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Citation: Schmeling, M. & Wagner, C. (2015). Does Central Bank Tone Move Asset Prices?. SSRN.

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Does Central Bank Tone Move Asset Prices?*

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Abstract

We explore whether the *tone* of central bank communication matters for asset prices and find that tone changes have a significant effect on equity returns. Stock prices increase when tone becomes more positive and vice versa. Moreover, we find that positive tone changes are associated with increasing bond yields, lower implied equity volatility, lower variance risk premia, and lower credit spreads. Since we also show that tone changes are largely unrelated to current and future economic fundamentals, our results suggest that central bank tone matters for asset prices through a risk-based channel.

JEL Classification: G10, G12, E43, E44, E58

Keywords: Central bank communication, stock returns, return predictability, bond yields, monetary policy shocks, textual analysis

*First version: February 10, 2015. This version: October 7, 2016. We thank Gino Cenedese, Chris Downing, Michael Ehrmann, Marcin Kacperczyk, Mark Kamstra, Ralph Koijen, Tim Kroencke, David Lando, Christian Laux, Mike Lemmon, Tim Loughran, Alex Michaelides, Silvia Miranda-Agrippino, Michael Melvin, Menno Middeldorp, Thomas Nagel, Florian Nagler, Evgenia Passari, Lasse Pedersen, Tarun Ramadorai, Jesper Rangvid, Lucio Sarno, Andreas Schrimpf, Vania Stavrakeva, Andrea Tamoni, Desi Volker, Paul Whelan and participants at the Western Finance Association (WFA) Meetings 2016, the SFS Cavalcade 2016, the 2nd London Empirical Asset Pricing (LEAP) Meeting 2015, the European Finance Association (EFA) Meetings 2015, as well as seminar participants at the Bank of England, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Copenhagen Business School, the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW, Berlin), and the Vienna Graduate School of Finance (VGSF) for helpful comments and suggestions. We thank Alessandro Beber, Michael Brandt, and Maurizio Luisi for sharing their real-time macro indices with us. Christian Wagner acknowledges support from the Center for Financial Frictions (FRIC), grant no. DNRF102.

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“I don’t think I’m stepping up my rhetoric on inflation, Draghi said [...]. Financial market analysts nonetheless detected a shift in tone if not in substance of monetary policy.”

REUTERS, APRIL 4TH, 2012

“All eyes will be on the ECB this afternoon. If the tone is clearly dovish, then it could maybe stop the bleeding on the market.”

REUTERS, AUGUST 7TH, 2014

“This time, it’s very hard to predict [...] the tone in the press conference, and investors are quite anxious.”

REUTERS, NOVEMBER 2ND, 2014

Given the uncertainty, how Ms. Yellen frames what the Fed is doing will be as important as what the Fed actually does.”

WALL STREET JOURNAL, SEPTEMBER 16TH, 2015

1. Introduction

Central bank communication shapes market expectations and has become an integral part of the monetary policy toolkit.¹ As such, central bank (CB) communication is closely followed by market participants, extensively covered in the financial press, and central banks evaluate the media coverage of their statements to gauge the effectiveness of their communication. To accommodate the rising importance of communication, numerous central banks nowadays hold live press conferences, so that information becomes available to all market participants at the same time. At these press conferences, market participants do not only pay attention to the content but also, as the above quotes illustrate, closely follow the *tone* of central bank statements.

This paper explores how the *tone* of CB press conference statements affects prices in equity, government bond, and other asset markets. To quantify CB tone, we employ standard techniques of textual analysis. First, we use the financial dictionary developed by [Loughran and McDonald \(2011\)](#) to identify *negative* words in a CB statement.² Second, we evaluate

¹For an overview of the literature on central bank communication see, e.g., [Woodford \(2005\)](#) and [Blinder et al. \(2008\)](#).

²This dictionary has already proven useful in different financial contexts (see the survey of [Loughran and](#)

the tone of the statement by assessing the prevalence of negative words in its text and construct a measure of tone such that higher values reflect a more positive tone of the CB and vice versa. By repeating this procedure and scoring each press conference statement individually, we construct a time-series of CB tone that we use to study if and how CB tone affects prices. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use such an objective and systematic approach to measure the *tone* of CB statements and its impact on financial markets.³

In our empirical analysis, we focus on press conferences held by the European Central Bank (ECB), because the ECB was the first CB to set up comprehensive press conferences directly after meetings of its Governing Council. These press conferences are broadcasted live and thus represent a source of real-time information for market participants.⁴ We evaluate the tone of the ECB president’s statement during these press conferences from January 1999 to October 2014. Given that ECB press conferences take place on Thursdays in the early afternoon (14:30 CET), any information revealed during the press conference can affect financial market prices directly on the same day. Our empirical results show that ECB tone indeed has a statistically and economically significant effect on equity and government bond prices on the day of the press conference and that this effect propagates beyond the release day through the cycle to the next ECB press conference.

Our first main result is that changes in ECB tone have a significant effect on stock prices on the day of the press conference (PC). When ECB tone becomes more positive compared to the previous PC, equity prices increase by about 25 basis points (bp) whereas

McDonald, 2016) but we are the first to apply it to central bank statements.

³Related papers typically aim at measuring the *content* rather than the *tone* of central bank communication, use textual analysis or narrative approaches that require double usage of data, and/or subjective judgements. For instance, Romer and Romer (2004) apply a narrative approach to central bank documents to identify monetary policy shocks. Rosa and Verga (2007) and Rosa (2011) construct a proxy for tone but use a narrative approach and self-defined dictionaries, which are subjective and relatively narrow in scope. Lucca and Trebbi (2009) analyze the content of FOMC statements by semantic orientation scores that are computed from a extremely large set of information obtained through search engines. Our approach exclusively focuses on the text of the CB statement itself and measures tone directly from this statement. We choose an off-the-shelf dictionary that we do not change in any way and use a simple tone metric to provide a transparent measure of tone in a real-time setting that avoids hindsight bias from using the data twice (e.g., for first constructing a dictionary or training an algorithm that is subsequently applied in the empirical analysis).

⁴We discuss these features and their usefulness for our empirical analysis in more detail in Section 2.1.

a more negative tone is associated with a return of -35 bp on that day. This differential of about 60 bp is statistically significant. We find very similar effects for a broad stock market index (MSCI EMU), an index of large stocks that can be traded via highly liquid futures contracts (Eurostoxx50), as well as value and growth stocks (MSCI value and growth indices for the Eurozone, respectively). With approximately twelve ECB press conferences per year, this tone-related return differential of 60 bp annualizes to around 7% in absolute value which seems economically large. Similarly, regression evidence suggests that a one-standard deviation shock to tone translates into an equity return of ± 30 bp on PC days, depending on whether ECB tone becomes more positive or negative.

Second, we show that the effect of tone on equity prices is not confined to PC days but persists beyond the day of the press conference. The PC-day return differential of around 60 bp increases to more than 100 bp over the cycle to the next press conference. This finding suggests that the effect of tone changes on equity prices is not quickly reversed after PC days but rather that the information conveyed by CB tone gradually diffuses into equity prices over time. More generally, we show that all of the cumulative equity return (for, e.g., the MSCI EMU) over our sample period is earned during periods when the most recent tone change was positive whereas cumulative returns are close to zero or negative after PCs with a negative tone change. These findings prevail even when removing PC-day effects and suggest that all of the equity premium is generated in times of positive ECB tone. Furthermore, we corroborate our results by documenting that tone changes have a very similar effect on all individual EMU countries' stock returns, which implies that our results for aggregate stock returns in the Eurozone are not driven by a few countries.

Our finding that stock returns are related to changes in central bank tone naturally raises the question *why* tone affects stock prices. Put differently, does central bank tone affect the cash flow or the discount rate component of stock prices? If tone matters because it affects the discount rate, is this effect driven by a link between tone and riskfree rates and/or by a link between tone and the risk premium? To answer these questions, we study the relation between ECB tone and interest rates, macroeconomic fundamentals, as well as asset prices that are particularly sensitive to changes in risk aversion such as credit spreads

and option-implied volatility.

First, we explore whether ECB tone matters for interest rates by examining the link between tone changes and the shape of the government bond yield curve. We show that more positive CB tone is associated with increasing yield levels on PC days as well as over PC cycles and that the hump in the yield curve becomes more pronounced until the next PC (because medium-term yields increase more than short- and long-term yields). In general, yields with shorter maturities are most sensitive to CB tone changes, which is consistent with the view that central banks control the short end of the yield curve. The nature of this link between tone and interest rates suggests that we can rule out an explanation in which more positive CB tone drives up stock prices via lowering yields. Instead, more positive tone drives up stock prices *and* government bond yields.

Another alternative potential explanation for why more positive central bank tone drives up equities could be that ECB tone simply aggregates information about economic fundamentals. Under this view, a more positive ECB tone indicates stronger economic growth and higher cash flows. However, we find that changes in ECB tone are largely unrelated to current and future real-time macro fundamentals and that there is no clear relation between CB tone and survey expectations about macroeconomic fundamentals. In sum, our results do not suggest that tone matters for equities because of a cash flow effect.

Since tone neither moves stock prices via its effect on riskfree interest rates nor because it forecasts economic growth, we next investigate whether our findings are consistent with a risk-based channel, as discussed in previous research that finds monetary policy (announcements) to affect risk premia embedded in market prices (see, e.g., [Shiller et al., 1983](#); [Hanson and Stein, 2014](#); [Morris and Shin, 2014](#); [Gertler and Karadi, 2015](#); [Hattori et al., 2015](#)). If a more positive tone drives down the risk aversion of market participants, one would expect to find the positive link between tone changes and, both, stock returns and bond yields documented in our empirical results. We provide support for such a risk-based channel by showing that corporate credit spreads, which are viewed as particularly sensitive to changes in risk aversion, decrease when tone becomes more positive. We provide further support for this view by examining the link between tone and the VSTOXX, which is commonly viewed

as a proxy for uncertainty and risk aversion (e.g., [Bekaert et al., 2013](#); [Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2014](#)).⁵ Following [Bekaert et al. \(2013\)](#), we decompose the VSTOXX into uncertainty and risk aversion and find a significantly negative relation between changes in ECB tone and changes in option-implied risk aversion: more positive tone is associated with lower risk aversion, and vice versa. These results support the idea that ECB tone moves asset prices through risk premia required by market participants.

Moreover, we also present evidence that central bank tone matters for asset prices in the U.S. While the Fed has introduced press conferences comparable to those of the ECB only recently (in April 2011), data on the Fed Chair’s Testimonies to the U.S. Congress is available from 1996. An interesting feature of these hearings is that the Fed Chair’s report on monetary policy does not coincide with actual monetary policy decisions (as is the case for ECB press conferences which take place after meetings of its Governing Council). Nonetheless, we find that the relation between U.S. asset prices and Fed tone at these hearings is qualitatively identical to the reaction of EMU market prices to changes in ECB tone at press conferences: a more positive central bank tone is associated with higher equity returns and higher bond yields compared to changes in asset prices when central bank tone becomes more negative. These results provide further evidence that central bank tone contains generic information for asset prices.

To corroborate our conclusions, we conduct various additional empirical exercises and robustness checks. For example, we provide evidence that ECB tone changes mostly do not reflect a response to recent economic and financial market developments. Our findings remain unchanged when controlling for actual changes in the stance of monetary policy or unconventional monetary policy announcements by the ECB. We also generate a time-series of central bank “tone shocks” and find that using these unexpected tone changes yields virtually the same results as using simple tone changes.

On a general level, our work relates to previous research that analyzes the effect of monetary policy on asset prices and risks (e.g., [Rigobon and Sack, 2004](#); [Bjornland and Leitemo, 2009](#); [Buraschi et al., 2014](#); [Campbell et al., 2015](#)). We also contribute to the literature

⁵The VSTOXX is an equity volatility index, computed from prices of options on the EuroStoxx50, similar to the VIX in the U.S.

that quantifies monetary policy shocks in terms of market prices (e.g., [Kohn and Sack, 2004](#); [Guerkaynak et al., 2005](#); [Brand et al., 2010](#); [Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011](#); [Hanson and Stein, 2014](#); [Chodorow-Reich, 2014](#)). In these papers, monetary policy shocks are measured as the price change of financial variables (e.g., bond yields) in a short window around a monetary policy announcement. Our results show that tone changes affect both the sign and size of monetary policy shocks measured in this way and are thus informative about the source of monetary policy shocks. Our paper also relates to studies that explore equity returns around policy meetings and over cycles between policy meetings (e.g. [Lucca and Moench, 2015](#); [Cieslak et al., 2016](#)).

Our contribution is to highlight that the *tone* with which a central bank chooses to communicate its monetary policy affects asset prices. To this end, our empirical results support the idea that the ECB can, at least to a certain extent, manage market expectations and risk appetite through central bank communication (e.g., [Woodford, 2005](#); [Blinder et al., 2008](#)) by signaling more optimism or pessimism (e.g., [Born et al., 2013](#)).

The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. Section [2](#) describes the setup of our empirical analysis and Section [3](#) details the data and presents descriptive statistics. Section [4](#) presents empirical results on the relation between central bank tone and equity returns, and Section [5](#) presents evidence on the channels through which tone affects asset prices. In section [6](#), we report corroborating results for U.S. markets. Section [7](#) concludes.

2. Empirical Setup

This section describes our empirical approach to measuring the effect of central bank tone on asset prices. We first discuss potential data sources for measuring CB tone. Next, we specify our approach to constructing a measure of CB tone based on press conference statements. Third, we describe the timing of returns and price changes to gauge the direct effect of CB tone on asset prices and the link between tone and future prices. Finally, we sketch the econometric setup for our analysis.

