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Citation: Fleischmann, L. (2016). Beyond Paralysis: The Reframing of Israeli Peace Activism Since the Second Intifada. *Peace & Change*, 41(3), pp. 354-385. doi: 10.1111/pech.12162

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Link to published version: <https://doi.org/10.1111/pech.12162>

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BEYOND PARALYSIS: THE RE-FRAMING OF ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM SINCE THE SECOND INTIFADA

by Leonie Fleischmann

ABSTRACT

This article looks at the transformation of Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada. It does this by focusing on the collective action frames of Israeli peace activism, using framing processes from social movement theory to identify and explain shifts in the ideas and beliefs surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Israeli peace activism did not reach a ‘dead-end point’ following the second Intifada but instead took on a new trajectory. While the moderate component of Israeli peace activism may have become paralyzed, unable and unwilling to respond to the prevailing realities, the radical and alternative components continued to act, transforming their ideas and presenting new ways to challenge the conflict. This article suggests that although these groups have not had an impact in the policy arena, their influence comes in the realm of norm entrepreneurship and therefore their efforts should not be overlooked.

Within the vast scholarly literature on Israeli peace activism a conventional perspective prevails in which the movement was “paralyzed” in the wake of the second *Intifada* (Palestinian uprising).¹ Unable and unwilling to respond to the outbreak of violence from the Palestinians and Israel’s response to the uprising, the argument holds, the Israeli peace movement became politically irrelevant, particularly with its acceptance of the unilateral 2005 Disengagement Plan, and all significant peace activities came to a halt. Tamar Hermann’s influential study *The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream* is one of many

that mark the definitive endpoint of all Israeli peacemaking activity at the conclusion of the Second *Intifada*. She asserts,

“...the bitter disappointment with the political chaos and accelerating violence that followed Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the later electoral victory of Hamas in early 2006, led to a complete halt of peace activism in Israel. Not even the...Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006...nor the Annapolis peace initiative of late 2007, were successful in revitalizing the movement, which is admittedly a historical remnant today and no longer a relevant political actuality.”²

Similar studies cite exhaustion and disillusionment, alongside peace activists’ inability to form a coherent agenda in response to the outbreaks of violence in this period, as indications of the decline of the Israeli peace movement. These accounts characterize “the most prominent peace activists” as “silent and disillusioned,” inertly “retir[ing] to the seclusion of their homes.”³ While these scholars are right in arguing that Israeli peace activism has been in decline since the second *Intifada* and that activists have been unable to revitalize activities to a level comparable to the 1980s and 1990s, this decline has only been evident amongst some, as opposed to all, of the activist groups.

This is confirmed through my three-fold typology of Israeli peace activism. Three components of Israeli peace activism can be identified through the ways in which they frame the conflict, a “moderate component”, a “radical component” and an “alternative component”. Such typologies have a strong precedent in the study of peace movements and both Hermann and Kaminer use the terms “radical” and “moderate” to describe different parts of the Israeli peace movement.⁴ Groups within the moderate component frame the conflict through a liberal Zionist lens, which seeks peace for the sake of the continuity and

security of Israel. The paralysis and decline of the Israeli peace movement only refers to these such groups. Groups within the radical component, which tend to focus on the Palestinian narrative of suffering under Israeli military occupation, and the alternative component, which try to balance these two positions, often with a specific human rights frame, have continued to mobilize. Existing groups, such as *Gush Shalom* (Peace Bloc) and *B'Tselem* (The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories), alongside emerging organizations, are a voice that calls for alternative peacebuilding strategies and are the catalysts for challenging the political status quo. The more radical Israeli peace activists and their movements, despite their relative invisibility within the scholarly literature, are far from “paralyzed.”⁵ Israeli peace activism is in a state of flux since the breakdown of the Camp David talks and outbreak of the second *Intifada* in 2000 and so the demarcations into the different components may not be strict; some organizations may display characteristics that cross over into the different components and individual activists may perceive themselves as more ‘radical’ or more ‘moderate’ than the groups they operate within however, key trends in the collective action frames can be identified that enable this typology.

Even among the emerging studies that give attention to some of the groups within the radical and alternative components that have emerged since the second *Intifada*, such as *Anarchistim Neged haGader* (Anarchists Against the Wall) and *Machsom Watch* (Check Point Watch), there is a greater focus on the exogenous factors that affect a peace movement.⁶ Hermann, for example, uses a framework built around political opportunity structures and public opinion to analyze the peace movement from 1993 to 2008.⁷ This leads her to read the marginality of these radical groups within Israeli society as the indicator of political irrelevancy that marks the “dead end point” of the Israeli peace movement. While these groups have been unable to influence policy change, there is much more to the political landscape that demands consideration. Scholars’ tendency to focus on the external factors

that affected Israeli peace activism and to narrowly contextualize it within the Oslo peace process obscures significant internal features. These restrictive frameworks have kept those groups, formulating different ideas surrounding the conflict, outside the scope of scholarly analysis, which has inhibited a full accounting of the impact that these groups have had and are having beyond the policy arena—particularly in the realm of norm entrepreneurship, which refers to the changes that people can make to social norms on which, according to Sunstein, social conditions are dependent.⁸ Unearthing the details that allow for an understanding of the relationship between the different components of Israeli peace activism requires the clear identification of framing processes, which highlight the meaning work behind enduring grassroots Israeli peacebuilding efforts.

In a study of Israeli peace activism from the first *Intifada*, Reuven Kaminer argues that the radical groups were the agenda setters. While *Shalom Achshav* (Peace Now), the largest of the moderate groups, was able to mobilize mass demonstrations, such as 50,000 to 80,000 people in January 1988 against the Government's response to the first *Intifada*, Kaminer emphasizes that it was the pressure of the “small wheel of the bicycle” (the radical component) that pushed the “big wheel” (the moderate component) to take certain positions and mobilize sooner than they would have otherwise.⁹ Ideas that originated in the radical component, such as recognition that the Palestinian Liberation Organization was the true representative of the Palestinian people, diffused into the moderate component of Israeli peace activism and, eventually, into later government policy, highlighting norm entrepreneurship in practice.¹⁰ In the period beginning with the second *Intifada*, however, the “big wheel/little wheel” dynamic no longer held true and a new trajectory in Israeli peace activism can be identified. Although the “big wheel” did slow down, this essay will show that the “small wheel”—the radical component—continued to move and develop new ideas, indicating that not all components of Israeli peace activism became paralyzed.

While it is true that the “big wheel” de-mobilized and moderated their message in order not to antagonize the Israeli public, who were the victims of Palestinian suicide bombs and rockets, thus paralyzing their ability to confront the status quo, the radical groups further radicalized their response by showing concern for the Palestinians under occupation, enabling them to continue to mobilize, leading to a clear polarization in Israeli peace activism rather than complete paralysis. This polarization can be identified in the immediate wake of the outbreak of the second *Intifada*, with the moderate and radical components taking opposing perspectives on the situation. Polarization deepened throughout the 2000s, as the moderate component moved towards the center of the Israeli political spectrum in order to stay in line with mainstream public opinion. This was particularly prominent in the case of *Shalom Achshav*, and exemplified by the appointment of Director Yariv Oppenheimer at the beginning of the second *Intifada*, who continued to conduct his military reserve duty in the West Bank, which he argues to be his “civilian duty.”¹¹ The radical component, in contrast, has further radicalized since the outbreak of the second *Intifada*. This was particularly evident amongst women’s peace groups, as demonstrated by the emergence of the *Koalitziat Nashim l’Shalom* (Coalition of Women for Peace), which evolved from pre-existing female activists, such as the prominent group *Nashim b’Schachor* (Women in Black), but has taken a more explicitly critical approach towards the Israeli government and IDF, stating their “opposition to the militarism that permeates both [Israeli and Palestinian] societies.”¹² In doing so, the more radical groups have challenged mainstream public opinion by holding to account the Israeli authorities in perpetuating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular through the continued occupation of the Palestinians.

