieving food security for all and to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security”(FAO 2012k:iv). Towards this end, the VGGTs cover five key areas related to the responsible tenure of land, fisheries and forests: Legal recognition and allocation of tenure rights and duties, including safeguards, public resources, Indigenous Peoples, and informal tenure; transfer and other changes to tenure rights and duties, specifically as they relate to markets, investments, land consolidation; restitution; redistributive reform; the Administration of tenure including records of tenure rights, valuation, taxation, resolution of disputes, and transboundary matters; responses to climate change and emergencies; and the promotion, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

These areas are all framed by a set of guiding principles of responsible tenure governance as well as principles for implementation (Part 3). The former declare that states should recognise and respect all legitimate tenure right holders, safeguard legitimate tenure rights and provide access to justice to deal with infringement of legitimate tenure rights. Furthermore, non-state actors including businesses have a responsibility to respect human rights and legitimate tenure rights. Ten principles for implementation are identified: human dignity; non-discrimination; equity and justice; gender equity; holistic and sustainable approach; consultation and participation; rule of law; transparency; accountability; continuous improvement.

In the First Draft there were only nine principles with “Gender and social equity, and gender and social justice” constituting a single principle which recognised that “equality between individuals may require acknowledging differences between individuals, and taking positive action, including empowerment, to ensure equitable treatment and outcomes for all, women and men, and vulnerable and marginalized people”(FAO 2012c). In the final document, the social focus was lost when the principle was split into “Gender equality” and “Equity and justice”. The principle of equity and justice recognises “that equality between individuals may require acknowledging differences between individuals, and taking positive action, including

empowerment, in order to promote equitable tenure rights and access to land, fisheries and forests, for all, women and men, youth and vulnerable and traditionally marginalized people, within the national context.”

Section 1.2 outline the objectives of the Guidelines, specifically:

1.2.4 strengthen the capacities and operations of implementing agencies; judicial authorities; local governments; organizations of farmers and small-scale producers, of fishers, and of forest users; pastoralists; indigenous peoples and other communities; civil society; private sector; academia; and all persons concerned with tenure governance as well as to promote the cooperation between the actors mentioned (FAO 2012k).

This paragraph represents a key battle for CSOs who fought for a definition of small-scale producers to be included. It is noteworthy that the term “small-scale producers” is used over smallholders as the focus is specifically on food producers. Furthermore, in the First Draft, civil society came after the private sector in the listing and judicial authorities replaced reference to courts thereby increasing relevance across multiple contexts and respecting systems of traditional authority.

To improve on the implementing principle of transparency, a proposal was made by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, represented by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, who sits on the Advisory Group to the CFS. The proposal was to explicitly state the need to make information available in formats accessible to all “including women, communities in remote areas and persons with disabilities”. The proposal was rejected. The final principle reads:

3B.8 Transparency: clearly defining and widely publicizing policies, laws and procedures in applicable languages, and widely publicizing decisions in applicable languages and in formats accessible to all”.

Some delegations argued that rather than have a “bucket list” it was more appropriate to ensure accessibility for all. The limitation of this being that a focus on everyone depoliticized or shifts focus away from the groups of people who are most often ignored. However, in the spirit of language harmonization, and to avoid inevitably leaving groups off the list, throughout the document the application of the implementing principles and relevant guidelines apply broadly “to all”, with the notable exception of Section 9 which relates specifically to Indigenous peoples and other communities with customary tenure systems.

Tensions related to issues of state sovereignty and definitions were inevitable and correspondingly took a prominent position in the negotiations. These tensions are raised immediately in paragraph 1.1 where, referring to the objectives of the Guidelines it notes that the “Voluntary Guidelines seek to improve governance of tenure of land*, fisheries and forests.” The asterisk refers to a footnote that states “there is no international definition of land within the context of tenure. The meaning of the word may be defined within the national context.” This is problematic given that the guidelines are meant to provide guidance on the tenure of land and that becomes challenging if land remained undefined. Throughout the negotiations countries were adamant about maintaining their right to define land within a national context. While this does

remain the right of countries, a definition of what “land” is would certainly have strengthened the Guidelines. Broad definitions of land do exist and the FAO discussion paper on the development of guidelines did provide a definition that could have been used:

Terminology is problematic in any material of this nature. In order to simplify the text, the term “land” is used to include any human-made improvements to the land, including housing and other buildings, and infrastructure such as irrigation systems. In addition to land, the discussion paper addresses other natural resources (such as trees and forests, pastures and other vegetation, water and fisheries) that cover the land or are otherwise related to it (FAO 2009f:1–2).

Building on the theme of state sovereignty, the final version of the Guidelines includes a new paragraph (2.5) which states that “These Guidelines should be interpreted and applied in accordance with national legal systems and their institutions.” This directive is reiterated in 3.1.2 with reference to the principles that should be upheld by states. In reference to safeguards, language was added to clarify that states should protect tenure rights holders against the arbitrary loss of their tenure rights, including forced evictions “that are inconsistent with their existing obligations under national and international law.” In that same section, language related to the prevention of corruption was weakened for the final document. The First Draft mentioned that states “should prevent opportunities for corruption in all forms, at all levels, and in all settings” but this was changed to “should *endeavour to* prevent corruption”. The shift is subtle but important and reflects awareness on the part of governments that they could potentially be held to these Guidelines.

7.5. Negotiating the Voluntary Guidelines: Insight into process and participation

It is important to note that the negotiations VGGTs were technically not negotiations but discussions and consultations by the Open-Ended Working Group. Even after the Guidelines had been finalised in the Working Group, member states had the right to reopen the text and launch negotiations in the CFS Plenary. While the Working Group was only “consulting” on the text so that it could present it to the CFS plenary for endorsement, in practice, the Working Groups, especially by the March 2012 session, functioned very much like a session of the plenary and the participants adopted the language of “negotiation” and worked in a manner that was almost indistinguishable from the negotiations that take place during the CFS sessions. Furthermore, in promoting the VGGTs, actors including the CFS and the FAO speak about them as being the result of intergovernmental negotiations. Because of this, the language used herein relates to negotiations as a more adequate reflection of the process and to distinguish the efforts of the CFS open-ended working group from the consultations that took place around the Zero and First Draft.

Building buy-in and convincing member states about the relevance and potential of these Guidelines took time. This is perhaps not surprising given the politically sensitive nature of land tenure and related issues. When the FAO launched the process, it was mainly European

countries that supported the process financially. There was hesitation on the part of many African countries due to the fact that in 2009 the African Union had adopted a Land Policy Framework and were concerns over how the two documents would correlate. That said, the Africa Group ended up playing a critical role in the negotiations, often forging political alliances with the EU and rejecting claims by other governments that such guidelines were not needed by giving concrete examples of why they were needed. Indeed, the insistence of African governments on the potential value of guidelines for the governance of land, fisheries and forests provided motivation and legitimacy throughout the negotiation process.

Asian countries were largely absent from the negotiations. The delegate from Afghanistan was the exception and the Chinese delegation followed the negotiation closely and contributed to discussions on tenure in the context of state-owned land and markets. That the negotiations on the text take place in English can be given as part of the reason. India was completely absent from the discussions, which was surprising in part given that India had been active in processes linked to the Voluntary Guidelines on the Progressive Realization on the Right to Food, but perhaps less surprisingly when one considers that India is involved in 65 land investment deals whereof 39 are transnational and 26 domestic (International Land Coalition 2013). The land tenure conflict related to Kashmir district could have also limited a desire to enter into international discussions on land tenure.

In what follows five specific paragraphs are reviewed. Focus is on the processes of negotiations that took place during the final session of the CFS intergovernmental working group (March 2013). The process of negotiation unrolled as follows. Working in English with the proposed text projected onto a large screen, participants would identify themselves to the chair and then the chair would call on them to make suggestions. Scribes noted the suggestions in the working document using track changes. This tracked all of the inclusions and deletions. All members of the Committee, including civil society, governments and the private sector, had the right to make suggestions and all suggestions must be taken into account. Negotiations continued until member states reached consensus on the text.

Proposed text was inserted into the working text and if it was contentious it was put into square brackets. Proposed text that had been rejected was crossed out. In the cases where it became apparent that the plenary was unlikely to find consensus the problematic paragraphs were sent to a “Friends of the Chair” (FOC) group. For this, the Chair identified an agreeably neutral “friend” (most often a government representative from a member state with little stake in the issue) to facilitate negotiations between interested parties. These groups are in theory open to all interested CFS participants. However, often these groups meet simultaneously as the plenary negotiations continue. This actively restricts the level of participation as many delegations do not have enough people or resources to cover both meetings. Consequently, wealthier countries are better represented in these groups. Less well staffed delegations tend to develop regional alliances and divide the work amongst themselves. Once the Friends of the Chair reaches

consensus, the facilitator reports back to the chair, and often Plenary, with a text that has the agreement group and consensus is sought from plenary to approve the language. When consensus is reached amongst member states, the changes are accepted and the text is “cleaned” (meaning track changes are accepted) and the paragraph is then closed.

The paragraphs selected for review reflect the most contentious issues dealt with during the negotiations: state-owned land; responsible investment; provisions for investment; climate change and emergencies; and, implementation. As such, a review of the process sheds light on the various tensions that exist within the CFS. At the same time, they provide insight into how the CFS navigates these tensions. The overall aim of the review is to highlight the complexity of political positions as well as the way in which non-state actors, notably civil society actors, influence the final outcome. In an effort to clarify the analysis, tables have been developed. The tables compare the text at the start of the negotiations (March 2012) and the final text and provide a summary of changes. Under the tables, descriptions of the negotiation process are provided. These outline the chronology and key tensions of negotiations as participants moved towards consensus.

Tenure rights for state owned land (the commons)

8.2 Recognising legitimate tenure rights where state own or control land, fisheries and forests		
March 2012	Final Text	Changes of Note
8.2 Where States own or control land, fisheries and forests, they should respect existing [holders of legitimate tenure rights] {tenure right holders} [and their rights]. States should [recognise and respect, in accordance with national law] [provide legal recognition] , in a non-discriminatory and gender-sensitive way, [to] [legitimate] tenure rights of individuals and communities [with customary tenure systems] [including legitimate customary tenure rights, that are considered legitimate but are not currently protected by law.] States should define through widely publicized rules the categories of [legitimate tenure] rights [that are considered legitimate.] <i>(proposed in plenary discussions)</i> OR: [Where States own or control land, fisheries and forests they should operate in line with paragraph 4.5.] <i>(alternative version of 8.2 proposed in plenary discussions)</i>	Where States own or control land, fisheries and forests, the legitimate tenure rights of individuals and communities, including where applicable those with customary tenure systems, should be recognized, respected and protected, consistent with existing obligations under national and international law, and with due regard to voluntary commitments under applicable regional and international instruments. To this end, categories of legitimate tenure rights should be clearly defined and publicized, through a transparent process, and in accordance with national law.	This section refers to government owned land, fisheries and forests, including the commons. Respect existing tenure rights became recognise tenure rights. The link to international law reinforces the rights-based approach. The need for states to develop clear categories of legitimate tenure rights is a positive addition. While the focus on non-discrimination and gender-sensitive approaches is lost, those aspects have been strengthened in the principles for implementation. Inclusion of “where applicable those with customary tenure systems” weakens this paragraph.

Part 8 of the VGGTs addresses issues of public land, fisheries and forests. The Chair introduced this paragraph by noting that 8.2 and 8.3, which describe state-owned or controlled land, fisheries and forests were repetitive of 4.5 (“States should protect legitimate tenure rights, and ensure that people are not arbitrarily evicted and that their legitimate tenure rights are not otherwise extinguished or infringed”), 3.1.2 (“State should safeguard legitimate tenure rights against threats and infringements”), and 3B (the ten principles of implementation). The Chair proposed the following to replace 8.2 and 8.3: “Where states own or control land, fisheries and forests, the legitimate tenure rights of individuals and communities not currently protected by law should be respected. Categories of legitimate tenure rights should be clearly defined and publicised.”

The delegate from Mexico was first to interject. They generally agreed with the change but argued that there was a need to talk about legitimate beneficiary rights since the land, fisheries and forests remain state property. The delegate provided alternative wording.

A representative for fish workers spoke next and raised concern with the Chair’s formulation. They urged the Committee not to replace 8.3 and to focus efforts on refining 8.2. A key reason for this was that strong principles outlined in 8.3 would be lost. At this time, 8.3 stated:

States should establish up-to-date tenure information on land, fisheries and forests that they own or control by creating and maintaining accessible inventories. Such inventories should record the agencies responsible for administration as well as any legitimate tenure rights held by indigenous peoples and other customary communities and the private sector. Where possible, States should ensure that the publicly-held tenure rights are recorded together with tenure rights of indigenous peoples and other customary communities and the private sector in a single recording system, or are linked to them by a common framework (FAO 2012c).

The general sense of 8.3 (which eventually became 8.4) was retained in the final version, however it was modified slightly to say that states should “strive” to establish, in lieu of simply establishing, tenure information, a successful attempt to weaken the language and again evidence of the way states had started to think about the potential responsibilities that could come with these guidelines.

The delegate representing the EU and Switzerland noted that 8.3 was about collectively managed resources and questioned the rationale for eliminating it. It was noted that at the start of the negotiation process reference to “the commons” caused problems but that they had devised a grammatical solution with “state owned land”. The EU did not support the text proposed by Mexico on the basis that it contradicted language agreed to in earlier negotiations. The delegate from Chile, speaking on behalf of GRULAC (the Latin American and Caribbean Group) spoke to support Mexico’s suggestion to change legitimate tenure to beneficiary rights because the paragraph discusses land that is owned by the state. At this point the delegate from Mexico spoke again and clarified that they were speaking about “user rights” and not “beneficiary”. They noted that the confusion was due a translation issue.

This illustrates a key challenge of these text-based negotiations. The text was negotiated in English, but many delegations working in other languages. As a result, a great deal of pressure was placed on interpreters who at times failed to use the correct term or word. Indeed, throughout the process there are several examples of incorrect translations causing temporary blocks in the consensus-building process. In this specific case, elucidation came when the Resource Person of the civil society working group on land tenure, who was fluent in both English and Spanish, and went over to speak directly to the Mexican delegation to seek clarification. This example serves to highlight another important role played by civil society actors – that of inter-mediator – in these negotiations.

Once the translation problem had been cleared up, the representative from Canada spoke to question the need for the inclusion of “*not currently protected by law*” and requested that it be removed. This was a point they had pushed for in the previous round of discussions and noted that on top of a reference to “legitimate” this presented a redundancy.

This was followed by a request by the representative of the International Indian Treaty Council that “indigenous peoples” be inserted ahead of “individuals and communities” in 8.2, in line with other treaties and paragraphs (e.g., 8.4). The representative from South Africa then spoke on behalf of the Africa Group and called for the inclusion of “transparent process” and supported keeping 8.3. The suggestion was accepted.

The delegate from Canada took the floor to address the proposal from the International Indian Treaty Council and request that “indigenous peoples” not be added. The delegate noted that within the Guidelines there is “an entire section on indigenous communities” and asked the group “not to add this concept to other sections as this will add a great deal of work to paragraphs that have been dealt with in other places.” This rejection was later supported by the EU.

Coming back to the issue of legal versus legitimate, the delegate from Ecuador spoke to highlight the difference between the two terms and called the group to keep the language on “not currently protected by law”. The Chilean negotiator encouraged Canada to withdraw their proposal for deletion, noting that in the Latin American context, legitimacy and legality are two different things. The negotiator explained that “tenure is exercised over land by indigenous people but they do not have legal status”. The current and historic socio-political relationship between the Canadian government and the indigenous people of Canada and on-going political negotiations (historic, present and future) around land rights and access to natural resources.

Following Chile’s intervention, the Chair questioned the Canadian delegation on whether they could withdraw their request to delete “not currently protected by law”, and they replied that they would need time to consider this. To encourage Canada, the Chair referenced paragraph 8.4, for which language had been agreed to and that reference to “legitimate tenure rights held by indigenous peoples and other customary communities and the private sector”. The Canadian delegation turned to the “bucket list” argument noting that if they were to add indigenous people

they would also have to include a long list of names, “making the text practically illegible”. The Chair supported the argument, noting that it had been a principle “not to add lists because frequently people are left out.” The delegate from Canada then referenced paragraph 4.4 which was closed (i.e., consensus had been reached) which notes that states should provide legal definitions of legit tenure rights not currently protected. The delegate from the USA supported Canada and called on delegates to delete “not currently protected by law” because as that would give states the right to recognise tenure rights whether or not they are recognised by law, addressing GRULACs concerns. The American delegate went on to say that they still had “trouble understanding how legitimate tenure rights would not be protected by law, but this gives states the opportunity to recognise those rights.”

Contextualising the debate in the context of indigenous rights, the representative of the International Indian Treaty Council spoke to explain that their rights are linked to specific tenure rights. Indigenous peoples are included in other paragraphs but that Section 9 on indigenous peoples does not make reference to state-owned land. The representative noted that “many of the indigenous peoples in the U.S. do not have legally recognised tenure rights, currently”.

The speaker from the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues supported the previous speaker and called on the Committee to keep the language of “not currently protected.” They reiterating that Section 9 does not contain the totality of what should be included. The speaker also reminded the Committee that it had been previously agreed that when it comes to issues not covered in Section 9, indigenous peoples should be added, “not in all paragraph but in areas where appropriate”.

The EU representative, speaking about the original text, noted similar language had been agreed to in other paragraphs and for coherence they supported the original phrasing, and not a substitution of user rights.

The Chilean representative then spoke to address a tension: “there is a certain confrontation between the design of the Latino legal system and the Anglo legal system. There is a difference in Latin America between legitimacy and legality and legitimacy is not enough for tenure to have consequences and there is a need to recognise legality.” They also noted that they understood that in “Anglo” law, there is no legitimacy without legality.

The Friends of the Chair on Language Harmonization spoke in an attempt to resolve the ongoing debate:

The general clause in 4.4 asks for recognition of tenure rights not currently protected by law. 8.2 is only dealing with land owned by the state so we could harmonise with language in 4.4. There is a need to respect all recognised tenure rights and also when they are not legally protected. We can reiterate the same phrase but with state-owned land.

The Canadian delegate noted that 8.2 is about commonly owned state land whereas 4.4 calls on states to look at land, and legally recognise what is legitimate, concluding that “Canada cannot go farther on this right now,” as clarification of their inability to back down on their request.

At this point the Chair recognised that there was no way to build consensus. At 23:18 the Chair sent 8.2 and 8.3 a new Friends of the Chair, Cape Verde. The next day at the afternoon session the FOC wording was presented with the inclusion of a new paragraph. The final text read:

8.2 Where States own or control land, fisheries and forests, the legitimate tenure rights of individuals and communities, including where applicable those with customary tenure systems, should be recognized, respected and protected, consistent with existing obligations under national and international law, and with due regard to voluntary commitments under applicable regional and international instruments. To this end, categories of legitimate tenure rights should be clearly defined and publicized, through a transparent process, and in accordance with national law.

8.3 Noting that there are publicly-owned land, fisheries and forests that are collectively used and managed (in some national contexts referred to as commons), States should, where applicable, recognize and protect such publicly-owned land, fisheries and forests and their related systems of collective use and management, including in processes of allocation by the State.

8.4 States should strive to establish up-to-date tenure information on land, fisheries and forests that they own or control by creating and maintaining accessible inventories. Such inventories should record the agencies responsible for administration as well as any legitimate tenure rights held by indigenous peoples and other communities with customary tenure systems and the private sector. Where possible, States should ensure that the publicly-held tenure rights are recorded together with tenure rights of indigenous peoples and other communities with customary tenure systems and the private sector in a single recording system, or are linked to them by a common framework.

The problem of legal versus legitimate was addressed in the new paragraph 8.3 which called on states to recognise and protect the systems of collective use and management on publically-owned lands. CSOs failed to secure the inclusion of indigenous peoples in 8.2. This is because the CFS works towards consensus and the Canadian delegation did not have the authority from its Capital to accept the inclusion of indigenous peoples in this section. This example illustrates the influence that one country can have and how national-level priorities make their way into international negotiations. What is perhaps not as clear in the review above is the political pressure placed on the individuals negotiating the positions sent to them by technical experts in their capitals. Countries that have been able to effectively veto changes proposed by others are the traditionally more powerful and wealthy states. Finally, the discussions reviewed above illustrate one of the few times where Western governments explicitly engaged with the VGGTs in terms of their potential impact on domestic policy. Through the negotiations, Western governments tended to speak in terms of what these guidelines could go for developing countries and their role as donor countries, and rarely was there consideration of the influence and impact the VGGTs could have in the Global North.