2.1. Discussion of potential data sources for measuring central bank tone

Our goal is to measure the impact of CB tone on asset prices. This requires the use of CB statements with a precise timing, i.e., it needs to be clear when these statements become publicly available to market participants. In this respect, press conferences by the European Central Bank (ECB) provide an ideal setup. Following the meetings of the Governing Council (which are scheduled well ahead of time), the ECB holds press conferences that begin with a statement by the president. This statement is drafted in advance and serves to inform the general public about the council's decisions, why these decisions have been made, how they have been reached, and a general outlook. With the press conferences taking place on Thursdays in the early afternoon at 2:30pm CET, any new information revealed during the press conference can affect financial market prices on the same day. ECB press conferences are broadcasted live, are thus available in real time to all market participants, and the ECB makes transcripts publicly available on its website.

Moreover, we focus on ECB press conferences because the ECB was the first central bank to establish live press conferences after meetings of its Governing Council and thus provides the longest time series of press conferences. By contrast, other central banks have only introduced similar live press conferences in recent years and a reliable empirical study is not feasible due to the low number of observations. For instance, the U.S. Fed held its first comparable press conference on April 27, 2011 and at the time of writing this paper only 14 press conferences have been held. Likewise, other central banks have introduced press conferences only recently and at lower frequency; for example, the Swiss National Bank has adopted a news conference setting in 2011 that takes place in July and December only.

Alternative sources of communication could be the minutes of CB meetings such as FOMC meetings or the Minutes of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy committee. However, these minutes are only available with a time lag and are edited transcripts of actual discussions at these meetings and therefore, by their nature, not designed as a device to directly communicate with market participants.⁶ Moreover, several CBs issue statements

⁶Besides, a substantial portion of the content refers to administrative aspects such as listing the names of participants in particular decisions which is not very informative.

about decisions (e.g. Fed statements released after FOMC meetings). Compared to the president’s statement at ECB press conferences, these are typically much shorter. As an example, the average number of words in FOMC statements since the 1990s is lower than that of the shortest ECB statement in our whole sample. Hence, the information contained in these statements seems rather limited.

For the U.S., a further source of information could be Testimonies to the U.S. Congress given by the Fed Chair. Transcripts for these testimonies are available from July 1996 onwards and, given that the Fed Chair typically testifies to Congress twice a year, this provides a series of 37 transcripts up to fall 2014 (the end of our sample period). Compared to ECB press conferences, these testimonies are available at a much lower frequency and the news component is likely to be smaller. Nonetheless, these speeches still seem interesting for the following reasons. First, similar to ECB press conferences, these speeches are scheduled in advance, available in real time, and are closely followed by financial markets. Second, different from ECB press conferences, these speeches do not concur with FOMC meetings and thus allow us to measure the effect of tone on asset prices without potentially confounding effects from actual decisions. For these reasons, we also examine the link between Fed testimony tone and asset prices in the U.S. in Section 6.

2.2. Measuring the tone of central bank statements

To quantitatively measure CB tone, we prepare the transcripts of ECB press conferences for the subsequent textual analysis as follows: we (i) convert all words to lower case, (ii) remove numbers, (iii) remove punctuation, (iv) remove English stop words (e.g., for, very, and, of, are, etc.), and (v) strip whitespace as is common in the textual analysis literature. After preparing the text files, we construct a proxy for CB tone using the financial dictionary developed by Loughran and McDonald (2011). More specifically, we use this dictionary to identify words that can be classified as *negative* in financial contexts.⁷ We then count the number of negative words in each transcript and compute the ratio of the number of negative

⁷We only use negative words because the usefulness of positive words for measuring tone is very limited, as discussed by Loughran and McDonald (2011) and also noted by others before. The main reason is that positive words are frequently negated. By contrast, negation of negative words is far less common.

words (N) to the total number of words (T), N/T . We define CB tone (τ) as

$$\tau = 1 - N/T \quad (1)$$

such that lower values reflect more negative CB tone and higher values imply a more positive (i.e., less negative) tone. In our empirical analysis, we focus on *changes in tone*, $\Delta\tau$, measured as the first difference in τ between two subsequent press conference. Accordingly, we interpret increases in τ as tone becoming more positive and decreases in τ as tone becoming more negative.⁸

A few words on this procedure are in order. Our choice of scoring the tone of CB statements based on the Loughran and McDonald (2011, LM) dictionary is driven mainly by two considerations. First, we want to rely on a dictionary to classify words as being negative that is based on prior work and *not* on our own choice of words being negative or not. An alternative would be to build our own dictionary of CB language, either based on just selecting words as being negative based on common sense or based on some statistical procedure where certain words are classified as being negative based on the market’s reaction to the occurrence of these words. However, (subjectively) defining a list of negative words ourselves would essentially mean that we have control over the resulting time series of tone and, thus, the outcome of our empirical analysis later in the paper. Using a statistical procedure to generate a negative word list would require us to use the same data twice, first to build the dictionary and, subsequently, to analyze the effect of tone on asset prices, thereby leading to a hindsight bias. To avoid such a double usage of the data, we could split the sample into a training and a test sample but that would significantly reduce the sample period that we can cover in our empirical analysis. Employing the LM dictionary alleviates these concerns as we are not using the same data twice and because we have no control over the (exogenous) list of negative words.

Second, the LM dictionary is explicitly designed to be informative for financial documents, in contrast to, e.g., the widely used Harvard Dictionary. The LM dictionary was

⁸Similarly, we may use expressions like “improving tone” or “ameliorating tone” to refer to $\Delta\tau > 0$ and “worsening tone”, “deteriorating tone”, etc. when $\Delta\tau < 0$.

originally designed for 10-K filings but has proven useful in other financial contexts as well (see, e.g., [Gurun and Butler, 2012](#); [Hillert et al., 2014](#), for recent papers) and the survey of [Loughran and McDonald \(2016\)](#) more generally. It seems likely, however, that central bank language differs from the typical language used in 10-K filings to a certain extent. Such misclassification should work against us in our empirical analyses, though, and raise the hurdle to find a link between tone and asset prices.

Finally, we choose to measure tone by means of simple words counts rather than more elaborate approaches such as term weighting or topic modelling, because the latter would require to look ahead through all documents before starting the actual empirical analysis which would again imply a hindsight bias. Hence, to avoid all these potential biases, we choose simplicity and transparency over more elaborate alternatives.⁹

2.3. Identification and timing of returns

In our empirical analysis, we explore how changes in CB tone affect market prices of financial assets. We now discuss how previous research on monetary policy shocks guides our identification strategy to gauge the immediacy and persistence of CB tone-related effects on asset prices.

A standard approach to measuring monetary policy shocks is to compute asset price changes around monetary policy meetings (see, e.g., [Guerkaynak et al., 2005](#); [Hanson and Stein, 2014](#), among others). The key idea is that any price reaction in a short time window is likely to be caused by information about (unexpected) changes in monetary policy and that this information swamps other information about returns. We rely on this idea when we compute *PC-day price changes* to measure the immediate effect of CB tone on asset prices. Furthermore, we compute changes in asset prices beyond the PC date to assess whether CB tone has a persistent effect on asset prices. In other words, we analyse whether information

⁹For the same reason, we do not make use of human scoring techniques, i.e. ask human readers to evaluate central bank statements. For instance, while a potential advantage of that approach may be that human readers are better in processing certain nuances of texts, a disadvantage is that human judgement cannot be avoided in the scoring process, thereby neither guaranteeing an avoidance of misclassification nor ‘reader-fixed effects’ in tone measures (e.g., [Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007](#)). Moreover, it would be difficult to set up a generic out-of-sample analysis of how central bank tone matters for asset prices, as multiple readers would have to be trained on a large body of statements.

conveyed through CB tone is absorbed by asset prices immediately or whether information diffuses gradually. Longer-term price changes exclusive of PC-day effects will be informative in this respect and also alleviate potential concerns about reverse causality. Below, we define how we measure price changes, specifically their time dimension, to gauge the immediacy and durability of tone-related effects on asset prices. Figure IA.1 in the Internet Appendix illustrates the timing convention for *PC-day returns* and *PC-cycle returns*.

PC-day returns. To explore the contemporaneous effect of CB tone on stock and bond markets on a particular PC day t , we compute the one-day equity returns and yield changes using the closing prices of the day preceding PC_t and the day on which PC_t takes place. We denote these *PC-day returns* by r_t .

Returns beyond PC days. To gauge the tone-asset price relation beyond the PC day, we also compute cumulative returns over k days (starting with the PC day) and denote them by $r_{t,k}$. For $k = 0$, $r_{t,0}$ just corresponds to the PC-day return r_t and for $k = 10$, for instance, $r_{t,10}$ specifies cumulative equity returns and yield changes from the day preceding PC_t up to ten trading days after PC_t (i.e. a total of 11 trading days).

PC-cycle returns. When we are interested in returns over the full PC cycle, i.e., returns from PC_t to PC_{t+1} , we use the closing prices of the day preceding PC_t and the day preceding PC_{t+1} . We thereby capture the whole period from one PC up to the next PC but exclude information only revealed at the day of the next PC. We denote these *PC-cycle returns* by $r_{t,t+1}$. Additionally, we compute returns over PC cycles excluding the PC-day itself. We measure returns from the closing prices of the day on which PC_t takes place to the day preceding PC_{t+1} and denote these returns by $r_{t,t+1}^{exPC_t}$. Given that $r_{t,t+1}^{exPC_t}$ only reflects the information content of CB-tone for non-PC days, this measure is more akin to an out-of-sample perspective and alleviates potential concerns about reverse causality.

2.4. Econometric setup

Before exploring the asset price effect of CB tone, we check more generally whether changes in asset prices are systematically different on days when press conferences take place relative to other days in our sample. We use the following dummy regression setup for daily price changes r_s ,

$$r_s = b^{noPC} \times D_s^{noPC} + b^{PC} \times D_s^{PC} + u_s, \quad (2)$$

where $D_s^{PC} = 1$ ($D_s^{noPC} = 0$) on days when a press conference takes place and $D_s^{PC} = 0$ ($D_s^{noPC} = 1$) otherwise. The coefficient-estimates for b^{noPC} and b^{PC} correspond to the mean price changes on non-PC and PC days, respectively. This setup allows to use standard t - and F -tests to assess whether coefficients are significantly different from zero and significantly different from each other, i.e. to check for a *PC-day effect*.¹⁰

To evaluate the effect of CB tone on asset prices, we run regressions of r_i on measures of tone changes, where r_i represents either an equity return or yield (factor) change with i specifying the timing convention discussed above, $r_i \in \{r_t, r_{t,k}, r_{t,t+1}, r_{t,t+1}^{exPCt}\}$. To compare mean returns on PC days when CB tone becomes more positive (indicated by $\Delta\tau > 0$) to returns when tone becomes more negative ($\Delta\tau < 0$), we run the dummy regression

$$r_i = b^{\Delta\tau>0} \times D_t^{\Delta\tau>0} + b^{\Delta\tau<0} \times D_t^{\Delta\tau<0} + u_i \quad (3)$$

and test for the significance of differences in asset price changes conditional on improving or deteriorating CB tone. As a related exercise, we regress r_i on the *sign of tone changes*,

$$r_i = a + b \times \text{sign}[\Delta\tau_{t-1,t}] + u_t. \quad (4)$$

to test for a general effect of more positive or negative tone on asset prices. Finally, to assess whether the magnitude of the tone change matters for asset prices beyond its sign, we regress

¹⁰A recent literature shows that FOMC meetings in the U.S. have a strong effect on U.S. stock returns at the day of the meeting (Lucca and Moench, 2015) and even weeks after a meeting (Cieslak et al., 2016).

returns on tone changes,

$$r_i = a + b \times \Delta\tau_{t-1,t} + u_t. \quad (5)$$

Following this setup, we present empirical results for the relation of changes in CB tone to returns in equity markets and changes in government yield curves using the data described in the next section.

3. Data and Descriptive Statistics

In this section, we describe the data that we use in our empirical analysis to gauge the relation between central bank tone and asset prices. We first present descriptive statistics for CB tone and then move on to describe the asset price data used in our empirical analysis.

3.1. ECB press conferences: Descriptive statistics

The ECB makes transcripts of its press conferences publicly available on its website.¹¹ We obtain these transcripts, starting with the introduction of the Euro, for a total of 185 press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. From these transcripts, we extract the opening statement of the ECB president and process the text as described in Section 2.2.

Table I presents some descriptives statistics, first showing that ECB press conferences take place regularly but not at equidistant intervals. The average PC cycle is around 22 trading days, with the range spanning 10 to 50 days for the shortest and longest intervals, respectively. The second column summarizes statistics for the ratio of the number of negative words to the number of total words (N/T), which we use to compute the tone measure defined in Equation (1). On average, the ratio of negative to total words is around 2.7% but it is associated with substantial variability within the range of 0.4% and 5.7%. The third column presents the properties of tone changes, $\Delta\tau$, measured as difference in tone between two subsequent PCs in percentage points. Tone changes are close to zero on average and at the

¹¹See, for instance, the following link for transcripts of all ECB press conferences held in 2014: [ECB Press Conferences in 2014](#).

median but show substantial variation in the range from -2.4% to +2% points and exhibit significant first-order autocorrelation over our sample period. Of the 184 ECB tone changes in our sample, we find that tone increases at 100 press conferences and deteriorates in 84 cases.

Figure 1 plots the time series of ECB tone, τ , and changes in ECB tone, $\Delta\tau$. The grey vertical lines mark the dates of the ECB press conferences. Panel (a) shows that ECB tone reaches its minimum at the end of 2008/beginning of 2009 during the financial crisis and Panel (b) illustrates the volatility of tone changes over time.

An interesting exercise is to take a closer look at the words that drive our measure of tone and Table II provides some insights in this respect. First, we present a list of the 20 negative words (as classified by Loughran and McDonald, 2011) with the highest number of occurrences across all ECB press conference statements and find that the most frequently used negative word-stems are “weak”, “decline”, and “imbalances”.¹² To see whether certain negative words are recurrently used in specific contexts, we also present frequency counts for bigrams and trigrams (i.e. sequences of two and three adjacent words). While, for instance, the general notion of “global imbalances” seems to be a recurring theme, the much lower frequency counts for bi- and trigrams suggest that our measure of ECB tone captures how the ECB interprets and judges developments rather than hard facts associated with specific monetary policy, financial market, or macroeconomic topics. We provide more evidence in this respect in Section 5 where we show that our measure of CB tone is not related to macroeconomic fundamentals.