The differences between the components of Israeli peace activism are most clearly seen through an analysis of the relationship between universal human rights and the particularistic principles inherent in Zionism in each the components’ positions. The

moderate component shifted to focus almost solely on particularistic concerns, such as the safety, security and continuity of Israel as the Jewish State, removing any pro-Palestinian sentiments from their messaging. Meanwhile, the radical component focused even more directly on universalism by emphasizing the negative impact of the Israeli occupation on the lives of the Palestinians, which has presented an opportunity to challenge the very foundations of a political peace process by refuting the idea that the Israelis and Palestinians are engaged in a symmetrical conflict. Accordingly the radical groups should be considered “anti-occupation” rather than “pro-peace,” which enables them to develop new motivations for acting. The alternative component of Israeli peace activism consists of those groups that are either trying to balance their focus between both the Israeli and Palestinian narratives and concerns or are focusing on revealing violations of Palestinian human rights perpetrated by Israelis, such as the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, which document the demolition of Palestinian homes by the Israeli army. Many of these groups emerged during the first *Intifada* of 1987-1991, and show an attempt to balance the two poles created by the moderate and radical components, either by not prioritizing the claims of one side of the conflict over the other or, by avoiding political discussions and focusing on the realities on the ground. In doing so these groups are also finding new ways to confront the occupation.

Although polarization characterizes the period of Israeli peace activism since the Second *Intifada*, protests were held in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of *Sheikh Jarrah* between 2009 and 2012, which brought together Israeli activists from across the spectrum. Activism in *Sheikh Jarrah* was initiated by a group of radical left-wing Israeli students, with the aim of supporting Palestinian families who were being evicted from their homes in *Sheikh Jarrah*. According to one of the activists, they stayed with the Palestinians in their homes as “an act of solidarity with the families, which cannot really stop evictions but, can delay them a little bit.”¹³ Some of these activists had been involved in *Ta’ayush* (Partnership), one of the

first groups to emerge in the second *Intifada* and a key actor in developing the framing of the radical component, whose activities were built on the basis of “non-violent actions of solidarity to end the Israeli occupation.”¹⁴

Some older activists, who interesting had also been involved in *Ta'ayush* activities in the early 2000s, became aware of the activism in *Sheikh Jarrah* and saw the opportunity to expand the framing of the evictions beyond that of “solidarity” to one of “injustice in the name of Israeli law.”¹⁵ The Palestinian residents were being evicted from their homes, to be immediately replaced by Jewish settlers, who claimed ownership of the properties, on the basis of a particular interpretation of an Ottoman Law. Following Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, the law enabled Jews who had lost property in East Jerusalem in the 1948 war to be able to reclaim it. However, Palestinian property that was abandoned in the 1948 war could not be reclaimed and became state property.¹⁶ By framing the story of *Sheikh Jarrah* in a clear, accessible manner that focused on inequality between Israelis and Palestinians in the face of Israeli law, the activists believed it would draw media attention and encourage the involvement of people who were otherwise unlikely to engage with the radical fringes of peace activism.¹⁷ The protests succeeded in drawing attention to the plight of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem and temporarily halted the evictions.

The careful, moderate framing of what was initially a radical act of solidarity with Palestinian families led to the mobilization of individuals from across the spectrum of Israeli peace activism, demonstrating how strategic framing can assist in enabling the components of Israeli peace activism to mobilize together. In addition, this illuminates the under-explored role of the radical component as the “early risers” who, in reframing approaches to conflict and peacebuilding through “solidarity” and “co-resistance” with the Palestinians under Israeli occupation, paradoxically widen the ideological gulf with the moderates and create the potential for future cooperation among all of the components.¹⁸

This essay explores this seeming paradox and, in doing so, offers a more nuanced treatment of Israeli peacemaking. Its analysis centers upon the framing processes that have made the radical component an effective agent of change and traces the collective action frames of the three components in the immediate wake of the second *Intifada* into the 2010s. Re-centering the recent history of Israeli peace activism from previous scholars' emphasis on the ability for peace activists to influence the political peace process to the ways in which various activists frame "conflict" and "peace" illuminates the specific challenges to new formations of Israeli peace activism, as well as these movements' potential contributions to changing the social norms surrounding the Israeli perspectives over the causes of and issues within the Israeli-Palestinians conflict, and thus the potential for future solutions.¹⁹

METHODOLOGY

The method of data collection was based on qualitative methods, in line with other studies conducted on Israeli peace activism.²⁰ The study of Israeli peace activism is in many respects the study of narratives of those individuals and groups involved in activism. Qualitative research methods allow for an appreciation of the individual's understandings, experiences and interactions, rather than testing the correlations between previously defined variables.²¹ This research was therefore conducted as a semi-ethnographic study. Fieldwork was conducted in Israel between January 2013 and July 2013 to collect interviews from a variety of activists, core leadership, administrative personnel, and broader members.²² I also attended events and tours during my fieldwork in order to conduct some participant observation and gain first-hand experience. I attended a range of activities, across the different components of Israeli peace activism, in order to gain a broad picture. These included tours in the West Bank and Jerusalem run by activist groups, demonstrations in Israeli towns, solidarity actions in the West Bank, discussion groups amongst activists, humanitarian envoys to Palestinian villages and peace education workshops between Israelis

and Palestinians. Primary sources were also gathered through the websites of the organizations, calls for action via emails, as well as blogs written by activists. Secondary data was gathered mainly from newspaper articles and alternative media sites. Other studies on individual groups and autobiographical accounts were also consulted.

The data has been analyzed through the method of traditional qualitative analysis with the goal of identifying the underlying collective action frames and framing processes that highlight and account for the ideas, beliefs, problem identification and solutions of the groups being studied. Whilst Israeli peace activism may not constitute a social movement, few phenomena will meet the strict, detailed definition of a social movement yet, elements of social movement theory have been widely applied to a number of cases of activism that fall short of fully-fledged movements.²³ Looking at collective action frames is a way of delving into the internal features of a social movement to understand how the activists view the prevailing realities. Disaggregating and highlighting the meaning work of a social movement is important because, “whatever else social movement actors do, they seek to affect interpretations of reality among various audiences. They engage in this framing work because they assume, rightly or wrongly, that meaning is prefatory to action.”²⁴

The concept of “frames” was first identified by Goffman and was later followed by Gamson, Fireman & Rytina’s concept of “injustice frames,” which can be identified in the case of Israeli peace activism.²⁵ Some theorists have focused on the collective and organizational processes of framing, which helps to understand a movement as a whole or the interactions between components and individual organizations.²⁶ This requires attention to be given to how certain organizations or components have chosen to collectively frame themselves in response to certain situations. In addition, Johnston & Klandermans identify that the ‘true location’ of a frame is in the mind of an activist and therefore close attention has also been given to interviews conducted with activists.²⁷ In analyzing the framing

processes this paper will provide a detailed study of the meaning work that Israeli activists are engaged in, providing a different angle from which to understand the trajectory of Israeli peace activism.

