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Citation: Hargreaves, J., Kessler, E., Izamoje, D. & Symon, A. (2020). How We Get Along: The Diversity of England and Wales 2020. Cambridge, UK: Woolf Institute.

This is the published version of the paper.

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How we get along

THE DIVERSITY STUDY OF
ENGLAND AND WALES 2020

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The full report is available as a free download at:
www.woolf.cam.ac.uk/diversity



Preface

It is common to read in the media that our increasingly diverse society – particularly its ethnic, national and religious diversity – is becoming polarised and divided. This, it is feared, will lead to further marginalisation and prejudice.

The Government has reacted by developing a range of policies and interventions designed to tackle polarisation and its consequences and to foster better relations between diverse groups. Such interventions require significant amounts of money, time and human resource. In a time of pressures on finances and public services, local and national governments need to know whether or not the interventions they are funding are successful.

The Woolf Institute, which seeks to improve the relationship between religion and society through education, addressed the issues raised by these concerns and conducted a major two-year study. This included the examination of relevant existing research, surveying the views of more than 11,000 adults in England and Wales and undertaking interviews. We collected the data needed to understand how people perceive and experience diversity in their neighbourhoods, towns and cities and how this compared to an overall national picture. Our analysis is focused on personal, not institutional, attitudes towards diversity – in sum, what divides and what unites us.

We are encouraged by the extent of interest ***The Diversity Study of England and Wales 2020*** has generated at local authority, regional and national levels. We would like to express our gratitude to everyone who contributed to this study, both individuals and organisations.

There has been general agreement that, in today's society, it is essential not only to take diversity seriously, but also to reflect on the significance of how we view one another. Indeed, it is only with such an understanding that we learn how to get on together.

We believe this is an important report and ask that its findings, which takes into account an extensive range of different views, be widely considered across the political spectrum by policymakers, government officials, religious and community leaders and the wider public.

We commend it to you.



Shabir Randeree CBE
Chair of the Board of Trustees
Woolf Institute



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Founder Director
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Introduction

What do we think of our neighbours? And what do they think of us? When it comes to race, religion and immigration, what divides us and what brings us together? Do we all share the same experiences of the diverse everyday world around us? Or is diversity something other people do? These are some of the questions that motivated the Woolf Institute to produce ***How We Get Along: The Diversity Study of England and Wales 2020***.

But they were not our only motivations. We wanted to address regular media reports of increasing polarisation and fragmentation of British society. Are these concerning depictions of us supported or challenged by large-scale data? Is there, in fact, more to unite us on issues of diversity than we might assume? And if so, how might public policy reflect this? We also wanted to address the lack of available evidence on diversity, integration and cohesion. In doing so, our study fills some of the knowledge gaps identified by the 2016 Casey Review and by many others since.

The Diversity Study of England and Wales 2020 has surveyed, mapped, measured and analysed attitudes and experiences relating to diversity across England and Wales. We worked closely with Survation, a leading market research company, and surveyed 11,701 adults throughout England and Wales. We asked respondents about their attitudes towards diversity in British society as a whole and within their local communities. We asked questions about the pace of change. To bring these issues closer to home, we invited respondents to share their attitudes towards a close relative marrying someone from a different background. We also explored our lived experiences of diversity both at work and among friendship groups.

We recognise that issues concerning diversity are complex and sensitive. Accordingly, we created a research design that reflects this complexity, the richness of the data and the regional differences across England and Wales. Similarly, we have taken care to present our findings and recommendations clearly and compassionately. To reach our conclusions, we have explored an array of factors that shape attitudes and experiences. The in-depth analysis presented in this report considers sex/gender, age, ethnicity and religion, location of residence and local levels of diversity, alongside education, employment, income and voting behaviour. To illustrate some of our main themes, we conducted a series of in-depth interviews.

How We Get Along provides the granular evidence requested by many, as well as the information required to better inform national, regional and local policymaking. We are delighted to make our work available for use by the UK Government, the Welsh Senedd, local and combined authorities and city mayors.

To help enhance and complement current debates around institutional and structural forms of racism, we placed our focus on relations between everyday people. In doing so, we hope to transcend some of the political tribalism that we believe has hindered previous debates in this field.

The report provides evidence that, far from being divided and highly polarised, there is an emerging national consensus that diversity is good for our country, but that the pace of change has been too fast. It also suggests that while racism and xenophobia by individuals may be in decline, negative attitudes towards diversity based on religion, especially Islam, are still widely held.

The findings suggest that friendships and workplaces have a vital role to play in bringing people together. Changing work and life patterns as a result of coronavirus may require new local, regional and national approaches by policymakers to help us get along better in the future.

As you will read, some of our findings present a hopeful vision of British society, a place of diversity and inclusion to celebrate and cherish. Other findings suggest that, as a nation, we still have much work to do.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading 'J Hargreaves'.

Dr Julian Hargreaves
Senior Research Fellow
Woolf Institute

Key Findings

Diversity

There is a national consensus that diversity is good for British society – we get along. Importantly, positive attitudes towards diversity are common between majority and minority groups. For example, there were no differences between White and Asian respondents in respect of attitudes towards ethnic diversity in British society, nor is there divergence amongst religious believers with respect to migrants and local communities.

- Most people (53%) in England and Wales agree that ethnic diversity is good for British society. Around a fifth (17%) disagree. Those who agree outnumber those who disagree by 3 to 1.
- Just under a half (46%) agree that migrants are good for British society. A fifth (20%) disagree. Those who agree outnumber those who disagree by over 2 to 1.
- 41% agree that religious diversity is good for British society. Nearly a quarter (22%) disagree. Religious diversity is less popular than ethnic and national diversity, but those who agree still outnumber those who disagree by nearly 2 to 1.

Despite widespread positive attitudes towards diversity, we found regional differences.

- Compared to people living in London, people in the North and East of England and in Wales tended to be less positive about diversity.

Attitudes towards diversity

Fig. 1 Ethnic diversity is good for British society (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 2 Ethnic diversity is good for my local community (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 3 Migrants are good for British society (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 4 Migrants are good for my local community (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 5 Religious diversity is good for British society (% agree or disagree)





Fig. 6 Religious diversity is good for my local community (% agree or disagree)



Data source: Survation 2019

Change

Despite positive attitudes towards diversity, many people across England and Wales appear to be uncomfortable with the pace of national and local change. There is an emerging consensus that for many it has been too quick.

- Almost two thirds of people (60%) in England and Wales agree that the number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years. 17% disagree. Those who agree outnumber those who disagree by over 3 to 1.
- Half (exactly 50%) agree that ethnic diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the last 10 years. 21% disagree. Those who agree outnumber those who disagree by over 2 to 1.
- 43% of respondents agree that religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years. 19% disagree. Those who agree outnumber those who disagree by over 2 to 1.
- 54% of those who perceive their community to be nationally diverse agree that the number of migrants has increased too quickly. 22% disagree. Those who agree outnumber those who disagree by over 2 to 1.

Attitudes towards change

Fig. 7 Ethnic diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 8 Ethnic diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 9 The no. of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 10 The no. of migrants in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 11 Religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (% agree or disagree)





Fig. 12 Religious diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (% agree or disagree)



Data source: Survation 2019

Marriage

We are a society largely comfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying someone from a different ethnic or national background. This is often seen in social science circles as a proxy for the acceptance of diversity.

We are, however, less comfortable with a close relative marrying someone from a different religious background. This particularly applies to marrying a Muslim, the group most often targeted by negative attitudes from other faith groups, but also the group most likely to have negative attitudes towards other faith groups.

Religious prejudice, rather than racism or xenophobia, is the “final frontier” for diversity, a place where individuals are willing to express negative attitudes.

- Around three quarters of us are comfortable with a close relative marrying an Asian or Black person (70% and 74%).
- Less than half (44%) are comfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying a Muslim.
- The word “Muslim” appears to trigger more negative sentiment than the word “Pakistani”. Given the vast majority of British Pakistani people are Muslim, we would expect feelings towards both groups to be broadly similar. However, feelings towards a close relative marrying a Muslim person appear to be more negative than those towards a Pakistani person.
- Attitudes between faith groups are more negative than between ethnic and national groups. The strongest negative attitudes towards marrying someone from another background are observed when we group the survey respondents by religion.
- Despite the evidence of uncomfortable marriage feelings between faith groups, our interviews suggest that attitudes within minority faith communities are far from static. On the contrary, they are undergoing significant generational shifts. In particular, British Muslim women are exercising more freedom to decide when, whom and how to marry.

Attitudes towards a close relative marrying someone from a different background

The heatmaps below report attitudes at the local authority level towards a close relative marrying someone from a different ethnic, national or religious background. Green tones indicate positive attitudes, red tones indicate negative attitudes and tones in between represent weaker sentiment or ambivalence.

Fig. 13 A Black person




Fig. 14 An Asian person



Fig. 15 A Pakistani person



Fig. 16 A Muslim person



Data source: Survation 2019

Friendship

Diverse friendships are the norm in British society. Our findings reveal that large majorities of the public enjoy friendships that are ethnically, nationally or religiously diverse. Previous studies have shown that having diverse friends impacts more forcefully on our prejudices than our prejudice does on our choice of friends.

When it comes to tackling prejudice, friendship matters and works.

- 87% of respondents who told us they are religious have friendships with people from other faith backgrounds.
- Three quarters (76%) of respondents stated they have at least one friend from a different ethnic background.
- Over two thirds (69%) of British respondents reported having non-British friends.
- All ethnic groups are equally likely to have ethnically diverse friendships. All faith groups equally likely to have religiously diverse friendships.
- We found little evidence supporting stereotypes that Jewish and Muslim people only mix with their own.

Again, despite the largely positive overall picture, we found regional differences.

- People in the North West are the least likely to have ethnically diverse friendships. Compared to people living in London, and after taking into account differing levels of diversity, they are 54% more likely to have friends only from the same ethnic background.
- People in the North East are the least likely to have any non-British friends. Compared to people living in London, people there are over twice as likely to have only British friends.

Workplace

Most workplaces are diverse. They provide opportunities for integration and meeting points to create shared goals, break down stereotypes and foster positive attitudes towards one another. Those without work are up to twice as likely to have no friends outside their own ethnic, national and religious groups. Our analysis suggests that workers are a “safe bet” for integration and cohesion strategies.

- Three quarters of all workers in England and Wales (76%), regardless of ethnicity, work in a setting that is ethnically diverse.
- Three quarters of workers born in the UK (75%), and three quarters of those who described their ethnicity as British (75%), work with non-British workers.
- Over three quarters of all workers in England and Wales who self-described as religious (81%) work in settings that are religiously diverse.

Our research also examined people in non-diverse workplaces and “workplace solos” (people who are the only representative of their ethnic, national or religious group at work):

- In terms of non-diverse workplaces, 1 in 5 White workers work with no other ethnic groups. They are the ethnic group most likely to do so.
- British Asian workers are the minority group most likely to work in non-diverse places – 1 in 12 (8%) work only with other Asian workers.
- In terms of “workplace solos”, 1 in 5 British Asian workers work with no other people from their own ethnic background. Over a third of people who described their ethnicity as Mixed work as “solos”.
- 1 in 8 Muslim workers are “workplace solos”, as are around 1 in 5 from the other minority faith groups (Hindus, Jews and Sikhs).

Again, our data revealed regional differences.

- Workers in the North East, North West and Wales are 70% more likely than those in London to work only with British colleagues.
- Workers in the East Midlands are nearly four times more likely than those in London to work only with colleagues from the same religious background.

Policy Recommendations

The findings from this report suggest several important policy considerations:

- Despite public concern and media narratives that our country is increasingly polarised, there is an emerging national consensus that **diversity is good for Britain**, but **the pace of change has been too fast for many**. Our findings suggest that “pro-diversity” and “pro-immigration control” positions are neither contradictory nor irreconcilable. The existence of an emerging consensus on both diversity and change offers policymakers opportunities for coalitions and broader appeal. They should seek to build on this finding when considering issues such as equality and immigration.
- Regional variations in attitudes to diversity suggest the need for an **even more devolved, regional approach to integration and cohesion policymaking**, including the increased use of local consultations. **This means giving more attention to regional difference and allowing local and regional government more responsibilities and discretion to manage diversity.**
- **Friendship should occupy a more prominent role in policymaking**, with friendships between people from different backgrounds more actively encouraged and supported.
- Building on the above, there should be a **shift in the focus in workplaces tackling inequality towards promoting diversity**. Policymakers and employers should consider “workplace solos” more often. More broadly, all workers are a “safe bet” for integration and cohesion strategies. As potential “ambassadors” of their own ethnic, national or religious group, they are well-placed to challenge stereotypes and establish new norms of social mixing.

DIVERSITY

IN A NUTSHELL

To help build our understanding of diversity in England and Wales, we asked respondents to our nationwide survey a series of questions concerning their attitudes towards ethnic, national and religious diversity. In particular, we asked whether diversity is good for British society and whether it is good, or would be good, for their local community. Our analysis revealed positive attitudes towards ethnic, national and religious diversity.

- Most respondents (53%) agreed or strongly agreed that ethnic diversity is good for British society (see Table 1 and Fig. 1). Overall, more than twice as many respondents agreed as disagreed (17%).
- Just under half (46%) agreed that migrants are good for British society (see Table 2 and Fig. 3). Again, more than twice as many agreed as disagreed (20%).
- 41% agreed that religious diversity is good for British society (see Table 3 and Fig. 5). Nearly twice as many agreed as disagreed (22%).
- Women appear to be more positive towards diversity. For example, female respondents were 31% less likely to be negative towards ethnic diversity than male respondents and 30% less likely to be negative towards religious diversity (see Tables 13 and 15).

Where respondents agreed that their local communities were diverse (see Tables 4-6), attitudes towards diversity tended to be positive (see Tables 7-9 and Figs. 2, 4 and 6). Attitudes were more mixed and less positive among respondents in communities perceived as being less diverse (see Tables 10-12). Several factors appear to drive negative feelings towards national and local diversity. These include: being male; being older; disagreeing that your local community is diverse; living in a region outside London; having no qualifications or qualifications other than a degree; and voting behaviour in the 2016 EU Referendum and 2017 General Election (see Tables 13-21). Our findings in relation to positive attitudes towards diversity underpinned several policy recommendations reported towards the end of this report.

WHAT WE KNOW SO FAR

The body of academic literature concerning diversity is vast. The term “diversity” has been applied in multiple academic contexts, each representing significant sub-fields of academic study. One suitable starting point suggested by the existing literature, as used in this report and many others, is Robert Putnam’s influential 2006 lecture, *E Pluribus Unum* (“out of many, one”).

- Putnam introduced the concepts of “contact” and “threat” (in essence, positive and negative consequences of diversity) and “bonding” and “bridging” (in essence, the distinction between communities looking inwards or outwards towards other ethnic, national and religious groups). The methods and findings reported below are all situated within a framework suggested by Putnam’s lecture and subsequent work influenced by it.
- The study of immigration is central to the study of diversity in the UK, particularly where research focuses on relations between people and groups from different ethnic, national and religious backgrounds. A review of recent statistical studies revealed a mixed picture in the UK, defying a simple overall conclusion about the British public’s attitudes towards immigration and migrants.
- Research is often politically motivated: some studies emphasise the positive consequences of contact between ethnic, national and religious groups; others focus on the negative attitudes directed towards minority groups.

We chose to adopt a more neutral, less political approach to diversity. The findings and analysis we present below, and throughout our report, offer both positive and negative attitudes.

A full review of literature relating to diversity is presented in Appendix A.

WHAT WE DID

We conducted a nationally-representative survey of 11,701 adults throughout England and Wales. Respondents were asked a series of questions relating to attitudes towards diversity. Respondents were asked three questions on whether ethnic, national and religious diversity is good for British society. Respondents who agreed that their local community is diverse (ethnically, nationally or religious) were asked three questions on whether such diversity is good for it. Respondents who disagreed that their local community is diverse were asked whether ethnic, national or religious diversity *would* be good for it.

We explored the data using a variety of methods. We used basic statistical techniques to establish an overall picture of attitudes towards national and local diversity. Known as bivariate analysis, such techniques focus on two factors at a time (such as attitudes to diversity and ethnicity). We also used more advanced techniques to offer more in-depth analysis. Known as multivariate analysis, such techniques, including statistical modelling, consider multiple factors simultaneously. We grouped together the respondents who reported negative attitudes towards national and local diversity. Statistical modelling was used to determine which, if any, of the other factors (sex/gender¹, age, ethnicity, religion, etc.) predicted negative attitudes towards diversity. As you will read, several did.

Measuring diversity

We adopted two approaches to describing local levels of diversity: a subjective measure and an objective measure. The subjective measure was based on whether respondents agreed that their local community is diverse (i.e. whether they perceived it to be diverse). The objective measure used data based on estimated updates from the Census to group local authorities depending on ethnic, national and religious diversity.

Simply put, we grouped local authorities into one of ten groups depending on how diverse they are (in effect, ten tiers of diversity). We formed three sets of these groupings; one each for ethnic, national and religious diversity. Ethnic diversity was measured using the proportion of non-White residents in each local authority. National diversity was measured using the proportion of residents born outside the UK. Religious diversity was measured using the proportion of residents from minority faith backgrounds. In sum, we created two diversity measures: perceived diversity and actual diversity.

¹ We use the term “sex/gender” to recognise diverse approaches to both.

Research questions

- To what extent may we describe attitudes towards national and local diversity in England and Wales as positive or negative?
- To what extent do attitudes towards national diversity differ to those towards local diversity?
- To what extent do attitudes towards local diversity differ between those who do and do not perceive their local community to be ethnically, nationally or religiously diverse?
- To what extent do demographic and socio-economic factors, including actual levels of diversity, predict the likelihood that a person will have negative attitudes towards national and local diversity?

WHAT WE FOUND

A more detailed look at our findings

BASIC ANALYSIS

DIVERSITY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

- As for all the survey responses reported in our study, many people felt unable or unwilling to offer definitive agreement or disagreement on the national benefits of diversity, or else had no view, or were not confident or comfortable in expressing a view. This is a reminder of the sensitivities around these topics and people's willingness to discuss them.
- Despite this, most people are positive towards ethnic diversity in Britain (see Table 1). Just under half (46%) agreed that migrants are good for British society (see Table 2). 41% agreed that religious diversity is good for British society (see Table 3, see also Figs. 1, 3 and 5)).
- Despite the purported toxicity of public debates around migrants and immigration, more people are positive towards migrants than religious diversity.
- If we were to establish a hierarchy of national diversity across our three chosen dimensions (from most popular to least), religious diversity would be at the bottom.

Most respondents (53%, see Table 1) either agreed or strongly agreed that ethnic diversity is good for British society. The response "agree" was the most popular (33% selected it as a response). Whilst reported levels of ambivalence and uncertainty were high (30% neither agreed nor disagreed or else answered "don't know"), nearly three times as many people agreed than disagreed (53% as compared to 17%). Even if all of those who answered "neither agree nor disagree" used the response to mask negative attitudes, the group agreeing would still have outnumbered all those who disagreed.