3.2. Asset price data

This section summarizes the data on equity prices and government bonds that we use in our core empirical analysis. Other financial market variables and macroeconomic data used for supplementary analyses are introduced in the corresponding Sections along with the results. The Internet Appendix provides details about the sources and corresponding identifiers for

¹²These counts are based on aggregating words by their word-stem; for example, the 361 occurrences we summarize for “weak” are the sum of occurrences for “weak” (166), “weaken” (6), “weakened” (18), “weakening” (47), “weaker” (78), “weakness” (44), and “weaknesses” (2).

all data (see Section [IA.A](#)).

Equities. We obtain daily data on equity indexes for the sample period covered by ECB press conferences, that is from January 1999 to October 2014. To explore the overall effect on EMU equity markets, we use the EuroStoxx 50 index (denoted “ESX50”) which contains the 50 largest firms from the Eurozone.¹³ We also use data on the MSCI EMU index (denoted “MSCI”) that includes all countries that have adopted the Euro, accounting for the evolving membership of countries. The MSCI index has a broader coverage than the ESX50 and also includes smaller firms. Additionally, we use the MSCI sub-indices that specifically cover value- and growth stocks in the Eurozone, MSCI EMU Value (denoted “Value”) and MSCI EMU Growth (denoted “Growth”). For our analysis on the individual country level, we include all EMU-members that have been covered by MSCI country indexes throughout our sample period: with the exception of Luxembourg, this includes the other ten of the eleven original member states: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. In our benchmark empirical analyses, we will look at simple stock returns (based on total return indices) and not excess returns since we do not want to confound the effect of tone on returns and yields. We provide robustness on this in Section [5.4](#) where we also report results for excess returns and find that our results are robust.

Term structure of government bond yields. To explore the effect of ECB tone on government bond markets we use the term structure of German yields (available from the Bundesbank) which is available over our full sample period. European yield data are available from the ECB but cover a substantially shorter sample from 2004 to 2014. However, the German yield curve is highly correlated with the ECB AAA yield curve over the period September 2004 to October 2014 where both data sets are available, providing virtually identically results in our empirical analysis for the period of joint coverage. The high cor-

¹³Furthermore, there is a liquid market for options on the ESX50 and the VSTOXX, a volatility index constructed from ESX50 options. The VSTOXX is a common measure of Eurozone option-implied stock volatility (see, e.g., [Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2014](#)).

relation reflects the fact that Germany is the largest EMU member state, subject to comparably very low sovereign risk, and is typically perceived as the engine of the EMU economy. As a consequence, German yields are viewed as a benchmark against which other EMU government yield curves are referenced. This line of reasoning follows that of earlier research that attributes a lead role to Germany, some already even prior to the introduction of the Euro during the existence of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM); see e.g. [di Giovanni et al. \(2009\)](#) and the references therein. We therefore use daily data of German government bond yields with maturities ranging from one to 20 years provided by Deutsche Bundesbank from January 1999 to October 2014.

4. ECB Tone and Equity Returns

In this section, we document a strong link between Eurozone stock prices and the *tone* of ECB press conference statements. A more positive (negative) tone compared to the previous press conference is associated with positive (negative) equity returns on the day of the press conference. These effects persist and strengthen over the cycle to the next conference and also hold for individual Euro-country equity markets.

4.1. Do ECB press conferences move equity markets?

As discussed above, ECB press conferences take place on Thursdays in the early afternoon (14:30 CET) so that any new information revealed during the press conference can affect equity prices on the same day. To assess whether ECB tone does affect stock prices, we first look at PC-day equity returns, i.e., the return from the trading close of the preceding day to the trading close of the press conference day. Figure 2 previews our main findings. Panel (a) shows that stock returns are close to zero across all PC days, i.e., there is no general PC-day effect akin to the FOMC effect documented by [Lucca and Moench \(2015\)](#).¹⁴ At the same time, we find that returns on all four indices are negative on PC days when ECB tone

¹⁴More generally, [Savor and Wilson \(2013, 2014\)](#) show that asset prices (stocks, bonds, currencies) behave very differently on days with scheduled U.S. macro news announcements and that risky assets earn higher returns on announcement days.

becomes more negative compared to the previous PC (Panel b) and positive on PC days when tone becomes more positive (Panel c). The differential in average returns on PC days with positive and negative tone changes suggests that ECB tone affects stock markets and that this effect is very similar for large stocks (ESX50), all stocks (MSCI), as well as value and growth stocks.

Table III presents detailed regression results on the relation between tone changes and stock returns. We start by comparing equity market returns on PC days versus non-PC days, and Panel A shows that average ESX50 returns on non-PC and PC days are 1 bp (basis point) and -3 bp, respectively. Neither of these returns is statistically different from zero, and standard tests show that equity returns on PC compared to non-PC days are also not significantly different from each other. The same finding obtains for the MSCI index and value and growth stocks. Hence, stock returns are not unusually high or low on PC days (unlike the results for the U.S., see e.g. Lucca and Moench, 2015).

Instead, the return plots presented above suggest that stock returns on PC days are very different depending on whether the tone of the ECB becomes more positive or negative. Panel B of Table III shows that these large return differentials are significantly different from zero based on a standard F -test. On PC days with more positive tone, equity returns range from $+19$ bp (value stocks) to 26 bp (ESX50 and growth stocks) whereas a more negative tone is associated with equity returns of -38 bp (ESX50) to -35 bp (growth). These differences of around 60 bp are statistically significant and sizeable from an economic point of view: In a year with twelve press conferences, an average PC-day difference of 60 bp annualizes to about 7% p.a. which is of the order of the equity premium.

To evaluate the impact of positive versus negative tone changes on equity returns in more depth, we run sign regressions as specified in Equation (4), and present the results in Panel C. The estimates of the intercept a are not different from zero, confirming that there is no pure PC day-effect. The estimates of b are significantly positive and suggest that stock returns are about 30 bp higher or lower depending on whether tone becomes more positive or more negative, respectively. The R^2 s are in the range of 3% to 4% and suggest sizeable explanatory power of ECB tone changes for the daily equity returns around press

conferences. To take the magnitude of tone changes into account, we regress equity returns on tone changes, see the specification in Equation (5), and report very similar results in Panel D. To give an economic interpretation to the estimated b -coefficients, recall that the standard deviation of tone changes is around 0.80 (see Table I). Hence, a one-sigma increase in tone translates into an ESX50 return of around 30 bp.

Given these results, it seems safe to conclude that changes in tone move equity markets. A natural next step is to investigate whether this effect is confined to PC days or whether it persists beyond to see how quickly tone changes are incorporated into prices.

4.2. Equity returns over ECB press conference cycles

As a first step in our analysis of tone changes and equity returns beyond PC days, we plot average cumulative k -day returns (defined as $r_{t,k}$ in Section 2.3) conditional on the last tone change being positive or negative in Figure 3. Panel (a) shows that the initial tone-related return differential (corresponding to $k=0$) persists beyond the PC day and widens over the next 15 trading days. Panel (b) of Figure 3 underpins the statistical significance of the relation between ECB tone changes and subsequent equity returns by presenting slope coefficients from regressions of cumulative k -day returns on preceding tone changes, along with 90% confidence bands. These plots confirm that the ECB tone-stock return link persists and strengthens over time. A one-sigma change in tone is associated with a stock return of more than 1% within the next three trading weeks, thereby suggesting that ECB tone conveys information to markets that is relevant beyond the PC day itself. This finding also makes it unlikely that the results for PC days documented above are due to simple short-term (liquidity) effects which would be associated with a reversion in equity prices and not a drift in the same direction.

To assess the link between tone changes and subsequent equity returns over full PC cycles, we regress the PC-to-PC equity returns (the “PC-cycle return” denoted by $r_{t,t+1}$ in Section 2.3) on tone changes. More precisely, for press conferences taking place at times t and $t + 1$, we compute the return from the closing price on the day before PC_t to the closing price on the day before PC_{t+1} . These returns capture the market impact of PC_t but

exclude the impact of PC_{t+1} . The regression results in Panel A of Table IV show that slope coefficients for tone changes are all significantly positive and that R^2 s are around 3%–3.5%. The estimated b s imply that a one-sigma tone change translates into an average PC-cycle return of about ± 100 basis points.

We repeat this PC-cycle exercise but now exclude the PC_t day return itself, by computing the return from the close on the day at which PC_t takes place to the close price on the day prior to PC_{t+1} , denoted by $r_{t,t+1}^{exPC}$ in Section 2.3. By excluding the direct impact of the PC day, we can test whether returns are significantly related to tone changes after the PC day as well, i.e. when the contemporaneous correlation between tone changes and PC-day returns is removed. The results in Panel B of Table IV suggest that the estimates of b remain significant, albeit at a lower level, and this similarly applies to the regression R^2 s. Overall, these results corroborate that tone changes have a lasting effect on equity prices and have predictive ability for stock returns throughout PC cycles, even when excluding the PC day effect itself. In other words, CB tone conveys information that is gradually incorporated into prices over the cycle to the next press conference.

Dissecting stock returns. To better understand the economic significance of our results, we dissect cumulative equity returns based on regimes with positive and negative tone changes. The first row in Panel C of Table IV presents cumulative returns over all 4,076 trading days in our sample as the arithmetic sum of daily returns (“simple”) as well as cumulative geometric returns to account for compounding effects (“comp.”). For the four equity indices used in our analysis, cumulative simple and compound returns in EMU equity markets are in the range of 28.37% to 52.99% and -10.94% to 10.44% , respectively. Next, we dissect the sample into the 2,264 days for which the most recent ECB tone change was positive and the 1,812 days for which the most recent tone change was negative. The results show that cumulative simple (compound) stock returns are in the range of 55.70% to 89.72% (43.00% to 92.41%) when the most recent tone change was positive whereas cumulative stock returns are in the range of -36.73% to -27.33% (-42.71% to -35.42%) when the most recent tone change was negative. These results demonstrate that EMU equity markets

earn all of their cumulative returns during times associated with more optimistic ECB tone and that stock prices fall during periods following ECB press conferences with deteriorating tone.

Panel D reports the results of repeating this exercise in a generic out-of-sample setup by excluding returns of all PC days. These results confirm the strikingly distinct performance of EMU equity markets conditional on preceding ECB tone changes.

On the whole, our results suggest that changes in CB tone have a strong effect on equity returns over PC cycles, beyond returns generated on PC days. More generally, throughout our sample period, we find that all of the cumulative stock market performance is earned after positive ECB tone changes whereas negative tone changes are followed by negative (or zero) returns on average.

4.3. Individual country equity returns

We now turn to individual EMU member country stock markets and examine all countries for which MSCI provides coverage of comparable country indexes for the full sample period. Our sample of MSCI country indices contains 10 of the 11 original EMU member countries (all except Luxembourg) and we find that results are very similar across all countries. Figure 4 shows that average PC day returns are relatively small (i.e., there is no PC-day effect) but that PC-day returns are significantly different on days with more positive compared to more negative ECB tone. Panels A and B of Table V show that these findings are statistically significant, except for Austria where the PC day differential of about 35 bp is associated with a p -value of 0.12. Panel C reports results for regressions of stock returns on tone changes on PC days and we find that the estimated slope coefficients are all positive and range from 0.24 (Ireland) to 0.70 (Finland). R^2 s range from 1.08% (Ireland) to 4.19% (Finland). Overall, the estimated slope coefficients and R^2 s are close to the values we found for the aggregate European stock market indexes above. Finally, Panel D reports results for regressions of returns on tone changes over the full PC cycle and shows that the link between tone changes and stock returns is not limited to the PC day itself but extends to the days

after a press conference.

Overall, our results show that ECB tone conveys information for stock returns in the EMU as a whole but also for individual EMU-member stock markets. This also suggests that tone might be a driver of EMU stock market co-movement.

4.4. Controlling for predictability of tone and monetary policy shocks

Before exploring the channels through which central bank tone matters for equity prices in the next section, we provide evidence that changes in tone contain information for stock markets beyond a standard measure of monetary policy shocks and after controlling for predictability of tone itself. More specifically, we run augmented PC-day and PC-cycle regressions for ESX50 returns (r_i) based on the specification

$$r_{i,t} = a + b_1 \Delta \tau_{t-1,t} + b_2 \Delta \tau_{t-2,t-1} + \gamma \Delta i_t^{1y} + u_t,$$

where $\Delta \tau_{t-1,t}$ denotes the change in tone from the previous press conferences (as in the above specifications), $\Delta \tau_{t-2,t-1}$ is the lagged tone change, and Δi_t^{1y} is the change in the 1-year yield of (German) government bonds.¹⁵ We add lagged tone changes to control for the negative autocorrelation in $\Delta \tau$ reported in Table I so that the coefficient b_1 more closely measures the effect of tone surprises. By adding Δi_t^{1y} to the regression to control for monetary policy shocks, we follow previous research that defines monetary policy shocks as changes in short-term government bond yields around policy meetings.

Table VI reports the results for the PC-day and PC-cycle regressions in the left and right part of the Table, respectively. Specification (i) corresponds to ESX50 tone regressions reported in Tables III and IV. In specification (ii), we add lagged tone changes and find that accounting for the serial correlation in tone changes does not overturn our finding that CB tone matters for stock prices on PC days and over PC cycles. Since estimates of b_1 remain virtually unchanged compared to specification (i), these results suggest that unexpected tone shocks matter for stock prices, rather than the predictable component of tone changes.

¹⁵Using MSCI returns instead of ESX50 returns does not change the findings reported below.

Finally, specification (iii) shows that additionally controlling for monetary policy shocks (through Δi_t^{1y}) has only a small impact on estimates of b_1 and does not render tone shocks insignificant. Since we also find that estimates of γ are significantly different from zero and that adding Δi_t^{1y} approximately doubles the R-squared, these results suggest that equity-relevant information conveyed by tone changes is different from that captured by monetary policy shocks.