Although the focus of this study is on the collective action frames of Israeli peace activism, the context in which these frames developed must be outlined in order to provide a full understanding. In social movement theory the exogenous factors are known as “political opportunity structures” and refer to the factors in the external environment that facilitate or constrain activism, such as the nature of the government, security discourse, and cultural norms.²⁸ However, political opportunity structures are only opportunities or threats if they are perceived as such; they should not be treated as “objective,” but viewed instead from the perspective of the social movement actors.²⁹ According to Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, the fate of a social movement is “heavily shaped by their own actions.”³⁰ This highlights the important role of agency in social movement theory and therefore the centrality of the meaning work being done not only in response to the prevailing realities but also despite them. Therefore, some context will be given to shed light on the shifting collective action frames.

The choice to set the demarcation point of this study at the start of the second *Intifada* in late 2000 is also a deliberate one. Given this analysis is focused on the internal dynamics, it is suitable to provide a demarcation point that represents a turning point in the internal dynamics of Israeli peace activism. Just as 1978 represented an internal shift in Israeli peace activism, with the consolidation of disparate peace attempts into something that resembled a movement, in 2000 another internal shift occurred in Israeli peace activism with the polarization of the components and significant shifts in framing processes and collective action frames.

Some clarification over the use of certain terms is necessary at this stage. Hermann explains that the term “Israeli peace movement” is an “analytical construct rather than a concrete entity,” noting that the “movement” was always comprised of various individual organizations and groups that held different underlying beliefs and ideas about the conflict.³¹ She bases her use of the term “peace movement” upon the fact that many groups saw themselves as one body that was opposed to the national camp and that many outsiders also saw distinct peace organizations as one movement.³² I have chosen, however, to use the term “Israeli peace activism” as the overarching analytical unit of this study. This is for two main reasons. First, it helps in distinguishing the periods in which the groups were more or less fragmented; I use the term “peace movement” in the period when there was an organization that was capable of rallying together hundreds of thousands of participants and when the other groups would join them for mass demonstrations. I use the term “Israeli peace activism” at times when there was more fragmentation, such as in the first decades of the State and the period post-2000. Secondly, the term “Israeli peace movement” has become a euphemism for the liberal Zionist camp and therefore does not encapsulate the full range of groups that are operating.

Complexities also arise in describing the activists as Israeli “peace” activists, since some within the radical and alternative components reject the label “peace” activists. They explain that the term “peace” is associated with the political peace process and the goals of the moderate component, which they seek to distance themselves from.³³ The nature and framing of their activism, as challenging the realities on the ground, suggests that the term “anti-occupation” activists would be more accurate to describe them. However, in order to maintain analytic simplicity and a comparative element with previous studies, the term Israeli “peace” activism will continue to be used.

POLARIZATION IN THE WAKE OF THE SECOND INTIFADA

Despite the brief alignment of the moderate and radical components of Israeli peace activism in supporting Ehud Barak at Camp David II, the failure of the summit sparked a progressive polarization between the moderate and radical components, with the two taking opposing positions in response to Barak's post-summit rhetoric that there was "no partner for peace on the Palestinian side."³⁴ *Shalom Achshav* and the moderate component maintained a similar prognostic framing from the previous phase, particularly the strategy of not positioning themselves too far in front on public opinion with respect to the conflict, in order not to "lose the public."³⁵ In the face of low levels of support for the Oslo process among the Israeli Jewish public, the moderates strategically accepted Barak's rhetoric and made a "very strong effort, a direct effort to change [their] image to be moderate" by ridding themselves of any pro-Palestinian sentiments.³⁶ The wave of suicide bombings conducted by some Palestinians reinforced the need for this shift in the collective action frames of the moderate component as the Israeli public "lost faith" in the peace process. Furthermore, many within the movement, including some of the leadership felt betrayed by the Palestinians, even if their contacts were not the ones perpetrating the violence, and wanted to "change the image" of *Shalom Achshav* to be "more conservative."³⁷ In line with their traditional strategy, *Shalom Achshav* has continued with a pragmatic as opposed to a principled approach, which meant a reduction in calls for large scale protests and a shift in their diagnostic framing to an even more focused attention on the settlements as the main obstacle to peace.³⁸ The strategy of *Shalom Achshav* is summed up by Hagit Ofran, the Director of their Settlement Watch Project, "We try to influence public opinion. Influencing public opinion requires that we relate to the political agenda so our message resonates within public discourse...[we] attempt to speak the language mainstream Israelis might be able to listen to – or at least the media that nourishes what the mainstream can accept."³⁹

In stark contrast, the radical left refused to accept Barak's rhetoric and shifted its prognostic framing, which involved giving up promoting a political solution and further radicalizing as the *Intifada* progressed. According to peace activist Irit Halperin, "[t]he second *Intifada* showed that the peace camp had to use a much more radical perspective that would be able to confront the mainstream belief [that the Palestinians continually rejected peace offers from Israel and therefore did not want peace] about the reasons for the conflict and the ways to resolve it. Resisting the mainstream ideology gave these groups the capability to confront the traditional meaning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."⁴⁰ This radicalization can be identified in the shifts in the way in which the radical component framed the conflict, its origins, and viable solutions. New groups, most notably *Ta'ayush*, and *Anarchistim Neged Ha'Gader* in the radical component and *Shovrim Shtika* (Breaking the Silence) and *Machsom Watch* in the alternative component, emerged finding new ways to challenge Israeli leaders' approaches to and framing of the conflict. Their ability to continue to operate as activity within the moderate component slowed, can be explained through the framing processes they underwent and how they perceived the political opportunity structures.

POLARIZATION DEEPENED: UNIVERSALISM VS PARTICULARISM

Continuous shifts in the context in which the activists were operating and their perceptions of these, namely the continuation and heightening of the second *Intifada* and the Israeli response to it, the erection of the Separation Barrier, the Hamas take-over of Gaza, and the Israeli operations in Gaza that followed, led to the deepening of the polarization between the moderate component and the radical component, with the alternative component presenting collective action frames that in some ways showed signs of balancing the two poles.⁴¹ The differing trajectories of moderate and radical components can be most clearly determined and understood through an analysis of the extent to which activists within each

component emphasize universal or particularistic principles in framing issues of conflict and peacebuilding. Whilst all components are acting with the aim to end the occupation, there is a difference in the motivations behind this; whether removing the occupation is an end in itself, as the radical component would argue, or a means to an end, as the moderate component has always proposed. A tension had always been present in the Zionist movement between universal principles of humanity and the particularism of Zionism and this tension was historically reflected in the Israeli peace movement, with *Shalom Achshav* in particular struggling to reconcile the two.⁴² This can be seen in their reports on the settlements. In the details of their reports there is often reference to the human rights impact of the settlements on the Palestinians yet, their central framing of the problem of the settlements stresses the particularism of Zionism, whereby “settlements... represent an existential threat to Israel as a Jewish, democratic state.”⁴³ Similarly, the external framing in its peak years in the 1980s prioritized the importance of peace for the sake of the security of Israel whilst internally, members were often involved in activities, such as demonstrations, sit-ins and dialogue activities, in the West Bank that were aimed at reducing harm experienced by the Palestinians. Since the second *Intifada*, *Shalom Achshav* has shifted towards an even more particularistic approach, focusing on the future of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, in its attempt to stay relevant to mainstream public opinion.