Just under a majority of respondents (46%, see Table 2) agreed that migrants are good for British society. Over twice as many agreed than disagreed (20%). 1 in 3 expressed either ambivalence or uncertainty (33%).

From the three questions concerning diversity in British society, the question on religious diversity generated the highest levels of ambivalence and uncertainty: just over 1 in 3 (38%, see Table 3) answered "neither agree nor disagree or "don't know". It also produced the least positive attitudes: 41% agreed religious diversity is good for British society (compared to 23% who disagreed).

DIVERSITY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN DIVERSE COMMUNITIES

- Most people perceive themselves to live in ethnically and nationally diverse communities. Fewer perceive themselves to live in religiously diverse communities (see Tables 4-6, see also Figs. 2, 4 and 6).
- Attitudes towards diversity at the local level among people who consider their local community to be diverse are very positive. People with positive attitudes outnumber those with negative attitudes by 3 to 1 or more.
- Moreover, compared to attitudes towards national diversity, people were more inclined to express agreement or disagreement about the benefits of local diversity. Respondents were more likely to have an opinion, or more comfortable expressing it.

Most respondents perceived their local community to be ethnically diverse (53%, see Table 4). A similar proportion perceived their local community to be nationally diverse (54%, see Table 5). Fewer perceived their local community to be religiously diverse (39%, see Table 6).

From those who perceived their local community to be ethnically diverse, nearly two thirds (63%, see Table 7) agreed that ethnic diversity was good for their local community; over four times as many as disagreed (14% as compared to 63%). Further, there was less reported ambivalence and uncertainty than for questions concerning whether ethnic diversity is good for British society (23% as compared to 30%, see Table 1).

From those perceiving themselves to live in a nationally diverse local community, most respondents (54%, see Table 8) agreed that migrants are good for it; exactly three times agreed than disagreed (54% compared to 18%). Ambivalence and uncertainty were higher than for ethnic diversity, though the difference was not large (28% compared to 23%).

From those who considered their local community to be religiously diverse, most respondents (57%, see Table 9) agreed that such diversity was good for it; nearly three times as many as disagreed (15% as compared to 57%). Levels of ambivalence and uncertainty were similar to those reported in relation to local attitudes towards migrants (28% answered “neither agree nor disagree” or “don’t know”).

DIVERSITY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN NON-DIVERSE COMMUNITIES

- Overall, attitudes to diversity among people perceiving themselves to live in non-diverse local communities are more mixed and less positive (see Tables 10-12).
- Further, more people in these areas are either unable or unwilling to express definitive agreement or disagreement, or have no view, or are otherwise less comfortable or confident in expressing how they feel.

Levels of ambivalence and uncertainty were the highest for these questions as compared to the others reported in this chapter. Whilst not revealed by the data, this could reflect the fact that more respondents were unable or unwilling to express definitive agreement or disagreement. Perhaps these respondents had no view or no desire to express one or were otherwise masking more negative sentiment. Whatever the motivation, for ethnic, national and religious diversity, 44%, 48% and 53% (respectively) answered “neither agree nor disagree” or “don’t know”.

From those who expressed an opinion, 33% agreed that ethnic diversity would be good for their local community (compared to 23% who disagreed). 24% agreed that migrants would be good for it (compared to 27% who disagreed). 22% agreed that religious diversity would be good for it (compared to 25% who disagreed). (See Tables 10-12.)

ADVANCED ANALYSIS

Logistic regression modelling

A. ATTITUDES TOWARDS DIVERSITY IN BRITISH SOCIETY

I. ATTITUDES TOWARDS ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN BRITISH SOCIETY (see Table I3)

We analysed data responses from respondents who either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement “ethnic diversity is good for British society”, here referred to as being negative towards diversity in Britain.

Sex/Gender

Women appear to be more positive towards ethnic diversity in Britain than men. Female respondents were 31% less likely to be negative towards ethnic diversity than men (our reference category).

Age

Older people appear to be more negative towards ethnic diversity in Britain. Compared to 18 to 24 year olds (our reference category), being in one of the age categories over 45 (i.e. 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 to 74 and 75 and over made it twice as likely to be negative towards ethnic diversity in Britain (i.e. increases in likelihood by factors of 2, 2, 2.2 and 1.9 respectively).

Ethnicity

White and Asian people appear to share the same views about ethnic diversity in Britain. Whilst there were no differences between White and Asian respondents, or between White and Mixed respondents, respondents in the Other ethnic group (which included respondents who self-described as Black) were half as likely as White respondents to be negative towards ethnic diversity in Britain (51% less likely).

Religion

Compared to respondents in the No religion (our reference category), respondents in the Other religion group were 32% less likely to be negative towards ethnic diversity in Britain.

Perceived diversity

Respondents who agreed that their local community is ethnically diverse were less likely to be negative towards ethnic diversity in Britain.

Compared to those who disagreed (our reference category), agreeing made it half as likely to be negative (45% less likely).

Actual diversity

Conversely, respondents who lived in local communities with more actual diversity (rather than perceived diversity) were more likely to be negative towards ethnic diversity in Britain. Compared to living in a local authority with low levels of ethnic diversity (our reference category), living in local authorities with the highest proportions of BAME population doubled the likelihood of being negative towards ethnic diversity. We observed an increase in likelihood by factors of 2.3 and 2.1 for groups of local authorities with the largest and second largest BAME populations by proportion.

Region

Compared to living in London (our reference category), living in Wales doubled the likelihood of being negative towards ethnic diversity in Britain (see Fig. 7). Living in the North East, the East of England, the North West or South West increased the likelihood of being negative towards ethnic diversity by a factor of 50% or more (88%, 63%, 50% and 45% more likely respectively).

Education

People with university degrees appear to be more positive about ethnic diversity in Britain. Compared to those with degrees (our reference category), those with qualifications other than degrees and those with no qualifications were around a third more likely to be negative (44% and 32% more likely respectively).

Voting behaviour

Remain, Labour and Liberal Democrat voters appear to be more positive towards ethnic diversity in Britain. Compared to voting Leave (our reference category), respondents who voted Remain in 2016 were 76% less likely to be negative towards ethnic diversity in Britain. Those who voted either Labour or Liberal Democrat at the 2017 General Election were around half as likely (48% and 46% less likely respectively).

Other factors that predicted negative attitudes towards ethnic diversity in British society (altering the likelihood by 20% or less)

Respondents from minority faith backgrounds (religious, non-Christian respondents) were more likely to be negative towards ethnic diversity, although the difference was not large. Compared to respondents in the No religion group (our reference category), those in the Christian group were 16% less likely.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards ethnic diversity in British society

Living in a rural area, employment and income had no effect in predicting being negative towards ethnic diversity in British society.

2. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRANTS IN BRITISH SOCIETY (see Table 14)

Ethnicity

White and Asian people appear to have the same attitudes towards migrants in Britain.

Compared to White respondents (our reference category), belonging to the Other ethnic group (which included Black respondents) made it half as likely to be negative towards migrants in Britain (58% less likely). There were no differences between the Asian and Mixed groups when compared individually to the White group.

Perceived diversity

People who perceive their local community to be diverse are more positive towards migrants in Britain. Compared to those who disagreed (our reference category), respondents who agreed that their area is nationally diverse were around a third less likely to be negative towards migrants in Britain (31% less likely).

Actual diversity

People living in communities with more migrants appear to hold more negative attitudes towards them. Respondents living in one of the groups of local authorities with higher proportions of residents born outside the UK were more likely to be negative towards migrants in Britain (53%, 56%, 55% and 80% more likely).

Region

People living outside London appear to be more negative towards migrants in Britain (see Fig. 8). Compared to living in London (our reference category) and having taken into account both perceived and actual levels of local diversity, living in several regions doubled, or nearly doubled, the likelihood of being negative towards migrants in Britain. Such regions included: Wales, the North East, the North West, the West Midlands and the East Midlands (and increases in likelihood by factors of 2.6, 2.5, 2.1, 2 and 1.9 respectively).

Education

People with university degrees appear to be more positive towards migrants in Britain.

Compared to those with degrees (our reference category), those with qualifications other than a degree and those with no qualifications were more likely to be negative towards migrants in Britain (57% and 35% more likely).

Income

Lower earners appear to be more negative towards migrants in Britain. Compared to the highest earners (our reference category), earning less than £20,000 made it 30% more likely to be negative towards migrants in Britain.

Voting behaviour

Remain, Labour and Liberal Democrat voters appear more positive towards migrants in Britain. Compared to voting Leave (our reference category), respondents who voted Remain in 2016 were 75% less likely to be negative towards ethnic diversity in Britain than those voting Leave (our reference category). Those who voted either Labour or Liberal Democrat at the 2017 General Election were between a third and a half as likely (34% and 59% less likely respectively).

Other factors that predicted negative attitudes towards migrants in British society (altering the likelihood by 20% or less)

Female respondents were 14% less likely to be negative towards migrants in Britain. Compared to respondents in the No religion group (our reference category), Christian respondents were 12% less likely to be negative towards migrants in Britain.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards migrants in British society

Age, living in a rural location and employment had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards migrants in Britain.

3. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN BRITISH SOCIETY (see Table 15)

Sex/Gender

Women appear to be more positive towards religious diversity in Britain. Female respondents were 30% less likely to be negative toward religious diversity than male respondents (our reference category).

Age

Older people appear to be more negative about religious diversity in Britain. Compared to being 18 to 24 (our reference category), being in either the 45-54 or the 55-64 age category increased the likelihood of being negative towards religious diversity in Britain (by 40% and 41% more likely).

Ethnicity

Minority ethnic groups appear to be more positive towards religious diversity in Britain. Compared to White respondents (our reference category), Asian respondents and those in the Mixed ethnic group were half as likely to be negative towards religious diversity in Britain (58% and 42% less likely).

Religion

Religious people are more positive about religious diversity in Britain. Compared to being in the No religion (our reference category), being Christian and being in the Other religion group (respondents from non-Muslim minority faith backgrounds) reduced the likelihood of being negative towards religious diversity (by 21% and 42% respectively).

Perceived diversity

People who perceive their local community to be diverse are more positive towards religious diversity in Britain. Compared to those who disagreed (our reference category), respondents who agreed that their local community is religiously diverse were a third less likely to be negative toward religious diversity in Britain (38% less likely).

Actual diversity

People living in more diverse communities are more negative about religious diversity in Britain. Respondents who lived in two of the groups of local authorities with some of the highest proportions of residents from minority faith backgrounds (groups with the seventh and ninth highest proportions) were 57% and 38% more likely to be negative towards religious diversity in Britain.

Employment

People who are economically inactive appear to be more negative about religious diversity in Britain. Compared to being employed (our reference category), being economically inactive increased the likelihood of being negative towards religious diversity in Britain by a third (33%).

Voting behaviour

Remain, Labour and Liberal Democrat voters appear to be more positive about religious diversity in Britain. Compared to voting Leave (our reference category), respondents

who voted Remain in 2016 were 72% less likely to be negative towards ethnic diversity in Britain. Compared to those voting Conservative (our reference category), those who voted either Labour or Liberal Democrat at the 2017 General Election were half as likely to be negative (49% and 44% less likely respectively).

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards religious diversity in British society

Region, living in a rural location, education and income had no effect in terms of predicting negative attitudes towards religious diversity in Britain.

B. ATTITUDES TOWARDS DIVERSITY IN DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

I. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES (see Table 16)

Age

Older people appear to be more negative about ethnic diversity in their local community. Respondents in one of the age categories between 35 and 74 (i.e. 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 to 74) were around twice as likely to be negative (increases in likelihood by factors of 1.8, 1.8, 2.2, 2.6 and 1.9 respectively).

Ethnicity

As we expected, respondents in the BAME group were more positive towards local ethnic diversity. Compared to White respondents (our reference category), BAME respondents were half as likely to be negative towards local ethnic diversity (57% less likely).

Religion

People from minority religious backgrounds appear to be more positive about local ethnic diversity. Compared to respondents in the No religion group (our reference category), respondents in the Christian group were about a third less likely to be negative towards local ethnic diversity (30% less likely). Being in the Other religion group (all non-Christian faiths) had no effect.

Region

Compared to living in London (our reference category), living in the North East and Yorkshire and Humber increased the likelihood of being negative towards local ethnic diversity by two thirds (68% and 66% respectively).

Education

People with degrees appear to be more positive about ethnic diversity in diverse local communities. Compared to having a degree (our reference category), having qualifications other than a degree and no qualifications increased the likelihood by around half (52% and 40% respectively).

Employment

People who are economically inactive appear to be more negative about local ethnic diversity. Compared to respondents in work (our reference category), respondents who were economically inactive were a third more likely to be negative towards local ethnic diversity (37% more likely).

Voting behaviour

Remain and Labour voters appear to be more positive about local ethnic diversity. Compared to voting Leave (our reference category), voting Remain in 2016 decreased the likelihood of being negative towards local ethnic diversity by 78%. Compared to voting Conservative in 2017 (our reference category), voting Labour decreased the likelihood by 45%.

Other factors that predicted negative attitudes towards local ethnic diversity (altering the likelihood by 20% or less)

Being female decreased the likelihood of being negative towards local religious diversity by 18%.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards ethnic diversity in diverse local communities

Neither living in a rural location nor income had an effect on predicting negative attitudes towards local ethnic diversity.²

2. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRANTS IN DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES (see Table 17)

Age

Older people appear to be more negative toward migrants in their local community. Compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24 (our reference category), respondents in one of

² After earlier experimentation, actual levels of ethnic diversity were excluded from the model. Inclusion of this variable affected overall accuracy and made the model unsuitable for robust reporting.

the age categories between 35 and 64 (i.e. 35 to 44, 45 to 54 and 55 to 64) were more likely to be negative (70%, 81% and 56% more likely respectively).

Region

Compared to respondents in London (our reference category), respondents in the West Midlands and Yorkshire and Humber were more likely to be negative towards migrants in their local community (67% and 81% more likely respectively, see Fig. 9).

Education

People with degrees appear to be more positive towards migrants in their local community. Compared to having a degree (our reference category), having qualifications other than a degree and having no qualifications increased the likelihood of being negative towards migrants (60% and 35% more likely respectively).

Voting behaviour

Remain voters are more positive about migrants. Compared to voting Leave (our reference category), voting Remain in 2016 decreased the likelihood of being negative towards migrants in their local community by 77%.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards migrants in diverse local communities

Sex/gender, ethnicity, religion, actual national diversity, employment, income and voting behaviour in the 2017 General Election had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards migrants in the local community.

3. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES (see Table 18)

Age

Older people appear to be more negative about local religious diversity. Compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24 (our reference category), older respondents were more likely to be negative towards local religious diversity. Respondents between 45 and 74 (45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 to 74) were over twice as likely to be negative (increases in likelihood by factors of 2.6, 2.6 and 2.3 respectively).

Ethnicity

Non-White people appear to be more positive about local religious diversity. Compared to White respondents (our reference category), respondents in the BAME group were half as likely to be negative towards local religious diversity (56% less likely).

Religion

Religious people are more positive about local religious diversity. Compared to respondents in the No religion group (our reference category), religious respondents were less likely to be negative towards local religious diversity. Respondents in the Christian and Other religion groups were 38% and 47% less likely respectively.

Education

People with degrees appear to be more positive about local religious diversity. Compared to having a degree (our reference category), having qualifications other than a degree and having no qualifications increased the likelihood of being negative towards local religious diversity (by 39% and 65% respectively).

Voting behaviour

Remain voters appear to be more positive about local religious diversity. Compared to voting Leave (our reference category), respondents who voted Remain in 2016 were 73% less likely to be negative towards local religious diversity.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards religious diversity in diverse local communities

Sex/gender, actual levels of religious diversity, living in a region outside London, living in a rural area, employment, income and voting behaviour in the 2017 General Election local communities.

C. ATTITUDES TOWARDS DIVERSITY IN NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

To recap, we asked respondents who did not agree that their local community was ethnically, nationally or religiously diverse whether diversity *would* be good for it.

I. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS FUTURE ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES (see Table 19)

Sex/Gender

Female respondents in non-diverse communities were more positive than male respondents about future ethnic diversity. Compared to male respondents (our reference category), they were a third less likely to be negative (33% less likely).

Ethnicity

Compared to White respondents (our reference category), respondents in the BAME group were 41% less likely to be negative towards future ethnic diversity.

Actual diversity

Respondents in the group of local authorities representing those with the second largest proportion of BAME residents were nearly twice as likely to be negative towards future ethnic diversity.

Region

Compared to living in London (our reference category), living in Wales, the North East, the South West and the North West doubled the likelihood of being negative towards future ethnic diversity (we observed increases in likelihood by factors of 2.1, 2.1, 1.9 and 1.8 respectively).

Education

People with degrees appeared less likely to be negative towards future ethnic diversity. Compared to having a degree (our reference category), having qualifications other than a degree increased the likelihood of being negative towards it by a third (31%).

Voting behaviour

Voting Remain in 2016 decreased the likelihood of being negative towards local ethnic diversity (by 71%). Compared to voting Conservative (our reference category), Labour and Liberal Democrat reduced the likelihood by 52% and 40% respectively.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards religious diversity in non-diverse local communities

Age, religion, living in a rural area, employment and income had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards future ethnic diversity in respondents' local communities.

2. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS FUTURE MIGRATION TO NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES (see Table 20)

Respondents who did not agree that their local community was **nationally** diverse were asked if migrants *would* be good for it (hereafter, attitudes towards migrants in the future).

Age

Compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24 (our reference category), those between 25 and 34 were twice as likely to be negative towards migrants being good for local community in the future. No other age category returned a statistically significant effect. This anomalous finding may have revealed pessimism among this age group in relation to future prospects.

Ethnicity

Asian respondents appeared more positive towards migrants in the future. Compared to White respondents (our reference category), Asian respondents were half as likely to be negative towards migrants in their local community (58% less likely).

Actual diversity

Respondents in some local authorities with higher proportions of people born outside the UK were up to two and half times more negative about the prospect of migrants moving into their local community. Compared to living in a local authority with the lowest proportions (our reference category), those in three groups of local authorities (the highest, second highest and fifth highest proportions of non-UK born residents) had an increased likelihood of being negative by factors of 1.5, 1.7 and 2.7 respectively.

Region

Compared to living in London (our reference category), living in any of the other regions increased the likelihood of being negative towards migrants by factors of between 2.5 and 5.5. Living in the North East increased the likelihood by a factor of 5.5, living in Wales by a factor of 3.4 and living in the North West by a factor of 3.3.

Education

Compared to having a degree (our reference category), having qualifications other than a degree and having no qualifications increased the likelihood of being negative towards the prospect of migrants in local communities (by 28% and 57% respectively).

Voting behaviour

Compared to voting Leave (our reference category), voting Remain in 2016 decreased the likelihood of being negative towards migrants in the future by 74%. Compared to voting Conservative in the 2017 General Election, voting Labour and Liberal Democrat halved the likelihood of being negative towards future migrants (reduced likelihoods of 44% and 62%).