On the whole, all our empirical findings so far provide strong evidence that ECB tone contains price-relevant information for EMU equity markets. In the next section, we discuss the potential channels through which central bank tone may matter for stock prices.

5. Why does central bank tone matter for asset prices?

Our results above suggest that there is a significant link between changes in central bank tone and stock returns. In this section, we explore possible channels through which tone might affect equity prices by studying the relation of tone changes to prices of other financial assets and to macroeconomic fundamentals. Based on our findings that tone matters for the government yield curve, credit spreads, and equity (option-implied) market volatility but is unrelated to macro fundamentals, we conclude that central bank tone affects asset prices through a risk-taking channel.

5.1. Central bank tone and the term structure of government yields

One channel through which tone changes could affect equity markets is that CBs use communication to actively manage the market's expectation about future interest rates and that equity prices simply react to changing (expectations about) interest rates via discount rates. Hence, we now examine the link between tone and Eurozone government bond markets, using the term structure of German yields for maturities of one to 20 years provided by Deutsche Bundesbank as proxy for the EMU term structure of yields. We find that tone matters for the shape of the yield curve on PC days and over PC cycles, generally leading to an increase (decrease) in yield levels and curvature if tone becomes more positive (more negative). These

findings are in line with the notion that CB communication aims for managing interest rate expectations but also suggest that the link between tone and equity prices uncovered above is unlikely to be due to a simple discount rate effect as more positive tone is associated with higher equity prices *and* higher yields.

Yield curve changes on press conference days We present results for each of the twenty individual yields as well as for a parsimonious three factor characterization of the yield curve by its level, slope, and curvature that we estimate by a principal components analysis (see [Litterman and Scheinkman, 1991](#)). The level factor captures the average level of yields, slope captures the difference between long and short maturity yields, and curvature captures the difference between long and short maturities relative to medium-term maturities (i.e., the curvature factor is low when the yield curve is hump-shaped).

We start by comparing PC days to non-PC days. In contrast to equity markets, we find that there is a pronounced PC day-effect for bond yields (see Panel A in [Figure 5](#)): Unconditional yield changes on non-PC days are negative, small in magnitude, and very similar across maturities, which just reflects generally decreasing interest rates over our sample period. By contrast, on PC days, all yields increase and more so for longer as compared to shorter maturities. One interpretation of this slope effect with the full yield curve shifting upwards may be that markets generally expect more easing before the PC compared to the actual outcome at the Governor Council’s meeting such that yields tended to increase after the PC statement. Panel A of [Table VII](#) confirms the significant increase in the level and in the slope of the yield curve compared on PC compared to non-PC days.

When we separate PC days with positive and negative tone changes, we see a similar slope effect for both, but the level of yield changes is significantly different across all maturities (Panel (b) in [Figure 5](#)): when ECB tone becomes more positive, all yields increase and more so for longer maturities. When ECB tone becomes more negative, yields of shorter maturities decrease whereas yields of longer maturities increase on average. Panel B of [Table VII](#) shows that, as a consequence, the level of yields significantly increases on PC days with positive tone changes but is not affected when tone becomes more negative, which results in

a significant difference. The slope effect is also only significant for positive tone changes but the difference compared to negative tone changes is not significant.

Regressing yield (factor) changes on the signs of tone changes (Panel (c) in Figure 5 and Panel C in Table VII), shows that the sign of tone changes affects yield across all maturities. In regressions using the yield factors, the slope coefficient is significant for yield level (with an R^2 of 4.59%) but not for slope and curvature. Moreover, the PC day-effects (independent of the signs of tone changes) manifest themselves through significant estimates of the intercepts a for the yield curve’s level and slope. When taking the magnitude of tone changes into account by regressing yield (factor) changes on tone changes, ECB tone does not appear to matter much beyond PC-day effects captured by the intercepts a (Panel D in Table VII). Taking a look at Panel (d) in Figure 5, however, reveals that changes in yields with maturities of up to three years are significantly related to changes in ECB tone, which is consistent with the view that central banks control the short end of the yield curve (Blinder et al., 2008).

Yield curves over press conference cycles Moving from PC days to PC cycles, we find an even stronger relation between bond yields and ECB tone changes. However, the nature of this relationship is quite different from the one discussed above for PC days. So far, we have documented that tone changes on the PC day almost exclusively matter for the level of the yield curve. Over the full PC cycle, however, we find that tone changes are related to both the level and curvature. Panel (a) in Figure 6 shows that PCs with a more negative tone are followed by a drop in the yield level and a pronounced inverted hump around shorter to medium-term maturities. The opposite pattern obtains for positive tone changes. Panel A in Table VIII shows that these tone-related differences in curvature are highly significant.

When we run regressions of yield (factor) changes on changes in ECB tone, we find that the relation becomes stronger over PC cycles as compared to PC days. Panel (b) in Figure 6 shows that term structure of b -estimates exhibits a hump-shape as well and that coefficients are significantly different from zero for yield maturities up to seven years. The corresponding results in Panel B of Table VIII show that the effect of tone on level and curvature is highly

significant with R^2 s of 2.17% and 6.04%, respectively. Thus, more positive CB tone is associated with a higher level and a more pronounced hump (i.e., more negative curvature) of the yield curve over the PC cycle.

Overall, our results indicate that CB tone changes matter for the level of yields on PC days and for the level and curvature of the yield curve over PC cycles. These results are largely consistent with our results for equities above. A more positive tone drives up both yields and equity prices and can thus be viewed as signalling “better times” for the economy. Moreover our findings appear consistent with the notion that changes in curvature reflect expected changes in risk premia (e.g., [Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2008](#)). We provide more evidence for such a risk-based channel below.

The results reported above show that our measure of central bank tone τ contains information for stock prices and government bond yield curves. While we have already provided some evidence that τ does not seem to be driven by specific contextual statements, we now provide further evidence indicating that τ contains generic information for asset prices that is not subsumed by macroeconomic or financial market variables. These results suggest that τ does not simply reflect an aggregation of macro fundamentals and that the extent to which tone changes may be driven by the ECB reacting to market conditions is limited. Instead, we provide evidence that the effect of tone changes on asset prices is consistent with a risk-taking channel of monetary policy.

5.2. Real-time economic activity, growth, and sentiment

A plausible mechanism for central bank tone to affect asset prices could be that it conveys information about economic fundamentals. In other words, the central bank may act as an aggregator of news about macroeconomic activity and our tone measure may be driven by the central bank’s view on the state of the business cycle. Such a channel would be consistent with our finding that more positive tone is associated with increases in equity prices as well as in government bond yields.

[Beber et al. \(2015\)](#) construct macroeconomic indices that track the state of the economy along different dimensions in *real-time*. Specifically, they provide real-time measures for eco-

economic activity (“Econ”), economic growth (“Growth”), and economic sentiment (“Sent”).¹⁶ To explore whether there is a macro-channel that links central bank tone and asset prices, we regress changes in the real-time economic on contemporaneous and lagged changes in ECB tone. Panel A of Table IX shows that changes in the real-time economic indices over a PC cycle are neither related to contemporaneous tone changes (left) nor can they be predicted by tone changes over the previous cycle (right). None of the slope coefficients is significantly different from zero and R^2 s are very low. Panel B reports qualitatively similar results when we investigate whether tone changes predict future changes in real-time macro activity, growth or sentiment over (fixed) horizons ranging from 5 to 250 days. Finding that tone changes are virtually unrelated to current and future macroeconomic conditions, it seems unlikely that central bank tone matters for stock prices and government yields through a macro-information channel. These findings also support our interpretation of Table II (see Section 3.1) that tone changes are not driven by ‘hard information’. In the same vein, we provide additional evidence that there is only a weak relation between ECB tone and survey expectations of macroeconomic fundamentals (see Section 5.4 below).

5.3. A risk-based channel?

Our empirical results so far show that tone changes are largely unrelated to economic fundamentals and that positive tone changes are associated with increases in stock prices and bond yields. These findings rule out a channel where stock prices increase because a more positive tone is associated with lower interest rates or higher growth expectations. Below, we provide evidence that our results are in line with a channel where tone affects risk premia embedded in market prices (see, e.g., Shiller et al., 1983; Hanson and Stein, 2014; Morris and Shin, 2014; Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Hattori et al., 2015).

If central bank tone affects asset prices through a risk-based channel, we should find that tone changes specifically matter for assets that are particularly sensitive to changes in risk aversion. Based on this rationale, we investigate the link between central bank tone and

¹⁶We are grateful to the authors for providing us with their data on real-time indices for the Euro area. For details on the construction of the indices see Beber et al. (2015). The general idea is to apply a principal components analysis to macro news surprises; the sentiment index is based on survey expectations.

corporate credit spreads, measured as the yield differential of BBB-rated and AAA-rated bonds; this yield spread directly measures the compensation for risk that investors demand for holding bonds with low compared to high credit quality.

Figure 7 shows that changes in credit spreads are inversely related to tone changes, i.e., that the BBB-AAA-spread decreases (increases) when central bank tone becomes more positive (negative). The credit spread differential accumulating over the 15 days after the latest press conference is approximately 10 basis points (Panel a) and the regression results (Panel b) suggest that the link between credit spread and tone changes is statistically significant. These findings are consistent with the view that central bank tone affects asset prices through a risk-based channel.

Next, we explore how changes in CB tone affect stock market volatility implied by equity options, akin to previous papers showing that option-implied volatility is linked to monetary policy (see, e.g., [Bekaert et al., 2013](#); [Hattori et al., 2015](#)). We measure market-implied expected volatility from the VSTOXX, a volatility index constructed from ESX50 options, which has become a benchmark measure for Eurozone equity market volatility (similar to the VIX for the U.S.). First, we use the VSTOXX sub-indices for eight maturities ranging from one month to two years to illustrate the relation between ECB tone and market-implied volatility. Figure 8 presents results from regressing changes in implied volatility at different horizons on changes in ECB tone. We find that all slope coefficients are negative, with results becoming statistically more significant for options with longer maturities, both, for volatility changes on PC days as well as over PC cycles. From an economic perspective, our findings suggest that more positive (negative) tone is associated with decreasing (increasing) volatility expectations, consistent with the notion the changes in tone affect the risk-appetite of market participants.

To provide more explicit evidence for this notion, we follow [Bekaert et al. \(2013\)](#) and decompose the VSTOXX into proxies for *uncertainty* and *risk aversion*. We estimate *uncertainty* as the conditional stock market variance, obtained from regressing realized variance ($RVAR$) on lagged VSTOXX² and lagged realized variance. The proxy for *risk aversion* is the regression-implied variance risk premium. More specifically, we implement the approach

of [Bekaert et al. \(2013\)](#), see Equation (1) in their article) by running a regression on daily data and obtain

$$RVAR_{t,t+22d} = 0.0003 + 0.6318 \cdot VSTOXX_t^2 + 0.1643 \cdot RVAR_{t-22d,t} + e_t.$$

The fitted values from this regression ($\widehat{RVAR}_t$) provide us with a time series of conditional variance, which serves as our measure of uncertainty.¹⁷ The variance risk premium implied by this regression, i.e. the difference in $\mathbb{Q}$ - and $\mathbb{P}$ -measure expected variance, which serves as our proxy for risk aversion is given by $VRP_t = VSTOXX_t^2 - \widehat{RVAR}_t$.¹⁸

Table [X](#) presents regression results which show that risk aversion is significantly related to changes in ECB tone whereas uncertainty is not. More specifically, changes in uncertainty and risk aversion are both negatively related to tone changes, implying that a more positive tone is associated with lower uncertainty and lower risk aversion. While the slope coefficient for uncertainty is not different from zero, we find that market-implied risk aversion significantly decreases (increases) when ECB tone becomes more positive (negative) with associated R^2 s in excess of 5%.

In sum, our results reported in the this and the previous sections suggest that central bank tone matters for the prices of stocks and other financial assets by affecting risk premia embedded in market prices. When tone becomes more positive, the risk aversion of market participants decreases, which results in an increase of stock prices and government bond yields as well as in a decrease of corporate credit spreads and equity option-implied market volatility.

5.4. Additional results and robustness checks

This section summarizes the results of various additional empirical exercises, for which we report detailed results in the Internet Appendix.

¹⁷The R^2 of this regression is 49.74% and the coefficient estimates on $VSTOXX_t^2$ and $RVAR_{t-22d,t}$ are significant at the 1% and 10% level, respectively, as judged by [Newey and West \(1987\)](#) standard errors.

¹⁸[Bekaert et al. \(2013\)](#) also discuss the rationale for using the variance risk premium as a proxy for risk aversion by referencing different types of models in which risk aversion and the variance risk premium are directly related to each other.

ECB tone and policy rates We now explore the relation between ECB tone and key interest rates that the ECB sets for the euro area. First, the interest rate on main refinancing operations (MRO), which are essential in providing liquidity to the banking system. Second, the rate on the deposit facility, which banks use for overnight deposits. Third, the rate on the marginal lending facility, which banks use for overnight credit.¹⁹ More specifically, we test whether the (cumulative) changes in these key interest rates over the cycle from the press conference at time t to the next press conference at $t+1$ are significantly related to the ECB tone change revealed at time t . In these regressions, we also control for lagged policy rate changes to account for the standard practice of central banks to change interest rates in multiple small steps (“interest rate smoothing”) which leads to autocorrelation of policy rate changes. The regression results reported in Table IA.1 suggest that the link between changes in ECB tone and policy rates is positive, similar to our results for government bond yields reported above, and that this relation remains significant even after controlling for policy rate changes over previous PC cycles.

