



City Research Online

City St George's, University of London

Citation: Hargreaves, J., Branco, C. & Izamoje, D. (2024). Woolf Diversity Study 2024. Cambridge, UK: Woolf Institute.

This is the published version of the paper.

This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. To cite this item please consult the publisher's version.

Permanent repository link: <https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/34866/>

Copyright and Reuse: Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, unless otherwise indicated, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. For full details of reuse please refer to [City Research Online policy](#).

WOOLF **DIVERSITY** **STUDY** **2024**

Julian Hargreaves, Carla Branco and David Izamoje

THE WOOLF INSTITUTE

Since 1998, the Woolf Institute has been working towards building tolerance and fostering understanding between religion and society through education. The Institute conducts rigorous academic work to emphasise and bring about positive interactions between the Abrahamic faiths and support the public understanding of the concerns and needs of members of the Abrahamic faiths in secular Britain. By answering practical and theoretical questions concerning aspects of religious identity, culture and practice, the Institute translates research into policy recommendations and public engagement that improve relations between those of different beliefs.



A NOTE FROM WOOLF INSTITUTE'S CHAIR OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES

It is now 25 years since the founding of the Woolf Institute in Cambridge, committed to the task of public education about the relation between religion and society. During that time debates around British identity, diversity and immigration have routinely surfaced and have been reshaped by events. Extreme disturbances such as 9/11 in New York and 7/7 in London and the current crisis in the Middle East each threaten to destabilise the sometimes delicate relations between faith and ethnic minority communities. Yet in spite of repeated challenges to cohesion, British society has demonstrated a degree of resilience and resistance to extremism.

This is the background against which this current study seeks to offer a carefully researched snapshot of contemporary attitudes, priorities and concerns with a view to shaping the policy agenda at the local, regional and national level. The study is based on a nationally representative sample of 10,000 adults living in England and Wales using the most sophisticated statistical techniques and including a wide range of ethnic and faith backgrounds.

It explores current public attitudes to diversity, to change, to levels of trust at local level, to local engagement and to local priorities. It notes that while public attitudes to diversity have become slightly more positive since 2020, attitudes towards immigrants have become slightly more negative. Yet it clearly also indicates that peoples' priorities are in the main much more focused around health, crime and the cost of living than on relations at local level between faith groups.

The former Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks wrote in his book "The Dignity of Difference": "The question is; to what extent will we see our present interconnectedness as a threat or a challenge?" That is a question for faith leaders, for policy makers and for every citizen. This study is offered as a contribution to finding the answers.

The Rt Revd Tim Stevens CBE

FOREWORD

By Professor Miles Hewstone

This latest report underlines that the Woolf Diversity Study is a robust source of local, regional and national data on attitudes to diversity, and now also on related issues such as local trust, engagement and priorities. The findings are, moreover, presented in a refreshingly clear manner.

This report is especially welcome because it does not attempt to portray a uniquely positive, or negative, picture of diversity in Britain, but accepts that the real picture is more complicated. Notably, the survey on which this report is based did not examine only attitudes towards diversity, but also attitudes towards change, and especially to the speed with which diversity has increased in some places. This focus on the speed of change is an especially valuable feature of the Woolf Diversity Study, and an aspect that has been missing from many previous analyses.

There are both “positives” and “negatives” in the fine detail. On the positive side, public attitudes towards ethnic and religious diversity have become more positive since 2019, and in most cases positive attitudes towards ethnic, national and religious diversity are held by more people than those who hold negative views. There is, moreover, a key difference between local communities perceived as being diverse or not. Attitudes towards migrants within local communities perceived as diverse have also become more positive since 2019.

Less positively, or even negatively, this report provides clear evidence that the pace at which many respondents perceive that diversity has occurred is faster than they are comfortable with. More than half the respondents (57%) agreed that the number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years, while substantial minorities agreed that ethnic diversity and religious diversity in Britain have increased too quickly in the past 10 years (47% and 36%, respectively). It is to their credit that the authors of this report do not apply a simplistic analysis and note the underlying ambivalence of some patterns of responding. One can be in favour of diversity, while still feel its pace has been too fast, without being a racist. Thus 40% of those who agreed that religious diversity is good for Britain also think that the pace of change is too fast. And this is not a simple case of White British people opposing

diversity. When compared to non-religious respondents, Muslim respondents were 72% more likely to have negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in Britain. Whereas respondents who self-described as “Other” ethnicity were slightly more than twice as likely as White respondents to have negative attitudes towards future migrants in their local communities.

Thus, this report draws our attention to what it refers to as the “inconvenient truth”, that, stated baldly, negative attitudes towards diversity and change are now widespread throughout British society (that is, specifically, public attitudes towards, on the one hand, ethnic and religious minorities, and, on the other, the number of migrants in Britain, and especially the rates at which all are increasing, are very mixed). Digging deeper, this report provides illuminating insights into what it refers to as “local trust”, based on responses to a question asking whether they know anyone locally well enough to ask for a favour. Analysis reveals that, controlling for ethnic and religious demographics, among people living in England and Wales, just over half (52%) respond that they know no-one from an ethnic background different to their own, and just under half (45%) that they know no-one from a religious background different to their own.

Finally, this report goes some way beyond “taking the temperature”. Although it does not argue that “the patient” is incurably sick, it does alert the reader to a series of possible future threats to the body (politic). Past treatments, in the form of policies and practices promoted to strengthen social cohesion and intergroup trust, have not stabilised the patient, leaving it at risk of future infections in the form of extreme political groups who seek to exploit the situation at hand for their own narrow interests. To this end, the Woolf Diversity Study report contains a series of recommendations, including interventions to boost social capital by, for example, listening to what respondents have to say about their local priorities, and promoting civic and social engagement. Both findings and recommendations make essential reading.

Miles Hewstone

Emeritus Professor of Psychology,
Oxford University

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	6
INTRODUCTION	14
DIVERSITY	18
CHANGE	28
LOCAL TRUST	40
LOCAL PRIORITIES	52
LOCAL ENGAGEMENT	62
REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	68
LITERATURE REVIEW	80
TABLES	94
METHODS	160
REFERENCES	166

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

In September 2022, the Woolf Institute surveyed over 10,000 adults living in England and Wales (n=10,296). Our objectives are to build a better understanding of the following aspects of current British society:

- Current public attitudes towards ethnic, national¹ and religious **diversity**;
- Current public attitudes towards **change** (i.e. the changing nature of diversity in British society);
- Current levels of trust in local areas and between people from different ethnic and faith backgrounds (referred to here as “**local trust**”);
- Aspects of local life (facilities, services, assets, opportunities and conditions) that are considered important in making somewhere a good place to live and those that are considered to most need improvement (taken together to represent “**local priorities**”);
- Activities engaged with by people in their local area (referred to here and elsewhere as “**local engagement**”).



DIVERSITY

Our survey asked (separately) whether ethnic, national and religious diversity is good for British society and good for the respondent's local community (if diverse) or would be good for it (if non-diverse).

KEY FINDINGS

- Public attitudes towards ethnic and religious diversity have become slightly more positive since 2020.
- Public attitudes towards migrants have become slightly more negative since 2020.
- Most people still agree that ethnic diversity is good for British society.
- A minority agree that migrants and religious diversity are good for British society or local communities although many more agree than disagree.
- People in ethnically, nationally and religiously diverse communities tend to have more positive attitudes towards these types of diversity than people in non-diverse communities.
- People who are older and those with lower educational attainment are among those most likely to have negative views towards ethnic, national and religious diversity.

KEY STATISTICAL FINDINGS

- Most respondents (56%) agreed that ethnic diversity is good for British society.
- Fewer agreed that migrants and religious diversity are good for British society (44% for each).
- For those living in diverse local areas, two thirds agreed that ethnic diversity and religious diversity are good for their local community (67% and 64% respectively).
- Fewer, although still a majority, agreed that migrants are good for their local community (52%).
- Attitudes towards diversity appear to be slightly more positive than when last published in 2020.²

Comparisons between first and second Woolf Diversity Study

Fig. 1: Attitudes towards diversity in British society




Fig. 2: Attitudes towards diversity in respondents' local communities (diverse communities)





Fig. 3: Attitudes towards diversity in respondents' local communities (non-diverse communities)



¹Public attitudes towards “national diversity” were collected using attitudes towards international migrants (i.e. people living in the UK who were born outside it).

²Some differences were statistically significant, others were not.

CHANGE

Our survey asked (separately) whether ethnic, national and religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years. Those in diverse local areas were asked if diversity had increased too quickly. Those in non-diverse areas were asked if it is likely to increase too quickly.

KEY FINDINGS

- Public attitudes towards increases in ethnic, national and religious diversity in Britain have become more positive since 2020.
- Some public attitudes towards increases in diversity in local communities have improved since 2020. Others remain the same.
- Despite more positive attitudes overall since 2020, most people in England and Wales still agree that the number of migrants has increased too quickly in the past 10 years.
- While in most cases, less than a majority of people agree that diversity in local communities has increased too quickly in the past 10 years, many more agree than disagree.
- People with lower educational attainment are among those most likely to have negative views towards diversity.
- In some cases, people from minority ethnic and religious backgrounds are more likely than White and non-religious people to report negative attitudes towards increases in ethnic, national and religious diversity across Britain as a whole and within their local communities.

KEY STATISTICAL FINDINGS

- In terms of both religious and ethnic diversity in Britain, a minority agreed that it has changed too fast in the past 10 years (36% and 47%, respectively).
- A majority (57%) agreed that the number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly during the same time.
- A minority of those living in diverse local areas agreed that ethnic, national and religious diversity in their local community had increased too quickly (41%, 48% and 44% for each type of diversity, respectively).
- Attitudes towards change appear to be slightly more positive than when last published in 2020.³

Comparisons between first and second Woolf Diversity Study

Fig. 4: Attitudes towards changes in diversity in Britain




Fig. 5: Attitudes towards changes in diversity in respondents' local communities (diverse communities)





Fig. 6: Attitudes towards changes in diversity in respondents' local communities (non-diverse communities)



LOCAL TRUST

Our survey asked respondents how many people in their local area are known well enough to ask for a favour. Respondents were then asked (separately) how many of these come from ethnic and faith backgrounds different to their own.⁴

KEY FINDINGS

- One in 10 people in England and Wales have no-one in their local area known well enough to ask for a favour.
- One in 10 people in England and Wales have 20 or more people in their local area known well enough to ask for a favour.
- Two thirds (64%) of people living in England and Wales know between one and nine people well enough to ask for a favour.
- Most people (52%) living in England and Wales know no-one locally well enough to ask for a favour who is from an ethnic background different to their own.
- Just under half of people (45%) living in England and Wales know no-one locally well enough to ask for a favour who is from a religious background different to their own.
- Non-White people are more likely than White people to know fewer than two local people to ask for a favour, as are older people.
- Unsurprisingly perhaps, the likelihood of knowing more than ten local people to ask for a favour is higher among those who are socially active in their local area.
- When compared to non-religious people, the likelihood of knowing ten or more people to ask for a favour is highest within Hindu communities.
- The five local authorities in England and Wales with the highest mean number of people known locally well enough to ask for a favour are mainly Welsh: Ceredigion (Wales), Gwynedd (Wales), Malvern Hills (West England), Isle of Anglesey (Wales) and City of London.

KEY STATISTICAL FINDINGS

- The average (mean) number of people known well enough to ask for a favour was six.
- Respondents from minority ethnic backgrounds were more likely to know no-one or only one local person.
- The average (mean) number of people from a different ethnic background known well enough to ask for a favour was just under two (1.74). For most respondents (52%), the average was zero.
- The data suggest people in the North East and North West of England are less likely to know two or more people from different ethnic groups.
- The average (mean) number of people from a different faith background known well enough to ask for a favour was two (1.74). For nearly half the respondents (45%), the average was one.

³ As for the Diversity findings, some differences were statistically significant, others were not.

⁴ In our full report, we examine the various factors that determine the likelihood of having more or fewer numbers of local people to trust (including local trust across ethnic and religious divides).

LOCAL PRIORITIES

Our survey asked respondents to report the level (where 1=lowest and 5=highest) of importance of the following local assets in making somewhere a good place to live and then the level (where 1=lowest and 5=highest) to which each needed improvement in their local area:⁵

- | | | |
|---------------------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| ➤ Access to nature | ➤ Good relations between ethnic groups | ➤ Level of traffic congestion |
| ➤ Activities for teenagers | ➤ Good relations between faith groups | ➤ Parks and open spaces |
| ➤ Affordable housing | ➤ Health services | ➤ Public transport |
| ➤ Clean streets | ➤ Job prospects | ➤ Road and pavement repairs |
| ➤ Community activities | ➤ Level of crime | ➤ Shopping facilities |
| ➤ Education provision | ➤ Level of pollution | ➤ Sports and leisure facilities |
| ➤ Facilities for young children | | ➤ Wage levels and cost of living |



⁵ In our full report, we use various statistical methods (factor analysis and correlation statistics) to explore the relationships between groups of assets and other socio-economic factors such as income, levels of child poverty and multiple deprivation.

KEY FINDINGS

- When it comes to local priorities, personal and family security comes before community and leisure.
- According to our survey, local factors that are most important in making somewhere a good place to live are: health services, the level of crime, and wage levels and the cost of living (taken together).
- Local factors that are least important in making somewhere a good place to live are: good relations between faith groups, community activities, and sports and leisure facilities.
- According to our survey, local factors that are considered most in need of improvement are: wage levels and the cost of living, health services, and affordable housing.
- Local factors that are considered least in need of improvement are: good relations between faith groups, good relations between ethnic groups, and access to nature.
- Based on these findings, local priorities (factors that are considered important and needing improvement) are: affordable housing, clean streets, health services, job prospects, level of crime, public transport, road and pavement repairs, and wage levels and the cost of living.
- In-depth analysis revealed strong positive correlations between child poverty and viewing local assets, facilities and conditions as being in need of improvement.

KEY STATISTICAL FINDINGS

Most important in making somewhere a good place to live:

- Health services (average score=4.47)
- Level of crime (average score=4.44)
- Wage levels and cost of living (average score=4.31)

Least important in making somewhere a good place to live:

- Good relations between faith groups (average score=3.75)
- Community activities (average score=3.77)
- Sports and leisure facilities (average score=3.86)

Most in need of improvement:

- Wage levels and cost of living (average score=3.98)
- Health services (average score=3.88)
- Affordable housing (average score=3.87)

Least in need of improvement:

- Good relations between faith groups (average score=3.08)
- Good relations between ethnic groups (average score=3.13)
- Access to nature (average score=3.16)

LOCAL PRIORITIES (importance and improvement considered together)

Highest (more important, more in need of improvement)

- Affordable housing
- Clean streets
- Health services
- Job prospects
- Level of crime
- Public transport
- Road and pavement repairs
- Wage levels and cost of living

Lowest (less important, less in need of improvement)

- Community activities
- Good relations between ethnic groups
- Good relations between faith groups
- Sports and leisure facilities

LOCAL ENGAGEMENT

Our survey asked how often, if at all, respondents engaged with the following (in alphabetical order):

- A local branch of a national political party
- A local campaign group
- A local charity
- A local environmental/nature group
- A local faith-based organisation
- A local history group
- A local residents' group
- A local social media group
- A local sports club
- Other local hobby/activity group/helping people

KEY FINDINGS

- At least seven in 10 people never participate in any of the local activities or with any of the groups listed in our survey.
- The most popular local activity in our survey was engaging with a social media group.
- Engaging with a charity and a sports club were the second and third most popular local activities.
- Compared to people who are non-religious, Muslim people are the most likely to engage with local charities.
- In fact, being Muslim is the single strongest predictor of local charity engagement in our dataset.
- Compared to people who are non-religious, Buddhist, Jewish and Muslim people are all more likely to engage with a local social media group.
- Compared to White people, Black people are more likely to participate in local charity work.
- People who know more than one other person from a different ethnic or religious background well enough to ask for a favour are more engaged with local charities and local social media groups.
- People aged between 18 and 24 are the most likely to engage with a local charity. People aged 44 or under are more likely to engage with a local social media group.

KEY STATISTICAL FINDINGS

The most popular local activities were:

- 30% engaged with a local social media group; 16% weekly or more often.
- 23% engaged with a local charity; 7% weekly or more often.
- 20% engage with a local sports club; 13% weekly or more often.

For engagement with a local charity:

- Being Muslim doubles the likelihood of engagement when compared to respondents who reported having no religion.
- Christian and Jewish were 58% and 76% more likely to engage than respondents with no religious affiliation.

For engagement with a local social media group:

- Jewish respondents were 64% more likely than those of no religion to engage.

METHODS

- A nationally representative sample of over 10,000 adults living in England and Wales (n=10,296).
- Use of online polling methods.
- Use of various statistical techniques including standard bivariate tests, logistic regression modelling and multilevel regression with post-stratification.
- Inclusion of respondents from a range of faith backgrounds (Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh, Other religion and None) and from a standard range of ethnic backgrounds (Asian, Black, Mixed, Other and White).



RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 1: The use of granular data capable of building a picture of how ethnic, national and religious diversity may be changing over time is crucial to our understanding of social cohesion in the UK. Policymakers, practitioners and academics should use and support the use of large-scale datasets, and methods such as MRP,⁶ to measure British public attitudes concerning diversity and change in order to track social cohesion in the UK at the local, regional and national levels.

RECOMMENDATION 2: Low levels of trust between ethnic and religious groups should be regarded as an urgent wake-up call for national policymakers. Policymakers need to better understand the factors that facilitate and impede local trust between ethnic and religious groups as a matter of urgency. We recommend a more evidence-based “what works” approach to better understand how to increase levels of local trust between ethnic and religious groups across England and Wales.

RECOMMENDATION 3: Levels of local trust between ethnic and religious groups are low and represent a creeping social cohesion challenge. Policymakers and practitioners should commit more resources to the design, implementation and testing of interventions that boost connections and trust between people of different backgrounds in order to strengthen local trust and social capital. Policymakers and practitioners should take into account positive contribution of community and faith leaders.

RECOMMENDATION 4: There is a need for policymakers and practitioners to better understand and support local communities where changes in ethnic, national or religious diversity are underway or expected. Policymakers should take a more evidence-based, “what works” approach to social cohesion. This could include taking knowledge from the evaluation of policies and interventions in more diverse local authorities and applying it to the design of future programmes in local communities where demographic change is underway or anticipated.

RECOMMENDATION 5: There is a discrepancy between what local communities want and what policy researchers think they want. Policymakers and practitioners should measure local needs and priorities rather than assume them.

RECOMMENDATIONS 6: Social media is the low hanging fruit of local social cohesion policymaking! When policymakers consider concepts such as belonging and pride of place, they should more often prioritise social media. Policymakers should look at social media as a key tool for boosting civic engagement and improving social cohesion, local trust and social capital.

RECOMMENDATION 7: Popular measures of trust fail to map trusting relations within local communities. Policymakers and practitioners should adopt a more objective measure of local trust, such as the one used in the Woolf Diversity Study, to establish a more concrete baseline measurement against which future policy interventions can be evaluated.

⁶ Multilevel regression with post-stratification.

INTRODUCTION

At the heart of the Woolf Diversity Study is a simple question: **What do we think of our neighbours and what do they think of us?** To answer this question, the Woolf Institute – an interfaith research institute based in Cambridge – undertook a survey designed to explore ethnic, national and religious diversity and the changing nature of British society and local communities.¹ We surveyed over 10,000 adults living in England and Wales using online polling methods and a nationally representative sample (see **Table 1** in the Appendix for a demographic breakdown of respondents). The research presented in this report and the work undertaken to support it were conducted by a team led by the Woolf Institute. Special thanks goes to them and to all those who took the time to complete our survey. Without you all, we would have no data, no analysis and no conclusions!

Back in 2020, we published the Diversity Study of England and Wales 2020 (Hargreaves et al, 2020). Now known more simply as the Woolf Diversity Study, the aim then was to establish one of the UK's largest ever studies of diversity. This report represents the second stage of our project and the work undertaken for it in 2022 and 2023.

Last time, the data collection in 2019 and the report launch in 2020 straddled a tumultuous time for the UK: namely, of course, the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. This year, our research coincides with a time marked by economic challenges understood by many as a cost of living crisis. It also comes soon after the launch in February 2022 of the UK Government's Levelling Up strategy (Department of Levelling Up, Housing and Communities), an attempt to address geographic and economic inequalities across the UK. In part, the Woolf Diversity Study is an attempt at a robust but non-partisan response to the UK Government's recent efforts.

In order to deepen our understanding of diversity, we have returned to two key themes from our first report: public attitudes towards the benefits of ethnic, national and religious diversity, and public attitudes towards the pace with which diversity is increasing within British society and across local communities. To broaden our focus,

we have added new themes to this year's study (all of which are explained in more detail below): local trust, local priorities and local engagement.

One of our objectives in undertaking the Woolf Diversity Study is to support policymaking and to help provide some of the information needed to build more cohesive communities. In the UK, some of the most significant work in this area is done by the Government's Department of Levelling Up, Housing and Communities. The UK Government's Levelling Up strategy (Department of Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, 2022) seeks to address economic inequality across the UK including so-called "left behind places". Key to this mission is the identification and development of "social capital", described as the strength of communities, relationships and trust.

Whilst the Levelling Up strategy has not been without strong criticism, the Woolf Institute recognises the need to contribute towards a better understanding of British society at the local level in order to address some of the inequalities faced by minority communities, including the socio-economic disadvantages faced by minority faith communities in the UK.

¹We did not define "local" in precise terms on our survey questionnaire in order to accommodate a range of subjective understandings and applications of the term. People living in rural areas may view "local" as covering many square miles. Those in urban areas may see "local" as covering a few streets. We were keen to consider as many different perspectives as possible.

MAIN AIMS

Given all of the above, the main objectives of this year's Woolf Diversity Study are:

- To develop our understanding of public attitudes towards ethnic, national and religious diversity and the changing nature of British society and local communities.
- To track shifts in public attitudes towards ethnic, national and religious diversity and change over time.
- To increase our understanding of trust between local people with a focus on people from different ethnic and faith backgrounds.
- To increase our understanding of people's priorities in local areas across England and Wales.
- To increase our understanding of the types of local activities with which people engage most often.
- To place research on diversity within the wider context of the UK's current economic challenges.
- To increase our understanding of "levelling up", "social cohesion" and "social capital" and especially where these concepts relate to minority faith communities and ethnic groups.
- To give policymakers and practitioners the information and recommendations needed to serve and support people from all faiths and none.
- To provide the basis for improved trust between faith communities and more meaningful encounters between people of all faiths and none.
- To continue to develop the Woolf Institute as a trusted source of knowledge relating to religion, faith communities and related topics.

THEMES

To achieve our objectives, we are focusing on five main themes. Each is introduced below:

Diversity, Change, Local trust, Local priorities and Local engagement.

DIVERSITY: We asked questions concerning people's attitudes towards ethnic and religious diversity, and the presence of migrants (what might be thought of as "national diversity" given most are born outside the UK), in Britain as a whole and across more diverse and less diverse local communities.

CHANGE: To further explore these attitudes, we asked related questions concerning attitudes towards the pace of change and whether ethnic and religious diversity, and the number of migrants, have increased, or might increase, too quickly both locally and nationally in the UK.

LOCAL TRUST: Taking our cue from previous public health and social policy-related research, we explored local patterns of trust by inviting respondents to tell us how many people they know in their local area well enough to ask for a favour. To explore the role of diversity in shaping these patterns of local trust, we developed follow-up questions to establish how many of these trusted neighbours come from ethnic and faith backgrounds different to the respondents' own. Does local trust cut across ethnic and religious divides? Our findings may surprise you. We found far less intergroup trust than anticipated.

LOCAL PRIORITIES: With Levelling Up and "left behind places" in mind, we were keen to explore attitudes towards the things that are important in making somewhere a good place to live. Which local assets, facilities and services are considered most important by local people? And which are considered as being most in need of improvement? Considering importance and improvement together, we are able to identify aspects of local community life including relations between different ethnic and faith groups that might be considered by local authorities as local priorities.

LOCAL ENGAGEMENT: Politicians and policymakers often consider volunteering to be beneficial for local communities and the country at large. Volunteers and volunteering is mentioned throughout the Levelling Up white paper. But how many people actually spend their time doing local charity work? And how does this form of local engagement compare with other local activities such as being a member of a sports club or campaigning for a political issue? Are there faith communities or ethnic groups that are more or less likely to engage locally with charities and other local groups? Our survey questionnaire was designed to find out.

REVISITING THE DIVERSITY STUDY OF ENGLAND AND WALES 2020

The Woolf Institute published the Diversity Study of England and Wales 2020 (now known more simply as the Woolf Diversity Study). Data analysis published then revealed that public attitudes towards ethnic, national and religious diversity at both the national and local levels were generally positive. Majorities agreed that many aspects of diversity are good for British society: 53% agreed that ethnic diversity is good for it, compared to 17% who disagreed. In cases where there was no majority view, many more survey respondents agreed (41%) than disagreed (22%) that, for example, religious diversity is good for British society. Attitudes were also positive at the local level: 57% of those surveyed agreed that religious diversity is good for their local community, where as 15% disagreed. For each question regarding national and local diversity, around a quarter neither agreed nor disagreed: a reminder that these are sensitive topics and that not all are comfortable offering an opinion.

In contrast to positive overall attitudes towards diversity, our analysis from 2020 revealed that public attitudes towards changes in ethnic, national and religious diversity over the past ten years, at both the national and local level, were generally more negative.

Majorities agreed that diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past ten years. For example, 60% agreed that the number of migrants (our proxy for national diversity) has increased too quickly, compared to 17% who disagreed.

Again, where there were no majorities, many more agreed than disagreed. For example, 50% agreed that ethnic diversity in Britain has increased too quickly, compared to 21% who disagreed.

At the local level, attitudes were similarly negative: 54% of respondents agreed that the number of migrants in their local community has increased too quickly in the past ten years compared to 22% who disagreed.

All these survey questions were revisited for the latest iteration of the Woolf Diversity Study and we are now building the datasets required to track changes over time and against shifting local, regional, national and global patterns.

CONTEXT FOR THE PRESENT STUDY

Context for this year's Woolf Diversity Study is provided by several social, political and economic factors including recent national and international news events.

COST OF LIVING

Data collection for our first study was undertaken just a few weeks before the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic and the subsequent lockdowns. Since then, many British people, including many within minority communities, have been faced with economic challenges driven by inflation and its effects on increasing food prices, energy bills and housing costs. According to the Office for National Statistics (2023), the Consumer Price Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) rose by 6.3% in the 12 months to August 2023 although was down from 6.4% in July. Similarly, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose by 6.7% in the 12 months to August 2023, down from 6.8% in July. Although the worst may now be over – food prices rose by less in August 2023 than the year before and accommodation services where prices fell in August 2023 – inflation is still significantly higher than it was between 2015 and 2020. Economic hardship had political consequences with spiralling living costs and stagnated salaries underpinning a wave of strikes from public sector workers (BBC News, 2023b).

BOATS CROSSING THE CHANNEL

Incidents of migrants arriving on a small boat across the English Channel provide another important context for public attitudes towards diversity and change in 2022 and 2023. Channel crossings have risen sharply since 2019 from occasional to daily crossings. According to the Home Office (2023), there were 52,530 irregular migrants (including those crossing the Channel by small boat) detected entering the UK in the year ending June 2023, up 17% from the year ending June 2022. 85% (nearly 45,000) of these arrived via small boats.

FIRE BOMB ATTACK IN DOVER

2022 saw increases in the number of protests outside hotels housing asylum seekers. In November 2022, there was a firebomb attack on an immigration centre in Dover. The attacker died at the scene but was later said by police to have been motivated by terrorism ideology (BBC 2022a). Since then, there have been numerous protests near known migrant accommodation and concerns at the influence of far-right groups. There have also been accusations of complicity made against the UK Government for their alleged emboldening of more extreme protest groups (The Guardian, 2023, see also The Times, 2023).

UNREST IN LEICESTER

In September, there was tension and violence in Leicester between Hindu and Muslim communities (BBC News, 2022b). A series of police arrests followed. In the weeks that followed, numerous local and national debates emerged concerning the causes of the violence and the most appropriate longer-term solutions. Events in Leicester reminded us that social cohesion is both hard-won and fragile.

ISRAEL-GAZA

On 7 October, Hamas committed a terrorist attack killing more than 1,400, the vast majority of whom were civilian, and taking scores of hostages. Israel responded by launching military air strikes on Gaza killing thousands of mainly civilian people (BBC News, 2023b). The events as well as protests and commentary supporting each side in the Israel-Gaza war threaten relations between British Jewish and British Muslim communities. Further, leaving aside Jewish-Muslim relations, it is likely that unfolding events and responses to them in the UK will increase feelings of insecurity and marginalisation for some within both groups as well as providing justification for prejudice and

discrimination – including anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim discrimination – among some within the wider population. According to the Community Security Trust (a charity which helps Jewish people in the UK with security and antisemitism), incidents of antisemitism increased immediately and dramatically following Hamas' attack on Israel and Israel's military response. Tell Mama (a charity which helps Muslim people who have victimised by discrimination) reported an increase in Islamophobia during the same period. (Patel and Cafe, 2023c).

PRESENTING THE LATEST WOOLF DIVERSITY STUDY

We hope you will find the following analysis helpful. It is presented here in a style that we hope will suit all levels of expertise. The statistical methods and findings are described in plain English wherever possible with full results and more technical information reported in our Appendix and available on request. We hope to make our statistical data available for all. Please do contact the Woolf Institute for more information at enquiries@woolf.cam.ac.uk.

REFERENCES

- BBC News (2022a). *Dover migrant centre attack driven by right-wing ideology - police*. BBC News, 5 November. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-63526659>. Accessed on 17 October 2023.
- BBC News (2022b). *2022 Leicester unrest*. BBC News, n.d. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/c0m2wr69355t?page=2>. Accessed 17 October 2023.
- BBC News (2023a). *Strike dates: Who is striking and what pay do they want?* BBC News, 1 August. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-62134314>. Accessed 17 October 2023.
- BBC News (2023b). *Israel Gaza war: History of the conflict explained*. BBC News, 15 November. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/newsbeat-44124396>. Accessed on 15 November 2023.
- Patel, A. and Café, R. (2023c). *London hate crime: Worry over 'significant fracture' in communities*. BBC News, 23 November. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-67503062>. Accessed on 26 November.
- Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (2022). *Levelling Up the United Kingdom [white paper]*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/levelling-up-the-united-kingdom>. Accessed 22 November 2023.
- Home Office (2023). *Official Statistics: Irregular migration to the UK, year ending June 2023*: published 24 August 2023. [online]. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year-ending-june-2023>. Accessed 17 October 2023.
- McGarvey, E. (2023c). *Antisemitic incidents 'quadruple in UK' since Hamas attack in Israel*. BBC News, 13 October. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-67085625>. Accessed 17 October 2023.
- Office for National Statistics (2023). *Consumer price inflation, UK: August 2023*. [online]. Available online at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/bulletins/consumerpriceinflation/august2023>. Accessed 17 October 2023.
- Scott, G. (2023). *Why was Suella Braverman sacked? Nine key moments*, The Times, 14 November. Available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/why-suella-braverman-sacked-home-secretary-md3qgjzm2>. Accessed on 26 November 2023.
- Townsend, M. (2023). *UK government 'complicit' in asylum seeker hotel attacks, say unions*, The Guardian, 5 March. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/mar/05/uk-government-complicit-asylum-seeker-hotel-attacks-say-unions>. Accessed on 17 October 2023.

DIVERSITY

Attitudes towards ethnic, national and religious diversity in British society and local communities

KEY FINDINGS

- Public attitudes towards ethnic and religious diversity have become slightly more positive since 2020.
- Public attitudes towards migrants have become slightly more negative since 2020.
- Most people still agree that ethnic diversity is good for British society.
- A minority agree that migrants and religious diversity are good for British society or local communities although many more agree than disagree.
- People in ethnically, nationally and religiously diverse communities tend to have more positive attitudes towards these types of diversity than people in non-diverse communities.
- People who are older and those with lower educational attainment are among those most likely to have negative views towards ethnic, national and religious diversity.

WHAT WE DID

We measured public attitudes towards ethnic, national and religious diversity in British society at both the national and local levels. We also gathered information regarding respondents' sex or gender, age, ethnicity, religion, where in the UK they live and a range of other relevant demographic variables.

Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

“Ethnic diversity is good for British society”; “Migrants are good for British society”; and “Religious diversity is good for British society”.

Respondents were offered responses on a scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” and “don’t know”.

DIVERSITY IN BRITISH SOCIETY

MAIN FINDINGS

A majority (56%) agreed that ethnic diversity is good for British society, while 44% agreed that migrants and religious diversity are good for British society. Between 15% and 24% of respondents disagreed that migrants (24%), religious diversity (19%), and ethnic diversity (15%) are good for British society.

However, between 29% and 37% of respondents answered “neither agree nor disagree” or “don’t know” whether ethnic diversity (29%), migrants (32%) and religious diversity (37%) are good for British society (see **Table 2** in the Appendix).

COMPARING OLDER AND NEWER DATA

Public attitudes towards ethnic and religious diversity have become slightly more positive since 2020. In Wave 1 of the study (published in 2020), 53% agreed that ethnic diversity is good for British society. In Wave 2 (the current study), 56% agreed. In Wave 1, 40% agreed that religious diversity is good for British society. In Wave 2, 44% agreed.

Positive attitudes towards migrants, however, have decreased slightly. In Wave 1, 46% agreed migrants are good for British Society. In Waves 2, 44% agreed.

Whilst these differences are not large, they are all statistically significant, meaning they represent what might be described as “real” change over time.



A CLOSER LOOK AT THE NEW DATA

An analysis of the relationship between these attitudes and demographic variables shows that attitudes regarding ethnic diversity, migrants and religious diversity being good for British society are associated with demographic characteristics such as sex, age, region, ethnicity, religion, education and income (see **Table 5** in the Appendix for chi-square independence tests). Based on this, we proceeded with more advanced multivariate analysis.

We conducted logistic regression analyses to determine which variables, if any, might be said to predict negative attitudes towards ethnic diversity, migrants and religious diversity in British society. In other words, we looked for clues as to which groups of respondents were more or less likely to be negative towards diversity in British society.

Demographic and individual variables were entered into each model to predict disagreement in response to the three questions on British society and ethnic diversity, numbers of migrants and religious diversity. For the purposes of our modelling of data, disagreement was compared to responses in relation to all other responses taken together (i.e. agreement, neither agreeing nor disagreeing and answering “don’t know”).

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN BRITISH SOCIETY

Those who think their local community is not ethnically diverse were twice as likely (99% more likely) as those who think their local community is ethnically diverse to have negative attitudes towards ethnic diversity in British society.

Lower levels of educational attainment appeared to predict negative attitudes towards ethnic diversity. In addition, compared to those with Degree level attainment, respondents with Apprenticeship level education were 85% more likely to have negative attitudes towards ethnic diversity in British society, while respondents with a Level 1 qualification were 54% more likely to have negative attitudes (see **Table 8** in the Appendix).

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRANTS IN BRITISH SOCIETY

Similarly, lower levels of educational attainment appeared to predict negative attitudes towards migrants. Respondents with an apprenticeship level qualification were over twice as likely (2.4 times more likely) to have negative attitudes towards migrants in British society than those with Degree level attainment. Similarly, compared to those with a degree, respondents who responded “No qualifications” were nearly twice as likely (96% more likely) to have negative attitudes towards migrants in British society. Compared to those with a degree, respondents with an entry level or a Level 1 qualification were 77% and 67% more likely, respectively, to have negative attitudes towards migrants in British society.

Age was also a factor with older respondents more likely to hold negative attitudes towards migrants. Compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24, those aged between 55 and 64 were twice as likely (99% more likely) to have negative attitudes towards migrants in British society. Respondents aged between 45 and 54 were 58% more likely to have negative attitudes towards migrants. Respondents aged over 65 years were 53% more likely to have negative attitudes towards migrants in British society.

The likelihood of having negative attitudes towards migrants in society is 65% higher for those who think their local community is not nationally diverse compared to those who perceive it as being diverse in that way (see **Table 9** in the Appendix).

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN BRITISH SOCIETY

Respondents who think their local community is not religiously diverse were over twice as likely (2.4 times more likely) as those who think it is to have negative attitudes towards religious diversity in British society. When compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24 years old, those aged between 55 and 64 were exactly twice as likely to have negative attitudes towards religious diversity. Those aged over 65 were 82% more likely to have negative attitudes towards religious diversity.

The likelihood of having negative attitudes towards religious diversity in society was 56% higher for those who have an apprenticeship level of education, relative to those who have a degree (see **Table 10** in the Appendix).

Fig.7: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that ethnic diversity is good for British society




Fig.8: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that migrants are good for British society





Fig.9: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that religious diversity is good for British society



DIVERSITY IN DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

WHAT WE DID

As for attitudes towards diversity in British society, we measured attitudes towards ethnic diversity, migrants and religious diversity in respondents' local communities. First, respondents answered, on a scale from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" (or "don't know"), to the following questions: "To what extent do you agree that your local community is ethnically diverse/is diverse in terms of migrants/is religiously diverse?" Those who agreed that their local communities are diverse in terms of ethnicity, migrants and religion, were then asked to what extent they agreed, respectively, with the following statements: "Ethnic diversity is good for my local community"; "Migrants are good for my local community"; and "Religious diversity is good for my local community", answered in a scale from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" or "don't know".

MAIN FINDINGS

Two thirds of respondents agreed that ethnic diversity (67%) and religious diversity (64%) are good for their local communities, while half (52%) agreed that migrants are good for their local communities. In contrast, 11% and 14% of respondents disagreed that ethnic diversity and religious diversity, respectively, are good for their local communities, while 19% of respondents disagreed that migrants are good for their local communities. However, 29% of respondents answered "neither agree nor disagree" or "don't know" when asked whether migrants are good for their local communities, while about 20% of respondents answered "neither agree nor disagree" or "don't know" when asked whether religious diversity (22%) and ethnic diversity (21%) are good for their local communities (see **Table 3** in the Appendix).

COMPARING NEW DATA WITH OUR PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Public attitudes towards ethnic and religious diversity in local communities perceived by respondents to be diverse have become slightly more positive since 2020. In Wave 1 of the study (2020), 63% of respondents agreed that ethnic diversity is good for their local community, in Wave 2 (the current study) 67% agreed. Similarly, 57% agreed in Wave 1 that religious diversity is good for their local community, in Wave 2, 64% agreed.

Positive attitudes towards migrants in diverse local communities decreased slightly from 54% of respondents in Wave 1 who agreed they are good for their local community to 52% in Wave 2.

As for difference in attitudes towards diversity in British society, these differences are not large but are statistically significant and represent "real" change over time.

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE NEW DATA

Attitudes towards ethnic diversity, migrants and religious diversity being good for respondents' local communities are associated with demographic characteristics such as sex, age, region, ethnicity, religion, education and income (see **Table 6** in the Appendix for chi-square independence tests). Based on this, we proceeded with more advanced multivariate analysis.

We conducted logistic regression analyses to determine which variables predict negative attitudes towards ethnic diversity, migrants and religious diversity in local communities. Like the previous section, demographic and individual variables were entered into the model to predict responses of disagreement to the three questions "Ethnic diversity/migrants/religious diversity is/are good for my local community", compared to responses of agreement or neither agree nor disagree (or don't know) to these questions. Below we present the results for each question.

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

The strongest predictor of negative attitudes towards local ethnic diversity was being Buddhist.¹ Buddhist respondents were nearly four times more likely (3.9 times more likely) than those describing themselves as non-religious to have negative attitudes towards ethnic diversity in their local communities. Age was also a strong predictor but only for one age group. Compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24, those aged between 55 and 64 were 63% more likely to have negative attitudes towards ethnic diversity in their local communities (see **Table 11** in the Appendix).

¹The authors recognise that this finding is surprising and potentially controversial. It should be noted that, whilst the finding is based on robust statistical analysis and statistically significant, the Buddhist group was one of the smaller subgroups we analysed for this study (n=95). On that basis, we report our analysis of responses from Buddhist respondents cautiously and with due regard to the fact that more research is needed to better understand attitudes within British Buddhist communities.



PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRANTS IN DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

Age was a strong predictor for negative local attitudes towards migrants. Compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24, those aged between 55 and 64 were nearly four times (3.8 times) more likely to have negative attitudes towards migrants in their local communities. Respondents aged over 65 were three times more likely to have negative attitudes towards migrants in their local communities. Compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24, those aged between 35 and 54 were over twice as likely (2.3 times more likely) to have negative attitudes towards migrants in their local communities, followed by those aged between 25 and 34 who are 93% more likely to have negative attitudes towards migrants in their local communities.

As before, lower educational attainment appeared to have a negative impact upon attitudes. Relative to those with Degree level attainment, those with an apprenticeship level qualification were over twice as likely (2.3 times more likely) to have negative attitudes towards migrants in their local communities. Respondents who responded “No qualifications” were 77% more likely to have negative attitudes towards migrants in their local communities.

Unsurprisingly, perhaps, respondents who voted for the Brexit Party in the 2019 General Election were over twice as likely (2.3 times more likely) as those who voted for the Conservative Party to have negative attitudes towards migrants in their local communities. Respondents who self-described as being in the “Other” religion group were 76% more likely than non-religious respondents to have negative attitudes towards migrants in their local communities (see **Table 12** in the Appendix).

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

Age was a strong predictor of negative attitudes towards local religious diversity. When compared to those aged between 18 and 24, respondents aged over 65 were nearly four times as likely (3.8 times more likely) to have negative attitudes towards religious diversity in their local communities. Similarly, compared to those aged between 18 and 24, respondents aged between 55 and 64 were three times more likely to have negative attitudes towards religious diversity in their local communities. Those aged between 45 and 54 were twice as likely (2.1 times more likely) to have negative attitudes towards religious diversity in their local communities. Respondents between 35 and 44 were 56% more likely to do it.