Other factors that predicted negative attitudes towards future migration to non-diverse local communities (altering the likelihood by 20% or less)

Compared to male respondents (our reference category), female respondents were 15% less likely to have negative attitudes.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards future migration to non-diverse local communities

Religion, living in a rural area, employment and income had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards migrants among respondents who did not perceive their local community to be nationally diverse.

3. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS FUTURE RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES (see Table 21)

Respondents who did not agree that their local community was **religiously** diverse were asked if such diversity would be good for it (hereafter, future religious diversity).

Sex/Gender

Women appeared more positive towards future religious diversity than men (our reference category). Female respondents were a third less likely to be negative towards future religious diversity (36% less likely).

Ethnicity

Compared to White respondents (our reference category), Asian respondents and respondents in the Other ethnic group were half as likely to be negative towards future ethnic diversity (46% and 51% less likely respectively).

Education

Compared to having a degree (our reference category), having qualifications other than a degree increased the likelihood of being negative towards future religious diversity by a third (an increase of 28%).

Voting behaviour

Compared to voting Leave (our reference category), voting Remain in 2016 decreased the likelihood by 63%. Compared to voting Conservative in the 2017 General Election, voting Labour and Liberal Democrat halved the likelihood (45% in both cases).

Other factors that predicted negative attitudes towards future religious diversity in non-diverse local communities (altering the likelihood by 20% or less)

Compared to respondents in the No religion group (our reference category), Christian respondents were 18% less likely to be negative towards future religious diversity. Living in a rural location reduced the likelihood by 19%.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards future religious diversity in non-diverse local communities

Actual religious diversity, employment and income had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards religious diversity among respondents who did not perceive their local community to be religiously diverse.³

³ After early experimentation, age was excluded from the model. Inclusion of this variable affected overall accuracy and made the model unsuitable for robust reporting.

DISCUSSION POINTS

Consensus?

If we consider only those who were inclined to express agreement or disagreement, we see that positive attitudes outweigh negative attitudes on all forms of diversity. Overall, many more people in England and Wales are more positive towards diversity than we might assume reading accounts from the media or campaign groups of political and socio-economic division, racial tensions and societal unrest. Whilst attitudes towards various ethnic, national and religious groups in Britain vary, our findings reveal that those who hold diversity in Britain to be a good thing far outnumber those who do not.

Consideration of those who expressed ambivalence or uncertainty

We should not dismiss respondents who neither agreed nor disagreed that diversity is or would be good for British society, or their local community, or would be good for the latter. Questions concerning diversity are sensitive and there is much academic evidence to show that survey respondents are often influenced by social acceptability bias (respondents giving the answers they presume other people will want to receive). Respondents are often uncomfortable expressing negative feelings towards minority groups. That said, it also holds that we should not presume all people answering “not sure” or “don’t know” are harbouring negative sentiment.

Local diversity

Given these considerations, we also see that perceiving a local area to be diverse has a positive effect on attitudes related to diversity. As an aside, perceptions of diversity and positive attitudes towards it may be contingent on each other: it may be that perceptions of diversity are more likely among those with positive attitudes towards it. For those not perceiving their local community to be diverse, attitudes were often much less positive and in the case of religious diversity more negative than positive.

Conversely, living in a local authority that is *actually* more diverse is associated with more negative views towards diversity and British society. Interestingly, there is no association between attitudes towards diversity and perceptions of local diversity except for those who perceived themselves to be in ethnically and nationally *non*-diverse communities. Residents in these non-diverse local communities reported more negative views toward diversity.

Regional differences

Whilst an overall consensus may be observable in the data, there were marked regional differences and differences between those living in areas that are actually diverse (rather than those that are perceived to be diverse).

In terms of migrants, attitudes were more negative in every region outside London bar the South East of England. To multicultural Londoners, this may be a regrettable bad news story from the provinces. To our team, it suggests that a greater emphasis is required on understanding regional differences beyond mere differences in local levels in diversity. Regional differences emerged and held even after actual levels of diversity were considered. This suggests a greater emphasis is required on socio-economic drivers such as education and income and even on demographic factors such as sex/gender and age. It also suggests the UK Government should further devolve policymaking which considers diversity, integration and cohesion or, at the very least, think regionally more often.

CHANGE

IN A NUTSHELL

To develop our understanding of diversity in England and Wales, we asked respondents to our nationwide survey a series of questions concerning their attitudes towards the pace of change in relation to ethnic, national and religious diversity. We asked whether diversity has increased too quickly in Britain. We also asked those in diverse local communities whether diversity in them has increased too quickly and those in non-diverse areas whether it is likely to.

Our analysis revealed negative attitudes towards national and local change in the last ten years.

- Almost two thirds of respondents (60%) agreed that the number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (Table 23 and Fig. 12).
- Half of the respondents (exactly 50%) either agreed or strongly agreed that ethnic diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the last ten years (see Table 22 and Fig. 10). Over twice as many agreed than disagreed (50%, compared to 21%).
- 43% of respondents agreed that religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past ten years (see Table 24 and Fig. 14). Over twice as many agreed than disagreed (43%, compared to 19%).

Several factors appear to drive negative attitudes towards increasing ethnic, national and religious diversity across Britain. These include: being male; being older; living in a diverse local authority; living in a region outside London; having no qualifications or qualifications other than a degree; earning less than the country's highest earners (those earning £60,000 per year and over); and voting behaviour in the 2016 EU Referendum and 2017 General Election (see Tables 31-33). We also found respondents in some minority ethnic groups who were more likely than White respondents to feel negatively towards national change.

Several factors appeared to drive negative attitudes towards increasing diversity within local communities: living in the North or Midlands; having no qualifications or qualifications other than a degree; earning less; and voting behaviour. Rather counter-intuitively, being older reduced the likelihood of respondents agreeing that ethnic and religious diversity has increased too quickly in local communities (see Tables 34-36). To illustrate some of the local issues related to change we interviewed a city councillor working in the North East of England. Our findings have been

incorporated into a series of policy recommendations relating both to addressing negative attitudes towards change and managing change at a regional and local level.

WHAT WE KNOW SO FAR

A review of academic literature concerning attitudes towards demographic and societal change confirmed that there are many overlaps between studies of change and diversity in the UK. Any attempt to gather data relating to attitudes towards diversity in the UK (or Western Europe, or any developed country) does so within the context of increasing diversity, whether through migration from outside, urban migration and growth or birth rates within various population subgroups. Two of the most frequently used theories in the field of diversity studies – contact theory and threat theory – both imply demographic change whether in terms of increased opportunities for intergroup mixing or heightened concerns around competition for jobs and housing.

Recent studies have confirmed the scale and rate of demographic and societal change in the UK in terms of minority communities. According to the Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity, there have been significant changes in the ethnic diversity of England and Wales since 1991. In 2011, one-in-five people (20%) identified with an ethnic group other than White British compared with 13% in 2001. The population with ethnic background other than White (meaning White British, White Irish and White Other) has more than doubled in size since 1991 from 3 to 7 million, while remaining a minority of the total population (14%).

The religious landscape has also changed. According to a report from the Commission of Religion and Belief in British Public Life (2015) almost half of the population of England describes itself as non-religious, as compared with an eighth in 2001. There has been a general decline in Christian affiliation. In 1985, two-thirds of the population identified as Christian but by 2015 that figure was four in ten. Finally, there have also been increases in religious diversity. Fifty years ago, Judaism – at one in fifty – was the largest non-Christian tradition. Today, it is the fourth largest behind Islam, Hinduism and Sikhism. Taken as a group, religious minorities make up one in ten of the UK's population.

Research has tended to focus on minority rights rather than native attitudes. Where native attitudes are considered, focus is often placed on attitudes belonging to groups labelled as “White working class”. Fewer studies have focused on native born populations from mixed ethnic and religious backgrounds. British Future, a leading British think tank, has called for a more balanced approach to reporting British attitudes towards immigration among the public at large.

A full review of relevant literature is presented in Appendix A.

WHAT WE DID

Our nationally representative survey included a series of questions relating to attitudes towards changes in diversity. As stated, we asked respondents whether diversity has increased too quickly in Britain. We also asked those in diverse local communities whether diversity in them has increased too quickly and those in non-diverse areas whether it is likely to. As before, we explored the data using a variety of methods. We used basic statistical techniques – bivariate analysis (i.e. two factors considered at a time) – to establish an overall picture of attitudes towards national and local change. We used more advanced techniques – multivariate analysis (i.e. all factors considered at once) – to identify the groups who were the most likely to have negative attitudes towards national and local change.

We asked, for example, “Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Ethnic diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past ten years?” Our multivariate analysis focuses on those who agreed with each statement (and were, therefore, deemed to have negative attitudes towards change).

(NB. We used the same subjective and objective measures of diversity as in the Diversity chapter.)

Research questions

- To what extent may we describe attitudes towards national and local change in England and Wales as positive or negative?
- To what extent do attitudes towards national change differ to those towards local change?
- To what extent do attitudes towards local change differ between those who do and do not perceive their local community to be ethnically, nationally or religiously diverse?
- To what extent do demographic and socio-economic factors, including actual levels of diversity, predict the likelihood that a person will have negative attitudes towards national and local change?

WHAT WE FOUND

A more detailed look at our findings

BASIC ANALYSIS

CHANGE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Half of the respondents (exactly 50%) either agreed or strongly agreed that ethnic diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the last 10 years (see Table 22 and Fig. 10). The response “agree” was the most popular (28% chose it). Whilst reported levels of ambivalence or uncertainty were high (just over 1 in 3 or 29%, neither agreed nor disagreed or otherwise answered “don’t know”), over twice as many agreed than disagreed (50%, compared to 21%). Even if all those answering “neither agreed nor disagree” were masking negative attitudes, those who agreed would still have outnumbered those who disagreed.

Almost two thirds of respondents (60%) agreed that the number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (Table 23 and Fig. 12). Over three times as many agreed than disagreed (60%, compared to 17%). 1 in 4 or 24% expressed ambivalence or uncertainty.

43% of respondents agreed that religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (see Table 24 and Fig. 14). Over twice as many agreed than disagreed (43%, compared to 19%). Over a third of respondents (38%) expressed ambivalence or uncertainty.

CHANGE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN DIVERSE COMMUNITIES

As reported in Chapter 1 (Diversity), most respondents perceived their local community to be ethnically diverse (53%, see Table 4). A similar proportion perceived their local community to be nationally diverse (54%, see Table 5). Around 1 in 3 (39%, see Table 6) perceived their local community to be religiously diverse.

From those perceiving themselves to live in an ethnically diverse local community, 44% agreed that ethnic diversity in their local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (see Table 25 and Fig. 11). 27% disagreed and 29% expressed ambivalence or uncertainty. There were levels of ambivalence and uncertainty similar to those for the question on increased ethnic diversity in Britain (29% for both).

From those perceiving themselves to live in a nationally diverse local community, a majority of respondents (54%) agreed that the number of migrants in their local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (see Table 26 and Fig. 13). Half as many respondents (22%) disagreed and 26% expressed ambivalence or uncertainty.

From those perceiving themselves to live in a religiously diverse local community, 44% of respondents agreed that religious diversity in their local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (see Table 27 and Fig. 15). 25% disagreed and 31% expressed ambivalence or uncertainty.

CHANGE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN NON-DIVERSE COMMUNITIES

As reported in Chapter I, we found higher levels of ambivalence and uncertainty. For ethnic, national and religious diversity (respectively), 44%, 45% and 55% answered “neither agree nor disagree” or “don’t know”.

From those who reported some level of agreement or disagreement, 27% agreed that ethnic diversity in their local community is likely to increase too quickly (compared to 29% who disagreed). 30% agreed that the number of migrants locally is likely to increase too quickly (compared to 24% who disagreed). 21% agreed that local religious diversity is likely to increase too quickly (compared to 24% who disagreed). (See Tables 28-30.)

ADVANCED ANALYSIS

Logistic regression modelling

A. ATTITUDES TOWARDS CHANGE IN BRITAIN

I. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCREASED ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN BRITAIN (see Table 31)

Ethnicity

Compared to White respondents (our reference category), respondents in the Asian group were 57% more likely to agree that ethnic diversity has increased too quickly in Britain.

Religion

Compared to respondents in the No religion group (our reference category), Christian respondents were 36% more likely to agree that ethnic diversity has increased too quickly in Britain. Respondents in the Other religion group (including Buddhist respondents who were merged with the Other religion group because of small sample sizes) were twice as likely (95% more likely).

Actual diversity

Conversely, respondents who lived in one of the local authorities that are *actually* more diverse were more likely to agree that ethnic diversity has increased too quickly in Britain. Compared to respondents living in the least diverse local authorities (our reference), those living in the most were 86% more likely to agree.

Region

People in the North East appear to least positive about increases in ethnic diversity. Compared to respondents living in London (our reference category), those living in the North East were 45% more likely to agree that ethnic diversity has increased too quickly in Britain.

Education

Compared to having a degree (our reference category), having qualifications other than a degree or having no qualifications increased the likelihood of agreeing that ethnic diversity has increased too quickly in Britain by 37% and 35% respectively.

Voting behaviour

Compared to voting Leave in the 2016 EU Referendum (our reference category), voting Remain reduced the likelihood of agreeing by 68%. Compared to voting Conservative in the 2017 General

Election (our reference category), voting Labour and Liberal Democrat reduced the likelihood of agreeing by 45% and 43% respectively.

Other factors that predicted negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in Britain (altering the likelihood by 20% or less)

Compared to male respondents (our reference category), female respondents were 36% less likely to agree that ethnic diversity has increased too quickly in Britain in the last ten years. Compared to those who disagreed (our reference category), respondents who agreed their local community is ethnically diverse were 19% likely to agree.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in Britain

Living in a rural area, employment and income had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in Britain.¹

2. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCREASED NUMBERS OF MIGRANTS IN BRITAIN (see Table 32)

Age

Compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24 (our reference category), respondents in the 35 to 44, 45 to 54 and 55 to 64 groups were more likely to agree that the number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the last ten years (45%, 59% and 47% more likely respectively).

Ethnicity

Compared to White respondents (our reference group), Asian respondents were 47% more likely to agree that the number of migrants has increased too quickly in Britain. Respondents in the Other ethnic group (which included Black respondents) were 37% more likely.

Perceived diversity

Respondents who agreed their local community is nationally diverse were less positive towards increased numbers of migrants in Britain. Compared to those who disagreed (our reference category), they were a third more likely to agree it had increased too quickly (exactly 33% more likely).

Actual diversity

¹ After earlier experimentation, age was excluded from this model. Inclusion of this variable affected overall accuracy and made the model unsuitable for robust reporting.

Living in local authorities with more migrants appears to reduce positive feelings towards them. Compared to those living in a group of local authorities with the lowest proportions of migrants (our reference category), respondents in all but one of the other groups were more likely to agree that the number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly (by factors of between 1.3 and 2.1). Those in local authorities with the most migrants were over twice as likely to agree that numbers have increased too quickly.

Region

Compared to those living in London (our reference category), respondents living in the East Midlands, North West, West Midlands and Wales were more likely to agree that the number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly by 48%, 52%, 37% and 53% (see Fig. 16). Living in the North East doubled the likelihood of agreeing (95% more likely).

Education

Compared to those with degrees (our reference category), respondents having qualifications other than a degree or having no qualifications increased the likelihood of agreeing that the number of migrants has increased too quickly by 60% and 46%.

Income

Compared to the highest earners (our reference category), those earning less than £20,000 per year were 80% more likely to agree that the number of migrants has increased too much. Those earning between £20,000 and £39,000 were 25% more likely. Those earning between £40,000 and £59,000 were 24% more likely.

Voting behaviour

Compared to voting Leave in the 2016 EU Referendum (our reference category), voting Remain reduced the likelihood of agreeing that the number of migrants has increased too quickly in Britain by 76%. Compared to voting Conservative in the 2017 General Election (our reference category), voting Labour and Liberal Democrat reduced the likelihood by 42% and 56% respectively.

Other factors that predicted negative attitudes towards increased numbers of migrants in Britain (altering the likelihood by 20% or less)

Female respondents were 17% less likely to agree that the number of migrants has increased too quickly in Britain.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards increased numbers of migrants in Britain

Employment had no effect.²

3. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCREASED RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN BRITAIN (see Table 33)

Ethnicity

Compared to White respondents (our reference group), Asian respondents were 51% more likely to agree that religious diversity has increased too quickly in Britain.

Religion

Compared to respondents in the No religion group (our reference category), respondents in the Other religion group (including Buddhist respondents) were 64% more likely to agree that religious diversity has increased too quickly in Britain.

Perceived diversity

Respondents who agreed their local community is religiously diverse were less positive towards increased religious diversity in Britain. Compared to those who disagreed (our reference category), they were 46% more likely to agree it had increased too quickly.

Actual diversity

Similarly, living in religiously diverse communities appears to reduce positive attitudes towards such diversity. Compared to those living in one of the local authorities with the lowest proportion of people from minority religious backgrounds (our reference category), respondents living in one with the highest proportion were 46% more likely to agree religious diversity has increased too quickly in Britain.

Region

Compared to those living in London (our reference category), respondents in the North East were 47% more likely to agree religious diversity has increased too quickly in Britain.

Education

Compared to those with degrees (our reference category), respondents with qualifications other than a degree or having no qualifications were 42% and 31% less likely to agree that the number of migrants has increased too quickly in Britain.

² After earlier experimentation, religion and living in a rural location were excluded from this model. Inclusion of these variables affected overall accuracy and made the model unsuitable for robust reporting.

Income

Compared to the highest earners (our reference category), respondents earning less than £20,000 were 34% more likely to agree that religious diversity has increased too quickly in Britain.

Voting behaviour

Compared to those voting Leave in the 2016 EU Referendum (our reference category), respondents who voted Remain were 60% less likely to agree that religious diversity has increased too quickly in Britain. Compared to those voting Conservative in the 2017 General Election (our reference category), those voting Labour and Liberal Democrat were, respectively, 42% and 41% less likely to agree.

Other factors that predicted negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in Britain (altering the likelihood by 20% or less)

Female respondents were 14% less likely to agree that religious diversity has increased too quickly in Britain. Being in the Christian religion group increased the likelihood by 14%. Those earning between £20,000 and £39,000 were 19% more likely to agree than the highest earners.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in Britain

Age, living in a rural location and employment had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in Britain.

B. ATTITUDES TOWARDS CHANGE IN DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

I. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCREASED ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES (see Table 34)

Sex/Gender

Compared to male respondents (our reference category), female respondents were 29% less likely to agree that ethnic diversity has increased too quickly in their local community in the last ten years.

Age

Compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24 (our reference category), older respondents were less likely to agree that ethnic diversity has increased too quickly in their local community (see Fig. 17). Those between 55 and 64 were 39% less likely; those between 65 and 74 were 50% less likely; and those 75 and over, 68% less likely.

Ethnicity

Ethnicity had no effect on whether respondents agreed that ethnic diversity had increased too quickly in their local community.

Religion

Compared to respondents of in the No religion group (our reference category), Hindu respondents were two and half times more likely to agree that ethnic diversity has increased too quickly in their local community. Those in the Other religion group were over twice as likely to agree. Christian respondents were 40% more likely to agree.