Controlling for actual policy changes We also check whether excluding PC days with actual changes in policy rates and/or announcements of unconventional monetary policy measures affects our main findings. We find that excluding these days does not matter much for the link between tone and stock returns, in the sense that controlling for policy actions taken by the ECB does not render the role of tone insignificant. More specifically, we repeat our regressions of stock returns and yield changes on tone changes for a subsample that excludes press conferences, at which the ECB changes at least one of the three policy rates, and present the results Figures IA.2 and IA.3. We repeat the same analysis and additionally exclude days with unconventional monetary policy (UMP) announcements and report these results in Figures IA.4 and IA.5 in the Internet Appendix.²⁰ While the statistical significance of our estimates decreases slightly compared to the full sample estimates, their magnitudes

¹⁹These rates move in lockstep for most parts of our sample (and, hence, do not really offer independent information) but we include all three rates here for completeness.

²⁰For a detailed study of unconventional ECB policies, see, e.g., Krishnamurthy et al. (2015).

and economic significance are essentially unchanged.²¹ Overall, these results corroborate our conclusions on the relation between tone changes, equity returns, and the yield curve.

Survey expectations of macroeconomic fundamentals Our results in Section 5.2 suggest that changes in current and future economic fundamentals are not significantly related to changes in ECB tone. We now complement these findings by studying the link between ECB tone and expectations about economic fundamentals. Using survey data on a range of macro variables, taken from Consensus Economics for Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, we do not find an unambiguous link between changes in survey expectations and changes in ECB tone.²² The regression results in Table IA.2 suggest that for the 50 country/fundamental combinations only four are significantly related to ECB tone changes: unemployment for Germany, industrial production for France, GDP and consumption growth for Spain. While some other regression coefficients exhibit marginal significance, there is no particular cross-country pattern in the link between ECB tone changes and changes in survey expectations about GDP growth, consumption growth, industrial production, inflation, wages and unemployment. Most interestingly, survey expectations about short- and long-term interest rates at horizons of three months and one year appear to be unrelated to ECB tone changes in all countries.

Tone “reaction functions”? In the spirit of the central bank literature on policy rules and reaction functions, we now study whether ECB tone changes simply reflect recent market conditions and whether the ECB can be viewed as following a reaction function to adjust its tone in response to such developments.²³ Table IA.3 reports results for regressions of

²¹Given that the economic magnitudes are almost the same as in the full sample estimation, somewhat lower statistical significant apparently results from the comparably lower number of observations that is available for this subsample analysis.

²²Consensus economics conducts surveys among financial and economic forecasters towards the end of the month. While the data only reports the publication date of the survey results (which is in the first half of the subsequent month), our aim is to capture expectations when surveys are actually conducted. Hence, Table IA.2 reports results for setting the date to five business days before the end of the month. Results are very similar when shifting the date to the end of the month or ten days before the end of the month.

²³There is a large literature that investigates whether central banks that follow some form of policy rule, like inflation targeting, *should* respond to asset price changes or asset price volatility at all and, if so, how (see, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1999, 2001; Gilchrist and Leahy, 2002).

tone changes on potential drivers of such a reaction function. As candidate variables, we consider lagged changes in the level, slope, and curvature of the yield curve, lagged stock returns (ESX50), lagged changes in (market expectations of) equity volatility (VSTOXX), and lagged changes in the real-time indices of [Beber et al. \(2015\)](#).²⁴ To avoid look-ahead biases, we set the timing such that we regress tone changes from one PC to the next on changes in the independent variables measured from the day after the previous PC to the day before the current PC. Interestingly, we find that the lagged change in yield curvature is the only significant driver of tone changes, whereas all other variables appear unrelated to future tone changes. Since changes in yield curvature only explain a small portion of the time-series variation in tone changes, and other variables do not seem to have any predictive ability at all, our results suggest that ECB tone mainly conveys information beyond recent market developments.

Unexpected changes in ECB tone Given that our measure of tone changes exhibits significant autocorrelation (see Table I in [3.1](#)), one could argue that tone changes are predictable to some extent. We showed above in Table VI that controlling for lagged tone changes does not affect our main conclusion. Another way of showing this is to generate a series of serially uncorrelated ‘tone shocks’, by estimating an AR(1) process for ECB tone changes and then repeating our main empirical analyses for stock returns by using the residuals of the AR(1) process instead of tone changes themselves.²⁵ Using these AR(1) residuals rather than the tone changes themselves does not change our conclusions, as we show in more detail in the Internet Appendix for equity returns (see Figure [IA.6](#)) and yield changes (see Figure [IA.7](#)).

Equity excess returns We also repeat the empirical analysis of how ECB tone affects stock prices using equity excess returns instead of raw returns. As a proxy for the risk-

²⁴For the data of [Beber et al. \(2015\)](#), we only include the real-time economic activity and sentiment index as the growth index is highly correlated with the economic activity index and including them jointly leads to multicollinearity problems.

²⁵Using AR(1) residuals is equivalent to controlling for lagged tone changes but it allows us to present our results in a simple graphical way, comparable to the results in our main analysis.

free rate, we use the 3-month interbank rate for the Eurozone (Datastream Mnemonic BBEUR3M). Using equity excess returns, our conclusions remain unchanged. In the Internet Appendix, Figure IA.8 reveals patterns that are very similar to those displayed in Figure 3 above. On PC-days, there is an excess return differential depending on whether the ECB tone change is positive or negative. This differential widens on the days after the PC and regressing equity excess returns on tone changes yields significantly positive slope estimates.

6. Fed tone and U.S. asset prices

Using a setup that is very different compared to the ECB press conferences explored above, we now provide evidence that central bank tone also matters for asset prices in the U.S. Specifically, we use data on the Fed Chair’s Testimonies to the U.S. Congress, typically taking place twice a year with the Chair testifying to the U.S. House of Representatives and to the U.S. Senate on two subsequent days, in both cases delivering identical remarks. Given that the frequency of these testimonies is low and that the testimony dates do not concur with policy meetings of the Fed, the news component embedded in the Chair’s should be comparably small.²⁶

Measuring the tone of the Fed Chair’s testimony provides an interesting setup for at least three reasons. First, it allows us to check the robustness of our main results for a different country and different central bank. Second, the testimony is an event that is not tied to actual monetary policy decisions (e.g., unlike the FOMC meeting) so that there should be no potential for confounding effects from actions and tone. Third, and despite the differences mentioned before, other important features of the testimony are similar to the ECB press conferences studied above. These common features include the fact that the testimony is a scheduled event that market participants are aware of well before it takes place, that the

²⁶As detailed in Section 2.1, higher frequency data that allows to measure Fed tone in a way comparable to our analysis of the ECB has become available only very recently and the number of observations is very small. The Fed has introduced press conferences comparable to those of the ECB only recently (in April 2011). The statements released after FOMC meetings are generally very short and do not allow for a comprehensive textual analysis.

testimony is available to market participants in real time, and that the Fed Chair’s speech is carefully drafted in advance to convey the Fed’s intentions to the public.

Transcripts for these testimonies are available from July 1996, providing us with a series of 37 transcripts up to fall 2014 (the end of our sample period). Over this period, the average time interval between two testimonies is 130 days and the shortest interval is 52 days. We measure Fed tone in the same way as for ECB PCs and find that tone become more positive (negative) compared to the previous testimony in 20 (16) cases and that tone matters for U.S. equity and government bond prices.

Figure 9 shows distinct patterns for equity returns and yield changes depending on whether Fed tone becomes more positive or negative. Over the two months following the testimony (corresponding to the shortest 52-day interval between any two consecutive testimonies), cumulative equity returns are around 3% when tone has become more positive compared to -1% when tone has become more negative. The slope coefficient from regressing cumulative stock returns on tone changes is positive and becomes increasingly significant with time passed since the last testimony. We also find that tone matters for changes in the U.S. government bond yield curve, both, around the days of testimonies to Congress and beyond. A more negative Fed tone is associated with a decrease in yields (across maturities up to 20 years) up to the day after the testimony to the U.S. Senate as well as over the next two months. By contrast, a more positive Fed tone is associate with an immediate increase in yields and a much smaller decrease in yields over the two-months following the testimonies. The difference in yield changes conditional on Fed tone becoming more positive or negative is largest for short-term yields, which appears consistent with the view that central banks control the short end of the yield curve.

One caveat is that we only have 36 observations available in this exercise. However, our findings on how U.S. equity and government bond markets relate to changes in Fed tone appear significant from an economic perspective. Qualitatively, the results are identical to those for ECB press conferences: a more positive central bank tone is associated with higher equity returns and higher bond yields compared to changes in asset prices when central bank tone becomes more negative.

7. Conclusion

We use a systematic and objective approach to measure the *tone* of central bank statements and evaluate its impact on asset prices. To quantify tone, we apply standard techniques of textual analysis from the recent finance literature. Our empirical analysis focuses on the European Central Bank (ECB), which has been the first major central bank to establish live press conferences as a communication channel after meetings of its Governing Council. These press conferences begin with a statement by the ECB president that presents real-time news about monetary policy decisions, contains fresh information about ECB views, and is made available to all market participants at the same time. Our sample covers a total of 185 press conferences between January 1999 and October 2014.

Our results document a strong link between ECB tone and equity returns. On the day of the press conference, a more positive (negative) tone, compared to the previous press conference, is associated with increasing (decreasing) stock prices. This effect is statistically significant, economically large, and persists over the cycle to the next press conference. Throughout our sample, the equity premium in European markets accumulates subsequent to positive tone changes whereas it diminishes when ECB tone becomes more negative. The same patterns prevail in the stock markets of individual Eurozone countries.

Changes in ECB tone also affect government bond prices, with more positive tone being related to a higher level and a more pronounced hump of the yield curve. Finding that ECB tone matters for yields is consistent with the notion that central banks use communication as a device to manage market expectations. However, since equity prices also increase when tone becomes more positive, our results suggest that tone affects asset prices via their risk premium component. More positive ECB tone appears to increase equity prices and bond yields because it lowers the risk aversion of market participants. In line with this conjecture, we find that tone changes are significantly related to asset prices that are very sensitive to changes in risk aversion such as variance risk premia and corporate credit spreads.

Our conclusions on how central bank tone matters for asset prices also apply to U.S. markets. Measuring the tone of the Fed chair's semiannual Congressional Testimonies, we

find that a positive change in Fed testimony tone is associated with increases in equity prices and increases in Treasury bond yields.

Our work is related and contributes to various strands of the literature by showing that *central bank tone* is a key communication feature that affects asset prices. Changes in central bank tone appear to matter for the risk-taking of market participants and for (the interpretation of) monetary policy shocks, which are typically measured by changes in market prices around policy meetings and announcements.

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Table I: The Tone of ECB Press Conference Statements

This table reports descriptive statistics for the 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. The column ‘Cycle’ presents statistics on the length of the press conference (PC) cycle, i.e., the number of business days between PCs. N/T reports the ratio of the number of negative words divided by the total number of words in the president’s opening statement at the PC (in percentage points). $\Delta\tau$ measures the change in tone τ compared to the tone at the previous PC, where $\tau = 1 - N/T$ as defined in Equation (1); reported numbers are the changes in percentage points. For the 184 realizations of $\Delta\tau$, we also report the coefficient of an AR(1) regression and the associated t -statistic. ‘Obs $\Delta\tau > 0$ ’ denotes the number of tone changes when tone becomes more positive and ‘Obs $\Delta\tau < 0$ ’ counts the observations when tone becomes more negative.

	Cycle [in days]	N/T [in %]	$\Delta\tau$
Mean	22.255	2.703	-0.002
Std dev	5.700	0.988	0.795
Min	10.000	0.361	-2.409
Q5	15.000	1.323	-1.419
Q25	20.000	1.990	-0.435
Median	20.000	2.616	0.047
Q75	25.000	3.230	0.445
Q95	30.000	4.799	1.271
Max	50.000	5.651	2.015
AR(1)			-0.424
t -statistic			[-6.36]
Obs $\Delta\tau > 0$			100.000
Obs $\Delta\tau < 0$			84.000

Table II: Which words drive tone?

This table presents descriptive statistics for the “negative” words (as classified by the dictionary of [Loughran and McDonald, 2011](#)) that are most prevalent in ECB press conference statements. The left panel, reports the 20 most frequently used negative words, ordered by the number of their occurrence across all ECB press conferences statements. The center and right panels show the context in which negative words are most frequently used by the ECB by presenting counts for bigrams and trigrams (i.e., sequences of two and three adjacent words), respectively. The analysis is based on 185 ECB press conference statements between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.

Words	#	Bigrams	#	Trigrams	#
weak	361	global imbalances	86	correction global imbalances	38
decline	321	weaker expected	46	disorderly correction global	36
imbalances	216	correction global	38	global imbalances regard	36
concerns	205	fiscal imbalances	38	imbalances regard price	36
volatility	168	imbalances regard	37	possibility disorderly correction	26
negative	163	disorderly correction	36	pressures possibility disorderly	25
deficit	148	possibility disorderly	35	financial market volatility	23
unemployment	132	excessive deficit	30	high level unemployment	22
crucial	125	level unemployment	28	prolonged period low	22
dampened	112	prolonged period	26	financial market turmoil	21
challenges	107	disorderly developments	25	disorderly developments owing	20
downward	105	remain weak	25	owing global imbalances	20
slow	88	excessive deficits	24	balance sheet restructuring	18
adverse	81	market volatility	24	concerns remain relating	18
correction	80	financial turmoil	22	crucial social partners	18
disorderly	67	high unemployment	21	weaker expected domestic	17
restructuring	67	market turmoil	21	insufficient implementation structural	16
excessive	61	revised downwards	21	unemployment euro area	16
turmoil	61	short-term volatility	21	excessive deficit procedure	15
protracted	45	address challenge	20	negative feedback loop	15

Table III: Equity Returns on ECB Press Conference Days

This table reports results for the returns of Eurozone equity indexes on days on which the ECB holds a press conference (PC). We use data for the EuroStoxx 50 (ESX50), the MSCI EMU (MSCI), the MSCI Value EMU (Value), and the MSCI Growth EMU (Growth). We compute returns from the closing prices on the day preceding the PC and the day on which the PC is held. For each index, our sample includes a total of 184 returns between the 185 ECB press conferences from January 7, 1999 to October 2, 2014. *Panel A* reports average returns across PC days and non-PC days, respectively. Values in brackets are t -statistics and $p[F]$ reports the p -value of an F -test for equal means. *Panel B* reports average returns separately for the 100 (84) observations at which the tone of the ECB becomes more positive (negative) compared to the previous PC, along with t -statistics and p -values of F -tests for equal means. *Panels C and D* present results of regressing PC-day equity returns on the signs of ECB tone changes and on ECB tone changes, respectively. Values reported for a and b represent estimates of the intercept and slope coefficients. All t -statistics are based on [White \(1980\)](#) standard errors.