We measured objective religious diversity using the proportion of residents from minority faith backgrounds in local authorities. We arranged local authorities into deciles. Proportions vary from the first decile – the lowest proportion of residents from a minority faith background – to decile 10 – the highest proportion. Compared to living in a local authority with the highest levels of religious diversity (tenth decile), the likelihood of having negative attitudes towards religious diversity in local communities is between over twice as likely (decile 4, 2.6 times more likely) and 58% more likely (decile 9) for those who live in local authorities with lower proportions levels of religious diversity. It should be noted that not all deciles returned significant results when compared to the least religiously diverse local authorities. The relationship between “actual” local religious diversity and local attitudes is complex and appears not to be linear (see **Table 13** in the Appendix).

Fig.10: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that ethnic diversity is good for my local community




Fig.11: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that migrants are good for my local community





Fig.12: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that religious diversity is good for my local community



DIVERSITY IN NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

WHAT WE DID

Respondents who disagreed that their local community is ethnically diverse, diverse in terms of migrants or religiously diverse were asked, respectively, to what extent they agreed with the following statements: “Ethnic diversity would be good for my local community”, “Migrants would be good for my local community”, and “Religious diversity would be good for my local community”. Respondents answered on a scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” or “don’t know”.

MAIN FINDINGS

36% of respondents agreed that ethnic diversity would be good for their local communities. 28% and 25% agreed that religious diversity and migrants, respectively, would be good for their local communities. 31% disagreed that migrants would be good for their local communities, while 21% of respondents disagreed that ethnic or religious diversity would be good for their local communities.


Half of the respondents (51%) answered “neither agree nor disagree” or “don’t know” when asked whether religious diversity would be good for their local communities, while 44% answered “neither agree nor disagree” or “don’t know” when asked whether ethnic diversity and migrants would be good for their local communities (see **Table 4** in the Appendix).

COMPARING NEW DATA WITH OUR PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Public attitudes towards ethnic and religious diversity in local communities perceived by respondents to be non-diverse have become slightly more positive since 2020. In Wave 1 of the study (2020), 33% of respondents agreed that ethnic diversity would be good for their local community. In Wave 2 (the current study), 36% agreed.

In Wave 1, 22% agreed that religious diversity would be good for their local community. In Wave 2, 28% agreed.

As before, these differences are not large but, again, are statistically significant and represent “real” change over time.



In Wave 1, 24% agreed that migrants would be good for their local community, in Wave 2, 25% agreed. This difference was not statistically significant and, on that basis, is not considered to be “real” change over time. Attitudes have roughly stayed the same.

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE DATA

Attitudes towards whether ethnic diversity, migrants and religious diversity would be good for respondents’ local communities are associated with demographic characteristics such as sex, age, region, ethnicity, religion, education and income. However, there was an exception in which sex was not associated with attitudes towards migrants in local communities (see **Table 7** in the Appendix for chi-square independence tests). Based on this, we proceeded with more advanced multivariate analysis.

We conducted logistic regression analyses to determine which variables predict negative attitudes towards future ethnic diversity, migrants, and religious diversity in local communities. Like the previous analyses, demographic and individual variables were entered into the model to predict responses of disagreement to the three questions “Ethnic diversity/migrants/religious diversity would be good for my local community”, compared to responses of agreement or neither agree nor disagree (or don’t know) to these questions. Below we present the results for each question.

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

Respondents who voted for the Brexit Party in the 2019 General Election were 82% more likely than those who voted for the Conservative Party to have negative attitudes towards future ethnic diversity in their local communities. Green Party voters were 70% less likely. Labour voters were 66% less likely. Liberal Democrat voters were 38% less likely (see **Table 14** in the Appendix).

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRANTS IN NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

As before, the analysis revealed a relationship between lower educational attainment and negative attitudes. Compared to those with Degree level attainment, respondents who told us they had “Other” qualifications were nearly four times more likely to have negative attitudes towards future migrants in their local communities. Those with an apprenticeship level qualification were nearly three times more likely to have negative attitudes towards future migrants in their local communities. Those who answered “No qualifications” or had a Level 1 or Level 2 qualification were between 84% and 77% more likely to have negative attitudes towards migrants in their local communities.

Respondents who self-described as “Other” ethnicity were twice as likely (2.1 times more likely) as White respondents to have negative attitudes towards future migrants in their local communities (see **Table 15** in the Appendix).

67%
of respondents
in diverse local
communities agreed
that ethnic diversity
is good for their
local community

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

Compared to non-religious respondents, Buddhist respondents were over twice as likely (2.5 times more likely) to have negative attitudes towards future religious diversity in their local communities. Respondents from the North East were 67% more likely than those from London to have negative attitudes towards future religious diversity in their local communities (see **Table 16** in the Appendix).

CONCLUSION

Overall, the analysis revealed that public attitudes have shifted slightly since 2020, but in two different directions. Positive attitudes towards ethnic and religious diversity have increased since 2020 but so have negative attitudes towards migrants.

Most people still agree that ethnic diversity is good for British society and more agree than disagree that migrants and religious diversity are good for British society and their local communities. Confirming previous social psychological research and the effect of contact in terms of reducing negative sentiment towards people from different backgrounds, people in ethnically, nationally and religiously diverse communities tend to have more positive attitudes towards these types of diversity than people in non-diverse communities.

While the logistic regression modelling reveals a complex overall picture, people who are older and those with lower educational attainment are among those most likely to have negative views towards ethnic, national and religious diversity.

Our next chapter looks at attitudes towards change and, in particular, whether people agree or disagree that ethnic, national and religious diversity in British society and their local communities has increased too quickly in the past 10 years.

Fig.13: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that ethnic diversity would be good for my local community




Fig.14: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that migrants would be good for my local community





Fig.15: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that religious diversity would be good for my local community



CHANGE

Attitudes towards changes in ethnic, national and religious diversity across Britain and within local communities

KEY FINDINGS

- Public attitudes towards increases in ethnic, national and religious diversity in Britain have become more positive since 2020.
- Some public attitudes towards increases in diversity in local communities have improved since 2020. Others remain the same.
- Despite more positive attitudes overall since 2020, most people in England and Wales still agree that the number of migrants has increased too quickly in the past 10 years.
- While in most cases, less than a majority of people agree that diversity in local communities has increased too quickly in the past 10 years, many more agree than disagree.
- People with lower educational attainment are among those most likely to have negative views towards diversity.
- In some cases, people from minority ethnic and religious backgrounds are more likely than White and non-religious people to report negative attitudes towards increases in ethnic, national and religious diversity across Britain as a whole and within their local communities.

WHAT WE DID

We measured public attitudes towards increases in ethnic, national and religious diversity in Britain at both the national and local level. As for our research on attitudes towards diversity, we asked respondents the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements: “Ethnic diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years”; “The number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years”; and “Religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years”. Respondents were invited to answer on a scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” or “don’t know”.

CHANGE IN BRITAIN

MAIN FINDINGS

A majority (57%) of respondents agreed that the number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years. 47% and 36% of respondents agreed that ethnic diversity and religious diversity, respectively, in Britain have increased too quickly in the past 10 years. Around 20% of respondents disagreed that ethnic diversity (22%), religious diversity (22%) and the number of migrants (19%) in Britain have increased too quickly in the past 10 years. 42% responded “neither agree nor disagree” or “don’t know” to whether religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years. Between 25% and 30% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed or didn’t know that whether ethnic diversity (31%) and number of migrants (25%) in Britain have increased too quickly in the past 10 years (see **Table 17** in the Appendix).

COMPARING NEW DATA WITH OUR PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Public attitudes towards increases in ethnic diversity, the number of migrants and religious diversity in Britain have become slightly more positive since 2020. In Wave 1 of the study (published in 2020), 50% agreed that ethnic diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years. In Wave 2 (the current study), 47% agreed. In Wave 1, 60% agreed that the number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly. In Wave 2, 56% agreed. In Wave 1, 43% agreed that religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly. In Wave 2, 36% agreed.

These differences are not large but they are statistically significant, meaning they represent “real” change over time.



A CLOSER LOOK AT THE DATA

An analysis of the relationship between these attitudes and demographic variables shows that attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity, migrants and religious diversity in Britain are associated with demographic characteristics such as sex, age, region, ethnicity, religion, education and income (see **Table 20** in the Appendix for chi-square independence tests). Based on this, we proceeded with more advanced multivariate analysis.

We conducted logistic regression analyses to determine which variables, if any, may be said to predict negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity, number of migrants and religious diversity in Britain in the past 10 years. Demographic and individual variables were entered into each model to predict responses of agreement to the three questions: “Ethnic diversity/migrants/religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years”. For the purposes of our modelling of data, agreement was compared to responses in relation to disagreement, neither agreeing nor disagreeing and answering “don’t know”.

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCREASED ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN BRITAIN SOCIETY

The strongest predictor of negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in Britain was being Buddhist. When compared to non-religious respondents, Buddhist respondents were over twice as likely (2.3 times more likely) to have negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in Britain. Muslim respondents were 72% more likely to have negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in Britain.

Compared to respondents with Degree level attainment, those with an apprenticeship level qualification were nearly twice as likely (92% more likely) to have negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in Britain. Those with entry level were 58% more likely to have negative attitudes.

Compared to White respondents, those who self-described themselves as “Other” ethnicity were 73% times more likely to have negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in Britain (see **Table 23** in the Appendix).

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS AN INCREASED NUMBER OF MIGRANTS IN BRITISH SOCIETY

As for attitudes towards diversity, lower educational attainment predicted negative attitudes towards change. When compared to those respondents with a degree, respondents with an apprenticeship level qualification are over twice as likely (2.6 more likely) to have negative attitudes towards an increased number of migrants in Britain.

Again, age was a strong predictor. Compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24, those aged between 55 and 64 were over twice as likely (2.4 more likely) to have negative attitudes towards an increased number of migrants in Britain, followed by respondents aged over 65 who are exactly twice as likely to have negative attitudes towards an increased number of migrants in Britain. Respondents aged between 18 and 24, those aged between 45 and 54 are 90% more likely to have negative attitudes towards an increased number of migrants in Britain. Those aged between 35 and 44, and 25 and 34 were 76% and 63%, respectively, more likely to have negative attitudes towards an increased number of migrants in Britain.

Respondents self-describing as “Other” ethnicity were 88% more likely than White respondents to have negative attitudes towards an increased number of migrants in Britain (see **Table 24** in the Appendix).

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCREASED RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN BRITAIN SOCIETY

Self-identifying as being from one of the minority faith backgrounds was again a strong predictor. When compared to non-religious respondents, Buddhist respondents were twice as likely (2.1 times more likely) to have negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in Britain. Muslim and Hindu respondents were 92% more likely of having negative attitudes.

Compared to respondents with a degree, those with an entry level qualification were 77% more likely to have negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in Britain.

Respondents self-describing as “Other” ethnicity were 77% more likely than White respondents to have negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in Britain (see **Table 25** in the Appendix).

Fig.16: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that ethnic diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years




Fig.17: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that the number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years





Fig. 18: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years



CHANGE IN DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

WHAT WE DID

Respondents who agreed that their local communities are diverse in terms of ethnicity, migrants and religion, were asked to what extent they agreed that ethnic diversity, the number of migrants and religious diversity in their local communities has increased too quickly in the past 10 years. They were invited to respond to the following statements: “Ethnic diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years”; “Number of migrants in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years”; and “Religious diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years”. Respondents answered on a scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” or “don’t know”.

MAIN FINDINGS

A higher proportion (between 41% and 48%) of respondents agreed that the number of migrants (48%), religious diversity (44%) and ethnic diversity (41%) in their local communities have increased too quickly in the past 10 years, while less than a third disagreed that ethnic diversity (28%), religious diversity (27%) and number of migrants (25%) in their local communities have increased too quickly in the past 10 years. Around a third of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed, or didn’t know whether ethnic diversity (31%), religious diversity (29%) and the number of migrants (27%) in their local communities have increased too quickly in the past 10 years (see **Table 18** in the Appendix).

COMPARING NEW DATA WITH OUR PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Public attitudes towards increases in ethnic diversity and the number of migrants in local communities perceived by respondents to be diverse have become slightly more positive since 2020. In Wave 1 of the study, 44% of respondents agreed that ethnic diversity in their local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years. In Wave 2 (the current study), 41% agreed. In Wave 1, 54% agreed that the number of migrants in their local community has increased too quickly. In Wave 2, 48% agreed. There was no difference in attitudes towards religious diversity in local communities. In Waves 1 and 2, 44% agreed that it has increased too quickly.

Differences we found are not large but they are statistically significant, meaning they represent “real” change over time.

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE DATA

An analysis of the relationship between these attitudes and demographic variables shows that attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity, migrants and religious diversity in local communities in the past 10 years are associated with demographic characteristics such as sex, age, region, ethnicity, religion, education and income (see **Table 21** in the Appendix for chi-square independence tests). Based on this, we proceeded with more advanced multivariate analysis.

We conducted logistic regression analyses to determine which individual variables predict negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity, number of migrants and religious diversity in local communities (in the past 10 years). Demographic and individual variables were entered into each model to predict responses of agreement to the three questions: “Ethnic diversity/number of migrants/religious diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years”. As before, agreement responses were compared to disagreement, “neither agree nor disagree” or “don’t know” responses. Below we present the results for each question.

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCREASED ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

As before, lower educational attainment predicted negative attitudes. When compared to respondents with Degree level attainment, those with an entry level qualification were over three times more likely (3.3 times more likely) to have negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in their local communities. Compared to respondents with a degree, those with an apprenticeship level qualification were 69% more likely to have negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in their local communities.

Religious affiliation was also a strong predictor of negative attitudes. Hindu and Buddhist respondents were twice as likely (2.1 and 2 times more likely, respectively) to have negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in their local communities compared to non-religious respondents. Compared to non-religious respondents, Muslim respondents were 65% more likely to have negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in their local communities.

When compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24, those aged between 25 and 34 were 62% more likely to have negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in their local communities (see **Table 26** in the Appendix).

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCREASED NUMBER OF MIGRANTS IN DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

Respondents with an entry level of education were over three times more likely (3.2 more likely) than those with a degree to have negative attitudes towards increased number of migrants in their local communities. When compared to respondents with a degree, those with an apprenticeship level qualification were 87% more likely to have negative attitudes towards increased number of migrants in their local communities. Those who answered “No qualifications” were 64% more likely to have negative attitudes towards an increased number of migrants in their local communities.

When compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24, those aged between 35 and 44 were over twice as likely (2.3 times more likely) to have negative attitudes towards increased number of migrants in their local communities. Respondents aged between 25 and 34 were exactly twice as likely to have negative attitudes towards an increased number of migrants in their local communities. Compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24, those aged between 45 and 64 were around 90% more likely to have negative attitudes towards increased number of migrants in their local communities. Those aged over 65 were 56% more likely to have negative attitudes towards an increased number of migrants in their local communities.

In addition, respondents who voted for the Brexit Party in the 2019 General Election were nearly twice as likely (99% more likely) to have negative attitudes towards increased number of migrants in their local communities than those who voted for the Conservative Party.

Compared to non-religious respondents, Buddhist respondents and those self-describing as “Other” religion were twice as likely (2.1 times more likely) to have negative attitudes towards increased number of migrants in their local communities. Hindu respondents were 91% more likely to have negative attitudes towards an increased number of migrants in their local communities (see **Table 27** in the Appendix).

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCREASED RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

Compared to non-religious respondents, Buddhist respondents were over twice as likely (2.7 times more likely) to have negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in their local communities. Compared to non-religious respondents, Hindu respondents were twice as likely (2.1 times more likely) to have negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in their local communities. Muslim respondents were 51% more likely to have negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in their local communities.

Respondents who voted for the Brexit Party in the 2019 General Election were over twice as likely (2.4 times more likely) as those who voted for the Conservative Party to have negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in their local communities.

When compared to respondents with a degree, those with an entry level qualification were twice as likely (2.1 times more likely) to have negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in their local communities. Those with an apprenticeship qualification level were 81% more likely to have negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in their local communities. Again, when compared to respondents with a degree, those with a Level 1 qualification and those who answered “No qualifications” were around 60% more likely to have negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in their local communities.

When compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24, those aged between 25 and 34 were 75% times more likely to have negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in their local communities. Those aged between 35 and 44 were 56% more likely to have negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in their local communities (see **Table 28** in the Appendix).

Fig.19: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that ethnic diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years




Fig.20: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that the number of migrants in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years





Fig.21: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that religious diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years



CHANGE IN NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

WHAT WE DID

Respondents who disagreed that their local communities are diverse in terms of ethnicity, migrants and religion were asked to what extent they agreed that ethnic diversity, number of migrants and religious diversity in their local communities is likely to increase in the next 10 years, through the following questions: “Ethnic diversity in my local community is likely to increase in the next 10 years”; “Number of migrants in my local community is likely to increase in the next 10 years”; and “Religious diversity in my local community is likely to increase in the next 10 years”. Respondents answered on a scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” or “don’t know”.

MAIN FINDINGS

A majority (56%) of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed, or didn’t know whether religious diversity in their local communities is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years. Around 45% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed or didn’t know whether ethnic diversity (46%) and number of migrants (44%) in their local communities are likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years.

Around a quarter of respondents disagreed that ethnic diversity (28%), number of migrants (26%) and religious diversity (24%) in their local communities are likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years, while between 20% and 30% of respondents agreed that the number of migrants (30%), ethnic diversity (26%) and religious diversity (19%) in their local communities is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years (see **Table 19** in the Appendix).

COMPARING NEW DATA WITH OUR PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Public attitudes towards ethnic and religious diversity in local communities perceived by respondents to be non-diverse have become slightly more positive since 2020. In Wave 1 of the study (2020), 33% of respondents agreed that ethnic diversity would be good for their local community. In Wave 2 (the current study), 36% agreed.

This difference is not large but is statistically significant, meaning it represents “real” change over time.

There was no difference in attitudes towards the number of migrants in local non-diverse communities. Across Waves 1 and 2, 30% agreed that it is likely to increase too quickly. There was an apparent small difference between Waves 1 and 2 in terms of attitudes towards ethnic diversity in non-diverse local communities (from 27% to 26%) but it is not statistically significant and, on that basis, is not considered to be a “real” change over time.

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE DATA

An analysis of the relationship between these attitudes and demographic variables shows that attitudes towards the likelihood of increasing ethnic diversity, number of migrants and religious diversity in local communities (in the next 10 years) were associated with demographic characteristics such as sex, age, region, ethnicity, religion, education and income. With an exception in which sex was not associated with attitudes towards an increased number of migrants in local communities (see **Table 22** in the Appendix for chi-square independence tests). Based on this, we proceeded with more advanced multivariate analysis.

We conducted logistic regression analyses to determine which variables predict negative attitudes towards future increases in ethnic diversity, number of migrants and religious diversity in local communities (in the next 10 years). Demographic and individual variables were entered into each model to predict responses of agreement to the three questions: “Ethnic diversity/number of migrants/religious diversity in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years”. As before, agreement responses were compared to responses of disagreement, “neither agree nor disagree” responses and “don’t know”. Below we present the results for each question.

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS FUTURE INCREASES IN ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

Compared to non-religious respondents, Buddhist respondents were over twice as likely (2.6 times more likely) to have negative attitudes towards future increases in ethnic diversity in their local communities.

When compared to White respondents, those self-describing as “Other” ethnicity were over twice as likely (2.5 times more likely) to have negative attitudes towards future increases in ethnic diversity in their local communities.

Respondents who voted for the Brexit Party in the 2019 General Election were 70% more likely than those who voted for the Conservative Party to have negative attitudes towards future increases in ethnic diversity in their local communities.

Compared to respondents with Degree level attainment, those with a Level 1 qualification were 61% more likely to have negative attitudes towards future increases in ethnic diversity in their local communities. Those who answered “No qualifications” were 52% more likely to have negative attitudes towards future increases in ethnic diversity in their local communities (see **Table 29** in the Appendix).

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS FUTURE INCREASES IN THE NUMBER OF MIGRANTS IN NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

When compared to respondents with Degree level attainment, those with an apprenticeship qualification were 77% more likely to have negative attitudes towards future increases in the number of migrants in their local communities. Those with a Level 1 or Level 2 qualification or who answered “No qualifications” were, respectively, 64%, 57% and 56% more likely to have negative attitudes towards future increases in the number of migrants in their local communities (see **Table 30** in the Appendix).

PREDICTING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS FUTURE INCREASES IN RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

Compared to White respondents, Mixed respondents were 92% more likely to have negative attitudes towards future increases in religious diversity in their local communities.

When compared to respondents with a degree, those who answered “No qualifications” were 64% more likely to have negative attitudes towards future increases in religious diversity in their local communities. Those with an apprenticeship level qualification were 54% more likely to have negative attitudes towards future increases in religious diversity in their local communities (see **Table 31** in the Appendix).



Fig.22: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that ethnic diversity in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the past 10 years




Fig.23: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that the number of migrants in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the past 10 years





Fig.24: Percentage of agreement and disagreement with a statement that religious diversity in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the past 10 years



CONSIDERING DIVERSITY AND CHANGE TOGETHER

44% of all respondents agreed that religious diversity is good for British society and 36% agreed that it is increasing too quickly. Responses were not mutually exclusive and, as expected, some respondents agreed with both statements. To determine how many had these types of views, we cross-tabulated responses to questions concerning attitudes towards ethnic, national and religious diversity and responses from corresponding questions concerning increasing diversity across each of those domains. The analysis focused on respondents who agreed that diversity is good for British society but also agreed that it is increasing too quickly.

One in five of all respondents surveyed (22%) agreed that ethnic diversity is good for British society but increasing too quickly. Considering these respondents, this group may be described in at least two other ways. Over a third of those who agreed ethnic diversity is good for British society (39%) also agreed that it is increasing too quickly. Expressed another way, nearly half of those who agreed ethnic diversity is increasing too quickly (47%) nevertheless agreed that it is good for British society.

One in five of all respondents surveyed (19%) agreed that migrants are good for British society but that their numbers are increasing too quickly. Respondents who agreed that the number is increasing too quickly represented two fifths (42%) of all those who agreed that migrants are good for Britain. Expressed another way, 33% of those who agreed that the number of migrants is increasing too quickly nevertheless agreed that they are generally good for Britain.

Finally, around one in seven of all respondents surveyed (15%) agreed that religious diversity is good for British society but that it is increasing too quickly. These respondents made up 41% of all those who agreed religious diversity is good for Britain and 33% of all those who agreed it is increasing too quickly.

CONCLUSION

Overall, our analysis reveals that public attitudes towards increases in ethnic, national and religious diversity in Britain have become more positive since 2020. At the more local level, some attitudes are more positive, some have remained the same.

Despite some increases in positive attitudes, most people in England and Wales still agree that the number of migrants has increased too quickly in the past 10 years. And many more agree than disagree that ethnic, national and religious diversity in local communities (at least within the ones perceived as diverse) has increased too quickly. In some ways, this challenges previous social psychological research on contact. Contact may reduce negative sentiment towards diversity per se, but its effects on attitudes towards changes in diversity are altogether less clear.

Taking all other factors into consideration, people with lower educational attainment appear to be among those most likely to have negative views towards ethnic, national and religious diversity.

In some cases, people from minority ethnic and religious backgrounds are more likely than White and non-religious people to report negative attitudes towards increases in ethnic, national and religious diversity across Britain as a whole and within their local communities.

In our next chapter, we maintain a focus on local neighbourhoods with an exploration of trust between people living locally and trust between local people from different ethnic and religious groups.

19%
of all respondents agreed that migrants are good for British society but that their numbers are increasing too quickly



LOCAL TRUST

Knowing people locally well enough to ask for a favour

BACKGROUND

The subject of trust is something of a mainstay within the field of social capital, integration and cohesion and also a common topic within public and policy debates on the general social and political wellbeing of the UK's population and its local communities.

The Levelling Up white paper focuses on “deeper trust” as part of its strategy to “transform places and boost local growth” (Department of Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, 2022: xiv). The Office for National Statistics (ONS) uses “trust and co-operative norms” as one of four categories which constitute its definitional model of “social capital” (2022a and 2022b). Edelman, a global communications firm, has explored trust in 28 countries through the Edelman Trust Barometer,

a series of surveys and briefing reports that have analysed trust across society and towards government, media, business and NGOs.

In 2023, Edelman reported the UK being in danger of “severe polarisation” driven by distrust in government and media and, more pertinently for the present study, a lack of a shared identity with 65% of respondents globally perceiving the “lack of civility and mutual respect today” to be the worst they had ever seen (Edelman, 2023).

In 2022, Onwards used an establish survey instrument and asked over 42,000 respondents, “Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” (Blagden and Stanley, 2023).

KEY FINDINGS

- One in 10 people in England and Wales have no-one in their local area known well enough to ask for a favour.
- One in 10 people in England and Wales have 20 or more people in their local area known well enough to ask for a favour.
- Two thirds (64%) of people living in England and Wales know between one and nine people well enough to ask for a favour.
- Most people (52%) living in England and Wales know no-one locally well enough to ask for a favour who is from an ethnic background different to their own.
- Just under half of people (45%) living in England and Wales know no-one locally well enough to ask for a favour who is from a religious background different to their own.
- Non-White people are more likely than White people to know fewer than two local people to ask for a favour, as are older people.
- Unsurprisingly perhaps, the likelihood of knowing more than ten local people to ask for a favour is higher among those who are socially active in their local area.
- When compared to non-religious people, the likelihood of knowing ten or more people to ask for a favour is highest within Hindu communities.
- The five local authorities in England and Wales with the highest mean number of people known locally well enough to ask for a favour are mainly Welsh: Ceredigion (Wales), Gwynedd (Wales), Malvern Hills (west England), Isle of Anglesey (Wales) and City of London.¹

¹According to the Census 2021, the population of City of London is 8,583. For more info see: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/visualisations/censusareachanges/E09000001/>

Our measure of trust was adapted from an important US study of social capital and community belonging (Carpiano and Hystad, 2011). Carpiano and Hystad's analysis concludes that a people's sense of community belonging is associated positively with several network-based social capital measures including the number of people in the local neighbourhood known well enough to ask for a favour.

Arguably, a measure of people living locally who are trusted by a respondent is a more useful metric than one measuring how trusting a respondent feels themselves to be generally or whether the respondent believes other people living locally, or anywhere else, can be trusted. The former says little about the local area and the latter invites the respondents to speculate. Counting the number of people a respondent knows well enough for a favour provides relief from more subjective interpretations of local trust and trustworthiness and offers policymakers and practitioners a more objective test that can be used to evaluate short- and medium-term efficacy of interventions and longer-term changes over time. In other words, it is a much more useful baseline metric for policy.

WHAT WE DID

To measure trust within local neighbourhoods and trust between people within local areas from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, our survey asked respondents:

"How many people in your local area do you know well enough to ask for a favour?"

To explore trust between ethnic and religious groups in local areas, respondents were asked two follow-up questions:

"Now thinking about the number of people in your local area that you could ask for a favour, how many of them are from a different ethnic background to your own?"

"Now thinking about the number of people in your local area that you could ask for a favour, how many of them are from a different religious background to your own?"

Response options for all three questions ranged from zero (no people) to 20 people.



MAIN FINDINGS

Overall, the mean number (in everyday language, the average number) of people in a respondent's local area known well enough to ask for a favour is just over six (6.3). The mean number of people known well enough for a favour who come from a different ethnic background is just under two (1.7). The mean number of those from a different religious background is two (2.0) (see **Table 32** in the Appendix).

However, there were many respondents who reported knowing no-one from a different ethnic or religious background: 52% and 45% of respondents respectively (see **Table 33** in the Appendix). In more technical terms, these distributions are right-skewed. Given this, a more appropriate measure of central tendency is the median: the middle value in our dataset, or the one splitting the top half of results (i.e. half the respondents) from the bottom half.

The median number for people known well enough to ask for a favour (from any background) is four. For those from a different religious background, the value is one. The median number of people known well enough to ask for a favour from a different ethnic background is zero (see **Table 32** in the Appendix).

As described, 52% of respondents reported knowing no-one well enough from a different ethnic background; 45% of respondents knew no-one from a different religious background. In both cases, most of the remaining respondents reported knowing between one and two people well enough from different ethnic and religious backgrounds (29% and 32%, respectively). Around one in five reported knowing more people well enough: 19% reported knowing three or more people from different ethnic backgrounds, 23% reported knowing three or more people from different religious backgrounds (see **Table 33** in the Appendix).

The picture for knowing people well enough from any background is perhaps more positive. Only around one in 10 respondents (9%) have no-one in their local area known well enough for a favour. 23% reported knowing one or two people. A further 18% said they know three or four people and 24% said they know between five and nine people.

On this basis, and taking into account exact figures (rather than rounding up or down), two thirds of respondents (64%) reported knowing between one and nine people well enough to ask. A quarter reported knowing 10 or more people including 10% of all respondents who told us they know 20 or more (see **Table 33** in the Appendix).

Tables 34-37 show the numbers and percentages of respondents from different ethnic and religious groups who reported how people they know from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Given that many cell counts are below 30, we report these bivariate statistics tentatively and with caution. The more advanced modelling reported below provides stronger clues as to patterns within the data.



A CLOSER LOOK AT THE DATA

To account for how many respondents reported knowing no one across the three questions, we had to adapt our analytical methods and divide our respondents into more manageable groups for the purposes of using more advanced statistical techniques.

In more technical terms, because these items do not follow a normal distribution and are right-skewed, we transformed these answers into categories (or groups) and conducted logistic regressions to determine which of our variables, if any, might be said to predict whether respondents have a specific range of people in their local area known well enough to ask for a favour.



Returning to the first question, “How many people in your local area do you know well enough to ask for a favour?”, we observed that 25% of respondents answered up to two people and 75% of them answered up to 10 people.

Based on this, we employed a two-part model technique. We used two separate models to explore which factors, if any, predict whether respondents know a relatively low number of people locally (zero or just one person) when compared to knowing two or more (Model 1) and which factors, if any, predict whether respondents have a relatively high number of people locally (10 or more) compared to knowing fewer than ten (Model 2).

As 25% of the respondents answered zero people and 75% answered up to 2 people to questions of how many of the people who they can trust were from a different ethnic or religious background, we conducted one model for each question to determine which factors, if any, predict whether respondents had more than two people from a different ethnic background (Model 3) or religious background (Model 4) in the local area who they can trust (compared to knowing fewer than two).

This research design has at least two advantages. First, it accommodates a large amount of “zero” responses (right skewness). Second, it allows for a degree of consistency across three of the four models in that each of these includes consideration of respondents who reported knowing two or more people.

On this basis, demographic and individual variables were entered into these four models, for which we present the results below.

MODEL 1: KNOWING NO-ONE OR ONLY ONE PERSON WELL ENOUGH TO ASK FOR A FAVOUR

Respondents who self-reported being an ethnicity other than White were more likely to have fewer than two people who they can trust to ask for a favour. Compared to White respondents, respondents who “prefer not to say” about their ethnicity were three times as likely to have fewer than two people who they can trust. Black respondents were over twice as likely (2.3 times more likely) to have fewer than two people who they can trust. Compared to White respondents, Asian and Mixed respondents were 75% more likely to have fewer than two people who they can trust. Respondents who self-described as “Other” ethnicity were 63% more likely to know fewer than two people.

Respondents who voted for a political party other than the main ones listed in the 2019 General Election were over twice as likely (2.3 times more likely) as those who voted for the Conservative Party to have fewer than two people who they can trust. Compared to those who voted for the Conservative Party, respondents who voted for the Liberal Democrats or did not vote were 82% and 59%, respectively, more likely to have fewer than two people.

Compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24, those aged between 25 and 34, and 35 and 44 were 81% and 51%, respectively, more likely to have fewer than two people (see **Table 38** in the Appendix).

MODEL 2: KNOWING 10 OR MORE PEOPLE WELL ENOUGH TO ASK FOR A FAVOUR

Participation in local activities increases the likelihood to have 10 or more people respondents can trust. Respondents who participate in a local sports club on a weekly and daily basis were 94% and 56%, respectively, more likely to have 10 or more people who they can trust when compared to those who do not participate at all.

When compared to respondents who do not participate in a local social media group, those who participate daily were 78% more likely to have 10 or more people who they can trust. Moreover, respondents who participate monthly in a local charity were 61% more likely to have 10 or more people who they can trust compared, as before, to those who do not participate.

Hindu respondents were 81% more likely than non-religious respondents to have 10 or more people they can trust.

Compared to respondents from London, those from Wales were 53% more likely to have 10 or more people they can trust (see **Table 39** in the Appendix).

MODEL 3: KNOWING TWO OR MORE PEOPLE FROM A DIFFERENT ETHNIC BACKGROUND WELL ENOUGH TO ASK FOR A FAVOUR

Compared to non-religious respondents, Jewish respondents were three times more likely to have two or more people from a different ethnic background who they can ask for a favour. Hindu respondents and those who self-described as being from the “Other” religious groups were 83% and 51%, respectively, more likely to have two or more people from a different ethnic background who they can trust.

When compared to respondents with a degree level of education, those with “other” qualifications were three times as likely to have two or more people from a different ethnic background who they can trust.

Participation in local activities increases the likelihood to know two or more people from a different ethnic background to ask for a favour. Respondents who responded “prefer not to say” about their frequency of participation in “a local hobby/activity group/helping people” were over twice as likely (2.7 times more likely) as those who don’t participate to have two or more people from a different ethnic background who they can trust.

Respondents who participate in “a local hobby/activity group/helping people” from daily or less than once a month were 83% and 51%, respectively, more likely to have two or more people from a different ethnic background who they can trust, than those who don’t participate at all.

Respondents who answered “prefer not to say” about their frequency of participation in a local charity, and respondents who participate daily or less than once a month were twice as likely (99% more likely) and 72% more likely, respectively, to have two or more people from a different ethnic background who they can trust, than those who do not participate at all.

Compared to those who do not participate in a local sports club, respondents who participate on a daily or monthly basis were 51% and 80%, respectively, more likely to know two or more people from a different ethnic background who they can ask for a favour.

Mixed respondents were over twice as likely (2.4 times more likely) as White respondents to know two or more people from a different ethnic background to ask for a favour. Compared to White respondents, Asian respondents and those from the “Other” ethnic group were 91% and 70%, respectively, more likely to know two or more people from a different ethnic background well enough to ask for a favour (see **Table 40** in the Appendix).

MODEL 4: KNOWING TWO OR MORE PEOPLE FROM A DIFFERENT RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND WELL ENOUGH TO ASK FOR A FAVOUR

Jewish respondents were over four times as likely to have two or more people from a different religious background who they know well enough to ask for a favour, compared to non-religious respondents. Compared to non-religious respondents, Hindu respondents were over twice as likely (2.6 times more likely) to know two or more people from a different religious background. Compared to non-religious respondents, respondents from the “Other” religion group were twice as likely (2.2 times more likely) to have two or more people from a different religious background who they can trust. Muslim respondents were nearly twice as likely (91% more likely) to have two or more people from a different religious background who they can trust.

As before, we found that participation in local activities increases the chance of respondents having two or more people from a different religious background who they can trust. Respondents who answered “prefer not to say” about their frequency of participation in a local charity were over twice as likely (2.7 times more likely) as those who do not participate to have two or more people from a different religious background who they can trust.

Respondents who participate in a local charity weekly and less than once a month were nearly twice as likely (98% and 89% more likely, respectively) to know two or more people from a different religious background when compared to those who do not participate at all.

Respondents who participate in a local sports club on a daily to monthly basis were between twice as likely to 56% more likely to have 2 or more people from a different religious background who they can trust, when compared to those who do not participate.

Compared to those who don’t participate in a local hobby/activity group/helping people, respondents who participate on a monthly and daily basis are, respectively, 67% and 57% more likely to have 2 or more people from a different religious background who they can trust.

Respondents who participate in a local social media group on a daily and weekly basis are, respectively, 60% and 51% more likely to have 2 or more people from a different religious background who they can trust, compared to those who don’t participate at all (see **Table 41** in the Appendix).

64%
of respondents reported
knowing between one
and nine people well
enough to ask a favour

MAPPING LOCAL TRUST ACROSS ENGLAND AND WALES

We used an advanced statistical method known as multilevel regression with post-stratification (MRP) to map local levels of trust across England and Wales. The MRP technique involves a two-step process. Step one involves taking Census data relating to people categorised by various characteristics (in this case, gender, age group, education and voting behaviour in the 2019 General Election). The second step involves using the outputs of regression modelling (using the characteristics as independent variables), and the number of people known within a local authority area to have each characteristic, to estimate local levels of trust.

In plainer English, we surveyed a small number of people living in each local authority. We took Census data related to all people living in each. Using these two sources of information together, we estimated local patterns of trust across each local authority in England and Wales.

(Full details of our MRP work and the statistical outputs are available on request.)


Local authorities in England and Wales with the highest mean number of people known locally well enough to ask for a favour

Local Authority	Description	People known (mean):
Ceredigion	County and unitary authority in west Wales that includes Aberystwyth and Cardigan.	6.2
Gwynedd	County and unitary authority in the north-west of Wales that includes the Snowdonia National Park and Wales' highest mountain, Snowden.	6.1
Malvern Hills	Non-metropolitan district (sometimes referred to as a "shire district") in Worcestershire, a county in the west of England, just east of the city of Worcester.	5.8
Isle of Anglesey	Unitary authority and island off the north-west coast of Wales and across the Menai Strait (in Welsh, Afon Menai) from Gwynedd.	5.8
City of London	London borough (one of 32 within the larger regional geography of Greater London), historic centre of London and the primary financial district of both London and the UK.	5.6

Local authorities in England and Wales with the lowest mean number of people known locally well enough to ask for a favour

Local Authority	Description	People known (mean):
Hackney	Inner London borough in the east of London that includes many of the 2012 Olympic venues including those within the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park.	3.1
Slough	Town and unitary in the south east of England approximately 20 miles west of central London.	3.2
Leicester	City and unitary authority in the East Midlands region of England, county town and largest urban centre within the largely rural county of Leicestershire.	3.3
Tower Hamlets	Inner London borough in the east of London incorporating much of the traditional "East End of London", an area known for its high population density, poverty and "working class" culture.	3.3
Redbridge	London borough (one of 32 within the larger regional geography of Greater London).	3.4

Fig.25: Number of people known well enough to ask for a favour



OTHER RESULTS


Local authorities in England and Wales with the highest mean number of people from a different ethnic background known locally well enough to ask for a favour

Local Authority	People known (mean):
Newham (London)	2.2
Tower Hamlets (London)	2.1
Redbridge (London)	2.0
City of London	2.0
Slough (South East England)	1.9

Local authorities in England and Wales with the lowest mean number of people from a different ethnic background known locally well enough to ask for a favour

Local Authority	People known (mean):
North Norfolk (East England)	0.4
Isle of Wight (island, South Coast of England)	0.4
Rother (South East England)	0.4
East Devon (West England)	0.4
Forest of Dean (West England)	0.4

Fig.26: People from a different ethnic background known well enough to ask for a favour



Local authorities in England and Wales with the highest mean number of people from a different religious background known locally well enough to ask for a favour


Local Authority	People known (mean):
City of London	2.1
Newham (London)	2.0
Tower Hamlets (London)	1.9
Harrow (London)	1.8
Redbridge (London)	1.8

Local authorities in England and Wales with the lowest mean number of people from a different religious background known locally well enough to ask for a favour

Local Authority	People known (mean):
Great Yarmouth (East England)	0.7
Thanet (South East England)	0.7
Gosport (South England)	0.7
Mansfield (East England)	0.8
Torbay (South West England)	0.8

The MRP findings on local trust probably raise more questions than they answer. The five local authorities with the highest levels of trust are predominantly rural with the obvious exception of City of London. The London Boroughs of Redbridge and Tower Hamlet are both in a group of five local authorities with the lowest levels of trust. However, both are among five local authorities with the highest levels of trust between ethnic groups and faith groups. This suggests that levels of general trust in a local area do not necessarily predict levels of trust between ethnic and faith groups in the same area. Or, framed in another way, it could be argued that low levels of local trust in a particular area do not necessarily negate trust between ethnic and faith groups in the same area.

Fig.27: People from a different religious background known well enough to ask for a favour



CONCLUSION

Arguably, the local trust picture in England and Wales (based on our metric) is fairly positive: two thirds know between one and nine people well enough to ask for a favour; the mean number of people known is just over six; and only one in 10 people in England and Wales know no-one in their local area well enough to ask.

Arguably, the picture in terms of local trust between ethnic and religious groups is far less positive with around half of people in England and Wales knowing no-one locally from an ethnic and faith background other than their own.

Non-White people are more likely than White people to know fewer than two local people to ask for a favour, as are older people although the likelihood of knowing ten or more people (from any background) to ask for a favour is highest within Hindu communities.

The local authorities in England and Wales with the highest mean number of people known locally well enough to ask for a favour are mainly Welsh and mainly rural with the exception of City of London.

In the next chapter, we continue our focus on local communities and explore local priorities: the aspects of local life that people in England and Wales consider to be important and in need of improvement.

REFERENCES

- Blagden, J. and Stanley, L. (2023). *Good neighbours: how do levels of hyper-trust vary and why does it matter?* London: Onwards.
- Carpiano, R.M. and Hystad, P.W. (2011). 'Sense of community belonging' in health surveys: what social capital is it measuring? *Health & Place*, 17, pp.606-617.
- Department of Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (2022). *Levelling up: levelling up the United Kingdom*. London: HMSO. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/levelling-up-the-united-kingdom>. Accessed 23 October 2023.
- Edelman (2023). *2023 Edelman Trust Barometer: global report*. London: Edelman. Available at: <https://www.edelman.com/trust/2023/trust-barometer>. Accessed 23 October 2023.
- Office for National Statistics (2022a). *Social capital in the UK: April 2020 to March 2021*. London: Office for National Statistics. Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing/bulletins/socialcapitalintheuk/april2020tomarch2021>. Accessed 23 October 2023.
- Office for National Statistics (2022b). *Measuring national well-being: an analysis of social capital in the UK*. London: Office for National Statistics. <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing/articles/measuringnationalwellbeing/2015-01-29>. Accessed 23 October 2023.