Responsible Investment and Safeguarding

When the negotiations turned to Section 12 on Investment, the Chair sarcastically proclaimed “and now the fun really begins” suggesting that this section of negotiations would be a great challenge. Indeed, the section on investment proved to be the most contentious, mirroring growing cleavages between “business as usual” approaches defined by neoliberal policies and

the alternatives informed predominantly by food sovereignty frameworks and rights-based approaches.

Section 12 on investment contains fifteen paragraphs. Importantly, 12.2 recognises that smallholder producers and their organizations in developing countries provide a major share of agricultural investments that contribute significantly to food security, nutrition, poverty eradication and environmental resilience” and that “state should support investments by smallholders as well as public and private small-holder-sensitive investment”. This language reflects the outcomes of the CFS roundtable on smallholder sensitive investment. Guidelines for safeguards are included (e.g., paras 12.4, 12.6) and the principles of consultation and transparency are reinforced (e.g., paras 12.3, 12.5). Paragraph 12.12 notes the responsibility of investors “to respect national law and legislation and recognize and respect tenure rights of others”. The final paragraph provides guidance for states investing or prompting investment abroad: “they should ensure that their conduct is consistent with the protection of legitimate tenure rights, the promotion of food security and their existing obligations under national and international law, and with due regard to voluntary commitments under applicable regional and international instruments.”

The First Draft contained paragraphs related to the development of “independent and voluntary quality certification schemes for internationally accepted practices for investment [~~and concessions~~] in land, fisheries and forests” (FAO 2012c:para 12.14). It was the Chinese delegate who questioned

who will set up the scheme, and who is authorized to do this, and what is the content to be included? There are still problems here, ambiguities. If the answers to the questions I raised are not there, the paragraph will be meaningless.

The delegate from Argentina agreed with China and called for the paragraph to be deleted. La Via Campesina agreed with Argentina’s proposal to strike the paragraph, noting that

interesting in the subject is great. For that reasons we are very aware that as soon as the Guidelines are adopted by the CFS we will start negotiations on rai [CFS principles for responsible agricultural investment]. We see this as somewhat pre-emptive and call for the elimination.

In this example interjections from three rather unlikely allies (China, Argentina and La Via Campesina) resulted in the deletion of a paragraph.

12.4 Responsible Investment		
March 2012	Final Text	Changes of Note
12.4 * Responsible investments should do no harm, safeguard against dispossession of legitimate tenure rights holders and environmental damage, and should respect human rights. Such investments should be made working in partnership with relevant levels of government and local land, fisheries and forest tenure right holders, respecting their legitimate tenure rights. * They [should further] contribute to objectives including: poverty alleviation, food security and sustainable use of land, fisheries and forests; support local communities, contribute to rural development, promote [and secure] local food production systems, enhance social and economic development, create employment, diversify livelihoods, provide benefits to the country and its people, including the poor and most vulnerable and [Such investments should] comply with [applicable] [national [laws] [and international core labour standards and ILO standards when applicable] [and International Labour Organization standards.] (proposed in plenary discussions)	12.4 Responsible investments should do no harm, safeguard against dispossession of legitimate tenure right holders and environmental damage, and should respect human rights. Such investments should be made working in partnership with relevant levels of government and local holders of tenure rights to land, fisheries and forests, respecting their legitimate tenure rights. They should strive to further contribute to policy objectives, such as poverty eradication; food security and sustainable use of land, fisheries and forests; support local communities; contribute to rural development; promote and secure local food production systems; enhance social and economic sustainable development; create employment; diversify livelihoods; provide benefits to the country and its people, including the poor and most vulnerable; and comply with national laws and international core labour standards as well as, when applicable, obligations related to standards of the International Labour Organization.	Weakened language: should further contribute became “should strive to further”. The objectives were further defined as “policy objectives”. Poverty alleviation was replaced with a stronger statement of policy eradication, in line with the CFS’s reform vision. The final version made reference to secure local food production, an improvement over simply promoting local food production. A success for CSOs was the inclusion of the final reference to states upholding, when applicable, obligations related to standards of the International Labour Organization.

In March 2012, when attention turned to this paragraph the representative from Ethiopia, speaking on behalf of the Africa Group, began the negotiations by focusing on labour standards. They argued that there should only be a reference to the ILO standards and recommended that the Committee delete the reference to “core labour standards”. The rational was to only have one reference to standards. The EU supported this intervention. Russia followed, beginning by making reference to a problem related to translation. The representative noted that in the Russian translation, language about local communities has disappeared and that there was a need to revise the translation. Then, recalling previous discussions, the Russian Federation

spoke about the international core labour standards and ILO standards arguing that “if they are not classified, it will not have a broader interpretation. ILO conventions are voluntarily ratified by states, thus in this proposal there should be a full stop after national laws.” The EU spoke to explain that “core labour standards consist of four internationally recognized rights signed by all countries. The ILO standards are signed on a voluntary basis”. The EU then suggested the following language: “... comply with national laws and with international core labour standards, as well as, when applicable, obligations related to ILO standards.” The sentence was reworked for clarity and language cohesion but the essence remained in the final version.

The inclusion of labour into negotiations on tenure governance is crucial, especially given trends in large-scale land acquisition and claims that such investments benefit countries by providing employment. What is also important to note here is the complexity of the debate and the breadth of technical and legal expertise that is required to effectively participate in these negotiations. Here, civil society has an advantage insofar as it engages a diverse range of constituencies that work across multiple policy environments.

Provisions for Investments

12.8/12.9 Provisions for Investments		
March 2012	Final Text	Changes of Note
12.8 States should ensure that proposals for investments [and concessions] involving the acquisition of tenure rights are subject to [negotiations] or [active, free, effective, meaningful and informed consultation] with [those affected] or [the affected men and women, families and communities, including indigenous peoples] [supported by legal professionals where necessary]. States and civil society should inform individuals, families and communities of their tenure rights, and assist to develop their capacity in [negotiations] or [consultations] and implementation, and provide professional assistance. (proposed by Thematic Group 3)	12.9 States should make provision for investments involving all forms of transactions of tenure rights, including acquisitions and partnership agreements, to be consistent with the principles of consultation and participation of these Guidelines, with those whose tenure rights, including subsidiary rights, might be affected. States and other relevant parties should inform individuals, families and communities of their tenure rights, and assist to develop their capacity in consultations and participation, including providing professional assistance as required.	Focus changed from investment proposals to states taking responsibility to make provisions for investments. Inclusion of partnership agreements. Focus on those whose rights might be affected. Expansion of responsibility of informing people of their rights beyond the state and civil society. Failed to extend the CFS model of engaging civil society actors in negotiations. Maintained focus on consultation and added participation.

Still in the section on investment, paragraph 12.8 addresses the development of laws at a national level to encourage responsible investment, and ensure the development of agreements

outlining the rights and duties of all parties. Discussion on this paragraph began with the negotiator from Ecuador requesting clarity as to whether the paragraph referred to public or private investment as this would impact the jurisdiction of the state. The technical secretariat explained that the paragraph refers to both private and public investment and states can determine how they deal with investment. The delegate from Brazil expressed support for the paragraph but called to strike the word “negotiations” in the spirit of language harmonization. The negotiator from Ecuador spoke again to clarify their concern, noting that the wording of the paragraph was focused on proposals and not on investment. The delegate from Canada supported Ecuador and noted that states cannot ensure that the private sector proposals follow all the steps.

The representative from the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues argued that in paragraph 12.8 focus on the acquisition of tenure rights must be accompanied by free, prior and informed consent, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. Because reference to informed consent had been removed, the representative requested that the deletion of “including indigenous peoples”. They argued, “in any case, that paragraph does not include indigenous peoples who have their rights established under different treaties. 9.8 has much stronger language and includes free, prior and informed consent.”

The EU negotiator made a proposal in the spirit of cohesion, to include “involving all forms of transactions of tenure rights” and the Mexican delegation requested the addition of “...such as acquisition of partnerships”. Civil society actors requested that the paragraph end with “if needed states should provide access to recalls for affected people including a provision of legal aid or support in fielding complaints.” The representative of the Africa Group proposed “States should strive to ensure that...”. They also raised concern that the responsibility of informing people about their tenure rights could extend beyond the responsibility of states and civil society, and suggested more inclusive wording: “states and other parties”.

This intervention was followed up by the U.S.A. negotiator:

The intervention from the Africa Group is helpful. How are other member states going to support this directive in the context of private investment? How are states going to strive to ensure that a private investment is subject to consultation and participation? We are talking about those affected. The final sentence is covered by 4.9 so it is not necessary here.

The EU negotiator requested that they keep the language around “states should make provision for” and “with those affected.” They also raised a question about the word “partnership”, asking if that is a form of transaction of tenure rights. On this point the Chair noted that there has been trouble with the terms “partnership” and “association” and it came down to translation from Spanish to English. The delegate from Mexico noted that they support the language as it is: “partnership, which we call an association”. Another translation issue emerged with consent and consultation and it was clarified that consent was “*consentimiento*” and consultation was best translated as “*consulta*”.

With the language issue addressed, the representative from the Africa Group suggested “acquisition and partnership agreement” and the Brazilian negotiator prefaced the suggestion with “all forms of transactions of tenure rights including acquisitions and partnership agreements.” At this point the representative from the U.S.A. raised concern that they were creating an impossible standard for states to comply with, and proposed the following:

States should take the necessary measures to ensure that investments involving all forms of transactions of tenure rights, including acquisition and partnership agreements are subject to consultation and participation with those whose tenure rights might be affected.

The Mexican delegation asked to change “affected” to “involved”. The EU responded by noting that the language used throughout the guidelines is “affected”.

A new proposal was made:

States should take the necessary measures to ensure that investments involving all forms of transactions of tenure rights, including acquisition and partnership agreements are subject to consultation and participation with those who hold rights of resources that might be affected.

The delegate from the U.S.A. argued that “the reference to resources in this context is too broad but there has been general agreement it is meant to refer to land tenure rights. In the spirit of what the EU has suggested [they proposed]: “with those who hold tenure rights.” Or “those who hold tenure rights that might be affected”.

In rebuttal, the delegate from Brazil stated that the paragraph needs to be broader than “those who hold tenure rights” to capture all the stakeholders affected, including those who do not have tenure rights (e.g., fishers) and proposed “or whose livelihoods may be affected”.

The delegate then re-read the proposed text:

States should take the necessary measures to ensure that investments involving all forms of transactions of tenure rights, including acquisition and partnership agreements are subject to consultation and participation with those who hold tenure rights or whose livelihoods might be affected.

A representative from La Via Campesina voiced support for Brazil’s suggestion and noted that they were concerned about the “disconnection between bureaucratic level and the on-the ground reality. We look at a map and we see boundaries but in reality, these lines do not exist. We strongly urge members to agree to this language and requests that the US reconsider their proposal.” This intervention serves as a good illustration of a CSO strategy. NGOs with budgets, time and technical expertise played a key role on technical issues but social movements played fundamental role in reinforcing the need for strong guidelines by bringing the debate back to what was happening on the ground, in their communities. Because of this symbiotic relationship, supported by a strong facilitator, tensions often present between NGOs and social movements were less prevalent in this working group.

After La Via Campesina’s intervention, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food proposed “those whose tenure rights, livelihoods and human rights are affected” as alternative wording. Here the EU negotiator interjected. They argued that now this paragraph was trying to provide protection for those with tenure rights who may be impacted by a transaction and may lose their

tenure rights. “It’s a safeguard for people who may lose tenure rights as result of a transaction” they argued, and “now the language goes far beyond that and it does now create an extremely high bar without definition.” They proposed instead “...are subject to consultation and participation with those who hold tenure rights” noting that “to add extra things is to undermine the thrust of the paragraph.”

The Brazilian delegate noted that the intent of the paragraph was clearly not commonly shared by all delegations. The International Planning Committee on Food Sovereignty (IPC) supported the position of Brazil and the SRRFT arguing that there were broader rights that could potentially be affected and which needed to be taken into account. They suggested to add, after those who hold tenure rights, “including those whose tenure rights are not currently protected or recognized by law.”

The private sector representative spoke to concerns that 12.8 was repeating 12.5 (transparent rules for allowable transactions in tenure rights) and proposed that this paragraph should ensure that investors consult with those who are affected by a transaction. The delegate from Canada wanted to qualify that free, prior and informed consent is linked to interpretation at the state level and in Canada this is understood as participation and consultation. They then proposed to soften the language about “taking the necessary measures” arguing that the wording was setting up a situation that would be impossible for states to comply with. The Secretariat, trying to get everyone back on the same page, reminded the group that the intention of the sentence was that the state needs to provide the legal framework.

A representative from the Africa then spoke:

As Africa, we would go along with the idea that we need to have safeguards for the livelihoods of people but we do not need to include them here. We need to be specific on what we can address. We requests that we go back to the original text.

The statement was supported by Ecuador. In an attempt to strengthen language around participation and enhance cohesion, a representative from Oxfam proposed the following:

States should take the necessary measures to ensure that investments involving all forms of transactions of tenure rights, including acquisition and partnership agreements in line with provisions included in 3b.6 and in the case of indigenous peoples, in 9.8 with those who hold tenure rights.

However, this was rejected as the representative from the U.S.A. explained there had been an effort to avoid cross referencing within the Guidelines:

The paragraphs speak to specific cases. Let’s rely on the principles that have been heavily negotiated. It is referenced elsewhere in the document and then I suggest not cross-referencing.

The delegate from Chile proclaimed that they had the “impression that this is a tower of Babel.”

They continued:

We are not understanding the same things with the same words: this [paragraph] applies to large tracts of land and on the other hand, it refers to all investment. There is a great deal of misunderstanding. What is responsible investment? All investment should be responsible.

The EU representative, trying to accommodate Canada’s earlier request to soften language, suggested that the EU could support “make provision for” in the first line, reminding the group

that in the context of this paragraph, it is not up to the state to undertake the consultation. They also sought compromise on “with those whose tenure rights, including subsidiary rights, might be affected”.

At this point, the paragraph read:

States should make provision for investments involving all forms of transactions of tenure rights including acquisitions and partnership agreements to be subject to consultation and participation with those whose tenure rights, including subsidiary rights, might be affected.

The Brazilian delegate stated that the original text spoke about “those affected”. Again the paragraph was reviewed:

States should make provision for investments involving all forms of transactions of tenure rights, including acquisitions and partnership agreements to be subject to consultation and participation with those whose tenure rights, including subsidiary rights, might be affected [or with those affected].

At this time, states, with the exception of Brazil, agreed on a text. Brazil was unable to support the consensus as they needed time to consult with their Capital. The following day Brazil accepted the language of “might be affected”.

In the endorsed Guidelines, paragraph 12.9 reads:

States should make provision for investments involving all forms of transactions of tenure rights, including acquisitions and partnership agreements, to be consistent with the principles of consultation and participation of these Guidelines, with those whose tenure rights, including subsidiary rights, *might be affected*. States and other relevant parties should inform individuals, families and communities of their tenure rights, and assist to develop their capacity in consultations and participation, including providing professional assistance as required (*emphasis added*).

The review of the negotiation of this paragraph highlights not only the complexity of the negotiations but also the various challenges that arise from issues linked to language and translation, country-contexts, and the impact of mandates delivered to negotiators by ministries or technical experts who operate not only in different time zones but also are unlike to understand the way in which the reformed CFS conducts negotiations. What should also be evident from the above review is the engagement of the various participants in the Committee and the very important role they play in the debate.

The final wording of paragraph 12.9 is the result of compromise. The paragraph is valuable insofar as it clearly calls on states to create provisions for investments that involve the transfer of tenure rights and clarifies the importance of consultation with those who may be affected by such investments. This includes people whose livelihoods depend on access to land, fisheries and forests. While across global governance literature there is a critique that the elite maintain a monopoly on decision-making, the record of this negotiation shows that things are changing. While Canada, the U.S.A. and the EU played influential roles, it was the Brazilian delegation that was blocking consensus by the end. Civil society actors managed to delete text they deemed to be inappropriate. The Africa Group expanded the language of responsibility of informing people about tenure rights to “other relevant parties”.

Part 6: Responses to climate change and emergencies		
March 2012	Final Text	Changes of Note
This part addresses the governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests during catastrophic events where people could be displaced on a large scale as a result of climate change, natural disasters and violent conflicts.	This part addresses the governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests in the context of climate change, natural disasters and conflicts.	Reference to the displacement of people was removed. Reference to catastrophic events was deleted. Violent conflict was replaced with just conflict.

Part 6 of the Guidelines addresses responses to climate change and emergencies. Within Part 6 there are sections on climate change, natural disaster, and conflict. The Chair rightly predicted that it would be challenging for the Committee to negotiate a consensus on the title of the Part – Response to climate change and emergencies – and sent it to a Friends of the Chair group. The process for negotiating the chapeau (the descriptive text that follows the title of the part and preceded the sections) also presented a challenge. The chapeau is meant to provide a summary of what is included in each part of the VGGTs and thus frames how the various paragraphs are negotiated and understood. A speaker from the civil society working group pushed for the inclusion of protracted crisis in the chapeau, in line with outcomes of the CFS’s recommendations on the issue from CFS 36, the 2010 State of Food Insecurity (SOFI) report which focused on protracted crisis. In their proposal they suggested replacing “violent conflict” with “situations of violence” which was said to be an internationally agreed upon term. They also called for the inclusion of a reference to occupation. Their proposal read:

This part addresses the governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests in the context of effects of climate change, disasters and armed conflict and [other situations of violence and occupation] ~~during catastrophic events where people could be displaced on a large scale as a result of climate change, natural disasters and violent conflicts.~~

The delegate from Egypt rejected the change to “other situations of violence” claiming that it was unclear. The representative from the EU noted that given the sensitivity of the issue, it would be wise to consult experts.

The Chair suggested that the group first negotiate the relevant paragraphs before trying to negotiate the chapeau. This proposal was supported by the Mexican delegate who noted that because the chapeau refers to the content of the document, it is best to first determine what will be in the section. The speaker for Ecuador disagreed and argued for a discussion of the chapeau first. The delegate from Jordan spoke to support both Egypt and the CSOs, as did the representative from Afghanistan who called on CSOs to propose a paragraph on occupation. CSOs replied that there was a need to clarify the use of the term occupation and that the term could not be used in isolation of previous negotiations. Finally, after much debate in plenary and

deliberation by the Friends of the Chair, the heading to Part 6 remained “Responses to climate change and emergencies” and the chapeau read:

This part addresses the governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests in the context of climate change, natural disasters and conflicts.

CSOs failed to secure separate parts for conflict and from natural disaster but they did manage to secure a statement with reference to occupation in situations of conflicts in respect to tenure of land, fisheries and forests:

25.1: All parties should take steps to prevent and eliminate issues of tenure of land, fisheries and forests as a cause of conflict and should ensure that aspects of tenure are addressed before, during and after conflict, *including in situations of occupation* where parties should act in accordance with applicable international humanitarian law (emphasis added).

Reference to occupation in paragraph 17.2 (recording systems for tenure rights that are appropriate to the particular circumstances, taking particular care to prevent registration of competing rights when it is not possible to record tenure rights such as occupations in informal settlements) also remained in the final text. The push for, and successful inclusion of references to occupation in the Guidelines highlights the complexity of alliances across these negotiations. Jordan and CSOs are not traditional allies but on this issue, they supported each other against the U.S.A. delegation and produced a positive result from their perspective. This again illustrates the influence and impact of improved participation.

At the same time, Part 6 of the VGGTs remains somewhat problematic. First, the combination of conflict and natural disaster is limiting. While natural disasters can lead to increased conflict, these are both important themes requiring focus and attention from policymakers. Another problem that was raised by CSOs was the reduction of conflict to tenure rights and the lack of reflection on instances where conflict arises with and against the state.

Implementation

26.4 Implementation		
March 2012	Final Text	Changes of Note
	The Committee on World Food Security should be the global forum where all relevant actors learn from each other's experiences, and assess progress toward the implementation of these Guidelines and their relevance, effectiveness and impact. Therefore, the Secretariat of the Committee on World Food Security, in collaboration with the Advisory Group, should report to the Committee on World Food Security on the progress of the implementation of these Guidelines, as well as evaluate their impact and their contribution to the improvement of tenure governance. Such reports should be universal and include, inter alia, regional experiences, best practices and lessons learned.	The addition of this paragraph was proposed by a working group led by Egypt for the Africa Group.