The radical left, while also concerned with the settlements, diverges from the moderate component in that the groups are exclusively centered on universal principles, which emerges as a focus on the suffering of the Palestinians under occupation. *Ta'ayush* developed the following collective action frame in the wake of the second *Intifada*, with a central message that emphasizes rights for all, “Together we strive for a future of equality, justice and peace through concrete, daily, non-violent actions of solidarity to end the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and to achieve full civil equality for all.”⁴⁴

Their activity reports consistently focus on the negative impact of the settlements, settlers and Israeli army presence on the daily lives of the Palestinians.⁴⁵ Having rejected the state narrative that prioritizes Israeli security above all, the radicals are able to present innovative and confrontational collective action frames. The alternative component seems to be attempting to balance the two poles, with the groups situating themselves across a spectrum that sits in between the collective action frames of the radical and moderate groups.

The shifts in collective action frames have also led to a shift in the tactics that are employed by the different organizations and groups. This is a further means of demarcating the components, with more radical collective actions frames allowing for more confrontational tactics. This is seen in weekly demonstrations against the Separation Barrier, in Palestinian villages such as Bi'ilin and Nabi Saleh, where members of the more radical groups, in particular *Anarchistim Neged HaGader*, demonstrate in direct opposition to the Israeli army, alongside Palestinian activists. These demonstrations often turn violent, with Palestinians throwing rocks and the Israeli army shooting tear gas or rubber-coated bullets at the activists. In contrast, as will be further explained below, *Lochamim l'Shalom* (Combatants for Peace), a central group in the alternative component, make every attempt to avoid these violent confrontations, despite also conducting demonstrations against the Israeli army and in solidarity with the Palestinians.

The Moderate Component: Sticking with Consensus

Shalom Achshav has continued its efforts to rid itself of pro-Palestinian sentiments since the second *Intifada*. They sought advice from public relations (PR) companies on how to attract the Israeli public and, along with a new member of *Shalom Achshav* who worked in PR, advised the organization on how they could come across “more Israeli.”⁴⁶ One pertinent example of how they promoted this new image was the creation of a new flag. The original

flag has the words “Shalom Achshav” written in Hebrew letters in black and red on a white background. The new flag has the word “Shalom” written in Hebrew letters in blue inside two horizontal blue lines on a white background, which closely mirrors the Israeli flag, thus demonstrating the patriotism of the organization.⁴⁷ The moderate peace movement continues to be informed by a liberal Zionist ideology, which is outlined by Yossi Beilin, the initiator of the 1993 Oslo Agreements and of the 2003 Geneva Initiative, “[w]e [the Zionist left] have a deep belief in the right of the Jewish people to a democratic and secure state, which has a stable Jewish majority: the state of the Jewish people and all of its citizens. We are convinced our national interest is in completing the moves towards peace with the Palestinians, Syria and Lebanon, and that there is no alternative to an agreement.”⁴⁸

A number of framing processes can be identified in the moderate component’s attempt to stay relevant to their primary target audience: the Israeli public. Frame extension, the process of adding other issues to the primary concern of the social movement organization, can be seen in *Shalom Achshav*’s criticism of the West Bank settlements as the “main obstacle for peace.”⁴⁹ Their Settlement Watch Project has become the central *raison d’être* of *Shalom Achshav*, and arguably the only effective strategy it currently has in promoting a two-state solution.⁵⁰ They track settlement building and use any expansions to argue that the facts on the ground show that possibility of a two-state solution is in jeopardy. Most of the Israeli public still believes in a two-state solution; however, they are skeptical about the likelihood or possibility of implementation.⁵¹ The Settlement Watch Project gives *Shalom Achshav* a tool with which to pressure the Israeli public to act on its belief in a two-state solution.

However, the aftermath of the 2005 unilateral disengagement of Israel from Gaza (which *Shalom Achshav* supported) and the rise of Hamas has meant that the doctrine of “land for peace,” on which the criticism of settlements is based, no longer holds resonance

amongst the Israeli public. The concept that peace would bring security was destabilized as, arguably, the peace process only led to increased personal insecurity for Israeli citizens. In recognition of this, the moderate peace movement tried to re-sell the two-state solution through frame transformation, the process of shifting old understandings and beliefs regarding an area of contention or creating new ideas, and frame amplification, the process of “embellishing, clarifying or invigorating” existing understandings and beliefs, that argues for its necessity as “the only solution that will ensure the future of Israel as Jewish and democratic.”⁵² According to Yariv Oppenheimer, the former Director General of *Shalom Achshav*, “if Israel will continue to control the West Bank, we [Israel] are going to lose our identity either as a Jewish State or as a democratic state.”⁵³ A sense of urgency is added to the framing given by *Shalom Achshav*, with the claim that “the window of opportunity” for a two-state solution is coming to an end.⁵⁴ However, despite these attempts to shake the Israeli public into mobilizing behind the two-state solution through re-framing their message, there was little response in support of *Shalom Achshav*. This can be explained in part due to a growing dislike for *Shalom Achshav*, with a poll conducted in August 2009 finding that 41 percent of respondents felt that *Shalom Achshav* had caused damage to Israel, and partly due to the shifts in the Israeli political climate and Israeli public opinion.⁵⁵

Israeli public opinion has shifted towards the political center and right, with the issue of security remaining a prominent concern. This has meant that the moderate component no longer has the support of hundreds and thousands to take to the streets to demand peace. Furthermore, the political parties which the moderate peace movement has traditionally been closest to, *Meretz* and *Avoda*, have seen declining support. Combined they held 15.9 percent of the votes in the 2013 elections compared with 34.2 percent of votes in the 1996 elections, whereas there has been a rise in right-wing parties. Having few allies within the Government to lobby, combined with the unwillingness of the moderate peace movement to overly

challenge the Israeli public with regards to ending the occupation and the arguably successful diffusion of the concept of a two-state solution into Israeli public opinion, has meant that the moderate peace component has, as concluded by Hermann, become “politically irrelevant.”⁵⁶ Galia Golan, a former leader and spokesperson for *Shalom Achshav*, expressed her disappointment that the organization did not follow the direction of some of the alternative and radical components. In speaking about *Lochamim l'Shalom*, she expressed her affiliation with them, “I feel 100% at home with them and they are doing what I feel *Shalom Achshav* should be doing - what we used to do. The trips to the territories, the dialogues with the Palestinians, joint activities with the Palestinians. We did all these things, running round in *Silwan* [a Palestinian neighborhood in East Jerusalem], we were the ones running around on the rooftops in *Silwan* saying “don’t do this.”⁵⁷ However, the decision to moderate their framing has meant *Shalom Achshav* has been unable to be as confrontational as she would have liked.

The Radical Component: Challenging Consensus

Since the radical groups are not focused on mobilizing the Israeli public nor do they perceive an opportunity to influence the Israeli government, they do not need to moderate their message to appeal to the mainstream and are therefore able to be more confrontational. In doing so have developed new ideas and understandings of the conflict. Some are critical of the moderate component for accepting the basic concepts behind a Jewish state, which entails some non-universalistic characteristics and choose instead to focus solely on the negative impacts of the Israeli military occupation on the lives of the Palestinians, such as restrictions of movement, collective punishment and house demolitions.⁵⁸ They criticize *Shalom Achshav* in particular for failing to acknowledge the Palestinian historical narrative as an oppressed people and for not “confront[ing] history from the standpoint of the oppressed.”⁵⁹ According to *Gush Shalom*, the role of Israeli peace activism following the collapse of Camp David was to “lead public opinion to a brave reassessment of the national “narrative” and rid it of false

myths.”⁶⁰ This has manifested through a number of framing processes, which present examples of norm entrepreneurship in practice.