Panel A. PC versus Non-PC Days

	No PC	PC	p[F]
ESX50	1.03 [0.43]	-3.26 [-0.27]	0.70
MSCI	1.16 [0.53]	-4.02 [-0.36]	0.62
Value	1.66 [0.71]	-6.24 [-0.54]	0.47
Growth	0.81 [0.38]	-1.63 [-0.14]	0.81

Panel B. Positive versus Negative Tone Changes

	$\Delta\tau > 0$	$\Delta\tau < 0$	p[F]
ESX50	26.43 [1.47]	-38.59 [-2.49]	0.01
MSCI	23.00 [1.39]	-36.18 [-2.56]	0.01
Value	19.23 [1.08]	-36.57 [-2.72]	0.02
Growth	26.52 [1.70]	-35.13 [-2.22]	0.01

Panel C. Regressions on Signs of Tone Changes

	a	b	R^2
ESX50	-0.61 [-0.51]	32.51 [2.75]	3.79
MSCI	-0.66 [-0.61]	29.59 [2.72]	3.72
Value	-0.87 [-0.78]	27.90 [2.50]	3.09
Growth	-0.43 [-0.39]	30.82 [2.78]	3.97

Panel D. Regressions on Tone Changes

	a	b	R^2
ESX50	-0.00 [-0.26]	0.38 [2.50]	3.26
MSCI	-0.00 [-0.36]	0.35 [2.53]	3.30
Value	-0.00 [-0.54]	0.30 [2.12]	2.22
Growth	-0.00 [-0.14]	0.40 [2.76]	4.21

Table IV: Equity Returns over Press Conference Cycles

This table presents results on how changes in ECB tone revealed at the most recent ECB press conference (PC_t) affect equity returns. Using data for the EuroStoxx 50 (ESX50), the MSCI EMU (MSCI), the MSCI Value EMU (Value), and the MSCI Growth EMU (Growth), we compute returns from the closing prices on the day preceding PC_t and the day preceding PC_{t+1} . Results excluding PC-day return effects are based on returns computed from the closing prices of the day of PC_t to the day preceding PC_{t+1} . For each index, our sample covers a total of 184 PC-cycle returns (including or excluding PC-days) between the 185 ECB press conferences held from January 7, 1999 to October 2, 2014. *Panels A and B* present results of regressing PC-cycle equity returns on ECB tone changes including the PC-day return and excluding the PC-day return, respectively. Values reported for a and b represent estimates of the intercept and slope coefficients with associated t -statistics in brackets. All t -statistics are based on [Newey and West \(1987\)](#) standard errors. In *Panels C and D*, we present results for decomposing the full sample period ('all'), at a daily frequency, into periods where the latest PC revealed an improvement or a deterioration in ECB tone as indicated by ' $\Delta\tau > 0$ ' and ' $\Delta\tau < 0$ ', respectively. For each equity index, we compute cumulative returns as the arithmetic sum of daily returns ("simple") as well as cumulative geometric returns to account for compounding effects ("comp."). Results in Panel C (D) include (exclude) PC-day returns.

Panel A. PC Cycle Regressions

	a	b	R^2
ESX50	0.00 [0.28]	1.26 [2.77]	3.06
MSCI	0.00 [0.40]	1.32 [2.95]	3.52
Value	0.00 [0.56]	1.40 [2.73]	3.26
Growth	0.00 [0.27]	1.25 [3.09]	3.45

Panel B. Regressions excluding PC days

	a	b	R^2
ESX50	0.00 [0.31]	0.89 [2.03]	1.78
MSCI	0.00 [0.46]	0.97 [2.28]	2.25
Value	0.00 [0.68]	1.10 [2.24]	2.34
Growth	0.00 [0.26]	0.85 [2.21]	1.90

Panel C. Dissecting Aggregate Equity Returns

	ESX50			MSCI		Value		Growth	
	obs	simple	comp.	simple	comp.	simple	comp.	simple	comp.
all	4076.00	33.98	-10.94	37.81	-0.22	52.99	10.44	28.37	-7.66
$\Delta\tau > 0$	2264.00	69.96	55.44	71.15	64.46	89.72	92.41	55.70	43.00
$\Delta\tau < 0$	1812.00	-35.98	-42.71	-33.34	-39.33	-36.73	-42.60	-27.33	-35.42

Panel D. Dissecting Aggregate Equity Returns over Non-PC Days

	ESX50			MSCI		Value		Growth	
	obs	simple	comp.	simple	comp.	simple	comp.	simple	comp.
all	3892.00	39.97	-2.99	45.20	9.79	64.48	26.78	31.36	-2.74
$\Delta\tau > 0$	2164.00	43.53	21.32	48.15	32.51	70.49	61.33	29.18	11.08
$\Delta\tau < 0$	1728.00	-3.56	-20.04	-2.95	-17.14	-6.01	-21.41	2.18	-12.44

Table V: Individual Country Equity Returns

This table reports results for PC-day and PC-cycle returns of individual Euro-member country equity indexes. The PC-day results in *Panels A, B, and C* are presented in the same way as the Eurozone results in Table III (Panels A, B, and D), the PC-cycle results in *Panel D* are presented as described in Table IV for Panel A.

<i>Panel A. PC versus Non-PC Days</i>				<i>Panel B. Positive versus Negative Tone Changes</i>			
	No PC	PC	p[F]		$\Delta\tau > 0$	$\Delta\tau < 0$	p[F]
Austria	1.00 [0.41]	3.53 [0.31]	0.83	Austria	19.78 [1.25]	-15.83 [-1.00]	0.12
Belgium	0.12 [0.06]	5.28 [0.51]	0.62	Belgium	33.77 [2.44]	-28.63 [-1.91]	0.00
Finland	1.40 [0.40]	20.77 [1.04]	0.24	Finland	58.47 [2.49]	-24.12 [-0.73]	0.04
France	1.68 [0.73]	-5.95 [-0.50]	0.48	France	24.73 [1.43]	-42.47 [-2.88]	0.00
Germany	2.02 [0.84]	-8.11 [-0.66]	0.37	Germany	17.37 [0.92]	-38.45 [-2.71]	0.02
Ireland	-1.56 [-0.59]	4.74 [0.35]	0.62	Ireland	35.49 [1.69]	-31.88 [-2.12]	0.01
Italy	0.29 [0.13]	-10.88 [-0.88]	0.31	Italy	15.37 [0.86]	-42.13 [-2.65]	0.02
Netherlands	1.26 [0.57]	-1.82 [-0.18]	0.77	Netherlands	20.96 [1.38]	-28.93 [-2.21]	0.02
Portugal	-1.44 [-0.77]	-4.90 [-0.53]	0.70	Portugal	10.01 [0.77]	-22.65 [-1.79]	0.08
Spain	1.59 [0.65]	-0.16 [-0.01]	0.88	Spain	25.32 [1.41]	-30.48 [-1.82]	0.03
<i>Panel C. PC Day Regressions</i>				<i>Panel D. PC Cycle Regressions</i>			
	a	b	R^2		a	b	R^2
Austria	0.00 [0.32]	0.26 [1.75]	1.79	Austria	0.00 [0.51]	0.92 [1.26]	1.11
Belgium	0.00 [0.52]	0.28 [2.09]	2.49	Belgium	0.00 [0.20]	1.21 [1.68]	2.43
Finland	0.00 [1.07]	0.70 [2.69]	4.19	Finland	0.00 [0.68]	1.81 [2.02]	2.04
France	-0.00 [-0.51]	0.36 [2.45]	3.26	France	0.00 [0.60]	1.29 [2.48]	3.56
Germany	-0.00 [-0.66]	0.32 [2.08]	2.39	Germany	0.00 [0.69]	1.53 [2.37]	3.47
Ireland	0.00 [0.35]	0.24 [1.21]	1.08	Ireland	-0.00 [-0.70]	1.02 [1.65]	1.48
Italy	-0.00 [-0.89]	0.35 [2.56]	2.71	Italy	-0.00 [-0.17]	0.93 [1.69]	1.51
Netherlands	-0.00 [-0.17]	0.28 [2.19]	2.48	Netherlands	0.00 [0.52]	1.40 [2.53]	4.06
Portugal	-0.00 [-0.53]	0.26 [2.50]	2.74	Portugal	-0.00 [-0.72]	0.80 [1.39]	1.17
Spain	-0.00 [-0.01]	0.34 [2.14]	2.50	Spain	0.00 [0.64]	1.11 [1.99]	2.02

Table VI: Tone changes and Monetary Policy Shocks

This table reports results for regressions of EuroStoxx50 returns on tone changes ($\Delta\tau_{t,t-1}$), lagged tone changes ($\Delta\tau_{t-1,t-2}$), and monetary policy shocks shocks, measured as the 1y government bond yield change on PC days (Δi_t^{1y}). The left part of the table refers to regressions with PC day returns as the dependent variable, computed from the closing prices on the day preceding the PC and the day on which the PC is held. The right part of the table refers to regressions with PC cycle returns, computed from the closing prices on the day preceding PC_t and the day preceding PC_{t+1} . t -statistics for PC day regressions are based on [White \(1980\)](#) standard errors and t -statistics for PC cycle regressions are based on [Newey and West \(1987\)](#) standard errors. Our sample covers a total of 185 ECB press conferences held from January 7, 1999 to October 2, 2014.

	PC days			PC cycles		
	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(i)	(ii)	(iii)
$\Delta\tau_t$	0.38 [2.50]	0.41 [2.74]	0.35 [2.47]	1.26 [2.77]	1.26 [2.67]	1.09 [2.47]
$\Delta\tau_{t-1}$		0.10 [0.43]	0.03 [0.08]		-0.16 [-0.29]	-0.36 [-0.74]
Δi_t^{1y}			0.02 [2.35]			0.05 [2.19]
$R^2[\%]$	3.26	2.54	6.83	3.06	2.36	5.44

Table VII: Yield Changes on ECB Press Conference Days

This table reports results for changes in yield curve factors on days that the ECB holds a press conference. We measure level, slope, and curvature as the first three principal components of the yield curve. Then, we compute changes in level, slope, and curvature from the closing prices on the day preceding the PC and the PC day. In total, we have 184 changes for each factor between the 185 ECB press conferences held from January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. *Panel A* presents average changes on PC days and non-PC days. Values in brackets are t -statistics and $p[F]$ reports the p -value of an F -test for equal means. *Panel B* reports average changes separately for the 100 (84) observations at which the tone of the ECB becomes more positive (negative) compared to the previous press conference, along with t -statistics and p -values of F -tests for equal means. *Panels C and D* present results of regressing PC-day yield factor changes on the signs of ECB tone changes and on ECB tone changes, respectively. Values reported for a and b represent estimates of the intercept and slope coefficients. All t -statistics are based on [White \(1980\)](#) standard errors.

Panel A. PC versus Non-PC Days

	No PC	PC	p[F]
Level	-0.114 [-1.56]	0.661 [2.37]	0.02
Slope	-0.172 [-0.84]	2.462 [2.63]	0.01
Curvature	-0.008 [-0.13]	-0.010 [-0.05]	0.99

Panel B. Positive versus Negative Tone

	$\Delta\tau > 0$	$\Delta\tau < 0$	p[F]
Level	1.404 [3.47]	-0.224 [-0.64]	0.00
Slope	3.695 [2.67]	0.995 [0.83]	0.15
Curvature	-0.070 [-0.26]	0.062 [0.23]	0.73

Panel C. Regressions on Signs of Tone Changes

	a	b	R^2
Level	0.059 [2.20]	0.814 [3.04]	4.59
Slope	-0.234 [2.56]	1.350 [1.48]	1.12
Curvature	-0.000 [-0.02]	-0.066 [-0.34]	0.06

Panel D. Regressions on Tone Changes

	a	b	R^2
Level	0.000 [2.38]	0.005 [1.36]	1.03
Slope	0.000 [2.64]	-0.016 [-1.19]	0.94
Curvature	-0.000 [-0.05]	-0.002 [-0.75]	0.31

Table VIII: Yield Changes over ECB Press Conference Cycles

This table reports results for yield factor changes over the cycle of ECB press conferences (PCs), with level, slope, and curvature estimated as the first three principal components of the yield curve. We compute changes in level, slope, and curvature from the closing prices on the day before a PC takes place to the day preceding the next PC. In total, we have 184 PC-cycle changes for each factor between the 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. *Panel A* reports average changes separately for the 100 (84) PCs at which the tone of the ECB becomes more positive (negative) compared to the previous PC along with t -statistics and p -values of F -tests for equal means. *Panel B* present results of regressing PC-cycle yield factor changes on ECB tone changes. Values reported for a and b represent estimates of the intercept and slope coefficients. All t -statistics are based on [Newey and West \(1987\)](#) standard errors.