Actual diversity

Compared to those living in one of the local authorities with the lowest proportions of BAME residents (our reference category), respondents living in most of the other groups were more likely to agree that local ethnic diversity has increased too quickly (by factors of between 1.5 and 3). Respondents in the local authorities with the highest proportion of BAME were three times as likely to agree.

Education

Compared to those with degrees (our reference category), respondents with qualifications other than a degree or no qualifications were, respectively, 49% and 42% more likely to agree that local ethnic diversity has increased too quickly.

Income

Compared to the highest earners (our reference category), respondents earning less than £20,000 per year were 46% more likely to agree that local ethnic diversity has increased too quickly.

Voting behaviour

Compared to voting Leave in the 2016 EU Referendum (our reference category), voting Remain reduced the likelihood of agreeing that local ethnic diversity has increased too quickly by 46%. Compared to voting Conservative in the 2017 General Election (our reference category), voting Labour and Liberal Democrat reduced the likelihood by 33% and 37% respectively.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in diverse local communities

Ethnicity, region, living in a rural location and employment had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in local communities.

2. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCREASED NUMBERS OF MIGRANTS IN DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES (see Table 35)

Age

Compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24 (our reference category), respondents over 75 were 32% less likely to agree that the number of migrants has increased too quickly in their local community. Despite older respondents tending to be more negative in relation to other questions, here they appeared to be more positive. It could be that previous encounters with migrants tend to reduce negative sentiment towards them.

Ethnicity

Compared to White respondents (our reference group), respondents in the BAME group were 36% more likely to agree that the number of migrants has increased too quickly in their local community.

Religion

Due to low cell counts we used only two categories here, religious and non-religious. Compared to respondents in the No religion group (our reference category), religious respondents were 56% more likely to agree that the number of migrants has increased too quickly in their local community.

Actual diversity

Compared to those living in one of the local authorities with the lowest proportions of migrant residents (our reference category), respondents living in most of the other groups of local authorities were more likely to agree that local ethnic diversity has increased too quickly (by factors of between 1.8 and 3). Respondents in the local authorities with the highest proportion of residents born outside the UK were three times as likely to agree.

Region

Compared to those living in London (our reference category), respondents in the North West, West Midlands and Yorkshire and Humber were all more likely to agree that the number of migrants has increased too quickly in their local community (39%, 50% and 46% respectively). Respondents in the South West were 30% less likely.

Education

Compared to having a degree (our reference category), having qualifications other than a degree or having no qualifications were 54% and 33% more likely to agree that the number of migrants has increased too quickly in their local community.

Employment

Compared to those in work (our reference category), respondents who were unemployed or economically inactive were more likely to agree that the number of migrants has increased too quickly in their local community (43% and 29% respectively).

Income

Compared to the highest earners (our reference category), those earning less than £20,000 per year were 77% more likely to agree that the number of migrants in their local community has increased too much. Those earning between £20,000 and £39,000 were 28% more likely. Those earning between £40,000 and £59,000 were 32% more likely.

Voting behaviour

Compared to voting Leave in the 2016 EU Referendum (our reference category), voting Remain reduced the likelihood of agreeing that the number of migrants has increased too much by 66%. Compared to voting Conservative in the 2017 General Election (our reference category), both voting Labour and Liberal Democrat reduced the likelihood by 39%.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards increased numbers of migrants in diverse local communities

After earlier experimentation, sex/gender and living in a rural location were excluded from these models due to their inclusion reducing the overall accuracy of the models and making them unsuitable for robust reporting.

3. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCREASED RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES (see Table 36)

Age

Compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24 (our reference category), older respondents were less likely to agree that religious diversity has increased too quickly in their local community. Those between 55 and 64 were 42% less likely; those between 65 and 74 47% less likely; and those 75 and over 57% less likely.

Ethnicity

Compared to White respondents (our reference group), Asian respondents were 44% more likely to agree that religious diversity has increased too quickly in their local community.

Religion

Compared to respondents in the No religion group (our reference category), those in the Other religion group were 70% more likely to agree that religious diversity has increased too quickly in their local community. Christian respondents were 27% more likely to agree.

Actual diversity

We used those living in one of the local authorities with the lowest proportions of respondents from minority faith backgrounds as our reference category. Respondents living in most of the other groups of local authorities were more likely to agree that local religious diversity has increased too quickly (by factors of between 1.6 and 3.2). Respondents in the local authorities with the highest proportion of minority faith residents were over three times as likely to agree (more likely by a factor of 3.2).

Region

Compared to those living in London (our reference category), respondents in the East Midlands were 71% more likely to agree that local religious diversity has increased too quickly.

Education

Compared to those with degrees (our reference category), respondents with qualifications other than a degree were twice as likely to agree that religious diversity has increased too quickly in their local community (93% more likely). Those with no qualifications were 21% more likely.

Income

Compared to the highest earners (our reference category), those earning less than £20,000 per year were 66% more likely to agree that religious diversity in their local community has increased too much. Those earning between £20,000 and £39,000 were 32% more likely. Those earning between £40,000 and £59,000 were 34% more likely.

Voting behaviour

Compared to voting Leave in the 2016 EU Referendum (our reference category), voting Remain reduced the likelihood of agreeing that local religious diversity has increased too much by 58%. Compared to voting Conservative in the 2017 General Election (our reference category), voting Labour reduced the likelihood by 27%.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in diverse local communities

Sex/gender, living in a rural area and employment had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards increased religious diversity in local communities.

C. ATTITUDES TOWARDS CHANGE IN NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES

I. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS FUTURE INCREASES IN ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES (see Table 37)

Actual diversity

We used those living in one of the local authorities with the lowest proportions of respondents from BAME backgrounds as our reference category. Respondents living in most of the other groups of local authorities had a greater chance of agreeing that local ethnic diversity was likely to increase too quickly (by factors of between 1.6 and 3.5). Respondents in the local authorities with the highest proportion of BAME residents three and a half times more likely to agree (more likely by a factor of 3.5).

Region

Compared to those living in London (our reference category), respondents in the East Midlands, East of England, North East and North West had a greater chance of agreeing that local ethnic diversity was likely to increase too quickly by factors of 1.9, 1.7, 2.6 and 1.9 respectively.

Education

Compared to those with degrees (our reference category), respondents with qualifications other than a degree and those with no qualifications had a greater chance of agreeing that local ethnic diversity would probably increase too quickly (more likely to agree by factors of 2 and 1.5 respectively).

Income

Compared to the highest earners (our reference category), those earning between £40,000 and £59,000 had a 42% greater chance of agreeing that local ethnic diversity was likely to increase too quickly.

Voting behaviour

Compared to voting Leave in the 2016 EU Referendum (our reference category), voting Remain reduced the chances of agreeing that local ethnic diversity is likely to increase too quickly by 60%.

Other factors that predicted negative attitudes towards future increases of ethnic diversity in non-diverse local communities (altering the likelihood by 20% or less)

Compared to those who voted Conservative at the 2017 General Election (our reference category), respondents voting Labour were 20% less likely to have negative attitudes towards future increases of ethnic diversity.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards future increases of ethnic diversity in non-diverse local communities

Sex/gender, age, ethnicity, religion, living in a rural location and employment had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards future increases of ethnic diversity in local communities.

2. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS FUTURE INCREASES IN THE NUMBERS OF MIGRANTS IN NON-DIVERSE LOCAL COMMUNITIES (see Table 38)

Sex/Gender

Compared to male respondents (our reference category), female respondents were 21% less likely to agree that the number of migrants in the local community is likely to increase too quickly in the next ten years.

Region

Compared to those living in London (our reference category), respondents living in the East Midlands were over twice as likely to agree that the number of migrants in the local area would probably increase (more likely by a factor of 2.1).

Education

Compared to those with degrees (our reference category), respondents with qualifications other than a degree and those with no qualifications had a greater chance of agreeing that local ethnic diversity would probably increase too quickly by factors of 2.1 and 1.8 respectively.

Income

Compared to the highest earners (our reference category), those earning less than £20,000 and those earning between £40,000 and £59,000 were, respectively, 45% and 37% more likely to agree that the number of migrants in their local community would probably increase too quickly.

Voting behaviour

Compared to voting Leave in the 2016 EU Referendum (our reference category), voting Remain reduced the chances of agreeing that the number of migrants in the local community are likely to increase too quickly by two thirds (a reduced likelihood of 67%). Compared to voting Conservative in the 2017 General Election (our reference category), voting Labour and Liberal Democrat reduced the likelihood by 33% and 35% respectively.

Other factors that predicted negative attitudes towards future increases in the numbers of migrants in non-diverse local communities (altering the likelihood by 20% or less)

Compared to respondents in the No religion group (our reference category), Christian respondents were 19% more likely to agree that the number of migrants in the local community would probably increase too quickly. Respondents living in rural locations were 19% less likely to agree.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards future increases in the numbers of migrants in non-diverse local communities

Age, ethnicity, actual national diversity and employment had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards future increases of numbers of migrants in local communities.

3. NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS FUTURE INCREASES IN RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES (see Table 39)

Sex/Gender

Compared to male respondents (our reference category), female respondents were 26% less likely to agree that religious diversity would probably increase too quickly in their local community in the next ten years.

Actual diversity

We used those living in one of the local authorities with the lowest proportions of residents from minority faith backgrounds as our reference category. Respondents living in most of the other groups of local authorities were more likely to agree that local religious diversity would probably increase too quickly (by factors of between 1.4 and 2.4). Respondents in the local authorities with the highest proportion of BAME were over twice as likely to agree (an increase by a factor of 2.2).

Education

Compared to those with degrees (our reference category), respondents with qualifications other than a degree or no qualifications were, respectively, 49% and 42% more likely to agree that local religious diversity would probably increase too quickly.

Employment

Compared to those in work (our reference category), respondents who were economically inactive were 25% less likely to agree that local religious diversity would probably increase too quickly.

Voting behaviour

Compared to voting Leave in the 2016 EU Referendum (our reference category), voting Remain reduced the likelihood of agreeing that local religious diversity would probably increase too quickly by 60%. Compared to voting Conservative in the 2017 General Election (our reference category), voting Liberal Democrat reduced the likelihood by 35%.

Other factors that predicted negative attitudes towards future increases of religious diversity in non-diverse local communities (altering the likelihood by 20% or less)

Compared to voting Conservative in the 2017 General Election (our reference category), voting Labour reduced the likelihood by 20%.

Factors that had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards future increases of religious diversity in non-diverse local communities

Religion, region and living in a rural location had no effect on predicting negative attitudes towards future increases in local religious diversity.

We interviewed a city councillor working in the North East of England and learnt how national approaches to diversity and change can cause local resentment.

We spoke to Antony Mullen, Councillor for Barnes Ward, Sunderland City Council. (Antony allowed us to use his full name and job title.) His work brings him into close contact with a wide range of people in Sunderland. As he explained, he is able to “survey” the mood of local residents on a continual basis (albeit informally through daily contact and conversation rather than quantitative social science methods). Through this engagement, Antony described his ability to establish a “tacit understanding” of attitudes towards local issues, future voting intentions and where on the political spectrum people are likely to sit.

Antony took care to point out that assumptions about “left” and “right” held by his contacts within academia, and the attitudes and values often ascribed to each political side, are challenged by lived realities in places such as Sunderland. He described anti-immigration and even racist views found across political divides and among supporters of both major parties.

Antony developed this with an account of how traditional Labour support has declined since 2008 (the collapse of Labour support in northern England – the so-called “red wall” – after the 2019 election has been well-documented elsewhere). After 2008, Labour lost council seats to the Conservative Party. Since then, further seats have been lost to other parties: Liberal Democrat, UKIP and the Green Party. Consequently, and surprisingly perhaps, Sunderland’s city council is now one of the most diverse in England.

Despite this now rich political culture, the region’s lack of ethnic and national diversity is something Antony agreed was perceived locally. A humorous, and perhaps less than politically-correct, claim made in the city around 2010 asserted that “Sunderland has more teenage mothers than migrants”. (Newcastle and Durham are the regions two notable exceptions with foreign

students attracted to their respective well-regarded universities.) Antony's descriptions and insights asserted the dominance of White British working-class culture in the North East.

Antony summarised the realities and implications of the city and region's lack of diversity. A lack of opportunities has limited migration to the area from abroad and elsewhere within the UK. Residential segregation, particularly stark between the city's Muslim and non-Muslim populations, has reinforced unhelpful "them and us" narratives. Despite these challenges (common to many British towns and cities), Antony was careful to point out that fears around the effects of increased diversity were often allayed by people's experiences of it. In Antony's own words:

"The way I have described this in the past, because Sunderland isn't a particularly diverse place, and because it doesn't have a lot of inward migration...I think, when there is a strong sense that [change] that might be happening nationally, and that there's mass immigration and so on, but we haven't experienced it...the reason people in areas that aren't diverse can be...more sceptical than people who live in places like London, is it is almost like when you're going to get a needle [an injection], and you see a huge syringe coming towards you and you think "that's really going to hurt", then you get it and it doesn't, well the people in Sunderland are in a position where the needle is approaching...[but] the people in more diverse areas have realised that the pain is actually not very significant..."

The discussion turned to some of the concerns about the vulnerabilities of local residents to recruitment by far-right groups, as voiced by some outside the North East. Whilst recognising this to be the case for some, Antony was keen to stress that depictions of "burning hatred" towards minority groups are far less prevalent than feelings of "indifference" and toleration (albeit in the guise of resignation and a sense of "that's how it is").

Antony also described local frustrations towards national politicians and media commentators who "preach" the importance of diversity and attempt to impose "top down" measures and values. According to Antony, such interventions often result in resistance from local residents who ask, "what's wrong with the way we're living now?". Many in Sunderland resent both having to "perform" national models of diversity and equality and the subsequent castigation for not doing so. Such challenges suggest a more tailored, regional approach to managing change and a more sympathetic approach to lived realities within communities.

DISCUSSION POINTS

Consensus?

Our analysis of attitudes towards change revealed patterns of consensus similar to those revealed by our analysis of attitudes towards diversity. However, whereas public attitudes towards diversity were largely positive, attitudes towards change were markedly less so.

- Over three times as many agreed that the number of migrants has increased too quickly in Britain than disagreed.
- Twice as many agreed that ethnic diversity has increased too quickly in Britain than disagreed.
- Twice as many agreed that religious diversity has increased too quickly than disagreed.

How are we to explain these findings? Arguably, our existing frameworks and applications lack utility. Previous studies have sought to celebrate multiculturalism whilst placing a spotlight on White working-class communities (with implications about such groups being especially culpable for racism and bigotry). Whilst this is undoubtedly the case in certain specific contexts, our analysis reveals that negative attitudes towards increases in diversity are common between majority and minority groups.

For example, we found Asian respondents with negative attitudes towards increased ethnic and religious diversity and increased numbers of migrants in Britain. We found attitudes towards migrants that were shared between faith groups. (Religion had no effect on predicting attitudes towards national increases in migrants). We found several examples of negative attitudes towards local change held by respondents from minority backgrounds (including among Muslim respondents and respondents from minority ethnic backgrounds).

In sum, and perhaps rather ironically, it would appear our frameworks, lexicons and debates concerning attitudes towards diversity and change themselves require change and diversification.

Reconciling attitudes towards diversity and change

Political debates around race and immigration often rely on arguments that seek to stereotype opponents and opposing views. Some right-wing politicians and commentators use caricatures of more left-leaning opponents as metropolitan elites fixated on “woke” agendas and identity politics, deaf to the voices and needs of ordinary, working people, particularly in the North, and naïve to the consequences of unlimited immigration. In turn, some left-wing debaters regularly depict conservative opponents as trading in “dog whistle” politics, purveyors of policies which seek to justify or perpetuate unwelcome nationalist and far-right values. Our findings suggest that neither

side offers a complete picture of British attitudes towards diversity and change and that both are highly likely to over-estimate our differences.

Instead, our analysis provides strong evidence of a Britain largely at ease with itself over issues of ethnic diversity and migrants, but with demonstrably less positive attitudes towards and between minority faith groups and apparent concerns over the pace of national and local change. On the one hand positive, on the other, less so.

For parliamentarians and policymakers (both within Government and Opposition), our analysis suggests the existence of a national consensus on diversity and change that offers opportunities for coalitions, wider bases of support and broader appeal. For example, findings suggest that “pro-diversity” and “pro-immigration control” positions are neither contradictory nor irreconcilable, despite the vocabulary of political debate from the far-left and far-right. The strengthening of minority rights and protections alongside tighter immigration controls, for example, need not be viewed as necessarily incompatible. Reconciling positive attitudes towards diversity and less positive attitudes towards change is achievable, but only if we accept that we are less divided than we often assume.

MARRIAGE

IN A NUTSHELL

We asked respondents to our nationwide survey a series of questions concerning how comfortable or uncomfortable they were about a close relative marrying someone from different ethnic, national or religious background. Among the extensive findings, we found positive attitudes among the British public towards minority ethnic groups and between them. Our analysis revealed that the British public is largely positive towards marriage across ethnic and national lines and, therefore, perhaps largely positive towards issues of race and ethnicity where they relate to individuals and families.

For example:

- Three quarters of respondents (74%) were comfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying a Black person (compared to 13% who answered “uncomfortable, see Fig. 19).
- Over two thirds (70%) were comfortable with a close relative marrying an Asian person (compared to 16% who answered “uncomfortable”, see Fig. 20).

Our findings revealed positive feelings between ethnic and national groups (see Fig. 23 and 24). However, we found more negative attitudes towards and between minority religious groups and instances where a majority in a particular group were uncomfortable towards another group were observed only when we grouped respondents by religion. In particular, Muslim respondents stood out from the other minority groups. The country at large feels less comfortable about a close relative a British Muslim than about people from other ethnic, national and religious groups.

- Less than a half of respondents (44%) were comfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying a Muslim (compared to 37% who answered uncomfortable and 20% who answered “don’t know”, see Fig. 22).

Majorities in the Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Sikh and No religious groups felt uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying a Muslim (see Fig. 25). However, the data also suggest that Muslims are the group most likely to target other faith groups with the same negative marriage attitudes. A majority felt uncomfortable towards Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish and Sikh people and those of no faith.

From our advanced analysis we identified various factors that predict the likeliness of feeling more uncomfortable more often about a close relative marrying someone from a different background (see Table 41). These included: being 75 years old or older; belonging to one of the non-Asian ethnic minority groups; being Baptist. Being female, and certain voting behaviours – specifically, voting Remain, Labour or Liberal Democrat – appeared to reduce the likelihood of feeling uncomfortable.

From our interviews with religiously observant people, we heard accounts of how adherence to religion continues to shape marriage aspirations but also how younger generations are disrupting more traditional norms and values around marriage and choice of partner. It would appear attitudes are undergoing a major shift.

Overall, our research suggests that religion is a “red line” for many people in England and Wales. Our analysis also suggests that when it comes attitudes towards marriage, adherence to religious norms and values is capable of co-existing alongside patterns of prejudice and discrimination.

WHAT WE KNOW SO FAR

We conducted a review of previous academic research on relations and marriage between ethnic, national and religious groups (often referred to as the study of intergroup relations).