“Harm reduction,” for instance, became a central tenet of the radical left, with activities involving “going to places where the occupation and expulsion actually take place,” with the explicit aim to “confront racism and discrimination where they happen.”⁶¹ This is reflective of some of the radical groups and often members of *Shalom Achshav* in the previous phase, which began demonstrating in places where the Israeli army or Israeli settlers were harming or violating the rights of the Palestinians, such as at checkpoints, during the olive harvest, or through house demolitions. However, in this current phase, such solidarity actions define the identity of the activist groups and are not merely a part of their tactical repertoires, representing a process of frame transformation, with the terms “co-resistance” and “solidarity” replacing the concept of “co-existence” that characterized the movement’s aims, identity and tactics in previous phases.⁶² One of the first groups to emerge along these lines, and as a result of the events of the second *Intifada*, was *Ta’ayush*, which created the framework of joint Arab-Jewish humanitarian solidarity activism that underlay much of the collective action frames and tactical repertoires of the radical left in this phase.⁶³ According to Kaminer, “*Ta’ayush* discovered something, that people in the radical left did not believe in any kind of political process so, instead of organizing a demonstration with 150 people by the Prime Minister’s office, they said, “let’s fill up a truck with goods and go to one of the areas and bring them stuff.”⁶⁴

The focus on the realities on the ground led the radical component and some groups within the alternative component to reject the term “peace,” citing it as an abstract concept and one only to be associated with *Shalom Achshav* and the Oslo Peace Accords, which they argued favored the Israeli side.⁶⁵ Many groups within the radical left have shifted to referring to themselves as “anti-occupation, anti-apartheid, anti-wall,” activists as opposed to “peace”

activists, representing what one activist called the maturation of the peace movement, as opposed to its death.⁶⁶ Some have also transformed their prognostic framing to center on “justice” and “equality,” which brings them closer to the global social justice movement. This can be seen in the mission statements of the radical groups, such as *Ta’ayush* and the *Koalitziat Nadhim l’Shalom* respectively:

Together we strive for a future of equality, justice and peace through concrete, daily, non-violent actions of solidarity to end the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and to achieve full civil equality for all.⁶⁷

The vision of peace is indivisible from the vision of justice and equality. We seek to install all three principles into all aspects of Israeli society.⁶⁸

One example of how the language of “justice” and “equality” has affected the prognostic framing of the radical groups is the emphasis on 1948 as the beginning of the Israeli occupation as opposed to since the aftermath of the 1967 war, which is the starting point for the moderate component. *Zochrot* (Remembering) is an Israeli organization that seeks to raise awareness of the Palestinian *Nakba* (Catastrophe) of 1948 in the Israeli Jewish consciousness and supports the right of return for Palestinian refugees, something that is almost taboo amongst Israeli society. According to one of the founders, the organization was built following a “provocative piece in *Ha’aretz*, which challenged the nationalist position.”⁶⁹ The focus on historical narratives represents a frame transformation that can be linked to the work of New Historians such as Avi Shlaim and Ilan Pappé. In framing themselves in this way, they have been able to develop joint actions with Palestinians and Palestinian Citizens of Israel. This was seen in the demonstrations against the Gaza Operations, with a veteran activist Hannah Safran arguing that “something else has developed on the ruins of the old

Zionist left.”⁷⁰ This identifies the importance of collective action frames in not only presenting new ideas but also in affecting the suitability of certain tactics and participants.

Universal human rights can also be identified underlying the discourse of “haves” and “have-nots” that is particularly prevalent in the young generation of activists. A process of frame-bridging can be identified in the connections that are made between the oppression inherent in the occupation with oppression in other areas of Israeli society, such as the lower socioeconomic sector of the *Mizrahi* community, women, refugees and migrant workers.⁷¹ These groups seek to combat all forms of oppression whilst being constantly aware of their privilege as mainly *Ashkenazi* educated Jews and the need to empower the oppressed peoples to form their own struggles.⁷² This is also an example of frame extension, whereby the identified struggle has extended beyond that of peace or ending the occupation to one of combatting all forms of oppression, which are seen as intertwined with each other. *Tarabut-Hithabrut* (Come Together/Associate) was formed out of members of *Ta’ayush* with these principles in mind. They argued that whilst the goals and work of *Ta’ayush* were extremely important and had managed to shift the discourse among the radical left, something with a wider participant base that could form into a political movement was needed. One activist described how a movement made up of “Jews that were usually extremely privileged, mostly white *Ashkenazi* and mostly intellectual, cannot be a proper grassroots movement for long term political change.”⁷³ *Tarabut-Hithabrut* is a front of the *Hadash* political party and seeks to empower those from oppressed communities to “free themselves” and identify not as victims of different social ills, but as activists struggling against their shared oppression.⁷⁴ This frame extension has had the effect of shifting the identity of activists within the Israeli left, with the division between those who are represented within the movement and those who are not, more closely associated with class division than the ethnic divisions of the previous phases.⁷⁵ While the peace activists remain predominantly *Ashkenazi*, middle-class Jews, there

is a greater awareness of the need to expand the membership to marginalized groups. There is greater potential for this due to the identified shifts in the collective action frames that make Israeli peace activism more inclusive to other activists.

The radicalization in the collective action frames also enabled the employment of more confrontational tactics. Since the radical component was not concerned with influencing the Israeli public and not constrained by the state narrative, they were able to use more radical tactics. The most prominent example is that of *Anarchistim Neged HaGader*. Regular demonstrations in the form of nonviolent resistance against the Separation Barrier were incorporated in the tactics of Israeli peace activism in 2003 following a four-month protest camp formed by Palestinian, Israeli, and international activists in the Palestinian village of *Mas'ha*, whose land was being cut off due to the erection of the Separation Barrier. Each week Israeli activists travel to the West Bank to join Palestinians in resisting the Separation Barrier, which has spread to different Palestinian villages, most notably *Bil'in*, *Nabi Saleh* and *Al Ma'asara*.⁷⁶ These demonstrations involve directly confronting the IDF, which is not widely accepted in Israeli society, due to the high regard given to the army, which is based on compulsory conscription. The actions against the IDF therefore further separate the radical component from the moderate component. The collective action frames of the radical component since the second *Intifada* has led to their further marginalization in Israeli society and the moderate component has been quick to disassociate themselves from the radical left, although they too are considered a marginal sector of society.

The Alternative Component: Trying to Reconcile Differences

Groups within the alternative component seem to be responding to the increasing polarization in two ways: first, by attempting to balance or reconcile universalism and particularistic values in their framing and activities; and second by shifting their attention to

revealing hidden realities. While this may have provided an alternative entry point for new activists, it also signifies further the fragmentation of Israeli peace activism.