The First Draft was inarguably weak on implementation, monitoring and evaluation. A working group, led by delegates from Egypt and the Africa Group was established to address this. They proposed the following paragraph to link the Voluntary Guidelines back to the CFS:

26.4 [States are encouraged to use the CFS as the forum for reporting process on the implementation of the VG and their experience on the effectiveness of these guidelines.]

CSO actors then proposed the addition of a sentence to go before the proposed text:

[The CFS should be the global forum where all relevant actors learn from each other's experiences, assess progress towards the implementation of the VGs and the relevance, effectiveness and impact of the VGs.]

The delegate from Egypt added to this:

Therefore, the Secretariat of the Committee of World Food Security, in collaboration with the [Bureau and the...]

The speaker from Brazil rejected the language for the reason that it would mandate countries to produce work for the CFS. This point was debated at the 37th CFS and it was decided that countries should not have to report back to the CFS. The Brazilian delegate proposed language to the effect that “the Advisory Group, [shall]”, arguing that the Advisory Group has the authority to instruct the Secretariat. The delegate from the U.S.A. supported Brazil's proposal but requested that [shall] be replaced with [should]. The representative from Ecuador suggested including language to reflect that the Secretariat “is invited to periodically” report on progress, so as to avoid a strict timeframe or mandate annual reports.

A discussion ensued over whether the Secretariat in collaboration with the Advisory Group should report or review progress:

[review] report to the CFS on the progress of the implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines, as well as evaluate their impact and their contribution to the improvement of tenure governance. Such reports should be universal and include, inter alia, regional experiences, best practices and lessons learned.

The group settled on report.

The civil society working group proposed “[and should be complemented by reports produced by other CFS participants.]” This was to ensure that the CFS continued to respect its reform commitment to including the voices of those most affected by food insecurity as well as their commitment to being the foremost inclusive forum for discussion on food security. Civil society actors also proposed that the CFS facilitate the establishment of a global observatory for monitoring the evolution of land, fisheries and forests tenure as it relates to food security.

The representative from Afghanistan argued that

the role of the state in reporting needs to be introduced before the role of the CFS on reporting. The Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food, in the second part there is a statement: “states may report on a voluntary basis on relevant activities and progress achieved on achieving the right to food ... to the CFS. We are not at the point that the global reporting on this issue, including evaluation, should go to the CFS. Does the Secretariat have the resources, the staff, the time, to do this work?”

The points raised by the representative are critical. The issue of the CFS falling victim to its own success is worrying as actors try task the Secretariat and the Committee with a growing workload without first securing additional resources and staff.

Following the statement from the Afghan representative, the delegate from Egypt explained that in drafting the language the working group took a two-track approach. First they sought to find the mechanism for the CFS to assess the impact of the VGGTs, and then they considered how States could share experiences. The delegate noted that:

In the working group, there was fear of reporting fatigue around voluntary reporting by states. The CFS would be the best forum for sharing the best practices around monitoring and following-up on the guidelines.

In a move away from discussions on increased monitoring, the Russian delegation suggested the CFS needed more time to consider these issues, and the CFS has the responsibility to determine who will collect the information. The Secretariat reiterated that they play a technical role to support the coordination of the CFS, suggesting that they are not the appropriate body to report on progress, a suggestion that was ignored.

The delegate from Canada presented their position:

The CFS is certainly the place for a broad discussion on the VGs and we recognise the fatigue of national reporting, especially when these are proforma and not used to learn lessons. For the CFS to consider the implementation of the guidelines, especially to garner lessons learned, they should have some basis for recommendations. Canada prefers to see the retention of the Secretariat and AG producing a report that would include highlighting regional experience, best practices and lessons learned. Of course all actors can add their addition.

Both Africa and Afghanistan spoke to suggest that CSOs were asking for too much with their proposals. However, the mere fact that their proposals were debated to the extent that they were illustrates the participatory and innovative nature of CFS negotiations.

A proposal was made to replace the civil society actors' proposal:

States are encouraged to use the CFS as the forum for reporting process on the implementation of the VG and their experience on the effectiveness of these guidelines.

This links to the CFS's second phase of reform sees the CFS promoting accountability and sharing best practices at all levels.

Civil society actors interjected with another proposal, this time to include: "and should be complemented by reports produced by other CFS participants". After more deliberation, the Group arrived at compromise:

The Committee on World Food Security should be the global forum where all relevant actors learn from each other's experiences, and assess progress toward the implementation of these Guidelines and their relevance, effectiveness and impact. Therefore, the Secretariat of the Committee on World Food Security, in collaboration with the Advisory Group, should report to the Committee on World Food Security on the progress of the implementation of these Guidelines, as well as evaluate their impact and their contribution to the improvement of tenure governance. Such reports should be universal and include, inter alia, regional experiences, best practices and lessons learned.

The lack of reference to the CFS Bureau (the executive arm of the CFS) is problematic and suggests that states are diverting responsibility.

CSOs were disappointed to have lost the fight for the inclusion of “should be complemented by reports produced by other CFS participants”. They tried to negotiate for the addition of 26.4bis: “All CFS participants should be invited to participate in the process described in the paragraph 26.4 above” but this was rejected by Mexico and Ecuador as being redundant.

The final text for this paragraph remains disappointing. That the Committee on World Food Security could not declare themselves to be “the” global forum where relevant actors share best practices and assess progress towards implementation, but opted instead for “should be” speaks to fact that there are member states who do not want the CFS to fulfil its reform vision. At the same time, it is admittedly also evidence of the limitations of the CFS insofar as it has no capacity for implementation, monitoring or evaluation. What the paragraph offers is that start of a much needed conversation about how the Guidelines will be carried forward and what role the CFS should and could have towards this end.

7.6. Analysis of the Final Document

The selected review of the final negotiations highlights the complexity of the process but also the high level of engagement and interaction across participants. What inarguably sets the CFS negotiations apart from other intergovernmental negotiations is not simply the inclusion of participants in such a meaningful way, but also the level of debate and dialogue amongst member state delegates. Within these negotiations, there are prepared positions but no prepared statements orated by ministers forwarding grandiose visions but failing to address concrete issue or advance the process. The move away from prepared statements makes room for negotiation, compromise and eventually consensus.

That the VGGTs respect and protect human rights in the context of tenure is key not only for ensuring coherence with CFS policies and the Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food, but also insofar as this links the VGGTs to existing international commitments and therefore strengthens them from a legal and enforcement perspective. The emphasis on women, peasant farmers, fishing communities, pastoralists and indigenous peoples is valuable as are the principles of implementation. CSOs were pleased to have secure the use of the term “small-scale producers” over the term “small-holder farmer” noting that focus needs to be on those who produce food, a category that extends well beyond what is commonly understood to be farming. Finally, the importance of the VGGTs extends beyond having an intergovernmentally negotiated and endorsed set of best practices for responsible governance of tenure, to evidence of the capacity of the CFS to live up to its reform mandate and deliver relevant and useful outcomes.

That said, there are limitations within the document. First and foremost, there is no definition of land, fisheries or forests. While initially a glossary had been proposed, this was later rejected because it was evident that member states would be unlikely to reach consensus and that they

preferred to define the terms within their national context. CSOs wanted a glossary but were aware of the potential implications of a glossary containing weak definitions.

The failure of the VGGTs to address water is perhaps the greatest weakness. Changes in land tenure can result in changes to access of fishers to waterways and fishing grounds. Moreover, irrigation, water for animals and transport, and rights and access to water stand to be challenged with shifts in land tenure. CSOs pushed for this to be recognized in the Guidelines but were not successful. Migratory routes were not given adequate consideration in the Guidelines and the assumption that large-scale investments in industrial agriculture, fisheries and forests are essential for development remains unchallenged within the VGGTs.

Throughout the negotiations participants were keenly aware of the increasing number of large-scale land acquisitions taking place, particularly in food insecure countries. For some, this contributed to a sense of urgency to complete the Guidelines. While these Guidelines were not specifically meant to address land grabbing (Seufert 2013:183), the links between the responsible governance of tenure and increasing large-scale acquisitions of land could not be avoided. CSOs pushed for an international ban on land grabbing while governments from several developing country governments argued in favour of the large-scale acquisition of tenure rights as central to fostering national and regional economic development (Seufert 2013). In the end, the VGGTs address safeguards to enact with respect to the large-scale acquisition of tenure rights and resulting impacts.

Another limitation of the VGGTs is that they do not prioritise support to small-scale food producer groups. Furthermore, they do not consolidated the recognized rights of indigenous peoples, as articulated in UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and other international instruments.

As CSOs noted in their analysis, the longer term implications of tenure on youth and future generations are also not adequately addressed. Nor is there enough clarification on different modes of production. CSOs also noted that not enough emphasis has been placed on enforcement and that the document lacked adequate propositions for mechanism of enforcement.

Recent literature on food security debates at the multilateral level and participatory policy-making spaces (e.g., Holt-Giménez and Altieri 2013; Hospes 2013) has captured the participatory shift but has failed to fully capture the complexity and multiple dimensions. This is perhaps a reaffirmation of the value of participant observation as it necessitates exploration through the various positions and reinforces the view that very few actors can be places into ideological boxes. Instead, while their subjectivity, ethics, training and or mandate may suggest a predisposition to specific approach, the complexity and scope of discussion, the diversity of perspectives and the consensus model make ideological inflexibility not only difficult, but politically disadvantageous at times insofar as those actors opted out of the give and take – the compromise – that is politics.

The VGGTs are an excellent example of the value of consultation and inclusive negotiation processes. CSOs participated at all stages of development, and they were effective in raising awareness throughout the discussions about the real-life issues facing them and their communities. Their engagement extended to the development and advancement of concrete proposals, many of which were incorporated into the final text.

7.7. Implications and Next Steps

As their name suggests the Voluntary Guidelines are voluntary. In practice they are an instrument of international soft law and do not replace existing national or international laws, treaties, or agreements. Not enforceable, the Guidelines represent global consensus on accepted principles and standards for responsible land tenure governance practices. Importantly, “they explicitly refer to existing binding international human rights obligations related to land and natural resources and provide interpretation and guidance on how to implement these obligations” (Seufert 2013:182). The question of why bother if the end result is a set of non-enforceable, voluntary guidelines needs to be addressed. First and foremost, the VGGTs respond to a need expressed by several states: applicable guidance for good governance of tenure. Second, the VGGTs are an entry point to begin to talk about land governance and to foster public engagement. Third, the VGGTs can be effectively used at the national level to evaluate existing land tenure and easily identify gaps in policy. Fourth, the rights-based approach is important as it shifts focus of land tenure to the most vulnerable populations. Fifth, the VGGTs are a useful tool for assessing and monitoring the actions of governments and non-governmental investors.

The final document represents what one leading UN expert on food security declared to be a “contribution to those struggling to address power relations” (Field notes, Berlin, June 2013). While an initial reading of these comments suggests that this is a rather positive statement, it is important to note the focus is not on the responsibility of states but rather it is placed on CSOs. This is a trend that must be monitored. To frame the VGGTs as a success for those struggling against stronger powers is not incorrect but the VGGTs are not to be seen as limited to CSOs. For the VGGTs to be most effective and to fulfil their purpose, they must be taken up at the national level, in national laws and policies. The move towards strong national or regional policies around the governance of land fisheries and forests is not something that will come about overnight. Furthermore, it is a process that must be undertaken carefully and with sensitivity. At the same time, there is urgency not least due to the links between tenure of natural resources and food security. While moving forward cautiously, there are several issues that remain to be addressed, notably communication, implementation and monitoring.

In terms of next steps, a lot of focus has been placed on communication and awareness building. This is of course of a fundamental step but there are potential implications which must be taken into consideration. For example, the issue of language must be addressed. The VGGTs are not

available in all languages and furthermore, the language used therein is quite technical. There are efforts underway to translate the document into other languages and to make the content more accessible. However, as the review of the negotiations highlights, the language within the VGGT is highly negotiated and must be interpreted with upmost caution.

Beyond efforts to disperse the VGGTs and build awareness, there is a need for capacity building, for example in cases where states do not have surveyors or records of tenure or documentation. Also, governments must be prepared to develop complaints mechanisms and clear processes address grievances in line with the Guidelines. This is something that to date has been inadequately considered.

Implementation of the VGGTs is not simply a technical issue; it is also a highly political issue that will require a great deal of political will. Since their endorsement there has been an assumption about the goodwill to implement, but in actuality, implementing guidelines on such a contentious issue will likely be avoided by most governments. In order to address this is challenge, focus could be scaled-up to the regional level and regional groupings of countries could work towards implementation of relevant aspects employing regional pressure and resources. The point on relevance is important. The VGGT are not to be seen as a one-size-fits-all solution that should be incorporated as is into national law and policy. Instead, the VGGT seek to provide best practices on a range of tenure-related issues allowing governments and policy makers to pick and choose what is needed given their specific context.

Another way of supporting implementation would be to build on the links to existing human rights obligations. Here it could be advantageous for the FAO to work closely with interested countries and with countries that have a strong human rights record to begin to implement sections of the VGGTs into the national context and to then use their experiences to help motivate of guide other countries.

Across civil society organizations there is growing tension around leadership and authority with respect to monitoring and implementation with the IPC (International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty) and IPC+ (which includes select NGOs) forging ahead to develop CSO guidelines, but excluding actors keen to participate. The IPC, which liaises with FAO, has also made it clear that the CFS has no capacity to implement and therefore by extension the CSM does not have a mandate to work on implementation. The CSM is only a facilitation mechanism but its members are able to work on whatever projects they deem appropriate. The rising tensions between the IPC and CSM are politically sensitive and illustrate the factions and turf wars that emerge within these international fora.

With respect to implementation accountability needs to be at the fore, which in turn requires monitoring. Monitoring is as technical as it is political. The purpose of the VGGTs is to provide guidance to improve the governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests with the goal of achieving food security for all. CSOs have proposed two possibilities for monitoring. First is the establishment of an independent body to review progress made towards improved governance

of tenure, using the VGGTs as a baseline. Alternatively, a process could be identified by states report on their progress in implementing the Voluntary Guidelines. This process would be peer-reviewed by other states, CSOs, and other CFS participants (Seufert 2013). While innovative and forward looking, these proposals are unlikely to see any traction. With respect to the first suggestion, the question of who and how need to be addressed. Also it remains to be seen how such a body would be funded and how they would select to countries to be monitored. With respect to the second proposal, member states have been explicitly clear in their rejection of mandatory reporting or paperwork in the reformed CFS.

Despite the limitations of the CSO proposals, the fact remains that monitoring is key to achieving the objectives of the VGGTs. The FAO has a role to play in supporting countries and building capacity but their role in monitoring is less clear. While there is agreement that the CFS is not an implementing body, there is arguably a role for the CFS in monitoring. The Global Strategic Framework of the CFS (2012c:para 101) notes that

In line with the CFS mandate, some way should be found to monitor the state of implementation of the Committee's own decisions and recommendations, so as to allow for the reinforcement of the coordination and policy convergence roles of the CFS. To this end, the Secretariat was tasked with reporting, in collaboration with the Advisory Group, on the state of implementation of numerous CFS decisions and recommendations, including the VGGT.

The CFS has also launched a open-ended working group on monitoring chaired by the representative from Zimbabwe.

The open-ended working group on monitoring, established by the CFS Bureau, has decided to focus its first efforts on this component, and will further debate possible options, modalities and required resources for the follow-up of the state of implementation of CFS recommendations by the Secretariat, according to the role of CFS to promote accountability as defined in the Reform Document. The GSF, by providing a consolidated body of CFS outputs, will, in conjunction with the VGGT and future similar instruments, contribute to the task of knowing what recommendations to monitor (CFS 2012c:para 102).

Moving forward, the OEWG has decided to focus on the monitoring of the VGGTs and will present select case studies to CFS 40 (October 2013). They aim to share best practices, advancing the objectives of the CFS's phased reforms. Case studies provide a review of the context and provide a sense of where things stand. However, careful attention must be paid to the method used to select case studies. The method should ensure that case studies are collected from a variety of actors (e.g., government, private sector, social movements, NGOs, research institutes) to ensure that multiple perspectives are reflected.

While case studies provide a useful starting point, indicators are needed to begin to assess impact and implication. For the VGGTs, both qualitative and quantitative indicators would be advisable. The CFS's Global Strategic Framework contains suggestions for developing indicators in a gender-sensitive approach and within a human-rights based framework. Given the complexity of land governance and the importance of location and context, indicators will need to be considered and designed to suit specific cases.

Multistakeholder platforms will also be central to effective monitoring, while supporting the principles of the VGGT and the CFS. These need to meaningfully involve all actors, and be multi-sectoral. Correspondingly, a clear methodology for establishing the multi-sectoral platforms and ensuring transparency. It is also important to note that with respect to monitoring and indicators, the question of attribution must be addressed: how can change be attributed to the VGGTs or related actions? This is something that has received inadequate attention and requires further research.

7.8. Summary

The successful negotiation of the VGGTs is evidence of the value of the reformed CFS as well as participatory policy making at the global level. This case study began by reviewing land tenure and highlighting the importance of good governance of land tenure to the eradication of hunger. The methodology employed in the development of the VGGTs was presented and followed by a review of the negotiations. The interactive and participatory nature of the CFS was illustrated through a review of the negotiations of the Voluntary Guidelines, and social dynamics were elucidated. The analysis alluded to a strengthening relationship – based on ideology as well as successful lobbying – between the Right to Food and food sovereignty. The Right to Food approach provides legally binding obligations which serve to reinforce the experiential legitimacy derived from the global peasant movement. While there are limitations with the VGGTs there is also growing interest and discussion about next steps. Strategies for implementation and monitoring at the national and regional level are being considered along with extraterritorial obligations suggesting that the VGGTs could have an important impact on policy.

The analysis of the negotiations illustrates the important role that consultation and participation of a wider-range of stakeholders can have on policy outcomes. The process of negotiating the VGGT also provides insight into key tensions in participatory policy making that can inform wider scholarship and practice. Notably, issues of language, state sovereignty, legitimacy, geopolitics, capacity and alliances were identified as challenges and their complexity elucidated, at least in part, by identifying how they arose out of the VGGTs negotiation process and how they were address.

Further lessons can be learnt from this case study. For example, the value of consultation is made evident through the analysis but what is perhaps not as well captured is the role of resources: not only financial resources (which were significant), but also less tangible resources such as time, expertise, trust and patience. The case study also raises important questions to be addressed through future research: that is, what are the implications for policy when a technical process becomes co-opted by a political process, albeit a consultative and participatory political process? Questions of expertise and the implications of consensus building require more consideration. Finally, the VGGTs map out an important relationship between the FAO and the

CFS in so far as the FAO initiated the process in response to requests by member states, the CFS took over the process, expanded consultations and secured intergovernmental agreement on the document, and now the FAO is taking the lead on developing tools to effectively operationalise the Guidelines. The reinforcing nature of the CFS process and FAO work is another area that requires further investigation and questions of who is being included, who is being left out, and who is making use of the resources developed by the FAO need to be answered.

8. Case Study 3: Global Strategic Framework

8.1. Introduction

One of the main tasks of the reformed Committee on World Food Security (CFS) was to launch a consultative process with the aim of developing a Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition (GSF) by October 2012. Specifically, the Reform Document (CFS 2009a:B.6.iii) states that the CFS would:

Develop a Global Strategic Framework for food security and nutrition in order to improve coordination and guide synchronized action by a wide range of stakeholders. The Global Strategic Framework will be flexible so that it can be adjusted as priorities change. It will build upon existing frameworks such as the UN's Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA), the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), and the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security.

The process of developing a Global Strategic Framework was tasked to an open-ended working group, led by representatives from Brazil. In line with the reform values of consultation and participation, the Working Group managed to complete the document and have a first version adopted the 39th Session (October 2012). At this time, the plenary “noted that the main added value of the GSF is to provide an overarching framework and a single reference document with practical guidance on core recommendations for food security and nutrition strategies, policies and actions validated by the wide ownership, participation and consultation afforded by CFS, and noted that the GSF is not a legally binding document” (CFS 2012b:para 18c). The GSF provides an overarching framework and acts as a single reference document with practical guidance on core recommendations for food security and nutrition strategies, policies and actions validated by the wide ownership, participation and consultation afforded by the CFS (2012c:para 7).

8.2. Developing a Global Strategic Framework

The GSF is a single, living document with an aim to improve coordination and guide synchronized action by a wide range of stakeholders. As a living document, the GSF will incorporate new policy decisions endorsed by the CFS. This will ensure the on-going relevance and utility of the GSF moving forward. This “living” nature is one aspect that sets the GSF apart from the other policy frameworks: it seeks to build on best practices and has developed mechanisms to ensure continuity. This is certainly the best way of ensuring policy coherence over the medium to long-term. Furthermore, insofar as the GSF is a living document, it is flexible so that it can be adjusted as priorities change.