LOCAL PRIORITIES

Considering the local factors that are important in making somewhere a good place to live and that are in most need of improvement

BACKGROUND

What makes somewhere a good place to live? The answer is, of course, entirely subjective. Responses to the question are likely to tell us as much about those offering their opinions as any actual place. Recent academic studies and policy reports, including those related to the UK Government's Levelling Up strategy, have sought to identify aspects of local life – the facilities, services, assets, opportunities and conditions – which contribute towards feelings of local satisfaction, pride and togetherness and which we might associate with social capital, cohesion and more general wellbeing (Department of Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, 2022).

Considering the six “capitals” presented in the Levelling Up white paper (see Appendix for a more detailed discussion of it), at least three (“physical capital”, “human capital” and “social capital”) relate to improving infrastructure, housing, health, and the strength of communities, relationships and trust – in other words, all factors we might consider as making somewhere a good place to live (2022: 58–95). The white paper lists various policy “missions” (2022: 117), several of which also relate to local satisfaction: pay, jobs and living standards; public services; and feelings of community, local pride and belonging (2022: 120–121). More specifically, the white paper

KEY FINDINGS

- When it comes to local priorities, personal and family security comes before community and leisure.
- According to our survey, local factors that are most important in making somewhere a good place to live are: health services, the level of crime, and wage levels and the cost of living (taken together).
- Local factors that are least important in making somewhere a good place to live are: good relations between faith groups, community activities, and sports and leisure facilities.
- According to our survey, local factors that are considered most in need of improvement are: wage levels and the cost of living, health services and affordable housing.
- Local factors that are considered least in need of improvement are: good relations between faith groups, good relations between ethnic groups and access to nature.
- Based on these findings, local priorities (factors that are considered important and needing improvement) are: affordable housing, clean streets, health services, job prospects, level of crime, public transport, road and pavement repairs, and wage levels and the cost of living.
- In-depth analysis revealed strong positive correlations between child poverty and viewing local assets, facilities and conditions as being in need of improvement.

pledges to improve: transport infrastructure; digital connectivity; primary school education standards; skills and training; health and “Healthy Life Expectancy”; general wellbeing; and “pride in place” (including satisfaction with the town centre and engagement in local culture), housing and levels of crime.

Given its characterisation as a “shared national project” (2022: xix), it is perhaps unsurprising that the Levelling Up white paper has little to say on regional differences concerning multifaceted local priorities although the strategy does provide a policy framework for local devolution and decision-making. Our data analyses provide some of the information required by local government agencies and decision-makers when considering the allocation of public funds to improve and maintain local areas.

Two recent reports published by the University of Cambridge’s Bennett Institute have helped develop the concepts and our understanding of “social infrastructure” (Kelsey and Kenny, 2021) and “pride in place” (Shaw, Garling and Kenny, 2022). “Social infrastructure” is defined as “the physical spaces and community facilities which bring people together to build meaningful relationships”. According to the Bennett Institute, these include both town centres and more open, green space alongside “libraries, language schools, museums, theatres and art galleries”, “village halls, community centres, local pubs and public gardens”, as well as cafes and other community facilities (2022: 5–6). The benefits of investing in social infrastructure include those related to social values such as better community resilience (i.e. better responses to crises), better public health, and the bridging of divides and those more related to civic values such as increased local pride, the shaping of positive feelings about the identity, heritage and standing of their town, and reduced pessimism and disenchantment (2022: 6).

Considering Levelling Up and the Bennett Institute reports, there is a lingering question concerning whether, and to what extent, local priorities vary across England and Wales and whether certain social groups are more or less likely to prioritise certain aspects of their local lives over others, particularly during economically uncertain times. Do all communities, for example, wish for better museums, theatres and art galleries? As was suggested in a roundtable event in Manchester, are some people less interested in local arts and culture and more interested in cleaner, safer streets for their children?

In a foundational and still popular study, A.M. Maslow published his now famous “hierarchy of needs” (Maslow, 1943). Maslow divided and categorised human motivation into physiological needs (air, food, water, shelter, etc.), safety needs (security, employment, health, property, etc.), love and belonging (friendship, intimacy, family, etc.), esteem (respect, self-esteem, status, etc.). According to Maslow, needs lower down in the hierarchy (physiological and safety needs, for example) must be satisfied before individuals can attend to higher needs (such as esteem). Our analyses of local priorities applied and explored Maslow’s theoretical framework.

An influential report, *One World, Many Places*, published in 2010 by the Ipsos Social Research Institute (better known today as Ipsos MORI) presented findings from an international study of attitudes towards municipal government and local areas across the world (Ipsos Social Research Institute, 2010). The Ipsos study combined analysis of attitudes towards determinants of quality of life with attitudinal data related to what people would most like to see improved in their local area. Combining responses in this way, allows researchers to explore issues that might be considered local priorities (i.e. on the basis that they are felt to be important and in need of improvement). The report concedes that “priorities do differ from place to place” and that “more targeted research (either nationally or, ideally, at the local level) can make a real difference to our understanding of citizens’ needs” (2010: 15). We seek to provide some of the information needed to develop an understanding of local priorities in England and Wales.

Are some people less interested in local arts and culture and more interested in cleaner, safer streets for their children?


WHAT WE DID

We measured public attitudes concerning the factors (i.e. the local assets, facilities and conditions) that make somewhere a good place to live. We also measured attitudes towards factors considered most in need of improvement. Taken together, we used the two measurements to identify local priorities. Our survey asked respondents:

“On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not at all important and 5 is very important, how important, if at all, do you think the following are in making somewhere a good place to live?”

- “Access to nature”
- “Activities for teenagers”
- “Affordable housing”
- “Clean streets”
- “Community activities”
- “Education provision”
- “Facilities for young children”
- “Good relations between ethnic groups”
- “Good relations between faith groups”
- “Health services”
- “Job prospects”
- “Level of crime”
- “Level of pollution”
- “Level of traffic congestion”
- “Parks and open spaces”
- “Public transport”
- “Road and pavement repairs”
- “Shopping facilities”
- “Sports and leisure facilities”
- “Wage levels and cost of living”

Fig.28: Priorities for local communities



Following this, respondents were presented with the same list again and asked:

“Thinking about your local area, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is the least needs improving and 5 is most needs improving, to what extent, if at all, do you think the following need improving?”

We chose a range of factors that relate to the individual, family, community, and society, home, work, and public and private spaces. This enabled sensitivity to key hypothetical factors (i.e. the factors were estimated would be deemed important to respondents) within a reasonable limit of 20 variables.

MAIN FINDINGS

Overall, the importance attributed to these local factors by respondents reflected, as we expected, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.

MAKING SOMEWHERE A GOOD PLACE TO LIVE

The factors considered to be the most important in making somewhere a good place to live (see **Tables 42 and 44** in the Appendix) were:

- Health services (average score = 4.47)
- Level of crime (average score = 4.44)
- Wage levels and cost of living (average score = 4.31)

The factors considered to be the least important in making somewhere a good place to live were:

- Good relations between faith groups (average score = 3.75)
- Community activities (average score = 3.77)
- Sports and leisure facilities (average score = 3.86)

Most important:
health services, level of
crime, and wage levels
and cost of living

NEEDING IMPROVEMENT

The factors considered to be those most in need of improvement (see **Tables 43 and 44** in the Appendix) were:

- Wage levels and cost of living (average score = 3.98)
- Health services (average score = 3.88)
- Affordable housing (average score = 3.87)

The factors considered to be those least in need of improvement were:

- Good relations between faith groups (average score = 3.08)
- Good relations between ethnic groups (average score = 3.13)
- Access to nature (average score = 3.16)

LOCAL PRIORITIES

Highest (important and needing improvement):

- Affordable housing
- Clean streets
- Health services
- Job prospects
- Level of crime
- Public transport
- Road and pavement repairs
- Wage levels and cost of living

Lowest (less important and less in need of improvement)

- Community activities
- Good relations between ethnic groups
- Good relations between faith groups
- Sports and leisure facilities

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE DATA

We wanted to further explore the extent to which our data reflected Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Did respondents consider groups of factors related to more "basic" needs as more important and more in need of improvement than other groups of factors? The analyses reported below are among the more technical undertaken by the research team. More information and our full results are available on request.

CORRELATION TESTS: CHECKING OUR MEASURES¹

We began by running a series of Pearson's correlations to measure the strength of relationship between the variables and to determine whether any of them were, in effect, measuring the same aspect of local life (as might have been the case if we had measured, for example, attitudes to local public transport services alongside attitudes towards local bus services).

The Pearson correlation matrix for the variables shows that none of the variables were "on top of each other". On that basis, none were deemed extraneous. The strongest correlations (measured on a scale from zero to one) in relation to factors perceived as being important were .63 for faith group relations and ethnic group relations and .61 for facilities for young children and activities for teenagers.²

In relation to factors perceived as most needing improvement, the highest correlations were .67 for faith group relations and ethnic group relations and .62 for open spaces and nature.

The direction and strength of the coefficients gave us confidence in our methods (i.e. in the measurement validity). We expected that hypothetically adjacent variables would be more strongly correlated with each other than with other, less obviously related variables.

DIMENSION REDUCTION: CREATING CLUSTERS OF VARIABLES³

Given we had 20 variables, a decision was made to reduce them down to a more manageable number. Accordingly, we simplified our set of 20 variables into four variables. This process of dimension reduction began with the creation of theoretical groupings of variables, based on Maslow's hierarchy of needs. We used statistical software to form clusters of variables. These clusters are usually referred to more technically (and rather confusingly given our subject matter) as "factors" (see **Table 45** in the Appendix).⁴

In other words, we looked at theoretical reductions of the variables and considered how well these functioned, if at all, in practice.

After experimentation based on our hypothesis and use of factor and principal component analyses, we derived four factors: here labelled as "levels" to evoke Maslow's hierarchy of needs model:

LEVEL 1 (Security) – basic local needs (the most important local factors): Affordable housing, Health services, Level of crime, and Wage levels and costs of living.

LEVEL 2 (Stability) – other local needs (other important local factors): Clean streets, Education provision, Job prospects, Level of pollution, Level of traffic congestion, Parks and open spaces, and Public transport.

LEVEL 3 (Facilities) – local facilities and services (less important local factors): Access to nature, Activities for teenagers, Community activities, Facilities for young children, Road and pavement repairs, Shopping facilities, and Sports and leisure facilities.

LEVEL 4 (Diversity) – local intergroup relations (least important local factors): Good relations between ethnic groups and Good relations between faith groups.

¹ An Excel spreadsheet reporting results from our use of Pearson's correlation (including a correlation matrix) is available on request. Please email enquiries@woolf.cam.ac.uk for more information.

² We assume the following: .00 is no correlation; .01-.19 is a very weak correlation; .20-.39 is a weak correlation; .40-.59 is a moderate correlation; .60-.79 is a strong correlation and .80-.99 is a very strong correlation; 1 is a perfect correlation.

³ As above, results from our use of dimension reduction techniques, factor analysis and Cronbach's alpha tests are available on request.

⁴ The term "factor" is used in two different ways. First, the term is used in its plainer sense to describe local assets, facilities and conditions (as in, the "local factors" making somewhere a good place to live). Second, the term is used in its more technical sense to describe the outputs of a statistical method known as "factor analysis" which in our case was used to simplify 20 local assets, facilities and conditions into what might be considered as clusters are known more technically as "factors".



We observed scaling success. Each of the 20 variables listed above is more correlated with its own level than with any other level. We observed that while the range of mean scores for each level overlapped slightly, as is to be expected, the levels appeared to have aggregated the variables in four levels with descending importance attached by the respondents (i.e. a mean score higher for Level 1 (Security) than for Level 2 (Stability), higher for Level 2 than Level 3 (Facilities), and higher for Level 3 than Level 4 (Diversity). This descending pattern of importance fits squarely within Maslow's model (see **Table 46** in the Appendix).

Furthermore, this descending pattern was also observed when we aggregated respondents by sex, age, ethnic group, religion, region, qualifications, income, disability and long-term health conditions, country of birth, citizenship and voting behaviour.⁵

INTERNAL VALIDITY: CHECKING OUR WORK

We used a statistical test known as Cronbach's alpha to determine the internal validity of each level (i.e. the consistency with which respondents responded to the questions within each group) to provide another statistical clue as to how successfully the levels were grouping variables. We found there to be strong internal consistency within each of the four levels (see **Table 45** in the Appendix).⁶

Although the differences were not large (suggesting a degree of universality in people's perception of local factors), our findings suggest that female respondents and older respondents attached more importance overall to housing, health, crime and wages than male and younger respondents. We observed very few differences across the regions (means for all for between 4.3 and 4.4). Similarly, there was only a minor difference between England and Wales (4.4 and 4.3 respectively).

⁵ As before more information and full results are available on request.

⁶ Security: $\alpha = .771$; Stability: $\alpha = .841$; Facilities: $\alpha = .834$; Diversity: $\alpha = .768$

MRP ANALYSIS: MAPPING LOCAL PRIORITIES ACROSS ENGLAND AND WALES⁷

As for our analyses of local trust, we used an advanced statistical method known as multilevel regression with post-stratification (MRP) to map local priorities across England and Wales. Regressions included local data relating to gender, age, education and voting behaviour at the 2019 General Election taken from the Census.

First, we grouped and labelled each of the “improvement” variables according to their corresponding “level” from our factor analysis of “importance” variables. For example, “Important: Level 1” and “Improvement: Level 1” both contained “basic” Security-related variables (i.e. housing, health, crime, wage and costs of living).

The MRP results confirmed our regional analysis and indicated that there is relatively little variance across England and Wales in terms of what is considered important and needing improvement. For example, for “import 1” (“Important: Level 1” – see page 48), the local authority attaching the most importance to this, East Devon, had a mean score of 4.6 (from a possible total of 5.0). The local authority attaching the least importance, Gwynedd, had a mean score of 4.2.

330 local authorities had a variation of around 0.4. Mean scores from around two thirds of local authorities fell within the lower limit of a 10% confidence interval derived from the mean value for East Devon. This indicates that, in effect, there are unlikely to be statistically significant differences among over 200 local authorities.

There was more apparent variance between the “top” and “bottom” local authority in terms of the importance attached to good relations between ethnic and faith groups (Level 4 (Diversity)). Hackney had the highest mean score of 4.13. Gwynedd (again) had the lowest mean score of 3.69. Mean scores from around a half of local authorities fell within the lower limit of a 10% confidence interval derived from the mean value for Hackney.



In terms of good relations between ethnic and faith groups needing improvement, Newham returned the highest mean score (3.6). Only five other local authorities had a mean value within the lower limit of a 10% confidence interval derived from the mean value for Newham. This suggests that there were a higher number of statistically significant differences between the local authorities although, again, differences did not appear large. The lowest mean was returned by North Norfolk (2.8).

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN IMPORTANCE AND IMPROVEMENT AND OTHER SOCIAL INDICATORS

Next, we analysed the correlation between the four factors of local priorities – Security, Stability, Facilities and Diversity – as before, in terms of both importance and improvement – and three other local social indicators (taken individually): mean earnings, child poverty⁸ and multiple deprivation.⁹

⁷ Full results available on request.

⁸ Taken from here: <https://www.jrf.org.uk/child-poverty>

⁹ Taken from two sources: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/datasets/mappingincomedepriivationatalocalauthoritylevel/2019/> and <https://opendatacommunities.org/data/societal-wellbeing/imd2019/indicesbyla>



IMPORTANCE

Use of Pearson's correlation revealed a complex overall picture.

Results show that the perceived importance of Security, Stability Facilities and Diversity was in each case negatively associated with mean earnings with a moderate strength of relationship (see **Table 47** in the Appendix).¹⁰

The importance of Security, Stability, Facilities and Diversity was in each case negatively associated with child poverty with a weak strength of relationship (see **Table 48** in the Appendix).¹¹

Non-significant correlations were found between the importance of local priorities and multiple deprivation (see **Table 49** in the Appendix).

IMPROVEMENT

The needs for improvement of Security, Stability and Diversity are positively associated with mean earnings with strengths of relationship that ranged from very weak to moderate (see **Table 47** in the Appendix).¹²

The need for improvement of Security, Stability, Facilities and Diversity are positively associated with child poverty with either a strong or very strong relationship (see **Table 48** in the Appendix).¹³

The need for improvement of Security, Stability, Facilities and Diversity, are positively associated with multiple deprivation with a strong relationship (see **Table 49** in the Appendix).¹⁴

Focusing on child poverty, it would appear that people place less emphasis on local assets, facilities and conditions in places where child poverty is higher. Perhaps feelings of local belonging in such places are determined by less tangible, more emotional factors such as ties to family and friends. Either way, and while we are careful here not to assert causation between local factors and local poverty, it appears respondents in these places and those facing other forms of deprivation, recognise when assets, facilities and conditions in the local areas need improvement.

¹⁰ Mean earnings:

Importance of Security ($r = -.419, p < .001$)
Stability ($r = -.415, p < .001$)
Facilities ($r = -.424, p < .001$)
Diversity ($r = -.383, p < .001$)

¹¹ Child poverty:

Importance of Security ($r = -.246, p < .001$)
Stability ($r = -.274, p < .001$)
Facilities ($r = -.272, p < .001$)
Diversity ($r = -.162, p < .001$)

¹² Mean earnings:

Improvement of Security ($r = .123, p = .026$)
Stability ($r = .147, p = .008$)
Diversity ($r = .375, p < .001$)

¹³ Child poverty:

Improvement of Security ($r = .750, p < .001$)
Stability ($r = .815, p < .001$)
Facilities ($r = 0.731, p < .001$)
Diversity ($r = .781, p < .001$)

¹⁴ Multiple deprivation:

Improvement of Security ($r = .677, p < .001$)
Stability ($r = .773, p < .001$)
Facilities ($r = .730, p < .001$)
Diversity ($r = .627, p < .001$)

CONCLUSION

Our data reveal that, at the time of the survey, people in England and Wales were more likely to prioritise more “basic” needs over those relating to belonging and esteem. Overall, when it comes to current local priorities, personal and family security comes before community and leisure. Respondents considered health, crime and wages and the costs of living (taken together) as the most important factors in making somewhere a good place to live, and wages, health and housing as in most need of improvement. Local factors that are least important in making somewhere a good place to live are good relations between faith groups, community activities, and sports and leisure facilities.

According to our survey, local factors that are considered most in need of improvement are wage levels and the cost of living, health services and affordable housing. Local factors that are considered least in need of improvement are good relations between faith groups, good relations between ethnic groups and access to nature.

Thinking about local priorities in terms of the factors considered both most important and most in need of improvement (affordable housing, clean streets, health services, etc.), all of the most popular selections map onto Maslow’s more “basic” human needs: affordable housing, clean streets, health services, job prospects, crime, public transport, roads and wages. Similarly, aspects of local life deemed less important and less in need of improvement corresponded to Maslow’s less basic human needs: community and leisure activities.

Very pertinently for this study of attitudes towards and experiences of ethnic, national and religious diversity, good relations between faith groups were considered to be among the least important factors in making somewhere a good place to live. Good relations between faith and ethnic groups were both considered as among the factors least needing improvement and among the lowest local priorities overall.

How might we explain this? We could point to the economic conditions at the time of writing and, more specifically, to the rising costs of food, energy and other basic household items and services. It could be that during economically uncertain times, relations between social groups are viewed as less important.

If we return to the Ipsos study from 2010, we can see that 23,000 respondents across 23 mainly developed countries appeared to prioritise more basic needs such as jobs, housing, health services and crime levels and needs that are perhaps slightly higher up Maslow’s hierarchy including roads, public transport, congestion and pollution. Echoing our findings, factors in the 2010 study that were considered to be low priorities included “race/interethnic relations”.

Our next chapter follows on from this discussion of local priorities by analysing survey responses to questions asking respondents about the frequency of their local engagement in terms of participation in various activities.

REFERENCES

- Department of Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (2022). *Levelling up: levelling up the United Kingdom*. London: HMSO. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/levelling-up-the-united-kingdom>. Accessed 23 October 2023.
- Ipsos Social Research Institute (2010). *One world, many places: citizens’ views of municipal government and local areas across the world*. London: Ipsos Social Research Institute.
- Kelsey, T. and Kenny, M. (2021). *Policy Report Series: Townscapes: 7. The value of social infrastructure*. Cambridge: Bennett Institute. Available at: <https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/publications/social-infrastructure/>. [Online.] Accessed 26 October 2023.
- Maslow, A.H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. *Psychological Review*, 50(4), pp.370-96.
- Shaw, J., Garling, O., and Kenny, M. (2022). *Policy Report Series: Townscapes: pride in place*. Cambridge: Bennett Institute. Available at: <https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/publications/pride-in-place/>. Accessed 26 October 2023.



LOCAL ENGAGEMENT

Engaging in local activities and with local groups

BACKGROUND

We might imagine that healthy local communities involve neighbours sharing local space and engaging in the types of activities and groups that can bring people together and improve community belonging. But how much do we actually know about the British public's preferences for such activities? When it comes to local engagement with civil society – the term is used here to describe volunteering or engaging in local activities or with local groups – what do people living in England and Wales actually do locally with their spare time? In other words, to what extent is engagement in civil society groups and activities part of everyday life in local communities?

Policymakers, as well as the academic and think tank researchers who aim to influence them, place great emphasis on promoting and improving access to shared local physical space and local community facilities to discuss shared physical spaces and local facilities and their impact on local pride and belonging (Bonaiuto et al, 2020; Abrams et al, 2021; Kelsey and Kenny, 2021; Shaw, Garling and Kenny, 2022;). Libraries, museums, community and arts centres all feature frequently in policy reports (see previous chapter for analysis on which types of local facilities are considered as priorities across England and Wales). Similarly, the types of activities we might find in these local spaces, such as local volunteering, are often seen as the primary drivers of healthy, interconnected community life.

KEY FINDINGS

- At least seven in 10 people never participate in any of the local activities or with any of the groups listed in our survey.
- The most popular local activity in our survey was engaging with a social media group.
- Engaging with a charity and a sports club were the second and third most popular local activities.
- Compared to people who are non-religious, Muslim people are the most likely to engage with local charities.
- In fact, being Muslim is the single strongest predictor of local charity engagement in our dataset.
- Compared to people who are non-religious, Buddhist, Jewish and Muslim people are all more likely to engage with a local social media group.
- Compared to White people, Black people are more likely to participate in local charity work.
- People who know more than one other person from a different ethnic or religious background well enough to ask for a favour are more engaged with local charities and local social media groups.
- People aged between 18 and 24 are the most likely to engage with a local charity. People aged 44 or under are more likely to engage with a local social media group.

Policy researchers at the Bennett Institute in Cambridge apply the concept of “social infrastructure” to their work on physical spaces and local facilities and has asserted the economic, social and civic value of them (Kelsey and Kenny, 2021). Analysis of Covid-19 Mutual Aid UK data shows a correlation, albeit a relatively weak one, between levels of social infrastructure and the number of mutual aid groups that emerged during the pandemic (with the implications that where there is social infrastructure, there is also local connectedness and belonging). There is stronger evidence linking access to open space and population health improvements. There is also evidence that indicates the benefits of volunteering in terms of enhancing skillsets, growing social networks, improving employability and sustaining higher levels of wellbeing. Taken together, the suggested value of social infrastructure and the types of activities that improvements in it might encourage offer compelling glimpses of more positive local futures.


Based on all of this, our objectives in undertaking the analysis reported below were threefold. First, we aimed to scrutinise some of the assumptions concerning the purported universal appeal

of volunteering (taken broadly here to cover local engagement with charities and other civil society groups and compared to other forms of local participation). Second, we wished to make available up-to-date statistical data analysis for those engaged in policy discussions around social cohesion, social capital, social infrastructure and local belonging (given the relative scarcity of statistical analyses of local data). Third, and more generally, we wanted to better understand the nature and extent of people’s local engagement with civil society groups and activities in their local neighbourhoods (to assist future policy and practice in this area).

70%
of respondents reported
they never participate in
any of the local groups or
activities shown on the
survey questionnaire



Fig.29: Frequency with which respondents participate in local activities or with local groups



MAIN FINDINGS

To measure local engagement, we measured the extent to which respondents participate in various local activities or with local groups. Our survey asked respondents:

“How often, if at all, do you participate in each of the following?”

Our survey offered the following possible responses:

- “A local branch of national political party”
- “A local campaign group”
- “A local charity”
- “A local faith-based organisation”
- “A local history group”
- “A local residents’ group”
- “A local social media group”
- “A local sports club”
- “A local environmental/nature group”
- “Other hobby/activity group/helping people”

Respondents were offered responses on a scale to measure frequency of engagement over time: “Daily”; “Weekly”; “Monthly”; “Less than once a month”; “Never” and “Prefer not to say”.

A majority of all respondents reported that they do not participate in any of the local groups or activities shown on the survey questionnaire with between 70% and 91% of them answering “never” (see **Table 50** in the Appendix).

The most popular activities from those available were engagement with a local social media group (29%), a local charity (22%), a local sports club (20%) and our “other engagement” category (“other local hobby/activity group/helping people” – 19%). Engagement appeared to be most likely on a weekly basis, rather than daily, monthly or less frequently, although not all differences were large.

For example, from those asked about engagement with a local social media group, 6% engaged daily, 10% engaged weekly, 7% engaged monthly and 7% less than once a month.

Among those who reported engagement with a local charity, 2% engaged daily, 6% weekly, 9% monthly and 6% less than once a month.

Among those who reported engagement with a local sports club, 2% engaged daily, 8% engaged weekly, 6% engaged monthly and 3% engaged less than once a month.

Among those who reported engagement with “other local hobby/ activity group/ helping people”, 2% engaged daily, 8% engaged weekly, 6% engaged monthly and 3% engaged less than once a month.

Respondents participate less in a residents’ group (17%), a local faith-based organisation (12%), a local environmental/nature group (11%), a local branch of a national political party (10%), a local campaign group (9%) and a local history group (8%).

In relation to these activities, frequency of engagement is mixed. Engagement in a residents' group, a faith-based organisation, an environmental/nature group and a local branch of a national political party is more likely to be on a weekly and monthly basis. Engagement in a local campaign group and a local history group is more likely to monthly or less than once a month.

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE DATA

We selected two popular forms of local engagement – participating with a local media social group and a local charity – to explore which factors, if any, may be said to predict such activities.

A preliminary analysis of the relationship between demographic variables and engagement in a local charity or a social media group revealed that engagement in these activities is associated with characteristics such as sex, age, region, ethnicity, religion, education and income (see **Table 51** in the Appendix for chi-square independence tests). Based on these results, we proceeded with more advanced multivariate analysis.

We conducted logistic regression analyses to determine which variables, if any, predict engagement with a local media social group and a local charity.

Demographic and socioeconomic variables were entered into both models to predict responses reporting any engagement in these activities (i.e. all responses from daily to less than once a month), compared to responses of “never” to these questions (responses of prefer not to say were considered missing). Below we present the results for each type of engagement.

PREDICTING ENGAGEMENT WITH A LOCAL CHARITY

Compared to respondents self-identifying as having no religion, Muslim respondents were over twice as likely (2.1 times) to engage with a local charity. Being Muslim was found to be the strongest predictor of local charity engagement in the dataset. Jewish respondents were 76% more likely to participate. Buddhist respondents were 71% more likely. Christian respondents were 58% more likely.

Compared to knowing either no-one or only one person well enough to ask for a favour, respondents who reported knowing two or more local people from a different religious background were 83% more likely to participate in charity work. Those knowing two or more from a different ethnic background were 77% more likely.

Compared to White respondents, Black respondents were 75% more likely to participate in local charity work. Those preferring not to report their ethnicity were 57% more likely. Respondents who self-reported as being Mixed ethnicity were 53% more likely.

Compared to younger respondents (those aged 18-24), respondents aged between 55 and 64 were 65% less likely to participate with a charity. Those aged between 45 and 54 were 55% less likely. Those aged 65 or over were 54% less likely. Those aged between 35 and 44 were 37% less likely.

Respondents with “Entry level” qualifications were 51% more likely than those with degrees to engage with a local charity. Those who responded “No qualifications” were 34% less likely.

The model predicted between 11% and 16% of the variance meaning there are factors other than those included in our dataset that determine the likelihood of engaging with a local charity (see **Table 52** in the Appendix).

PREDICTING ENGAGEMENT WITH A LOCAL SOCIAL MEDIA GROUP

Compared to respondents who self-reported belonging to the “No religion” group, Jewish respondents were 65% more likely to engage with a local social media group. Buddhist respondents were 54% more likely to engage. Muslim respondents were 44% more likely.

Respondents aged between 55 and 64 were 61% less likely to participate. Those aged 65 or over were 59% less likely. Those aged between 45 and 54 were 35% less likely.

Compared to respondents living in London, respondents in the North East were 60% more likely to participate with a local social media group. Respondents in the East of England were 34% more likely to participate.

Compared to male respondents, female respondents were 40% more likely to participate in a local social media group.

The model predicted between 7% and 19% of the variance meaning, as before, there are factors other than those included in our dataset that determine the likelihood of engaging with a local social media group (see **Table 53** in the Appendix).

CONCLUSION

Local engagement with a civil society group or activity is arguably less common than we might presume from an uncritical reading of policy literature concerning social cohesion and local belonging with at least seven in 10 people never participating at all.

Despite the emphasis placed by policy researchers on shared physical spaces, the most popular local activity in our survey was online engagement. It would appear that this type of activity is currently under-valued as a method to bring people together locally. Engaging with a charity and a sports club were the second and third most popular local activities.

Being Muslim and being Black are both strong predictors of participating with local charity work. In fact, being Muslim is the single strongest predictor of local charity engagement in our dataset. Being from a minority faith group – namely, a Buddhist, Jewish or Muslim community – is a strong predictor of local social media engagement.

Knowing people from different backgrounds well enough to ask for a favour predicted both local charity and local social media engagement although we should be careful not to overemphasise any direct causal relationship or the direction of causality for either type. It might be that respondents build trusting relations across ethnic and faith divides through their local engagement, or look for opportunities to participate locally in order to further develop existing relations with their neighbours, or both.

Despite any stereotypical images we may hold of older people being more active locally with charity work and local activities, our analysis reveals that younger people – under 25 for charity work and under 45 for social media – are the ones more engaged with local civil society groups.

REFERENCES

- Abrams, D., Lalot, F., Broadwood, J., Davies Hayon, K. and Dixon, A. Nuffield Foundation, University of Kent and Belong (2021). *Beyond us and them: societal cohesion in Britain through eighteen months of COVID-19*. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.belongnetwork.co.uk/resources/beyond-us-and-them-societal-cohesion-in-britain-through-eighteen-months-of-covid-19/>. Accessed 26 October 2023.
- Bonaiuto, M., Ariccio, S., Albers, T., Eren, R. and Cataldi, S. (2020). *Pride of place: definitions, causes, effects and relevance for the rural context*. [A framework produced as part of the Erasmus+ Project “Pride of Place”]. Available at: https://prideofplace.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/PoP_IO1_full_web.pdf. Accessed 26 October 2023.
- Kelsey, T. and Kenny, M. (2021). *Policy Report Series: Townscapes: 7. The value of social infrastructure*. Cambridge: Bennett Institute. Available at: <https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/publications/social-infrastructure/>. Accessed 26 October 2023.
- Shaw, J., Garling, O., and Kenny, M. (2022). *Policy Report Series: Townscapes: pride in place*. Cambridge: Bennett Institute. Available at: <https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/publications/pride-in-place/>. Accessed 26 October 2023.





REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

When it comes to telling our national story as a multicultural society, simplistic narratives concerning Britain and diversity are unhelpful. Those that assert only positives (“Britain is welcoming”) or negatives (“Britain is racist”) will always fail to capture the complexity of public attitudes towards diversity and change.

Data collected for the Woolf Diversity Study provide a rich, complex picture of ethnic, national and religious diversity in England and Wales. Analysis of local, regional and national data and trends offer insights relevant to the UK Government’s efforts to “level up” the UK but also to policymakers and practitioners working in the fields of social cohesion, social integration and counter extremism, and to academic and policy researchers with wider interests related to ethnic and religious minority communities, public attitudes towards them and issues concerning prejudice and discrimination.

For the purposes of this discussion, insights are offered as a series of reflections and recommendations gathered under seven key themes. The first two, “Reasons to be optimistic” and “Reasons to remain cautious”, offer overviews of the data analysis with a focus on “good” and “bad” news for those seeking to increase social cohesion in the UK. Following these, two sections offer remarks on two key aspects of the research related directly to other research, education and policy-related work at the Woolf Institute and particularly its interfaith expertise: “Intergroup relations” and “Diverse and non-diverse communities”. The last three sections are directed more specifically towards policymakers and practitioners working to better understand and support local communities and the myriad social and economic issues pertinent to them and issues related to diversity and cohesion: “Understanding local priorities”, “Trusting what works” and “Measuring trust”.



REASONS TO BE OPTIMISTIC

For those whose policy work engages with social integration and cohesion, or whose research interests touch on wider issues of ethnic and religious minority communities and public attitudes towards them, or who have otherwise dedicated themselves to tackling prejudice, discrimination and racism, the data offer various reasons to be optimistic.

Public attitudes towards ethnic and religious diversity have become slightly more positive since 2019. This includes attitudes towards these forms of diversity across British society as a whole and within local communities regardless of whether the latter are perceived as being diverse or not. Attitudes towards migrants within local communities perceived as diverse have become more positive since 2019 (although, as discussed below, other attitudes towards migrants have become less positive).

Whilst it should be noted that differences between data collected in 2019 and 2022 are not large (around three or four percentage points in some cases), they are statistically significant. On that basis, we can say that these differences are less likely to be due to random factors related to the research design and more likely to be a sign of improving social attitudes within Britain towards diversity: in other words, the apparent differences are likely to represent “real” change over time.



Similarly, attitudes towards change – increases in the levels of ethnic and religious diversity and the numbers of migrants in Britain – have become more positive since 2019 with fewer agreeing that increases have been too quick in the last 10 years. Again, these changes are statistically significant and represent “real” change over time.

In local communities perceived as diverse, fewer people think ethnic diversity and the number of migrants have increased too quickly in the past 10 years. In communities perceived as less diverse, recent increases in religious diversity are viewed less negatively than they were in 2019.

Our findings echo those found in recent reports such as *A New Consensus? How Public Opinion Has Warmed to Immigration* published in 2022 by the Institute for Public Policy Research, a progressive policy think tank (Institute for Public Policy Research, 2022). Its analysis of British

Election Study data from 2014 to 2022 revealed a positive shift in public attitudes over that period across England and Wales with an increase from a third to a half reporting positive attitudes towards the economic and cultural impact of immigration.

There are other reasons for cautious optimism. 50% of people living in England and Wales have five or more people living locally known well enough to ask for a favour and less than 10% have no-one. Despite being relatively low as a priority when compared to other local factors, a majority of people think that positive relations between ethnic and faith groups are important in making somewhere a good place to live.

Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to understand exactly why attitudes towards diversity and change are becoming more positive, but they do offer some opportunities for tentative speculation. For example, it could be that as more time passes since the EU Referendum in 2016 so more people hold positive views on ethnic, national and religious diversity. Perhaps those who voted to leave the EU are now satisfied with the UK Government’s general position on immigration and feel less negatively towards the issue. With this in mind, it would be interesting to understand more about the impacts of the illegal Channel crossings and the UK Government’s responses, on wider public attitudes towards immigration and demographic change. We should not underestimate the potential impacts of electioneering in the forthcoming General Election (to be held by 28 January 2025 and expected before late 2024). Campaigning on issues related to minority communities and immigration may result in the hardening of attitudes and positions among the British public.

Alternatively, increases in positive attitudes towards diversity could be part of a longer-term, upward shift in public attitudes over several decades. It could be that as more and more significant contributions to British society and mainstream culture are made by people from minority backgrounds, so public attitudes towards diversity continue to warm up. This would echo analysis from the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford. It has reported (with caveats) that public opposition towards immigrants and immigration has declined since 1964 (Richards, Fernández-Reino and Blinder, 2023).

While some public attitudes towards ethnic and religious diversity and towards migrants appear to be more positive overall according to our data analysis (and analysis from others), we would need at least one more wave (i.e. another round of data) in two or three years' time to indicate whether there is a steady rise based on our methods alone. Without that, we cannot be certain, for example, that the public attitudes we have chosen to measure are not merely fluctuating up and down, as we might expect over relatively short periods and in response to external factors such as significant national and international events, or whether they are likely to return to previous levels in due course (what we might refer to as "regression to the mean").

Either way, robust sources of local, regional and national data such as the Woolf Diversity Study remain a crucial component of our understanding and, arguably, the most appropriate available method to track the British public's attitudes towards diversity and their experiences of it.

RECOMMENDATION 1: The use of granular data capable of building a picture of how ethnic, national and religious diversity may be changing over time is crucial to our understanding of social cohesion in the UK.

Policymakers, practitioners and academics should use and support the use of large-scale datasets and methods such as MRP,¹ to measure British public attitudes concerning diversity and change in order to track social cohesion in the UK at the local, regional and national levels.

REASONS TO REMAIN REALISTIC

Despite what looks to be a general warming of public attitudes towards diversity and change in Britain, particularly in relation to ethnic and religious diversity, it is crucial that we remain realistic about both the direction and speed of travel across England and Wales and within local communities. As our data analysis revealed, positive attitudes towards diversity and minority ethnic and faith communities are far from universal with some evidence to show mixed overall sentiment towards, for example, migrants in British society and their increased numbers nationally and locally. There is evidence within the Woolf Diversity Study to suggest that there are still many issues concerning diversity and minority communities that are likely to

divide rather than unite us. Our ability to tackle racism in the UK depends on a more detailed understanding of these societal dynamics.

In terms of being good for British society, significant minorities (around a quarter of those asked) neither agreed nor disagreed with statements concerning the positive benefits of ethnic and religious diversity and migrants. Similar proportions living in areas perceived to be diverse felt the same about diversity in their local community. In non-diverse areas, a higher proportion (over a third) reported ambivalence ("neither agree nor disagree") or uncertainty ("don't know") towards the future benefits of ethnic and religious diversity and migrants in their local community. Whilst we cannot assume any deeper or more private feelings among these groups, and certainly should not ascribe their ambivalence or uncertainty to any negative sentiment that we might imagine is being concealed, we can describe this sizeable minority, albeit tentatively, as a group lacking demonstrable commitment to Britain's diversity.

We can learn much more from those who were comfortable reporting negative attitudes. While in most cases positive attitudes towards ethnic, national and religious diversity are held by more people than those who hold negative views, most people in England and Wales consider the number of migrants to have increased too quickly in Britain in the last decade. Almost a half of the population think that levels of ethnic diversity have risen too quickly in Britain and more people agree than disagree that religious diversity has done the same. When people who perceive themselves to be living in diverse areas are asked, more agree than disagree that the number of migrants and ethnic and religious diversity have all increased too quickly in their local community.

Attitudes towards future diversity (whether diversity would be good for a local community) appear to divide people who perceive themselves to be living in non-diverse places. Around a half of those in non-diverse communities report being ambivalent or uncertain when asked about the possible benefits of future diversity. The other half may be divided into two smaller groups of roughly equal size: those with and without positive attitudes towards future local diversity. In short, there appears to be no majority view and little consensus within non-diverse local communities as to the potential benefits or risks of future changes in diversity.

¹ Multilevel regression with post-stratification.

For those who are concerned about political polarisation in the UK, and the many continued sensitivities around race, religion and immigration, there is a reminder here that negative sentiment towards people from different ethnic and faith backgrounds, and those coming here from outside the UK, should not be considered as the preserve of a marginal few. It might be easier and perhaps more comforting for some of us to imagine that strong negative views concerning diversity are held by only a small group of hardened bigots and are invariably outweighed by the sheer mass of more positive, more liberal majoritarian opinion. This could well be true for some issues but, according to our data and analysis, there are significant minorities – and majorities in some cases – who are likely to feel dissatisfied, concerned and perhaps even angry, with the pace of demographic change around them.

Our data allow us to explore the presence of “mixed” views across society and within local communities but also those held by individuals. Our analysis identified large numbers of people with mixed views concerning diversity and the rate at which it is increasing. As reported, one in five of all respondents surveyed agreed that ethnic diversity is good for Britain but increasing too quickly. Over 40% of those who agreed that migrants are good for Britain also agreed that their numbers are increasing too quickly. And over 40% of those who agreed that religious diversity is good for Britain also think that the pace of change is too fast.

Similarly, there are other reasons for a more cautious approach to celebrating Britain’s successes in bringing diverse communities together. As is discussed below, relatively few of us who live in more diverse local areas have people from different ethnic and faith backgrounds we know well enough to ask for a favour. Further, relations between ethnic and faith groups are seen as less of a priority than more “basic” local considerations (e.g. crime, health and housing) and relatively few of us engage in the types of civil society activities considered by experts as crucial in bringing local people together across racial and religious divides.

Violent forms of prejudice and discrimination such as racism, antisemitism and Islamophobia may be relatively rare in British society but our understanding of them is better understood when we consider these wider contexts within which

they occur and the processes which identify, amplify and exploit legitimate attitudes towards diversity and change for more illegitimate political, extremist and violent aims.

If future social cohesion, counter extremism and anti-racism policies are to succeed, and the authors of this report all sincerely hope they will, policymakers and practitioners need to consider more often an inconvenient truth: public attitudes towards ethnic and religious minorities and the number of migrants in Britain, and the rates at which all are increasing, are decidedly and demonstrably mixed as are our experiences of engaging with people from different backgrounds.