A joint Israeli-Palestinian group emerged toward the end of the second *Intifada* that can be seen as representing a balance between the frames of the moderate and radical components. *Lochamim l'Shalom* was formed by a group of ex-combatants from both sides. It was conceived of by an Israeli, Yonatan Shapira, who in October 2003 initiated a group of Israeli Air Force Pilots to refuse missions over the Palestinian Territories. Those involved felt, however, that the debate needed to extend beyond the Israeli side and to reach those Palestinians who had been involved in violence and were now opposed to it and, following a series of secret discussions, *Lochamim l'Shalom* was born.⁷⁷ In what can be described as a series of attempts to balance Universalist humanism with Zionism, *Lochamim l'Shalom* has succeeded in attracting significant numbers of new members.⁷⁸ In particular, they conduct solidarity and resistance activities to condemn the suffering of the Palestinians but remain clear in their goal of a two-state solution that allows Israeli participants to maintain a Zionist outlook, as confirmed by the bi-national identity of the group, as opposed to a Palestinian solidarity group. They conduct dialogue activities in order for the two sides to get to know each other but are clear that they are not a “dialogue” group based on the contact hypothesis.⁷⁹ The group is also open to non-combatants, given their belief that in “militarized societies such as ours [Israeli and Palestinian] everyone was in one way or another involved in the violence” and that in order to bring change “[they] needed everybody.”⁸⁰

While there are some clear similarities with groups in the radical component, in particular the solidarity actions in the West Bank, *Lochamin l'Shalom* attempts to distance themselves from the radical component, and keeping in line with their framing, have developed creative methods in their tactics to emphasize the nonviolent nature of their protest. Unlike the radical groups, such as *Anarchistim Neged HaGader*, *Lochamin L'Shalom*

does not want to provoke violence nor confront the IDF in an overt manner. One activist says of its activities, “We avoid violence because the army can be very violent; they are just kids and they are terrified...we play football in front of the army, we have flown kites...we try to come with something original.”⁸¹ The combination of these collective action frames with less confrontational tactics has shown signs of success in terms of mobilizing the Israeli public. Around 2,500 people attended their joint Israeli-Palestinian Memorial Day Ceremony in 2013.⁸²

The second way in which the alternative component is arguably striking a balance between the moderate and radical components is by focusing on revealing the hidden realities of occupation. Whilst the radical component has framed itself in a way that ignores the Israeli public and the moderate component avoids developing frames that are too confrontational for the Israeli public, groups in the alternative component are challenging the Israeli public by reporting on human rights violations. A number of groups, such as *B'tselem* and ACRI (The Association for Civil Rights in Israel) were involved in these activities in the previous phase of Israeli peace activism, particularly since the first *Intifada*. However, given the shifting political context, particularly the humanitarian situation in Gaza, more groups have emerged with the aim of bringing the Israeli public out of its apathy, ignorance or denial.⁸³ These groups provide reports on the civil and human rights situations in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. In doing so, they raise awareness of the harm caused to the Palestinians by the Israeli occupation, showing similarities with the radical component, without criticizing the liberal Zionist ideology of the moderate component. In doing this, the alternative component presents a less confrontational collective action frame than the radical component, yet continues to put forward ideas that challenge public consensus.

The human rights groups are keen to differentiate themselves from the political groups (both radical and moderate) by eschewing an emphasis on solidarity in favor of taking a

rights-based approach by working on cases or issues that could meet the criteria for a human rights violation set by the international community. However, there is an understanding amongst the activists that the Israeli public may not be open to the language of human rights. Hagai El-Ad from ACRI noted that these organizations “need to think about how to make human rights relevant to people that are less secular, less liberal and have a different set of values than the liberal, secular set of values.”⁸⁴ This affects the way in which the leadership of groups within the alternative component present their mission and activities; or, in other words, the way in which they construct their collective action frames. According to Tania Hary of the human rights organization, *Gisha* (Legal Centre for Freedom of Movement),

We define ourselves in the community of human rights organizations...we do not see ourselves as a peace organization or a political organization per se because we are working within the framework of human rights and International Law. It is important for us to do that and maintain that professionalism in order to make the message heard. Of course we are identified with the left but...we are trying to say that respect for human rights should not be an issue that is reserved for the left or leftist discourse.⁸⁵

A number of other Israeli NGOs outside the human rights community, have also emerged with similar missions to dispel the ignorance of many Israelis of the realities on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza, motivated by the belief that, “people need to know what is going on to make changes, to try and achieve something.”⁸⁶ *Ir Amim* (City of People) and *Emek Shaveh* (Valley of Worth) focus their efforts on Jerusalem in order to “raise awareness about what is being done in Jerusalem, what the implications are, what the complexities are.”⁸⁷ *Ir Amim* looks at the ramifications of the policies in Jerusalem in terms of politics, security and humanitarian issues, highlighting the complexities and the differences between Jewish neighborhoods and Palestinian neighborhoods. *Emek Shaveh* focuses on the role of

archaeology in political conflict, arguing that archaeology is political because the archaeologists get to decide what will be seen and what will not.⁸⁸ The aim of the organization is to “explain the role of archaeology in the conflict and to understand how it has influenced life here,” since they believe that “Israelis are not aware that archaeology is a political tool at all.”⁸⁹

Shovrim Shtika is a unique organization that centers its work upon the testimonies of Israeli soldiers who have served in the West Bank and Gaza, starting with those who were active in the second *Intifada*. They aim to, “make heard the voices of these soldiers, pushing Israel to face the reality whose creation it has enabled.”⁹⁰ In highlighting this disconnect between the experiences of soldiers and life as a civilian, the organization also frames itself as a safe space for soldiers to verbalize what they have been through, rather than keeping it to themselves, as is expected of them. In this sense they create the space for soldiers to “break the silence,” which in turn breaks some of the illusions that much of the Israeli public held to, and perhaps even identified themselves by.

Despite their careful attempts to balance universal and particularistic values, the groups within the alternative component have not succeeded in engaging the Israeli public. In order to maintain momentum and ensure an audience, the international community has become increasingly important target for Israeli peace activism, both in terms of attracting resources and ideological support.

TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

For those in the radical component who have given up on mobilizing the Israeli public, and those from the alternative component who wish to expand their audience, the international community has become a central dimension to attract. For the radical component, there is a connection with transnational social movements that are also focused

on the Palestinian struggle, such as The International Solidarity Movement and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) Movement. *Anarchistim Neged HaGader* activists in particular feel connected to these movements and believe that they “are more an extension of the international movement in Israel than an extension of the Israeli movement.”⁹¹ While connecting with these movements may provide material capacity in the form of funding and may give the activists momentum in the face of an unresponsive domestic scene, they only serve to further decrease the legitimacy of the radical groups within Israel, particularly since the passing of the Anti-Boycott Law in 2011 that “prohibits the public promotion of boycott by Israeli citizens and organizations against Israeli institutions or illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank [and] it enables the filing of civil lawsuits against anyone who calls for boycott.”⁹²

The groups in the alternative component seek to influence public opinion and decision makers in other countries by disseminating their reports in English. The human rights groups were particularly active in response to the developing humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, due to restrictions of goods to and from the area and the military operations conducted by Israel that killed thousands of Palestinian civilians. In November 2006, eight organizations issued a joint statement on the “Gaza humanitarian Crisis,” and following each of the three major operations in 2008/9, 2012, and 2014 they produced reports of Israel’s use of force in the Gaza strip.⁹³ These reports sought to encourage the international community to play a role in ensuring that “Israel respect the basic human rights of residents of the Gaza Strip, and that all parties respect International humanitarian law.”⁹⁴ With the Israeli public and government are unwilling to listen or accept the content of these reports, the international community became the primary target. This suggests a situation reflective of Keck and Sikkink’s boomerang process, whereby when domestic actors cannot influence their own public or

government, they appeal to international actors to lobby their own governments to put pressure on Israel.⁹⁵

The groups also conduct “alternative” tours to the West Bank for foreigners visiting Israel. Similar tours had been conducted prior to the second *Intifada* by peace activists, but in this phase the tours were specifically aimed at revealing hidden narratives and raising awareness of Palestinian suffering as part of the alternative faction’s goal to remove the Israeli “state of denial.” The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions explains the aim of their tours as an attempt provide participants with “an overview of some of the main issues facing a population living under occupation; house demolitions, displacement, education, refugees, water, lack of freedom of movement, women's issues and discrimination within the state of Israel.”⁹⁶ Although these groups are not acting alongside “anti-Israel” or “pro-Palestinian” groups, their attempts to speak to the international community only reinforce their marginality at home.