One of the main initial tasks of the reformed Committee on World Food Security (CFS) was to launch a consultative process with the aim of developing a Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition (GSF) by October 2012. The CFS agreed that the Bureau, with the assistance of the Secretariat and in close collaboration with the Advisory Group, should launch

a consultative and inclusive process to be conducted to develop the first version of the Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition (GSF).

At the 36th Session (October 2010), a concept note for a Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition, developed by the CFS Secretariat, was presented to the Committee. The concept note highlighted six key objectives: improving coordination and synergy among all stakeholders; strengthening coherence and convergence among policies and programs; bringing together knowledge (HLPE) and field experience (Joint Secretariat); catalysing country-level capacity building; improving communication and information exchange; and, creating an atmosphere of trust and shared responsibility.

At the Session, the CFS agreed that the first step of this inclusive consultation process was to establish agreement on purposes, basic principles and structure of the GSF while taking into account existing frameworks. Prior to the 36th Session, civil society actors had developed a series of key messages that were shared during the Session. Their key issues responded to the concept note and raised concern about the absence of reference to fundamental rights, including an absence of reference to the Universal Right of all human beings to adequate, affordable food. They also highlighted lack for engagement with broader rights-based frameworks such as the ILO Conventions. The CSOs provided a clear list of references to be included into the GSF, including the resolution of the International Labour Conference's (2008) Committee on Rural Employment for Poverty Reduction; the Memorandum of Understanding between the ILO and FAO signed in September 2004; and, the reform of the Food Aid Convention. CSOs reinforced the sovereign rights and responsibilities of states but highlighted the importance of elaborating the GSF through a broad and participatory process.

The civil society members of the AG raised concerns that the role of the CSM was not explicitly recognized in the online GSF consultation process and it was argued that by not coordinating CSO consultation through the CSM, the CSM was effectively being undermined. It is important to remember that the CSM has principles and processes in place to ensure that the voices of those most affected by food insecurity are prioritised and there was concern that an open consultation could be usurped by large NGOs that do not share the same values. CSOs are also raised concerns about the limitations of an electronic consultation, noting that those most affected by hunger and malnutrition would be unable to participate meaningfully and that therefore the consultation was inadequate. As one leader of a European farming social movement explained:

Electronic space should not constitute a participatory space. We need money to find more innovative ways to bring stories forward. How can we use existing CFS structures to elaborate and deepen discussions but how this feeds into the GSF is key. We need to get out of the tight box of electronic consultation.

In the spirit of action and engagement, CSOs decided that the CSM, led by the Working Group on the GSF, needed to coordinate an autonomous consultation to feed into the CFS consultation

process. The outcome of this process fed into two CSO Working Document (September 2011 and December 2011).

Within these documents, CSOs articulated their vision for the GSF. They expressed the view that the GSF should set criteria for policy makers, for civil society, for financial institutions, for UN agencies and all other actors. It was fundamental that the GSF be built around the aim to improve food and nutrition security and work towards the realization of the right to food and food sovereignty. Therefore, the GSF must create and enable an environment for States to take up their responsibilities for the realization of the right to food. There was also emphasis on focus on engaging states. Speaking of the GSF as a political battle, a central strategy for CSOs was to

politicize the debate towards the national level and towards governments. [We need to] explain to national parliaments what is happening at the CFS around the global governance of CFS. Don't leave it to the bureaucrats. This a way to politicize the debate through the issues and through the process (International Farmer Social Movement Leader, Rome, May 2011).

These sentiments were echoed by one EU-based food security analyst:

We need to start lobbying and invest in engaging national governments on why the GSF is a useful tool. Because there is no money for consultation, we have to start planning now to take full advantage of the FAO regional conferences that will take place next year. The regional consultations are a stepping stone to the CFS process, they are meant to be part of the CFS (Rome, May 2011).

CSOs were aware of the importance of making the links between the Global Strategic Framework and national-level policy processes explicit. They recognised that the GSF will have no significance if it remains at global level and noted that the process of “nationalizing” the GSF is crucial. They argued that the ultimate goal of the GSF is for it to achieve national ownership (understood as democratic ownership). CSOs proposed that the GSF could articulate a strategy on how to operationalize the GSF at the national level. It should clarify the kinds of policies that must be adopted to strengthen small-scale food producers and their respective areas of concern, including cooperation with the private sector. On a related point, the GSF should provide strategies for revitalizing the role of the public sector and of the State in really addressing the causes of hunger and malnutrition. To be most meaningful, the GSF must challenge assumptions of current models of consumption and production, as well as public-private for profit partnerships and their inconsistencies, and denounce unequal trade relations as a factor contributing to malnutrition. As CSOs continued to work on their position, under the leadership of representatives from FIAN and La Via Campesina, their positions became increasingly sophisticated, especially with respect to the integration of a rights-based approach. The ideas developed in the Working Document informed many of the CSO interventions in the consultation as well as CSO interventions in the negotiations.

Following the consultation, the open-ended working group came to agreement on the nature, purpose and principles of the GSF. Here, there was agreement that the structure and content of the GSF should be consistent with the vision, roles and guiding principles of the CFS and that

the content should be taken from CFS outcomes, country-level experience, existing best-practices, stakeholder dialogues and evidence-based knowledge. The broad issues to be addressed by the GSF was also outlined, including identifying challenges and opportunities for food security and nutrition, identifying priorities for action, promoting convergence, recommending and describing options for governance mechanisms, and consolidating macro-level warnings about challenges related to food security and nutrition. They also agreed to describe and recommend strategies that could be adopted by stakeholders at different levels, to encourage the adoption of national strategies following a twin-track approach, and to identify areas across policy and practice that could benefit from future consensus building and convergence. Unfortunately, when time came to identify the issues for which there was no international consensus, the CFS failed to come to consensus and the section was dropped in favour of completing the negotiations.

An annotated outline was then developed and two versions were presented (April and June 2011). There was a tight timeline for comment on the Annotated Outline. CSO, facilitated through the CSM, attempted to come to a consolidated position but this proved impossible and they thus submitted one document with three sets of comments developed by different coalitions of actors. This action reinforced the principle of diversity and the commitment of CSOs working through the CSM to respect diversity. At this point, they acknowledged that there was strength in submitting a unified proposal but the importance of diversity over-rode the desire for a strong political statement. This sheds light on when and where and how CSO actors negotiate their positions amongst themselves and when they are willing to compromise and perhaps more interestingly, when they are not. It further illustrates the challenge of arriving at compromise when issues are highly political and response time is limited. This limited time frame also impacted the responses received by member states. As one leading human rights campaigner reflected: “Only 19 countries manifested comments on the annotated outline and most of them were negative, which caused countries like Canada and the US to claim that the process isn’t working, no one is buying in (Rome, May 2011)”.

Indeed, government buy-in and engagement in the GSF negotiations were low in comparison to the negotiations on the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the context of national food security (VGGTs). For example, discussions on Section V: Uniting and organizing to fight hunger involved a smaller number of delegates. Observation at the time noted that those present included Switzerland, France, Finland, Denmark, US, Mexico, Argentina, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola and China along with FIAN, La Via Campesina, Indigenous Caucus, International Union of Food Workers, World Alliance of Fisherfolk and an NGO working on protracted crisis and food security. When questioned about the low attendance, many felt that this was due in part to CFS-overload brought about by an engaged and lengthy negotiation on the VGGTs. Others felt that active participation on a document that aimed to bring together issues upon which there was already

international consensus was not the best use of time and resources. However the Chair of the open-ended working group was committed to completing the process. This led one EU-based food security analyst to declare that “[i]t is clear that the strategy of Brazil, who have been carrying this process, is to take people by surprise to ensure it is not clear what the significant of it is until it is too late to shut it down” (Rome, May 2011). This strategy seemingly employed by the Brazilian Chair was one echoed by CSOs: notably, to take advantage of limited buy-in and engagement to advance more progressive solutions. Indeed one network of NGOs working in Europe deliberated at length as to whether or not they should lobby their national government on issues related to the CFS. The concern was that too much engagement and awareness on the part of civil servants and politicians could backfire insofar as they could potentially get increasingly engaged and then restrict the trajectory of more progressive policy making processes and policy recommendations. In the end, this network opted not to lobby at the national level, recognizing that their government participated in the negotiations as part of the European Union who were generally considered to arrive at favourable positions and were seen as allies by the many of the civil society actors working through the CSM.

At the 37th session of the CFS the Committee acknowledged the CFS Bureau-led consultative and inclusive process that resulted in the purposes, basic principles, structure and process of the GSF as well electronic consultation on the Annotated Outline. The Committee also underlined the critical role of planned consultations on the GSF and the role of the GSF as a dynamic instrument which reflects and consolidates the on-going policy convergence work of CFS, noting that recommendations of the CFS should be incorporated in the final draft of the GSF.

Following the 37th Session, a first draft of the CFS was developed and included in the official agenda of each 2012 FAO Regional Conference as well as on the agendas of the CSO Regional Consultations. Based on the regional consultations and electronic inputs, a second draft of the GSF was released, and was the basis for negotiations during an Open Ended Working Group Meeting that took place in Rome at the FAO between June 27-29, 2012. At this meeting, agreement was reached by the plenary of the CFS intergovernmental working group on the first five chapters of the First Version of the Global Strategic Framework on Food Security and Nutrition. After that meeting, a further meeting was scheduled for July 19, 2012 to finalise chapter six, the so-called “gap” section which was meant to list key issues upon which there was not yet international consensus. Then the document was submitted for editorial review and the inclusion of case studies and a final version was sent for translation into all FAO official languages and then presented for submission to the 39th Session of the CFS in October 2012.

8.3. Negotiating the Global Strategic Framework

During the June meeting, as with other CFS negotiations, contentious sections that blocked consensus were sent to the Friends of the Chair (FOC). In this case, the FOC was an open group and coordinated (voluntarily) by a representative from the Swiss government. Originally, the

Chair recommended that the FOC run parallel to the Plenary, but this was rejected as it restricted the participation of smaller delegations. Examples of issues that were sent to the FOC include discussion on paragraph 30, the Chapeau of section IV Policy, Programme and Other Recommendations. The Second Draft text read:

30. Based on the foundation of the right to adequate food, and in the context of the overarching frameworks described above, there is broad international consensus on the appropriate policy response to the underlying causes of hunger and malnutrition in a number of areas. The recommendations in this section represent a consensus reached in the CFS. The list is not comprehensive and will develop over time as the GSF is regularly updated to take account of decisions of the CFS. Recommendations resulting from the discussions and endorsed by CFS will be included in future versions of the GSF.

Delegates from Canada and the U.S.A. wanted to delete reference to the right to adequate food.

The final text reads:

28. Taking into account the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security and in the context of the overarching frameworks described in Chapter III, there is broad international consensus on appropriate policy responses to the underlying causes of hunger and malnutrition in a number of areas. The recommendations in this chapter are drawn from decisions reached in the CFS with the exception of sections E and F, where the recommendations come from other sources. The list is not comprehensive and will develop over time as the GSF is regularly updated to take account of decisions of the CFS. Recommendations resulting from the discussions and endorsed by CFS will be included in future versions of the GSF.

The shift from being based on the foundation of the right to food, to taking into account the progressive realization of the right to food was a clear set-back for actors promoting a rights-based approach. Given that the CFS reform document gives primacy to achieving the right to food, this edit can also be seen as a set-back for the CFS. The focus on national context again points to the push for national sovereignty but simultaneously reflects an effort to restrict the influence of the document. The shift from highlighting that included recommendations representing consensus reached in the CFS, to simply reflecting decisions reached in the CFS, is another example of how the language was weakened.

In a negotiation on the text related to gender, CSOs had some success. In Section D: Addressing gender issues in food security and nutrition, CSOs secured language in paragraph 47 that recognised that women “are often subjected to structural violence”. They also managed to include the key role women play in securing nutrition into this paragraph so that the first sentence of paragraph 47 reads “Women make vital contributions to the food security and nutrition of developing countries, but they consistently enjoy less access than men to the resources and opportunities for being more productive farmers”.

After the year long process of developing and negotiating the GSF within the intergovernmental open-ended working group, the first version of the GSF was finalised and endorsed by the CFS at their 39th Session. At this point the Committee also agreed that “the GSF should be updated regularly to reflect the outcomes and recommendations of CFS in a manner consistent with multilateral principles, agreements and mandates.”

8.4. Assessing the Global Strategic Framework

Given the mandate and authority of the CFS, the GSF is not a legally binding instrument. Like all CFS documents, guidelines and recommendations are meant to be interpreted and applied in accordance with national policies, legal systems and institutions. This focus on the national-level not only reinforced the theme of country-led plans, but it also suggests recognition that food security is a national responsibility. It also alludes to broader themes of state sovereignty and the role of the state in global governance. What the GSF does offer are “guidelines and recommendations for catalysing coherent action at the global, regional and country levels by the full range of stakeholders, while emphasizing the primary responsibility of governments and the central role of country ownership of programmes to combat food insecurity and malnutrition” (CFS 2012c:para 8).

In line with its reform rationale and reinforcing one of the key policy themes, the GSF places emphasis on policy coherence designed to target decision and policy-makers responsible for policy areas with a direct or indirect impact on food security and nutrition. This is another factor that separates the GSF from the other policy framework insofar as it moves beyond high-level rhetoric and focuses on the practice of policy making at the national level.

The breadth and technical capacity of the negotiators and related technical staff is also important. The negotiators representing countries are, for the most part, permanent representatives to the FAO or the Rome-Based Food Agencies and thus, if not experts, they are at least well versed and certainly immersed in issues related to food, agriculture and nutrition. This comes through not only in the negotiations but also in the breadth of recommendations. Comparing for example the way in which the CFS addresses the importance of a gender-sensitive approach, with recognition of the key role of women as food and nutrition providers and producers as well as the structural barriers they face, to the way in which the other policy documents, at best, recognise that gender is an issue to be addressed in food security, it becomes clear that CFS recommendations take a systems approach and are more useful in terms of informing and supporting positive policy change to work towards the eradication of hunger. The mechanisms for participation and inclusivity was key to the development of a useful and applicable one-stop policy shop document like the GSF and the CSF is showing that it has processes in place to make this happen.

It is informative to compare key policy documents selected for further examination with the overarching frameworks on food security and nutrition identified by the Committee on World Food Security. The intended “value added” of the Global Strategic Framework is that it provides “an overarching framework and a single reference document with practical guidance on core recommendations for food security and nutrition strategies, policies and actions validated by the wide ownership, participation and consultation afforded by the CFS” (CFS 2012:para 7). The GSF identifies six primary frameworks that are important due to their particular connection to food security and nutrition (see Figure 18).

It is interesting that the Millennium Development Goals are listed first. The Goals provide a political and operational framework for development and provide measurements of human development that are based on more than income. The MDGs have a target of reducing hunger but fail to address agriculture or food security. They do not include a focus on participation and fail to emphasise sustainability. Some of the goals lack measurements, meaning assessment and monitoring is limited at best. Furthermore, while each of the goals have specifically stated targets and dates for achieving those targets, there are no clear guidelines on how they can or should be achieved. They are not used as a policy tool as much as an aspirational framework. When they are referenced in a post-2008 context, it is predominantly in the context that they are unlikely to be met, or that new goals are being developed with a sustainability focus for post-2015.

Frameworks	
1.	The Millennium Development Goals
2.	The Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security
3.	The Five Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security
4.	The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land,
5.	Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security
6.	High-Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness
7.	United Nations Updated Comprehensive Framework for Action (UCFA)
8.	Other frameworks and documents: • The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) • The 1981 International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes • The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) • The 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) • The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action ensure women's rights • ILO Conventions 87, 98 and 169 • The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) • The final Declaration of the International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD) • The UN Declaration on Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP) • The Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Framework and Roadmap

Figure 20: Overarching Frameworks identified in the Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition (CFS 2012c).

The Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security are a useful addition to the Global Strategic Framework as they provide an overall framework for achieving food security and nutrition objectives. They call for the right to adequate food to be the main objective of food security policies, programmes, strategies and legislation; that human rights principles (participation, accountability, non-discrimination, transparency, human dignity, empowerment and rule of law) should guide activities designed to improve food security; and that policies, programmes, strategies and legislation need to enhance the empowerment of rights-holders and the

accountability of duty-bearers, thus reinforcing the notions of rights and obligations as opposed to charity and benevolence.

A right to food approach has been central to the reform of the Committee on World Food Security, arguably for a few key reasons. The first is based on the broad recognition of the work of the current Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, who has consistently presented strong, legally-grounded arguments promoting the value of a right to food approach to achieving food security in a sustainable and appropriate way. Efforts of the Special Rapporteur have ensured that more actors are aware of the importance of a right to food approach. An obvious example of this was the public exchange between Pascal Lamy, Director of the World Trade Organization and Oliver De Schutter (World Trade Organization 2011) relating to the impact of the World Trade Organization on the progressive realisation of the Right to Food. Second, civil society actors involved in the Committee on World Food Security have consistently pushed for, and negotiated the inclusion of, language linked to a rights-based approach. For them, a rights based approach is very much aligned with a food sovereignty approach and moreover provides a framework for holding states accountable. Finally, the reform document of the Committee on World Food Security clearly expresses that the “CFS will strive for a world free from hunger where countries implement the voluntary guidelines for the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security” (CFS 2009:para 4).

While a rights-based approach has been widely accepted by the Committee on World Food Security, a right to adequate food normative and analytical framework has yet to permeate policy fora outside the FAO, and even within the FAO and the UN there is ample work to be done (de Schutter 2013). Because there has been such limited uptake of a right to adequate food normative and analytical framework beyond the FAO and because the Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security were developed pre-2007, they are not included in the mapping of key frameworks informing the architecture of global food security governance. This is not however to suggest that they do not have an important role to play as illustrated throughout the case studies.

The Five Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security are discussed below and while the High-Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness is not explicitly reviewed, links to the Rome Principles are considered. The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security were initiated before the food price crisis.

8.5. Summary

When compared to the other key policy documents that have been developed multilaterally to address food security in the wake of the food price spikes of 2007-8 (e.g., the UN HLTF’s Updated Comprehensive Framework for Action; World Bank’s Agriculture Action Plan:

FY2010-1; the G8's L'Aquila Joint Statement on Food Security; the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program Framework; the Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security; and the G20's Multi-Year Action Plan on Development) it becomes clear that while the GSF has perhaps the lowest level of recognition, it is by far the most comprehensive, useful and fit-for-purpose. When reviewing the First Version of the GSF, one thing that stands out, especially in comparison to the other policy frameworks reviewed above, are the end notes (a total of one hundred) referencing statements to existing documents. There are important implications and insights to be gained from this. First, the CFS has made a deliberate effort to ground the recommendations and policies in the GSF in existing commitments and best practices as negotiated or promoted by other multilateral fora. Second, and this came out clearly in the negotiations, the open-ended working group was pressured into defending and rationalising what was included in the GSF to appease less-friendly governments. Third, the references strengthen the potential application and uptake of the policies therein insofar as policy makers will have not only the negotiated GSF text but can also easily access the origins of the recommendation which can arguably strengthen the rationale for their implementation.

What is important to recognise is that the legitimacy and authority of the CFS, as limited as it is, is consistently being undermined by these other multilateral actors. Non-CFS actors have failed to produce meaningful, consultative, inclusive, grounded policy recommendations built on existing international commitments but forward looking and grounded in a broad knowledge base. The CFS is proving to be fastidious when it comes to detail because of the internal and external pressure that it faces. It is also motivated by the energy of the participants, notably those from civil society, who are consistent in their engagement and commitment.

The question about usefulness versus influence remains unaddressed however. Given that competing policy frameworks (e.g., CFA, L'Aquila (see chapter 4) reviewed above have been developed with country leaders, and given how little influence and notoriety the CFS has, influence and uptake remain a challenge. To begin to assess the impact and usefulness of the GSF, future research must consider the ways in which the GSF is being used by policy makers in the development of food security policies, as well as civil society organizations looking to hold governments to account.

9. Assessment of and Conclusions on the Reformed CFS: 2010-2013

9.1. Introduction

This research identified the reformed CFS as important to the changing architecture of global food security governance and asked: To what extent is the reformed CFS realising its objectives (RQ1)? The question was answered through a detailed examination of three key reform objectives: the expansion of participation; applicable policies and guidelines; and policy coordination and coherence. Each of these aspects of the reform were explored, respectively, through case studies on the Civil Society Mechanism, the Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, and the Global Strategic Framework.