Panel A. Positive versus Negative Tone

	$\Delta\tau > 0$	$\Delta\tau < 0$	p[F]
Level	0.41 [0.16]	-4.15 [-2.01]	0.15
Slope	0.44 [0.09]	-2.83 [-0.42]	0.68
Curvature	-1.95 [-1.96]	1.95 [1.79]	0.01

Panel B. Regressions on Tone Changes

	a	b	R^2
Level	-0.00 [-0.90]	0.04 [2.12]	2.17
Slope	-0.00 [-0.25]	-0.04 [-0.69]	0.39
Curvature	-0.00 [-0.26]	-0.03 [-2.49]	6.04

Table IX: Regressions of real-time macro growth on tone changes

This table reports results for regressions of changes in real-time macro indices on changes in tone ($\Delta\tau$) over PC cycles (Panel A) and for predictive regressions of changes in real-time macro indices on tone changes for fixed forecast horizons ranging from 5, 10, ..., 250 trading days. The left part of Panel A reports results for contemporaneous regressions (changes from one press conference to the next) and the right part presents results for regressions of changes in real-time macro indices on lagged changes in tone (i.e., tone changes from the previous press conference cycle). We only report slope coefficients and R^2 s in both panels. The real-time macro indices employed in these regressions correspond to “economic activity” (Econ), “sentiment” (Sent), and “growth” and are taken from [Beber et al. \(2015\)](#). We report t -statistics based on standard errors following [Newey and West \(1987\)](#) in brackets. We standardize the independent variable (tone changes) in all regressions for ease of interpretability. R^2 s are reported in parentheses. The sample covers 184 tone changes between the 185 ECB press conferences held from January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.

Panel A. Tone changes and real-time macro over PC cycles							
	Contemporaneous				Predictive		
	Econ	Sent	Growth		Econ	Sent	Growth
$\Delta\tau$	0.04	0.08	0.04	$\Delta\tau$	0.00	0.01	0.03
	[0.43]	[1.05]	[0.47]		[0.07]	[0.13]	[0.11]
$R^2(\%)$	(0.20)	(0.72)	(0.20)	$R^2(\%)$	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Panel B. Tone changes and real-time macro for fixed forecast horizons							
<i>horizon</i>	Econ	Sent	Growth	<i>horizon</i>	Econ	Sent	Growth
5 days	-0.04 [-0.49] (0.10)	-0.03 [-1.70] (1.41)	-0.03 [-0.41] (0.07)	60 days	0.03 [0.58] (0.09)	0.00 [-0.01] (0.00)	0.04 [0.69] (0.13)
10 days	-0.05 [-0.84] (0.21)	0.04 [0.92] (0.27)	-0.04 [-0.74] (0.17)	120 days	0.10 [1.72] (0.96)	-0.04 [-0.77] (0.16)	0.10 [1.83] (1.01)
30 days	0.02 [0.43] (0.04)	0.02 [0.40] (0.02)	0.02 [0.47] (0.05)	250 days	0.07 [1.59] (0.49)	-0.06 [-1.02] (0.40)	0.07 [1.49] (0.49)

Table X: Uncertainty and Risk Aversion

This table shows results for regressions of changes in uncertainty and risk aversion on lagged tone changes over ECB press conference cycles. We follow [Bekaert et al. \(2013\)](#) and measure uncertainty as the conditional variance ($\widehat{RVAR}_t$) obtained from a regression of realized variance on lagged realized variance and lagged $VSTOXX^2$; the VSTOXX is a volatility index computed from prices of options on the Eurostoxx50, similar to the VIX in the U.S.). The regression-implied variance risk premium, i.e. $\widehat{VRP}_t = VSTOXX_t^2 - \widehat{RVAR}_t$, serves as the proxy for risk aversion. The sample covers 184 tone changes between the 185 ECB press conferences held from January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.


Panel A. PC cycles

	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	R^2
Uncertainty	-0.00 [-0.01]	-2.36 [-0.80]	0.45
Risk aversion	0.00 [0.10]	-2.93 [-2.34]	5.40

Panel B. PC cycles, excluding PC days


	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	R^2
Uncertainty	-0.00 [-0.01]	-3.23 [-1.10]	0.94
Risk aversion	-0.00 [-0.13]	-3.18 [-2.02]	5.19

Figure 1: The Tone of ECB Press Conference Statements



This figure plots the time-series of ECB tone, τ , and changes in ECB tone, $\Delta\tau$, in Panels (a) and (b), respectively. Tone is defined as $\tau = 1 - N/T$, see Equation (1), where N and T denote the number of negative words and the total number of words in a press conference statement. $\Delta\tau$ is measured as the difference in τ of two subsequently held press conferences. Tone is measured from the ECB president's opening statements at the 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. The solid vertical lines mark these 185 press conferences.


Figure 2: Equity Returns on Press Conference Days



This figure plots the returns of Eurozone equity indexes on days on which the ECB holds a press conference (PC). We use data for the EuroStoxx 50 (ESX50), the MSCI EMU (MSCI), the MSCI Value EMU (Value), and the MSCI Growth EMU (Growth). We compute returns from the closing prices on the day preceding the PC and the day on which the PC is held. For each index, we have a total of 184 returns between the 185 ECB press conferences held from January 7, 1999 to October 2, 2014. Panel (a) refers to average PC-day returns across all PCs. Panels (b) and (c) plot average returns separately for the 100 (84) observations at which the tone of the ECB becomes more positive (negative) compared to the previous PC.

Figure 3: Equity Returns following ECB Press Conferences


(a) Equity returns following press conferences



(continued on next page)


Figure 3 (*continued*)

(b) Coefficients of regressing equity returns on tone changes




This figure shows how changes in ECB tone affect equity returns. In Panel (a), we plot the average k -day cumulative equity returns from $k = 0$ (representing the PC-day return) up to $k = 15$. The green (red) lines plot the average cumulative returns on the k -th day after the PC, conditional on the tone being revealed at the press conference having been more positive (negative) compared to the previous one; values are reported in basis points. The dashed blue line represents the average return accumulating up to day k after the PC. Panel (b) plots the coefficients (and 90% confidence bands based on [White \(1980\)](#) standard errors) for regressing k -day cumulative returns on changes in tone revealed at the preceding press conference. The sample spans a total of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.

Figure 4: Individual Country Equity Returns on Press Conference Days




This figure plots the press conference (PC)-day returns of individual Eurozone country MSCI equity indexes. We compute returns from the closing prices on the day preceding the PC and the day on which the PC is held. We compute a total of 184 returns between the 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. Panel (a) refers to average PC-day returns across from all PCs. Panels (b) and (c) plot average returns separately for the 100 (84) observations at which the tone of the ECB becomes more positive (negative) compared to the previous PC. The countries covered are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), and Spain (ES).

Figure 5: Yield Changes on ECB Press Conference Days




This figure presents results on changes in the yield curve (for maturities ranging from one to 20 years, x-axis) on days that the ECB holds a press conference. Panel (a) plots average daily yield changes on PC days (blue boxes) compared to non-PC days (black circles). Panel (b) presents average PC-day yield changes conditional on ECB tone becoming more positive (green) or negative (red). Panel (c) plots intercept- and slope coefficients from regressing yield changes (of individual maturities) on the sign of the tone change revealed at the press conference, i.e., on the sign of $\Delta\tau$, in orange and blue respectively; the dotted lines represent 90% confidence bands (based on [White \(1980\)](#) standard errors). Panel (d) plots slope coefficients of regressing yield changes on changes in ECB tone along with 90% confidence bands. The sample spans a total of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.

Figure 6: Yield Changes over Press Conference Cycles




This figure presents results on changes in the yield curve (for maturities ranging from one to 20 years, x-axis) over cycles of ECB press conferences (PCs). Panel (a) presents average PC-to-PC yield changes conditional on the tone changes at the most recent PC having been positive (green) or negative (red). Panel (b) plots the slope coefficients from regressing yield changes (of individual maturities) on changes in ECB tone ($\Delta\tau$), along with 90% confidence bands (based on [Newey and West \(1987\)](#) standard errors). The sample spans a total of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.

Figure 7: Corporate credit spread changes



This figure presents results for regressions of changes in corporate credit spreads (BBB-AAA rated corporate bonds) on tone changes. Panel (a) presents the average cumulative change in the credit spread conditional on tone changes at the most recent PC having been positive (green) or negative (red). Panel (b) plots the slope coefficients from regressing credit spread changes on changes in ECB tone ($\Delta\tau$), along with 90% confidence bands (based on [White \(1980\)](#) standard errors). The sample spans a total of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.


Figure 8: ECB Tone and Changes in Equity Market Volatility




This figure presents results on the link between ECB tone and market expectations of future equity volatility as measured by the VSTOXX volatility index, which is constructed from options on the EuroStoxx50. In our analysis of how ECB tone changes and tone shocks affect market volatility on ECB press conference (PC) days and over PC cycles, we use the VSTOXX sub-indices for maturities of one, two, three, six, nine, twelve, 18, and 24 months. Panel (a) plots slope coefficients of regressing PC-day changes in volatility on tone changes along with 90% confidence bands (based on [White \(1980\)](#) standard errors for PC days and [Newey and West \(1987\)](#) standard errors for PC cycles) and Panel (b) presents analogue results for changes in implied equity volatility over PC-cycles. Our sample covers 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.

Figure 9: U.S. Markets following Congressional Testimonies of the Fed Chair

(a) U.S. stock market returns



(b) Changes in U.S. government bond yields



This figure shows how changes in Fed tone revealed at the Chair's most recent Congressional Testimony affect U.S. stock market returns and U.S. government bond yield changes. In Panel (a), present results for equity returns. On the left, we plot the average k -day cumulative equity returns from $k = 0$ (representing the date of the testimony) up to $k = 52$. The green (red) lines plot the average cumulative returns on the k -th day after the testimony, conditional on the tone being revealed at the testimony having been more positive (negative) compared to the previous one; values are reported in basis points. The dashed blue line represents the average return accumulating up to day k after the testimony. On the right, we plot the coefficients (and 90% confidence bands based on [White \(1980\)](#) standard errors) for regressing k -day cumulative returns on changes in tone revealed at the preceding testimony. Panel (b) presents results on cumulative changes in U.S. government bond yields (for maturities ranging from one to 20 years, x-axis) over 2 days and 52 days from the testimony on the left and right, respectively. We present yield changes conditional on Fed tone becoming more positive (green) or negative (red), and the dashed blue line represents average cumulative yield changes up to day k after the testimony. The sample spans a total of 36 tone changes from 37 testimonies from 1996 to 2014.

Internet Appendix for

Does Central Bank Tone Move Asset Prices?

(not for publication)

IA.A. Data sources and tickers

This Appendix details the sources of data used in the empirical analysis.

Equity data. We use data on stock returns for the EuroStoxx 50, the MSCI EMU All cap index, as well as the MSCI Value EMU and MSCI Growth EMU index. MSCI data for all three indices are obtained from Datastream and the mnemonics are MS1EMUL (MSCI All cap EMU), MSVEMUL (MSCI Value EMU), and MSGEMUL (MSCI Growth EMU). Historical data for the EuroStoxx 50 and corresponding implied volatilities (VSTOXX) at different maturities can be downloaded from [here \(EuroStoxx50 data\)](#) and [here \(VSTOXX implied volatilities\)](#), respectively.

Term structure of yields. We employ yield curve data for the term structure of German government bonds from 1 to 20 years provided by Deutsche Bundesbank. These series can be downloaded from [here](#). The tickers of the series we use are: BBK01.WT3211, BBK01.WT3213, BBK01.WT3215, BBK01.WT3217, BBK01.WT3219, BBK01.WT3221, BBK01.WT3223, BBK01.WT3225, BBK01.WT3227, BBK01.WT3229, BBK01.WT3431, BBK01.WT3433, BBK01.WT3435, BBK01.WT3437, BBK01.WT3439, BBK01.WT3441, BBK01.WT3443, BBK01.WT3445, BBK01.WT3447, BBK01.WT3449.

Real-time macro indices. We employ real-time measures of economic activity (“Econ”), growth (“Growth”), as well as a real-time measure of economic sentiment (“Sent”) for the Eurozone . These real-time measures are based on [Beber et al. \(2015\)](#) and we thank the authors for sharing these indices with us.

Table IA.1: ECB Tone and Policy Rates

This table reports results for the link between ECB policy rates and ECB press conference tone, using the interest rates on the main refinancing operations (Panel A), the deposit facility (Panel B), and the marginal lending facility (Panel C). We measure changes in policy rates from the PC at time t to the PC at time $t + 1$ and regress these changes on the tone change revealed at the time- t press conference, i.e., on $\Delta\tau_{t,t-1}$, in our baseline specification (i). Other specifications (ii-iv) additionally include lagged tone changes ($\Delta\tau_{t-1,t-2}$) and/or lagged changes in policy rates over the previous two PC cycles ($\Delta r_{t,t-1}$ and $\Delta r_{t-1,t-2}$). The last row reports the adjusted- R^2 in percentage points. In total, we have 184 PC-cycle changes between the 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. The left part of the Table reports results when using all 184 PC cycle changes, the right part reports results when only using the PC cycles with nonzero changes in policy rates (39 cycles for Panels A and B, 37 cycles for Panel C). All t -statistics are based on [Newey and West \(1987\)](#) standard errors.