RETURNING TO THE ISRAELI PUBLIC: INJUSTICE FRAMING PROVES SUCCESSFUL

Despite the polarization and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism in the period since the second *Intifada*, alongside the difficulties the moderate component had in mobilizing the Israeli public, the story of *Sheikh Jarrah* shows the continued relevance of Israeli peace activism. In particular it confirms the argument that the radical component are norm entrepreneurs and shows that they have the potential to mobilize activists beyond the radical fringes.

The initial identification of the injustice towards the Palestinian residents, the solidarity actions conducted by the radical students and the strategic framing that followed led to the mobilization of the largest solidarity group that the radical left has managed to

gather from across the political spectrum, with an estimated five thousand people protesting in *Sheikh Jarrah* in March 2010.⁹⁷ While the initial involvement of activists was borne out of the radical left framing of Palestinian solidarity, it was because of the “clear-cut story of inequality in the face of the law,” as well as the unthreatening location of the protests, a fifteen- minute walk from the center of Jewish West Jerusalem and along the bus route to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in a “fairly safe middle-class Palestinian neighborhood” that brought out members of the moderate component, temporarily bridging the chasm that had become entrenched between the moderate and radical left.⁹⁸ This episode in Israeli peace activism provides an example of successful framing originating from the radical component, which was based on an injustice frame that is centered on human rights, without directly challenging a Zionist ideology or state narrative.

The swell of Israeli peace activism in *Sheikh Jarrah* did not last more than a few years, however, due to a number of reasons. With particular reference to the issue of framing, an ideological disagreement arose within the core group between those who wanted to use the opportunity to push their more radical agenda and those that felt that “purity of heart” would be at the cost of effectiveness in building a mass movement.⁹⁹ “Purity of heart” refers to maintaining solidarity with the Palestinian families in *Sheikh Jarrah* in case of future eviction orders, whereas other argued that moving on to other cases of injustice was needed to help build a movement. This is connected to a common phenomenon, as explained by postmodern ideas on social and cultural fragmentation, particularly within left-wing movements, whereby critique and ideological commitment can cause fragmentation and are sometimes undertaken in contradiction with pragmatic developments.¹⁰⁰ Despite the inability to maintain the protests in *Sheikh Jarrah* nor transport the same intensity of demonstrations to other Palestinian neighborhoods also facing similar evictions, the case of *Sheikh Jarrah* highlights the

important role of the radical component and the possibility of reconciling the differences amongst the different components of Israeli peace activism.

CONCLUSION: NORM ENTREPRENEUNERSHIP IN PRACTICE

The challenge of developing a master frame that will accommodate all components and groups is, however, particularly difficult in this current phase of Israeli peace activism due to the polarization and fragmentation between the radical, moderate and alternative components, which is compounded by dissension within each component. The ways in which they frame themselves, the underlying problems and their proposed solutions are in stark contrast with one another, making any formal coordination or unification unlikely. However, despite the inability to present a unified front or to affect government policy, Israeli peace activism has undergone interesting and potentially important framing processes, which has created new collective action frames that have opened up new opportunities for mobilization and change.

This is particularly true for the radical component which, through a process of radicalization, is reassessing the origins of the conflict and reframing ways in which to confront it. By focusing on universal values, such as justice and equality, they are shifting the meaning of “peace” and how it can be achieved. Although at present their activities are focused on alleviating the suffering of the Palestinians and ignoring the Israeli public, this process of norm entrepreneurship highlights the fact that not all components of Israeli peace activism were paralyzed in the wake of the second *Intifada* and points towards the “early riser” role that the radical component has traditionally played.

Given the paralysis of the moderate component as it moved toward the center of the Israeli political spectrum, the alternative component could be arguably be starting to assume the “big wheel” function that moderate component once did in the “big wheel/small wheel”

dynamic. The “new moderate component” will continue to call for a two-state solution (or some variant of it) but will use collective action frames and tactical repertoires that are more confrontational, which were developed by the radical component in the period since the second *Intifada* in 2000. This can already be seen in the alternative component’s attempt to focus on revealing hidden realities, where they attempt to encourage the Israeli public to “wake-up” to the Palestinian predicament, without challenging the foundations of the Jewish State. This is evident in the annual joint Israeli and Palestinian Memorial Ceremony of *Lochamim l’Shalom*, which is held on the national Israeli Memorial Day and commemorates the losses on both sides, emphasizes the need to end the occupation, whilst calling for two states existing side by side in peace.¹⁰¹ This presents a more radical position than the moderate component, without focusing solely on the Palestinian experiences of the conflict. The effect of these shifting dynamics has meant that the moderate component has become redundant, but the alternative component and radical component have maintained their momentum. In an era marked by the growing marginalization of peace activists, an Israeli public that seems content with the status quo and a progressively more right wing government, the alternative and radical components present the new ideas and actions to challenge the status quo, confirming the argument that not all components of Israeli peace activism became paralyzed and should encourage the continual assessment of their role as norm entrepreneurs.

NOTES

¹ See in particular Tamar Hermann, *The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

² Hermann, *The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream*, 10.

³ David Newman, "How Israel's Peace Movement Fell Apart," *The New York Times*, August 30, 2002
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/30/opinion/how-israel-s-peacemovementfellapart.htm?pagewanted=all&src=pm>

⁴ Most notably the works of Martin Ceadle, *Pacifism in Britain 1914-1945: The Defining of a Faith* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) and *Thinking about Peace and War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Hermann, *The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream*; Reuven Kaminer, *The Politics of Protest: The Israeli Peace Movement and the Palestinian Intifada* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1996).

⁵ Irit Halperin, "Between the Lines: The Story of Machsom Watch," in *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* 34 (2007): 333-339.

⁶ See for example Martha Kaufman-Lacusta, *Refusing to be Enemies* (Reading, UK: Ithica Press, 2010); Hermann, *The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream*; *Civil Organizations and Protest Movements in Israel: Mobilization around the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* ed. Elizabeth Marteu, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009); and Edy Kaufman, Walid Salem and Juliette Verhoeven, eds. *Bridging the Divide: Peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Boulder, CO; London: Lynne Rienner, 2006).

⁷ 'Political opportunity structures' is a term taken from social movement theory and refers to the context within which a social movement emerges and evolves. Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 3rd edtn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Hermann, *The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream*.

⁸ Cass R. Sunstein, 1996. "Social Norms and Social Roles," *Columbia Law Review* 96 (1996): 903-968.

⁹ Kaminer, *The Politics of Protest: The Israeli Peace Movement and the Palestinian Intifada*, 48.

¹⁰ For a study on norm entrepreneurship see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52 (1998): 887.