As was discussed in commentary published shortly after publication of the first Woolf Diversity Study in 2020 (Hargreaves, 2020), empathetic consideration of those who have generally positive views on diversity but less positive views on the pace of change or less experience of social mixing is important. Demands for ideological purity on issues such as immigration, integration and multiculturalism are unlikely to bring people together locally or nationally around sensitive social and political issues. There needs to be more acceptance of reality here. British people have a range of attitudes and experiences in relation to diversity along a spectrum of mainstream left-wing, liberal and conservative positions. Further, celebrating multi-ethnic and multi-faith Britain whilst being concerned about the pace of societal and demographic change, especially within economically disadvantaged local communities, should not be regarded as evidence of cognitive dissonance or hypocrisy. Many negative views on social change (including those with which we may vehemently disagree) are held in good faith by people from a range of ethnic and religious backgrounds. On the basis that the social world should be approached as we find it not as we wish it to be, and regardless of our own positions on such matters, we must accept a second inconvenient truth: negative attitudes towards diversity and change are widespread throughout British society. Racism in the UK should never be justified but to tackle it we must be more attentive to the wider context from which it emerges.



INTERGROUP RELATIONS

Woolf Diversity Study data offer a rich source of insight into contemporary intergroup relations within British society and across local communities in the UK. As discussed above, findings from our data analysis remind us to expect ambivalence, and sometimes hostility, towards migrants and people from minority backgrounds particularly in local areas when transformational demographic change is underway or expected. But the data related to local trust and priorities help develop our understanding of other aspects of intergroup relations.

Our adoption of an established survey instrument to measure local trust and our analysis of the data collected while using it revealed that relatively few people living locally enjoy the types of reciprocal “everyday” engagement that is capable of building neighbourly relations and co-dependence between different ethnic and religious groups despite the presence of higher levels of more general local trust across England and Wales.

Instead, the data analysis appears to indirectly describe a form of “homophily” as conceived by Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954: 23): the “tendency for friendships to form between those who are alike in some designated respect”; here conceptualised as a dynamic within local groups defined by ethnicity or religion that might limit the processes needed to increase intergroup trust. In other words, and as Putnam might have it, the data help to describe a model of local community relations where “bonding capital” (the strength of relationships within groups) is stronger than “bridging capital” (the strength of relationships between groups) (Putnam, 2000).

Arguably, and perhaps from a less neutral political perspective, these findings alert us to the apparent systemic failure of policy and practice in relation to social cohesion and intergroup trust. Despite their best efforts, national and local government bodies and charitable organisations have not succeeded in creating the conditions or the interventions that might encourage and sustain trusting relations between different ethnic and religious groups within local settings.

Put plainly, low levels of trust between ethnic and religious groups should be regarded as an urgent wake-up call for national policymakers. First, we need to better understand the factors that facilitate and drive trust between local people

and those that impede the same local trust from manifesting between different ethnic and faith groups. In other words, we need to understand the extent to which local bonding capital may be converted into local bridging capital. Second, we need to understand “what works” to increase levels of local trust between ethnic and religious groups and measure more accurately the consequences of increased intergroup trust at the local level. These might include the impacts on other forms of local belonging and pride and on more general feelings of inclusion and behavioural patterns of local citizenship. We need a much clearer understanding of what works to bring communities together with more recourse to reliable statistical evidence and regular evaluation of policies, programmes and interventions.

Returning to our analysis of local priorities, positive relations between ethnic groups and faith communities were considered to be the least important factor in making somewhere a good place to live and the local factors which were considered to be among the least in need of improvement. On that basis, intergroup relations may be categorised as the lowest local priority from those listed on our survey questionnaire.

However, the low priority status given to ethnic and faith group relations should not necessarily mean that local communities are without opportunities to come together across lines of difference. Our research suggests that people’s local priorities are much more likely to centre on factors such as health, crime and jobs. These are the local issues that could bring communities together across ethnic and religious divides. We recommend that policymakers and charitable organisations working on social cohesion place much more emphasis on these basic aspects of local life, especially during times of economic hardship.

Whilst attempts to emphasise the positive aspects of local diversity are understandable and well-meaning, policymakers and practitioners should avoid initiatives that are merely performative or overly celebratory in nature. In times of economic hardship, the local importance of intergroup relations and social cohesion, and the extent to which interventions are welcomed by local communities, should be measured rather than assumed.

The challenges of low intergroup trust and the low status of intergroup relations could be more serious than many, within the public and charity sectors, assume or dare to admit. Our data suggest a creeping challenge of social cohesion that was almost certainly masked by national and local expressions of community spirit during the Covid-19 pandemic. Based on our data and analysis, it is clear that we now need a more honest, difficult conversation about local patterns of polarisation, the lack of social mixing within and between communities, and the urgent need for better social cohesion policies and interventions.

RECOMMENDATION 2: Low levels of trust between ethnic and religious groups should be regarded as an urgent wake-up call for national policymakers. Policymakers need to better understand the factors that facilitate and impede local trust between ethnic and religious groups as a matter of urgency. We recommend a more evidence-based “what works” approach to better understand how to increase levels of local trust between ethnic and religious groups across England and Wales.

RECOMMENDATION 3: Levels of local trust between ethnic and religious groups are low and represent a creeping social cohesion challenge. Policymakers and practitioners should commit more resources to the design, implementation and testing of interventions that boost connections and trust between people of different backgrounds in order to strengthen local trust and social capital. Policymakers and practitioners should take into account the positive contribution of community and faith leaders.

NON-DIVERSE COMMUNITIES

The Woolf Diversity Study is, in part at least, an exploration of themes commonly associated with Allport’s intergroup contact hypothesis (1954) and its many applications (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). To sum up, contact theory suggests that intergroup contact will, under certain conditions, reduce prejudices. In other words, when people from different backgrounds have a chance to spend time with one another, relations between them are likely to be more positive. Our data contributes (yet) more empirical evidence to scrutinise this proposition. (Those familiar with this field will know that contact theory has hardly wanted for empirical scrutiny!).

In terms of attitudes towards diversity, those who perceived their local communities to be diverse tended to be more positive about it. (Of course, “perceived” and “actual” diversity in a particular local setting may differ.) Our data analysis regarding perceived diversity appears to reinforce the basic contact theory hypothesis – contact reduces prejudice – but also reminds us that the reverse holds: people with less contact with others from different ethnic, national and religious backgrounds are less likely to have positive attitudes towards diversity.

In terms of attitudes towards diversity being good for British society, we have discussed respondents’ perceptions about living in a diverse or non-diverse area. We factored “actual” diversity into our statistical analyses using a variety of available demographic statistics relating to various minority proportions: the proportion of a local authority that self-identifies as “BAME”; the proportion born outside the UK and the proportion from a minority religious background.²

The picture in terms of attitudes towards diversity and their relationships with actual diversity is considerably less clear than attitudinal data based on perceptions of diversity. In terms of ethnic diversity in British society, for example, those living in local authorities with lower proportions of BAME residents were less positive towards it. (We might assume that positive attitudes in more diverse areas are determined by the greater numbers of survey respondents from ethnic minority backgrounds as well as White respondents with more positive attitudes towards them.) That said, perceiving local ethnic diversity was a stronger predictor of positive attitudes than actual levels of the same.

Similarly, while attitudes towards religious diversity in Britain were less positive in some local authorities with lower proportions of residents from minority religion backgrounds, differences between the least and most religiously diverse authorities were not statistically significant and perceived religious diversity was a far stronger predictor of positive views than actual levels. Attitudes towards migrants in Britain followed a similar pattern: perceived local diversity in terms of non-UK born residents played a stronger role in predicting attitudes towards migrants than living in areas ranked as having the lowest or highest proportions of such people.

² The term “BAME” has fallen out of favour with many community organisations, charities, and academic and policy researchers but survives for the time being within the world of administrative data collection and analysis.

In terms of attitudes towards local diversity, and whilst we might expect to see less diverse areas with less positive attitudes, most differences between the least diverse local authorities and those with most diversity were not statistically significant. Surprisingly, given what we know about former applications of contact theory, some of the least religiously diverse local authorities had more positive attitudes towards religious diversity than those with the highest proportions of people from minority religious backgrounds.

From an academic perspective, these findings contribute towards our understanding of how we might apply the contact theory hypothesis by demonstrating that, within some local contexts, perceived diversity may be more important than actual diversity in shaping attitudes towards minority communities. Alternatively, it might be the case that we need a geographic unit smaller than a local authority to enable more detailed work on the relationships between actual and perceived local ethnic, national and religious diversity and public attitudes towards each type.

From a policy perspective, we need to know how best to understand and support non-diverse communities in which change is happening or expected to happen soon. Use of the term “left behind” to describe socio-economic disparity and disadvantage is often well-meaning but the implication that these communities are outdated, unsophisticated or even bigoted can be normative and unhelpful. We hope our analysis will make a meaningful contribution to a more nuanced, more granular understanding and provide some of the methods and data analysis needed to support changing communities.

RECOMMENDATION 4: There is a need for policymakers and practitioners to better understand and support local communities where changes in ethnic, national or religious diversity are underway or expected. Policymakers should take a more evidence-based, “what works” approach to social cohesion. This could include taking knowledge from the evaluation of policies and interventions in more diverse local authorities and applying it to the design of future programmes in local communities where demographic change is underway or anticipated.

LOCAL PRIORITIES

Our decision to develop measures of local priorities was made following a roundtable discussion in Manchester during the preparatory consultation phase of this year’s Woolf Diversity Study. The roundtable was convened for the purpose of gathering local expertise on social cohesion and community work from local authority staff – from Greater Manchester and a local borough council serving one of Manchester’s satellite towns – senior staff from local charities serving the city’s minority ethnic and faith communities and senior Manchester-based academics.

During the discussion, it was pointed out by someone working for a local authority that their understanding of what was needed locally, gleaned from conversations with local people, was often different to their perceptions of how local needs were understood by some national government departments, academic and policy researchers and charitable organisations. Local people, it was argued, more often wished for things that were perhaps more “basic” than policymakers and experts working on their behalf assumed. The example given was “safer, cleaner streets” that are called for more often than “improved local arts and culture”. In many ways, our data and analysis of local priorities confirm the more “basic” needs of local communities in England and Wales.

According to our data, health services, level of crime and wage levels and cost of living are seen as the most important factors in making somewhere a good place to live in England and Wales. Least important are good relations between faith groups, community activities, and sports and leisure facilities. Similarly, wage levels and cost of living, health services and affordable housing are seen as the local conditions, services or assets most in need of improvement in England and Wales. Least important were good relations between faith groups, good relations between ethnic groups and access to nature.

Based on our data, we consider current local priorities in England and Wales to be affordable housing, clean streets, health services, job prospects, level of crime, public transport, road and pavement repairs, and wage levels and cost of living.

Given this, policymakers and policy researchers would be well-advised to measure local priorities rather than assume them. Our analysis suggests that policy research asserting the benefits of libraries, arts centres and museums, for example, or community activities and leisure facilities, with the implication that these should be treated as funding priorities by the UK Government, probably tells us more about those doing the research than it does about the local communities on which they focus. According to our data, the lowest priority local factors (i.e. those seen as least important and least in need of improvement) in England and Wales are community activities, good relations between ethnic groups, good relations between faith groups, and sports and leisure facilities.

In times of economic hardship, as our data on local priorities show, relations between ethnic and faith groups are seen as less important than life's basic necessities. Diversity in Britain is rightly celebrated. But we should remember that its benefits may not be obvious to everyone at all times and certainly not prioritised by all during challenging times.

RECOMMENDATION 5: There is a discrepancy between what local communities want and what policy researchers think they want. Policymakers and practitioners should measure local needs and priorities rather than assume them.

TRUSTING WHAT WORKS

Our data analysis revealed various surprises, most of which have been discussed above. One further surprise was the relative low number of people engaged with local activities and groups. Between around 70% and 90% of respondents answered “never” when asked to describe the frequency with which they participate in one of the activities or groups listed on our survey questionnaire.

Given some of the emphases placed by policymakers and policy researchers on activities, such as volunteering, as a driver of local belonging and on the reliance on local physical spaces as the sites for social cohesion, it may surprise some to see the importance attached by respondents to local social media groups.

However, the importance of social media groups as drivers of local identity, belonging and integration was suggested to Woolf Institute researchers in our early preparatory fieldwork for the Woolf Diversity Study. Online platforms and services such as Facebook and WhatsApp have been mentioned repeatedly in focus groups and during informal conversations held with local people and organisations in England since our work began in 2017. Although the base was fairly small, three times as many people (around 6%) engage with social media on a daily basis than with other local activities. Similarly, social media engagement is one of the most popular weekly and monthly forms of local participation. It would appear, therefore, that the role of social media in bringing local people together has been somewhat undervalued by policymakers and policy researchers.

Whilst an emphasis on volunteering as a tool for increasing local belonging and community cohesion is understandable – engagement with a local charity was the most popular monthly activity according to respondents – we must not forget that physical, face-to-face engagement may not suit everyone. Volunteering may be seen by many within the public and charity sectors as a ready-made solution to problems concerning social cohesion but it is unlikely to be an attractive proposition for those with more than two children and more than two part-time jobs.

Similarly, the focus on physical space and “social infrastructure” is understandable. A lack of long-term investment and over a decade of economic hardship have left many local neighbourhoods and their public spaces needing improvement. There is evidence from previous policy research (some stronger, some weaker) to suggest (but not prove) that improved social infrastructure will lead to improved community cohesion and wellbeing.

However, social media in local neighbourhoods is now a fact of life for many. It is not the only solution to less cohesive communities and, of course, as the vehicle for a social cohesion policy intervention may work better for some societal groups than others (e.g. those who are younger, better off and more “tech-savvy”). But to exclude social media engagement entirely on the grounds that online spaces and participation do not fit neatly into more fashionable “place-based” policy models loses sight of what is currently working “on the ground” to help bring communities together.

Our data show that relatively few people engage regularly with the types of civil society activities and groups that feature routinely in policy documents. Social media is the low hanging fruit of local social cohesion policymaking! A much stronger focus on what is already working within communities may well lead the way to harnessing its potential.

RECOMMENDATION 6: Social media is the low hanging fruit of local social cohesion policymaking! When policymakers consider concepts, such as belonging and pride of place, they should more often prioritise social media. Policymakers should look at social media as a key tool for boosting civic engagement and improving social cohesion, local trust and social capital.

MEASURING TRUST

One of our key objectives was to build a more detailed local picture of local people generally and those from specific ethnic and religious groups. In the first Woolf Diversity Study (Hargreaves et al, 2020) we published data concerning diversity within people's friendship groups and at work. We decided to continue focusing on these types of observable and measurable types of interpersonal and intergroup relations.

The Office for National Statistics considers "trust and co-operative norms" to be one of the four categories of social capital alongside "civic engagement", "personal relationships", "social network support". Increasing social capital is a key objective of the Levelling Up agenda but also an important consideration of influential policy research on trust and community wellbeing (Bennett Institute/Letter One, 2020).

As described in our report, previous attempts to measure trust have usually focused on the extent to which survey respondents perceive other people to be trustworthy (e.g. survey instruments asking respondents to place the extent to which they trust other people on a scale from 0 ("you can't be too careful") to 10 ("most people can be trusted")). One limitation of this method of measuring trust is that the extent to which local factors drive patterns of local trust is not at all clear. Separating psychological factors from environmental factors is difficult. This makes designing policy interventions difficult. Adopting

a more "objective" approach to trust (i.e. the same approach we took in the first Woolf Diversity Study) enables policymakers and practitioners to measure the practical manifestations of trust (i.e. actual trusting relationships) in a given local area and to make comparisons with other places. Objective trust metrics offer a more valid measurement as they rely less on highly subjective perceptions of cohesion within a local neighbourhood – such as those that might be driven by local media, local political groups or more active community organisations – and more on the actual social relations that develop as a result of prevailing social conditions or successful local interventions. Objective measures offer a more concrete baseline measurement against which future policy interventions can be evaluated.

The UK Government and, particularly, the Department of Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, should consider using metrics of trust that explore practical experiences of trust and the observable presence of trusting local relationships, rather than more subjective survey questions concerning perceived levels of trust in a local area or more general questions regarding the trustworthiness of people.

RECOMMENDATION 7: Popular measures of trust fail to map trusting relations within local communities. Policymakers and practitioners should adopt a more objective measure of local trust, such as the one used in the Woolf Diversity Study, to establish a more concrete baseline measurement against which future policy interventions can be evaluated.

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 1: The use of granular data capable of building a picture of how ethnic, national and religious diversity may be changing over time is crucial to our understanding of social cohesion in the UK. Policymakers, practitioners and academics should use and support the use of large-scale datasets and methods such as MRP,³ to measure British public attitudes concerning diversity and change in order to track social cohesion in the UK at the local, regional and national levels.

RECOMMENDATION 2: Low levels of trust between ethnic and religious groups should be regarded as an urgent wake-up call for national policymakers. Policymakers need to better understand the factors that facilitate and impede local trust between ethnic and religious groups as a matter of urgency. We recommend a more evidence-based “what works” approach to better understand how to increase levels of local trust between ethnic and religious groups across England and Wales.

RECOMMENDATION 3: Levels of local trust between ethnic and religious groups are low and represent a creeping social cohesion crisis. Policymakers and practitioners should commit more resources to the design, implementation and testing of interventions that boost connections and trust between people of different backgrounds in order to strengthen local trust and social capital. Policymakers and practitioners should take into account the positive contribution of community and faith leaders.

RECOMMENDATION 4: There is a need for policymakers and practitioners to better understand and support local communities where changes in ethnic, national or religious diversity are underway or expected. Policymakers should take a more evidence-based, “what works” approach to social cohesion. This could include taking knowledge from the evaluation of policies and interventions in more diverse local authorities and applying it to the design of future programmes in local communities where demographic change is underway or anticipated.

RECOMMENDATION 5: There is a discrepancy between what local communities want and what policy researchers think they want. Policymakers and practitioners should measure local needs and priorities rather than assume them.

RECOMMENDATION 6: Social media is the low hanging fruit of local social cohesion policymaking! When policymakers consider concepts, such as belonging and pride of place, they should more often prioritise social media. Policymakers should look at social media as a key tool for boosting civic engagement and improving social cohesion, local trust and social capital.

RECOMMENDATION 7: Popular measures of trust fail to map trusting relations within local communities. Policymakers and practitioners should adopt a more objective measure of local trust, such as the one used in the Woolf Diversity Study, to establish a more concrete baseline measurement against which future policy interventions can be evaluated.

³ Multilevel regression with post-stratification.



REFERENCES

- Allport, G. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Addison Wesley.
- Bennett Institute/Letter One (2020). *Valuing wealth, building prosperity: the wealth economy project on natural and social capital, one year report*. [online]. Available at: https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/WER_layout_March_2020_ONLINE_doubles.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2023.
- Hargreaves, J. (2020). *Religion, race and nationality – what are our prejudices and how can we overcome them? The Conversation*, 19 November. [online]. Available at: <https://theconversation.com/religion-race-and-nationality-what-are-our-prejudices-and-how-can-we-overcome-them-150306>. Accessed on 3 November 2023.
- Hargreaves, J., Kessler E., Izamoje, D., Symon, A. (2020). *How we get along: the Diversity Study of England and Wales [now the Woolf Diversity Study]*. [online]. Cambridge: Woolf Institute. Available at: <https://www.woolf.cam.ac.uk/diversity>. Accessed 26 November 2023.
- Institute for Public Policy Research (2022). *A new consensus? How public opinion has warmed to immigration*. London: Institute for Public Policy Research. [online]. Available at: <https://www.ippr.org/articles/a-new-consensus>. Accessed 3 November 2023.
- Lazarsfeld, P.F. and Merton, R.K. (1954). *Friendship as a social process: a substantive and methodological analysis*. In: M. Berger, T. Abel and H., Charles, eds. 1954. *Freedom and Control in Modern Society*. New York: Van Nostrand. Pp.18-66.
- Pettigrew, T. F. and Tropp, L. R. (2006). *A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory*. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90(5), pp.751-783.
- Putnam, R.D. (2000). *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Richards, L., Fernández-Reino, M. and Blinder, S. (2023). *UK public opinion toward immigration: overall attitudes and level of concern*. [online]. Oxford: Migration Observatory. Available at: <https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/>. Accessed 3 November 2023.

LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this non-systematic literature review is to explore and summarise recent academic and policy research concerning ethnic, national and religious diversity, social cohesion and related topics. This is done for several reasons: most pertinently perhaps, to identify the relevant gaps in the knowledge that the current study aims to fill; to assist readers wishing to explore the themes included in the Woolf Diversity Study in more depth; and, more generally, to place the current study within the context of recent academic and policy research.

We explored the subjects of diversity and change at length in the first Woolf Diversity Study report, *How We Get Along*, published in 2020 (Hargreaves et al, 2020). We encourage readers to access the report's appendix for a full literature review of each.¹ The sections that follow complement the literature review there and the short summaries of previous research at the opening of the chapters in this report on local trust, local priorities and local engagement. (We have reproduced the latter here for your convenience).

¹<https://www.woolf.cam.ac.uk/diversity> (see Appendix for literature reviews).



DIVERSITY

As for our previous study, we adopted a plain English, common sense definition of “diversity”. The Oxford Dictionary of English defines “diversity” as “the state of being diverse”. It defines “diverse” as “showing a great deal of variety”.

ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN NUMBERS

According to the Census 2021 (Office for National Statistics, 2022c) and its use of “high-level” ethnic categories, the population of England and Wales by ethnicity is as follows:

9.3% (5.5 million) identified as “Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh”.

4.0% (2.4 million) identified as “Black, Black British, Black Welsh, Caribbean or African”.

2.9% (1.7 million people) identified as “Mixed or Multiple ethnic groups”.

2.1% (1.3 million people) identified as “Other ethnic group”.

81.7% (48.7 million people) identified as “White”.²

In England and Wales, 10.1% of households (2.5 million households) consisted of people identifying with two or more ethnic groups.

NATIONAL DIVERSITY IN NUMBERS

According to the Census 2021 (Office for National Statistics, 2022d):

83.2% of residents (49.6 million people) in England and Wales in March 2021 were born in the UK.

6.1% (3.6 million people) were born in EU countries.

10.7% (approximately 6.4 million people) were born elsewhere in the world.

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN NUMBERS

According to the 2021 Census (Office for National Statistics, 2022e) and its use of religious affiliation categories, the population of England and Wales by religion is as follows:

0.5% (273,000 people) identified as Buddhist.

46.2% (27.5 million people) identified as Christian.

1.7% (1.0 million people) identified as Hindu.

0.5% (271,000 people) identified as Jewish.

6.5% (3.9 million people) identified as Muslim.

0.9% (524,000 people) identified as Sikh.

0.6% (384,000 people) identified as “Other religion”.

37.2% (22.2 million people) identified as “No religion”.

6.0% (3.6 million people) preferred not to state their religious affiliation.

THINKING ABOUT DIVERSITY

As before, our study of ethnic, national and religious diversity develops Allport’s foundational work on intergroup relations (1954), Putnam’s later influential work on diversity in contemporary society (2007), key policy documents from the last decade such as The Casey Review (Casey, 2016) and recent research on immigration and ethnic diversity (Lymperopoulou, 2020). As we outlined in 2020:

²The ONS do not give details on non-response.

EXTRACT FROM HOW WE GET ALONG (HARGREAVES ET AL, 2020)

Given our focus on communities, one suitable starting point (among the many available) is Robert Putnam's well-known lecture on diversity and community delivered in 2006 and published a year later: *E Pluribus Unum* ["out of many, one"]: *Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century* (Putnam, 2007). Putnam's lecture provides the departure point for a host of subsequent studies (see, among many others, van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014; Laurence and Bentley, 2016; Piekut and Valentine, 2016; Kaufmann and Goodwin, 2018; and Lymperopoulou, 2020).

In his lecture, Putnam considered increases in ethnic diversity in many advanced countries, driven largely by immigration, with a focus on the US. Putnam argued that, in the long-term, immigration and diversity would be [...] beneficial to society – as he describes, "an important social asset" (2007: 138). However, in the short-term, Putnam argued that immigration and ethnic diversity tend to reduce social solidarity and social capital. This position of Putnam's is sometimes known as the "constrict claim". According to Putnam, one consequence of ethnic diversity is a tendency for residents of all races to "hunker down"; in other words, to look inwards, detach and become increasingly separate – to become constricted. In Putnam's own words: "Trust (even of one's own race) is lower, altruism and community cooperation rarer, and friends fewer" (2007: 137).

Social contact and social solidarity, as applied by Putnam, are both complex concepts, with much academic writing devoted to both. For the purposes of this report, we may think of them as the quantity and quality of interactions and connections with other people living locally. Scholars have used two dominant theories to discuss and debate these social connections: "contact" and "conflict". According to contact theory (sometimes known as the "contact hypothesis") and confirming most common-sense understandings of such situations, trust between people from different backgrounds increases when contact between them

increases. According to proponents of this theory (including those influenced by Allport's *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954)), diversity reduces ethnocentric attitudes and fosters trust and solidarity towards people from other backgrounds (2007: 142).

In opposition to contact theory stands "conflict theory". Related to the notion of constriction, conflict theory posits that diversity leads to increased competition for limited resources (employment, housing, etc.), which in turn leads to the distrust of others (or to use the more technical term, "out-group distrust") and a tendency to "hunker down" (or to use the more technical phrase "in-group solidarity").

Putnam's influential lecture also describes the differences between "bonding" social capital (ties to people from similar backgrounds) and "bridging" social capital (ties to people from other backgrounds). Putnam challenges the notion that as one grows, the other diminishes. For Putnam, bridging and bonding is not a zero-sum game. Putnam's main argument is that research prior to 2006 had not focused on in-group attitudes (attitudes of members of a group towards each other) but on out-group attitudes (attitudes within a group towards another group). Further, he argued that researchers had presumed, but not firmly established, the links between in-group and out-group attitudes. In Putnam's view, the evidence did not support the theory. In taking this position, Putnam countered earlier research (e.g. Pettigrew and Tropp's influential and much-cited work), which had asserted the positive effects of contact between different ethnic groups within communities – to use the jargon, in-group contact at the local level (see Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Unsurprisingly, research following Putnam's lecture, whether supporting or challenging its main claims, now represents another giant block of academic work on diversity, with over 5,500 academic works citing it.

CHANGE

As for our 2020 study, we returned to the subject of public attitudes towards changes in ethnic, national and religious diversity in Britain as a whole and in diverse and non-diverse local communities.

CHANGE IN ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN NUMBERS

According to the Census 2011 and Census 2021 (Office for National Statistics, 2022c), the proportion of people identifying their ethnic group within the high-level “White” category dropped from 86.0% in 2011 to 81.7% in 2021.

The proportion of people identifying as “Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh” increased from 7.5% in 2011 to 9.3% in 2021 (4.2 million to 5.5 million people), the largest percentage increase of any of the “high level” ethnic groups in the Census.

Across the 19 ethnic groups used in the Census 2021, we see significant changes in the number of people identifying through the “White: Other White” category: from 4.4% in 2011 to 6.2% in 2021 (2.5 million to 3.7 million people). (One explanation for this increase is the ONS’s use of a new survey format that allows respondents to select this category and add their own text.)

Those identifying as “Other ethnic group: Any other ethnic group” increased from 0.6% in 2011 to 1.6% in 2021 (333,000 to 924,000 people). Those identifying as “Black, Black British, Black Welsh, Caribbean or African” rose from 1.8% in 2011 to 2.5% in 2021 (990,000 to 1.5 million people).

CHANGE IN NATIONAL DIVERSITY IN NUMBERS

According to the Census 2011 and Census 2021, the numbers of residents in England and Wales who were born in the UK dropped from 86.6% in 2011 to 83.2 % in 2021 (Office for National Statistics/Nomis, 2023).

The number of people in England and Wales born in an EU country increased from 4.3% in 2011 to 6.1% in 2021 (2.4 million to 3.6 million people).

The number of people in England and Wales born elsewhere in the world has increased from 4.3% in 2011 to 10.7% in 2021 (5 million to 6.4 million people).

CHANGE IN RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN NUMBERS

According to the Census 2021 (Office for National Statistics, 2022e), the number of people self-identifying as Christian dropped from 59.3% in 2011 to 46.2% in 2021 (33.3 million to 27.5 million people). For the first time in a census in England and Wales, less than half the population described themselves as Christian.

The number of people self-identifying as Muslim rose from 4.9% in 2011 to 6.5% in 2021 (2.7 million to 3.9 million people).

The number of people who responded “no religion” increased from 25.2% in 2011 to 37.2% in 2021 (14.1 million to 22.2 million people).

THINKING ABOUT CHANGE

The field of public attitudes towards ethnic, national and religious changes in diversity is without a unifying theoretical framework (although those of Allport and Putnam guided our work). Our first report drew from a wide range of research on attitudes towards demographic change in the UK. This time, we also relied on recent empirical studies on public attitudes towards immigration (Ipsos MORI, 2022) that have revealed a complex overall picture across Great Britain. More people wish to see immigration reduced than increased although the proportion holding negative views has steadily decreased since 2015 (2022: 7). At the same time, there are more people with positive attitudes towards the impact of immigration than those with negative views (2022: 4). In 2020, we outlined the major demographic shifts as demonstrated in the following extract:

Projections of the ethnic minority population of the United Kingdom have used census data combined with estimates for fertility, mortality and migration rates (Coleman, 2010). Based on

EXTRACT FROM HOW WE GET ALONG (HARGREAVES ET AL, 2020)

the continuation of current patterns of immigration, we expect to see the proportion of the population described as White British, Irish and Scottish, which comprised 90% of the UK's total population in 2006, to fall to 56% by 2056. Coleman estimated that the non-White minority populations will rise from around 10% in 2006 to 34% by 2056 (2010: 461-2). In Coleman's own words (2010: 476):

If overall net immigration continues as projected by the ONS, and if the ethnic distributions assumed here are even approximately correct, then the ethnic composition of the United Kingdom would be radically transformed within the current century. By mid-century, the non-White population would increase to 24 million (31 percent) and the Other White minority to 7 million (10 percent). Continued further, the White British population would have fallen below half by the late 2060s. Variant projections with lower, more plausible migration levels moderate that conclusion. Even if all immigration ceased, the minority groups would double to comprise one-fifth of the population before age-structure momentum became exhausted. Beyond that,

only the Mixed populations would continue to increase unless some segregated groups preserved their high fertility.

The religious landscape has also changed. According to a report from the Commission of Religion and Belief in British Public Life (CORAB, 2015), almost half of the population of England describes itself as non-religious, as compared with an eighth in 2001. There has been a general decline in Christian affiliation. In 1985, two-thirds of the population identified as Christian but by 2015 that figure was four in ten. Finally, there have also been increases in religious diversity. Fifty years ago, Judaism – at one in fifty – was the largest non-Christian tradition. Today, it is the fourth largest behind Islam, Hinduism and Sikhism. Taken as a group, religious minorities make up one in ten of the UK population.

COVID-19

Since publication of our last study in 2020, the UK and much of the rest of the world, experienced the social upheaval caused by Covid-19 and the various public health responses to it. Academic studies published around the pandemic explored aspects of community relations. Some found lower levels of social cohesion in the UK during the early part of the pandemic (Borkowska and Laurence, 2021). Data analysis by the UK's Office for National Statistics (hereafter ONS) revealed no significant changes to most social capital indicators during 2020 and 2021 although found that being older, being female and living in rural areas all made stronger social connections more likely during the period (Office for National Statistics, 2022a).

A series of national and sub-national surveys conducted by Belong, a cohesion and integration network, and the University of Kent examined perceptions and experiences of social cohesion across Britain between May 2020 and July 2021 (Abrams et al, 2021). Subsequent analysis focused on intergroup relations between Black, Muslim and White people in Britain and perceptions of division and unity (Abrams et al, 2022). Analysis revealed 40% of Black and non-Black respondents perceived Black people as feeling opposed rather than united with others in the UK. 47% of non-Muslim respondents perceived Muslims to feel in opposition to other groups (35% of Muslim respondents perceived the same).

LEVELLING UP

The Levelling Up white paper (Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, 2022) celebrates, albeit in an entirely partisan way, progress towards spreading opportunity around the country since 2019 among other achievements (2022: xiii):

‘...control of our immigration system by ending free movement and introducing a new points-based immigration system, giving the UK the freedom to decide who comes to our country based on the skills people have to offer.’

Migration experts have defined current British public attitudes to immigration have as “cake-ism” where the public favours an increase in the immigration of high-skilled workers, and workers in jobs where there are shortages, while also favouring an overall reduction in the numbers of immigrants coming to Britain, including those seeking asylum (Migration Observatory, 2023). We should note, however, that within the wider context of European attitudes, and according to the European Social Survey 2018, attitudes within the UK towards whether migrants make a country a better place to live are above European averages (Goubin, Ruelens and Nicaise, 2022). Similarly, and as stated, the proportion of people wanting to see immigration reduced continues to decrease over time (Ipsos MORI, 2022).

The UK Government’s Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities published the Levelling Up white paper on 2 February 2022. It set out the Government’s strategy to address geographical inequalities in economic opportunity, performance and prosperity. The strategy aimed to “transform places and boost local growth” (2022: xiv) with a focus on an array of factors including:

‘...strong innovation and a climate conducive to private sector investment, better skills, improved transport systems, greater access to culture, stronger pride in place, deeper trust, greater safety and more resilient institutions.’

Alongside economic objectives such as boosting productivity, pay, jobs and living standards, the white paper set out social aims, such as those in the extract quoted above, and the Government’s further ambitions to improve public services, restore a sense of community, local pride and belonging and empower local leaders and communities. The Levelling Up is the most important spatial policy document for more than 80 years (Martin et al, 2022).

The Levelling Up white paper organises its objectives under six pillars of capital that relate to the investment needed in certain places (2022: xv).

- **Physical capital** – infrastructure, machines and housing.
- **Human capital** – the skills, health and experience of the workforce.
- **Intangible capital** – innovation, ideas and patents.
- **Financial capital** – resources supporting the financing of companies.
- **Social capital** – the strength of communities, relationships and trust.
- **Institutional capital** – local leadership, capacity and capability.

SOCIAL CAPITAL

The Woolf Diversity Study responds to the fifth capital from the Levelling Up white paper: “social capital”. The paper develops Robert Putnam’s application of the concept (Putnam, 2000). Putnam, and later others, used it to explain how the loss of trust led to a decline in US communities (Chilenski and Summers, 2016; Hamilton, Helliwell and Woolcock, 2016).

According to the Levelling Up white paper (2022: 46):

“Areas with low levels of social capital often have high levels of crime and anti-social behaviour, poor quality shops, sports and cultural facilities, and few green spaces and community groups. In other words, these places also lack the social infrastructure to support communities. This, too, tends to reduce their attractiveness to people and businesses.”

The report argues for the role of local voluntary and community groups and trades unions in building skills and social capital (2022: 48).

The white paper sets out various objectives described as “missions”. Two are particularly pertinent to the Woolf Diversity Study (2022: xxiii-xxiv):

- **Mission 8 (Wellbeing):** By 2030, wellbeing will have improved in every area of the UK, with the gap between top performing and other areas closing.
- **Mission 9 (Pride in Place):** By 2030, pride in place, such as people’s satisfaction with their town centre and engagement in local culture and community, will have risen in every area of the UK, with the gap between top performing and other areas closing.

MEASURING SOCIAL CAPITAL

The Levelling Up white paper describes the established methods for the measurement of social capital at the national and subnational levels, but we need more work to improve estimates at the designated geographical level. One of the aims of this year's Woolf Diversity Study is to make a contribution towards increasing the availability of local level data.

Social capital refers to the extent and nature of peoples' connections with others and the collective attitudes and behaviours between people that support a well-functioning, close-knit society (Office for National Statistics, 2020a). The ONS classifies it into four categories: personal relationships, social network support, civic engagement, and trust and co-operative norms. There are no internationally agreed quantitative definitions of social capital nor are there directly measured estimates of the stock and flow of social capital. Instead, researchers use proxies or indicators linked to the outcomes associated with higher levels of social capital.

At the aggregate level, the ONS produces estimates of social capital in the UK (Office for National Statistics, 2020a) based on 25 indicators of social capital covering the four categories. The ONS publishes estimates infrequently. The Bennett Institute produces estimates on dimensions of trust, including measures such as general trust and trust in individuals and institutions, with estimates available from 2002 to 2016 (Bennett Institute/Letter One, 2020). The Community Life Survey captures evidence on community engagement, volunteering and social cohesion, available from 2016 onwards (Department of Culture, Media and Sport, 2021).

At the regional and local level, the What Works Centre for Wellbeing presents local wellbeing indicators across local authorities in England (What Works Centre for Wellbeing, 2017). Not all of these indicators are frequently updated. The Local Trust produces a Community Needs Index (Oxford Consultants for Social Inclusion, 2020) which combines a series of indicators under the domains of social infrastructure, connectedness, and active and engaged communities. These estimates are available for England at local authority level from 2019. The Centre for Thriving Places produces a scorecard which shows a local authority's score in England and Wales under the headline elements of local conditions – for instance, are local authorities creating the right

wellbeing conditions; equality – for instance, is wellbeing delivered fairly across the local area; and sustainability – for instance, is wellbeing delivered sustainably. Data is available for 2020 and 2021 (Centre for Thriving Places, 2021).

Through our engagement with civil servants, we learnt of their interest in identifying which aspects of social capital need strengthening in order to enable the relationships people need in their lives to feel supported and empowered when considering local opportunities. Officials also told us they are seeking data on people's perceptions of their community and the “mood music” in different places, as well as data which shows people's contact points with others in their community and with public services.

Policy experts have identified several communities in England as having been “left behind” (Local Trust, 2019; Oxford Consultants for Social Inclusion, 2020). Local Trust's Community Needs Index includes measures of social infrastructure, connectedness, and an active and engaged community to identify “left behind” places (Local Trust, 2019).

Experts define a community as being “left behind” when it is in a local authority ward that has high levels of need, multiple deprivation and socio-economic challenges alongside poor community and civic infrastructure, relative isolation and low levels of participation. The process of identifying “left behind” wards includes the use of the Community Needs Index that combines indicators under three domains: social infrastructure, connectedness, and active and engaged communities. The Community Needs Index data sources include civic engagement indicators based on data from 2008 and 2009 (Local Trust, 2019: 28) and leisure and culture participation indicators based on data from 2011 to 2013. Similarly, indicators of the strength of local social relationships are based on data from 2014 to 2015.

Policy experts assert the social and economic benefits of improved social infrastructure (Local Trust, 2021) as per the Bennett Institute's arguments concerning the social and economic value of social infrastructure.

Analysis of data revealed that high levels of community need exist “in the East of the country, particularly around the agricultural Fen areas near the Wash, the industrial areas of the East

Midlands and South Yorkshire, and County Durham and in the Thames Gateway and coastal communities throughout England” (Oxford Consultants for Social Inclusion, 2020: 4). Lowest levels of community need exist in and around London, in university towns and rural areas in northern England.

OTHER RECENT RESEARCH AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

Local belonging continues to matter to most people, can have individual and collective forms, and shapes local and regional identity (Tomaney, 2014; 2015a; 2015b, see also, inter alia, Chin, 2019).

A consensus on the understanding of local belonging has been developing in the UK among policymakers and policy researchers for over a decade. As a report from the then Communities and Local Government, now the Department of Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, stated in 2009 (Communities and Local Government, 2009: 9):

“How a person feels about their neighbourhood is based upon a combination of their personal history, characteristics and perceptions, and how these interact with a particular place and the other people who live there.”

Authors of the report assert that people find reassurance and connectedness in the neighbourhoods as the world becomes ever more complex. Minority ethnic people and people in rural locations are more likely to identify with their neighbourhood. Local identity and national identity are not mutually exclusive. According to the report, building a local sense of belonging includes helping newcomers settle and helping existing residents to adapt to change and have pride in their neighbourhood.

European policy research has frequently focused on issues of belonging, identity and participation (Global Exchange on Migration and Diversity, 2014). Research in the UK has revealed high levels of national, British identity and belonging among ethnic minorities in Britain (including among Muslim communities).

“Pride of place” is the positive emotion held by people for a place with which they identify or associate (Bonaiuto et al, 2020). An alternative term for “pride of place” is “place attachment” (2020: 15).

“Pride of place” may have physical aspects – for example, attitudes towards the built and natural local environment – and a less visible social dimension – for example, attachment to places that offer possibilities for social relationships and group identity (Hidalgo and Hernández, 2001).

According to a report by the Bennett Institute (Shaw, Garling and Kenny, 2022: 8):

“There has been a notable turn in the policy world in recent years to recognise the importance and meaning of place, and a particular concern about the fate of post-industrial cities and regions, poorer towns and deprived communities has emerged.”

According to the authors (2022: 17):

“There is therefore no automatic relationship between relative affluence and a sense of pride, primarily because the latter cannot be reduced to economic determinants alone, but this is not to suggest that these links do not exist and government needs to be alive to the complex nature of the relationship between pride and deprivation in different places.”

The authors made a call for more and better data (2022: 18):

“If pride in place is going to be reliably quantified there is a need to generate better data about individual and community perspectives at more granular levels.”

Interest in “social capital” has led to interest in the health implication of social connections at the community level (Carpiano and Hystad, 2011). Surveys regularly ask respondents to rate their sense of belonging to their local community. Carpiano and Hystad offer more precise measures of social capital and local belonging. For example, knowing people in a neighbourhood well enough to ask for a favour predicts very good or excellent health (2011: 614). Research suggests that having positive relations with neighbours is important in terms of dealing with life strains and local issues and leads to better overall health. Further, measures of sense of community belonging may, in fact, be capturing neighbourhood attachment. In response, the Woolf Diversity Study research team uses survey questions concerning trust among neighbours to capture social capital data and as a contribution to making more concrete the highly subjective and nebulous notion of local belonging.

A proposed framework for measuring social capital published by the ONS (Office for National Statistics, 2014, see also Office for National Statistics, 2015) includes four different aspects: personal relationships; social network support; civic engagement; trust and cooperative norms. The ONS suggests measures for each aspect (2014: 3-10). Measuring all four aspects is beyond the scope of the Woolf Diversity Study although future waves of the study may return to themes not covered in the present study. We cover two aspects this year: social network support and civic engagement.