- Academic research into marriage between social groups has a long history. Previous studies have examined marriage to better understand wider social relations between ethnic, national and religious groups.
- Marriage occupies a unique position within the study of intergroup relations. It is widely viewed as one of the “closest” relationships between two distinct social groups. In other words, a close relative marrying someone from another ethnic, national or religious group is viewed as one of the closest types of relations a person can have with that group.
- Attitudes towards intergroup marriage have been widely used as proxy measures for more general attitudes towards other ethnic, national and religious groups.
- Previous social survey data has suggested that people in the UK are generally positive towards close relatives marrying someone from a different ethnic or religious background. Previous research has not sought to determine the drivers of these attitudes or the factors which underpin them, or which groups in society are more or less likely to have negative attitudes.

A full review of relevant literature is presented in Appendix A.

WHAT WE DID

Our nationally representative survey of 11,701 adults in England and Wales included a series of questions asking respondents whether they were comfortable or uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying someone from an ethnic, national and religious background different to their own. Our analysis focuses on:

- attitudes towards and between ethnic, national and religious groups; and
- respondents who feel negatively about these types of marriages most often.

As for our analysis of attitudes towards diversity, we explored the marriage attitudes data using bivariate analysis (two factors considered at a time) and multivariate analysis (many factors considered at once). We focused on respondents who were uncomfortable most often and sought to determine which factors, if any predicted being this way. To enhance our findings, we conducted a series of in-depth interviews.

Research questions

We used our data and chosen methods to answer the following research questions:

- To what extent do attitudes towards a close relative marrying someone from a different background vary when people from specific ethnic, national or religious backgrounds are considered?
- How comfortable or uncomfortable is the British public with the idea of a close relative marrying someone from a different ethnic, national or religious background?
- To what extent do attitudes differ within and between population subgroups defined by ethnicity, nationality and religion?
- To what extent do demographic and socio-economic factors predict negative attitudes towards close relatives marrying someone from a different ethnic, national and religious background?

WHAT WE FOUND

A more detailed look at our findings

BASIC ANALYSIS

Overall, our data suggest that the British public is largely positive towards marriage across ethnic and national lines. We found positive attitudes among the British public towards minority ethnic groups and positive attitudes between minority ethnic groups.

- Three quarters of respondents (74%) were comfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying a Black person (compared to 13% who answered “uncomfortable” and 13% who answered “don’t know”, see Fig. 19).
- Over two thirds (70%) were comfortable with a close relative marrying an Asian person (compared to 16% who answered “uncomfortable” and 14% who answered “don’t know”, see Fig. 20).

Our analysis revealed positive attitudes towards most of the national groups. Over two thirds of respondents (72%) were comfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying someone from Poland (compared to 13% who answered “uncomfortable” and 16% who answered “don’t know”, see Fig. A14 in Appendix). Most respondents (60%) were comfortable with a close relative marrying an Indian person (compared to 21% who answered “uncomfortable” and 20% who answered “don’t know”, see Fig. A9 in Appendix).

Similarly, in terms of attitudes towards religious groups, two thirds of respondents (66%) were comfortable with a relative marrying a Jewish person (compared to 16% who answered “uncomfortable” and 18% who answered “don’t know”, see Fig. A19 in Appendix).

However, less than half (44%) were comfortable with a close relative marrying a Muslim person (compared to 37% who answered uncomfortable and 20% who answered “don’t know”, see Fig. 22 and Fig. A20 in Appendix).

Our research aims were to examine attitudes between ethnic, national and religious groups. Our preliminary analysis suggested a promising relationship between ethnic and religious identity and levels of comfort towards marriage with members of other groups. Statistical tests were used to determine the relationships between the respondent’s self-described ethnicity and religion and the various response categories. In all but one scenario (that of a close relative marrying an Asian person), there appeared to be statistically significant associations between self-identified ethnic and religious characteristics and whether a respondent gave a “comfortable” or “uncomfortable” response.

Whilst some ethnic groups made respondents feel more uncomfortable than others (e.g. Arab and Black people), most people in each ethnic group felt comfortable towards other ethnic groups (see Fig. 23). Whilst it was the case that some countries made respondents feel more uncomfortable than others (e.g. Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan), most people in each ethnic group felt comfortable with the idea of marriage between members of their own group and members of the national groups listed by the survey (Fig. 24).

As stated, our analysis revealed that Muslims are the group most often targeted by negative marriage attitudes from other faith groups (see Fig. 25). Majorities in several faith groups felt uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying a Muslim. However, the data also suggest that Muslims are the group most likely to target other faith groups with the same negative marriage attitudes.

Attitudes toward people from different ethnic backgrounds

We examined attitudes found within ethnic groups towards other ethnic groups and as Fig. 23 shows, there are no red squares. Within the five broadly defined ethnic groups (“Asian/Asian British”, “Black/African/Caribbean/Black British”, “Mixed/multiple ethnic groups”, “Other ethnic group” and “White”), there were no majorities holding negative attitudes towards a close relative marrying someone from a different ethnic background. That does not mean, however, that all attitudes were positive.

We report the ethnic categories alphabetically and all findings for which we have sufficient data (sample sizes for each ethnic group of 100 or more and cell counts for “uncomfortable” responses of 30 or more).

A grey box denotes insufficient data. Where data were sufficient, a red box denotes a majority view within a group, an orange box denotes where between 25% and 50% of respondents responded “uncomfortable” and a green box denotes where between 0% and 24% of respondents responded “uncomfortable”.¹

We made the following observations.

An Arab person

A third of White respondents (34%) and around a quarter of Asian, Mixed and Black respondents (24%, 21% and 25%) were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying an Arab person.

An Asian person

Around one in five Black and White respondents (20% and 19%) were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying an Asian person.

¹ For the crosstabulation analysis we derived proportions from those answering either “comfortable” or “uncomfortable”.

A Black person

25% of Asian respondents and 14% of White respondents were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying a Black person.

A Chinese person

A quarter of Asian respondents (24%), a category not including respondents who self-identified as Chinese, and around 1 in 6 Black and White respondents (18% and 14%) were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying a Chinese person.

A White person

Finally, 15% of Asian respondents were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying a White person.

Attitudes towards people from different national backgrounds

As for ethnic targets of uncomfortable attitudes, no ethnic group held a majority view against the marriage of a close relative to someone from a different national background (see Fig. 20). Where sample sizes were large enough to draw conclusions, we made the following observations:

Egypt

Over a third of White respondents (35%) and a smaller proportion of Asian, Black and Mixed respondents (28%, 27% and 22%) were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying someone from Egypt.

France

One in five Asian respondents (22%) and one in twelve White respondents (8%) were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying someone from France.

India

Around one in four Black and White respondents (28% and 26%) and around one in five Mixed and Asian respondents (22% and 18%) were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying someone from India

Iraq

Half of the White respondents (48%), 40% of Black respondents and over a third of Mixed and Asian respondents were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying someone from Iraq. Attitudes appeared cooler than towards people from Egypt.

Jamaica

A third of Asian respondents (33%) and around one in five White and Mixed respondents (21% and 19%) were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying someone from Jamaica.

Nigeria

Around 40% of Asian respondents (41%) and between a third and a quarter of White, Mixed and Black respondents (36%, 25% and 23%) were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying someone from Nigeria. Overall, attitudes appeared cooler than towards people from Jamaica.

Pakistan

Around 40% of White respondents (41%) and around a third of Black, Mixed and Asian respondents (36%, 34% and 32%) were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying someone from Pakistan. Overall, attitudes were slightly cooler than towards people from India.

Poland

A third of Asian respondents (33%), a quarter of Black respondents (24%) and less than 1 in 5 Mixed and White respondents (19% and 13%) were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying someone from Poland. Overall, attitudes appeared cooler than toward people from France.

Attitudes towards people from different religious backgrounds

Fig. 25 shows both the targets and sources of negative marriage attitudes grouped by religious identity. For several groups (namely, Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh and Other religion) there were insufficient data to report attitudes towards a close relative marrying someone from a different religious background. As before, sufficient meant sample sizes for each ethnic group were over 100 and cell counts were over 30.

A Muslim person

Majorities in more than one religion group held negative attitudes towards Muslims. A majority of Christian, Hindu and Jewish respondents were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying a Muslim person (53%, 59% and 61%). Further, two of these groups contained majorities that were comfortable with a close relative marrying someone from a non-Muslim group. A majority of Christian respondents felt comfortable about Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish and Sikh people and people of no faith. A majority of Jewish respondents felt comfortable towards Buddhist, Hindu and Sikh.

In other words, Muslims were singled out by both Christian and Jewish respondents. We see evidence that respondents within the Christian and Jewish groups were comfortable with some other faith groups but not Muslims. These findings suggest strongly that in some cases marriage attitudes were driven by prejudices as well as by adherence to religious values and norms.

Other majority views between religious groups

Five other groups were targeted by majority attitudes held by respondents within another religion group: Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish and Sikh people and those of no faith were all groups targeted by majorities within another faith group (see Fig. 25). In each of these cases, the source of those majority “uncomfortable” responses was the Muslim group. In other words, a majority of Muslim respondents were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying a Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish or Sikh person, or someone of no religion. In addition, around a third of Muslim respondents (38%) were uncomfortable with a close relative marrying a Christian person.

To recap, the idea of a close relative marrying a Muslim generated the largest number of majority “uncomfortable” responses from other religious groups (i.e. Muslims were the targets of negative marriage attitudes held by the highest number of majorities from other groups). However, majority negative attitudes in relation to a close relative marrying someone from a different religious background were most often observed within the Muslim group.

Muslims were both the primary target for “uncomfortable” responses, but also the primary source. To put it another way, the Muslim group outnumbered the other religious groups in terms of being both the target and the source of negative attitudes held by a majority.

Other views between religious groups

There were three other religious groups (Christian, Jewish and Other religion respondents) that had significant minorities within them who were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying people from other religions. Around a third of Christian respondents were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying a Buddhist, Hindu or Sikh person (27%, 33% and 34% of Christian respondents). Overall, the group appeared more comfortable with Jewish people or people of no faith. Around a third of Jewish respondents were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying a Buddhist, Hindu or Sikh person (33%, 34% and 38% of Jewish respondents). There were insufficient data to compare Jewish attitudes towards Christian people and people of no religion. Between a third and a half of respondents from the Other religion group were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying Hindu, Muslim or Sikh people (32%, 50% and 30% from the Other religion group).

Between a quarter and two fifths of respondents from the No religion group were uncomfortable with the idea of a close relative marrying a Muslim or Sikh person (40% and 25% of respondents from the No religion group. It appears that, for some within the No religion group, Muslim and Sikh people triggered less positive views than people from other faiths.

From the three groups with relatively large sample sizes (Christian, Muslim and No religion), respondents from the No religion group appeared to be the least uncomfortable in terms of

collective attitudes towards other groups. In respect of four other religious groups (Buddhist, Christian, Hindu and Jewish), between 0% and 25% of those of no religion responded “uncomfortable” and for two (Muslim and Sikh), between 25% and 50% responded “uncomfortable”.

More indicative findings (where cell counts were just below 30) suggest that around a third of Hindu respondents were uncomfortable with a close relative marrying a Jewish person (34%, n=27) and that around half the Sikh respondents were uncomfortable with a close relative marrying a Muslim person (50%, n=27).

Attitudes toward marrying people from different religious backgrounds (respondents grouped by ethnicity)

Finally, attitudes towards people from different religious backgrounds were analysed using the ethnic subgroups where data were sufficient (see Fig. 26). We were interested to see whether similar patterns emerged where the targets were religious groups but where the respondents were grouped by ethnicity (i.e. views among ethnic groups towards faith groups).

Buddhist

40% of Asian respondents, a third of Black respondents (33%) and 21% of White respondents were uncomfortable with a close relative marrying a Buddhist person.

Christian

28% of Asian respondents and less than one in ten White respondents (7%) were uncomfortable with a close relative marrying a Christian person.

Hindu

Over 40% of Asian respondents (42%), around a third of Black and White respondents (35% and 27%) and one in five Mixed respondents (22%) were uncomfortable with a close relative marrying a Hindu person.

Jewish

Over 40% of Asian respondents, around a third of Black respondents (30%) and around one in five White respondents (17%) were uncomfortable with a close relative marrying a Jewish person.

Muslim

Around half of White and Asian respondents (47% and 44%) and around a third of Black and Mixed respondents (35% and 31%) were uncomfortable with a close relative marrying a Muslim person.

Sikh

40% of Asian respondents and between a third and a quarter of Black, White and Mixed respondents (36%, 29%, 24%) were uncomfortable with a close relative marrying a Sikh person.

No religion

Over 40% of Asian respondents (43%), a third of Black respondents (32%) and around one in ten White respondents (10%) were uncomfortable with a close relative marrying a person of no faith.

These findings suggest that feelings within ethnic groups towards interreligious marriage are more positive than among religious groups.

ADVANCED ANALYSIS

Multilevel Regression Poststratification (MRP)

Our use of MRP data and heatmaps provided further evidence that Britain is largely positive about marriage across ethnic and national lines. However, the question about marrying an Arab person caused a relatively large number of respondents to be uncomfortable. As stated in the summary, we see evidence of more negative attitudes towards Muslims.

We used MRP techniques to generate estimates for local attitudes towards each ethnic, national and religious group. Local, in our case, meant within each of England and Wales' local authorities. To address this complexity, we produced a series of heatmaps. These images are a more intuitive way to consider local patterns of attitudes towards marriage which help build our overall national picture.

Heatmaps by ethnicity (see Figs. A1 to A21 in Appendix)

Categories: Arab, Asian, Black, Chinese, European and White

The heatmaps showing attitudes towards Asian, Black, Chinese, European and White people reveal a large population that is relatively positive about the idea of someone from a different ethnic background marrying a close relative. The heatmap for attitudes towards Arab is also mainly positive although less so than for the other ethnic groups. This suggests cooler attitudes towards Arab people than towards ethnic minority groups (namely, Asian, Black and Chinese people). Attitudes towards Asian and Black people are more positive than some readers may have expected.

Heatmaps by nationality

Categories: [A person from...] Egypt, France, India, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland and Nigeria

Chosen as pairs of people, where the first is generally less stigmatised than the second: Egyptian and Iraqi; French and Polish; Indian and Pakistani; Jamaican and Nigerian. Overall, most responses appeared more positive than negative. That said, overall attitudes appeared cooler towards Iraqi people than Egyptian people (and many other ethnic groups); cooler towards Nigerian people than Jamaican people; cooler towards Indian people than Pakistani people; and around the same for French and Polish people (the only pair for which our “stigmatisation” hypothesis and approach were not supported).

For example, in Leeds (local authority area) 81.3% felt comfortable about a Jamaican person marrying a close relative, compared to 59.1% who felt comfortable about an Iraqi person doing the same.

Heatmaps by religion

Categories: [A/An] Atheist, Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh [person]

Findings appeared equally positive for Atheist, Buddhist, Christian and Jewish people and slightly cooler for Hindu and Sikh people. Overall attitudes towards Muslim people were the least positive overall. This supports previous research that has revealed discrepancies in public attitudes towards British Jewish and British Muslim communities, where the British public has been shown to be more negative towards the latter.

Logistic regression modelling

We considered the “uncomfortable” responses across all ethnic, national and religious categories. We arranged the respondents and their responses into ten equal groups. Our tenth group represented respondents who answered “uncomfortable” twelve or more times and were, on that basis, considered the most uncomfortable with people from ethnic, national and religious groups other than their own. We used the data to determine if there were any special characteristics of this group such as being more likely to be male, or older, or White, and so on.

Factors that increased the likelihood of a respondent being in the most uncomfortable group

Sex/Gender

Women appear to be more positive about marriage across ethnic, national and religious lines. Being female decreased the likelihood of being in the most uncomfortable group by 19% (when compared to being male, our reference category).

Age

Compared to those aged 18-24 (our reference category), those over 75 years old are 59% more likely to be in the most uncomfortable group.

Ethnicity

White people do not appear to be the most uncomfortable about marriage between people from different backgrounds. Compared to White respondents (our reference category), those grouped in the Other ethnic group were 59% more likely to be in the most uncomfortable group.

Religion

Despite common stereotypes, people from minority faith backgrounds (e.g. Jewish and Muslim people) do not appear to be the most uncomfortable (once several other factors are considered). Compared to respondents from the No religion group (our reference category), three religion categories returned significant effects: Baptist, Catholic and Other religion. Respondents from these groups were all more likely to be in the most uncomfortable group (61%, 52% and 42% more likely).

Education

People with degrees appear to be more positive about marriage across ethnic, national and religion lines. When compared to respondents with a degree or higher qualification (our reference category), those with no qualifications were over twice as likely to be in the most uncomfortable group (an increase in likelihood by a factor of 2.2). Respondents with qualifications other than a degree or above (i.e. qualifications up to degree level, such as further education or vocational qualifications), were 50% more likely.

Voting

Remain, Labour and Liberal Democrat voters appear to be more positive. Compared to voting Leave at the EU Referendum (our reference category), voting Remain were half as likely (48% less likely) to be in the most uncomfortable group. Compared to voting Conservative at the 2015 Election (our reference category), respondents who voted Labour were 21% less likely to be in the most uncomfortable group. Voters who voted Liberal Democrat were nearly half as likely (47% less likely).

Factors that had no effect on predicting being in the most uncomfortable group

Living in a particular region of England or Wales (when compared to living in London), living in a rural location (when compared to living in an urban location) and earning a particular wage (when compared to the highest earners) had no effect on predicting being in the most uncomfortable group.

Summary of logistic regression findings

The strongest predictors

Factors making it more likely to be in the most uncomfortable group (when compared to the reference category in each case):

- Holding no educational qualifications
- Being over 75 years old
- Being in the Other ethnic group (that included Arab, Black, Chinese and Mixed respondents)
- Being Baptist

Other factors making it more likely to be in the most uncomfortable group

- Holding a qualification other than a degree
- Being Catholic
- Being from the Other religion group
- Being male

Factors making it less likely to be in the most uncomfortable group

- Being Female (-30%)
- Voting Liberal Democrat at the General Election (-50%)
- Voting Remain at the EU Referendum (-50%)
- Voting Labour at the 2017 General Election (-20%)

We interviewed three people, two Muslim people engaged in community work and a female Rabbi, and learnt that, whilst religion is still a non-negotiable “red line” for many, attitudes towards marriage are shifting.

Our interview data showed that the reasons that intermarriage is frowned upon in both Jewish and Muslim British are varied and complex; communal disapproval and prohibition of intermarriage did not stem from xenophobia or pure religious practice alone. We interviewed a Jewish and a Muslim woman and a Muslim man about their experiences of marriage within more observant faith communities. Our interviews revealed that, whilst adherence to religious practice continues to shape marriage customs, younger generations are disrupting norms relating to marriage and the choice of partner.