This first case study on the CSM (Chapter 6) provides evidence of the history of engagement and effort that went into securing enhanced and autonomous participation of civil society actors within the CFS. Strategies for ensuring that the “voice of those most affected by food insecurity” were heard – a principle aligned with a key CFS reform principle – were reviewed. Also reviewed were the opportunities, challenges and strategies developed and employed by civil society actors in their relations within the CSM and between the CSM and the CFS. The case study highlighted how civil society has organised itself to engage effectively with the CFS while being keenly aware of issues linked to representation, power dynamics, political strategy, consensus and diversity.

Chapter 7 reviewed the intergovernmental negotiations around the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT). The VGGT represent the most important output of the reformed CFS and were frequently referred to as a “make or break” issue for the Committee. Many of the themes and tensions outlined in the policy roundtables were revisited in this case study, including the complexity of alliances. The analysis provided insight into the functioning of the reformed CFS, including how the inclusion of new actors works in practice. Analysis of the negotiations reinforced the value of civil society engagement in the work of the Committee and depicted a maturation of the negotiation strategies of CSOs. The case study highlighted how alliances are being built between states and non-state actors around issues and not necessarily along historic or regional lines. The review also served to illustrate how national and regional politics are taken up in global-level processes. The analysis also stressed the value of such guidelines, noting several positive and progressive guidelines. Finally, the review pointed to limitations in the outcomes and challenges moving forward.

Chapter 8 presented a review of the development of the Global Strategic Framework. The analysis reinforced many of the conclusions drawn from the first two case studies with respect to participation and engagement in policy processes. This case study also mapped out how the CFS was moving forward with its reform objectives as well as its efforts to develop tools that

serve to not just improve policy cohesion but also support the development of better policies. These three case studies help answer the primary research question. However, in order for the CFS to achieve its reform objectives in any sustainable way, strong mechanisms for policy-uptake, monitoring and evaluation are needed. Correspondingly, in this chapter, an assessment of the CFS's Results-Based Framework is presented. Following from this, a final assessment of the progress made by the CFS on its reform objectives is provided. The chapter concludes with a summary and reflections on the CFS.

9.2. Considering the Results-Based Framework

At the 39th Session (October 2012), the CFS updated its multi-year programme of work and prioritization of activities for the CFS and proposed a Results-Based Framework, (CFS 2012f). The Framework outlines an approach to reviewing the overall objective of the CFS – to contribute to reducing hunger and malnutrition and ensuring food security and nutrition for all human beings – as well as specific outcomes, including: the VGGT; principles for responsible agricultural investment (CFS-rai); Global Strategic Framework; policy roundtables based on HLPE studies; addressing food security and undernutrition in protracted crisis; food security and nutrition terminology; mapping food security and nutrition; and, communications. Of interest here is the process selected by the CSM for assessing achievement of their objective.

The Framework as presented to the 39th Session of the CFS remained in draft form, to be refined by the Open-Ended Working Group on Monitoring. Three outcomes were identified in Results-Based Framework: Enhanced global coordination; improved policy convergence on key food and nutrition issues; and, strengthened national and regional food security and nutrition actions. These outcomes are considered here to show the possible direction that the CFS could pursue in terms of monitoring and evaluation.

Outcome 1: Enhanced Global Coordination

Regarding the first outcome of “enhanced global coordination on food security and nutrition questions”, four indicators were identified. The first indicator asked “are CFS members and participants satisfied with its coordination role? Are all CFS stakeholders categories equally satisfied?” Similarly, the third indicator sought to capture “how many high-level events (including side-events to international or regional conferences) does the CFS organise per year?” Participant perception and CFS activities are important, but these indicators do little to provide insight into the CFS's role in global coordination. The second indicator is more useful for assessing the outcome: “does CFS collaborate with other key international and regional initiatives (e.g. ECOSOC, G20, G8, Rio+20, UN General Assembly, MDG / SDG process, UNFCCC, AU, CAADP and other regional partnerships, etc.)?”. A clear definition of collaboration is necessary. For example, does a speech by the Chair of the CFS at a G20 event count as collaboration? This indicator could be helped by the CFS's efforts on mapping actions for food security, which were initiated as a demo-website in 2012 but has since gone off-line.

The final indicator measures whether a CFS-like model to discuss food security and nutrition issues (multistakeholder and cross-sectoral) is replicated in other fora, especially at country level. The uptake of the CFS-model is an interesting issue and one addressed in part in Chapter 6 on the CSM. The implementation of a CFS model at the country-level would suggest a national-level commitment to multistakeholder, consultative and participatory processes that take a rights-based approach and place food security at the centre of policy objectives. This national-level action is fundamental to ensuring that the CFS achieves its objectives, as states are ultimately responsible for food security.

The assumptions and risks matched to this first outcome are telling. First, the CFS acknowledged that they are working on the assumption that food security and nutrition issues remain high in the international political agenda. To address this, as a risk indicator, they proposed a review of final reports of key international meetings and conferences. As a mitigating strategy they propose evidence-based communication and advocacy along with demonstration of linkages with other key areas.

Second, within the Results –Based Framework there is acknowledgement of the assumption that CFS members and participants remain committed to sharing lessons and expertise and coordinating their actions for food security and nutrition within the CFS framework. Indeed, this is the biggest challenge and relates to the critique of the first and third indicator for assessing the outcomes. The associated risk indicator then becomes a lack of participation in CFS meetings and negotiation sessions and/or a lack of representation of some categories of stakeholders. The mitigating strategy involves ensuring that all CFS participants have the possibility to voice their ideas and that all proposals are welcomed by the CFS. In this respect, the review of the CFS and the accompanying case studies suggests that overall, the CFS is making progress on this outcome and thereby advancing its reform objectives. However, the assumption extends farther than is suggested in the Results-Based Framework. For example, while CFS members and participants may work to share the lessons and try to ensure policy cohesion, political priorities may result in their efforts being ignored or pushed aside.

The final assumption for this outcome was that the “CFS has a good reputation and is recognised by international actors as the main international body for dealing with food security and nutrition issues. The international community remains ostensibly committed to providing resources according to needs identified and planned activities incorporated in the CFS work programme” (CFS 2010c). The CFS remains relatively unknown to many policy makers and practitioners, as well as country leaders. While this is slowly changing, there is much work to be done in terms of communication and awareness building. This extends beyond simple name recognition to include the operating principles of the CFS. As a risk indicator, the Results-Based Framework identified measuring decreased interest in the CFS model and activities among the international community and donors along with a lack of visibility and legitimacy of CFS. They also noted key issues related to food security and nutrition are dealt with by other actors/fora,

with no collaboration, consultation or reporting to CFS as another risk indicator. Furthermore, the inability to implement CFS-planned activities due to a lack of funding is also an indicator of risk. As a mitigating strategy the CFS proposed to undertake systematic networking, communication, fund-raising and advocacy efforts towards the donor community. Fundraising and communications are not adequate. If the CFS is targeting only donors, there is increased likelihood of better funding and importantly, more country-level buy-in. However, these strategies must extend to all stakeholders, not simply donors if the CFS is to maintain engagement of all participants.

Outcome 2: Improved Policy Convergence on Key Food and Nutrition Issues

The second outcome identified for accessing CFS progress towards its objective related to improved policy convergence on food and nutrition issues. For this, three indicators were identified. The first indicator again linked to communication and consisted of measuring whether CFS achievements and recommendations were communicated and advocated efficiently. While this sets out the necessary groundwork for improving policy convergence, the indicator fails to provide insight into whether the policy recommendations are in fact taken up or advocated for. The second indicator build on the first and focuses on how CFS members and participants have integrated CFS policy recommendations in their strategies and actions. Concrete data collected on this indicator would be most valuable to further understanding the influence of the CFS in supporting policy convergence. The third indicator focuses on how CFS policy recommendations have been integrated in national and regional policies, strategies and programmes for food security and nutrition. Again, this is a valuable indicator that can support analyses into the effectiveness of the CFS in performing its reform goals.

The CFS recognised the assumption that achievements and successes are well communicated among a large audience. Here, it becomes important to identify key stakeholders in the food security and nutrition area who are not aware of the activities. The corresponding mitigating strategy is then systematic networking, communication and advocacy efforts on CFS achievements and successes among a large audience.

The second assumption is that the topics of the HLPE reports and related policy discussions are in line with priorities on the international agenda and timely and comprehensively treated. The identified risk indicator was a lack of high-level participation in HLPE consultation processes and roundtables where reports are presented, to be mitigated by ensuring that selected subjects for HLPE reports have been identified as key priorities in other international fora and result from a consensus of all CFS stakeholders. This flags an important tension: the CFS needs to remain topical and must address emerging and pressing issues that come up. At the same time, the diversity across the Committee can help to ensure that the CFS does not fall victim to chasing the latest “hot” topic at the expense of continuing to challenge the main structural causes of food insecurity, malnutrition and violations of the right to food.

The final assumption regarding improved policy convergence in relation to stakeholders was that CFS stakeholders are engaged towards taking into account CFS recommendations and ensuring the use of its methodology, tools and frameworks. The risk indicator was a loss of momentum after the adoption/endorsement of CFS recommendations and tools and the delay of implementation or follow-up activities. The mitigating strategy included presenting the implementation of CFS recommendations to the CFS. This is very similar to the second assumption of the first outcome: CFS members and participants remain committed to sharing lessons and expertise and coordinating their actions for food security and nutrition within the CFS framework. It again comes down to communication. Not simply the capacity of actors to communicate effectively, but also the willingness of others to engage on the subject. Interviews and conversation conducted during fieldwork revealed that many civil servants and technical staff working on issues of food security and nutrition are being told to focus attention on other initiatives such as those advanced by the World Economic Forum, the G8 and the G20, leaving little time for meaningful exchange between CFS negotiators and decision-makers in the Capitals.

Outcome 3: Strengthened National and Regional Food Security and Nutrition Actions

The final outcome for assessing the CFS's progress towards its overall objective is strengthened national and regional food security and nutrition actions. As noted above, the overall and long-term success of the CFS is tied to the meaningful uptake of CFS recommendations and advice at the national level. This links back to the responsibility of states to ensure food security and to their role as decision-makers within the Committee. It also enhances the legitimacy and value of the CFS. The uptake of CFS policy recommendations at the regional and national-levels will be slow. That said, there has been progress, especially through collaboration with the FAO, and the CFS has included this as a key role and key outcome in the reform process.

Three indicators were proposed to measure this outcome. The first indicator measures if the CFS is often sought after by countries and regions for facilitating support to the design and implementation of their food security and nutrition plans, programmes and strategies. This raises important questions because the CFS is a committee of member-states and stakeholder participants who are not technical experts, nor are the majority likely to have applied experience in developing such plans. Furthermore, unlike other planning initiatives (including the G20's Global Agriculture and Food Security Program, or the G8's New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, or even the Scaling-Up Nutrition Movement), the CFS does not have the capacity to fund the plans. This indicator comes from the Reform Document, which identified support for country-led plans as a key role of the CFS. However, it remains to be seen how the CFS would accomplish this role and why countries would choose the CFS over other initiatives that include a finance component.

The second indicator reviews if CFS members and participants have strengthened their food security and nutrition actions in the field (including for monitoring and evaluation) and have increased related resources, as a result of CFS activities. It is assumed that the annual State of Food Security reports will be used to inform this indicator, however, there are important questions of attribution that need to be addressed if the CFS is going to start claiming that improvements in food security are directly linked to CFS policies.

The final indicator considers if national and regional stakeholders are satisfied with the use and impacts of CFS methodology, tools and frameworks. This indicator again seeks to make the link between CFS actions and local uptake. While a focus on satisfaction versus evidence of effectiveness, is questionable, the indicator could usefully illustrate which tools are being used with perceived success and which are not.

With respect to assumptions, the first to be noted was that countries and regions remain committed to tackle food security and nutrition issues, not too far from the above mentioned assumption that food security and nutrition issues remain high on the international political agenda. As a risk indicator, the CFS proposed a lack of interest for CFS methodology and tools and limited willingness of countries to provide resources and take responsibility for follow-up actions. As a mitigating strategy the CFS considered ensuring early involvement and endorsement from governments on CFS recommendations and tools, while also ensuring a clear demonstration of benefits.

The second assumption was that countries and regions monitor the actions resulting from the implementation of CFS recommendations, tools and frameworks and share related results, directly or indirectly, with CFS. Indeed, it is known that many countries engaged in the CFS do not have the capacity to monitor food security at the country-level, let alone actions related to the implementation of policies. Despite the challenges with respect to capacity, the assumption itself is important, especially with respect to feedback. CFS member-states have been very clear that there is no desire for increased reporting. There is however a commitment to sharing best practices. The related risk indicator was identified as a lack of reporting on the implementation of CFS recommendations, tools and frameworks at national and regional levels. The corresponding mitigation strategy was to encourage the use of already existing monitoring frameworks and include elements for guiding monitoring in all CFS recommendations, tools and frameworks. This is a strong strategy and potentially the best way to start to ensure CFS strategies are effectively integrated into national and regional-level food security policies and actions.

The final assumption relates to the provision of resources to implement CFS recommendations in countries and regions in a coordinated manner. Again, the CFS has been weak on financing and is challenged by other actors with a distinct financial mandate. As a result, funding from donors to ensure the uptake of CFS policies at the national level will be fundamental to the success of the CFS. The related risk indicator was identified as national and regional

stakeholders having limited capacity and funding to implement CFS recommendations, tools and frameworks as well as a lack of coordination to implement CFS recommendations at country- or regional level. To mitigate this, it was suggested to increase donor coordination in the support to countries and regions, pooling of resources as appropriate and increasing high-level dialogue with concerned governments and stakeholders. The CFS could also host regular meetings held with partners to check on progress and evolution of the situation.

The fact that the CFS has launched an Open-Ended Working Group on Monitoring and has approved a relatively comprehensive Results-Based Framework, complete with outcomes, indicators, assumptions, risk indicators and mitigating strategies, suggests that concerns about the monitoring and evaluative capacity of the CFS may be tempered as the CFS progresses.

This section has mapped out the concrete and observable steps that the CFS is taking with respect to what is arguably one of the most difficult aspects of multilateral governance processes: monitoring and evaluation. The process of reflection and awareness of geopolitical tensions come through in the assumptions and potential risks and the mitigating strategies, on the whole, suggest realistic strategies for addressing such risks. The CFS continues to refine and update their Results-Based Framework and the Open-Ended Working Group on Monitoring and Evaluation is working towards their October 2014 deadline. That the CFS has developed such processes is evidence of transparency, long-term thinking and accountability. Importantly, these processes can also be used in the future to defend the legitimacy and value of the CFS against competing processes.

9.3. Achieving the Reform Mandate

The CFS has managed to accomplish many of the tasks it assigned for itself but that there are certain roles which remain weak or inappropriate for the CFS to take on. To assess the CFS on the basis of the reform objectives, progress on the six roles identified for the CFS in the reform document are reviewed.

Coordination at Global Level

The first role identified for the reformed CFS was to “[p]rovide a platform for discussion and coordination to strengthen collaborative action among governments, regional organizations, international organizations and agencies, NGOs, CSOs, food producers’ organizations, private sector organizations, philanthropic organizations, and other relevant stakeholders, in a manner that is in alignment with each country’s specific context and needs”(CFS 2009a). Through the reform process, and alongside the efforts of new participants, the CFS has managed to provide a platform for strengthened collaboration amongst relevant stakeholders. Beyond collaboration, the inclusion of new participants – including UN agencies, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, the Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, Standing Committee on Nutrition, civil society organizations and their networks, international agricultural research systems, international and regional Financial Institutions, representatives

of private sector associations and, private philanthropic foundations – and the active engagement of these participants suggests that the CFS is providing space for stakeholders to have a voice and influence intergovernmental negotiations. To ensure that this continues, the Civil Society Mechanism will require more funds and the right to remain autonomous. CSM leaders, notably the Coordination Committee members, aided by the Secretariat, must work to expand their reach and find effective means for two-way communication on CFS issues. There are more issues to address here, especially related to accountability and decision-making, but these are limited to the CSM and not the CFS. For the CFS to ensure that all stakeholders are not simply given a voice, but are able to speak, member states must continue to support the CSM and the CFS as a whole must continue to respect processes to ensure that their voices are heard.

With respect to creating links to country-specific contexts, the CFS remain weak although they have been working closely with the FAO, and have begun to make clear links to national and regional processes (e.g., through support with the VGGTs and CFS sessions at the FAO regional conferences). Indeed, moving forward the CFS must find a way of supporting the uptake of CFS policy recommendations at the national level. This must be accompanied by careful monitoring and evaluation so as to allow for the full assessment of the policy impact on national-level food security. The tensions between CFS policies and other initiatives will also remain a challenge. In some instances efforts are being made to enhance cohesion (e.g., VGGT and the African Land Policy Initiative). In other cases, actors are moving ahead with disregard for CFS processes (e.g., PRAI and the G8's New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition).

Policy Convergence

The second role identified in the reform document was for the CFS to promote greater policy convergence and coordination. This raises two points. First, how can the CFS achieve this if it is being undermined by other actors? Secondly, which policies are to be cohered to? The CFS has shown that in the few years following its reform it has managed to produce evidence-based policies informed by wide-spread consultation and inclusive negotiations. The results are negotiated intergovernmentally and endorse policy proposals that have proven to be comprehensive and progressive in terms of seriously addressing food security. That said, given that food security has developed in line with a wider neoliberal agenda, and the CFS itself operates within a context of embedded neoliberalism, advancing policies that stray from the dominant model is not only difficult but also challenges cohesion. Furthermore, given the nature of CFS decision-making, it is argued that it is the responsibility of all actors to cohere to CFS decisions and not to use the CFS as a stamp of approval for initiatives and policies that were developed through non-transparent, non-participatory processes (e.g. AMIS, PRAI).

National-Level Support

The third role of the CFS was to support and provide advice to countries and regions in the development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of their nationally and regionally owned plans of action for the elimination of hunger based on the principles of participation, transparency and accountability. The CFS has produced policy recommendations, often with clear links to existing international commitments, and compiled them in the Global Strategic Framework to facilitate access and use. The CFS does not have the authority or the capacity to advise countries on national level strategies. The CFS is an intergovernmental body and not a technical body. It is the role of the FAO to support countries in the implementation of such plans and programmes. Where the CFS can help is by providing space for countries to share best practices and to raise issues so that the CFS can then request HLPE reports and develop policy recommendations.

Coordination at National and Regional Levels

The fourth role identified for the CFS was for it to “serve as a platform to promote greater coordination and alignment of actions in the field, encourage more efficient use of resources and identify resource gaps”. To date, the CFS has not addressed field-level coordination or alignment. This is outside the reach and mandate of the CFS. The CFS is accountable to member states and the outputs of the CFS are inter-governmentally negotiated policy recommendations for implementation at the national level. These in turn should be taken up, as appropriate, at the national level. However it is not the role of the CFS to coordinate action at the field-level. It can encourage efficient use of resources and identify resource gaps, but it then has no way of ensuring these gaps are closed or that more efficient practices are put into place.

Promote Accountability and Share Best Practices at All Levels

Developing accountability measures within the CFS would be complicated insofar as it would mean governments developing mechanisms to hold themselves accountable. The CFS should, as appropriate, help countries and regions assess whether their objectives are being achieved and how food insecurity and malnutrition can be reduced more quickly and effectively. This will entail developing an innovative mechanism, including the definition of common indicators, to monitor progress towards these agreed upon objectives and actions taking into account lessons learned from previous CFS and other monitoring attempts. Comments by all CFS stakeholders will have to be taken into account and new mechanisms built on existing structures. In terms of sharing best practices the CFs has been quite successful. It has endorsed the VGGTs and the GSF and is working towards the adoption of principles for responsible agricultural investment.

Develop a Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition

The final role identified in the reform document was the development of a Global Strategic Framework to improve coordination and guide synchronized action by a wide range of

stakeholders. As described in Chapter 8, the CFS designed the GSF and finalised it in a consultative and participatory way. To strengthen the policy recommendations therein, efforts were made provide references to existing international commitments. This both strengthens the policy recommendations and helps policy makers ensure coherence.

9.4. Reflections on the CFS

The assessment of the six roles identified for the CFS in the reform document confirms that in just a few years the CFS has implemented and operationalized an innovative approach to participatory policy making at the global level. The expansion of participation in the CFS has resulted in changes to policies that demonstrate stronger support for smallholders and prioritise food security. This is noteworthy and valuable.