To measure social network support, we borrow and adapt a survey instrument from Understanding Society which surveys the extent to which people in the UK borrow things and exchange favours with their neighbours. Rather than focusing specifically on borrowing, reciprocated favours and whether both are present generally, the survey design for the Woolf Diversity Study invites respondents to report the number of people living locally who they know well enough for a favour and then, in turn, the number of these people that are from a different ethnic group and a different faith group. This follows the Giving Green and white paper published by the UK Government's Cabinet Office (2011) which asserted the relationships between social cohesion, "community spirit" and health. To measure civic engagement, we ask a series of questions related to how often, if at all, respondents engage in specified local activities. The ONS (and others) have asserted that voting, volunteering and local political engagement are useful proxies for civic engagement and, therefore, for social capital and social cohesion. The Woolf Diversity Study explores civic engagement more widely than in previous studies (e.g. Understanding Society and Community Life Survey). First, we do not assume that volunteering suits everyone (e.g. those with more than one child and more than one job). Second, we do not assume that volunteering is the most popular local civic engagement. At the very least, such an assumption should be tested empirically whenever possible. The Woolf Diversity Study has designed the study to contribute in these ways. Finally, we contribute to a more granular local understanding given the geography of previous studies.

A report by the Bennett Institute and Letter One (2020) argued that investment in social infrastructure – the physical spaces and community facilities which bring people together to build meaningful relationships – is as important as physical infrastructure investment for rebalancing the prospects of the UK's nations, regions, cities and towns.

The Bennett Institute has called for an improvement in the availability of data on social infrastructure and data relating to community facilities and their levels of use (Kelsey and Kenny 2021). The report calls for a boost to local skills and highlights the importance of libraries, language schools, museums, theatres and art galleries. Later it highlights village halls, community centres, local pubs and public gardens. It also argues for the benefits of social infrastructure in terms of social value: community resilience (e.g. withstanding and recovering from crises), public health (e.g. improved physical and mental health) and bridging divides (e.g. across generational, ethnic, class and religious boundaries).

Two issues present themselves. First, the listed social infrastructure items look far from universal (i.e., museums, theatres and art galleries) and may have more to say about the authors of the report than the communities they describe. Secondly, and related to this, there is little evidence that these are local priorities around the UK. Considering Maslow, we would expect local priorities to centre on education, employment, housing, crime and health rather than on recreation and self-expression. A focus group in Manchester confirmed this when staff at a local authority in the north-west of England responded to a discussion on arts centres by suggesting that what local people living in the place they worked actually wanted were safer and cleaner streets.

In 2022, when given various options to choose, the top three issues British people worried about, according to British Futures, are prices and bills increasing, pressures on health services and the continuing presence of Covid-19, cost of living increases and health service pressures (Ballinger, Katawala and Rolfe, 2022). For younger people (those aged 16 to 18), climate change and other environmental crises were also among the most pressing issues (2022: 7). Britain being a less religious place was among the most observed changes alongside the more choices available to women and less discrimination towards gay people (2022: 11). Immigration issues still matter but fewer people see it as a negative for Britain.

Experts have questioned the apparent decrease in the importance of integration as a concept, organising principle and policy programme in the UK (Cox et al, 2022). The report laments the loss of connection in many communities and the problem of residential segregation. The report also asserts that minority communities are becoming less segregated from each other but no less so from the White British majority (2022: 24).

Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities (2021) reported one of its overarching themes as being “to build trust between different communities” but with more emphasis on trust in institutions rather than intergroup relations at the community level. Similarly, a recommendation mentions building “social and cultural capital” (2021: 20) but through the specific measure of extending school days rather than improving community relations.

British society values public services for the individual benefits they confer but also for their wider impacts on common benefit and public good (Public Services Trust, 2020).

LOCAL TRUST

The subject of trust is something of a mainstay within the field of social capital, integration and cohesion and also a common topic within public and policy debates on the general social and political wellbeing of the UK’s population and its local communities.

The Levelling Up white paper focuses on “deeper trust” as part of its strategy to “transform places and boost local growth” (Department of Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, 2021: xiv). The ONS uses “trust and co-operative norms” as one of four categories which constitute its definitional model of “social capital” (2022a and 2022b). Edelman, a global communications firm, has explored trust in 28 countries through the Edelman Trust Barometer, a series of surveys and briefing reports that have analysed trust across society and towards government, media, business and NGOs.

In 2023, Edelman reported the UK being in danger of “severe polarisation” driven by distrust in government and media and, more pertinently for the present study, a lack of a shared identity with 65% of respondents globally perceiving the “lack of civility and mutual respect today” to be the worst they had ever seen (Edelman, 2023).

In 2022, Onwards used an establish survey instrument and asked over 42,000 respondents, “Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” (Blagden and Stanley, 2023).

Researchers used multilevel regression with post-stratification (MRP), a technique also used in the Woolf Diversity Study, to estimate trust at the hyper-local level: 6,791 Middle Layer Super Output Areas (MSOA) in England; geographic units each with between 5,000 and 7,000 residents. Their analysis revealed that social trust varies within local authorities, that population density predicts lower social trust and prosperity predicts higher social trust.

Our measure of trust was adapted from an important US study of social capital and community belonging (Carpiano and Hystad, 2011). Carpiano and Hystad’s analysis concludes that a people’s sense of community belonging is associated positively with several network-based social capital measures including the number of people in the local neighbourhood known well enough to ask for a favour.

As mentioned in the main report, our study looks to establish how trust manifests in trusting relationships at the local authority level. As mentioned, we also explore trust between people from different ethnic groups and faith backgrounds, and the extent to which various demographic and socio-economic variables predict the numbers of people an individual trusts in a local area.

A measure of people living locally whom a respondent trusts is a more useful metric than one measuring how trusting a respondent feels themselves to be generally or whether the respondent believes other people living locally, or anywhere else, can be trusted. The former says little about the local area and the latter invites the respondents to speculate. Counting the number of people a respondent knows well enough for a favour provides relief from more subjective interpretations of local trust and trustworthiness and offers policymakers and practitioners a more objective test to evaluate short- and medium-term efficacy or interventions and longer-term changes over time. In other words, it is a much more useful baseline metric for policy.

LOCAL PRIORITIES

What makes somewhere a good place to live? The answer is, of course, entirely subjective. Responses to the question are likely to tell us as much about those offering their opinions as any actual place. Recent academic studies and policy reports, including those related to the UK Government's Levelling Up strategy, have sought to identify aspects of local life – the facilities, services, assets, opportunities and conditions – which contribute towards feelings of local satisfaction, pride and togetherness and which we might associate with social capital, cohesion and more general wellbeing (Department of Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, 2022).

Considering to the six “capitals” presented in the Levelling Up white paper, at least three (“physical capital”, “human capital” and “social capital”) relate to improving infrastructure, housing, health, and the strength of communities, relationships and trust – in other words, all factors we might consider as making somewhere a good place to live (2022: 58-95). The white paper lists various policy “missions” (2022: 117), several of which also relate to local satisfaction: pay, jobs and living standards; public services; and feelings of community, local pride and belonging (2022: 120-121). More specifically, the white paper pledges to improve the following: transport infrastructure; digital connectivity; primary school education standards; skills and training; health and “Healthy Life Expectancy”; general wellbeing; and “pride in place” (including satisfaction with the town centre and engagement in local culture), housing and levels of crime.

Given its characterisation as a “shared national project” (2022: xix), it is unsurprising that the Levelling Up white paper has little to say on regional differences concerning multifaceted local priorities although the strategy does provide a policy framework for local devolution and decision-making. Our data analyses provide some of the information required by local government agencies and decision-makers when considering the allocation of public funds to improve and maintain local areas.

Two recent reports published by the University of Cambridge's Bennett Institute have helped develop concepts and our understanding of “social infrastructure” (Kelsey and Kenny, 2021) and “pride in place” (Shaw, Garling and Kenny, 2022). The authors defined “social infrastructure” as “the physical spaces and community facilities which bring people together to build meaningful relationships”. According to the Bennett Institute, these include both town centres and more open, green space alongside “libraries, language schools, museums, theatres and art galleries”, “village halls, community centres, local pubs and public gardens”, as well as cafes and other community facilities (2022: 5-6). The benefits of investing in social infrastructure include those related to social values such as better community resilience (i.e. better responses to crises), better public health, and the bridging of divides and those more related to civic values such as increased local pride, the shaping of positive feelings about the identity, heritage and standing of their town, and reduced pessimism and disenchantment (2022: 6).

There is a lingering question concerning whether, and to what extent, local priorities vary across England and Wales and whether certain social groups are more or less likely to prioritise certain aspects of their local lives over others, particularly during economically uncertain times. Do all communities, for example, wish for better museums, theatres and art galleries? As a participant at a roundtable event in Manchester argued, people in disadvantaged communities are often less interested in local arts and culture and more interested in cleaner, safer streets for their children.

In a foundational and still popular study, A.M. Maslow published his now famous “hierarchy of needs” (Maslow, 1943). Maslow divided and categorised human motivation into physiological needs (e.g. air, food, water and shelter), safety needs (e.g. security, employment, health and property), love and belonging (friendship, intimacy and family), esteem (respect, self-esteem and status).

According to Maslow, needs lower down in the hierarchy (physiological and safety needs, for example) must be satisfied before individuals can deal with higher needs (such as esteem). Our analyses of local priorities applied and explored Maslow's theoretical framework.

An influential report, *One World, Many Places*, published in 2010 by the Ipsos Social Research Institute (better known today as Ipsos MORI) presented findings from an international study of attitudes towards municipal government and local areas across the world (Ipsos Social Research Institute, 2010).

One World, Many Places (Ipsos Social Research Institute, 2010) looked at how satisfied people from different countries are with their local area as a place to live although did not, as the Woolf Diversity Study does, take into account local or regional variation. The report found, broadly, that residents in countries where there is a high level of perceived community cohesion are more likely to be satisfied with their local area. The published model for "Priorities for quality of life" (2010: 15) plots local assets (such as "Access to nature", "Education provision" and "Shopping facilities") on a vertical y-axis labelled "Important in making somewhere a good place to live" (on the y-axis) against a horizontal x-axis labelled "Most needs improving". The resulting model is divided into quadrants such that some items rank highly in terms of making somewhere a good place to live and most needing improvement. These assets (for example, "Clean streets", "Health services" and 'Public transport') are local priorities for improvement. Similarly, those ranking high on being important but lower on needing improvement represent aspects of local satisfaction. These are important assets about which local people are satisfied. Finally, we can consider assets ranked lowest in terms of importance and improvement to be low local priorities.³

The Ipsos study combined analysis of attitudes towards determinants of quality of life with attitudinal data related to what people would most like to see improved in their local area. Combining responses in this way, allows researchers to explore issues that are local priorities (i.e. on the basis that people feel them to be important and in need of improvement). The report concedes that "priorities do differ from place to place" and that "more targeted research (either nationally or, ideally, at the local level) can make a real difference to our understanding of citizens' needs" (2010: 15). We seek to provide some of the information needed to develop an understanding of local priorities in England and Wales.

LOCAL ENGAGEMENT

We might imagine that healthy local communities involve neighbours sharing local space and engaging in the types of activities and groups that can bring people together and improve community belonging. But how much do we actually know about the British public's preferences for such activities? When it comes to local engagement with civil society – we use the term to describe volunteering or engaging in local activities or with local groups – what do people living in England and Wales actually do locally with their spare time? In other words, to what extent is engagement in civil society groups and activities part of everyday life in local communities?

Policymakers, as well as the academic and think tank researchers who aim to influence them, place great emphasis on promoting and improving access to shared local physical space and local community facilities to discuss shared physical spaces and local facilities and their impact on local pride and belonging (Bonaiuto et al, 2020; Abrams et al, 2021; Kelsey and Kenny, 2021 and Shaw, Garling and Kenny, 2022;). Libraries, museums, community and arts centres all feature frequently in policy reports (see previous analysis on which types of local facilities are priorities across England and Wales). Similarly, policy experts often see the types of activities we might find in these local spaces, such as local volunteering, as the primary drivers of healthy, interconnected community life.

³ We would not expect to observe assets that are of low importance but regarded by many as needing improvement and none in the Ipsos report is located in this quadrant.



Policy researchers at the Bennett Institute in Cambridge apply the concept of “social infrastructure” to their work on physical spaces and local facilities and has asserted the economic, social and civic value of them (Kelsey and Kenny, 2021). Analysis of Covid-19 Mutual Aid UK data shows a correlation, albeit a weak one, between levels of social infrastructure and the number of mutual aid groups that emerged during the pandemic (with the implication that where there is social infrastructure, there is also local connectedness and belonging). There is stronger evidence linking access to open space and population health improvements. There is also evidence that indicates the benefits of volunteering in terms of enhancing skillsets, growing social networks, improving employability and sustaining higher levels of wellbeing. Taken together, the suggested value of social infrastructure and the types of activities that improvements in it might encourage offer compelling glimpses of more positive local futures.

Based on all of this, our objectives in undertaking the analysis reported below were threefold. First, we aimed to scrutinise some of the assumptions concerning the supposedly universal appeal of volunteering (taken broadly here to cover local engagement with charities and other civil society groups and compared to other forms of local participation). Second, we wished to make available up-to-date statistical data analysis for those engaged in policy discussions around social cohesion, social capital, social infrastructure and local belonging (given the relative scarcity of statistical analyses of local data). Third, and more generally, we wanted to better understand the nature and extent of people’s local engagement with civil society groups and activities in their local neighbourhoods (to assist future policy and practice in this area).

RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS

TABLE 1: Respondent demographics

Variable	Category	Frequency	Percentage
Sex	Male	5,927	57.57
	Female	4,369	42.43
Total		10,296	100
Gender	Man	4,329	42.05
	Other	20	0.19
	Prefer not to say	21	0.20
	Woman	5,926	57.56
Total		10,296	100
Agecat (age 6 categories)	18-24 years old	1,330	12.92
	25-34 years old	2,069	20.10
	35-44 years old	2,078	20.18
	45-54 years old	1,754	17.04
	55-64 years old	1,474	14.32
	65+ years old	1,591	15.45
Total		10,296	100
Country	England	9,730	94.50
	Wales	566	5.50
Total		10,296	100
Region	East Midlands	860	8.35
	East of England	1,108	10.76
	London	1,328	12.90
	North East	515	5.00
	North West	1,340	13.01
	South East	1,455	14.13
	South West	975	9.47
	Wales	566	5.50
	West Midlands	1,133	11.00
	Yorkshire and the Humber	1,016	9.87
Total		10,296	100
Citizenship	Another country	422	4.10
	Both	178	1.73
	British citizen	9,621	93.44
	Prefer not to say	75	0.73
Total		10,296	100
Ethnicity	Asian	691	6.71
	Black	316	3.07
	Mixed	229	2.22
	Other	57	0.55
	Prefer not to say	74	0.72
	White	8,929	86.72
Total		10,296	100

Variable	Category	Frequency	Percentage
Religion	Buddhist	95	0.92
	Christian	4,506	43.76
	Hindu	151	1.47
	Jewish	116	1.13
	Muslim	540	5.24
	None	4,685	45.50
	Other	150	1.46
	Sikh	53	0.51
	Total	10,296	100
Education	Apprenticeship	296	2.87
	Entry Level	156	1.52
	Level 1	1,364	13.25
	Level 2	1,877	18.23
	Level 3	1,815	17.63
	Level 4+	3,572	34.69
	No qualifications	1,173	11.39
	Other	43	0.42
	Total	10,296	100
hhinc (household income 3 bands)	£0 - £19,999	3,650	35.45
	£20,000 - £39,999	3,967	38.53
	£40,000+	2,679	26.02
	Total	10,296	100
ge19 (General Election 2019 vote)	Brexit Party	193	1.87
	Conservative	2,939	28.55
	Did not vote	3,600	34.97
	Green Party	237	2.30
	Labour	2,701	26.23
	Liberal Democrats	528	5.13
	Other	97	0.94
	Refused	1	0.01
	Total	10296	100
eu16 (EU Referendum 2016 vote)	Did not vote	3,673	35.67
	Leave	3,491	33.91
	Remain	3,132	30.42
Total		10,296	100

DIVERSITY

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

BRITISH SOCIETY

TABLE 2: Frequency and percentage of agreement and disagreement with statements that ethnic, national and religious diversity are good for British society

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Ethnic diversity is good for British society	%	22.4%	33.6%	25.4%	8.8%	6.3%	3.5%	100.0%
	n	2,306	3,459	2,617	906	646	362	10,296
Migrants are good for British society	%	14.7%	29.1%	28.4%	13.3%	10.6%	3.9%	100.0%
	n	1,513	2,999	2,922	1,371	1,095	397	10,296
Religious diversity is good for British society	%	15.3%	28.7%	29.2%	11.2%	7.9%	7.7%	100.0%
	n	1,573	2,956	3,003	1,152	818	794	10,296

DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

TABLE 3: Frequency and percentage of agreement and disagreement with statements that ethnic, national and religious diversity are good for the respondent's local community

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Ethnic diversity is good for my local community	%	29.1%	38.2%	20.3%	6.6%	4.7%	1.1%	100.0%
	n	1,672	2,197	1,164	378	272	61	5,744
Migrants are good for my local community	%	19.8%	32.3%	26.2%	10.6%	8.6%	2.5%	100.0%
	n	1,179	1,927	1,562	632	515	151	5,966
Religious diversity is good for my local community	%	26.2%	37.7%	20.6%	8.3%	5.7%	1.4%	100.0%
	n	1,026	1,474	807	325	223	55	3,911

NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

TABLE 4: Frequency and percentage of agreement and disagreement with statements that ethnic, national and religious diversity would be good for the respondent's local community

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Ethnic diversity would be good for my local community	%	11.7%	24.1%	35.9%	11.8%	9.0%	7.6%	100.0%
	n	535	1,095	1,634	535	408	345	4,552
Migrants would be good for my local community	%	7.2%	18.1%	35.1%	16.0%	14.9%	8.6%	100.0%
	n	313	782	1,522	692	646	374	4,330
Religious diversity would be good for my local community	%	7.6%	20.0%	37.8%	12.1%	9.0%	13.6%	100.0%
	n	483	1,276	2,412	772	572	871	6,385

CHI-SQUARE INDEPENDENCE TESTS

BRITISH SOCIETY

TABLE 5: Chi-square independence tests between demographic categories and agreement or disagreement with statements that ethnic, national and religious diversity are good for British society

Variable	Categories	Ethnic diversity is good for British society		Religious diversity is good for British society		Migrants are good for British society	
		χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)	χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)	χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)
Sex	Female Male	133.874(5)	<.001	109.421(5)	<.001	18.880(5)	0.002
Age	18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+	666.476 (25)	<.001	783.668(25)	<.001	511.949(25)	<.001
Region (nutsi)	East Midlands East of England London North East North West South East South West Wales West Midlands Yorkshire and the Humber	165.565 (45)	<.001	167.141(45)	<.001	218.147(45)	<.001
Ethnicity	Asian Black Mixed Other Prefer not to say White	407.425 (25)	<.001	391.534(25)	<.001	443.431(25)	<.001
Religion	Buddhist Christian Hindu Jewish Muslim None Other Sikh	267.168 (35)	<.001	346.612(35)	<.001	273.254(35)	<.001
Education	Apprenticeship Entry level Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4+ No qualifications Other	770.634 (35)	<.001	483.563(35)	<.001	725.547(35)	<.001
Income (annual household)	£0-£19,999 £20-£39,999 £40,000+	183.847 (10)	<.001	116.708(10)	<.001	180.207(10)	<.001

DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

TABLE 6: Chi-square independence tests between demographic categories and agreement or disagreement with statements that ethnic, national and religious diversity are good for my local community

Variable	Categories	Ethnic diversity is good for my local community		Religious diversity is good for my local community		Migrants are good for my local community	
		χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)	χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)	χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)
Sex	Female Male	52.405(5)	<.001	27.331(5)	<.001	24.378(5)	<.001
Age	18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+	462.956(25)	<.001	315.645(25)	<.001	425.329(25)	<.001
Region (nutsi)	East Midlands East of England London North East North West South East South West Wales West Midlands Yorkshire and the Humber	108.865(45)	<.001	87.307(45)	<.001	190.577(45)	<.001
Ethnicity	Asian Black Mixed Other Prefer not to say White	249.065(25)	<.001	178.337(25)	<.001	270.379(25)	<.001
Religion	Buddhist Christian Hindu Jewish Muslim None Other Sikh	187.514(35)	<.001	162.152(35)	<.001	194.786(35)	<.001
Education	Apprenticeship Entry level Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4+ No qualifications Other	220.717(35)	<.001	93.338(35)	<.001	332.160(35)	<.001
Income (annual household)	£0-£19,999 £20-£39,999 £40,000+	65.445(10)	<.001	38.354(10)	<.001	87.143(10)	<.001

NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES**TABLE 7:** Chi-square independence tests between demographic categories and agreement or disagreement with statements that ethnic, national and religious diversity would be good for the respondent's local community

Variable	Categories	Ethnic diversity is good for British society		Religious diversity is good for British society		Migrants are good for British society	
		χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)	χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)	χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)
Sex	Female Male	67.798(5)	<.001	103.514(5)	<.001	8.707(5)	.121
Age	18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+	259.580(25)	<.001	346.304(25)	<.001	196.094(25)	<.001
Region (nutsi)	East Midlands East of England London North East North West South East South West Wales West Midlands Yorkshire and the Humber	98.361(45)	<.001	68.290(45)	0.014	119.500(45)	<.001
Ethnicity	Asian Black Mixed Other Prefer not to say White	156.982 (25)	<.001	179.811(25)	<.001	162.411(25)	<.001
Religion	Buddhist Christian Hindu Jewish Muslim None Other Sikh	156.388 (35)	<.001	180.256(35)	<.001	148.464(35)	<.001
Education	Apprenticeship Entry level Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4+ No qualifications Other	472.669(35)	<.001	295.137(35)	<.001	443.153(35)	<.001
Income (annual household)	£0-£19,999 £20-£39,999 £40,000+	126.062 (10)	<.001	43.332(10)	<.001	72.155(10)	<.001

BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELLING

BRITISH SOCIETY

TABLE 8: Predicting disagreement with the statement that ethnic diversity is good for British society

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.475(<.001)***	.060	.622	.553	.699
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	.038(.765)	.128	1.039	.808	1.336
35-44	-.015(.909)	.131	.985	.762	1.274
45-54	-.042(.747)	.131	.959	.741	1.240
55-64	.304(.022)*	.133	1.355	1.044	1.757
65+	.174(.193)	.133	1.189	.916	1.545
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	.399(.048)*	.202	1.490	1.003	2.214
Yes	.224(<.001)***	.064	1.251	1.103	1.418
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	-.307(.073)	.171	.736	.526	1.029
Black	-.176(.392)	.206	.838	.560	1.256
Mixed	-.002(.992)	.225	.998	.641	1.552
Other	-.444(.119)	.285	.642	.367	1.121
Prefer not to say	-.631(.138)	.426	.532	.231	1.226
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.339(.256)	.299	1.404	.782	2.522
Christian	-.007(.918)	.065	.993	.875	1.128
Hindu	.094(.732)	.276	1.099	.640	1.887
Jewish	.124(.619)	.250	1.132	.693	1.850
Muslim	-.241(.226)	.199	.786	.532	1.161
Other	.009(.969)	.226	1.009	.647	1.572
Local community is ethnically diverse (ref. Agrees)	.686(<.001)***	.071	1.985	1.728	2.280
BAME population in Local Authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	-.541(.003)**	.183	.582	.407	.833
2nd decile	-.562(.002)**	.177	.570	.403	.807
3rd decile	-.543(.002)**	.173	.581	.414	.816
4th decile	-.148(.382)	.170	.862	.619	1.202
5th decile	-.612(<.001)***	.167	.543	.391	.752
6th decile	-.428(.010)**	.165	.652	.472	.901
7th decile	-.322(.035)*	.153	.725	.537	.978
8th decile	-.281(.052)	.145	.755	.569	1.003
9th decile	-.240(.092)	.142	.787	.595	1.040

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	.006(.970)	.154	1.006	.743	1.361
East of England	.041(.779)	.147	1.042	.782	1.389
North East	.022(.905)	.185	1.022	.711	1.469
North West	.157(.254)	.138	1.170	.893	1.534
South East	-.346(.016)*	.143	.708	.534	.937
South West	.046(.760)	.152	1.048	.777	1.412
Wales	-.007(.972)	.186	.993	.690	1.431
West Midlands	-.086(.511)	.131	.917	.710	1.186
Yorkshire and the Humber	.161(.278)	.148	1.175	.878	1.571
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	.113(.179)	.084	1.119	.950	1.319
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.617(<.001)***	.152	1.853	1.376	2.494
Entry Level	.190(.438)	.245	1.210	.748	1.956
Level 1	.430(<.001)***	.095	1.537	1.277	1.851
Level 2	.225(.016)*	.093	1.252	1.043	1.502
Level 3	.103(.353)	.111	1.108	.892	1.378
No Qualifications	.391(<.001)***	.100	1.478	1.214	1.800
Other	.473(.166)	.341	1.605	.822	3.132
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	-.176(.040)*	.086	.838	.709	.992
£20-£39,999	-.152(.026)*	.068	.859	.751	.982
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.546(<.001)***	.090	.579	.485	.691
Remain	-1.282(<.001)***	.091	.277	.232	.332
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.251(.211)	.200	1.285	.867	1.903
Did not vote	-.349(<.001)***	.087	.705	.594	.837
Green Party	-1.011(<.001)***	.270	.364	.214	.617
Labour	-.716(<.001)***	.097	.489	.404	.591
Liberal Democrats	-.668(<.001)***	.146	.513	.385	.683
Other	-.322(.218)	.262	.724	.434	1.210
Constant	-.834(<.001)***	.179	.434		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.086; Nagelkerke = 0.150

Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 920,755$ df = 56, Sig. = <.001***

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 19.932$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.011*

n = 10,295

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value $\leq$ 0.001)

BAME = Black, Asian and minority ethnic

TABLE 9: Predicting disagreement with a statement that migrants are good for British society

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.008(.879)	.050	.992	.899	1.095
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	.375(<.001)***	.110	1.455	1.174	1.804
35-44	.373(<.001)***	.111	1.452	1.169	1.804
45-54	.459(<.001)***	.111	1.583	1.274	1.967
55-64	.687(<.001)***	.114	1.988	1.590	2.486
65+	.428(<.001)***	.115	1.534	1.223	1.924
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	-.073(.690)	.183	.930	.649	1.331
Yes	.090(.104)	.055	1.094	.982	1.219
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	-.215(.129)	.141	.807	.611	1.064
Black	-.449(.019)*	.191	.638	.439	.928
Mixed	-.414(.056)	.216	.661	.433	1.010
Other	-.537(.026)*	.241	.585	.364	.938
Prefer not to say	-.469(.158)	.332	.626	.326	1.199
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.018(.947)	.267	1.018	.603	1.718
Christian	-.038(.485)	.055	.963	.865	1.071
Hindu	.093(.689)	.231	1.097	.697	1.725
Jewish	-.605(.028)*	.275	.546	.319	.935
Muslim	-.121(.457)	.163	.886	.643	1.219
Other	-.024(.898)	.185	.977	.680	1.402
Local community is nationally diverse (ref. Agrees)	.503(<.001)***	.063	1.654	1.462	1.870
Non-UK born in Local Authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	.070(.697)	.179	1.072	.755	1.522
2nd decile	-.291(.094)	.173	.748	.532	1.051
3rd decile	-.106(.525)	.167	.899	.649	1.247
4th decile	-.247(.151)	.172	.781	.557	1.094
5th decile	-.165(.325)	.167	.848	.611	1.178
6th decile	-.115(.488)	.165	.892	.645	1.232
7th decile	-.178(.261)	.158	.837	.614	1.141
8th decile	-.318(.039)*	.154	.728	.539	.984
9th decile	-.315(.033)*	.148	.730	.546	.975

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	.031(.833)	.148	1.032	.772	1.378
East of England	-.027(.853)	.145	.974	.733	1.293
North East	.065(.712)	.177	1.067	.755	1.509
North West	-.028(.848)	.146	.972	.731	1.294
South East	-.118(.392)	.138	.888	.677	1.165
South West	.093(.531)	.149	1.098	.820	1.469
Wales	-.154(.380)	.176	.857	.608	1.209
West Midlands	.115(.414)	.141	1.122	.851	1.480
Yorkshire and the Humber	.153(.311)	.151	1.165	.867	1.567
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	.051(.434)	.065	1.052	.927	1.194
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.891(<.001)***	.133	2.439	1.879	3.165
Entry Level	.568(.003)**	.192	1.765	1.211	2.573
Level 1	.514(<.001)***	.081	1.672	1.427	1.958
Level 2	.306(<.001)***	.079	1.358	1.164	1.585
Level 3	.246(.008)**	.093	1.279	1.066	1.536
No Qualifications	.673(<.001)***	.084	1.960	1.662	2.312
Other	.837(.005)**	.300	2.309	1.282	4.157
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	.050(.487)	.072	1.051	.913	1.210
£20-£39,999	-.002(.971)	.058	.998	.890	1.119
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.424(<.001)***	.074	.655	.566	.757
Remain	-1.163(<.001)***	.073	.313	.271	.361
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.371(.049)*	.188	1.449	1.002	2.095
Did not vote	-.270(<.001)***	.073	.763	.661	.881
Green Party	-.642(.002)**	.204	.526	.353	.785
Labour	-.834(<.001)***	.082	.434	.370	.510
Liberal Democrats	-.668(<.001)***	.120	.513	.405	.649
Other	-.209(.332)	.215	.812	.533	1.237
Constant	-1.142(<.001)***	.149	.319		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .108; Nagelkerke = .161
 Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 1,171.447$, df = 56, Sig. = <.001***
 Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 4.202$, df = 8, Sig. = .838
 n = 10,295

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

TABLE 10: Predicting disagreement with a statement that religious diversity is good for British society

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.444(<.001)***	.054	.642	.577	.713
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	.296(.013)*	.119	1.344	1.064	1.698
35-44	.238(.052)	.123	1.268	.997	1.612
45-54	.370(.002)**	.121	1.448	1.141	1.837
55-64	.715(<.001)***	.124	2.044	1.604	2.605
65+	.603(<.001)***	.125	1.828	1.431	2.336
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	.123(.532)	.197	1.131	.769	1.662
Yes	.161(.006)**	.059	1.175	1.047	1.319
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	-.440(.005)**	.156	.644	.474	.874
Black	.270(.109)	.168	1.310	.942	1.821
Mixed	.118(.556)	.201	1.126	.759	1.670
Other	-.606(.019)*	.258	.546	.329	.904
Prefer not to say	-.089(.792)	.338	.915	.472	1.773
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.207(.434)	.265	1.231	.732	2.070
Christian	-.300(<.001)***	.059	.740	.660	.831
Hindu	.288(.238)	.244	1.333	.827	2.150
Jewish	-.353(.160)	.251	.703	.430	1.150
Muslim	.036(.832)	.170	1.037	.743	1.447
Other	-.110(.586)	.202	.896	.603	1.331
Local community is religiously diverse (ref. Agrees)	.886(<.001)***	.063	2.425	2.146	2.742
Minority religion population in local authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	-.009(.956)	.160	.991	.725	1.356
2nd decile	.151(.334)	.157	1.164	.856	1.582
3rd decile	.336(.029)*	.154	1.400	1.036	1.892
4th decile	.242(.115)	.153	1.273	.943	1.720
5th decile	.081(.594)	.151	1.084	.806	1.459
6th decile	.190(.211)	.152	1.209	.898	1.629
7th decile	.276(.042)*	.136	1.318	1.010	1.721
8th decile	.140(.290)	.133	1.151	.887	1.492
9th decile	.141(.288)	.133	1.152	.888	1.495

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	-.357(.009)**	.137	.700	.535	.916
East of England	-.307(.018)*	.129	.735	.571	.948
North East	-.035(.823)	.158	.965	.709	1.315
North West	-.179(.138)	.121	.836	.660	1.059
South East	-.428(<.001)***	.120	.652	.515	.826
South West	-.353(.009)**	.135	.702	.539	.915
Wales	-.336(.037)*	.161	.715	.522	.980
West Midlands	-.105(.365)	.115	.901	.718	1.129
Yorkshire and the Humber	-.036(.772)	.125	.964	.754	1.233
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	.102(.167)	.074	1.107	.958	1.280
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.442(.002)**	.140	1.556	1.182	2.049
Entry Level	.253(.245)	.217	1.287	.841	1.971
Level 1	.233(.006)**	.085	1.263	1.070	1.490
Level 2	.172(.034)*	.081	1.187	1.013	1.392
Level 3	.120(.212)	.096	1.127	.934	1.361
No Qualifications	-.006(.951)	.093	.994	.829	1.193
Other	.543(.083)	.313	1.721	.932	3.177
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	-.173(.029)*	.079	.841	.721	.982
£20-£39,999	-.119(.054)	.062	.888	.787	1.002
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.527(<.001)***	.082	.590	.503	.693
Remain	-.875(<.001)***	.075	.417	.360	.483
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.125(.534)	.200	1.133	.765	1.678
Did not vote	-.201(.012)*	.080	.818	.699	.956
Green Party	-.185(.340)	.194	.831	.569	1.215
Labour	-.580(<.001)***	.085	.560	.474	.662
Liberal Democrats	-.518(<.001)***	.121	.596	.470	.756
Other	-.153(.509)	.231	.858	.545	1.351
Constant	-1.137(<.001)***	.170	.321		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .082; Nagelkerke = .131
 Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 879.172$, df = 56, Sig. = <.001***
 Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 6.565$, df = 8, Sig. = .584
 n = 10,295

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

TABLE 11: Predicting disagreement with a statement that ethnic diversity is good for the respondent's local community

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.440(<.001)***	.091	.644	.539	.771
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	-.449(.029)*	.205	.638	.427	.954
35-44	-.069(.724)	.194	.934	.638	1.366
45-54	.010(.960)	.197	1.010	.686	1.487
55-64	.489(.012)*	.195	1.631	1.113	2.389
65+	.269(.184)	.202	1.308	.880	1.944
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say		.321	1.293	.689	2.429
Yes	.216(.026)*	.097	1.241	1.026	1.502
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	-.477(.061)	.254	.621	.377	1.021
Black	-1.336(.002)**	.441	.263	.111	.624
Mixed	-.072(.845)	.368	.931	.453	1.914
Other	-.493(.235)	.416	.611	.270	1.379
Prefer not to say	-.184(.753)	.586	.832	.263	2.625
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	1.353(<.001)***	.371	3.870	1.871	8.004
Christian	-.107(.281)	.099	.899	.740	1.091
Hindu	.071(.863)	.408	1.073	.483	2.386
Jewish	-.158(.634)	.332	.854	.446	1.636
Muslim	-.375(.220)	.305	.688	.378	1.251
Other	-.156(.676)	.372	.856	.413	1.773
BAME population in Local Authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	-.496(.097)	.299	.609	.339	1.094
2nd decile	-.164(.528)	.261	.848	.509	1.415
3rd decile	-.999(<.001)***	.298	.368	.205	.660
4th decile	-.005(.986)	.258	.996	.601	1.650
5th decile	-.130(.575)	.232	.878	.558	1.383
6th decile	.106(.640)	.227	1.112	.712	1.736
7th decile	.197(.330)	.202	1.217	.820	1.809
8th decile	.008(.969)	.203	1.008	.676	1.502
9th decile	-.020(.914)	.190	.980	.676	1.421

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	-.432(.068)	.237	.649	.408	1.033
East of England	-.228(.276)	.209	.796	.529	1.199
North East	-.212(.481)	.301	.809	.449	1.458
North West	.058(.760)	.189	1.060	.731	1.536
South East	-.546(.006)**	.200	.579	.391	.857
South West	-.637(.008)**	.241	.529	.330	.847
Wales	-.262(.395)	.307	.770	.421	1.406
West Midlands	-.114(.520)	.177	.892	.631	1.263
Yorkshire and the Humber	-.181(.390)	.211	.834	.552	1.261
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	.265(.051)	.136	1.304	.998	1.703
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.294(.182)	.220	1.341	.871	2.065
Entry Level	-.401(.332)	.414	.670	.298	1.507
Level 1	-.154(.291)	.146	.857	.644	1.141
Level 2	-.205(.133)	.137	.814	.623	1.064
Level 3	-.108(.506)	.162	.898	.654	1.233
No Qualifications	.286(.052)	.147	1.331	.998	1.775
Other	-.598(.368)	.664	.550	.150	2.023
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	.049(.708)	.132	1.051	.811	1.361
£20-£39,999	-.057(.588)	.105	.945	.770	1.160
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.548(<.001)***	.136	.578	.443	.754
Remain	-1.143(<.001)***	.136	.319	.244	.416
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.400(.194)	.308	1.491	.816	2.726
Did not vote	-.257(.046)	.129	.773	.601	.995
Green Party	-1.113(.007)**	.415	.329	.146	.741
Labour	-.800(<.001)***	.144	.449	.339	.596
Liberal Democrats	-1.815(<.001)***	.354	.163	.081	.326
Other	.192(.612)	.378	1.211	.577	2.543
Constant	-.855(<.001)***	.256	.425		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .085; Nagelkerke = .167

Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 508.616$, df = 55, Sig. = <.001***

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: $\chi^2 = 16.655$, df = 8, Sig. = .034*

n = 5,946

BAME = Black, Asian and minority ethnic

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value $\leq$ 0.001)

TABLE 12: Predicting disagreement with a statement that migrants are good for the respondent's local community

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.046(.528)	.073	.955	.828	1.101
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	.657(<.001)***	.171	1.930	1.379	2.700
35-44	.840(<.001)***	.170	2.316	1.659	3.234
45-54	.962(<.001)***	.171	2.618	1.873	3.659
55-64	1.345(<.001)***	.174	3.840	2.728	5.405
65+	1.123(<.001)***	.177	3.074	2.171	4.351
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	.209(.440)	.271	1.233	.725	2.095
Yes	.025(.755)	.080	1.025	.877	1.199
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	-.577(.009)**	.221	.562	.364	.866
Black	-.873(.004)**	.299	.418	.232	.751
Mixed	.097(.720)	.270	1.101	.649	1.869
Other	-1.677(.004)**	.579	.187	.060	.582
Prefer not to say	-.045(.914)	.420	.956	.420	2.175
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.328(.380)	.374	1.388	.667	2.886
Christian	-.106(.175)	.078	.899	.771	1.048
Hindu	-.091(.811)	.382	.913	.432	1.928
Jewish	-.843(.016)*	.350	.431	.217	.854
Muslim	-.359(.167)	.260	.698	.419	1.163
Other	.565(.040)*	.275	1.759	1.026	3.015
Non-UK born in Local Authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	.219(.384)	.251	1.244	.761	2.036
2nd decile	.140(.573)	.247	1.150	.708	1.868
3rd decile	.140(.541)	.229	1.151	.734	1.804
4th decile	-.350(.155)	.246	.705	.435	1.142
5th decile	-.010(.966)	.225	.990	.637	1.540
6th decile	.170(.445)	.222	1.185	.767	1.831
7th decile	.097(.646)	.210	1.101	.729	1.663
8th decile	-.215(.296)	.206	.806	.538	1.208
9th decile	-.079(.685)	.195	.924	.631	1.354

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	-.163(.426)	.205	.849	.568	1.269
East of England	.040(.839)	.194	1.040	.711	1.523
North East	-.085(.742)	.258	.918	.554	1.523
North West	-.112(.567)	.196	.894	.609	1.313
South East	-.181(.325)	.184	.834	.581	1.197
South West	-.063(.762)	.208	.939	.625	1.411
Wales	-.090(.721)	.252	.914	.558	1.497
West Midlands	.285(.127)	.187	1.329	.922	1.916
Yorkshire and the Humber	.248(.229)	.206	1.281	.856	1.917
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	-.089(.368)	.099	.915	.753	1.111
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.843(<.001)***	.184	2.322	1.618	3.333
Entry Level	-.061(.841)	.305	.941	.518	1.709
Level 1	.200(.087)	.117	1.222	.971	1.537
Level 2	.083(.455)	.111	1.087	.874	1.352
Level 3	.116(.382)	.132	1.122	.866	1.454
No Qualifications	.571(<.001)***	.119	1.771	1.402	2.237
Other	.625(.160)	.445	1.867	.781	4.466
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	.038(.720)	.106	1.039	.844	1.278
£20-£39,999	.042(.619)	.084	1.043	.884	1.229
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.430(<.001)***	.104	.650	.530	.797
Remain	-1.385(<.001)***	.107	.250	.203	.309
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.840(.002)**	.265	2.316	1.377	3.895
Did not vote	-.142(.173)	.104	.868	.707	1.064
Green Party	-.705(.022)*	.307	.494	.271	.901
Labour	-.674(<.001)***	.113	.509	.409	.635
Liberal Democrats	-.875(<.001)***	.193	.417	.285	.609
Other	-.063(.837)	.306	.939	.515	1.711
Constant	-1.705(<.001)***	.216	.182		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .125; Nagelkerke = .200

Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 796.162$, df = 55, Sig. = <.001***

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: $\chi^2 = 14.441$, df = 8, Sig. = .071

n = 6,148

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

TABLE 13: Predicting disagreement with a statement that religious diversity is good for the respondent's local community