Two key points emerged from our interview with Ayesha (not her real name). First, enforced norms around marriage, often guided by Islamic beliefs, are applied more often and more rigorously for Muslim women and by Muslim men. This reflected our data revealing men to be more uncomfortable. Second, whilst norms and expectations may be relaxed when considering marriage to Muslims from different national or ethnic backgrounds, religion is more often non-negotiable. That said, both she and Ahmed offered insights into the changing nature of marriage customs within British Muslim communities. As Ayesha told us:

“We are already seeing that change with friends and other...with wider society. Because people have that choice now, whereas for my parents’ generation there was no choice, it was arranged marriage, they married who they were told to marry, and people accepted [it].”

Some of findings suggest the role of prejudices shaping attitudes towards marriage between faith groups. Sarah (not her real name), a female rabbi from London, was careful to recognise the role of prejudices but also of other considerations:

“There maybe is an element of Islamophobia, I’m not trying to deny it. But if I thought about Muslims, or Sikhs and Hindus...the difference between those and Christians is that you’re talking about other minority faith groups. Why is that relevant? Because they’re all groups...that are small, relative to the general population, and are all seeking to preserve their own ethno-religious identity.

“Ultimately, they all seek to preserve their ethno-religious identity; when somebody is going to marry a Christian, they are not going to marry somebody who has a strong faith themselves. But if they marry a Muslim, most of the people, who are not involved in interfaith dialogue, will assume that person to be a religious person...Do I want a close relative to marry somebody who is going to pull them out of the Jewish religion?...It’s more likely, in people’s minds, if you’re marrying a Muslim, Hindu or a Sikh, there is a comprehension in our religion that these are faith groups where people tend to be more observant, more involved, on some level, than most Christians are.”

Ayesha elaborated that marriage between faiths is not only frowned upon from a religious perspective, but rather that negative attitudes may be deeply entrenched in a family’s or community’s ethnic heritage and culture. She explained, however, that patterns of marriage are far from static and are shifting from generation to generation. This is, in part, due to higher levels of communication between parents and the children.

Ahmed shared a similar sentiment:

“There are changes I’d say that, on the whole, there’s perhaps an acceptance that parents aren’t always going to be involved initially in choosing a partner. So, I think there is an acceptance that perhaps children will...go to university...or maybe they’re at work and meet somebody there. They might introduce them to the family and say...‘We want to get married’ and then get...the blessing of the family. So that is probably going to happen, that is happening more and more...and it probably will continue to.”

DISCUSSION POINTS

Male v Female

There was a difference between attitudes reported by male and female respondents. The image of the angry disapproving father is common trope, and, to a limited extent, supported by the data. Taking all other factors into account, men appear to be more uncomfortable, more of the time.

“Muslim” v “Pakistani”

One interesting result from the analysis visualised in the heatmaps is the difference between attitudes held by the British public towards Muslims and Pakistanis. Given what we know about the British Pakistani population – that the overwhelming majority are Muslim – we might expect to see similar attitudes towards both groups. Do the slightly warmer attitudes towards Pakistanis suggest that the word “Muslim” is capable of triggering more negative sentiment than the word “Pakistani”? If the word “Muslim” does generate a more emotive response, does this in turn suggest that interpersonal relations seen through the lens of race, ethnicity and nationality are likely to be perceived as more settled by the British public?

Religious practice v prejudice

It is possible that some will read these findings and argue that marriage attitudes expressed by respondents are likely to reflect adherence to religious customs, values or norms rather than prejudices towards people from different faith backgrounds.

We challenge this assumption by asking readers to imagine what would be the case if none of the findings reflected prejudice. For example, if a Jewish or Christian respondent adheres to the customs, values and norms of a stricter, more observant form of Judaism or Christianity, we would expect that person to be uncomfortable with a close relative marrying anyone from any other faith background.

Similarly, a secular Jewish or Christian person (or someone who is less observant) might be expected to be comfortable with a close relative marrying a person from any other faith. In other words, remove all possibilities of prejudice and we would expect to see only two groups: those who are uncomfortable with all other faiths (the more observant followers) and those who are comfortable with all other faiths (the less observant or secular followers).

The fact is, however, that we observe other types of respondents who are uncomfortable with some faith groups but not others. Put another way, we found religious respondents selecting some faith groups over others. It is therefore reasonable to assume that prejudice plays at least some role in determining whether a person is comfortable or uncomfortable about a close relative marrying someone from another religion.

FRIENDSHIP

IN A NUTSHELL

To address some of the current debates on integration and cohesion, we asked respondents a series of questions about diversity and friendship. In particular, we asked respondents to describe the amount of ethnic, national and religious diversity within their friendship groups.

Overall, we found high levels of diversity, especially between ethnic and religious groups.

- Three quarters of respondents (76%) stated they have at least one friend from a different ethnic background (see Fig. 27).
- Two thirds of British respondents (69%) reported having non-British friends (see Fig. 28).
- 87% of respondents who identified as religious have friendships with people from other faiths (see Fig. 29).
- Stereotypes about ethnic and religious minority communities not mixing, or mixing less than the general population, are not supported by our data.

Overall, the data suggest that all ethnic and all faith groups are equally likely to have ethnically and religiously diverse friendships and all faith groups equally likely to have religiously diverse friendships. It would appear that factors noted before play a role in shaping the likelihood of having diverse friendships.

- Having taken into account local levels of diversity, our analysis reveals regional differences. For example, people in the North East were twice as likely to have only British friends, whilst those in the North West were 50% more likely to have friends only from their own ethnic group.
- Our findings also revealed the importance of workers and workplaces in helping to provide some of the conditions for better integration and cohesion. Those without work were up to twice as likely to have no friends from outside their own ethnic, national and religious groups.

Our interviews revealed some of the challenges faced by people from minority backgrounds when attempting to make new friends at university. They also demonstrate that successful community work can encourage and support long-lasting friendships across racial and cultural lines. When it comes to tackling prejudice, friendship matters and works.

WHAT WE KNOW SO FAR

We conducted a review of previous academic research and policy literature.

- Previous studies of friendship across racial and ethnic lines constitute an expansive, and still growing, area of academic research.
- Previous academic research, particularly social psychological studies, has revealed the strong relationships between contact, friendship and reduced prejudices. In particular, friendships with people from different racial and ethnic groups have been shown to lead to reduced prejudices towards those groups.
- Despite the existence of strong academic evidence, the role of friendship has not been given a prominent role in the UK Government's recent integration and cohesion strategies.

A full review of relevant literature is presented in Appendix A.

WHAT WE DID

Our nationally representative survey included a series of questions asking respondents to describe how many of their friends are from their own ethnic, national and religious background. For example, we asked: “How many of your friends are the same ethnicity as you?” We explored the data using bivariate and multivariate techniques. We used multivariate analysis to identify and analyse groups of respondents who were more likely to have friends only from their own ethnic, national or religious background. We enhanced these findings with a series of in-depth interviews.

Research questions

We used our data and chosen methods to answer the following research questions:

- To what extent may we describe patterns of friendship within England and Wales as ethnically, nationally or religiously diverse?
- To what extent do demographic and socio-economic factors predict the likelihood that a person will have friends only from their own ethnic, national and religious background?
- To what extent may we describe social groups within England and Wales as being more or less likely to have ethnically, nationally and religiously diverse friendship groups?

WHAT WE FOUND

A more detailed look at our findings

BASIC ANALYSIS

According to our data, most people in England and Wales enjoy diverse friendships across ethnic, national and religious lines (see Tables 42-42).

- 76% of all respondents reported having friends from other ethnic backgrounds (see Fig. 27).
- 69% of all respondents reported having friends from other national backgrounds (see Fig. 28).
- 87% of all respondents who are religious reported having friends from other faith backgrounds (see Fig. 29).

In terms of ethnically diverse friendships, 72% of White respondents reported having friends from different ethnic backgrounds, whereas between 85% and 88% of the three minority groups analysed (Asian, Black and Other) reported having friends from different ethnic groups.

The differences between the White and non-White groups were statistically significant suggesting real differences between White and non-White respondents. There were no such differences between the non-White groups.

In terms of nationally diverse friendships and having British friends, 68% of respondents born in the UK reported having friends from other national backgrounds and 88% of those born outside the UK reported nationally diverse friendships (i.e. non-British friends). These differences were statistically significant suggesting a “real” difference between the groups.

In terms of religiously diverse friendships, the number of people from each minority faith group who had friends only from their own faith background were, in many cases, too small to analyse robustly. We compared Christian and Muslim respondents and respondents gathered by the Other religion group. Between 81% and 84% reported having friends from other faith backgrounds. Differences between the groups were not statistically significant, suggesting no real differences between these groups.

ADVANCED ANALYSIS

Logistic regression modelling

We ran a series of statistic models to explore our data (see Tables 45-47). In our analysis, we included a range of characteristics such as age, education, employment, area of residence and the diversity of the local community. Our aim was to determine which factors, if any, increased or decreased the likelihood of respondents having friends only from their own ethnic, national or religious group. In other words, we sought to identify the people in England and Wales who are more likely to have non-diverse friendship groups.

Our survey questions asked respondents how many of their friends are the same as them, rather than how many are different. Given the sensitivities around social mixing, we formulated our questions in this way in the expectation that respondents would be more comfortable talking about similarity than difference (or to put it more technically, more comfortable with aspects of social bonding rather than social bridging).

In this way, we hoped responses would be less influenced by social acceptability bias and not merely those thought to be the ones the survey researchers wanted or expected. A respondent with a lower likelihood of having friends only from their own ethnic, national or religious group was taken as evidence of diverse friendships.

I. ETHNICALLY DIVERSE FRIENDSHIPS (see Table 45)

Factors that predicted having ethnically diverse friendships

Perceived diversity

Living in communities that are perceived to be ethnically diverse appears to increase the likelihood of having friendships with people from other ethnic groups. Respondents who agreed that their local community was ethnically diverse were nearly half as likely (or 41% less likely) than those who disagreed (our reference category) to have friends only from their ethnic group.

Actual diversity

Similarly, some of those who lived in areas that were actually more diverse ethnically were more likely to have ethnically diverse friendships. For example, respondents residing in the local authorities with largest BAME populations were half as likely to have friends only of their own ethnicity (54% less likely) and so more likely to have ethnically diverse friends.

Region

People living in the North West appear to have fewer friendships across ethnic lines.

Compared to living in London (our reference category), and having considered all other factors, respondents in the North West were 54% more likely to have friends only of their own ethnicity. It was the only region to return a significant result: living in other areas outside London had no effect.

Education

People with degrees are more likely to have ethnically diverse friendships.

Compared to respondents with degrees (our reference category), respondents with qualifications other than a degree were 77% more likely to have friends only from their own ethnic group (see Fig. 30). Those with no qualifications were 30% more likely.

Employment

Employment appears to increase opportunities for friendships across ethnic lines.

Compared to those in employment (our reference category), respondents who were economically inactive were 37% more likely to have no friends outside their own ethnic group (see Fig. 31).

Income

People earning less appear to have fewer friendships across ethnic lines.

Income appears to be a significant factor. Compared to the highest earners (our reference category), respondents earning either up to £20,000 or between £20,000 and £39,000 per year were less likely to have ethnically diverse friendships. According to our models, respondents in these two groups were 52% and 27% more likely to have no friends from other ethnic groups (see Fig. 32).

Voting behaviour

Voting behaviour at the 2016 EU Referendum appears to determine the likelihood of having ethnically diverse friendships, with Remain voters more likely than Leave voters. Compared to Leave voters (our reference category), Remain voters were 22% less likely to have no friends from other ethnic groups.

Other factors that predicted ethnically diverse friendships (altering the likelihood by 20% or less)

Women appear to be more likely to have friends from other ethnic backgrounds. Female respondents were 13% less likely than male respondents (our reference category) to have friends only of their own ethnicity.

Factors that had no role in predicting ethnically diverse friendships

The following factors were included in our analysis but were found to have no effect: age, ethnicity, religion, living in a rural location (compared to living in an urban location) and voting behaviour in the 2017 General Election. The basic analysis suggested differences between the White and non-White ethnic groups. These differences appeared to flatten out once other variables were considered.

2. NATIONALLY DIVERSE FRIENDSHIPS (see Table 46)

Factors that predicted having nationally diverse friendships

Age

Being aged between 35 and 44 appeared to increase the likelihood of having nationally diverse friendships. Compared to respondents aged between 18 and 24 (our reference category), those aged 35 to 44 were 23% less likely to have only British friends. None of the other age groups had an effect.

Ethnicity

Non-White people appear to have more nationally diverse friendships. When compared to White respondents, respondents in the Black and Other ethnic groups were 33% and 45% less likely to have only British friends.

Religion

Christian people appear to have more friendships across national lines. Overall, religious identity played a role in determining the likelihood of having nationally diverse friends. Compared to respondents in the No religion group (our reference category), Christians were 14% less likely. Muslim respondents were 44% more likely to have only British friends.

Perceived diversity

Respondents who agreed that their local community is nationally diverse were around a third (39%) less likely to have only British friends compared to those who disagreed (our reference category).

Actual diversity

Actual levels of national diversity appear to have no effect on increasing or decreasing the likelihood of having non-British friends.

Region

Region plays a role in determining the likelihood of having nationally diverse friends. Living in many regions outside London appears to reduce the likelihood. Compared to living in London (our reference category), and having factored in actual levels of national diversity, living in the North East

made it two and half times more likely for respondents to have only British friends. Respondents in the North West, Wales and Yorkshire and Humber were nearly twice as likely (or 88%, 81% and 80% more likely). Living in the West Midlands, East of England and South West made it 51%, 45% and 42% more likely (see Fig. 33).

Education

People with degrees appear to be more likely to have nationally-diverse friendships.

Compared to degree-holding respondents (our reference category), those with qualifications other than a degree and those with no qualifications were 71% and 31% more likely, respectively, to have only British friends.

Employment

Working people appear to be more likely to have nationally diverse friendships.

Compared to employed respondents (our reference category), unemployed or economically inactive respondents were 44% and 28% more likely, respectively, to have only British friends (Fig. 34).

Income

Compared to the highest earners (our reference category), those paid less than £20,000 per year were 23% more likely to have only British friends.

Voting behaviour

Voting Remain in the EU Referendum reduced the likelihood of British-only friends by 30% when compared to those who voted Leave (our reference category).

Factors that had no effect on predicting nationally diverse friendships

Sex/gender had no effect on predicting nationally diverse friendships.¹

3. RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE FRIENDSHIPS (see Table 47)

Factors that predict respondents having religiously diverse friendships

Sex/Gender

Women who are religious appear more likely to have religiously diverse friendships than men. Female respondents were more 28% less likely to have only friends from their own faith background.

¹ Actual levels of national diversity, living in a rural area (compared to living in an urban area) and voting behaviour in the 2017 General Election were excluded from this model. Inclusion of these variables affected overall accuracy and made the model unsuitable for robust reporting.

Age

Older people appear more likely to have religiously diverse friendships. Compared to respondents aged 18 to 24 (our reference category), those aged 45 and over were up to 70% less likely to have only friends from their own faith background. More specifically, those aged 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 to 74, and 75 or over were 46%, 67%, 70% and 68% less likely respectively.

Ethnicity

Non-White people appear to be more likely to have religiously diverse friendships. Compared to White respondents (our reference category), those in the BAME group were more likely to have religiously diverse friendships. They were 44% less likely to have friends only from their own faith background.

Religion

Religion appears to have no role in determining the likelihood of having religiously diverse friendships. We compared two groups to Christian respondents, Muslim respondents and respondents in the Other religion group (essentially, non-Muslim minority faith groups). Being in either group had no effect.

Religiosity

Levels of religiosity appear to effect the likelihood of having religiously diverse friends (but the findings are complex). We asked respondents about their level of religiosity such as the frequency of their religious participation or attendance. Some of the religious participation categories returned significant effects. Participating at least once a week, less than once a month and only on festivals made it less likely to have only friends from their own religious background (65%, 47% and 53% less likely respectively). Participating at least once a day (the highest level of participation) had no effect.

Perceived diversity

Respondents who perceived their local community as religiously diverse were 38% less likely to have only friends from their own religious background.

Actual diversity

Only one of the local authority groups returned a significant effect. Living in a local authority gathered into one of the groups with smaller minority religious populations made it over twice as likely to have only friends from their own religious background (an increase by a factor of 2.4). No other deciles returned a significant effect when analysed.

Education

People with degrees are more likely to have religiously diverse friendships. Having qualifications other than a degree made it over twice as likely to have only friends from their own religious background (an increase by a factor of 2.1). Having no qualifications at all made it 47% more likely (or nearly half as likely again).

Voting behaviour

Voting Remain in the 2016 EU Referendum increased a respondent's likelihood of having only friends from their own religious background by 30%.

Factors that had no role in predicting religiously diverse friendships

The following factors had no effect: religion, living in a region outside London (compared to living in London), living in a rural area (compared to living in an urban area) and being either unemployed or economically inactive (compared to being employed). (NB. Cell counts for North East and Wales were below 30 but included as no regional category returned a statistically significant result. Notwithstanding the overall lack of effect for the regional variable, findings in respect of both categories are reported as being indicative rather than conclusive.)

We interviewed two female British Muslim graduates and learnt that diverse friendships are sometimes hard-won.

In terms of friendship, our survey data revealed that most people in England and Wales enjoy friendships that are ethnically, nationally and religiously diverse. However, despite this apparent good news story, we should not lose sight of the challenges faced by many from minority ethnic and religious backgrounds who find themselves in large groups of White British or Christian people or among those of no faith.

We interviewed Farah and Sireen. Both are female, Muslim, non-White and former students at a leading British university (we have changed both names to protect the interviewees' identities). Farah and Sireen offered insights into forming friendships across ethnic and religious lines. Their interviews reveal that being from a minority background and attempting to form diverse friendships can pose significant challenges.

Farah shared her experiences of making friends on campus, dealing with discourtesy and offensive language:

“It was hard to make friends with women – I was one of two women. I just felt that...There was one boy in my flat that wouldn't speak to me. It was really awkward...we were all hanging out...they made Islamophobic comments, and I got really emotional...Some of them

did apologise, but it really changed who I associated myself with. That's when I started going to the Islamic society and the BME society. I didn't want to, but that incident drove me to do that."

After similar experiences, Farah came to the unfortunate conclusion that establishing and maintaining friends from White British backgrounds would be difficult. In her own words, she "didn't become close friends with people who weren't ethnic minorities".

Sireen offered insights into being the only person from her faith background within a social group on campus, and how her minority status created challenges when trying to make friends:

"They would question me about the hijab. If I felt comfortable with certain things...There was always one person who made comments about Muslims and not once did he ask about the sort of work, I was doing...it was always those kinds of question."

But for all these challenges, developing diverse friendships for Sireen proved possible, if still difficult, through conversation and genuine dialogue. She shared an experience with a student from a White British background:

"Initially, I found it really hard to have conversations with her. As we started walking home together, we spent time talking, she spent time asking me questions. Through that, we formed a really special friendship...Some of the people on my course were like 'you know we never thought but you're actually quite cool'. When they spoke to me about life and not work, they realised I'm just normal like them."

We interviewed an experienced youth worker in Blackburn and learnt that structured settings can sometimes provide the necessary pre-conditions for diverse friendships.