When the CFS adopted the reform document it was setting out into uncharted territory both in terms of process and challenges. Conclusions drawn from the analysis show that the CFS has overcome its previous incarnation's history of inactivity to emerge as a leading intergovernmental body that develops comprehensive food security policies through participatory processes. The CFS has the legitimate function of acting as the forum in the United Nations' System for review and follow-up of food security policies. This legitimacy is based on agreement reached by the Committee's 123 member countries on reforms that would position the CFS as the foremost international and intergovernmental forum for food security and nutrition. It is further reinforced by participatory and transparent functioning of the CFS as well as the policy outputs. Importantly, this legitimacy extends beyond the Committee. The G8 stated its support for the "fundamental" reform process in the "'L'Aquila' Joint Statement on Global Food Security". The Declaration from the first meeting of G20 Agriculture Ministers expressed a commitment to work closely with the CFS to promote greater policy convergence and strengthen policy linkages at the global level (G20 2011). Even the UN General Assembly recognised "the important role and inclusive nature of the Committee on World Food Security as a key organ in addressing the issue of global food security, including in the context of the global partnership for food security" (UN General Assembly 2012a:para 26). The reform of the CFS has proven successful insofar as it has managed to achieve the bulk of its reform mandates, develop a strong consultative, scientific and participatory process for policy making. These conclusions were informed and backed up by the case studies.

Civil Society Mechanism

Establishing a mechanism that can represent a broad range of regions and constituencies and can effectively operate so as to have an impact on policy processes is no small task. The CSM continues to work through growing pains and given the political nature of its members, it is likely that the CSM will exist in a continuous state of tension and flux. While potentially exhausting for the Secretariat and executive, such tensions are not only unavoidable but also can also ensure the on-going development and progress of the mechanism.

The largest challenge facing the CSM is similar to that facing the CFS: the potential to be undermined by other actors. For the CSM to work, there must be clarity with respect to its jurisdiction and scope and so long as the CSM continues to operate in a transparent and accessible way, this should be respected by all civil society actors as well as donors.

The CSM provides two clear additions to the global architecture of food security governance. First, it provides a model that functions relatively well, that is broadly participatory and that can be replicated. Second, the experiences of CSO actors working within the CSM to engage with the CFS are also valuable sites where knowledge about participatory policy making can be enhanced. Finally, the ultimate success of the CSM can be measured in the impact CSOs have had on policies. Chapter 7 on the Voluntary Guidelines provided ample evidence of not only the impact but more importantly, the value of civil society contributions to the negotiation process and outcomes. Furthermore, throughout this thesis examples of how CSOs have opened up debate and challenged status quo have been presented. As such, the operation of the CSM within the CFS provides a challenge to theories of transnational neopluralism (described in Chapter 2) which suggest that the actors that possess the most transnationally interconnected resources, power and influence will be most effective at shaping policy. While this certainly applies to relations between the CFS and other initiatives, within the CFS, experiential knowledge and geopolitical realities have been shown to have an important impact on securing specific policy wants. CSOs and the governments of developing countries successfully negotiated terms based on legitimacy informed by experience and need. Correspondingly, future research should reflect on the value of transnational neopluralism within the CFS, seeking out indicators to identify resources that result in policy change.

Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Tenure of Land

As made clear in Chapter 7, the VGGTs mark a landmark in the evolution of the CFS. The value of the VGGTs comes from both the process and the outcome. The process of consultation and negotiation provide a model for meaningful participatory policy making. It also provides insight into some of the requirements to ensure the success of such a process, including financial resources, time, trust building, along with varied and translatable forms of expertise. Alongside insights into the broader methodology, Chapter 7 highlighted key tensions that arose during negotiations, especially with respect to language, state sovereignty, political priorities, and the capacity of different actors to engage. Lessons learned from these negotiations can usefully inform proceeding CFS negotiations as well as similar processes in other fora.

The analysis of the negotiations of the VGGTs support the conclusions of Chapter 6 insofar as they highlight important role played by CSOs. More broadly, the growing awareness about the VGGTs has helped to build awareness about the CFS.

Finally, the shift from technical processes to political processes requires further investigations. What are the implications of bringing issues as complex and politically sensitive into a non-

expert, political forum? How do the technical experts then take up the political document and translate it back into applicable and practical policy tools?

Global Strategic Framework

Chapter 8 reviewed the development of the Global Strategic Framework. Through the review and analysis it argued that the CFS has not only managed to develop a document that can support coordination and coherence of food security policies, but analysis also showed how the CFS is producing the most comprehensive policies recommendations at the global level. However, despite the potential value of the document, and its practical and intellectual worth, it has low political gravitas. For the GSF to fulfil its function, it needs to become a tool used by policy makers and at all levels, but especially at the national level. Efforts to establish procedures of monitoring and evaluation will eventually enable the CFS to assess the usefulness and impact of the GSF. At this stage, the GSF serves as another example of consultative and participatory negotiations. The negotiations themselves highlighted resistance and apprehension on the part of specific governments. The apprehension is most visible in moments where the CFS is challenging status quo. As the review of the GSF negotiations illustrate, at times, these challenges succeed and the boundaries of the neoliberal project are extended, weakened, and even reimagined.

10. Conclusions: Implications for food security and global governance

10.1. Reflections on the research questions

This thesis provides a window onto the reorganization of a UN Committee during a watershed period. It is particularly focused on the dynamics that took place within specific arrangements: the internal and external dynamics of the CFS. Specifically, this research set out to answer four research questions:

RQ1: To what extent is the reformed CFS realising its reform objectives?

RQ2. Who are the main actors and what are the dominant initiatives within the changing architecture of food security governance?

RQ3. How does the CFS relate to the changing architecture of global food security governance and what are the impacts?

RQ4. How do these findings contribute to the literature on, and understandings of, global governance and global food security governance?

With respect to RQ1, drawing on data and analysis presented throughout this thesis, it is argued that the CFS has managed to achieve the bulk of its reform objectives but that challenges and obstacles remain. Importantly, the CFS is now an innovative, participatory and consultative body with the capacity to address challenges as they arise while also producing progressive food security policies that move beyond business as usual and make a start at addressing root causes of food insecurity. As such, the reformed CFS is the most legitimate and appropriate body to lead efforts towards improved global cohesion and best practices in food security policy.

As it moves forward, the Committee must refrain from overloading itself: a real risk as interest in the CFS grows. Already the CFS is receiving requests related to monitoring and evaluation of external programmes. This type of work is beyond the scope and capacity of the Committee, at least at this time. The CFS should continue to reflect on its work plan and tackle issues within its mandate. Other challenges facing the CFS include awareness and recognition; monitoring and evaluation; influence in terms of being able to achieve its mandate as the foremost international and intergovernmental platform; and the ability to address interconnected crises and associated challenges of depleting natural resources and climate change.

It is important when assessing the CFS to remember that the vision of the reformed CFS was defined within the emerging new architecture of global food security governance and as a key part of an emerging Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition (CFS 2009b:para 4). This relates to RQ2: Who are the main actors and what are the dominant initiatives within the changing architecture of food security governance? Key multilateral actors have been identified as the G8, G20, World Bank and HLTF. While all have expressed their support for the CFS, they have also pursued food security policy programmes outside of the CFS. As illustrated throughout this thesis, the development of the initiatives present threats to the mandate and legitimacy of the CFS. Furthermore, the initiatives often contradict policy recommendations developed and negotiated through the CFS.

In answering RQ2, the answer to RQ3 (How does the CFS relate to the changing architecture of global food security governance and what are the impacts?) emerged. In this research the CFS has been identified as a key player that is pushing for recognition and to maintain legitimacy as the central (“the foremost”) actor in global food security policy discussions and policy development. At the same time, the Committee remains at the periphery of influence. It has been illustrated and argued in this thesis that this position is not inherently negative as it allows for, at times, greater freedom and flexibility with respect to policy processes and outcomes. The challenge becomes ensuring the uptake of the Committee’s policy proposals. It is also acknowledged that it remains too early in the reform process to conclude on the impact of the CFS.

What can be concluded at this stage is that despite its legitimacy, increasing recognition, deliberative mechanisms, and wide rhetorical support, the CFS continues to be undermined by powerful economically-driven actors and therefore any good policies and processes emerging from the CFS are in danger of being compromised by decisions made in competing international institutions and forums, as the CFS holds less (although perhaps increasing) political weight. This is reinforced by the fact that the CFS has no implementation or financial capacity and has yet to finalise processes for monitoring and evaluation.

Theoretical assumptions of transnational neopluralism (defined in Chapter 2) would suggest that within the architecture of global food security governance the ability of the CFS to fulfil its mandate is likely to remain limited. The CFS simply does not have the resources, power and influence of actors like the G8 and G20. Furthermore, while it remains too early to assess the policy impacts of the CFS, the advancement of competing visions for the future of food security continue to move ahead while internally, the CFS is faced with the possibility of experiencing more challenges as it gains prominence and attracts actors who are not versed in the rules of operation or who are resistant to such processes.

At the same time, to suggest that the G20 and G8 countries will disengage, or that they even should, also fails to recognise the important role these actors could play. First, wealthy countries face pressing food security and nutrition challenges at the national level, notably related to issues of (over-) consumption and malnutrition. Second, they have the responsibility of reforming financial and trade systems which currently negatively impact on food security. Not only do the G8 and G20 have technical capacity in this area, they also have a great deal of legitimacy in terms of regulating markets across the multilateral system.

Sophia Murphy (2013:4) has proposed important contributions the G20 could make towards global food security, all of which can also be applied to the G8:

by reforming certain problematic domestic policies (for instance, the minimum-use biofuels mandates of the European Union [EU] and the United States); by accepting greater transparency and predictability in the level and use of grain stocks; by accepting disciplines on the use of export restrictions and working with net-food importing developing countries to restore their confidence in international trade; and by improving the regulation of speculation and increasing transparency

on commodity-futures markets; by making significant progress toward shifting their agricultural production systems toward less-polluting models. In taking on such tasks, and “getting their houses in order” the G8 and G20 must avoid encroaching on wider intergovernmental processes wherein all countries participate, and especially processes where the voices of those most affected by food insecurity are given priority. It seems unlikely at this point that the G8 and G20 will step back and they appear increasingly committed to strengthening a neoliberal agenda that supports trade liberalization and strengthens the role of the private sector. Consider for example that Prime Minister David Cameron declared that the G8’s 2013 Lough Erne Summit: “will be focused on three ways in which we can support the development of open economies, open governments and open societies to unleash the power of the private sector” (Cameron 2012). The G8’s New Alliance appears to be doing just that in Africa, despite mounting evidence that these types of neoliberal policies have negative impacts on food security and the most vulnerable (Ben-David, Nordström, and Winters 1999; FAO 2000, 2012j; Madeley 2000; Panda and Ganesh-Kumar 2009; de Schutter 2013; Tyler and Dixie 2012; Wise 2009).

This thesis has also illustrated that with a context of embedded neoliberalism, and amidst the competition for leadership, space has been made for manoeuvring. In practice this means the CFS has initiated discussions and processes to tackle some of the more pressing and structural issues impacting food insecurity and malnutrition. Reviews of these processes further illustrates that this is due in large part to active civil society participation. As such, the CFS does represent a step away from “business as usual”, addressing an increasing number of calls to do so (IAASTD 2009; UNCTAD 2013; UNEP 2012).

Along these lines, this research has described how the CFS has begun to meaningfully include a wider range of actors and how these actors are opening up policy debates and influencing intergovernmental policies. However, it can also be concluded that so long as policy discussions revolve around food security, fundamental structural changes – non-hegemonic change – will remain impossible. As noted earlier in this thesis, non-hegemonic action stands in contrast to counter-hegemonic action. A hegemonic arrangement is achieved when a population comes to be dominated partly through its own consent. However, hegemony is relational insofar as the processes of organizing consent may also create opportunities for constructing counter-hegemonic movements and resistance (Carroll 1990:393). Simplified: counter-hegemonic action potentially exists in relation to hegemony. When considered in the context of embedded neoliberalism, it is theorized that such counter-actions serve to stretch boundaries but not deconstruct or rebuild them. As described in this thesis, such actions remain vulnerable to co-option. Thus, counter-hegemony may present itself as transformative, but it remains tied to the agenda of the dominant hegemonic actors (Carroll 2007; Hall 1988). By contrast, anti-hegemonic action seeks to remove itself from the terrain of hegemony by moving beyond counter-hegemonic promotion of fragmentation and politics of difference and seeking solutions outside of the logic of embedded neoliberalism. Following from this, it is theorized that while

the CFS presents opportunities for counter-hegemonic change, it skirts the possibility of anti-hegemonic change in so far as it remains tied to UN processes and the language of food security (see Chapter 4).

10.2. Implications for Food Security

The complexity and the way in which the discourse of food security is taken up across global food security governance raises more questions than it answers. Throughout this research the limitations of food security as a discourse and as a policy frame were consistently reinforced. First, food security employs a technocratic definition and approach: it has been highly negotiated and therefore does not necessarily reflect the best definition of the situation, but rather international consensus arrived at by diplomatic compromise. Food security is apolitical insofar as it fails to accept the political processes that contribute to food insecurity. Food security is constructed as disembodied, non-located, absent from political economic and sociocultural context. At the same time, food insecurity is constructed as embodied (normally a woman (mother)), it is located (usually in Africa), and framed within a specific socio-cultural context at the local or national scale. There is thus a disconnect between the way in which the end goal (food security) and the problem (food insecurity) are understood and framed. Food security as an approach, as a frame, as discourse, and as a policy programme, remains worthy of critique and scrutiny. At issue in this thesis however was not the relevance or usefulness of the term, but rather the ways in which it is being redefined in a post-food price spike policy context. The amount of focus and attention being paid to food security at this moment illustrates the need for on-going critical academic inquiry.

Food security, as a key policy frame, is an example of what James Ferguson (1994) calls an anti-political device. It turns a symptom of poverty into the ends of policy. Instead, hunger, and by extension poverty, must be situated within specific economic systems of production, modalities of representation and regimes of power (George 1984). Dominant discourses informing food security policy are marked by a reluctance to acknowledge hunger and malnutrition as a political problem linked to relations of power. Given the relationship between food security policy at the global level and broader neoliberal project it is not surprising that international actors chose food security over trade or financial markets as the discourse to frame the fallout of the food price spikes. Food security allowed actors to bypass difficult policy problems that make up the structural causes of hunger and malnutrition. In turn, governments can be seen to engage in seemingly urgent and earnest deliberations about food security with little threat to the status quo. In the global food security policy domain there is room for counter- and non-hegemonic actors to push for change (Holt Giménez and Shattuck 2011), but all policy debates framed through food security will have a hard time escaping the history and trajectory of the term.

Does this mean that the term should be done away with? Despite the clear limitations and problems outlined above, at this moment, as the battle for leadership over the problem and solutions continues, the answer is, hesitatingly, no. This is in part because academic ponderings on discourses of food security remain removed from the fact that food security describes a very real, very troubling problem. Indeed there is a disconnect between policy and practice that demands stronger analysis and reflection. From this perspective, however flawed, food security provides a common language that governments, policy makers, field staff, NGOs, the private sector and social movements understand and, at least partly, agree on. They certainly do not agree on the adequacy of the definition. There is also no agreement on the path to achieving food security. Yet, importantly, there is clarity in what is meant by food security in international circles. This agreement is valuable. To begin to reimagine and reopen negotiations on another term to describe the same problem – a lack of adequate access and availability of appropriate foods to lead a healthy life – could take years and could shift attention away from the pressing issue: almost one sixth of the planet is hungry and industrial food production models are not sustainable. Attempts by the CFS to expand the term to “food and nutrition security” (CFS 2012a) are illustrative of the challenges and tensions involved in reformulating terms in intergovernmental fora. At the same time, pushing to incorporate or embed language that provide a strategic critique of food security (i.e., food sovereignty) into these fora is also dangerous as critical aspects of these approaches are likely to be tempered through passive revolution (Gramsci 1971).

While the term remains useful (at least for now), food security programmes and policies need to be reimagined and an alternative future developed in line with ecological principles that tackle distribution, consumption, injustice and that are effectively integrated at the local, national and regional (and global, if appropriate) level in accordance with local realities. It is acknowledged a catch-22 situation emerges when this statement is considered in the context of embedded neoliberalism. As a result, it is also recognised that change will need to extend far beyond food security to the core of systems of global governance. Until then, food security at the global level will continue to exist as a policy framework that claims to work towards the eradication of a structural problem without addressing the structural issues. As noted above, this approach simultaneously provides a way for governments to feign action without having to address difficult political decisions related to financial systems, justice and natural resources. This is the conundrum of late capitalism and extends across the key challenges of this century. Thinking ahead, a food policy approach (Lang et al. 2009), food sovereignty (Holt-Giménez and Altieri 2013; McMichael 2006; Mousseau and Mittal 2006) and emerging literature on resilience (Alinovi et al. 2010; De Schutter 2008) could prove useful in imaginations of a post-food security policy era.

10.3. Implications for Global Governance

In this thesis, global governance literature provided a way of understanding complexity at multiple levels. The literature also raised questions that were reflected back in the processes being observed throughout the data collection process. As such, analysis of the application of global governance theory to the CFS provides an opportunity to reflect on implications for global governance studies more broadly, specifically with respect to addressing key challenges and limitations as identified across the literature. What follows is summary of ways in which the analysis of the CFS contributes to the existing literature on global governance.

Observable Phenomenon

With respect to global governance as observable phenomenon, the CFS as it is positioned within the broader architecture of global food security governance reflects the intersectional processes between the political, economic and sociocultural pillar described by Muldoon (2004). However, in contrast to processes of multipolarity of power and decentralisation of authority often associated with global governance, the CFS is recentralising power in the hands of nation states. At the same time, it is developing and supporting mechanisms to ensure that multiple stakeholders are involved in the processes. In this way, decision-making processes are pluralistic and decision-making remains the authority of nations. With respect to the variable geometry of political significance and regulatory capacity across systems of global governance, within and beyond the CFS, a shift in significance is evident. The CFS maintains limited regulatory capacity. Actors have sought to address this, in part, by rooting policy recommendations in existing intergovernmental agreements – notably the right to food – and by starting work on monitoring and evaluation of their own policy proposals. These changes, alongside the consistent output of the Committee, have led to increased political significance. As noted in the thesis, this comes at a potential risk insofar as the CFS has managed to advance comparatively progressive policies because the people negotiating them tend to fall below the ministerial level and hold diplomatic posts as permanent representatives to the Rome-based food agencies. Should the CFS become increasingly politically significant, it is likely that ministerial participation will increase. This will undoubtedly add a higher political dimension that has been relatively absent from the CFS thus far, but it could threaten existing procedures and flexibility that are in fact the strength and added-value of the reformed CFS.

Global governance requires institutions to function as intermediaries to tie together different components of socio-political and economic systems. The CFS has been restructured to play such a role, and not only to bring components together but also to ensure that where they meet there is an interface space that constitutes “important terrains for confrontations between social movements and the defenders of the neoliberal agenda” (McKeon 2009:48).

Muldoon (2004:9) argues that “governance structures only survive if they promote stability in the system”. As a participatory and inclusive platform for discussion, the CFS is in many ways

addressing the issue of stability, in line with a broader participatory turn. Ignoring civil society in an era of networks and social media is increasingly challenging and problematic. Creating this interface space serves to focus and align actors who are often on opposing sides. While there are implications for resistance and the capacity for counter versus non-hegemonic action (Holt Giménez and Shattuck 2011), that the confrontations take place within established parameters provides a level of enhanced stability. Where the CFS continues to struggle is in gaining authority to address political issues intimately tied to food security but addressed by other actors. Two key examples are trade and climate change.

With respect to shifts taking place at the level of global governance, the CFS exhibits an upward shift in authority as it seeks to coordinate national-level policies and ensure policy cohesion. Similarly, a downward shift is evident insofar as civil society participants have taken on a great deal of work in terms of research, coordination, planning and research. This is not perceived however as the CFS unloading work and responsibilities to the civil society sector, instead, this is perceived as a meaningful opportunity for civil society actors to influence policy processes.

With respect to network governance, the development of the Civil Society Mechanism and their unique blend of formal and informal governance structures is an important example of how global networks can address challenges related to language, time, representation and legitimacy. As a network, the CSM represents an effective organizing model for food social movements engaging in global governance processes; it is a politicizing, engaging and connecting mechanism. It actively seeks out and supports the engagement of those “most affected by food security” and provides opportunities to hear alternative voices perhaps more connected to the realities on the ground. Its structure can also be replicated at various levels to support regional, national, local engagement and across sectors.