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.286(.004)**	.101	.751	.617	.915
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	.342(.103)	.210	1.407	.933	2.123
35-44	.445(.038)*	.215	1.560	1.024	2.378
45-54	.721(<.001)***	.215	2.056	1.350	3.133
55-64	1.107(<.001)***	.223	3.024	1.952	4.686
65+	1.341(<.001)***	.224	3.825	2.467	5.930
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	.266(.472)	.369	1.305	.632	2.691
Yes	.342(.001)**	.107	1.408	1.140	1.738
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	-.455(.084)	.263	.635	.379	1.062
Black	.053(.845)	.270	1.054	.621	1.788
Mixed	.431(.192)	.330	1.538	.805	2.939
Other	-1.329(.019)*	.568	.265	.087	.807
Prefer not to say	-.985(.233)	.825	.373	.074	1.882
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.564(.176)	.417	1.759	.776	3.983
Christian	-.325(.003)**	.110	.723	.582	.897
Hindu	-.347(.455)	.465	.707	.284	1.758
Jewish	-.884(.040)*	.431	.413	.178	.961
Muslim	-.131(.637)	.277	.877	.510	1.509
Other	.326(.337)	.340	1.386	.712	2.698
Minority religion population in local authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	.027(.932)	.314	1.027	.556	1.899
2nd decile	.592(.036)*	.282	1.807	1.040	3.138
3rd decile	.605(.029)*	.277	1.830	1.063	3.151
4th decile	.937(<.001)***	.266	2.553	1.517	4.296
5th decile	.677(.008)**	.254	1.968	1.196	3.237
6th decile	.582(.020)*	.251	1.789	1.094	2.925
7th decile	.594(.006)**	.216	1.811	1.187	2.764
8th decile	.275(.182)	.206	1.316	.879	1.970
9th decile	.460(.023)*	.202	1.584	1.067	2.352

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	-.234(.338)	.244	.791	.490	1.277
East of England	-.443(.054)	.230	.642	.409	1.008
North East	-.249(.439)	.322	.779	.415	1.465
North West	-.256(.186)	.193	.774	.530	1.131
South East	-.729(<.001)***	.207	.482	.322	.723
South West	-.588(.020)*	.254	.555	.338	.913
Wales	-.175(.539)	.284	.840	.481	1.466
West Midlands	-.105(.575)	.187	.900	.624	1.299
Yorkshire and the Humber	-.185(.378)	.210	.831	.551	1.254
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	-.158(.318)	.158	.854	.627	1.164
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	-.057(.837)	.276	.945	.550	1.624
Entry Level	-.072(.860)	.407	.931	.419	2.067
Level 1	.204(.189)	.156	1.227	.904	1.664
Level 2	.170(.242)	.145	1.185	.892	1.576
Level 3	.335(.040)*	.163	1.397	1.015	1.924
No Qualifications	.045(.798)	.175	1.046	.743	1.473
Other	1.007(.076)	.567	2.737	.901	8.315
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	-.245(.102)	.150	.783	.583	1.050
£20-£39,999	-.006(.960)	.113	.994	.797	1.240
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.268(.070)	.148	.765	.572	1.023
Remain	-.897(<.001)***	.139	.408	.311	.535
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.214(.585)	.393	1.239	.574	2.677
Did not vote	-.286(.053)	.147	.751	.563	1.003
Green Party	.188(.515)	.288	1.207	.686	2.123
Labour	-.540(<.001)***	.151	.583	.433	.783
Liberal Democrats	-.746(.002)**	.242	.474	.295	.762
Other	.353(.368)	.393	1.424	.660	3.073
Constant	-1.946(<.001)***	.281	.143		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .080; Nagelkerke = .144
 Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 325.170$, df = 55, Sig. = <.001***
 Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 7.579$, df = 8, Sig. = .476
 n = 4,095

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

TABLE 14: Predicting disagreement with a statement that ethnic diversity would be good for the respondent's local community

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.430(<.001)***	.080	.651	.556	.761
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	.024(.896)	.181	1.024	.718	1.461
35-44	-.124(.503)	.186	.883	.614	1.271
45-54	-.193(.291)	.183	.824	.576	1.180
55-64	.263(.156)	.185	1.301	.905	1.871
65+	.222(.223)	.183	1.249	.873	1.787
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	.431(.111)	.270	1.538	.906	2.610
Yes	.155(.075)	.087	1.168	.984	1.386
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	-.488(.069)	.269	.614	.363	1.039
Black	-.050(.869)	.306	.951	.522	1.731
Mixed	-.224(.506)	.337	.799	.413	1.546
Other	.276(.433)	.351	1.317	.662	2.622
Prefer not to say	-.502(.370)	.560	.605	.202	1.815
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	-.004(.992)	.434	.996	.425	2.333
Christian	.126(.143)	.086	1.134	.959	1.341
Hindu	-.092(.836)	.446	.912	.381	2.183
Jewish	.570(.194)	.440	1.769	.747	4.186
Muslim	-.358(.278)	.330	.699	.366	1.335
Other	.078(.789)	.290	1.081	.612	1.909
BAME population in Local Authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	-.404(.130)	.267	.668	.396	1.127
2nd decile	-.472(.072)	.262	.624	.373	1.043
3rd decile	-.398(.123)	.258	.671	.405	1.113
4th decile	-.015(.952)	.255	.985	.597	1.624
5th decile	-.643(.013)*	.259	.526	.317	.873
6th decile	-.516(.047)*	.260	.597	.358	.994
7th decile	-.208(.406)	.250	.812	.498	1.326
8th decile	-.311(.182)	.233	.733	.464	1.157
9th decile	.075(.755)	.242	1.078	.672	1.731

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	.158(.479)	.223	1.171	.757	1.811
East of England	-.049(.823)	.220	.952	.618	1.466
North East	.410(.093)	.244	1.507	.934	2.433
North West	.073(.731)	.212	1.076	.710	1.630
South East	-.229(.285)	.214	.795	.523	1.210
South West	.020(.929)	.222	1.020	.660	1.577
Wales	.113(.649)	.248	1.120	.688	1.822
West Midlands	-.136(.504)	.203	.873	.586	1.300
Yorkshire and the Humber	.243(.272)	.221	1.275	.826	1.968
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	-.064(.540)	.105	.938	.764	1.152
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.371(.081)	.213	1.450	.955	2.200
Entry Level	.335(.282)	.311	1.397	.759	2.571
Level 1	.274(.027)*	.124	1.316	1.032	1.678
Level 2	.244(.048)*	.123	1.276	1.003	1.625
Level 3	.136(.362)	.150	1.146	.855	1.537
No Qualifications	-.026(.845)	.132	.974	.752	1.263
Other	-.017(.971)	.467	.983	.394	2.453
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	-.374(.001)**	.115	.688	.549	.862
£20-£39,999	-.226(.013)*	.091	.797	.667	.953
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.612(<.001)***	.127	.542	.423	.695
Remain	-.984(<.001)***	.114	.374	.299	.467
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.601(.023)*	.265	1.823	1.084	3.066
Did not vote	-.349(.004)**	.121	.705	.557	.893
Green Party	-1.217(.003)**	.406	.296	.133	.657
Labour	-.811(<.001)***	.134	.444	.341	.578
Liberal Democrats	-.472(.005)**	.169	.624	.448	.868
Other	-.175(.566)	.305	.840	.462	1.526
Constant	-.234(.386)	.270	.791		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .094; Nagelkerke = .146

Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 438.224$, df = 55, Sig. = <.001***

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: $\chi^2 = 55.849$, df = 8, Sig. = .664

n = 4,349

BAME = Black, Asian and minority ethnic

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

TABLE 15: Predicting disagreement with a statement that migrants would be good for the respondent's local community

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	.023(.754)	.072	1.023	.888	1.178
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	-.225(.173)	.165	.798	.578	1.103
35-44	-.073(.655)	.163	.930	.676	1.279
45-54	.041(.798)	.162	1.042	.759	1.432
55-64	.310(.063)	.167	1.363	.983	1.890
65+	.082(.623)	.167	1.085	.783	1.505
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	.075(.761)	.246	1.078	.665	1.746
Yes	.068(.401)	.081	1.070	.914	1.253
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	-.076(.726)	.216	.927	.607	1.416
Black	-.060(.838)	.291	.942	.533	1.667
Mixed	-.493(.152)	.344	.611	.311	1.199
Other	.728(.015)*	.301	2.072	1.149	3.735
Prefer not to say	-.375(.417)	.462	.687	.278	1.699
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.433(.243)	.371	1.541	.745	3.187
Christian	.025(.747)	.079	1.026	.879	1.197
Hindu	.480(.142)	.327	1.616	.852	3.066
Jewish	-.803(.193)	.617	.448	.134	1.500
Muslim	.021(.937)	.262	1.021	.611	1.705
Other	-.125(.598)	.238	.882	.554	1.405
Non-UK born in Local Authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	.342(.240)	.291	1.408	.796	2.493
2nd decile	-.139(.622)	.283	.870	.500	1.514
3rd decile	.130(.640)	.278	1.139	.661	1.963
4th decile	.202(.474)	.282	1.224	.704	2.129
5th decile	-.081(.776)	.285	.922	.527	1.613
6th decile	.148(.595)	.279	1.160	.672	2.002
7th decile	.130(.630)	.271	1.139	.670	1.937
8th decile	-.469(.081)	.268	.626	.370	1.059
9th decile	.094(.714)	.257	1.099	.664	1.818

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	-.067(.780)	.239	.935	.585	1.495
East of England	-.157(.504)	.236	.854	.538	1.356
North East	.096(.721)	.267	1.100	.652	1.858
North West	-.013(.956)	.237	.987	.621	1.570
South East	-.083(.717)	.230	.920	.587	1.443
South West	.029(.903)	.238	1.029	.646	1.641
Wales	-.195(.459)	.264	.822	.490	1.380
West Midlands	-.140(.546)	.233	.869	.551	1.371
Yorkshire and the Humber	.291(.227)	.241	1.338	.834	2.147
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	.186(.034)*	.088	1.205	1.014	1.431
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	1.093(<.001)***	.196	2.984	2.030	4.386
Entry Level	.285(.357)	.309	1.329	.726	2.434
Level 1	.608(<.001)***	.116	1.836	1.464	2.303
Level 2	.572(<.001)***	.114	1.772	1.418	2.214
Level 3	.396(.003)**	.135	1.485	1.140	1.936
No Qualifications	.606(<.001)***	.123	1.833	1.440	2.333
Other	1.329(.001)**	.411	3.778	1.689	8.447
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	-.163(.112)	.103	.849	.694	1.039
£20-£39,999	-.190(.024)*	.084	.827	.702	.975
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.765(<.001)***	.112	.465	.374	.580
Remain	-1.086(<.001)***	.103	.337	.276	.413
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.150(.594)	.281	1.162	.670	2.013
Did not vote	-.183(.090)	.108	.832	.673	1.029
Green Party	-.655(.027)*	.297	.520	.291	.929
Labour	-.794(<.001)***	.121	.452	.356	.573
Liberal Democrats	-.584(<.001)***	.161	.558	.407	.764
Other	-.323(.286)	.303	.724	.400	1.310
Constant	-.579(.016)*	.239	.561		

R^2 tests: Cox and Snell = .118; Nagelkerke = .167
 Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 545.315$, df = 55, Sig. = <.001***
 Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: $\chi^2 = 4.224$, df = 8, Sig. = .836
 n = 4,147
 * = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)
 ** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)
 *** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

TABLE 16: Predicting disagreement with a statement that religious diversity would be good for the respondent's local community

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.521(<.001)***	.066	.594	.522	.676
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	-.053(.737)	.156	.949	.698	1.289
35-44	-.073(.640)	.156	.930	.684	1.262
45-54	.021(.891)	.154	1.021	.756	1.380
55-64	.218(.162)	.156	1.243	.916	1.688
65+	-.025(.873)	.157	.975	.717	1.327
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	.173(.455)	.231	1.189	.755	1.871
Yes	.105(.146)	.072	1.110	.964	1.279
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	-.413(.059)	.218	.662	.431	1.015
Black	-.049(.858)	.275	.952	.555	1.632
Mixed	-.533(.096)	.320	.587	.313	1.099
Other	-.180(.569)	.317	.835	.449	1.554
Prefer not to say	.095(.813)	.401	1.100	.501	2.411
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.918(.004)**	.319	2.504	1.341	4.674
Christian	-.220(.002)**	.071	.803	.698	.923
Hindu	-.095(.799)	.375	.909	.435	1.897
Jewish	.102(.756)	.328	1.107	.582	2.106
Muslim	-.349(.221)	.285	.705	.404	1.233
Other	-.395(.139)	.267	.674	.399	1.137
Minority religion population in local authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	-.387(.062)	.207	.679	.453	1.019
2nd decile	-.250(.224)	.206	.779	.520	1.165
3rd decile	-.270(.187)	.205	.763	.511	1.140
4th decile	-.298(.143)	.204	.742	.498	1.106
5th decile	-.622(.002)**	.205	.537	.359	.802
6th decile	-.371(.072)	.206	.690	.461	1.033
7th decile	-.178(.349)	.190	.837	.576	1.215
8th decile	-.254(.183)	.190	.776	.534	1.127
9th decile	-.376(.056)	.196	.687	.467	1.009

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	.097(.590)	.180	1.102	.774	1.568
East of England	.192(.269)	.174	1.212	.862	1.704
North East	.511(.010)*	.198	1.667	1.131	2.458
North West	.285(.092)	.169	1.330	.955	1.852
South East	-.040(.813)	.167	.961	.692	1.335
South West	.085(.635)	.180	1.089	.766	1.550
Wales	.267(.190)	.204	1.306	.876	1.948
West Midlands	.104(.524)	.163	1.110	.806	1.528
Yorkshire and the Humber	.377(.029)*	.172	1.458	1.040	2.043
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	.220(.009)**	.085	1.246	1.056	1.471
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.179(.306)	.175	1.196	.849	1.683
Entry Level	.157(.576)	.281	1.170	.674	2.030
Level 1	.102(.325)	.104	1.108	.903	1.358
Level 2	-.009(.932)	.101	.991	.813	1.209
Level 3	.199(.089)	.117	1.220	.970	1.535
No Qualifications	-.098(.382)	.112	.906	.727	1.130
Other	.264(.485)	.379	1.303	.620	2.738
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	-.094(.323)	.095	.910	.755	1.097
£20-£39,999	-.150(.046)*	.075	.861	.742	.998
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.593(<.001)***	.103	.553	.452	.676
Remain	-.835(<.001)***	.092	.434	.362	.519
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.072(.761)	.236	1.075	.676	1.708
Did not vote	-.478(<.001)***	.098	.620	.512	.751
Green Party	-.566(.038)*	.273	.568	.333	.968
Labour	-.674(<.001)***	.104	.510	.415	.625
Liberal Democrats	-.535(<.001)***	.144	.586	.442	.776
Other	-.746(.013)*	.300	.474	.263	.854
Constant	-.152(.512)	.232	.859		

R^2 tests: Cox and Snell = .073; Nagelkerke = .114
 Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 484.169$, df = 55, Sig. = <.001***
 Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: $\chi^2 = 8.538$, df = 8, Sig. = .383
 n = 6,200
 * = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)
 ** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)
 *** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

CHANGE

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

BRITAIN

TABLE 17: Frequency and percentage of agreement and disagreement with statements that ethnic, national and religious diversity in Britain have increased too quickly in the past 10 years

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Ethnic diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years	%	20.3%	26.5%	26.6%	12.6%	9.2%	4.8%	100.0%
	n	2,091	2,731	2,738	1,295	951	489	1,0296
The number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years	%	29.6%	26.9%	20.8%	10.1%	8.5%	4.1%	100.0%
	n	3,043	2,768	2,139	1,044	879	423	1,0296
Religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years	%	14.7%	21.5%	30.5%	13.9%	8.1%	11.3%	100.0%
	n	1,511	2,212	3,144	1,428	838	1,162	1,0296

DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

TABLE 18: Frequency and percentage of agreement and disagreement with statements that ethnic, national and religious diversity in the respondent's local community have increased too quickly in the past 10 years

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Ethnic diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years	%	18.6%	22.5%	27.5%	16.5%	11.5%	3.4%	100.0%
	n	1,070	1,295	1,582	945	658	194	5,744
The number of migrants in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years	%	22.5%	25.5%	22.2%	14.4%	10.4%	5.1%	100.0%
	n	1,344	1,519	1,322	857	622	302	5,966
Religious diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years	%	18.5%	25.7%	25.9%	15.3%	11.2%	3.4%	100.0%
		723	1,004	1,013	599	437	134	3,911

NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

TABLE 19: Frequency and percentage of agreement and disagreement with statements that ethnic, national and religious diversity in the respondent's local community are likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Ethnic diversity in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years	%	8.2%	17.8%	34.0%	18.5%	9.6%	11.9%	100.0%
	n	373	812	1,547	840	436	543	4,552
The number of migrants in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years	%	11.2%	19.1%	31.8%	16.8%	8.8%	12.4%	100.0%
	n	485	827	1,375	728	380	535	4,330
Religious diversity in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years	%	6.1%	13.3%	34.8%	16.5%	7.8%	21.5%	100.0%
		388	851	2,222	1,053	501	1,371	6,385

CHI-SQUARE INDEPENDENCE TESTS

BRITAIN

TABLE 20: Chi-square independence tests between demographic categories and agreement or disagreement with statement that ethnic, national and religious diversity in Britain have increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Variable	Categories	Ethnic diversity in Britain has increased too quickly		Religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly		Number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly	
		χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)	χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)	χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)
Sex	Female Male	74.233(5)	<.001	112.012(5)	<.001	20.682(5)	<.001
Age	18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+	135.355(25)	<.001	197.428(25)	<.001	516.322(25)	<.001
Region (nutsi)	East Midlands East of England London North East North West South East South West Wales West Midlands Yorkshire and the Humber	137.227(45)	<.001	172.217(45)	<.001	87.060(45)	<.001
Ethnicity	Asian Black Mixed Other Prefer not to say White	151.295 (25)	<.001	134.360(25)	<.001	185.277(25)	<.001
Religion	Buddhist Christian Hindu Jewish Muslim None Other Sikh	286.103 (35)	<.001	271.290(35)	<.001	292.012(35)	<.001
Education	Apprenticeship Entry level Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4+ No qualifications Other	669.645(35)	<.001	417.526(35)	<.001	628.444(35)	<.001
Income (annual household)	£0-£19,999 £20-£39,999 £40,000+	170.167 (10)	<.001	74.154(10)	<.001	159.251(10)	<.001

DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

TABLE 21: Chi-square independence tests between demographic categories and agreement or disagreement with statements that ethnic, national and religious diversity in my local community have increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Variable	Categories	Ethnic diversity in my local community has increased too quickly		Religious diversity in my local community has increased too quickly		Number of migrants in my local community has increased too quickly	
		χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)	χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)	χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)
Sex	Female Male	71.726(5)	<.001	48.730(5)	<.001	22.533(5)	<.001
Age	18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+	72.099(25)	<.001	71.205(25)	<.001	109.779(25)	<.001
Region (nutsi)	East Midlands East of England London North East North West South East South West Wales West Midlands Yorkshire and the Humber	164.494(45)	<.001	118.821(45)	<.001	105.258(45)	<.001
Ethnicity	Asian Black Mixed Other Prefer not to say White	160.039(25)	<.001	91.228(25)	<.001	68.122(25)	<.001
Religion	Buddhist Christian Hindu Jewish Muslim None Other Sikh	228.401(35)	<.001	148.522(35)	<.001	158.316(35)	<.001
Education	Apprenticeship Entry level Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4+ No qualifications Other	247.166(35)	<.001	182.941(35)	<.001	302.304(35)	<.001
Income (annual household)	£0-£19,999 £20-£39,999 £40,000+	94.715(10)	<.001	61.037(10)	<.001	138.751(10)	<.001

NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES**TABLE 22:** Chi-square independence tests between demographic categories and agreement or disagreement with statements that ethnic, national and religious diversity in my local community are likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years

Variable	Categories	Ethnic diversity in my local community is likely to increase too quickly		Religious diversity in my local community is likely to increase too quickly		Number of migrants in my local community is likely to increase too quickly	
		χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)	χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)	χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)
Sex	Female	27.433(5)	<.001	42.496(5)	<.001	10.227(5)	0.069
	Male						
Age	18-24	93.649(25)	<.001	122.188(25)	<.001	155.422(25)	<.001
	25-34						
	35-44						
	45-54						
	55-64						
	65+						
Region (nutsi)	East Midlands	89.800(45)	<.001	133.117(45)	<.001	150.177(45)	<.001
	East of England						
	London						
	North East						
	North West						
	South East						
	South West						
	Wales						
	West Midlands						
	Yorkshire and the Humber						
Ethnicity	Asian	118.298(25)	<.001	68.131(25)	<.001	72.514(5)	<.001
	Black						
	Mixed						
	Other						
	Prefer not to say						
	White						
Religion	Buddhist	110.221(35)	<.001	159.893(35)	<.001	89.248(35)	<.001
	Christian						
	Hindu						
	Jewish						
	Muslim						
	None						
	Other						
Education	Sikh	367.503(35)	<.001	309.064(35)	<.001	359.314(35)	<.001
	Apprenticeship						
	Entry level						
	Level 1						
	Level 2						
	Level 3						
	Level 4+						
Income (annual household)	No qualifications	92.987(10)	<.001	47.136(10)	<.001	63.982(10)	<.001
	Other						
	£0-£19,999						
	£20-£39,999						
	£40,000+						

BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELLING

BRITAIN

TABLE 23: Predicting agreement with a statement that ethnic diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.182(<.001)***	.042	.834	.768	.905
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	.224(.007)**	.083	1.251	1.064	1.471
35-44	.144(.090)	.085	1.154	.978	1.363
45-54	.019(.828)	.086	1.019	.860	1.207
55-64	.012(.896)	.091	1.012	.847	1.209
65+	-.055(.548)	.091	.947	.792	1.132
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	-.302(.041)*	.148	.740	.554	.988
Yes	.053(.258)	.047	1.055	.962	1.157
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	.194(.066)	.105	1.214	.987	1.492
Black	.305(.016)*	.126	1.357	1.059	1.738
Mixed	.069(.648)	.150	1.071	.798	1.438
Other	.550(<.001)***	.159	1.734	1.271	2.366
Prefer not to say	-.452(.079)	.258	.636	.384	1.054
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.850(<.001)***	.215	2.339	1.534	3.565
Christian	.283(<.001)***	.046	1.327	1.212	1.451
Hindu	.329(.074)	.184	1.390	.969	1.993
Jewish	-.398(.042)*	.196	.672	.458	.986
Muslim	.544(<.001)***	.117	1.723	1.371	2.167
Other	-.145(.339)	.152	.865	.642	1.165
Local community is ethnically diverse (ref. Agrees)	-.289(<.001)***	.055	.749	.672	.834
BAME population in Local Authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	-.218(.095)	.131	.804	.622	1.038
2nd decile	-.085(.496)	.124	.919	.720	1.172
3rd decile	-.233(.054)	.121	.792	.625	1.004
4th decile	-.195(.107)	.121	.822	.648	1.043
5th decile	-.185(.106)	.114	.831	.665	1.040
6th decile	-.299(.009)**	.115	.742	.592	.929
7th decile	-.015(.888)	.107	.985	.799	1.214
8th decile	-.155(.123)	.100	.857	.704	1.043
9th decile	-.322(.001)**	.098	.725	.598	.879

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	-.121(.264)	.108	.886	.717	1.096
East of England	-.178(.085)	.104	.837	.683	1.025
North East	-.062(.640)	.132	.940	.726	1.217
North West	-.224(.021)*	.097	.799	.660	.967
South East	-.386(<.001)***	.096	.680	.563	.822
South West	-.244(.025)*	.108	.784	.634	.969
Wales	-.147(.255)	.129	.864	.671	1.112
West Midlands	-.279(.002)**	.091	.756	.633	.904
Yorkshire and the Humber	-.152(.148)	.105	.859	.699	1.055
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	-.078(.192)	.060	.925	.823	1.040
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.653(<.001)***	.120	1.921	1.519	2.430
Entry Level	.459(.006)**	.166	1.583	1.144	2.190
Level 1	.266(<.001)***	.067	1.305	1.145	1.488
Level 2	.176(.005)**	.063	1.192	1.053	1.348
Level 3	.184(.012)*	.073	1.202	1.042	1.387
No Qualifications	.167(.018)*	.071	1.182	1.029	1.358
Other	.369(.193)	.284	1.447	.829	2.525
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	.027(.662)	.061	1.027	.911	1.158
£20-£39,999	.040(.409)	.048	1.041	.947	1.144
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.463(<.001)***	.064	.629	.554	.714
Remain	-.671(<.001)***	.057	.511	.457	.572
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.164(.395)	.193	1.178	.808	1.718
Did not vote	-.459(<.001)***	.064	.632	.558	.716
Green Party	-.509(.001)**	.155	.601	.444	.815
Labour	-.595(<.001)***	.064	.552	.486	.626
Liberal Democrats	-.683(<.001)***	.090	.505	.424	.602
Other	-.310(.098)	.187	.733	.508	1.059
Constant	.680(<.001)***	.125	1.973		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .076; Nagelkerke = .102

Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 816.218$, df = 56, Sig. = <.001***

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 34.731$, df = 8, Sig. = <.001***

n = 10,295

BAME = Black, Asian and minority ethnic

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value $\leq$ 0.001)

TABLE 24: Predicting agreement with a statement that the number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.033(.453)	.044	.968	.888	1.054
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	.489(<.001)***	.084	1.631	1.385	1.922
35-44	.563(<.001)***	.086	1.755	1.483	2.077
45-54	.644(<.001)***	.088	1.903	1.603	2.260
55-64	.893(<.001)***	.094	2.443	2.034	2.935
65+	.713(<.001)***	.093	2.041	1.699	2.451
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	-.107(.466)	.147	.899	.674	1.198
Yes	.024(.628)	.049	1.024	.930	1.128
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	.092(.387)	.107	1.097	.890	1.351
Black	-.081(.529)	.128	.922	.717	1.186
Mixed	-.097(.524)	.152	.908	.674	1.223
Other	.631(<.001)***	.160	1.880	1.373	2.573
Prefer not to say	-.660(.012)*	.261	.517	.310	.863
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.227(.289)	.214	1.255	.825	1.909
Christian	.306(<.001)***	.048	1.358	1.237	1.492
Hindu	.023(.902)	.186	1.023	.710	1.474
Jewish	-.308(.117)	.196	.735	.500	1.080
Muslim	.266(.023)*	.117	1.305	1.037	1.643
Other	-.333(.030)*	.153	.717	.531	.968
Local community is nationally diverse (ref. Agrees)	-.049(.400)	.059	.952	.848	1.068
Non-UK born in Local Authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	-.267(.078)	.152	.765	.568	1.031
2nd decile	-.200(.168)	.145	.819	.617	1.088
3rd decile	-.137(.325)	.139	.872	.664	1.145
4th decile	-.092(.520)	.143	.912	.689	1.208
5th decile	-.108(.437)	.139	.897	.683	1.179
6th decile	-.112(.413)	.136	.894	.685	1.169
7th decile	-.139(.287)	.131	.870	.674	1.124
8th decile	-.328(.008)**	.124	.721	.565	.918
9th decile	-.264(.023)*	.116	.768	.612	.965

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	-.113(.363)	.124	.894	.701	1.139
East of England	-.095(.427)	.119	.910	.720	1.149
North East	.207(.177)	.153	1.230	.911	1.661
North West	-.143(.234)	.120	.867	.685	1.097
South East	-.112(.320)	.113	.894	.717	1.115
South West	-.180(.150)	.125	.835	.653	1.067
Wales	-.176(.230)	.146	.839	.630	1.118
West Midlands	-.008(.943)	.116	.992	.790	1.246
Yorkshire and the Humber	.110(.388)	.128	1.117	.869	1.434
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	-.056(.338)	.058	.946	.843	1.060
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.962(<.001)***	.134	2.617	2.014	3.400
Entry Level	.387(.022)*	.169	1.472	1.057	2.050
Level 1	.380(<.001)***	.069	1.463	1.277	1.675
Level 2	.282(<.001)***	.065	1.326	1.168	1.506
Level 3	.218(.004)**	.075	1.243	1.074	1.440
No Qualifications	.167(.022)*	.073	1.182	1.025	1.363
Other	.207(.499)	.306	1.230	.675	2.240
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	.170(.007)**	.063	1.186	1.047	1.342
£20-£39,999	.182(<.001)***	.050	1.200	1.087	1.324
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.706(<.001)***	.067	.494	.433	.563
Remain	-1.019(<.001)***	.060	.361	.321	.406
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	-.050(.817)	.215	.951	.624	1.451
Did not vote	-.537(<.001)***	.068	.584	.512	.667
Green Party	-.555(<.001)***	.156	.574	.423	.779
Labour	-.807(<.001)***	.067	.446	.391	.509
Liberal Democrats	-.925(<.001)***	.090	.397	.333	.473
Other	-.086(.668)	.200	.918	.619	1.359
Constant	.507(<.001)***	.123	1.661		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .135; Nagelkerke = .181

Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 1,496.234$, df = 56, Sig. = <.001***

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: $\chi^2 = 24.699$, df = 8, Sig. = .002**

n = 10,296

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

TABLE 25: Predicting agreement with a statement that religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.288(<.001)***	.043	.750	.689	.816
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	.387(<.001)***	.086	1.472	1.244	1.743
35-44	.189(.033)*	.089	1.209	1.015	1.439
45-54	-.010(.915)	.091	.990	.828	1.184
55-64	.019(.842)	.095	1.019	.845	1.229
65+	-.170(.076)	.096	.844	.700	1.018
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	-.392(.014)*	.160	.675	.494	.923
Yes	.089(.066)	.048	1.093	.994	1.202
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	.131(.221)	.107	1.140	.924	1.405
Black	.265(.037)*	.127	1.303	1.016	1.672
Mixed	.060(.698)	.155	1.062	.784	1.438
Other	.515(.001)***	.158	1.673	1.226	2.282
Prefer not to say	-.225(.400)	.267	.798	.473	1.348
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.765(<.001)***	.212	2.149	1.419	3.253
Christian	.300(<.001)***	.048	1.349	1.229	1.482
Hindu	.652(<.001)***	.184	1.920	1.339	2.752
Jewish	.198(.311)	.195	1.218	.831	1.786
Muslim	.653(<.001)***	.117	1.921	1.527	2.418
Other	.062(.693)	.158	1.064	.781	1.450
Local community is religiously diverse	-.084(.139)	.057	.919	.823	1.028
Minority religion population in local authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	-.177(.153)	.124	.838	.658	1.068
2nd decile	-.085(.487)	.122	.919	.724	1.167
3rd decile	-.129(.284)	.120	.879	.695	1.113
4th decile	-.162(.173)	.119	.851	.674	1.074
5th decile	-.306(.008)**	.116	.736	.587	.924
6th decile	-.093(.425)	.116	.911	.726	1.145
7th decile	-.085(.413)	.104	.918	.748	1.127
8th decile	.021(.832)	.097	1.021	.843	1.236
9th decile	-.077(.437)	.099	.926	.763	1.124

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	-.219(.038)*	.106	.803	.653	.988
East of England	-.191(.059)	.101	.826	.678	1.008
North East	-.124(.333)	.128	.883	.687	1.136
North West	-.341(<.001)***	.094	.711	.591	.855
South East	-.363(<.001)***	.092	.696	.580	.834
South West	-.201(.059)	.106	.818	.665	1.007
Wales	-.336(.009)**	.129	.715	.556	.920
West Midlands	-.236(.008)**	.090	.790	.663	.941
Yorkshire and the Humber	-.170(.091)	.100	.844	.693	1.028
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	-.036(.553)	.061	.964	.856	1.087
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.195(.103)	.120	1.216	.961	1.538
Entry Level	.572(<.001)***	.166	1.771	1.280	2.451
Level 1	.192(.005)**	.069	1.211	1.059	1.386
Level 2	.144(.026)*	.065	1.155	1.017	1.312
Level 3	.020(.792)	.076	1.020	.879	1.185
No Qualifications	.157(.032)*	.073	1.170	1.014	1.350
Other	.360(.203)	.283	1.433	.824	2.493
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	-.038(.550)	.063	.963	.851	1.090
£20-£39,999	.010(.844)	.050	1.010	.916	1.114
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.528(<.001)***	.067	.590	.517	.672
Remain	-.623(<.001)***	.059	.536	.477	.602
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.094(.609)	.183	1.098	.767	1.572
Did not vote	-.323(<.001)***	.066	.724	.637	.824
Green Party	-.040(.798)	.155	.961	.709	1.303
Labour	-.503(<.001)***	.067	.605	.530	.689
Liberal Democrats	-.571(<.001)***	.095	.565	.468	.681
Other	-.166(.395)	.195	.847	.578	1.242
Constant	.142(.268)	.128	1.153		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .064; Nagelkerke = .087

Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 676.435$, df = 56, Sig. = <.001***

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: $\chi^2 = 21.485$, df = 8, Sig. = .006**

n = 10,296

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

TABLE 26: Predicting agreement with a statement that ethnic diversity in respondent's local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.245(<.001)***	.057	.783	.699	.876
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	.483(<.001)***	.110	1.621	1.306	2.012
35-44	.389(<.001)***	.113	1.475	1.181	1.841
45-54	.147(.213)	.118	1.158	.919	1.459
55-64	.089(.474)	.124	1.093	.857	1.393
65+	-.014(.915)	.126	.987	.770	1.264
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	-.153(.461)	.208	.858	.571	1.289
Yes	.110(.089)	.065	1.116	.984	1.267
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	.099(.461)	.135	1.104	.848	1.437
Black	.305(.052)	.157	1.356	.998	1.844
Mixed	-.217(.290)	.205	.805	.539	1.203
Other	.187(.346)	.199	1.206	.817	1.780
Prefer not to say	-.532(.135)	.356	.588	.292	1.181
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.710(.015)*	.292	2.034	1.147	3.608
Christian	.208(.001)**	.063	1.232	1.087	1.395
Hindu	.756(.002)**	.243	2.129	1.323	3.425
Jewish	-.525(.030)*	.242	.591	.368	.950
Muslim	.501(<.001)***	.147	1.650	1.238	2.199
Other	-.173(.424)	.217	.841	.550	1.286
BAME population in Local Authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	-.925(<.001)***	.190	.396	.273	.575
2nd decile	-.477(.005)**	.169	.620	.446	.864
3rd decile	-.441(.006)**	.161	.643	.469	.881
4th decile	-.613(<.001)***	.165	.542	.392	.748
5th decile	-.438(.002)**	.144	.645	.486	.856
6th decile	-.560(<.001)***	.145	.571	.430	.758
7th decile	-.269(.038)*	.129	.764	.593	.985
8th decile	-.304(.013)*	.123	.738	.580	.939
9th decile	-.502(<.001)***	.116	.605	.483	.759

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	-.266(.064)	.144	.767	.578	1.016
East of England	-.307(.023)*	.135	.736	.565	.959
North East	-.146(.444)	.191	.864	.594	1.256
North West	-.230(.061)	.123	.795	.625	1.010
South East	-.526(<.001)***	.123	.591	.465	.751
South West	-.628(<.001)***	.149	.533	.398	.715
Wales	-.092(.620)	.185	.912	.635	1.311
West Midlands	-.138(.222)	.113	.871	.698	1.087
Yorkshire and the Humber	-.015(.911)	.135	.985	.756	1.283
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	.031(.724)	.088	1.032	.868	1.227
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.525(<.001)***	.154	1.690	1.250	2.285
Entry Level	1.197(<.001)***	.241	3.309	2.064	5.305
Level 1	.306(<.001)***	.091	1.357	1.135	1.624
Level 2	.012(.883)	.085	1.013	.858	1.195
Level 3	-.034(.728)	.097	.967	.800	1.168
No Qualifications	.241(.016)*	.100	1.272	1.045	1.548
Other	-.452(.293)	.429	.636	.274	1.477
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	.286(<.001)***	.085	1.332	1.127	1.574
£20-£39,999	.257(<.001)***	.066	1.292	1.135	1.472
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.392(<.001)***	.087	.676	.570	.802
Remain	-.647(<.001)***	.078	.523	.449	.610
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	-.297(.263)	.266	.743	.441	1.251
Did not vote	-.290(<.001)***	.086	.748	.632	.886
Green Party	.070(.724)	.199	1.073	.727	1.583
Labour	-.485(<.001)***	.086	.616	.520	.729
Liberal Democrats	-.418(.001)**	.128	.659	.513	.846
Other	.377(.198)	.293	1.458	.821	2.590
Constant	.305(.058)	.161	1.356		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .087; Nagelkerke = .117

Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 520.556$, df = 55, Sig. = <.001***

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: $\chi^2 = 11.952$, df = 8, Sig. = .153

n = 5,946

BAME = Black, Asian and minority ethnic

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value $\leq$ 0.001)

TABLE 27: Predicting agreement with a statement that the number of migrants in respondent's local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.165(.003)**	.056	.848	.759	.946
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	.699(<.001)***	.107	2.012	1.630	2.482
35-44	.829(<.001)***	.111	2.292	1.844	2.848
45-54	.622(<.001)***	.113	1.863	1.493	2.326
55-64	.647(<.001)***	.120	1.910	1.509	2.418
65+	.446(<.001)***	.122	1.562	1.231	1.982
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	-.300(.141)	.204	.741	.497	1.104
Yes	.037(.555)	.063	1.038	.917	1.174
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	.166(.217)	.134	1.180	.907	1.535
Black	.179(.245)	.154	1.196	.885	1.616
Mixed	.298(.117)	.190	1.348	.928	1.958
Other	.383(.054)	.199	1.467	.994	2.166
Prefer not to say	-.212(.527)	.336	.809	.418	1.563
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.721(.011)*	.283	2.057	1.180	3.585
Christian	.252(<.001)***	.062	1.286	1.140	1.451
Hindu	.649(.008)**	.243	1.914	1.188	3.083
Jewish	-.162(.458)	.218	.851	.555	1.304
Muslim	.403(.005)**	.144	1.496	1.127	1.986
Other	.696(.002)**	.220	2.005	1.302	3.088
Non-UK born in Local Authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	-.549(.004)**	.190	.577	.398	.838
2nd decile	-.326(.077)	.184	.722	.504	1.035
3rd decile	-.520(.002)**	.169	.594	.426	.829
4th decile	-.317(.070)	.175	.728	.516	1.027
5th decile	-.441(.007)**	.165	.643	.466	.888
6th decile	-.206(.204)	.162	.814	.592	1.118
7th decile	-.255(.096)	.153	.775	.574	1.046
8th decile	-.492(<.001)***	.145	.611	.460	.812
9th decile	-.360(.007)**	.133	.698	.537	.907

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	-.086(.569)	.151	.918	.683	1.233
East of England	-.081(.574)	.144	.922	.695	1.223
North East	-.196(.323)	.199	.822	.557	1.213
North West	-.035(.806)	.144	.965	.728	1.280
South East	-.248(.063)	.133	.781	.601	1.014
South West	-.483(.002)**	.156	.617	.454	.838
Wales	-.096(.614)	.191	.908	.624	1.321
West Midlands	.072(.605)	.139	1.074	.819	1.410
Yorkshire and the Humber	.118(.452)	.156	1.125	.828	1.528
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	-.021(.791)	.079	.979	.839	1.143
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.628(<.001)***	.157	1.873	1.377	2.549
Entry Level	1.177(<.001)***	.238	3.244	2.036	5.170
Level 1	.298(<.001)***	.089	1.348	1.132	1.605
Level 2	.091(.268)	.082	1.095	.933	1.286
Level 3	.071(.457)	.095	1.073	.891	1.293
No Qualifications	.494(<.001)***	.095	1.639	1.361	1.974
Other	-.085(.837)	.412	.919	.410	2.060
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	.353(<.001)***	.082	1.423	1.211	1.672
£20-£39,999	.221(<.001)***	.064	1.247	1.099	1.415
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.465(<.001)***	.085	.628	.531	.742
Remain	-.771(<.001)***	.075	.462	.399	.536
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.686(.016)*	.286	1.986	1.134	3.478
Did not vote	-.091(.286)	.085	.913	.773	1.079
Green Party	.015(.941)	.204	1.015	.681	1.513
Labour	-.446(<.001)***	.084	.640	.543	.754
Liberal Democrats	-.755(<.001)***	.123	.470	.369	.598
Other	-.206(.452)	.274	.814	.476	1.392
Constant	-.105(.486)	.151	.900		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .100; Nagelkerke = .134

Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 631.008$, df = 55, Sig. = <.001***

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: $\chi^2 = 11.613$, df = 8, Sig. = .169

n = 6,148

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

TABLE 28: Predicting agreement with a statement that religious diversity in respondent's local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.300(<.001)***	.069	.741	.647	.849
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	.559(<.001)***	.122	1.748	1.376	2.222
35-44	.445(<.001)***	.128	1.560	1.214	2.006
45-54	.288(.031)*	.134	1.333	1.026	1.733
55-64	.127(.391)	.148	1.136	.849	1.518
65+	.013(.928)	.147	1.013	.759	1.353
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	.033(.894)	.248	1.034	.636	1.680
Yes	.244(.002)**	.078	1.277	1.096	1.488
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	.320(.033)*	.150	1.378	1.027	1.849
Black	.290(.085)	.169	1.336	.960	1.860
Mixed	.365(.100)	.222	1.441	.932	2.227
Other	.224(.328)	.229	1.251	.799	1.959
Prefer not to say	.481(.248)	.417	1.618	.715	3.661
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	1.005(.002)**	.328	2.731	1.437	5.190
Christian	.229(.003)**	.078	1.257	1.079	1.465
Hindu	.740(.005)**	.266	2.097	1.245	3.532
Jewish	-.048(.860)	.273	.953	.558	1.628
Muslim	.415(.008)**	.157	1.514	1.113	2.059
Other	.269(.290)	.255	1.309	.795	2.156
Minority religion population in local authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	-.482(.020)*	.208	.617	.411	.927
2nd decile	.035(.858)	.196	1.036	.706	1.520
3rd decile	.082(.668)	.191	1.085	.747	1.578
4th decile	.022(.905)	.185	1.022	.711	1.469
5th decile	-.041(.813)	.172	.960	.685	1.345
6th decile	-.160(.349)	.171	.852	.610	1.191
7th decile	.093(.525)	.147	1.098	.823	1.464
8th decile	.199(.125)	.130	1.220	.946	1.573
9th decile	-.285(.031)*	.132	.752	.581	.974