Hannah Allen is Chief Operating Officer of Blackburn Youth Zone, a centre providing activities for young people from all backgrounds. (Hannah allowed us to use her full name and job title.) Among its stated aims, the Blackburn Youth Zone works "to change the prospects offered to young people in the area". Hannah began by describing Blackburn's diversity and the ways in which it is challenged by existing tensions between White British and British Asian communities. Hannah described how the centre succeeds in bringing together young people from both communities and how her work encourages diverse friendships:

"A lot of programmes are set up where there is a shared space and shared teams...there is a 'before' friendship which is activity based. What you'll find is that when you are designing a football activity in a social integration mindset, you're thinking 'how can I get people

together from different backgrounds?’...If you’re a White person and you’ve never really made friends with an Asian person...how are you going to connect to that person? And sometimes it’s about activity. It doesn’t matter the colour of the skin, what matters is the football. That’s how friendships are forged in Blackburn. I see lads now who were young leaders here, and I see them in town White and South Asian having coffee together and going to each other’s weddings. And that all stemmed from the youth centre.”

Hannah also shared that, in her opinion, integration between the different communities in Blackburn will get better, because the younger generation is beginning to have a stronger British identity and a different sense of community. At the same time, she explained that the public must understand the importance of minority identities. In her words:

“I think that as the generation now and parents of young children in both communities are more open minded and liberal. I think it will evolve over time. Within that ultra-norm, I don’t think that [the divide] will go away and I don’t think that it should go away. It’s really important to each of those communities because religion and culture are a factor and [in my opinion] why is that a problem...I feel we’re trying to get to this perfect world of social integration which I don’t know if it exists, and I don’t know if people want it to exist. And why is it so important that it does exist? Why can’t we just accept the diversity which exists and learn from each other?”

In a nutshell, Hannah expressed two important ideas. First, that the key to diverse friendships lies in forming joint activities such as sport, which on the basic level are simply for fun, but are actually designed with social integration in mind. Second, that creating a socially integrated society does not mean blurring identities and religions, but rather forming a society where individuals are encouraged and supported to respect and learn from each other.

DISCUSSION POINTS

Friendship

The absence of friendship in national integration and cohesion strategies is curious given the overwhelming evidence from decades of psychology studies. Where friendship is considered by policymakers, it is conceptualised more often as a product of good integration and cohesion rather than as a necessary building block. The emphasis is nearly always on friendship as an output rather than an input (see Appendix A for a more detailed discussion). In our view, friendship has been placed too often on the wrong side of the integration equation. Previous studies, and our interview with Hannah from Blackburn, provide strong evidence to support the argument that encouraging friendships between people from different backgrounds leads to a reduction in prejudices and possibilities for better integration and cohesion.

Ethnicity, religion and other factors

Rather counter-intuitively perhaps, ethnicity played no role in determining ethnically diverse friendships and religion played no role in determining religiously diverse friendships. In other words, all ethnic groups are equally likely to have ethnically diverse friendships and all faith groups equally likely to have religiously diverse friendships.

This is significant for at least two reasons. First, stereotypes about minority groups – such as Asian or Black people, or Jewish or Muslim people – mixing only with people from their own group (or being likely to do so more than the general population) are not supported by our data. It would appear that those enjoying diverse friendships are themselves a highly diverse group.

Secondly, factors other than ethnicity and religion are important when considering, in turn, ethnically and religiously diverse friendships. But which other factors? Two factors appeared consistently across all three models: perceived diversity and education.

In the Diversity chapter, we showed how the British public is largely accurate when asked to describe whether or not their local community is ethnically, nationally or religiously diverse. However, we must not discount the possibility that such perceptions are related to positive and negative attitudes towards diversity. Those celebrating diversity may be more inclined to perceive diversity in their local areas, as may those who lament it.

In terms of education, some readers will see at a glance that their intuitions are probably correct when considering the benefits of university education. In terms of offering the opportunities, the social skills, careers and general life trajectories, higher education makes diverse friendships more likely. In terms of policymaking, the question remains whether these increased opportunities

can be encouraged in contexts other than universities. Our interview with an experienced youth worker suggests they can.

Workplaces

Finally, our data suggest the workplace as a promising site for friendship diversity. Whilst elitism should be avoided and issues such as the labour market and employment inequalities should not be overlooked, could workplaces provide some of the bridging mechanisms needed to bring communities together on an individual level? Previous integration strategies have focused on younger people, on community hubs (including schools and places of worship) and on various community activities (including sports). The data suggest the workplace could make a useful addition to our integration and cohesion strategy repertoires.

Regional differences

Living within several regions plays a role in determining the likelihood of having non-British friends. According to Census data from 2011 – still our best source of data, despite its age – the North East is the region of England and Wales with the highest proportion of White British people (94%, twice that of London’s 45%). Experiences of diversity should be understood in terms of the opportunities, as well as the willingness, to engage with others. Our data suggest that people living in diverse local communities (or, at least, those perceived as being diverse) were more likely to have diverse friends and those that live in some local communities that are actually more diverse are more likely as well (although it does not hold that living in all actually diverse communities had an effect).

Local levels of diversity do not tell the whole story. Our findings revealed difference between certain groups – those with and without degrees or, relating to ethnic and national diversity, those on lower incomes or economically inactive – that suggest “real” differences between these groups despite local levels of diversity. This in turn suggests local responses to diversity and locally-tailored strategies around integration and cohesion are required. We welcomed the UK Government’s *Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper* with its focus on five key local areas: Blackburn with Darwen, Bradford, Peterborough, Walsall and Waltham Forest in London. Our data suggest the need to attend to regional differences with locally tailored strategies and to further devolve integration and cohesion policy.

WORKPLACE

IN A NUTSHELL

We asked a series of questions to respondents about diversity and their workplaces. Our analysis focused on respondents representing two distinct aspects of workplace diversity:

- Respondents who work only with colleagues from their own ethnic, national and religious background. We refer to these as workers in “non-diverse settings”.
- Respondents who work with no other colleagues from their own ethnic, national and religious backgrounds. We refer to these workers as “workplace solos”.

Our analysis reveals that ethnic, national and religious diversity is commonplace for most workers across England and Wales. Most workers have colleagues from ethnic, national and faith backgrounds other than their own, including large majorities of White, Asian and Black workers as well as adherents of all faith communities:

- Three quarters of all workers (76%) regardless of ethnicity in England and Wales work in a setting that is ethnically diverse (see Table 48 and Fig. 33).
- Three quarters of all workers, three quarters of workers born in the UK, and three quarters of those who described their ethnicity as British, work with non-British workers (75% for each group, see Tables 50 to 52 and Fig. 34).
- Similarly, over three quarters of all workers in England and Wales (81%) who self-described as religious work in a setting that is religiously diverse (see Table 53 and Fig. 35).

Our analysis again revealed regional differences, here in terms of non-diverse work settings and the likelihood of workers being “workplace solos” (see Tables 55 to 60):

- Workers in the North West were nearly twice as likely than those in London to work only with British colleagues. Workers in the East Midlands were four times more likely than those in London to work only with colleagues from the same religious background.
- In terms of age, workers aged over 65 years old were nearly twice as likely to work with only British colleagues (see Table 56). No other age category played a role in shaping such non-diverse working experiences.

- 1 in 5 White workers work with no other ethnic groups, the ethnic group most likely to do so. 1 in 5 British Asian workers are “workplace ethnic solos”. 36% of Mixed ethnicity workers are “workplace solos” (see Table 49).
- Women are particular prone to being “workplace solos”. Female workers are 54% more likely to be ethnic “solos” and 57% more likely to be religious “solos”.

To explore themes emerging from the statistical data, we conducted interviews with a trade union representative engaged in issues relating to workplace inequality and a partner at a leading London-based law firm. Overall, our findings suggest that policymakers should focus on workplaces as promising sites for integration and cohesion interventions.

WHAT WE KNOW SO FAR

We conducted a review of previous academic and policy literature.

- Similar to studies of friendship diversity, previous studies of racial and ethnic diversity in the workplace form a large and expanding body of academic literature.
- Previous studies of workplace diversity have focused on issues of racial and ethnic discrimination and inequality, particularly around disparities in pay, promotion and unemployment.
- Previous research provides the theoretical framework for the study of workplace diversity but few studies, if any, have conducted large-scale statistical studies of ethnic, national and religious diversity in British workplaces.
- Previous studies from social psychology have developed the concept of the “workplace solo”. Our research aimed to better understand such workers.
- For understandable reasons, most policy work in this area has focused on inequality rather than on building a more complete picture of diversity in the workplace.

A full review of relevant literature is presented in Appendix A.

WHAT WE DID

Our survey included a series of questions asking working respondents to describe the ethnic, national and religious diversity in their workplaces. As stated, our analysis focuses on two types of workers: those in “non-diverse settings” and “workplace solos”. We explored the data using a variety of methods. We used basic statistical techniques – bivariate analysis (i.e. two factors considered at a time) – to establish an overall picture of diversity and workplaces in England and Wales. We used more advanced techniques – multivariate analysis (i.e. all factors considered at once) – to identify two specific groups of respondents:

- those who were the most likely to respond “all of them” when asked how many of their colleagues are from their own ethnic, national or religious background; and
- those that were most likely to answer, “none of them”. We developed the concept of “workplace solos” to analyse these respondents.

To enhance these findings, we conducted a series of interviews to explore themes emerging from the data.

Research questions

Our data and methods were used to answer the following research questions:

- To what extent are workplaces in England and Wales ethnically, nationally and religiously diverse?
- To what extent do demographic and socio-economic factors predict the likelihood of a person working only with people of her or his ethnic, national or religious background? What can we say about people who work in non-diverse settings?
- To what extent do demographic and socio-economic factors predict the likelihood of a person being a “workplace solo”? In other words, what factors increase the likelihood of a person working with no colleagues from their own ethnic, national or religious group?

WHAT WE FOUND

A more detailed look at our findings

BASIC ANALYSIS

Ethnicity

Three quarters of all workers (regardless of ethnicity) in England and Wales (76%) work in a setting that is ethnically diverse to some degree (see Table 48 and Fig. 33). In other words, workplaces where “most”, “about half” or “a few” colleagues are from the same ethnic background. 77% of White workers work in ethnically diverse settings. Exact figures for the other groups were not available due to small sample sizes and low cell counts.

In terms of non-diversity, around 1 in 5 of all workers in England and Wales (19%) work in a setting that is not ethnically diverse (i.e. a workplace where only one ethnic group is represented, see Table 48). Around 1 in 5 of White workers (21%, see Table 49) work in an ethnically non-diverse setting. They are the ethnic group most likely to do so. Around 1 in 12 British Asian workers (8%) work only with colleagues from their own ethnic group (see Table 49).

1 in 20 workers in England and Wales (5%) are “workplace ethnic solos”: people who are the only representative of their ethnic group in a workplace. 1 in 5 British Asian workers (20%) are “workplace ethnic solos” and are the minority group most likely to be “workplace solos” (see Table 49).

Nationality

Three quarters of all workers, all workers born in the UK (75%) and workers who described their ethnicity as British (75%) work with non-British workers (see Tables 50 to 52 and Fig. 34). In other words, 25% of British workers work with only British colleagues.

Religion

Over three quarters of all workers in England and Wales who self-described as religious (81%) work in a setting that is religiously diverse. In other words, religious workers work in places where “most”, “about half” or “a few” colleagues are from the same faith background (see Table 53).

1 in 10 workers who are religious (11%) work only with colleagues from their own faith background. Around 1 in 10 of all workers who self-described as being religious (9%) are “workplace religious solos” (i.e. individuals who are the sole representative of their faith group at work, see Table 53).

Small sample sizes made it difficult to estimate proportions for individual faith groups. Despite this, our analysis suggested that broadly equal proportions of respondents in the Christian, Muslim and the Other religion groups (essentially, respondents from non-Muslim minority faith backgrounds) work in places that are religiously diverse. Between 88% and 90% work with colleagues from other faith backgrounds. Between 10% and 12% worked only with colleagues from their own faith background. There were no real differences between these groups (i.e. none of the differences between these three groups were statistically significant).

Around 1 in 20 Christian workers (6%) reported being “workplace religious solos”. Around 1 in 10 Muslim workers (12%) were “workplace religious solos” and around 1 in 5 respondents (19%) were from the other minority faith groups (gathered together in the Other religion group) were “workplace religious solos”.

ADVANCED ANALYSIS

A more detailed look at our findings

A. EXPERIENCES OF WORKPLACE DIVERSITY

I. EXPERIENCES OF WORKPLACE DIVERSITY BY ETHNICITY (See Table 55)

Factors that predict respondents having colleagues only from the same ethnic group as their own

Ethnicity

Overall, non-White workers appear to work in more diverse settings than White workers. Compared to White respondents (our reference category), BAME respondents (analysed as a single group) were 66% less likely to experience workplace non-diversity and work only with colleagues from their own ethnic group.

Actual diversity

Again, workers living in more ethnically diverse local authorities are more likely to work in ethnically diverse settings. For example, respondents living in one of the local authorities with highest proportion of BAME population were 67% more likely than those living in the least ethnically diverse local authorities to work in such settings.

Education

Workers with degrees appear more likely to work in diverse settings. Compared to those with degrees (our reference category), workers with no qualifications or qualifications other than a degree were a third more likely to work only with colleagues from their own ethnic group (37% more likely, in both cases).

Income

Workers on lower incomes appear to be less likely to work in ethnically diverse settings. Compared to those earning over £60,000 per year (our reference category), those earning less than £20,000 were 43% more likely to work only with colleagues from their own ethnic group.

Other factors that predicted experiences of ethnic workplace diversity (altering the likelihood by 20% or less)

Full-time workers appear to be more likely to be employed in an ethnically diverse setting than part-time workers. Compared to working full-time (our reference category), part-time work increased the likelihood of being employed in an ethnically non-diverse place by 16%.

Factors that had no effect on predicting experiences of ethnic workplace diversity

Neither living in a particular region of England and Wales (when compared to living in London) nor age had an effect on predicting the likelihood of working in an ethnically diverse workplace.¹

2. EXPERIENCES OF WORKPLACE DIVERSITY BY NATIONALITY (see Table 56)

Factors that predict respondents having only British colleagues

Age

Only one age group predicted working only with British colleagues: the very oldest group (workers aged over 65 years old). Compared to workers aged between 18 and 24 (our reference category), workers in the oldest group were nearly twice as likely to work with only British colleagues (93% more likely). No other age group had an effect.

Ethnicity

White workers appear to be more likely to work in nationally diverse settings. We analysed three ethnic groups: White, British Asian and British Other. The use of wider ethnic categories was made difficult by the low number of respondents from minority backgrounds working only with British colleagues.

Our data suggest that White workers are more likely to work in nationally diverse settings. British Asian workers appear the most likely to work only with British workers. Being British Asian, when compared to being White (our reference category), and having taken into consideration all other factors, made it 58% more likely to work only with British colleagues.

Religion

We analysed three religious groups (Christians, Muslims, Other religion) and the No religion group. Compared to respondents in the No religion group (our reference category), Muslim workers appeared to be 69% more likely to work only with British workers.

Actual diversity

Working in one of the local authorities with the highest proportion of people born outside the UK made it more likely to work in nationally diverse settings and less likely

¹ Sex/gender, religion, perceived diversity, living in a rural location, occupation and voting behaviour were excluded from this model. Inclusion of these variables affected overall accuracy and made the model unsuitable for robust reporting.

to work only with British colleagues. Living in three of the most diverse groups of local authorities (the seventh, ninth and tenth most diverse groups) halved the likelihood of working only with British workers (decreases of 42%, 52% and 55%).

Region

Workers living outside London appear to be more likely to work only with British colleagues. Compared to living in London (our reference category), and having taken into account actual levels of local diversity (see above), living in the Wales, the North West and North East increased the likelihood of working only with British colleagues by around two thirds (increases of 73%, 71% and 68% respectively). Living in the South West and East of England increased it by 55% and 49% respectively (see Fig. 37).

Education

Education appears to increase the chances of experiencing workplace diversity. Compared to having a degree (our reference category), having no qualifications made it around a third more likely that working respondents would have only British colleagues (37% more likely).

Occupation

Compared to working in a “high managerial” position (our reference category), working in a semi-skilled or unskilled position, in a “intermediate managerial” position or in the public sector all made it around a third less likely for a working respondent to have only British colleagues (40%, 38%, 30% and 28% less likely respectively).

Factors that had no effect on predicting workplace diversity by nationality

Sex/gender, employment status (full-time or part-time) and income had no effect on predicting working only with British colleagues.²

3. EXPERIENCES OF WORKPLACE DIVERSITY BY RELIGION (See Table 57)

Factors that predict respondents having colleagues only from their own religious background

Findings here are reported more tentatively due to smaller sample sizes.

² Perceived diversity, living in a rural location and voting behaviour were excluded from this model. Inclusion of these variables affected overall accuracy and made the model unsuitable for robust reporting.

Sex/Gender

Women appear to be more likely to work in religiously diverse settings. Compared to male respondents (our reference category), female workers were around a third less likely to work with colleagues only from their own religious background (35% less likely).

Age

Older workers appear to be more likely to work in religiously diverse settings. Compared to younger respondents (18 to 24 years old, our reference category), workers between 35 and 44 years old, and those aged 45 or older, were between a half and three quarters less likely (54% and 71% less likely) to work only with colleagues from their own religious background.

Ethnicity

Workers from non-Asian minority groups appeared more likely to work in religiously diverse settings. Compared to White respondents (our reference category), respondents grouped in the British Other category (essentially, non-Asian ethnic minority workers) were far less likely to work with only those from their own religious group (94% less likely).

Religious diversity

Overall, the religious diversity of a local authority was not a key factor in determining the likelihood of working in a religiously diverse place. However, working in one of the less diverse groups of local authorities (the third least diverse group) reduced the likelihood of respondents having colleagues only from their own faith background by 66%.

Region

Workers outside London appear to be less likely to work in religiously diverse settings. Compared to living in London (our reference category), living in the East Midlands made it four times more likely for respondents to work only with people of their own faith. Living in the South West made it around three times as likely (an increase in likelihood by a factor of 2.8). Living in the North West, South East and East of England made it twice as likely (increases by factors of 2.2, 2.2 and 2.1 respectively). The results took into account perceived and actual levels of religious diversity.

Occupation

Compared to working in a “high managerial” position (our reference category), working as an unskilled worker, in an “intermediate managerial” position, in the public sector or as a supervisor, managing director or owner, all made it less likely that a respondent would work with only British colleagues (81%, 68%, 67% and 44% less likely respectively).

Factors that had no effect on determining religious workplace diversity

Being a non-Christian had no effect (when compared to being Christian, no other religion groups were analysed due to small sample sizes), nor did education or employment type (full- or part-time).³

B. EXPERIENCES OF “WORKPLACE SOLOS”

I. EXPERIENCES OF “WORKPLACE SOLOS” BY ETHNICITY (See Table 58)

Factors that predict respondents having no colleagues from their own ethnic group

Sex/Gender

Women appear more likely to be “workplace ethnic solos”. Compared to being male (our reference category), being female increased the likelihood of being a “workplace ethnic solo” by 54%.