As noted in Chapter 2, shifts in governance lead to a rise in the popularity and usage of information comparison, such as benchmarking and best practices (van Kersbergen and Waarden 2004:55). The CFS reflects this trend but it is also acknowledged that such approaches are promoted within the CFS due to a lack of capacity to fund projects or to implement policies. Finally, as illustrated through the case studies, within the CFS, networks and alliances are being made and re-made along key issues and not necessarily along ideological or historic ties.

Political Project

Global governance as political project is taken up in several ways including: global governance as a way of solving the world’s collective problems; global governance to re-democratise in the face of globalization; and, global governance as advancement of a neoliberal project. Each of these forms of enactment can be seen in the reform of the CFS. The issue of coming together to solve a collective problem stems from the origins of the idea of food security and has continued to rationalise actions around food security as exemplified in part through the policy theme of relief. With respect to re-democratisation in the face of globalisation, the CFS has relied on

transparency, participation and applicability of policy outcomes to secure greater legitimacy in the fight for authority over food security policy. At the same time, the CFS continues to promote the advancement of a neoliberal project. Here, the understanding of embedded neoliberalism helps to make sense of why this is and how it functions. As Chapter 4 illustrated, the concept of food security in global policy debates has developed as part of a wider neoliberal project and as such debates about food security necessarily take place within the boundaries of embedded neoliberalism. The neoliberal discourse is further strengthened by the CFS's principle of one country-one vote which is arguably democratic but fails to address inequalities in power, wealth and capacity. Furthermore, during CFS negotiations it is apparent that countries with greater power and influence – most notably G8 countries – are better positioned and better able to block consensus than less powerful countries, but not always.

The political and social playing field – the transnational space – within which the CFS operates is defined by embedded neoliberalism. The embedded nature of neoliberalism establishes the main boundaries of logic and operation, but the theory forwards that neoliberal hegemony is ever-changing, always contested and thus in a constant state of flux. It thus represents a hard – but not impassable – barrier for actors seeking to challenge its logic. Whether previously “outside” actors prove more successful in their pursuits to change the system from the inside, as they continue to also work on the outside, remains to be seen. However, the research has also shown that there is room for real democratic processes to emerge. Indeed, while the CFS has emerged as but one process among others, the real value of the reformed Committee is that it is an international forum that engages with the more difficult, even structural, issues and it is helped to do so through the participation of multiple actors seeking to push it in that direction. Those actors are not only CSOs, but as this research has shown, many governments (represented through their delegations) also moved this way during the negotiations.

In this respect, the reformed CFS, as an actor in global governance, serves as a means to deal more effectively with the crisis-prone consequences of neoliberal social processes. As explained in Chapter 2, the prevailing neoliberal logic steering policy processes beyond the state are deeply embedded in a broader political trend towards reregulation of the world economy in ways that obscure the negative tendencies of late capitalism. However, the logic of embedded neoliberalism, informed by neo-Gramscian understandings of hegemony, suggest that this is inevitable. Related theories of change suggest that short of revolution, neoliberal hegemony will continue to be contested and in turn concessions will be granted to maintain relations of power in a slightly altered form. As such, while the CFS presents a space for confrontations between social movements and the defenders of the neoliberal agenda (McKeon 2009:48) the organizational structures within which it is embedded ensure that critical voices – the voices of those most affected by food insecurity – are engaged in counter-hegemonic action instead of non-hegemonic action. It is equally important not to ignore the capacity of powerful forces in this analysis, and their efforts to survive. This research has illustrated that across the CFS actors

are pushing, shoving, strategizing and compromising for something better, and their efforts are being at least partially rewarded. The implications in terms of change in the food system remains to be seen, but the key dynamic that has been uncovered is the policy clarification offered in the face of a complex and messy reality.

10.4. Addressing Limitations of Global Governance

Beyond the ideological barriers of embedded neoliberalism, global governance faces several challenges and critiques, notably with respect to questions of participation, accountability and legitimacy (see Chapter 2). These issues are now revisited with a view towards illustrating the way in they arise and are addressed within the CFS so as to contribute to the growing literature on global governance and global food security policy. First however, it is important address the three weaknesses of global governance as raised by Overbeek (in Overbeek et al. 2010). First, the critique that analyses relying on global governance tend to be ahistorical has been addressed by providing a review of the evolution of the discourse of food security policy in relation to wider political processes. With respect to the challenge that analyses are necessarily pluralist in so far as they tend to take the plurality of actors, interests and structures as essential, it is here argued that this is indeed a strength of the research. Of interest is how actors work together to achieve the reform objectives of the CFS and also so the CFS interacts with other actors within a changing architecture of global food security governance and at a specific moment of crisis. Finally, the critique argues that inquiries into processes of global governance are apolitical in so much as power is often removed from analyses are addressed by careful observation and reflection on relations of power within the CFS and outside, notably as they relate to language, capacity and perceived legitimacy.

Participation

Through its recent reform process, the CFS has supported new mechanisms and structures that are reshaping the way food security policy is debated and developed by changing who is engaged in the debate (Duncan and Barling, 2012). By including civil society actors as official participants on the Committee, the CFS is championing a model of enhanced participation at the level of international policy-making and finding new ways to engage actors who have previously sat at the margins of official food security debates.

By opening up participation on the CFS to civil society actors, new opportunities to challenge the logic of embedded neoliberalism are being created. While this has the potential to expand the terms of debate, understandings of the problems and the scope of solutions, which are here deemed to be positive, the challenge for the CSM, moving forward, will be finding a way to balance insider status with outsider objectives (Duncan and Barling 2012).

How well the reformed CFS is able to put into practice the values and mechanisms it has developed and supported is an important test not only of the value of the Committee, but also of civil society participation in global policy-making processes, and global governance more

broadly. Notably, how the CFS incorporates and manages the participation of civil society, and how civil society organization manage their participation and retain a meaningful sense of agency, will be a litmus test for claims of legitimacy in the face of challenges from donor-based and wealthy-country led initiatives that seek to maintain neoliberal hegemony and continue to forward agro-industrial solutions.

Within the CFS, participation from research bodies, philanthropic foundations and to a lesser extent, the private sector, remains limited. The enthusiasm and diligent engagement of CSOs had helped propel the reformed Committee through its post-reform learning curve, but to increase the impact and influence of the CFS and to ensure that it upholds its mandate of inclusivity, it will need to find a way of engaging other participant groups in more meaningful ways. At the same time, greater participation from these actors could quickly shift the balance of power and strain the CFS's commitment to ensuring that the voices of those most affected by food security are heard. More research into ways of balancing increased buy-in without impacting the growing influence and engagement of civil society actors within the CFS would be valuable.

Accountability

As noted in Chapter 2, in response to new forms of governance that render traditional mechanisms for checks and balances less effective, or even obsolete, new understandings and mechanisms for accountability are emerging. One of the major limitations to emerge from the review of multilateral policy processes is the lack of accountability. The lack of mechanisms to ensure accountability and follow-through of actors leads to unfulfilled commitments and a form of global-level policy amnesia wherein political leaders make declarations and commitments that are quickly forgotten or substituted for another policy deemed more appealing.

In terms of policy making at the global level, states are being asked to monitor their own progress and to prioritise development. States continue to predominantly prioritise economic values: food security becomes framed as an outcome of strong economy. It is a form of morality within the political economy but it fails to address over-consumption or obesity and fails to break down structural causes. Such an approach fails to make appropriate links to, or recognise, obesity or, perhaps more importantly, the impact of western or wealthy consumption patterns on food security worldwide.

Of the policy initiatives reviewed in Chapter 4, explicit discussion of accountability is notably absent in most. By contrast, the CFS's Global Strategic Framework dedicates a section to monitoring and follow-up of food security policies and right to food approached at various levels. The CFS has been very clear on the issue of accountability: while the CFS's work and negotiations are participatory, states are accountable for decision making. What the CFS lacks is the capacity to enforce the uptake of policy recommendations. The issue of which participants are accountable and who they are accountable to has been raised in the context of CSO

engagement (Chapter 6). Finding effective and appropriate mechanisms to ensure accountability to a global network of civil society actors is an impossible task. The CSM model is far from perfect but they are taking steps towards enhancing their accountability and decision-making structure, recruiting new actors and sharing leadership roles all the while remaining highly sensitive to issues of representation, social struggle and legitimacy.

Legitimacy

The legitimacy of CFS member states is assumed. When the CFS adopted the reform document, 123 countries agreed that it was the legitimate forum for discussions on food security at the global level. Despite this, actors are undermining this legitimacy by coordinating actions and policies on food security outside of the CFS. This illustrates the challenges of legitimacy at the multilateral level, especially when the most legitimate organization operates at a level below minister or heads of state.

The CFS's reform document defines which groups of actors are legitimate participants. With respect to CSO participants, legitimacy can be gauged in two ways. First, there is the argument that CSO actors are legitimate because of their lived experience and insofar as they have been selected to engage in the CFS through the Civil Society Mechanism (autonomously defined legitimacy). On the other hand, there are important questions related to the legitimacy of non-elected actors and the implications of their engagement in intergovernmental processes. Answers to the second point depend a great deal on the structure of the first: that is, legitimate processes for selection and engagement within the CSM are a prerequisite for their legitimate engagement in the Committee.

The CSM is continuously reflecting on and refining their selection processes. The autonomous nature of the mechanism means that each constituent and sub-region is responsible for designing and following through with a process deemed legitimate to a range of actors. This is an example of output legitimacy (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999:255). CSO leaders (or focal points) must be seen to be legitimate (as well as accountable) to their constituents. If they are not, actors may raise complaints and undermine the broader participatory process. In line with the academic literature, legitimacy is not understood to be a stable condition but something fluid that must be repeatedly created and recreated (Boström and Hallström 2010:15).

Importantly, within the CSM, legitimacy comes from working in an area related to food security and having access to networks. With respect to the influence of CSOs in the CFS, as the case studies show, they have actively earned their legitimacy through strategic and valuable interventions.

10.5. Reflections on Methods

More specific to this project, and as noted in Chapter 3, the fieldwork began just as the research project began and therefore the literature review and project planning ran parallel to the data

collection. This meant that the process and objectives were developed as the fieldwork progressed and were in turn heavily influenced by fieldwork. This is not necessarily negative as it meant that the research questions emerged out of the tensions observed in the field. At the same time, the research was often disjointed and fragmented at the beginning. The skill of taking field notes developed over the three years of participant observation. The focus of the field notes also became more targeted and more useful as the research questions emerged. By the final stint of fieldwork the process had become systematic.

Related to this, more effort or a different approach could have been employed to secure a broader and more representative range of interviews, especially with government representatives. Personality and confidence played a role here as it was rather uncomfortable to continuously ask individuals for interviews. Interviews may have benefitted from more structure (i.e. a defined interview schedule) to allow for more comparable results, although the overall aim of the purposive sample was to get insight into specific issues. A survey of participants and member states would have provided insight into perceptions of success and satisfaction with the reform. This is something that should be pursued in the future, perhaps in partnership with the CFS Secretariat. A similar survey should also be conducted within the CSM.³⁹

Access to the field was gained through the Civil Society Mechanism and as a result there is a bias towards the positions and perspectives of civil society organizations. Part of this is validated through solidarity research and through a commitment to exploring social movements' interactions as important and often neglected sites of knowledge making. Indeed, by exploring the interactions and strategies of civil society actors, this research has shed light on the complexities, challenges and opportunities that come from moving from the periphery into the centre of intergovernmental policy processes. In doing so, the thesis has been able to politicise what is often de-politicised in the literature: that is, processes of strategy, prioritisation and compromise that inform the public positions. There were of course drawbacks of being so closely aligned with civil society actors. The association could have impeded access to diplomats and technicians weary of close association with CSOs, although no such examples were obvious in the research process. By being an outsider – academic – in a very insider location, extra effort had to be made to establish and maintain trust. This in turn influenced which meetings were observed, which events were appropriate to write about, and the level of critique that could be developed against the CSM. Furthermore, friendships developed through the close working relationships raising ethical questions. These were resolved by carefully differentiating between “on the record” and “off the record” conversations which were often mixed, and by discussing the use of observations and other related data with relevant

³⁹ Following up with this conclusion, I worked with a group of CSM Coordination Committee Members to develop a short survey assessing the CSM's performance over its first three years of operation. The survey was carried out during the October 2013 CSM Forum.

participants. Awareness of the challenges of a close relationship to the CSM contributed to a change of research focus early in the process to place less emphasis on the CSM and more on the evolution and capacity of the CFS.

The research project focused on the engagement of CSOs in the CFS process in lieu of other participants. This was in part because the engagement of CSOs was what was so novel about the CFS reform and also because the CSM proved much more complex, intricate and advanced than the other mechanisms and modes of participation. Understanding how a mechanism could start to reflect the diversity of the civil societies of the world was nothing if not daunting and intriguing. However, a major weakness of the research is that it does not reflect adequately on the role of the private sector or philanthropic both within the CFS and outside. This is problematic given the growing influence of philanthropic foundations on food security programmes and policies. Another limitation was the lack of consideration paid to discourses of nutrition within and outside of the CFS. Many actors are now talking about “food and nutrition” security and there are important political and legal implications as well as a range of motivations advancing this terminology that require careful analysis.

During the negotiations and analysis, it would have also been useful to identify the geographical alliances between governments – especially pan-African and Latin American groupings – to better capture and understand the role of regional initiatives in the post-food price spikes architecture of food security policy. Such an analysis may also shed light on changing geopolitical arrangements of power.

10.6. Reflections on Broader Application of Methodology

As Pascal Lamy (2012:721) notes, “part of the difficulty in thinking global governance lies in the gap between theory and practice.” The theoretical framework described and applied throughout this thesis, in conjunction with data collected through participant observation, helps to shrink this gap. Global governance theory, as it has been presented in this thesis, recognizes fundamental political, economic, technological, and cultural dynamics that engage social and political theory while also moving beyond conventional international relations theory (Muldoon 2004). The approach provides conceptual and analytical tools to critically assess the rapidly changing terrain of global politics and the interactions of the various actors as they respond to shifts in politics, culture, the environment and the economy. The theory provides explanations for the evolution and impact of emerging modes of governance and, as has been argued in this thesis, can be applied to the governance of wicked problems.

Importantly, within a context of globalization, the approach allows researchers to identify key shifts in the transformation of the state, the role of international institutions, multilateral arrangements, private governance, the globalisation of civil society, and the myriad related interactions.

The global governance literature supports theorizing about the organization of actors a multilateral environment while also providing guidance for grouping the range of actions taken by these actors across different geo-political contexts. This serves to highlight issues likely to emerge in studies of multi-stakeholder governance processes. As such, the theoretical framework provides not only guidance but also a baseline against which emerging global processes can be understood and assessed. More broadly, a framework drawing from global governance theory has the scope to explore social relations from the level of the individual through to the global. However, it is also acknowledged that insofar as it is far-reaching, it fails to identify clear boundaries within which to frame and limit the scope of study.

As such, it is shown in this thesis that the analytic notion of embedded neoliberalism can be used to frame inquiries into global governance processes. Such an approach valuably theorises how formulations and enactments of the “neoliberal” come to form a boundary of sorts – rigid but not impermeable – within the context of a transnational neoplural space (Cerny 2008). This space is understood to be organised in ways that facilitate the objectives of economic actors. Yet, importantly, the approach makes space for the agency of actors, including those who resist and act against neoliberalism and push its boundaries from within and from outside. The approach is applicable to inquiries into multilateral and global governance processes, especially the governance of complex problems like food security.

While the strength of the framework is that it provides space for capturing social processes and related dynamics, and boundaries to frame the inquiry, actually identifying these can be challenging as they are actively written out of reporting processes. For this reason, there is great value in coupling the theoretical framework with participant observation.

Participation involves doing things – working alongside people, building trust, making yourself available, assuming new and different roles, and learning how to act in different contexts. By successfully doing participant observation researchers gain access to the everyday: to the sites where struggles, victories and the seemingly mundane emerge, play out and get resolved. Such an approach effectively shifts the emphasis from mainstream outcome-oriented policy scholarship towards an assessment of the processes that lead to outcomes. This serves to unmask and politicise the policy-making process and provides more nuanced insight into the organization of relations of power. Furthermore, it serves to foregrounds the meanings and diverse worldviews that actors bring with them, develop, and reconstruct through their interactions in policy processes.

In practice, participant observation involves a great deal of uncertainty and effectively shapes the research plan as the researcher processes through the fieldwork. In the context of this research, access to particular sites, unwillingness of research subjects to discuss specific topics, protecting participants, and unpredicted events provided unforeseen but often insightful and compelling windows onto key processes. Yet, gaining access to the group requires patience and earning the trust of key actors.

10.7. Opportunities for future research

There is more work to be done examining the use and implication of global governance and food security governance. As noted above, literature on global governance was used to frame the research project. However, global governance is also being enacted by policy makers and other actors to refer to processes of food security governance. The language of global food security governance is increasing in line with the G8 and G20's interest in the subject. As such there is a potential for reification between academic examinations of multilateral food security policies and a "real-world" discursive shift that more effectively aligns food security initiatives with the objectives and language of powerful economic actors.

There is also a need for more research into the relationship between the FAO and the CFS. It appears that the FAO is keen to take up CFS endorsed policies and to shift normally technical processes into political ones. The VGGTs is a prime example of this. Research into whether this is an increasing trend, and if so, what the implications are for the FAO work plan is important.

In this thesis policy cohesion is assumed to be desirable. This is another potential limitation. Indeed, as discussed throughout, cohesion exists in the form of neoliberal hegemony. The CFS reformed to facilitate this cohesion but its authority is often undermined and its policies often continue to hold fast to a neoliberal trajectory. Questions of whose policies are to be cohered to are addressed but require further theoretical and analytic attention alongside the question of whether cohesion around global food security – in all its complexity and scope – is even desirable.

Opportunities for further research into global food security governance are varied, however it is essential that researchers ensure that in responding to calls for increased research are not used as a stalling tactic to avoid having to make difficult policy decisions. That said, given the growing complexity of systems of global governance and the problems they seek to regulate, on-going research into the ordering of global food security governance is needed, especially with respect to the roles, responsibilities and influence of the private sector and philanthropic foundations, as noted above. To better understand the impact of the CFS, careful mapping of the implementation and impact of CFS policies at the country level is needed. Here, energy must also be directed at developing rigorous methods to account for attribution of policy changes.

Research is needed to identify ways in which the CFS model of participation and the CSM approach to facilitation can be transferred to other policy and negotiation spaces. At the same time, more attention needs to be paid to the implications of having social activists move from the periphery to the centre.

Within the CSM there is a push by many social movement actors to engage in discussion and debate on food sovereignty. Deep reflection on the implications of allowing the CFS to potentially define a critical resistance discourse is warranted to ensure that a potentially non-hegemonic discourse does not mutate into a counter-hegemonic discourse or become co-opted and redefined through multilateral negotiations.

Finally, there is a need to continue to map inconsistencies between research and policy. For example, calls for greater investment remain prominent and largely unchallenged within multilateral fora, especially outside of the CFS, yet research undertaken by the FAO (2012j:7) argues that “investors are targeting countries with weak land tenure security” and that investors tend to focus on the “poorest countries, and those that are also less involved in world food exchanges”. At a CFS side event hosted by the Inter-Agency Working Group discussing the impacts of investment and PRAI on developing country agriculture, the World Bank’s Agribusiness Unit Team Leader presented “a historical review of 179 agribusiness investments in developing countries” and noted that there was very little incentive to invest in food crops when investing in agriculture, and that most investors will opt for crops that provide high returns, such as palm oil or rubber.

The world is a messy place, overloaded with wicked problems. The interconnected nature of global food systems, the growing interconnectedness of food, fuel and financial markets and increasing competition for natural resources suggests that there is a need for meaningful global cooperation and cohesion so as to eradicate hunger and ensure the human right to adequate food. Despite the many challenges and limitations, the reformed CFS has emerged as the most legitimate and hopeful actor to lead this next phase of global food security governance.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Assessment of key meetings in a post-2008 food crisis architecture of global food security governance

This table lists the key policy frameworks developed by multilateral actors in reaction to the food price spikes of 2007-8. The criteria used for selecting the documents to focus on for analysis are listed across the top of the matrix. The 'X' denotes that the document meets the selection criteria. Bold font is used to clearly identify cases where a document conforms to all five criteria. The document chosen focus on throughout this analysis are highlighted in grey. There is some overlap across organizations. In these cases the most relevant document according to the selection criteria was chosen for analysis (e.g., CFA and UCFA, in this case, the updated Framework is analysed, and the GSF is used for the CFS).