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	-.347(.036)*	.165	.707	.511	.977
East of England	-.381(.015)*	.157	.683	.502	.929
North East	-.009(.968)	.218	.991	.647	1.520
North West	-.352(.009)**	.135	.703	.539	.916
South East	-.600(<.001)***	.136	.549	.421	.716
South West	-.648(<.001)***	.171	.523	.374	.731
Wales	-.043(.836)	.207	.958	.639	1.436
West Midlands	-.038(.767)	.128	.963	.749	1.238
Yorkshire and the Humber	-.159(.292)	.151	.853	.634	1.147
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	-.186(.099)	.113	.830	.666	1.035
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.595(.002)**	.192	1.812	1.245	2.638
Entry Level	.760(.002)**	.250	2.139	1.312	3.488
Level 1	.470(<.001)***	.109	1.600	1.293	1.980
Level 2	.207(.041)*	.101	1.229	1.009	1.499
Level 3	-.001(.990)	.115	.999	.797	1.252
No Qualifications	.452(<.001)***	.119	1.572	1.246	1.983
Other	-.138(.788)	.515	.871	.317	2.389
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	.201(.046)*	.101	1.222	1.004	1.489
£20-£39,999	.077(.334)	.079	1.080	.924	1.262
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.206(.052)	.106	.813	.660	1.002
Remain	-.420(<.001)***	.095	.657	.546	.792
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.886(.012)*	.353	2.426	1.214	4.846
Did not vote	-.212(.047)*	.107	.809	.656	.997
Green Party	-.099(.667)	.231	.906	.576	1.424
Labour	-.386(<.001)***	.105	.680	.554	.834
Liberal Democrats	-.482(.001)**	.149	.618	.461	.827
Other	-.002(.996)	.340	.998	.512	1.945
Constant	-.227(.212)	.182	.797		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .087; Nagelkerke = .116

Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 354.768$, df = 55, Sig. = <.001***

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: $\chi^2 = 24.436$, df = 8, Sig. = .002**

n = 4,095

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

TABLE 29: Predicting agreement with a statement that ethnic diversity in respondent's local community is likely to increased too quickly in the next 10 years

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.211(.003)**	.072	.810	.703	.932
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	-.235(.116)	.149	.791	.590	1.059
35-44	-.016(.913)	.148	.984	.736	1.316
45-54	-.263(.079)	.150	.769	.573	1.031
55-64	-.377(.018)*	.159	.686	.502	.937
65+	-.721(<.001)***	.159	.486	.356	.663
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	-.784(.008)**	.298	.456	.255	.819
Yes	.112(.152)	.078	1.119	.959	1.305
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	-.072(.716)	.199	.930	.630	1.374
Black	-.232(.362)	.254	.793	.482	1.305
Mixed	.426(.091)	.252	1.532	.934	2.511
Other	.904(.001)**	.282	2.470	1.422	4.291
Prefer not to say	-.576(.280)	.533	.562	.198	1.598
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.953(.003)**	.320	2.593	1.384	4.859
Christian	.302(<.001)***	.078	1.353	1.160	1.578
Hindu	.326(.313)	.323	1.386	.735	2.612
Jewish	.380(.350)	.407	1.462	.659	3.246
Muslim	.269(.237)	.228	1.309	.837	2.047
Other	-.004(.987)	.255	.996	.604	1.642
BAME population in Local Authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	-.401(.083)	.231	.670	.426	1.054
2nd decile	-.559(.014)*	.227	.572	.366	.892
3rd decile	-.819(<.001)***	.227	.441	.282	.688
4th decile	-.367(.098)	.222	.693	.448	1.070
5th decile	-.609(.006)**	.221	.544	.353	.838
6th decile	-.253(.249)	.219	.777	.506	1.193
7th decile	-.182(.392)	.213	.833	.549	1.265
8th decile	-.409(.038)*	.197	.665	.451	.979
9th decile	-.258(.221)	.211	.772	.511	1.168

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	.341(.083)	.197	1.407	.957	2.068
East of England	.193(.320)	.194	1.213	.829	1.774
North East	.025(.913)	.229	1.025	.655	1.606
North West	.233(.215)	.188	1.262	.874	1.823
South East	.244(.190)	.186	1.276	.886	1.838
South West	.141(.476)	.198	1.152	.781	1.699
Wales	.118(.604)	.227	1.125	.721	1.757
West Midlands	-.082(.647)	.179	.921	.649	1.309
Yorkshire and the Humber	.369(.060)	.196	1.446	.985	2.124
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	-.020(.836)	.095	.980	.813	1.182
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.380(.064)	.205	1.462	.978	2.186
Entry Level	.049(.867)	.291	1.050	.593	1.858
Level 1	.476(<.001)***	.114	1.609	1.287	2.011
Level 2	.232(.041)*	.113	1.261	1.010	1.575
Level 3	.328(.013)*	.133	1.388	1.070	1.800
No Qualifications	.418(<.001)***	.118	1.519	1.205	1.915
Other	-1.311(.093)	.781	.270	.058	1.247
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	-.111(.280)	.102	.895	.732	1.094
£20-£39,999	.019(.816)	.083	1.020	.867	1.199
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.648(<.001)***	.114	.523	.418	.654
Remain	-.792(<.001)***	.103	.453	.370	.554
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.528(.042)*	.259	1.696	1.020	2.820
Did not vote	-.076(.496)	.111	.927	.745	1.153
Green Party	-.077(.785)	.281	.926	.533	1.608
Labour	-.080(.487)	.115	.923	.736	1.157
Liberal Democrats	-.324(.041)*	.159	.724	.530	.987
Other	-.500(.139)	.338	.607	.313	1.176
Constant	-.306(.190)	.233	.736		

R^2 tests: Cox and Snell = .060; Nagelkerke = .088
 Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 280.561$, df = 55, Sig. = <.001***
 Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: $\chi^2 = 4.122$ df = 8, Sig. = .846
 n = 4,349
 BAME = Black, Asian and minority ethnic
 * = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)
 ** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)
 *** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

TABLE 30: Predicting agreement with a statement that the number of migrants in respondent's local community is likely to increased too quickly in the next 10 years

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.101(.154)	.071	.904	.787	1.039
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	-.122(.434)	.156	.885	.652	1.202
35-44	.079(.608)	.155	1.083	.799	1.466
45-54	.151(.331)	.155	1.163	.858	1.576
55-64	.221(.171)	.161	1.247	.909	1.710
65+	-.601(<.001)***	.165	.549	.397	.758
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	-.271(.295)	.259	.763	.459	1.266
Yes	.014(.859)	.079	1.014	.868	1.184
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	-.285(.164)	.205	.752	.503	1.124
Black	-.663(.023)*	.291	.515	.291	.912
Mixed	.056(.835)	.270	1.058	.623	1.797
Other	.296(.317)	.295	1.344	.754	2.397
Prefer not to say	-1.244(.040)*	.604	.288	.088	.942
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	-.028(.945)	.404	.973	.441	2.146
Christian	.216(.005)**	.078	1.241	1.066	1.445
Hindu	.534(.092)	.317	1.706	.916	3.177
Jewish	.194(.677)	.464	1.214	.489	3.015
Muslim	.336(.158)	.238	1.399	.878	2.232
Other	-.188(.437)	.241	.829	.516	1.330
Non-UK born in Local Authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	-.220(.430)	.279	.802	.465	1.386
2nd decile	-.034(.898)	.266	.966	.574	1.627
3rd decile	-.103(.695)	.263	.902	.539	1.510
4th decile	.079(.767)	.267	1.082	.642	1.825
5th decile	-.067(.803)	.268	.935	.554	1.581
6th decile	.242(.354)	.261	1.274	.764	2.125
7th decile	.195(.442)	.254	1.215	.739	1.998
8th decile	-.015(.950)	.246	.985	.608	1.594
9th decile	-.046(.849)	.242	.955	.594	1.534

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	-.332(.145)	.227	.718	.460	1.121
East of England	.027(.900)	.219	1.028	.669	1.579
North East	-.187(.468)	.258	.829	.500	1.376
North West	-.114(.608)	.221	.893	.578	1.377
South East	-.047(.825)	.213	.954	.628	1.449
South West	-.480(.035)*	.227	.619	.397	.966
Wales	-.266(.289)	.252	.766	.468	1.254
West Midlands	.096(.655)	.216	1.101	.722	1.680
Yorkshire and the Humber	-.039(.863)	.227	.962	.617	1.500
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	-.150(.087)	.087	.861	.726	1.022
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.571(.004)**	.198	1.770	1.200	2.609
Entry Level	.049(.872)	.307	1.051	.576	1.916
Level 1	.448(<.001)***	.113	1.566	1.255	1.953
Level 2	.494(<.001)***	.111	1.639	1.319	2.035
Level 3	.352(.007)**	.130	1.422	1.102	1.835
No Qualifications	.447(<.001)***	.121	1.564	1.234	1.982
Other	-.616(.268)	.556	.540	.182	1.607
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	.178(.079)	.102	1.195	.979	1.459
£20-£39,999	.174(.035)*	.083	1.190	1.012	1.400
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.747(<.001)***	.111	.474	.381	.589
Remain	-.821(<.001)***	.101	.440	.361	.536
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.149(.591)	.276	1.160	.675	1.994
Did not vote	-.192(.075)	.108	.825	.668	1.019
Green Party	-.312(.260)	.277	.732	.425	1.260
Labour	-.247(.030)*	.114	.781	.626	.976
Liberal Democrats	-.624(<.001)***	.166	.536	.387	.743
Other	-.380(.223)	.312	.684	.371	1.260
Constant	-.404(.077)	.229	.667		

R^2 tests: Cox and Snell = .081; Nagelkerke = .114
 Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 363.834$, df = 55, Sig. = <.001***
 Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: $\chi^2 = 4.395$, df = 8, Sig. = .820
 n = 4,147

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

TABLE 31: Predicting agreement with a statement that religious diversity in respondent's local community is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.344(<.001)***	.066	.709	.622	.808
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	.057(.683)	.139	1.058	.806	1.389
35-44	-.153(.279)	.142	.858	.650	1.133
45-54	-.373(.010)**	.144	.689	.519	.914
55-64	-.332(.024)*	.147	.717	.537	.957
65+	-.785(<.001)***	.151	.456	.339	.613
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	-.748(.007)**	.278	.473	.274	.817
Yes	-.026(.726)	.074	.974	.843	1.126
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	.107(.560)	.183	1.113	.777	1.593
Black	.342(.117)	.218	1.407	.918	2.157
Mixed	.650(.003)**	.220	1.915	1.243	2.950
Other	-.737(.028)*	.335	.479	.248	.923
Prefer not to say	-.267(.553)	.451	.766	.316	1.853
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.027(.944)	.391	1.028	.478	2.212
Christian	.348(<.001)***	.072	1.417	1.229	1.633
Hindu	-.085(.798)	.333	.918	.478	1.765
Jewish	.104(.763)	.345	1.110	.565	2.181
Muslim	.213(.344)	.225	1.238	.796	1.926
Other	-.149(.577)	.266	.862	.511	1.453
Minority religion population in local authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	-.432(.027)*	.196	.649	.442	.953
2nd decile	-.660(<.001)***	.200	.517	.349	.764
3rd decile	-.468(.016)*	.195	.626	.427	.918
4th decile	-.527(.006)**	.193	.590	.404	.862
5th decile	-.545(.004)**	.189	.580	.400	.840
6th decile	-.397(.039)*	.193	.673	.461	.981
7th decile	-.230(.190)	.175	.795	.564	1.121
8th decile	-.299(.085)	.173	.742	.528	1.042
9th decile	-.092(.593)	.173	.912	.649	1.280

Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	.195(.249)	.169	1.216	.872	1.694
East of England	.199(.222)	.163	1.221	.886	1.681
North East	-.010(.962)	.203	.990	.665	1.475
North West	-.003(.986)	.159	.997	.731	1.361
South East	.068(.662)	.155	1.070	.790	1.450
South West	-.019(.914)	.173	.981	.699	1.378
Wales	.136(.503)	.202	1.145	.770	1.702
West Midlands	.131(.378)	.148	1.140	.852	1.524
Yorkshire and the Humber	.183(.259)	.163	1.201	.873	1.653
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	.076(.386)	.088	1.079	.908	1.283
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.434(.016)*	.181	1.543	1.083	2.198
Entry Level	.457(.090)	.270	1.579	.931	2.680
Level 1	.335(.002)**	.109	1.398	1.129	1.730
Level 2	.347(<.001)***	.104	1.414	1.155	1.733
Level 3	.215(.079)	.122	1.240	.975	1.575
No Qualifications	.497(<.001)***	.113	1.644	1.317	2.053
Other	.103(.809)	.426	1.109	.481	2.555
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	-.217(.025)*	.097	.805	.666	.973
£20-£39,999	-.106(.163)	.076	.899	.775	1.044
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.501(<.001)***	.103	.606	.495	.741
Remain	-.561(<.001)***	.094	.570	.475	.685
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.226(.356)	.244	1.253	.776	2.024
Did not vote	-.138(.166)	.100	.871	.717	1.059
Green Party	-.302(.279)	.279	.739	.428	1.278
Labour	-.204(.050)*	.104	.816	.665	1.000
Liberal Democrats	-.427(.007)**	.158	.653	.479	.889
Other	-.223(.451)	.296	.800	.447	1.430
Constant	-.552(.011)*	.216	.576		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .041; Nagelkerke = .066

Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 270.239$, df = 56, Sig. = <.001***

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: $\chi^2 = 18.661$, df = 8, Sig. = .017**

n = 6,200

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

LOCAL TRUST

KNOWING PEOPLE LOCALLY WELL ENOUGH TO ASK FOR A FAVOUR - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

TABLE 32: Summary statistics: Number of people in respondent's local area known well enough to ask for a favour

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Median	Mode	Percentile 25 75
How many people in your local area do you know well enough to ask for a favour?	9,958	0	20	6.27	5.967	4	2	10
Now thinking about the number of people in your local area that you could ask for a favour, how many of them are from a different ethnic background to your own?	9,843	0	20	1.74	3.470	0	0	2
Now thinking about the number of people in your local area that you could ask for a favour, how many of them are from a different religious background to your own?	9,610	0	20	2.01	3.607	1	0	2

TABLE 33: Number of people in respondent's local area known well enough to ask for a favour (by categories)

Number of people in respondent's local area										
		0	1-2	3-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20+	Total	
Number of people in respondent's local area known well enough to ask a favour	%	9.4	23.1	17.6	23.5	13.0	2.3	11.1	100.0	
	n	932	2,304	1,753	2,343	1,292	226	1,107	9,958	
		0	1-2	3-4	5+					Total
Number of people in respondent's local area from a different ethnic background known well enough to ask a favour	%	52.0	28.9	8.4	10.7					100.0
	n	5,115	2,842	828	1,058					9,843
Number of people in respondent's local area from a different religious background known well enough to ask a favour	%	45.0	32.3	9.8	12.8					100.0
	n	4,324	3,106	946	1,234					9,610

TABLE 34: Number of people in respondent's local area from a different ethnic background known well enough to ask for a favour (by respondent's ethnic group – five categories)

Number of people in respondent's local area						
		0	1-2	3-4	5+	Total
Asian	%	16.0	40.1	16.9	27.1	100.0
	n	106	266	112	180	664
Black	%	19.5	41.8	18.5	20.2	100.0
	n	56	120	53	58	287
Mixed	%	18.5	34.4	22.1	25.1	100.0
	n	36	67	43	49	195
Other	%	28.5	24.4	20.7	26.4	100.0
	n	55	47	40	51	193
White	%	57.4	27.5	6.8	8.4	100.0
	n	4,844	2,322	574	706	8,446

TABLE 35: Number of people in respondent's local area from a different ethnic background known well enough to ask for a favour

		Number of people in respondent's local area				
		0	1-2	3-4	5+	Total
White	%	57.4	27.5	6.8	8.4	100.0
	n	4,844	2,322	574	706	8,446
Non-White	%	18.8	37.4	18.5	25.3	100.0
	n	252	500	248	338	1,338

TABLE 36: Number of people in respondent's local area from a different religious background known well enough to ask for a favour (by respondent's religion)

		Number of people in respondent's local area				
		0	1-2	3-4	5+	Total
Buddhist	%	21.7	47.8	15.2	15.2	100.0
	n	20	44	14	14	92
Christian	%	43.8	33.6	9.7	12.9	100.0
	n	1,943	1,487	432	570	4,432
Hindu	%	16.1	40.9	15.4	27.5	100.0
	n	24	61	23	41	149
Jewish	%	12.8	32.5	25.6	29.1	100.0
	n	15	38	30	34	117
Muslim	%	14.4	41.9	20.9	22.8	100.0
	n	71	206	103	112	492
Sikh	%	27.0	42.9	11.1	19.0	100.0
	n	17	27	7	12	63
Other	%	35.3	36.0	13.2	15.4	100.0
	n	48	49	18	21	136
None	%	53.0	28.9	7.7	10.4	100.0
	n	2,186	1,193	319	430	4,128

TABLE 37: Number of people in respondent's local area from a different religious background known well enough to ask for a favour (by respondent's religion)

		Number of people in respondent's local area				
		0	1-2	3-4	5+	Total
Christian	%	43.8	33.6	9.7	12.9	100.0
	n	1,943	1,487	432	570	4,432
Muslim	%	14.4	41.9	20.9	22.8	100.0
	n	71	206	103	112	492
Other	%	22.3	39.5	16.5	21.7	100.0
	n	124	220	92	121	557
None	%	53.0	28.9	7.7	10.4	100.0
	n	2,186	1,193	319	430	4,128

KNOWING NO-ONE OR ONLY ONE PERSON

TABLE 38: Predicting having no-one or only one person in the respondent's local area known well enough to ask for a favour (ref. two or more people)

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.208(<.001)***	.056	.812	.728	.906
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	.592(<.001)***	.111	1.807	1.453	2.247
35-44	.411(<.001)***	.114	1.508	1.205	1.887
45-54	.208(.077)	.117	1.231	.978	1.549
55-64	.340(.006)**	.123	1.405	1.104	1.786
65+	.128(.310)	.126	1.136	.888	1.454
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	-.201(.282)	.186	.818	.568	1.179
Yes	.072(.240)	.061	1.075	.953	1.212
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	.558(<.001)***	.133	1.748	1.348	2.266
Black	.847(<.001)***	.155	2.333	1.720	3.163
Mixed	.558(.002)**	.183	1.747	1.220	2.501
Other	.491(.013)*	.197	1.634	1.111	2.402
Prefer not to say	1.120(<.001)***	.297	3.064	1.713	5.481
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.387(.127)	.254	1.473	.896	2.421
Christian	-.254(<.001)***	.060	.776	.689	.873
Hindu	-.905(<.001)***	.261	.405	.242	.675
Jewish	-.364(.191)	.279	.695	.402	1.200
Muslim	-.329(.032)*	.153	.719	.533	.971
Other	-.435(.029)*	.199	.647	.439	.956
Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	.151(.213)	.121	1.163	.917	1.475
East of England	-.082(.486)	.117	.922	.733	1.159
North East	-.116(.444)	.152	.890	.661	1.199
North West	-.020(.854)	.106	.981	.797	1.207
South East	-.186(.077)	.105	.830	.676	1.020
South West	-.037(.752)	.117	.964	.766	1.212
Wales	-.565(<.001)***	.157	.569	.418	.774
West Midlands	-.211(.060)	.112	.810	.650	1.009
Yorkshire and the Humber	-.056(.619)	.113	.945	.758	1.180
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	-.304(<.001)***	.067	.738	.647	.842
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.247(.124)	.161	1.280	.935	1.754
Entry Level	.503(.014)	.205	1.653	1.106	2.472
Level 1	.348(<.001)***	.088	1.416	1.192	1.683
Level 2	.162(.057)	.085	1.176	.995	1.391
Level 3	-.032(.760)	.103	.969	.791	1.186
No Qualifications	.413(<.001)***	.091	1.511	1.263	1.807
Other	-.704(.147)	.485	.495	.191	1.281

Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	.357(<.001)***	.077	1.428	1.229	1.661
£20-£39,999	.031(.633)	.065	1.032	.908	1.172
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	.093(.257)	.082	1.098	.934	1.290
Remain	-.203(.011)*	.080	.816	.698	.955
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.216(.363)	.238	1.241	.779	1.977
Did not vote	.463(<.001)***	.085	1.589	1.345	1.877
Green Party	-.166(.498)	.245	.847	.523	1.370
Labour	.113(.210)	.090	1.119	.938	1.335
Liberal Democrats	.600(<.001)***	.115	1.823	1.456	2.282
Other	.815(<.001)***	.235	2.260	1.425	3.584
Participation in a local charity (ref. Never)					
Less than once a month	-.479(<.001)***	.135	.619	.475	.806
Monthly	-.553(<.001)***	.127	.575	.448	.737
Weekly	-.860(<.001)***	.170	.423	.303	.591
Daily	-.415(.106)	.257	.661	.399	1.093
Prefer not to say	.101(.756)	.326	1.107	.584	2.096
Participation in a local social media group (ref. Never)					
Less than once a month	-.562(<.001)***	.127	.570	.445	.731
Monthly	-.236(.051)	.121	.790	.623	1.001
Weekly	-.868(<.001)***	.126	.420	.328	.537
Daily	-.534(<.001)***	.146	.586	.440	.781
Prefer not to say	.048(.901)	.391	1.050	.488	2.258
Participation in a local sports club (ref. Never)					
Less than once a month	-.229(.210)	.182	.796	.556	1.138
Monthly	-.466(.005)**	.165	.627	.454	.867
Weekly	-.672(<.001)***	.121	.511	.403	.648
Daily	-.828(.003)**	.283	.437	.251	.761
Prefer not to say	-.226(.614)	.449	.797	.331	1.923
Participation in other local hobby/activity group/helping people (ref. Never)					
Less than once a month	-.516(.006)**	.187	.597	.414	.860
Monthly	-.609(<.001)***	.151	.544	.405	.731
Weekly	-.498(<.001)***	.133	.607	.468	.788
Daily	.084(.718)	.232	1.087	.690	1.713
Prefer not to say	-1.128(.009)**	.433	.324	.139	.757
Constant	-1.561(<.001)***	.155	.210		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .087; Nagelkerke = .141
 Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 909.134$, df = 66, Sig. = <.001***
 Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: $\chi^2 = 12.426$, df = 8, Sig. = .133
 n = 9,948

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= ≤ 0.05)
 ** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= ≤ 0.01)
 *** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value ≤ 0.001)

KNOWING 10 OR MORE PEOPLE

TABLE 39: Predicting having 10 or more people in the respondent's local area known well enough to ask for a favour (ref. between zero and nine people)

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	.092(.062)	.049	1.096	.995	1.207
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	-.659(<.001)***	.099	.517	.426	.628
35-44	-.417(<.001)***	.099	.659	.543	.801
45-54	-.298(.003)**	.101	.742	.609	.905
55-64	-.329(.002)**	.107	.719	.583	.887
65+	-.278(.009)**	.106	.757	.615	.932
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	-.313(.110)	.196	.731	.498	1.073
Yes	-.093(.088)	.054	.911	.819	1.014
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	-.167(.193)	.128	.847	.659	1.088
Black	-.676(<.001)***	.171	.509	.364	.712
Mixed	.098(.570)	.172	1.103	.787	1.545
Other	-.280(.157)	.198	.756	.513	1.114
Prefer not to say	-.966(.032)*	.452	.381	.157	.923
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	-.565(.075)	.317	.568	.305	1.058
Christian	.102(.052)	.053	1.108	.999	1.229
Hindu	.596(.005)**	.210	1.814	1.202	2.738
Jewish	.370(.070)	.204	1.448	.970	2.160
Muslim	.310(.028)*	.141	1.363	1.035	1.796
Other	-.213(.271)	.194	.808	.553	1.181
Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	.357(.001)**	.110	1.429	1.151	1.774
East of England	.329(.002)**	.104	1.390	1.133	1.705
North East	.373(.004)**	.131	1.452	1.124	1.876
North West	.343(<.001)***	.097	1.410	1.166	1.705
South East	.127(.182)	.095	1.136	.942	1.369
South West	.266(.013)*	.107	1.304	1.058	1.608
Wales	.427(<.001)***	.127	1.533	1.195	1.965
West Midlands	.074(.480)	.105	1.077	.877	1.322
Yorkshire and the Humber	.293(.005)**	.104	1.340	1.093	1.644
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	.083(.135)	.056	1.087	.975	1.212
Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	-.278(.039)*	.134	.758	.582	.986
Entry Level	-.445(.035)*	.211	.641	.424	.968
Level 1	-.183(.016)*	.076	.833	.717	.966
Level 2	-.125(.077)	.071	.883	.769	1.014
Level 3	.069(.389)	.080	1.071	.916	1.252
No Qualifications	-.283(<.001)***	.084	.754	.640	.888
Other	.365(.232)	.305	1.440	.792	2.620

Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	-.387(<.001)***	.073	.679	.589	.783
£20-£39,999	-.208(<.001)***	.054	.812	.730	.903
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.221(.004)**	.076	.802	.690	.931
Remain	-.025(.693)	.064	.975	.860	1.105
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	-.006(.978)	.207	.994	.663	1.490
Did not vote	-.179(.015)*	.074	.836	.723	.966
Green Party	-.150(.395)	.176	.861	.609	1.216
Labour	-.119(.100)	.072	.888	.771	1.023
Liberal Democrats	-.118(.226)	.097	.889	.734	1.076
Other	.341(.085)	.198	1.407	.954	2.074
Participation in a local charity (ref. Never)					
Less than once a month	.169(.090)	.100	1.184	.974	1.440
Monthly	.476(<.001)***	.083	1.609	1.368	1.893
Weekly	.380(<.001)***	.098	1.463	1.206	1.773
Daily	-.313(.106)	.194	.731	.500	1.069
Prefer not to say	.690(.016)*	.286	1.993	1.138	3.490
Participation in a local social media group (ref. Never)					
Less than once a month	-.032(.747)	.101	.968	.795	1.179
Monthly	.137(.150)	.095	1.147	.952	1.383
Weekly	.322(<.001)***	.078	1.379	1.183	1.608
Daily	.576(<.001)***	.094	1.778	1.479	2.138
Prefer not to say	-.049(.897)	.380	.952	.452	2.003
Participation in a local sports club (ref. Never)					
Less than once a month	.007(.965)	.149	1.007	.752	1.347
Monthly	.211(.064)	.114	1.235	.988	1.543
Weekly	.661(<.001)***	.074	1.936	1.673	2.240
Daily	.441(.007)**	.165	1.555	1.126	2.147
Prefer not to say	.274(.513)	.419	1.315	.578	2.992
Participation in other local hobby/activity group/helping people (ref. Never)					
Less than once a month	.067(.626)	.136	1.069	.818	1.396
Monthly	.266(.007)**	.098	1.305	1.077	1.582
Weekly	.237(.005)**	.085	1.267	1.074	1.495
Daily	.141(.412)	.172	1.152	.822	1.615
Prefer not to say	.089(.790)	.335	1.093	.567	2.108
Constant	-.871(<.001)***	.135	.419		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .062; Nagelkerke = .090
 Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 635.440$, df = 66, Sig. = <.001***
 Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: $\chi^2 = 13.202$, df = 8, Sig. = .105
 n = 9,948

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)
 ** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)
 *** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

KNOWING TWO OR MORE PEOPLE FROM A DIFFERENT ETHNIC BACKGROUND

TABLE 40: Predicting having two or more people in the respondent's local area from a different ethnic background known well enough to ask for a favour (ref. zero people or one person)

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.257(<.001)***	.051	.773	.700	.854
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	-.513(<.001)***	.094	.599	.498	.720
35-44	-.501(<.001)***	.096	.606	.502	.732
45-54	-.517(<.001)***	.099	.596	.491	.724
55-64	-.974(<.001)***	.109	.377	.305	.467
65+	-1.137(<.001)***	.109	.321	.259	.397
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	-.304(.086)	.177	.738	.521	1.044
Yes	-.096(.089)	.057	.908	.812	1.015
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	.647(<.001)***	.117	1.910	1.517	2.404
Black	.321(.023)*	.142	1.378	1.044	1.818
Mixed	.888(<.001)***	.167	2.431	1.754	3.370
Other	.531(.002)**	.173	1.701	1.211	2.390
Prefer not to say	.328(.275)	.300	1.388	.771	2.499
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.251(.320)	.253	1.286	.783	2.112
Christian	.224(<.001)***	.055	1.252	1.123	1.395
Hindu	.602(.004)**	.208	1.825	1.214	2.743
Jewish	1.168(<.001)***	.220	3.215	2.088	4.951
Muslim	.316(.017)*	.133	1.371	1.057	1.779
Other	.413(.014)*	.169	1.511	1.086	2.103
Local community is ethnically diverse (ref. Agrees)	-.780(<.001)***	.072	.458	.398	.528
BAME population in Local Authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	-.379(.015)*	.156	.684	.504	.929
2nd decile	-.297(.042)*	.146	.743	.558	.989
3rd decile	-.337(.016)*	.140	.714	.542	.939
4th decile	-.428(.003)**	.142	.652	.493	.862
5th decile	-.355(.007)**	.132	.701	.541	.909
6th decile	-.296(.024)*	.131	.744	.576	.962
7th decile	-.125(.299)	.121	.882	.697	1.118
8th decile	-.037(.740)	.113	.963	.772	1.202
9th decile	.163(.133)	.109	1.177	.951	1.457
Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	-.028(.823)	.124	.973	.762	1.241
East of England	-.049(.680)	.119	.952	.754	1.202
North East	-.477(.003)**	.163	.620	.451	.854
North West	-.328(.003)**	.111	.720	.579	.896
South East	-.048(.664)	.110	.953	.769	1.182
South West	-.125(.324)	.127	.883	.689	1.131
Wales	-.212(.175)	.156	.809	.596	1.099
West Midlands	-.166(.104)	.102	.847	.693	1.035
Yorkshire and the Humber	-.381(.002)**	.124	.683	.536	.870
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	-.120(.101)	.073	.887	.769	1.024

Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	-.004(.979)	.136	.996	.763	1.301
Entry Level	-.243(.206)	.193	.784	.538	1.143
Level 1	-.370(<.001)***	.080	.691	.590	.808
Level 2	-.241(.001)***	.074	.786	.679	.909
Level 3	-.063(.451)	.084	.939	.796	1.107
No Qualifications	-.177(.039)*	.085	.838	.709	.991
Other	1.111(<.001)***	.312	3.037	1.647	5.599
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	-.016(.831)	.074	.984	.852	1.137
£20-£39,999	-.005(.928)	.057	.995	.889	1.113
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	.052(.507)	.078	1.053	.904	1.226
Remain	.157(.023)*	.069	1.171	1.022	1.340
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	-.090(.694)	.229	.914	.583	1.432
Did not vote	.101(.197)	.078	1.106	.949	1.288
Green Party	.245(.174)	.180	1.277	.897	1.818
Labour	.210(.006)**	.076	1.233	1.062	1.432
Liberal Democrats	-.034(.749)	.106	.967	.785	1.190
Other	-.065(.787)	.241	.937	.584	1.504
Participation in a local charity (ref. Never)					
Less than once a month	.544(<.001)***	.097	1.722	1.424	2.083
Monthly	.693(<.001)***	.087	1.999	1.686	2.371
Weekly	.639(<.001)***	.102	1.894	1.552	2.312
Daily	.553(.003)**	.183	1.739	1.215	2.489
Prefer not to say	.687(.028)*	.314	1.988	1.075	3.675
Participation in a local social media group (ref. Never)					
Less than once a month	.037(.709)	.099	1.038	.855	1.260
Monthly	.356(<.001)***	.096	1.428	1.182	1.724
Weekly	.324(<.001)***	.084	1.382	1.172	1.630
Daily	.315(.002)**	.103	1.371	1.120	1.677
Prefer not to say	-.251(.503)	.375	.778	.373	1.621
Participation in a local sports club (ref. Never)					
Less than once a month	.291(.036)*	.138	1.338	1.020	1.755
Monthly	.587(<.001)***	.115	1.799	1.435	2.255
Weekly	.510(<.001)***	.080	1.664	1.424	1.946
Daily	.411(.018)*	.174	1.509	1.074	2.121
Prefer not to say	.542(.176)	.400	1.719	.785	3.766
Participation in other local hobby/activity group/helping people (ref. Never)					
Less than once a month	.604(<.001)***	.130	1.829	1.418	2.360
Monthly	.532(<.001)***	.101	1.703	1.396	2.076
Weekly	.417(<.001)***	.089	1.517	1.274	1.808
Daily	.412(.019)*	.176	1.510	1.070	2.131
Prefer not to say	1.002(.002)**	.328	2.724	1.432	5.182
Constant	-.193(.186)	.146	.824		

R2 tests: Cox and Snell = .188; Nagelkerke = .264
 Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 2,047.488$, df = 76, Sig. = <.001***
 Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 19.173$, df = 8, Sig. = .014
 n = 9,845

BAME = Black, Asian and minority ethnic
 * = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)
 ** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)
 *** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value $\leq$ 0.001)

KNOWING TWO OR MORE PEOPLE FROM A DIFFERENT RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND

TABLE 41: Predicting having two or more people in the respondent's local area from a different religious background known well enough to ask for a favour (ref. zero people or one person)

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	-.103(.031)*	.048	.902	.822	.991
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	-.538(<.001)***	.092	.584	.487	.700
35-44	-.583(<.001)***	.095	.558	.463	.672
45-54	-.505(<.001)***	.097	.603	.498	.730
55-64	-.545(<.001)***	.103	.580	.474	.710
65+	-.544(<.001)***	.103	.581	.474	.711
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	-.139(.421)	.172	.871	.621	1.220
Yes	-.027(.606)	.053	.973	.878	1.079
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	.130(.262)	.116	1.139	.907	1.428
Black	-.079(.571)	.140	.924	.702	1.215
Mixed	.259(.118)	.166	1.296	.936	1.793
Other	.281(.099)	.170	1.324	.948	1.849
Prefer not to say	-.198(.540)	.324	.820	.435	1.547
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.443(.058)	.234	1.558	.985	2.463
Christian	.298(<.001)***	.052	1.347	1.217	1.492
Hindu	.970(<.001)***	.200	2.638	1.784	3.901
Jewish	1.464(<.001)***	.217	4.323	2.826	6.614
Muslim	.647(<.001)***	.130	1.910	1.479	2.466
Other	.777(<.001)***	.161	2.176	1.588	2.982
Local community is religiously diverse	-.360(<.001)***	.062	.698	.618	.788
Minority religion population in local authority (ref. 10th decile)					
1st decile	-.245(.064)	.132	.783	.604	1.015
2nd decile	-.286(.030)*	.132	.751	.580	.973
3rd decile	-.453(<.001)***	.131	.636	.492	.821
4th decile	-.271(.034)*	.128	.762	.593	.980
5th decile	-.253(.042)*	.124	.777	.609	.991
6th decile	-.112(.369)	.125	.894	.700	1.141
7th decile	-.115(.307)	.113	.891	.715	1.112
8th decile	-.130(.219)	.106	.878	.714	1.080
9th decile	.009(.932)	.107	1.009	.818	1.244
Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	-.014(.905)	.114	.987	.789	1.234
East of England	-.160(.146)	.110	.852	.687	1.057
North East	-.192(.173)	.141	.826	.626	1.088
North West	.019(.852)	.100	1.019	.837	1.240
South East	-.033(.739)	.099	.967	.796	1.175
South West	-.170(.142)	.116	.843	.672	1.059
Wales	-.168(.229)	.140	.845	.643	1.111
West Midlands	-.096(.319)	.097	.908	.751	1.098
Yorkshire and the Humber	-.220(.045)*	.109	.803	.648	.995
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	.014(.832)	.066	1.014	.892	1.153

Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	-.102(.423)	.127	.903	.704	1.158
Entry Level	-.421(.025)*	.188	.656	.454	.948
Level 1	-.328(<.001)***	.074	.720	.623	.833
Level 2	-.177(.010)**	.069	.838	.731	.959
Level 3	.021(.790)	.079	1.021	.875	1.192
No Qualifications	-.280(<.001)***	.080	.756	.646	.884
Other	.258(.416)	.318	1.294	.695	2.412
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	-.125(.072)	.069	.882	.770	1.011
£20-£39,999	-.036(.497)	.053	.964	.869	1.071
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.057(.440)	.074	.945	.817	1.092
Remain	.181(.004)**	.063	1.198	1.058	1.356
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	-.163(.447)	.214	.850	.559	1.293
Did not vote	-.016(.822)	.073	.984	.852	1.135
Green Party	.283(.090)	.167	1.326	.957	1.839
Labour	.106(.133)	.070	1.112	.968	1.276
Liberal Democrats	-.025(.792)	.096	.975	.807	1.178
Other	.106(.615)	.211	1.112	.735	1.680
Participation in a local charity (ref. Never)					
Less than once a month	.636(<.001)***	.094	1.888	1.571	2.269
Monthly	.681(<.001)***	.083	1.975	1.678	2.325
Weekly	.649(<.001)***	.097	1.914	1.581	2.317
Daily	.342(.050)*	.175	1.407	.999	1.981
Prefer not to say	.999(.001)**	.304	2.716	1.495	4.932
Participation in a local social media group (ref. Never)					
Less than once a month	-.026(.789)	.096	.975	.808	1.176
Monthly	.281(.002)**	.092	1.325	1.106	1.588
Weekly	.410(<.001)***	.078	1.506	1.293	1.755
Daily	.471(<.001)***	.097	1.602	1.325	1.937
Prefer not to say	.378(.296)	.361	1.459	.719	2.962
Participation in a local sports club (ref. Never)					
Less than once a month	.228(.093)	.136	1.256	.963	1.639
Monthly	.752(<.001)***	.113	2.121	1.701	2.645
Weekly	.444(<.001)***	.075	1.559	1.345	1.808
Daily	.615(<.001)***	.170	1.849	1.326	2.580
Prefer not to say	.262(.500)	.389	1.300	.607	2.784
Participation in other local hobby/activity group/helping people (ref. Never)					
Less than once a month	.301(.019)*	.128	1.351	1.051	1.736
Monthly	.514(<.001)***	.096	1.672	1.384	2.020
Weekly	.364(<.001)***	.084	1.439	1.221	1.696
Daily	.451(.009)**	.172	1.569	1.120	2.198
Prefer not to say	.448(.154)	.314	1.566	.846	2.899
Constant	-.273(.052)	.140	.761		

R^2 tests: Cox and Snell = .129; Nagelkerke = .177
 Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 1,327.458$, df = 76, Sig. = <.001***
 Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 16.005$, df = 8, Sig. = .042
 n = 9,630

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= ≤ 0.05)
 ** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= ≤ 0.01)
 *** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value ≤ 0.001)

LOCAL PRIORITIES

IMPORTANT LOCAL FACTORS

TABLE 42: Summary statistics: Local factors considered by respondents as important in making somewhere a good place to live (scale is one to five, where one is not at all important and five is very important)

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Median	Mode	Percentile	
								25	75
Access to nature	10,296	1	5	4.15	0.92	4	5	4	5
Activities for teenagers	10,296	1	5	4.00	1.00	4	5	3	5
Affordable housing	10,296	1	5	4.26	0.95	5	5	4	5
Clean streets	10,296	1	5	4.27	0.85	4	5	4	5
Community activities	10,296	1	5	3.77	0.99	4	4	3	5
Education provision	10,296	1	5	4.25	0.93	5	5	4	5
Facilities for young children	10,296	1	5	4.08	0.98	4	5	3	5
Good relations between ethnic groups	10,296	1	5	3.98	1.06	4	5	3	5
Good relations between faith groups	10,296	1	5	3.75	1.14	4	5	3	5
Health services	10,296	1	5	4.47	0.82	5	5	4	5
Job prospects	10,296	1	5	4.19	0.94	4	5	4	5
Level of crime	10,296	1	5	4.44	0.89	5	5	4	5
Level of pollution	10,296	1	5	4.15	0.96	4	5	4	5
Level of traffic congestion	10,296	1	5	4.03	0.95	4	5	3	5
Parks and open spaces	10,296	1	5	4.30	0.86	5	5	4	5
Public transport	10,296	1	5	4.20	0.92	4	5	4	5
Road and pavement repairs	10,296	1	5	4.18	0.91	4	5	4	5
Shopping facilities	10,296	1	5	4.10	0.90	4	5	4	5
Sports and leisure facilities	10,296	1	5	3.86	0.98	4	4	3	5
Wage levels and cost of living	10,296	1	5	4.31	0.86	5	5	4	5

LOCAL FACTORS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT

TABLE 43: Summary statistics: Local factors considered by respondents as needing improvement (scale is one to five, where one is least needs improving and five is most needs improving)

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Median	Mode	Percentile	
								25	75
Access to nature	10,296	1	5	3.16	1.19	3	3	2	4
Activities for teenagers	10,296	1	5	3.71	1.05	4	4	3	5
Affordable housing	10,296	1	5	3.87	1.10	4	5	3	5
Clean streets	10,296	1	5	3.54	1.10	4	3	3	4
Community activities	10,296	1	5	3.42	1.03	3	3	3	4
Education provision	10,296	1	5	3.41	1.11	3	3	3	4
Facilities for young children	10,296	1	5	3.50	1.08	3	3	3	4
Good relations between ethnic groups	10,296	1	5	3.13	1.10	3	3	3	4
Good relations between faith groups	10,296	1	5	3.08	1.12	3	3	2	4
Health services	10,296	1	5	3.88	1.08	4	5	3	5
Job prospects	10,296	1	5	3.70	1.02	4	4	3	5
Level of crime	10,296	1	5	3.67	1.12	4	3	3	5
Level of pollution	10,296	1	5	3.43	1.12	3	3	3	4
Level of traffic congestion	10,296	1	5	3.57	1.12	4	3	3	4
Parks and open spaces	10,296	1	5	3.25	1.19	3	3	2	4
Public transport	10,296	1	5	3.54	1.15	4	3	3	4
Road and pavement repairs	10,296	1	5	3.79	1.05	4	4	3	5
Shopping facilities	10,296	1	5	3.45	1.13	3	3	3	4
Sports and leisure facilities	10,296	1	5	3.31	1.09	3	3	3	4
Wage levels and cost of living	10,296	1	5	3.98	1.01	4	5	3	5

TABLE 44: Summary statistics: Comparison of responses relating to local factors considered as important by respondents with those regarded as needing improvement

	Important		Improvement	
	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean	Std. Deviation
Access to nature	4.15	0.92	4.15	0.92
Activities for teenagers	4.00	1.00	4.00	1.00
Affordable housing	4.26	0.95	4.26	0.95
Clean streets	4.27	0.85	4.27	0.85
Community activities	3.77	0.99	3.77	0.99
Education provision	4.25	0.93	4.25	0.93
Facilities for young children	4.08	0.98	4.08	0.98
Good relations between ethnic groups	3.98	1.06	3.98	1.06
Good relations between faith groups	3.75	1.14	3.75	1.14
Health services	4.47	0.82	4.47	0.82
Job prospects	4.19	0.94	4.19	0.94
Level of crime	4.44	0.89	4.44	0.89
Level of pollution	4.15	0.96	4.15	0.96
Level of traffic congestion	4.03	0.95	4.03	0.95
Parks and open spaces	4.30	0.86	4.30	0.86
Public transport	4.20	0.92	4.20	0.92
Road and pavement repairs	4.18	0.91	4.18	0.91
Shopping facilities	4.10	0.90	4.10	0.90
Sports and leisure facilities	3.86	0.98	3.86	0.98
Wage levels and cost of living	4.31	0.86	4.31	0.86

TABLE 45: Results of dimension reduction using factor analysis and Chronbach's α test of internal validity

Level1: Security	Level 2: Stability	Level 3: Facilities	Level 4: Diversity
Affordable housing	Clean streets	Access to nature	Good relations between ethnic groups
Health services	Education provision	Activities for teenagers	Good relations between faith groups
Level of crime	Job prospects	Community activities	
Wage levels and cost of living	Level of pollution	Facilities for young children	
	Level of traffic congestion	Road and pavement repairs	
	Parks and open spaces	Shopping facilities	
	Public transport	Sports and leisure facilities	
Chronbach's α (test of internal validity)			
$\alpha = .771$	$\alpha = .841$	$\alpha = .834$	$\alpha = .768$
Mean (0-5)			
>4.25	4.0-4.3	3.76-4.2	3.75-4.0
Median			
5	4.5	4	4
Proportion of 5 out of 5 responses on "importance" scale			
0.52-.064	0.38-0.52	0.26-0.46	0.32-0.4

We assume the following levels of internal validity: .00 is no internal validity; .01-.499 is very poor; .500-.599 is poor; .600-.699 is acceptable; .700-.799 is good; .800-.899 is very good; .900-.999 is excellent; and 1.00 is perfect internal validity.