Age

Compared to being 18 to 24 years old (our reference category), being older made it around twice as likely to be a “workplace solo” by ethnicity. Respondents aged between 25 and 34, 35 and 44, and 55 and 64 were more likely by factors of 1.8, 2.3 and 2.1 respectively.

Ethnicity

Asian workers are the most likely to be “workplace ethnic solos”. Compared to White respondents (our reference category), British Asian workers were 19 times more likely to be a “workplace ethnic solo”. Being from one of the ethnic backgrounds grouped together by the British Other category (essentially, non-Asian minority workers) made it 15 times more likely.

Religion

Rather counter-intuitively perhaps, and having considered the ethnicity of respondents, being either Christian or Muslim reduced the likelihood of being a “workplace ethnic solo”. Compared to respondents in the No religion group (our reference category), Christian respondents were around a third less likely (30% less likely) to be a “workplace ethnic solo”. Muslim respondents were nearly half as likely (49% less likely).

³ Perceived diversity, living in a rural location, income and voting behaviour were excluded from the final model. Inclusion of these variables affected overall accuracy and made the model unsuitable for robust reporting.

Ethnic diversity

Local levels of ethnic diversity did not predict being a “workplace ethnic solo”. In other words, our data suggest those living in diverse and non-diverse local authorities have broadly the same likelihood of being a “workplace ethnic solo”.

Our statistical model included actual levels of ethnic diversity in local authorities. Whilst the inclusion of this factor improved the overall explanatory power of the statistic model, no single group of local authorities returned a statistically significant effect.

Region

Compared to living in London (our reference category), living in the North and Midlands made it less likely to be a “workplace ethnic solo” (48% and 42% less likely respectively).

Education

Those with qualifications other than degrees appear more likely to find themselves being “workplace ethnic solos”. Compared to having a degree, having qualifications other than a degree increased the likelihood of being an “ethnic solo” by 81%.

Occupation

Compared to being in a “high managerial” position (our reference category), several of the occupation categories returned significant effects. Being an unskilled worker made it five times more likely to be a “workplace ethnic solo”. Semi-skilled workers were over three and a half times more likely. Those in the public sector were over three times as likely (increases by factors of 5.1, 3.6 and 3.2 respectively).

Factors that had no effect on predicting being a “workplace solo” by ethnicity

Income had no effect on predicting whether a respondent was likely to be a “workplace ethnic solo”.⁴

EXPERIENCES OF “WORKPLACE SOLOS” BY NATIONALITY

Non-British “solos”

Analysis of workplace diversity and nationality to determine factors that predict respondents having no British colleagues has been excluded from the final analysis due to small sample sizes and low cell counts.

⁴ Perceived diversity, living in a rural location, employment status (full- or part-time) and voting behaviour were excluded from the model. Inclusion of these variables affected overall accuracy and made the model unsuitable for robust reporting.

2. EXPERIENCES OF “WORKPLACE SOLOS” BY RELIGION (see Table 59)

Factors that predict respondents having no colleagues from their own religious background

Sex/Gender

Women appear more likely to be “workplace religious solos”. Compared to male respondents (our reference category), female respondents were around 57% more likely to work in a setting with no colleagues from their own faith background.

Age

Older workers appear more likely to be “workplace religious solos”. Compared to workers under 40 years old (our reference category), workers aged 40 and over were 66% more likely to be “workplace religious solos”.

Religion

Non-Christian workers were more likely to be “workplace religious solos”. Compared to Christian respondents (our reference category), Muslim respondents were nearly three times more likely to be a “workplace religious solo” (an increase in likelihood by a factor of 2.7). Respondents in the Other religion group were four times more likely (an increase in likelihood by a factor of 4.2).

Region

Workers in London appear more likely to be “workplace religious solos”. Compared to working in London (our reference category), working outside London reduced the likelihood of being a “workplace religious solo” by a third (they were 37% less likely).

Factors that had no effect on predicting being a “workplace solo” by religion

Neither education nor income predicted whether respondents would be “workplace religious solos”.⁵

We interviewed a trade union representative in the North East and learnt that, whilst political events can impact heavily on diverse workplaces, supported dialogue can help bridge ethnic and religious divides among workers

Our findings described patterns of diversity in workplaces across England and Wales. We interviewed Ali, a trade union representative living in the North East, to learn more about the lived experiences of workplace diversity. Ali is employed by a large public transport company where he is

⁵ Perceived and actual diversity, living in a rural location, occupation and employment status (full- or part-time) and voting behaviour were excluded from the final model. Inclusion of these variables affected overall accuracy and made the model unsuitable for robust reporting.

an established trade union rep dealing with issues of workplace inequality and discrimination. His office has remained diverse since he began working there in 2001, a time when relationships between workers from different backgrounds were generally positive.

According to Ali, significant political events – namely, Brexit and the election of President Trump – appeared to signal a deterioration of working relations. In Ali's own words:

“Unfortunately, at these times you see a lot of racism. [...] Originally it was all fine, we had a lot of Polish workers that came over, they mixed in everything was great, there was banter going past...Since the whole Brexit thing you could see a division being created with our workers, and the BME workers. We were segregated towards the side. Since we got the Brexit result [the other workers said] the Polish are going out so you Muslims will be next. Which was like... what does that have to do with anything, we've been working side by side for so long. Our Polish workers started to feel like they're walking on eggshells around people...It was making the Polish drivers and the BME drivers uncomfortable. So, we sat away from our normal restroom just to get away from the workplace, just to have our dinner, just to have two minutes peace. That's the point that it reached. They sat outside with the public rather than sit inside with their work colleagues.”

As events unfolded, Ali alerted the management to a worsening situation:

“At the beginning we approached management as a union and the management just buried their head in the sand, they said, ‘Oh no, it's phase, it's going to pass over, if they don't mix in with the people, we can force them to sit with the people.’ They never took it seriously. So, through the union we did hold some bullying and harassment courses just to update people about the laws.”

According to Ali's account, improved communication, and dialogue supported by his union, proved to be the most decisive intervention:

“Our colleagues started making derogatory comments saying things about our holy book, the Qur'an, saying things about our Prophet...to overcome that we had one of these sessions, we talked about something that is dear to us. Like our family. If I was making jokes about your family how would you feel? And they said yeah, and I said, to us this is like that.

“The goal is to find something that we can both relate to, and that sorts of helps to build relations there. At the time it was terrible. Its improved things a lot, it made them think twice. We knew what was their touchy subjects. Religion and beliefs are no longer banter. They don't touch it or anything.”

We interviewed an executive working in London and learnt that being a “workplace solo” provides both challenges and opportunities, and how workers make good “ambassadors” for their ethnic, national and religious groups

We interviewed Anushka, a lawyer from a Malaysian background and a partner in a prestigious London law firm. She spoke about the lack of diversity on the executive level, relating to her experience as an “ethnic solo”. According to her, the problem begins with executive ranks and leadership:

“I have been a “solo” for many years. I was the only female partner ... the only Asian partner. My line of work for many years, there was nobody like me. Which has been a great teacher for me, in terms of what I do when I support my team. I chose having a conversation in the summer...how you manage that when you seem to be the only one like you...There are common things that we can always find. Looking for the common interest, the overlaps.”

Because of this experience, Anushka explained that she has made workplace diversity one of her top goals. Part of the problem she has encountered is the lack of diverse recruitment:

“I was on a webinar around COVID and BLM, and a great senior executive, chair and CEO here in the UK, he’s white and male, was talking about what he’s been doing to improve the diversity of his boards. One of the things we say [is] they’re not applying. Well that’s fine – but we can be more rigorous...Why is it that they’re not applying for these board positions? They were sharing some data for the number of applicants, its shockingly low. Why is it that were not getting enough applicants for minorities? There isn’t one simple answer. Part of it is because it isn’t what they see. But there is a lot more in terms of messaging, communication. Have applications been framed to really try to attract minorities? How you might characterise a particular role thinking about diverse aspects. Maybe reference things like ‘We welcome candidates which have had a broad experience.’”

Aside from the issue of recruitment, Anushka detailed how relationships operate in her workplace. She, like Ali from the North East, pointed out how Brexit has impacted on diverse relationships in the workplace but also how her firm have responded. In her own words:

“In our firm we have International Day where we try to promote different religions and cultures... we have a sheet and fun facts. Each cultures and nationals [nationalities] we’ve chosen are represented by people in our own office. So, we share that. There’s also a fear of being over-sensitised, I know myself that we have had fellow partners being fearful of having [certain] discussions...We’ve had sessions done. We give them the freedom to ask. This is how you could have conversation and ask someone about where they’re from, if there are certain things about the faith or their religion. I remember a terrible anecdote about a

Muslim who wanted to find a place to prayer and it was so awkward for them to have that conversation with the team, they didn't feel that they could have that conversation in the work place. You have to make an environment where asking questions is perceived as showing interest and respect.”

DISCUSSION POINTS

Workplace diversity and non-diversity

Our analysis reveals a detailed and complex picture of workplace diversity and non-diversity. In terms of non-diversity, several factors appear to take dominant roles in shaping respondents' experiences of ethnically, nationally and religiously homogeneous workplaces. However, only ethnicity and actual levels of local diversity had a role in shaping workplace diversity across all three types of diversity.

We observed various regional differences suggesting a greater emphasis on local and regional dynamics is needed to better understand drivers of workplace diversity. We interviewed Ali, a trade union representative working in the North East region of England (one of the places where workers are most likely to experience workplace non-diversity). He explained how local patterns of migration, domestic and international news events and established local patterns of prejudices can coalesce to impact negatively on workers.

Workplace solos

We developed the concept of “workplace solos” to shed light on a seldom reported aspect of diversity. Our analysis revealed that female workers, British Asian workers and workers from minority faith backgrounds are particularly prone to being ethnic and religious “workplace solos”. Previous academic and policy work has understandably centred on entire ethnic and religious groups with an implied focus on clusters of such groups within certain types of industries, businesses or public services. Our data suggests a shift in emphasis towards greater consideration by employers, trade unions and policymakers on the workplace would be valuable. Our statistical models suggest those with qualifications other than a degree and those working in semi-skilled and unskilled work, or within the public sector, are more likely to be “solos”. That said, our interview with Anushka demonstrates that issues related to being alone ethnically or religiously can affect all types of workers and can act as a source of professional motivation as well as unease.

Workers are a “safe bet” for integration and cohesion

Previous policy work relating to integration and cohesion has tended to focus on schools, places of worship and local communities. Our findings suggest adding workplaces to the repertoires of the UK Government's integration and cohesion strategies. We know from our research on friendship diversity, that people in employment are more likely to have diverse friendships. We also know from social psychologists that changing norms around social mixing can be achieved not only when people mix with members of other ethnic and religious groups but also when people see such mixing happening around them. In other words, people react positively when the status quo around

not mixing is broken down. Consequently, we consider workers to be a “safe bet” for integration and cohesion strategies. Workers, by virtue of education and developed socialisation skills, are likely to be worthy ambassadors of their own ethnic, national or religious group. They will be more able to break down stereotypes that might otherwise lead to the development of prejudices, distrust and discrimination. It follows that such people might also be worthy conduits of best practice around social mixing transferred from workplaces, where social mixing is destigmatised, to more private or domestic settings (homes, places of worship, other local community hubs) where more attitudes towards social mixing are more cautious or conservative. As potential “ambassadors” of their own ethnic, national or religious group, workers are well-placed to challenge stereotypes and establish new norms of social mixing.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

This report has identified a wide range of inter-personal attitudes towards diversity and produced a dataset enabling us to “drill down” to the regional and local authority levels. Unsurprisingly, our study has implications for national, regional and local policymaking. Previous integration and cohesion strategies have rightly focused on schools and colleges, places of worship and on community centres and activities (such as sports). Our focus on attitudes, friendship, workplaces and regional patterns of diversity offers new considerations and possibilities. We suggest that policymakers consider the recommendations below.

National consensus

In a time of increased concerns about polarisation and division, policymakers need to take seriously an emerging national consensus that diversity is good for all, but that the speed of change is too fast for many. Three times as many agreed that ethnic diversity is good for British society than disagreed (and twice as many that migrants and religious diversity are good). Yet, whilst our data challenges some of the reporting of issues associated with migrants and immigration (e.g. more people are positive towards migrants than towards religious diversity), almost two thirds agreed that the number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years. Similarly, there is consensus that ethnic and religious diversity has also increased too quickly.

Importantly, positive attitudes towards diversity and negative attitudes towards the pace of change are common between majority and minority groups. For example, there were no differences between White and Asian respondents in respect of negative attitudes towards increased ethnic diversity in Britain nor was there divergence amongst religious views. We should move beyond the simplistic assumption that “mainstream attitudes” and “minority attitudes” represent two monolithic and divergent positions.

The existence of an emerging national consensus on diversity and change offers policymakers opportunities for coalitions, wider bases of support and broader appeal. For example, our findings suggest that “pro-diversity” and “pro-immigration control” positions are neither contradictory nor irreconcilable, despite some of the political rhetoric coming from both Left and Right. Our analysis suggests that we have an opportunity to move beyond highly polarised debates around sensitive issues such as Brexit and immigration. In particular, academics and commentators should be wary of dismissing local concerns around change as hostility towards diversity. The strengthening of minority rights and protections alongside tighter immigration controls, for example, need not be viewed as necessarily incompatible. Reconciling positive attitudes towards diversity and less positive attitudes towards change and further developing a national consensus are achievable, but only when we accept that we are less divided than we often assume.

Regional variations

When looking at patterns of attitudes towards and experiences of diversity across England and Wales, we were careful to factor in local levels of diversity. In other words, we found regional differences that cannot be explained away simply by pointing to differences in the size of minority populations from one region to another.

Given our consideration of actual levels of diversity, our identification of regional variances in attitudes and experiences suggests that a far higher standard of regional literacy is required among national policymakers. Recent political projects such as David Cameron’s “Northern Powerhouse” and Boris Johnson’s “levelling up” agenda have made the economic case for regional reform. Our data suggest that a more concerted effort is needed to make the social case for reform across our regions.

We recommend the further devolution of integration and cohesion policymaking, particularly to our metro mayors and combined authorities. In the first instance, we recommend a series of regional diversity audits to further explore the local drivers of attitudes, experiences and outcomes.

The UK Government’s *Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper* (which focuses on five key local “Integration Areas”: Blackburn with Darwen, Bradford, Peterborough, Walsall and Waltham Forest in London) was a good start but could be extended further. We need greater attention given to regional differences and less reliance on “top down” measures and on London-centric models of integration. A deeper understanding of what works locally is essential.

Take friendship seriously

Whilst not entirely absent, the theme of friendship does not occupy a prominent role in the UK Government's policymaking around integration and cohesion. This is curious given its importance not as a product of good integration and cohesion but rather as a necessary building block. In our view, friendship has been placed too often on the wrong side of the integration equation.

Encouraging friendships between people from different backgrounds leads to a reduction in prejudices and possibilities for better integration and cohesion. In other words, there is a relationship between contact, friendship and a reduction in prejudices. Previous research has shown that having diverse friends impacts more forcefully on our prejudices than our prejudices do on our choice of friends. When it comes to tackling prejudice, friendship matters and works.

We recommend local authorities and combined authorities, with support from national Government, adopt the type of approaches used so successfully by the Mayor of London. For understandable reasons, policymakers have been reluctant to encroach on people's private lives and interfere with our choice of friends. However, there are examples, including in our reported interviews, of successful local initiatives that have aimed to break down barriers by encouraging friendships across ethnic, national and religious divides.

Our analysis revealed that education, and particularly university education, makes diverse friendships more likely. In terms of policymaking, the question remains whether increased opportunities can be encouraged in educational settings other than universities. such as further education institutions and apprenticeship schemes.

Work the workplace

Workplaces in England and Wales are ethnically, nationally and religiously diverse and experience of diversity is commonplace for most workers. The workplace is a promising site for fostering cohesion and provides bridging mechanisms needed to bring communities together on an individual level. For understandable reasons, most policy work in this area has tended to focus on issues related to inequality such as access to the labour market and discrepancies in pay and promotion between majority and minority groups.

We recommend an increased focus on workplaces as sites where diversity can be both celebrated and strengthened. Our report shows that people in employment are likely to have more positive attitudes towards diversity and more diverse friends. We also know from social psychologists that changing norms around social mixing can be achieved not only when people mix with members of other ethnic and religious groups but also when people see such mixing happening around them. In other words, people react positively when the status quo around *not* mixing is broken down.

For these reasons, we regard workers as a “safe bet” for integration and cohesion strategies. Not only are workers able to act as ambassadors for their own ethnic, national and religious groups but they are potential conduits of best practice around social mixing. Such practice can be transferred from workplaces, where social mixing is destigmatised, to more private or domestic settings (homes, places of worship, other local community hubs), where attitudes towards social mixing are more cautious or conservative.

We also call on employers to consider “workplace solos”. Previous academic and policy work has tended to focus on entire ethnic and religious groups with an implied focus on clusters of groups within certain types of industries, businesses or public services. We recommend employers make more effort to support “workplace solos” more effectively. Our data also suggest that female workers, British Asian workers and workers from minority faith backgrounds are particularly prone to being ethnic and religious “workplace solos” and deserving of extra attention and care.

Strengthen religious inclusion

Whilst findings suggest a country at ease with itself on issues of ethnicity and nationality, more negative attitudes exist towards and between minority religious groups. Overall, Muslims were the group most often targeted by negative attitudes from other faith groups, but also the group most likely to target other faith groups with the same negative marriage attitudes.

The Muslim group stood out within the dataset for two reasons. First, the idea of a close relative marrying a Muslim generated the largest number of majority “uncomfortable” responses from other religious groups (i.e. Muslims were the targets of negative attitudes held by the highest number of majorities from other groups). Despite the fact that 90% of people of British Pakistani heritage are Muslim, feelings towards a close relative marrying a Pakistani appear more positive than towards marrying a Muslim. This suggests perhaps that the word “Muslim” is capable of triggering more negative emotions than the word “Pakistani”.

Second, majority negative attitudes in relation to the idea of a close relative marrying someone from a different religious background were most often observed within the Muslim group. However, our interviews among British Muslim communities suggest that, despite these stark statistical findings, attitudes towards marriage are far from static and are undergoing generational shifts in relation to marriages across ethnic and national divides. In particular, Muslim women are exercising more freedom to decide when, whom and how to marry.

As academics and national watchdogs have asserted, one factor determining widespread anti-Muslim sentiment is the misrepresentation of Muslims in the media. We call on the British media to adopt more responsible approaches to the reporting of news stories involving Muslim individuals and groups.

Finally, one of the key factors determining negative views towards diversity is education. Those without educational qualifications are more likely to have negative towards diversity and less likely to have diverse friends. Tailored educational programmes developed in co-ordination with minority faith community leaders, particularly from Muslim communities, should form the central pillar of strategies to improve cohesion and integration.

The Woolf Institute's vision is one in which discussion and engagement overcome prejudice and intolerance. It combines teaching, research and outreach, focusing on Jews, Christians and Muslims, to foster understanding between people of diverse beliefs and improve the way that people live together in society.

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