Actor	Policy/Framework	Multilateral	Food security focussed	Policy focused	Response to the food crisis	Influential
World Bank Group	World Development Report on Agriculture for Development	X				X
World Economic Forum	Annual Forum	X	X		X	X
International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAA STD)	Results and conclusions ratified during the Intergovernmental Plenary Meeting	X		X		X
UN	High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis- Comprehensive Framework for Action	X	X	X	X	X
UN Economic and Social Council	Special Meeting on the Global Food Crisis	X	X	X	X	
FAO	High-Level Conference on Food Security and the Challenges of Bio-energy	X	X	X	X	
G8	Leaders Statement on Global Food Security	X	X	X	X	X
World Bank Group	Global Food Crisis Response Program	X	X		X	
UN	High Level Meeting	X	X	X	X	

	on Food Security for All					
World Bank Group	Implementing Agriculture for Development, World Bank Group Agriculture Action Plan: FY2010-1	X	X	X	X	X
G8	L'Aquila Joint Statement on Food Security	X	X	X	X	X
Rome-based Food Agencies	Joint Food Security Strategy		X	X	X	
G20	Pittsburgh Summit: proposal for GAFSP	X	X	X	X	X
UN + USA	Partnering for Food Security	X	X	X	X	
FAO	High-Level Expert Forum, How to Feed the World in 2050	X	X		X	
Committee on World Food Security	35 th Session: Agreement to reform	X	X		X	X
People's Food Sovereignty Forum	Mobilization around CFS reform and civil society mechanism		X		X	
FAO	World Summit on Food Security	X	X	X	X	X
FAO	Summit of World's Regions on Food Security	X	X	X		
FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD, World Bank	Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources	X		X	X	X
Global Forum for Agricultural Research	First Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development			X	X	
Scaling-Up Nutrition	Framework for Action to Scale Up Nutrition	X		X	X	X
High-Level Task Force	Updated Comprehensive Framework for Action	X	X	X	X	X
High Level Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly	Outcome Document promoting national food security strategies		X	X	X	

Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement	A Road Map for Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN)	X	X	X	X	X
<u>CSO Forum for the CSM</u>	<u>Approval of the Civil Society Mechanism</u>		X	X		X
Committee on World Food Security	36th Session, first of the reformed CFS	X	X	X	X	X
APEC	Ministerial Meeting on Food Security	X	X	X	X	
G20	Multi-Year Action Plan on Development	X	X	X	X	X
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food	Agroecology and the right to food		X	X	X	X
G20 Agriculture Ministers	Action Plan on Food Price Volatility	X	X	X	X	X
Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the International Food Policy Research Institute	International Conference on Climate Change and Food Security		X			
FAO	Regional Conferences	X	X			
Committee on World Food Security	Extraordinary 38th Session to endorse the Voluntary guidelines on the responsible governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests in the context of national food security.					
G8	New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition	X	X			X
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs	UN Conference on Sustainable Development	X				X
FAO	High level forum on food insecurity in protracted crisis	X	X	X		X
Committee on World Food Security	39th Session, adoption of the First Version of the Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition	X	X	X	X	X

Appendix 2: Reflections on Participant Observation

What is happening?⁴⁰	There is a shift in the ordering of food security policy and governance at the global level, spurred on by a food price crisis, a global economic crisis, restricted resources and climate change.
Who is involved?	States remain a key player but previously tertiary actors have moved into the periphery: BRICS countries and civil society actors have claimed political space and power, both officially (e.g. G20, CSM) and unofficially.
What counts as competency?	Capacity to comment on or react to a changing policy environment; experience (lived experience of developing countries; donor experience)
Who are the experts?	This is changing but it shifts depending on the context. Within the CSM, experts are leaders who have been involved in the process. With the CFS, the HLPE is meant to be the expert voice but it is often undermined.
Who is excluded from action and why?	This again depends on the context.
How is the boundary on participation maintained?	This boundary is flexible. At times I am observing, at other times I am participating to a degree where the capacity for observation and time for adequate reflection and analysis is lost. What is gained however is greater trust and consequently access.
Who contests what counts as participation and what is the consequence of resistance?	Supporting the work of the mechanism and participating in meetings counts as participation. Throughout my field work I have been very deliberate in not contributing to dialogue, decision making processes and other public meetings. I work (note take, report writing, interpretation) and sit in on meetings but I do not participate in the official debates. A large part of this is legitimacy: I do not represent a constituency and therefore have no authority to speak.
Who are the novices?	The people who attend just one meeting, who lack the knowledge and experience to actively participate. They are generally quickly identified by their outsider actions (not conforming to the working style that has developed within the CFS) or by asking questions that have become common sense to other participants.
What are the spatial-temporal arrangements/limits of the interactions?	These are varied depending on the context. With a shift towards greater focus on inter-sessional activities, the CFS is meeting more frequently. Meetings happen in Rome (there were regional FAO meetings but I did not attend) and they are usually very busy. There are opportunities to meet with people and conduct formal and informal interviews. Given that the meetings often take place over meal times they tend to be more informal, semi-structured, purposive and not recorded. I do not have access to the majority of the interactions that take place in and around the CFS (e.g., Bureau and Advisory Group, meetings between country representatives, friends of the chair meetings). The other challenge is finding time to meet with people. The meetings often take place during meal times or breaks and are consequently rather informal in nature (questions over coffee, or walking from one meeting room to another). Due to my funding, I was usually able to attend the relevant in-person meetings of the CFS. Within the CSM, communication happens mostly asynchronously, through email correspondence and usually in the three languages of the CSM. Most of the documents are posted at www.csm4cfs.org or are passed to me by participants. I have access to all CSM meetings and working groups but when the Coordination Committee meets in camera, as they did in advance of the 37 th Session, I do not have access.

40 These questions have been adapted from Evans 2012.

How are social relations organized and structured through this practice?	The CFS is formed of a rather small group of active people. Over the last two years, the relationships have strengthened as trust has been built. However, social relations between myself and NGOs, social movements, technicians, diplomats and ambassadors differ greatly. In all contexts, issues of ideology, language, class, race, age, and gender all come into play, just in different, often opposite ways. Positive social relations with social movements and NGOs have been cultivated slowly. There is sometimes apprehension about having a researcher in the midst. A social hierarchy exists within the CSM and while those who can be labelled leaders of the CSM see me as a researcher, many others see me as part of the secretariat, or as part of the CSM more broadly. I am generally accepted as “part of the CSM” and am included in their meals and social events, as well as in planning and strategy sessions. To date, relations with technicians have been formal. They are the experts and I am a researcher interested in answers. The diplomats have all been receptive and supportive of my research. With some, cordial relations have developed and they have included me in social activities, such as meals. They seem to be very happy that someone is interested in the work they do, especially from a policy perspective. These interviews tend to begin formally but shift quickly to rather informal interviews, especially in cases where follow-up interviews take place. Some countries were not receptive.
What cultural values and ethical dispositions emerge from the practice?	The cultural values vary greatly. Indeed it has proved easier fostering relations on geographic lines than along actor categories. The values that inform the research are my own and the ethics are made up, in part, by the proposal that was approved by the Ethics Committee, but codes of ethics that the people I engage with expect and uphold differs greatly. This can be a challenge to navigate.
What are the tensions and conflicts?	Many, including gender, class, race, age, lack of trust, language barriers.
How can I take part?	In various ways. To date, my participation has ranged from sitting and listening, to note taking, report writing, facilitating, translating, interpreting, running errands, organizing, interviewing for a short film, and providing technical support on specific issues.

Appendix 3: Participant Profiles

Summary of interviews by region and role


The following tables breaks down the interviews by region and by the type of actor. In total 15 interviews were conducted. While each was included in the analysis, only nine were specifically referenced in the text.

Region		Type	
EU	6	CSO	3
BRIC	2	Negotiator/ diplomat	10
Asia	1	Technical	1
Latin America	2	Financial Institutions	1
North America	1		
Africa	2		
Global	1		


Titles attributed to research participants

Reference in Thesis	
African famers' leader	Leading human rights campaigner
Coordination Committee member from the Global South	Member for the IPC
Constituent focal point on the CSM Coordination Committee	Member of the HLPE Steering Committee
EU delegate	Negotiator from a G20 country
EU-based food security analyst	Participant from a prominent rural network
FAO expert	Representative from a major international NGO based in Rome
FAO representative	Representative of a large International NGO active in the CSM since the beginning
FAO technical staff person	Representative of an African-based NGO
French civil servant	Social movement actor involved in the CSM
International Farmers' Social Movement Leader	Social movement coordinator
Key actor in the CSM	UK diplomat
Leader of a European farming social movement	UN expert on food security
<i>In total, attributable quotations were taken from 24 individuals: nine that participated in interviews and 13 selected from field work notes.</i>	


Breakdown of positions held by informants used in the thesis (n = 24)



Regional breakdown of informants used in the thesis (n =24)



Gender breakdown of informants used in thesis (n = 24)



Appendix 4: Participant Information Form

Jessica Research Student	Duncan
 CITY UNIVERSITY LONDON	Centre for Food Policy (Room C 307) School of Community and Health Sciences City University London Northampton Square London EC1V 0HB
I am writing to invite you to take part in an interview for a study entitled <i>Civil Society Participation in Global Food Security Governance</i>, carried out by Jessica Duncan as part of her PhD Research at City University's Centre for Food Policy. Project Title: Civil Society Participation in Global Food Security Governance: Tensions, challenges and opportunities Principal Investigators: Ms Jessica Duncan, Dr David Barling Why are you being asked for an interview? We are asking to interview you because we are interested in discussing with stakeholders issues relating to civil society engagement in global food security governance. Purpose of the interview As part of my PhD research, I am interested in exploring the role of civil society organizations and NGOs in the reformed architecture of global food security policy in the wake of the 2007-8 food price crisis. Procedure If you agree please reply to this letter by sending an email to Jessica Duncan. She will follow up to arrange an interview. Interviews can take place face-to-face or by telephone or Skype. Interviews will be arranged at a time that is suitable for you. It is likely that the interview will take no longer than one hour and it will be recorded. Your participation is entirely voluntary and you may withdraw at any time should you change your mind. Potential Benefits This will be an opportunity for you to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the current structure of global food security governance and world food security policy more specifically, and to share your concerns, ideas, insights and best practices. Confidentiality Every effort will be made to ensure confidentiality. No information that discloses your identity will be used in any project outputs (reports, articles, presentations) and all comments made in the interview will be anonymous. The recorded data will be stored as an mp3 file and will be transcribed by the researcher. We will hold the audio data for ten years after which the transcribed data will be destroyed. Once interviews are transcribed they will be anonymous, as all identifiable information will be removed. University Complaints Procedure If there is an aspect of the interview that concerns you, you may make a complaint. City University has established a complaints procedure via the Secretary to the Research Ethics Committee. To complain about the study, you need to phone 020 7040 3040. You can then ask to speak to the Secretary of the Ethics Committee and inform them that the name of the project is: Civil Society Participation in Global Food Security Governance.	

You could also write to the Secretary at:
Anna Ramberg
Secretary to Senate Ethical Committee
CRIDO E214
City University, Northampton Square
London, EC1V 0HB
Email: anna.ramberg.1@city.ac.uk

If you have any questions about the interview or the evaluation in general, please contact Jessica Duncan at jessicabrownduncan@gmail.com or +44 (0) 75 86 26 23 29

Appendix 5: Participant Consent Form



**CITY UNIVERSITY
LONDON**

Title: Civil Society Participation in Global Food Security Governance: Tensions, challenges and opportunities

Principal Investigators: Ms Jessica Duncan, Dr David Barling

☐ I agree to take part in the above City University research project. I have read the Information Sheet and my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.

☐ I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary, and that I can choose not to participate in part or all of the project and can withdraw at any stage without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way.

I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to:

- ☐ Be interviewed by the researcher
- ☐ Allow the interview to be audio taped

Data Protection

This information will be held and processed only for the purposes of the project.

I understand that any information I provide is confidential. I agree for the interview to be tape recorded and I agree for verbatim quotations from the interview to be used in presentations, reports and other publications on the understanding that no information that could identify me will be presented or published in any reports on the project, or to any other party.

I have received a copy of this consent form for my own records.

_____ Name of Participant	_____ Signature	_____ Date
_____ Name of Interviewer	_____ Signature	_____ Date

Appendix 6: Principles and guidelines related to investment in agriculture

Name	When	Who	What	Link
6 Basic Principles on the Purchase and Leasing of Large Areas of Land in Developing Countries	August 2009	German Government (BMZ)	To make use of the possible opportunities and potential, it is important when framing and implementing investments in land to adhere to the following six basic principles : 1. Participation and transparency in negotiations 2. Recognition of existing rights 3. Compensation 4. Fair sharing in the benefits of the investment 5. Sustainability 6. The human right to food	http://www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/strategies/diskurs015en.pdf
5 Elements for a code of conduct for foreign land acquisition	April 2009	International Food Policy Research Institute (Joachim von Braun and Ruth Meinzen-Dick)	Key elements of a code of conduct for foreign land acquisition include the following: 1. Transparency in negotiations 2. Respect for existing land rights 3. Sharing of benefits 4. Environmental sustainability 5. Adherence to national trade policies	http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/bp013all.pdf
Equator Principles (III)	2012	76 adopting financial institutions (73 Equator Principles Financial Institutions and 3 Associates)	Required impact assessments on any investment project beyond 10 million USD by participating financial institutions in advance of project. Financial industry benchmark for determining, assessing and managing social & environmental risk in project financing. While the Equator Principles are not intended to be applied retroactively, EPFIs will apply them to the expansion or upgrade of an existing Project where changes in scale or scope may create significant environmental and/or social impacts, or significantly change the nature or degree of an existing impact. Principle 1: Review and Categorisation Principle 2: Environmental and Social Assessment Principle 3: Applicable Environmental and Social	http://www.equator-principles.com/

			Standards Principle 4: Environmental and Social Management System and Action Plan Principle 5: Stakeholder Engagement Principle 6: Grievance Mechanism Principle 7: Independent Review Principle 8: Covenants Principle 9: Independent Monitoring and Reporting Principle 10: Reporting and Transparency	
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative Principles	Since 2003	Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative	A global standard ensuring transparency of payments from natural resources The EITI Principles provide the cornerstone of the initiative. They are: 1. We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create negative economic and social impacts. 2. We affirm that management of natural resource wealth for the benefit of a country's citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised in the interests of their national development. 3. We recognise that the benefits of resource extraction occur as revenue streams over many years and can be highly price dependent. 4. We recognise that a public understanding of government revenues and expenditure over time could help public debate and inform choice of appropriate and realistic options for sustainable development. 5. We underline the importance of transparency by governments and companies in the extractive industries and the need to enhance public financial management	http://eiti.org/eiti/principles

			and accountability. 6. We recognise that achievement of greater transparency must be set in the context of respect for contracts and laws. 7. We recognise the enhanced environment for domestic and foreign direct investment that financial transparency may bring. 8. We believe in the principle and practice of accountability by government to all citizens for the stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditure. 9. We are committed to encouraging high standards of transparency and accountability in public life, government operations and in business, 10. We believe that a broadly consistent and workable approach to the disclosure of payments and revenues is required, which is simple to undertake and to use. 11. We believe that payments' disclosure in a given country should involve all extractive industry companies operating in that country. 12. In seeking solutions, we believe that all stakeholders have important and relevant contributions to make – including governments and their agencies, extractive industry companies, service companies, multilateral organizations, financial organizations, investors, and non-governmental organizations.	
Large-Scale Land Acquisition and Responsible Agricultural Investment: For an approach respecting Human Rights, Food Security and	June 2010	Government of France	France strongly believes that the main stake is to optimise the contribution of land investments to the achievement of food security, secured land tenure, jobs preservation and creation and sustainable development. It is governed by 2 principles: 1. respecting land users rights, formal or informal (customary or traditional), individual or collective, is a prerequisite for any investment; and	http://www.agter.asso.fr/IMG/pdf/french-position-paper.pdf

Sustainable Development			2. ensuring that private use is compatible with general interests, insofar as food security shall be considered as a global public good. These basic principles apply throughout the 3 pillars of the Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition: knowledge and expertise; governance and policy coherence; funding and implementation.	
Minimum Human Rights Principles Applicable to Large-Scale Land Acquisitions or Lease	June 2009	Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (Olivier De Schutter)	1. The negotiations leading to investment agreements should be conducted in full transparency, and with the participation of the local communities whose access to land and other productive resources may be affected as a result of the arrival of an investor. 2. Any shifts in land use can only take place with the free, prior and informed consent of the local communities concerned. 3. States should adopt legislation protecting these and specifying in detail the conditions according to which shifts in land use, or evictions, may take place, as well as the procedure to be followed. 4. Investment agreement revenues should be used for the benefit of the local population. 5. Host States and investors should establish and promote farming systems that are sufficiently labour intensive to contribute to employment creation. 6. Host States and investors should cooperate in identifying ways to ensure that the modes of agricultural production shall respect the environment, and shall not accelerate climate change, soil depletion, and the exhaustion of freshwater reserves. 7. The obligations of the investor be defined in clear terms, and that these obligations are enforceable, for instance by the inclusion of pre-defined sanctions in cases of non-compliance.	http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/BriefingNotelandgrab.pdf

			8. Investment agreements should include a clause providing that a certain minimum percentage of the crops produced shall be sold on local markets, and that this percentage may increase, in proportions to be agreed in advance, if the prices of food commodities on international markets reach certain levels. 9. Impact assessments should be conducted prior to the completion of the negotiations, in order to highlight the consequences of the investment on the enjoyment of the right to food. 10. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. 11. Agricultural waged workers should be provided with adequate protection and their fundamental human and labour rights should be stipulated in legislation and enforced in practice, consistent with the applicable ILO instruments	
Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respect Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (PRAI)	January 2010	Inter-Agency Working Group: FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD and the World Bank	The seven Principles cover all types of investment in agriculture, including between principal investors and contract farmers. Principle 1: Existing rights to land and associated natural resources are recognized and respected. Principle 2: Investments do not jeopardize food security but rather strengthen it. Principle 3: Processes relating to investment in agriculture are transparent, monitored, and ensure accountability by all stakeholders, within a proper business, legal, and regulatory environment. Principle 4: All those materially affected are consulted, and	http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/G-20/PRAI.aspx

			agreements from consultations are recorded and enforced. Principle 5: Investors ensure that projects respect the rule of law, reflect industry best practice, are viable economically, and result in durable shared value. Principle 6: Investments generate desirable social and distributional impacts and do not increase vulnerability. Principle 7: Environmental impacts of a project are quantified and measures taken to encourage sustainable resource use, while minimizing the risk/magnitude of negative impacts and mitigating them.	
Promoting responsible international investment in agriculture	September 2009	Japanese government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs): Promoting Responsible International Investment in Agriculture: Roundtable concurrent with the 64th United Nations General Assembly	Participants discussed the following key tenets and reached a broad agreement that they could be a basis for the principles around which the international framework is designed. The overwhelming view was that the principles should be legally non-binding but have a flexible mechanism for monitoring, taking into account country-specific circumstances. 1. Land and Resource Rights 2. Food Security 3. Transparency, Good Governance and Enabling Environment Consultation and Participation 4. Economic viability and responsible agro-enterprise investing 5. Social Sustainability 6. Environmental Sustainability	http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fishery/agriculture/summary0909.pdf
Santiago Principles (Generally Accepted Principles and Practices)	October 2008	International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds	Set of 24 voluntary guidelines that assign "best practices" for the operations of Sovereign Wealth Funds	http://www.iwgswf.org/pubs/gaplist.htm
Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realisation of the	November 2004	FAO	1. Democracy, good governance, human rights and the rule of law 2. Economic development policies 3. Strategies	http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/009/y9825e/y9825e00.htm

Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security			4. Market systems 5. Institutions 6. Stakeholders 7. Legal framework 8. Access to resources and assets 9. Food safety and consumer protection 10. Nutrition 11. Education and awareness raising 12. National financial resources 13. Support for vulnerable groups 14. Safety nets 15. International food aid 16. Natural and human-made disasters 17. Monitoring, indicators and benchmarks 18. National human rights institutions 19. International dimension	
Voluntary s for Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the context of national food security	May 2012	CFS	The Voluntary s on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security promote secure tenure rights and equitable access to land, fisheries and forests as a means of eradicating hunger and poverty, supporting sustainable development and enhancing the environment.	http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/cfs/Docs1112/VG/VG_Final_EN_May_2012.pdf
Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investments	on-going	CFS	CFS has approved an inclusive consultation process to develop and ensure broad ownership of principles for responsible agricultural investments. The expected outcome is a set of principles to promote investments in agriculture that contribute to food security and nutrition and to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security.	http://www.fao.org/cfs/cfs-home/resaginv/en/

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