TABLE 46: Summary statistics: Comparison of responses relating to local factors considered as important by respondents with those regarded as needing improvement

	Level assignment	Level observation	Security 1	Stability 2	Facility 3	Diversity 4
Nature	3	3	0.49	0.6	0.66	0.4
Youth	3	3	0.51	0.6	0.76	0.45
Housing	1	1	0.76	0.56	0.53	0.39
Streets	2	2	0.59	0.74	0.61	0.38
Community	3	3	0.41	0.54	0.73	0.45
Education	2	2	0.59	0.73	0.64	0.43
Children	3	3	0.53	0.59	0.76	0.41
Ethnic	4	4	0.48	0.53	0.52	0.9
Faith	4	4	0.38	0.46	0.49	0.91
Health	1	1	0.79	0.65	0.56	0.37
Jobs	2	2	0.62	0.72	0.59	0.4
Crime	1	1	0.75	0.61	0.49	0.34
Pollution	2	2	0.54	0.72	0.56	0.4
Congestion	2	2	0.49	0.7	0.53	0.35
Spaces	2	2	0.58	0.74	0.64	0.4
Transport	2	2	0.56	0.71	0.56	0.4
Roads	3	3	0.56	0.62	0.68	0.35
Shops	3	3	0.53	0.57	0.66	0.32
Sport	3	3	0.43	0.53	0.72	0.39
Costs	1	1	0.79	0.62	0.56	0.36

TABLE 47: Correlations of local priorities factors with mean earnings

	r	S.E.	t-value	p-value
Important				
Security	-0.419	0.050	-8.356	<0.001***
Stability	-0.415	0.050	-8.256	<0.001***
Facilities	-0.424	0.050	-8.483	<0.001***
Diversity	-0.383	0.051	-7.499	<0.001***
Improvement				
Security	0.123	0.055	2.243	0.026*
Stability	0.147	0.055	2.689	0.008**
Facilities	-0.012	0.055	-0.217	0.828
Diversity	0.375	0.051	7.336	<0.001***

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= ≤ 0.05)** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= ≤ 0.01)*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value ≤ 0.001)

TABLE 48: Correlations of local priorities factors with child poverty

	r	S.E.	t-value	p-value
Important				
Security	-0.246	0.054	-4.592	<0.001***
Stability	-0.274	0.053	-5.165	<0.001***
Facilities	-0.272	0.053	-5.116	<0.001***
Diversity	-0.162	0.054	-2.980	0.003**
Improvement				
Security	0.750	0.037	20.539	<0.001***
Stability	0.815	0.032	25.460	<0.001***
Facilities	0.731	0.038	19.394	<0.001***
Diversity	0.781	0.034	22.685	<0.001***

TABLE 49: Correlations of local priorities factor with multiple deprivation

	r	S.E.	t-value	p-value
Important				
Security	0.036	0.055	0.649	0.517
Stability	-0.001	0.055	-0.017	0.986
Facilities	0.009	0.055	0.165	0.869
Diversity	0.101	0.055	1.830	0.068
Improvement				
Security	0.677	0.041	16.669	<0.001***
Stability	0.773	0.035	22.052	<0.001***
Facilities	0.730	0.038	19.347	<0.001***
Diversity	0.627	0.043	14.586	<0.001***

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= ≤ 0.01) *** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value ≤ 0.001)

LOCAL ENGAGEMENT

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

TABLE 50: Frequency of participation with a local activity or group

		Daily	Less than once a month	Monthly	Weekly	Never	Prefer not to say	Total
A local branch of a national political party	%	1.2%	2.9%	3.9%	2.3%	89.3%	0.4%	100.0%
	n	126	298	397	235	9,195	45	10,296
A local campaign group	%	1.0%	2.6%	3.3%	2.2%	90.5%	0.4%	100.0%
	n	99	266	343	227	9,316	44	10,296
A local charity	%	1.7%	6.3%	8.6%	5.7%	76.9%	0.7%	100.0%
	n	178	651	890	591	7,914	71	10,296
A local faith-based organisation	%	1.0%	2.8%	3.3%	5.0%	87.4%	0.5%	100.0%
	n	104	287	341	518	8,999	48	10,296
A local history group	%	1.0%	2.4%	3.0%	1.9%	91.4%	0.4%	100.0%
	n	101	244	304	198	9,410	40	10,296
A local residents' group	%	1.4%	5.3%	6.1%	3.8%	82.8%	0.5%	100.0%
	n	148	541	632	394	8,527	53	10,296
A local social media group	%	6.1%	6.6%	6.9%	9.7%	70.2%	0.5%	100.0%
	n	630	678	710	994	7,227	56	10,296
A local sports club	%	2.0%	2.9%	4.6%	10.5%	79.5%	0.4%	100.0%
	n	211	299	477	1,082	8,187	40	10,296
A local environmental/ nature group	%	1.2%	3.0%	4.8%	2.5%	88.1%	0.5%	100.0%
	n	123	304	491	258	9,066	52	10,296
Other local hobby/activity group / helping people	%	2.0%	3.4%	6.0%	8.0%	79.9%	0.6%	100.0%
	n	205	347	621	828	8,230	66	10,296

CHI-SQUARE INDEPENDENCE TESTS

TABLE 51

Chi-square independence tests between demographic categories and engagement with a local charity and a local social media group

Variable	Categories	Engagement in a local charity		Engagement in a local social media group	
		χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)	χ^2 (df)	p (2-sided)
Sex	Female Male	22.452	<.001	57.128	<.001
Age	18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+	385.617	<.001	467.828	<.001
Region (nutsi)	East Midlands East of England London North East North West South East South West Wales West Midlands Yorkshire and the Humber	156.130	<.001	78.046	.002
Ethnicity	Asian Black Mixed Other Prefer not to say White	334.550	<.001	158.308	<.001
Religion	Buddhist Christian Hindu Jewish Muslim None Other Sikh	327.804	<.001	155.909	<.001
Education	Apprenticeship Entry level Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4+ No qualifications Other	186.566	<.001	198.259	.001
Income (annual household)	£0-£19,999 £20-£39,999 £40,000+	28.683	<.001	36.912	<.001

BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELLING

TABLE 52: Predicting engagement in a local charity (ref. Never)

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	.003(.952)	.054	1.003	.903	1.115
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	-.197(.042)*	.097	.821	.679	.993
35-44	-.469(<.001)***	.102	.626	.513	.764
45-54	-.810(<.001)***	.107	.445	.361	.548
55-64	-1.048(<.001)***	.117	.351	.279	.441
65+	-.781(<.001)***	.112	.458	.367	.571
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	-.108(.588)	.199	.898	.609	1.325
Yes	.224(<.001)***	.059	1.251	1.115	1.404
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	.028(.817)	.122	1.029	.809	1.308
Black	.559(<.001)***	.142	1.749	1.323	2.312
Mixed	.431(.010)**	.167	1.539	1.109	2.136
Other	-.110(.540)	.179	.896	.631	1.273
Prefer not to say	.453(.181)	.339	1.572	.810	3.054
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.534(.033)*	.250	1.705	1.045	2.783
Christian	.455(<.001)***	.060	1.576	1.400	1.773
Hindu	.078(.716)	.213	1.081	.712	1.642
Jewish	.566(.008)**	.213	1.760	1.160	2.672
Muslim	.731(<.001)***	.133	2.077	1.599	2.699
Other	.263(.159)	.187	1.301	.902	1.875
Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	-.131(.268)	.118	.877	.696	1.106
East of England	-.268(.018)*	.113	.765	.612	.955
North East	.003(.981)	.144	1.003	.756	1.331
North West	-.195(.057)	.103	.823	.673	1.006
South East	-.111(.260)	.098	.895	.738	1.085
South West	-.034(.762)	.113	.966	.775	1.206
Wales	-.245(.091)	.145	.783	.589	1.040
West Midlands	-.178(.095)	.107	.837	.679	1.031
Yorkshire and the Humber	-.096(.386)	.111	.909	.731	1.129
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	.093(.149)	.064	1.097	.967	1.244

Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	-.110(.437)	.142	.895	.678	1.183
Entry Level	.409(.030)*	.189	1.505	1.040	2.179
Level 1	-.192(.023)*	.084	.826	.700	.974
Level 2	-.253(.001)**	.079	.777	.665	.907
Level 3	-.245(.006)**	.090	.782	.656	.934
No Qualifications	-.420(<.001)***	.093	.657	.548	.788
Other	-.521(.181)	.389	.594	.277	1.274
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	.144(.065)	.078	1.155	.991	1.346
£20-£39,999	.006(.923)	.062	1.006	.892	1.135
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.075(.372)	.085	.927	.786	1.095
Remain	.058(.429)	.073	1.059	.918	1.222
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.296(.186)	.224	1.345	.867	2.086
Did not vote	-.091(.281)	.084	.913	.774	1.077
Green Party	.336(.060)	.179	1.400	.986	1.987
Labour	.005(.948)	.081	1.005	.858	1.178
Liberal Democrats	.119(.278)	.109	1.126	.909	1.395
Other	.495(.031)*	.230	1.640	1.045	2.575
Knowing 10 or more people in the local area to whom respondents can ask for a favour	.135(.029)*	.062	1.145	1.014	1.293
Knowing 2 or more people from a different ethnic background in the local area to whom respondents can ask for a favour	.573(<.001)***	.070	1.773	1.547	2.033
Knowing 2 or more people from a different religious background in the local area to whom respondents can ask for a favour	.602(<.001)***	.067	1.825	1.601	2.081
Constant	-1.304(<.001)***	.143	.271		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .105; Nagelkerke = .159
Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 1,044.658$, df = 49, Sig. = <.001***
Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 12.802$, df = 8, Sig. = .119
n = 9,452

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

TABLE 53: Predicting engagement in a social media group (ref. Never)

Variables	β (Sig.)	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for EXP(β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex (ref. Male): Female	.336(<.001)***	.048	1.400	1.273	1.539
Age (ref. 18-24)					
25-34	.002(.986)	.091	1.002	.838	1.197
35-44	-.151(.107)	.094	.860	.715	1.033
45-54	-.433(<.001)***	.097	.649	.537	.784
55-64	-.935(<.001)***	.106	.393	.319	.484
65+	-.893(<.001)***	.105	.409	.333	.503
Disability status (ref. No disability)					
Prefer not to say	-.300(.114)	.189	.741	.511	1.074
Yes	.241(<.001)***	.053	1.273	1.147	1.412
Ethnicity (ref. White)					
Asian	-.051(.663)	.118	.950	.754	1.197
Black	.218(.117)	.140	1.244	.946	1.636
Mixed	.097(.556)	.165	1.102	.797	1.524
Other	.059(.730)	.170	1.060	.760	1.480
Prefer not to say	.065(.850)	.345	1.067	.543	2.100
Religion (ref. No religion)					
Buddhist	.428(.070)	.237	1.535	.965	2.440
Christian	.228(<.001)***	.053	1.255	1.131	1.393
Hindu	.093(.645)	.201	1.097	.740	1.626
Jewish	.502(.014)*	.205	1.653	1.107	2.469
Muslim	.362(.005)**	.130	1.436	1.113	1.853
Other	.164(.333)	.170	1.179	.845	1.644
Region (ref. London)					
East Midlands	.174(.107)	.108	1.190	.963	1.472
East of England	.294(.004)**	.101	1.342	1.101	1.637
North East	.468(<.001)***	.128	1.596	1.243	2.050
North West	.112(.238)	.095	1.119	.929	1.348
South East	.200(.028)*	.091	1.222	1.021	1.461
South West	.161(.125)	.105	1.174	.957	1.442
Wales	.115(.377)	.130	1.122	.869	1.448
West Midlands	.007(.940)	.100	1.008	.828	1.226
Yorkshire and the Humber	.130(.204)	.103	1.139	.932	1.393
Urban-Rural area (ref. Urban)	.151(.007)**	.056	1.163	1.041	1.298

Education (ref. Degree)					
Apprenticeship	.065(.616)	.130	1.068	.827	1.379
Entry Level	.245(.172)	.179	1.277	.899	1.815
Level 1	-.074(.325)	.075	.929	.802	1.076
Level 2	-.111(.114)	.070	.895	.779	1.027
Level 3	-.061(.450)	.080	.941	.804	1.101
No Qualifications	-.350(<.001)***	.084	.705	.598	.831
Other	-.579(.136)	.388	.561	.262	1.200
Income (£40,000 and over)					
£0-£19,999	-.109(.125)	.071	.897	.780	1.031
£20-£39,999	-.045(.414)	.055	.956	.859	1.064
EU Referendum 2016 vote (ref. Leave)					
Did not vote	-.151(.043)*	.075	.859	.742	.995
Remain	.019(.772)	.065	1.019	.897	1.158
General Election 2019 vote (ref. Conservative)					
Brexit Party	.050(.814)	.214	1.051	.692	1.598
Did not vote	-.061(.417)	.075	.941	.813	1.090
Green Party	.175(.296)	.167	1.191	.858	1.653
Labour	.097(.179)	.072	1.102	.956	1.269
Liberal Democrats	.241(.013)*	.097	1.272	1.052	1.539
Other	-.300(.208)	.238	.741	.465	1.181
Knowing 10 or more people in the local area to whom respondents can ask for a favour	.231(<.001)***	.056	1.260	1.128	1.408
Knowing 2 or more people from a different ethnic background in the local area to whom respondents can ask for a favour	.316(<.001)***	.065	1.372	1.208	1.558
Knowing 2 or more people from a different ethnic background in the local area to whom respondents can ask for a favour	.362(<.001)***	.061	1.435	1.273	1.619
Constant	-1.169(<.001)***	.132	.311		

R² tests: Cox and Snell = .074; Nagelkerke = .191
Omnibus Test: $\chi^2 = 727.143$, df = 49, Sig. = <.001***
Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 11.195$, df = 8, Sig. = .191
n = 9,454

* = significant at 5% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.05)

** = significant at 1% level or less (p-value= $\leq$ 0.01)

*** = significant at 0.1% level or less (p-value<0.001)

METHODS

BASIC INFORMATION

Data collection: Survation

Fieldwork: 14 September – 5 October 2022

Method: Online interviews with members of a panel. Interview length was approximately 10 minutes.

Sample: People living in England and Wales aged 18 and over

Sample size: 10,296

Sample weighting: Differential response rates from different demographic groups were taken into account (see variable weight)

Geographic unit: Local authority

TABLE 54: Frequency counts (unweighted) and percentages of the key participants' sociodemographic information

Variable	Category	Frequency	Percentage
Sex	Male	5,927	57.57
	Female	4,369	42.43
Total		10,296	100
Gender	Man	4,329	42.05
	Other	20	0.19
	Prefer not to say	21	0.20
	Woman	5,926	57.56
Total		10,296	100
Age (age 6 categories)	18-24 years old	1,330	12.92
	25-34 years old	2,069	20.10
	35-44 years old	2,078	20.18
	45-54 years old	1,754	17.04
	55-64 years old	1,474	14.32
	65+ years old	1,591	15.45
Total		10,296	100
Country	England	9,730	94.50
	Wales	566	5.50
Total		10,296	100
Region (NUTSI)	East Midlands	860	8.35
	East of England	1,108	10.76
	London	1,328	12.90
	North East	515	5.00
	North West	1,340	13.01
	South East	1,455	14.13
	South West	975	9.47
	Wales	566	5.50
	West Midlands	1,133	11.00
	Yorkshire and the Humber	1,016	9.87
Total		10,296	100

Variable	Category	Frequency	Percentage
Citizenship	Another country	422	4.10
	Both	178	1.73
	British citizen	9,621	93.44
	Prefer not to say	75	0.73
Total		10,296	100
Ethnicity	Asian	691	6.71
	Black	316	3.07
	Mixed	229	2.22
	Other	57	0.55
	Prefer not to say	74	0.72
	White	8,929	86.72
Total		10,296	100
Religion	Buddhist	95	0.92
	Christian	4,506	43.76
	Hindu	151	1.47
	Jewish	116	1.13
	Muslim	540	5.24
	None	4,685	45.50
	Other	150	1.46
	Sikh	53	0.51
Total		10,296	100
Education	Apprenticeship	296	2.87
	Entry Level	156	1.52
	Level 1	1,364	13.25
	Level 2	1,877	18.23
	Level 3	1,815	17.63
	Level 4+	3,572	34.69
	No qualifications	1,173	11.39
	Other	43	0.42
Total		10,296	100
Income (household income 3 bands)	£0 - £19,999	3,650	35.45
	£20,000 - £39,999	3,967	38.53
	£40,000+	2,679	26.02
Total		10,296	100
General Election 2019 vote	Brexit Party	193	1.87
	Conservative	2,939	28.55
	Did not vote	3,600	34.97
	Green Party	237	2.30
	Labour	2,701	26.23
	Liberal Democrats	528	5.13
	Other	97	0.94
	Refused	1	0.01
Total		10296	100
EU Referendum 2016 vote	Did not vote	3,673	35.67
	Leave	3,491	33.91
	Remain	3,132	30.42
Total		10,296	100

MEASURES

A full version of the questionnaire is available on request.

DIVERSITY MEASURES

Available responses to the diversity measures were:

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Don't know

All respondents answered the following questions:

- Ethnic diversity is good for British society
- Migrants are good for British society
- Religious diversity is good for British society
- My local community is ethnically diverse
- My local community is diverse in terms of people being of different nationalities
- My local community is religiously diverse

Respondents who agreed that their local community was ethnically, nationally or religiously diverse, answered the following questions:

- Ethnic diversity is good for my local community
- Migrants are good for my local community
- Religious diversity is good for my local community

Respondents who disagreed that their local community is diverse answered the following questions:

- Ethnic diversity would be good for my local community
- Migrants would be good for my local community
- Religious diversity would be good for my local community

CHANGE MEASURES

Available responses to the change measures were:

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Don't know

All respondents answered the following questions:

- Ethnic diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years
- The number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years
- Religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Respondents who agreed that their local community was ethnically, nationally or religiously diverse, answered the following questions:

- Ethnic diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years
- The number of migrants in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years
- Religious diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Respondents who disagreed that their local community is diverse answered the following questions:

- Ethnic diversity in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years
- The number of migrants in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years
- Religious diversity in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years

LOCAL TRUST MEASURES

Available responses to the local trust measures were from a minimum of zero to 20 or more.

All respondents answered the following questions:

- How many people do you know well enough to ask for a favour?
- How many people do you know well enough to ask for a favour who are from an ethnic background different to your own?
- How many people do you know well enough to ask for a favour who are from a religious background different to your own?

LOCAL PRIORITIES MEASURES

Local priorities were measured in terms of (1) importance and (2) need for improvement with two questions.

IMPORTANCE

On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not at all important and 5 is very important, how important, if at all, do you think the following are in making somewhere a good place to live?

IMPROVEMENT

Thinking about your local area, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is least needs improving and 5 is most needs improving, to what extent, if at all, do you think the following need improving?

All respondents answered the above questions (20 options were available and fully randomised for each question):

- Access to nature
- Activities for teenagers
- Affordable housing
- Clean streets
- Community activities
- Education provision
- Facilities for young children
- Good relations between ethnic groups
- Good relations between faith groups
- Health services
- Job prospects
- Level of crime
- Level of pollution
- Level of traffic congestion
- Parks and open spaces
- Public transport
- Road and pavement repairs
- Shopping facilities
- Sports and leisure facilities
- Wage levels and costs of living

LOCAL ENGAGEMENT MEASURES

Available responses were:

- Daily
- Weekly
- Monthly
- Less than once a month
- Never
- Prefer not to say

All respondents answered the following question:

How often, if at all, do you engage with each of the following? (10 options were randomised)

- A local branch of a national political party
- A local campaign group
- A local charity
- A local faith-based organisation
- A local history group
- A local residents' group
- A local social media group
- A local sports club
- A local environmental/nature group
- Other local hobby/activity group (please specify)

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

- Age in a single year
- Sex
- Gender
- UK Country
- NUTSI Region
- Local Authority
- Citizenship
- Country of Birth
- Ethnic Group (major, e.g., White, Asian)
- Ethnic Group (detailed, e.g., White British, Indian)
- Highest level of qualification
- Annual equivalised household income
- Disability or long-term health condition status
- 2019 General Election vote
- 2016 EU referendum vote
- Religion
- Religion (sub-questions: previous or cultural religion)
- Christian denomination or Muslim tradition

DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURE

The analysis was performed using SPSS version 28. All codes (syntax) are available upon request.

All analyses were weighted using variable weight. (Information concerning the design and use of the weighting variable is available on request.)

BIVARIATE ANALYSIS

In the first step, the Pearson's chi-square test of independence (i.e., Pearson Chi-Square; 95% of confidence level) was used to determine whether there was an association between sociodemographic variables (i.e., sex, age categories, region, ethnicity, education, religion, income) and diversity and change measures. This test was used also regarding two items of civic engagement (local charity and social media group). Original categories were used in these tests.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

In a second step, binary logistic regression was used to determine the predictive effects of several predictors (e.g., sex/gender, age, ethnicity and so on) on dis/agreement on diversity and change items (outcomes), with Entry method, and 95% of confidence level. For this purpose, categories of diversity and change items were transformed to predict the odds ratio of disagreement versus other responses (reference), in the case of diversity measures, or the odds ratio of agreement versus other responses (reference) in the case of change measures.

Responses of "don't know" to diversity and change measures were included in the analysis as they could be similar to the "neither agree nor disagree" option. However, "prefer not to say" responses were excluded from the analysis, regarding civic engagement, as it could match any of the other categories/values.

The same analysis technique was used regarding two items of civic engagement (local charity and social media group), which were transformed to predict the odds ratio of participation versus no participation ("never", reference) in these activities.

Because trust items were not normally distributed, they were transformed into categorical variables to predict the odds ratio of having a lower or higher number of people who they can trust.

As stated in the report, a two-part model was used to analyse trust data to account for the amount of "zero" responses (i.e., right-skewness).

To account for how many respondents reported knowing no-one across the three questions, we had to adapt our analytical methods and divide our respondents into more manageable groups for the purposes of using more advanced statistical techniques.

In more technical terms, because these items do not follow a normal distribution and are right-skewed, we transformed these answers into categories (or groups) and conducted logistic regressions to determine which of our variables, if any, might be said to predict whether respondents have a specific range of people in their local area known well enough to ask for a favour.

Returning to the first question, "How many people in your local area do you know well enough to ask for a favour?", we observed that 25% of respondents answered up to two people and 75% of them answered up to 10 people.

Based on this, we employed a two-part model technique. We used two separate models to explore which factors, if any, predict whether respondents know a relatively low number of people locally (zero or just one person) when compared to knowing two or more (Model 1) and which factors, if any, predict whether respondents have a relatively high number of people locally (10 or more) compared to knowing fewer than ten (Model 2).

REPORTING CRITERIA

We used the following reporting criteria to summarise the outputs from the logistic regression modelling:

Round values once only
(i.e., 1.45 = 1.5; 1.445 = 1.45 = 1.4)

Report odds $\geq$ 1.5

Report weaker associations ($\geq$ 1.3) when part of a variable where a category

already reported ($\geq$ 1.5).

MULTILEVEL REGRESSION AND POST-STRATIFICATION (MRP) METHODOLOGY

(NOTES COURTESY OF SURVATION)

Multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP) is a way of producing estimates of opinion and attitudes for small defined geographic areas. It works by combining information from large national samples with ONS and census data. This method has two components:

THE MR (MULTI-LEVEL REGRESSION) PART

The responses given by respondents are modelled on the basis of their demographic characteristics and what we know about their area (its past voting history, how it voted in the EU referendum and so on). This is the “multilevel regression” part. For example, a 23-year-old female living in London who works in the media sector and has a university education has a higher probability of being a remain voter than a 72-year-old male living in Grimsby who is a retired former fisherman who left school at 16. There are elements of a person’s lifestyle, background and life experience that may provide an indication as to their behaviour, be it likelihood to vote in a certain way (or choose not to vote at all), or a response to a survey question. “Multi-level regression” examines to what extent each of these elements has an effect on behaviour.

THE P (POST-STRATIFICATION) PART

In the subsequent “post-stratification” stage, we use census data to calculate how many people of each demographic type live in each area and combine this with additional relevant contextual information to predict how many of these people will vote for each party (or have a certain opinion). In this way, the estimates, although they are derived from a national sample, end up being representative of the demographic make-up of each constituency.

REFERENCES

2020 Public Services Trust and Ipsos MORI (2020). What do people want, need and expect from public services? London: Royal Society of Arts. Available on: https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/publication/1970-01/sri_what_do_people_want_need_and_expect_from_public_services_110310.pdf. Accessed on 26 November 2023.

Abrams, D., Lalot, F., Broadwood, J., Davies Hayon, K. and Dixon, A. (2021). Beyond us and them: societal cohesion in Britain through eighteen months of COVID-19. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.belongnetwork.co.uk/resources/beyond-us-and-them-societal-cohesion-in-britain-through-eighteen-months-of-covid-19/>. Accessed 26 October 2023.

Abrams, D., Lalot, F., Ozkeçeci, H., Broadwood, J., Davies Hayon, K. and Dixon A. (2022). Discrimination, prejudice and cohesion: intergroup relations among Black, Muslim and White people in Britain in the context of COVID-19 and beyond. [Online.] Available at: <https://www.belongnetwork.co.uk/resources/discrimination-prejudice-and-cohesion-intergroup-relations-among-black-muslim-and-white-people-in-britain-in-the-context-of-covid-19-and-beyond/>. Accessed on 26 November 2023.

Allport, G.W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Wokingham, England: Addison-Wesley.

Ballinger, S., Katwala, S. and Rolfe, H. (2022). Jubilee Britain: after a decade of upheaval, where are we going now? London: British Future. Available at: <https://www.britishfuture.org/publication/jubilee-britain/>. Accessed 26 November 2023.

BBC News (2022a). Dover migrant centre attack driven by right-wing ideology – police. BBC News, 5 November. [online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-63526659>. Accessed on 17 October 2023.

BBC News (2022b). 2022 Leicester unrest. BBC News, no date. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/c0m2wr69355t?page=2>. Accessed 17 October 2023.

BBC News (2023a). Strike dates: Who is striking and what pay do they want? BBC News, 1 August. [Online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-62134314>. Accessed 17 October 2023.

BBC News (2023b). Israel Gaza war: History of the conflict explained. BBC News, 15 November. [Online.] Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/newsbeat-44124396>. Accessed on 15 November 2023.

Bennett Institute/Letter One (2020). Valuing wealth, building prosperity: the wealth economy project on natural and social capital, one year report. [Online.] Available at: https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/WER_layout_March_2020_ONLINE_doubles.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2023.

Blagden, J. and Stanley, L. (2023). Good neighbours: how do levels of hyper-trust vary and why does it matter? London: Onwards.

Bonaiuto, M., Ariccio, S., Albers, T., Eren, R. and Cataldi, S. (2020). Pride of place: definitions, causes, effects and relevance for the rural context. Available at: https://prideofplace.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/PoP_IO1_full_web.pdf. Accessed on 26 November 2023.

Borkowska, M and Laurence, J. (2021). Coming together or coming apart? Changes in social cohesion during the Covid-19 pandemic in England. *European Societies*, 23(S1), pp. S618-S636.

Cabinet Office (2011). Giving Green and white paper. London: The Stationery Office. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/giving-green-paper>. Accessed on 26 November 2023.

Carpiano, R.M. and Hystad, P.W. (2011). 'Sense of community belonging' in health surveys: what social capital is it measuring? *Health & Place*, 17, pp.606-617.

- Casey, L. (2016). *The Casey Review: a review into opportunity and integration*. London: Department for Communities and Local Government [now Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities].
- Centre for Thriving Places (2021). *Thriving Places Index*. [Online.] Available at: <https://www.thrivingplacesindex.org/>. Accessed on 26 November 2023.
- Ceobanu, A. M. and Escondell, X. (2010). Comparative analyses of public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration using multinational survey data: a review of theories and research. *Annual Review Sociology*, 36(1), pp.309-28.
- Chilenski, S.M., Summers, N. (2016). *The value of social capital: what are its outcomes?* In Greenberg A., Gullotta T., Bloom M. (eds.) (2016). *Social capital and community well-being: issues in children's and families' lives*. New York: Springer.
- Chin, C. (2019). The concept of belonging: critical, normative and multicultural. *Ethnicities*, 19(5), pp.715-739. DOI:10.1177/1468796819827406.
- Coleman, D (2010). Projections of the ethnic minority populations of the United Kingdom 2006-2056. *Population and Development Review*, 36(3), pp.441-486.
- Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities (2021). *Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities: the report*. London: Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities.
- Communities and Local Government [now Department of Levelling Up, Housing and Communities] (2009). *Guidance on building a local sense of belonging*. London: Communities and Local Government.
- CORAB (Commission of Religion and Belief in British Public Life) (2015). *Living with difference: Community, diversity and the common good*. Cambridge: Woolf Institute. Available at: <https://www.woolf.cam.ac.uk/assets/file-downloads/Living-with-Difference.pdf>. Accessed on 26 November 2023.
- Cox, B., Goodhart, D., Kaufman, E. and Webber, R. (2022). *Whatever happened to integration?* London: Policy Exchange.
- Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (2022). *Levelling Up the United Kingdom [white paper]*. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/levelling-up-the-united-kingdom>. Accessed 22 November 2023.
- Department of Culture, Media and Sport (2021). *Community Life Survey 2020/21*. London: DCMS. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/community-life-survey-202021>. Accessed on 26 November 2023.
- Edelman (2023). *2023 Edelman Trust Barometer: global report*. London: Edelman. Available at: <https://www.edelman.com/trust/2023/trust-barometer>. Accessed 23 October 2023.
- Global Exchange on Migration and Diversity (2014). *What do we know about national and local belonging and civic participation and what are the key emerging issues?* Global Exchange Briefing 6/2014. [Online] Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS). Available at: <https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2014/what-do-we-know-about-national-and-local-belonging-and-civic-participation-and-what-are-the-key-emerging-issues/>. Accessed on 26 November 2023.
- Goubin, S., Ruelens, A. & Nicaise, I. (2022). Trends in attitudes towards migration in Europe. A comparative analysis. [Online.] Available at: <https://www.opportunitiesproject.eu/media/attachments/2022/04/20/changing-attitudes-towards-migration.pdf>. Accessed on 26 November.
- Hainmueller, J. and Hopkins, D. J. (2014). Public attitudes towards immigration. *Annual Review Political Science*, 17(1), pp.225-49.
- Hamilton, K., Helliwell, J. F. and Woolcock, M. (2016). *Social capital, trust and well-being in the evaluation of wealth: NBER Working Paper no. w22556*. [Online.] Available at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2832560>. Accessed on 26 November 2023.
- Hargreaves, J, Kessler, E, Izamoje, D., Symon, A. (2020). *How we get along: the Diversity Study of England and Wales [now the Woolf Diversity Study]*. [Online.] Cambridge: Woolf Institute. Available at: www.woolf.cam.ac.uk/diversity. Accessed 26 November 2023.
- Hargreaves, J. (2020). *Religion, race and nationality – what are our prejudices and how can we overcome them?* The Conversation, 19 November. [Online]. Available at: <https://theconversation.com/religion-race-and-nationality-what-are-our-prejudices-and-how-can-we-overcome-them-150306>. Accessed on 3 November 2023.

- Hidalgo, M. C., and Hernández, B. (2001). Place Attachment: Conceptual and Empirical Questions. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 21(3), pp.273-281. <https://doi.org/10.1006.jevp.2001.0221>.
- Home Office (2023). Official Statistics Irregular migration to the UK, year ending June 2023: published 24 August 2023. [Online.] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year-ending-june-2023/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year-ending-june-2023>. Accessed 17 October 2023.
- Institute for Public Policy Research (2022). A new consensus? How public opinion has warmed to immigration. London: Institute for Public Policy Research. [Online.] Available at: <https://www.ippr.org/publications/a-new-consensus>. Accessed 3 November 2023.
- Ipsos MORI (2022). Attitudes towards immigration: survey conducted in collaboration with British Future: fieldwork 28 January-10 February 2022. London: Ipsos MORI. [Online.] Available at: <https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2022-03/attitudes-towards-immigration-british-future-ipsos-march-2022.pdf>. Accessed on 26 November 2023.
- Ipsos Social Research Institute (2010). One world, many places: citizens' views of municipal government and local areas across the world. London: Ipsos Social Research Institute. [Online.] Available at: <https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/publication/1970-01/sri-one-world-many-places-june-2010.pdf>. Accessed 3 November 2023.
- Kaufmann, E. and Goodwin, M. J. (2018). The diversity wave: a meta-analysis of the native-born white response to ethnic diversity. *Social Science Research*, 76, pp.120-131.
- Kelsey, T. and Kenny, M. (2021). Policy Report Series: Townscapes: 7. The value of social infrastructure. Cambridge: Bennett Institute. Available at: <https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/publications/social-infrastructure/>. [Online.] Accessed 26 October 2023.
- Laurence, J. and Bentley, L. (2018). Countervailing contact: Community ethnic diversity, anti-immigrant attitudes and mediating pathways of positive and negative inter-ethnic contact in European societies. *Social Science Research*, 69, pp.83-110.
- Lazarsfeld, P.F. and Merton, R.K. (1954). Friendship as a social process: a substantive and methodological analysis. In: M. Berger, T. Abel, and H. Charles, eds. 1954. *Freedom and Control in Modern Society*. New York: Van Nostrand. Pp.18-66.
- Local Trust (2019). Left behind? Understanding communities on the edge. [Online.] Available at: <https://localtrust.org.uk/insights/research/left-behind-understanding-communities-on-the-edge>. Accessed on 26 November 2023.
- Local Trust (2021). The double dividend: the social and economic benefits of community infrastructure and its potential to level up 'left behind' neighbourhoods. London: Local Trust.
- Lymperopoulou, K. (2020). Immigration and ethnic diversity in England and Wales examined through an area classification framework. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 21(3), pp.829-846.
- Martin, R., Pike, A., Sunley, P., Tyler, P. and Gardiner, B. (2022). 'Levelling up the UK; reinforcing the policy agenda. *Regional Studies, Regional Science*, 9(1), pp.794-817. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21681376.2022.2150562>.
- Maslow, A.H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. *Psychological Review*, 50(4), pp.370-96.
- Migration Observatory (2023). Immigration: thinking behind the numbers, understanding public opinion on immigration in Britain. [Online.] Available at: <https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/reports/immigration-thinking-behind-the-numbers-understanding-public-opinion-on-immigration-in-britain/>. Accessed on 26 November 2023.
- Office for National Statistics (2014). *Measuring social capital*. London: Office for National Statistics.
- Office for National Statistics (2015). *Measuring national well-being: an analysis of social capital in the UK*. London: Office for National Statistics.
- Office for National Statistics (2022a). *Social capital in the UK: April 2020 to March 2021*. London: Office for National Statistics. Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing/bulletins/socialcapitalintheuk/april2020tomarch2021>. Accessed 23 October 2023.
- Office for National Statistics (2022b). *Measuring national well-being: an analysis of social capital in the UK*. London: Office for National Statistics. <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing/articles/measuringnationalwellbeing/2015-01-29>. Accessed 23 October 2023.

- Office for National Statistics (2022c). *Ethnic group, England and Wales: Census 2021: the ethnic groups of usual residents and household ethnic composition in England and Wales, Census 2021 data*. [Online.] Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/ethnicity/bulletins/ethnicgroupenglandandwales/census2021>. Accessed 24 November 2023.
- Office for National Statistics (2022d). *ONS Country of birth: Census 2021*. [Online.] Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/datasets/TS004/editions/2021/versions/3#summary>. Accessed 26 November 2023.
- Office for National Statistics (2022e). *Religion, England and Wales: Census 2021: the religion of usual residents and household religious composition in England and Wales, Census 2021 data*. [Online.] Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/bulletins/religionenglandandwales/census2021>. Accessed 24 November 2023.
- Office for National Statistics (2023). *Consumer price inflation, UK: August 2023*. [online] Available online at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/bulletins/consumerpriceinflation/august2023>. Accessed 17 October 2023.
- Office for National Statistics/Nomis (2023). *Nomis: official census and labour market statistics: KS204EW*. [Online.] Available at: <https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/ks204ew>. Accessed 26 November 2023.
- Oxford Consultants for Social Inclusion (2020). *Left Behind areas 2020 – Interim Set: Summary data set*. Oxford: OCSI. Available at: <https://localtrust.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Left-Behind-Areas-IMD-2019-REVISED-SLIDE-DECK-with-revised-unemployment-slide-Read-Only-copy.pdf>. Accessed 21 February 2023.
- Patel, A. and Café, R. (2023c). *London hate crime: Worry over ‘significant fracture’ in communities*. BBC News, 23 November. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-67503062>. Accessed on 26 November 2023.
- Pettigrew, T. F. and Tropp, L. R. (2006). *A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory*. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90(5), pp.751-783.
- Piekut, A. and Valentine, G. (2016). *Perceived diversity and acceptance of minority ethnic groups in two urban contexts*. *European Sociological Review*, 32(1), pp.339-354.
- Putnam, R. D. (2007). *E pluribus unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century*. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 30(2), pp.137-174.
- Putnam, R.D. (2000). *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Richards, L., Fernández-Reino, M. and Blinder, S. (2023). *UK public opinion toward immigration: overall attitudes and level of concern*. [Online.] Oxford: Migration Observatory. Available at: www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk. Accessed 3 November 2023.
- Scott, G. (2023). *Why was Suella Braverman sacked? Nine key moments*. *The Times*, 14 November. Available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/why-suella-braverman-sacked-home-secretary-md3qgjzm2>. Accessed on 26 November 2023.
- Kelsey, T. and Kenny, M. (2021). *Policy Report Series: Townscapes: 7. The value of social infrastructure*. Cambridge: Bennett Institute. Available at: <https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/publications/social-infrastructure/>. [Online.] Accessed 26 October 2023.
- Tomaney, J. (2014). *Place and region I: institutions*. *Progress in Human Geography*, 38(1), pp.131-140.
- Tomaney, J. (2015a). *Place and region II: belonging*. *Progress in Human Geography*, 39(4), pp.507-516.
- Tomaney, J. (2015b). *Place and region III: well-being*. *Progress in Human Geography*, 41(1), pp.99-107.
- Townsend, M. (2023). *UK government ‘complicit’ in asylum seeker hotel attacks, say unions*, *The Guardian*, 5 March. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/mar/05/uk-government-complicit-asylum-seeker-hotel-attacks-say-unions>. Accessed on 17 October 2023.
- Van der Meer, T. and Tolsma, J. (2014). *Ethnic diversity and its effects on social cohesion*. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 40(1), pp.459-478.
- What Works Centre for Wellbeing (2017). *Understanding local needs for wellbeing data*. Oxford Consultants for Social Inclusion, 2020. [Online.] Available at: <https://whatworkswellbeing.org/resources/understanding-local-needs-for-wellbeing-data/>. Accessed on 26 November 2023.



Woolf Institute

Madingley Road, Cambridge, CB3 0UB

+44 (0)1223 761973

enquiries@woolf.cam.ac.uk | www.woolf.cam.ac.uk

Charity No: 1069589 | Company No: 3540878