Panel A. Rate on the main refinancing operations

	All PC cycles				PC cycles with nonzero rate changes			
	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)
const	-0.02 [-1.29]	-0.01 [-0.75]	-0.01 [-0.78]	-0.01 [-0.77]	-0.07 [-1.39]	-0.03 [-0.58]	-0.02 [-0.63]	-0.03 [-0.70]
$\Delta\tau_{t,t-1}$	4.84 [2.51]		5.48 [2.80]	4.95 [2.39]	18.79 [3.49]		16.66 [3.33]	13.35 [1.98]
$\Delta\tau_{t-1,t-2}$				-1.28 [-0.89]				-7.43 [-1.03]
$\Delta r_{t,t-1}$		0.20 [2.44]	0.22 [2.72]	0.23 [2.94]		0.46 [3.16]	0.54 [3.21]	0.66 [4.15]
$\Delta r_{t-1,t-1}$		0.29 [2.88]	0.29 [3.02]	0.28 [2.96]		0.78 [6.55]	0.64 [4.81]	0.55 [3.38]
$R^2[\%]$	4.91	14.44	20.88	20.72	19.53	35.79	51.75	51.91

Panel B. Rate on the deposit facility

	All PC cycles				PC cycles with nonzero rate changes			
	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)
const	-0.01 [-1.02]	-0.01 [-0.53]	-0.01 [-0.54]	-0.01 [-0.54]	-0.05 [-0.87]	-0.01 [-0.27]	0.00 [0.01]	-0.00 [-0.03]
$\Delta\tau_{t,t-1}$	4.85 [2.78]		5.77 [3.17]	5.57 [2.93]	21.10 [4.19]		19.01 [4.85]	18.29 [2.97]
$\Delta\tau_{t-1,t-2}$				-0.47 [-0.28]				-1.32 [-0.16]
$\Delta r_{t,t-1}$		0.22 [1.68]	0.25 [1.91]	0.25 [1.96]		0.83 [6.65]	0.86 [8.58]	0.88 [8.21]
$\Delta r_{t-1,t-1}$		0.26 [2.81]	0.27 [2.93]	0.26 [2.89]		0.73 [5.28]	0.64 [7.30]	0.63 [6.09]
$R^2[\%]$	4.53	14.83	21.43	21.02	19.56	47.06	64.51	63.41

Panel C. Rate on the marginal lending facility

	All PC cycles				PC cycles with nonzero rate changes			
	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)
const	-0.02 [-1.56]	-0.02 [-1.20]	-0.02 [-1.22]	-0.02 [-1.22]	-0.08 [-1.47]	-0.07 [-1.31]	-0.05 [-1.11]	-0.06 [-1.17]
$\Delta\tau_{t,t-1}$	5.42 [2.58]		5.92 [2.83]	5.17 [2.26]	23.26 [4.36]		21.44 [4.48]	16.98 [2.10]
$\Delta\tau_{t-1,t-2}$				-1.85 [-1.13]				-9.61 [-1.03]
$\Delta r_{t,t-1}$		0.16 [2.06]	0.18 [2.26]	0.20 [2.43]		0.49 [5.00]	0.65 [4.92]	0.79 [4.46]
$\Delta r_{t-1,t-1}$		0.17 [2.13]	0.16 [2.17]	0.15 [2.03]		0.82 [6.73]	0.57 [3.46]	0.45 [2.10]
$R^2[\%]$	4.90	5.94	11.84	11.83	21.38	25.96	43.79	44.02

Table IA.2: ECB Tone and Survey Expectations of Macroeconomic Fundamentals

This table reports results for regressing changes in survey expectations about macro fundamentals from the press conference (PC) at time t to $t + 1$ on the change in ECB tone revealed at the PC at time t , i.e., $\Delta\tau_{t,t-1}$. The survey data is provided by Consensus Economics, who conduct the surveys towards the end of the month. Because the exact date is not reported in the data (which only contains the publication data in the first half of the subsequent month), we set the date to five business days before the end of the month; results are very similar when using the end of the month or ten days earlier. The surveys cover expectations about expected percentage changes in real GDP growth (gdp), real consumption growth (cons), real industrial production growth (ip), percentage changes in consumer and producer prices (cpi and ppi), percentage changes in wages (wage), unemployment (unem, as percentage of labour force), and expectations of three month and ten year interest rates one three months ahead (i_{t+3m}^{3m} and i_{t+3m}^{10y}) and one year ahead (i_{t+1y}^{3m} and i_{t+1y}^{10y}). In total, we have 184 PC-cycle changes between the 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. All t -statistics are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors. The last row in each panel reports the regression R^2 in percentage points.

Panel A. Germany

	gdp	cons	ip	cpi	ppi	wage	unem	i_{t+3m}^{3m}	i_{t+3m}^{10y}	i_{t+1y}^{3m}	i_{t+1y}^{10y}
$\Delta\tau_{t,t-1}$	2.780 [1.11]	0.864 [0.63]	8.891 [1.25]	1.276 [0.98]	1.337 [0.55]	-0.016 [-0.02]	-1.817 [-1.61]	0.385 [0.16]	-0.558 [-0.32]	0.564 [0.25]	-0.934 [-0.74]
$R^2[\%]$	0.870	0.266	1.222	0.791	0.178	0.000	1.470	0.030	0.057	0.057	0.238

Panel B. France

	gdp	cons	ip	cpi	ppi	wage	unem	i_{t+3m}^{3m}	i_{t+3m}^{10y}	i_{t+1y}^{3m}	i_{t+1y}^{10y}
$\Delta\tau_{t,t-1}$	2.884 [1.44]	2.142 [1.72]	11.107 [1.95]	1.909 [1.77]		-0.354 [-0.39]	-0.445 [-0.33]	0.505 [0.21]	0.979 [0.57]	1.999 [0.94]	1.168 [0.84]
$R^2[\%]$	1.602	2.002	3.037	2.397		0.083	0.055	0.050	0.164	0.668	0.284

Panel C. Italy

	gdp	cons	ip	cpi	ppi	wage	unem	i_{t+3m}^{3m}	i_{t+3m}^{10y}	i_{t+1y}^{3m}	i_{t+1y}^{10y}
$\Delta\tau_{t,t-1}$	2.412 [1.03]	1.834 [1.04]	6.557 [1.09]	-0.446 [-0.38]	5.147 [1.44]	-1.260 [-1.47]	-0.534 [-0.41]	0.638 [0.27]	-2.879 [-1.31]	1.616 [0.73]	-1.867 [-0.99]
$R^2[\%]$	0.865	0.844	0.773	0.094	1.322	1.404	0.092	0.079	0.925	0.428	0.549

Panel D. Netherlands

	gdp	cons	ip	cpi	ppi	wage	unem	i_{t+3m}^{3m}	i_{t+3m}^{10y}	i_{t+1y}^{3m}	i_{t+1y}^{10y}
$\Delta\tau_{t,t-1}$	2.618 [1.01]	-0.634 [-0.28]	6.386 [1.43]	1.251 [0.97]		-0.677 [-0.64]		0.304 [0.14]	-1.238 [-0.72]	-0.891 [-0.44]	-0.943 [-0.59]
$R^2[\%]$	0.813	0.035	1.122	0.594		0.189		0.019	0.255	0.127	0.148

Panel E. Spain


	gdp	cons	ip	cpi	ppi	wage	unem	i_{t+3m}^{3m}	i_{t+3m}^{10y}	i_{t+1y}^{3m}	i_{t+1y}^{10y}
$\Delta\tau_{t,t-1}$	3.751 [1.66]	4.537 [2.19]	0.843 [0.13]	1.213 [0.80]		-0.798 [-0.43]		0.706 [0.25]	-0.930 [-0.51]	-0.061 [-0.03]	-2.010 [-1.22]
$R^2[\%]$	2.245	2.364	0.009	0.422		0.130		0.088	0.107	0.001	0.592

Table IA.3: What drives tones changes?

This table reports results for regressions of tone changes on potential drivers, such as changes in the level, slope, and curvature of the yield curve, VSTOXX changes, lagged stock returns (EuroStoxx 50), and changes in real-time macro indices (“economic activity” and sentiment”, denoted RT Econ and RT Sent, respectively). The latter are based on [Beber et al. \(2015\)](#)). The timing in this regression is such that we regress changes in tone ($\Delta\tau$) from the previous to the current press conference on changes in the independent variables from the previous press conference until the day before the current press conference. We report t -statistics based on standard errors following [Newey and West \(1987\)](#) in brackets. The sample covers 184 tone changes between the 185 ECB press conferences held from January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.


	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)
Δ Level	0.48 [1.53]			0.21 [0.51]
Δ Slope	-18.77 [-1.74]			-11.42 [-1.01]
Δ Curvature	252.96 [3.59]			271.95 [3.68]
Δ VSTOXX		-2.06 [-0.99]		-1.63 [-0.80]
Lagged returns		-1.14 [-0.70]		-0.40 [-0.22]
RT Econ			0.12 [0.46]	0.17 [0.61]
RT Sent			0.09 [1.14]	0.13 [1.64]
$R^2(\%)$	7.33	-0.33	-0.44	8.32

Figure IA.1: Press conference days and timing of returns




This figure illustrates the timing of our different return measures using three subsequent ECB press conferences. Returns on press conference (PC) days are measured as the return from the close of the day preceding the PC to the close of the day on which the PC takes place. Returns over the “PC cycle” are measured as the return from the close of the day preceding a PC to the close of the day preceding the next PC. Returns over PC cycles that exclude the PC day itself (“PC cycle (ex PC)”) are computed from the close of the day on which a PC takes place to the close of the trading day preceding the next PC. Since ECB press conferences are held on Thursday afternoon before European equity market close, the “PC cycle (ex PC day)” window does not contain any PC event.

Figure IA.2: Equity Returns following Press Conferences: Controlling for Policy Rate Changes




This figure shows how changes in ECB tone revealed at the most recent ECB press conference (PC) affect equity returns when controlling for changes in policy rates. Our initial sample spans a total of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. From this sample, we remove press conferences at which changes in ECB policy rates have been announced. We plot the coefficients (and 90% confidence bands, based on [White \(1980\)](#) standard errors) for regressing k -day cumulative returns on changes in tone revealed at the preceding press conference. We evaluate the returns of four Eurozone equity indexes: EuroStoxx 50 (ESX50), the MSCI EMU (MSCI), the MSCI Value EMU (Value), and the MSCI Growth EMU (Growth).

Figure IA.3: ECB Tone and Yield Changes: Controlling for Policy Rate Changes




This figure presents results on how changes in ECB tone affect the yield curve when controlling for policy actions. Our initial sample spans a total of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences (PCs) between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. From this sample, we remove press conferences at which changes in ECB policy rates have been announced. We evaluated the affect on yields with maturities ranging from one to 20 years (x-axis) on PC-days and over PC-cycles. Panel (a) presents average PC-day yield changes conditional on ECB tone becoming more positive (green) or negative (red). Panel (b) plots slope coefficients of regressing PC-day yield changes on changes in ECB tone along with 90% confidence bands based on [White \(1980\)](#) standard errors. Panels (c) and (d) present analogue results for yield changes over PC-cycles with 90% confidence bands based on [Newey and West \(1987\)](#) standard errors.

Figure IA.4: Equity Returns following Press Conferences: Controlling for Policy Actions




This figure shows how changes in ECB tone revealed at the most recent ECB press conference (PC) affect equity returns when controlling for policy actions. Our initial sample spans a total of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. From this sample, we remove press conferences at which changes in ECB policy rates and/or unconventional policy measures have been announced. We plot the coefficients (and 90% confidence bands, based on [Newey and West \(1987\)](#) standard errors) for regressing k -day cumulative returns on changes in tone revealed at the preceding press conference. We evaluate the returns of four Eurozone equity indexes: EuroStoxx 50 (ESX50), the MSCI EMU (MSCI), the MSCI Value EMU (Value), and the MSCI Growth EMU (Growth).

Figure IA.5: ECB Tone and Yield Changes: Controlling for Policy Actions




This figure presents results on how changes in ECB tone affect the yield curve when controlling for policy actions. Our initial sample spans a total of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences (PCs) between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. From this sample, we remove press conferences at which changes in ECB policy rates and/or unconventional policy measures have been announced. We evaluated the affect on yields with maturities ranging from one to 20 years (x-axis) on PC-days and over PC-cycles. Panel (a) presents average PC-day yield changes conditional on ECB tone becoming more positive (green) or negative (red). Panel (b) plots slope coefficients of regressing PC-day yield changes on changes in ECB tone along with 90% confidence bands based on [White \(1980\)](#) standard errors. Panels (c) and (d) present analogue results for yield changes over PC-cycles with 90% confidence bands based on [Newey and West \(1987\)](#) standard errors.

Figure IA.6: Equity Returns following ECB Press Conferences: ‘Tone Shocks’



This figure shows how changes in ECB tone revealed at the most recent ECB press conference (PC) affect equity returns when using ‘tone shocks’ instead of raw tone changes. From our sample of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014, we compute the time series of tone changes, and measure tone shocks as the residuals from an AR(1)-regression. Using these tone shocks, we plot the coefficients (and 90% confidence bands, based on [White \(1980\)](#) standard errors) for regressing k -day cumulative returns on tone shocks revealed at the preceding press conference. We evaluate the returns of four Eurozone equity indexes: EuroStoxx 50 (ESX50), the MSCI EMU (MSCI), the MSCI Value EMU (Value), and the MSCI Growth EMU (Growth).


Figure IA.7: ECB Tone and Yield Changes: ‘Tone Shocks’



This figure presents results on how ECB tone ‘shocks’ affect the yield curve. . From our sample of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014, we compute the time series of tone changes, and measure tone shocks as the residuals from an AR(1)-regression. Using these tone shocks, we evaluated the affect on yields with maturities ranging from one to 20 years (x-axis) on PC-days and over PC-cycles. Panel (a) presents average PC-day yield changes conditional on ECB tone shocks being positive (green) or negative (red). Panel (b) plots slope coefficients of regressing PC-day yield changes on tone shocks along with 90% confidence bands based on [White \(1980\)](#) standard errors. Panels (c) and (d) present analogue results for yield changes over PC-cycles with 90% confidence bands based on [Newey and West \(1987\)](#) standard errors.

Figure IA.8: Equity Excess Returns following ECB Press Conferences


(a) Equity excess returns following press conferences



(continued on next page)

Figure IA.8 (continued)

(b) Coefficients of regressing equity excess returns on tone changes



This figure shows how changes in ECB tone revealed at the most recent ECB press conference (PC) affect equity excess returns. In Panel (a), we plot the average k -day cumulative equity excess returns from $k = 0$ (representing the PC-day return) up to $k = 15$. The green (red) lines plot the average cumulative excess returns on the k -th day after the PC, conditional on the tone being revealed at the press conference having been more positive (negative) compared to the previous one; values are reported in basis points. The dashed blue line represents the average excess return accumulating up to day k after the PC. Panel (b) plots the coefficients (and 90% confidence bands based on [White \(1980\)](#) standard errors) for regressing k -day cumulative returns on changes in tone revealed at the preceding press conference. The sample spans a total of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.