¹¹ Itay Blumenthal, "Peace Now Chief Does Reserve Duty in the West Bank," *YNet* April 19, 2015.
<http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4648489,00.html>

¹² Gila Svirsky, "Notes from the Field: A Roundtable: Local Coalitions, Global Partners: The Women's Peace Movement in Israel and Beyond," *Signs: Development Cultures: New Environments, New Realities, New Strategies. Special Issue* (2004): 29:2:543-550

¹³ Zvi Benninga (student), in discussion with author, February 19, 2013

¹⁴ "About Ta'ayush," *Ta'ayush* http://www.taayush.org/?page_id=61

¹⁵ Benninga, in discussion with author.

¹⁶ Gershom Gorenberg, "The Rebirth of the Israeli Peace Movement," *Prospect* August 5, 2010
<http://prospect.org/article/rebirth-israeli-peace-movement>

¹⁷ Assaf Sharon (Assistance Professor and Academic Director, Molad), in discussion with author, April 15, 2013.

¹⁸ The term "early risers" is taken from Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, and refers to those actors within a cycle of contention who emerge sooner than others.

¹⁹ It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide comprehensive picture of each group and organization that is operating but key trends in the collective action frames, as well as some background details, of the most prominent groups will be given.

²⁰ See for example Kaufman-Lacusta, *Refusing to be Enemies: Palestinian and Israeli Nonviolent Resistance to the Israeli Occupation*; Hermann, *The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream* and Marteu, *Civil Organizations and Protest Movements in Israel: Mobilizing Around the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*.

²¹ David Silverman, *Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook*, 2nd edtn. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2005).

²² A list was compiled based on a compilation in Hermann, *The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream*, 267-275, with additional groups added.

²³ See for example Suzanne Staggenborg and Josee Lecomte, "Social Movement Campaigns: Mobilization and Outcomes in the Montreal Women's Movement Community," *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 14 (2009): 163-180; Charles Tilly and Lesley Wood, *Social Movements, 1768-2008* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Press, 2009); *Mobilizing for peace: Conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa* ed. Benjamin Gidron, Stanley Katz and Yeheskel Hasenfeld, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

²⁴ Robert D. Benford, "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective," *Sociological Inquiry* 67 (1997): 410.

²⁵ Erving Goffman, *An Essay on the Organization of Experience: Frame Analysis* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1974); William A. Gamson, Brice Fireman and Steven Rytina, *Encounters with an Unjust Authority* (Belmont, CA: Dorsey Press, 1982).

²⁶ David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Warden and Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 51(1986): 464-481; Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611-639.

²⁷ Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, *Social Movements and Culture* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 218.

²⁸ William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer, "Framing Political Opportunity," in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, eds. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)

²⁹ McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing*, 12

³⁰ McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing*, 14

³¹ Tamar Hermann, "The Sour Taste of Success: The Israeli Peace Movement, 1967-1988," in *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa*, ed. Benjamin Gidron, Stanley Katz, and Yeheskel Hasenfeld (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 96.

³² Ibid.

³³ Haggai Matar (journalist and activist), in discussion with author, January 24, 2013; Dalit Baum (lecturer and activists), in discussion with author, March 19, 2013).

³⁴ See ABC News, "MidEast Talks End Without Agreement," July 19, 2000
<http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=83127&page=1>

³⁵ Prognostic framing is the task of proposing a solution of a social movement, or the strategies for reaching such a solution. See Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," 616; Galia Golan (Professor and core member of *Shalom Achshav*), in discussion with author, June 17, 2013.

³⁶ Ephraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann, "The Peace Index September 2001," *The Tami Steinmetz Centre for Peace Research*; Golan, in discussion with author.

³⁷ Lindsay Hilsum, "The Death of the Israeli Left," *New Statesman*, February 5, 2001
<http://www.newstatesman.caom/node/139560>; Golan, in discussion with author.

³⁸ Neve Gordon, "The Israeli Peace Camp in Dark Times," *Peace Review* 15 (2003):42; Diagnostic framing is the identification of the problems and causes of the issue of contention. See Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," 616.

³⁹ Hagit Ofran, "Interview with Hagit Ofran" *Just Vision*, 2010
<http://www.justvision.org/interviews/grassroots-leaders/97533/portrait>

⁴⁰ Halperin, "Between the Lines: The Story of Machsom Watch," 335.

⁴¹ The barrier began to be built by Israel in 2002 and runs between Israel and the West Bank, although not directly along the Green Line. The term used to describe this barrier is highly contentious issues. I use the term "Separation Barrier" to try to neutralize political connotations, however, they cannot be a completely neutral term.

⁴² Ran Greenstein, "The Perennial Dilemma of Liberal Zionism," *+972mag*, September 28, 2014 <http://972mag.com/the-perennial-dilemma-of-liberal-zionism/97076/>; Jon Simons, e-mail message to author, 23 May, 2013.

⁴³ See for example Lara Friedman and Dror Etkes, "Hebron – Settlements in Focus," *Peace Now*, October 2005 <http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/hebron-settlements-focus/>; "Settlements, Outposts, and Israeli Security," *Peace Now*, December 2003 <http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/settlements-outposts-israeli-security>

⁴⁴ "About Ta'ayush."

⁴⁵ See <http://www.taayush.org/?cat=16> for activity reports dating from 2001 to present.

⁴⁶ The Separation Barrier runs between Israel and the West Bank, although not directly along the Green Armistice Line. It was built by Israel, beginning in 2002, in response to the outbreak of Palestinian violence. The purpose and route of the barrier, as well as how it should be named, are highly contentious issues. In an attempt to avoid political connotations, I shall refer to it as the 'Separation Barrier,' although it can be argued that there is no neutral term for this structure; Baum, in discussion with author.

⁴⁷ For pictures of the new flag see Noam Shelef, "Israelis Raise the Peace Flag," *Americans for Peace Now*, April 18, 2010 http://archive.peacenow.org/entries/israelis_raise_the_peace_flag

⁴⁸ Yossi Beilin, "The Test of the Zionist Left," *Haaretz*, August 8, 2006 <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/the-test-of-the-zionist-left-1.194609>

⁴⁹ See Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," 625.

⁵⁰ The Settlement Watch project was set up in 1990 to provide information on the expansion of settlements in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

⁵¹ See The Associated Press, "Poll: Most Palestinians, Israelis want a Two-State Solution," *Haaretz*, April 22, 2009 <http://haartez.com/news/poll-most-palestinians-israelis-want-a-two-state-solution-1.274607>

⁵² See Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," 625; Kol Echad, "Divrei hesber. 'Chuk hesderet haribonot b'shatchi yehudi' *One Voice*, accessed 18 December, 2013 (Hebrew) <http://onevoice.org.il>.

⁵³ Yariv Oppenheimer, "Yariv Oppenheimer on a Two State Solution," *J-Street*, July 29, 2011 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9bzS0XhHrMs>

⁵⁴ See for example Gershon Baskin, "'Encountering Peace: Our Window of Opportunity,'" *J-Post*, May 6, 2013 <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Encountering-Peace-Our-window-of-opportunity-315572>

⁵⁵ Aaron Lerner, "A Current Digest of Media, Polls and Significant Interviews and Events," *IMRA* August 26, 2009 <http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=45421>

⁵⁶ The Israeli Democracy Institute, *Results of the 19th Knesset Elections*, 2013 <http://en.idi.org.il/tools-and-data/israeli-elections-and-parties/elections/2013/>; The Israeli Democracy Institute, *Results of the 14th Knesset Elections*, 1996 <http://en.idi.org.il/tools-and-data/israeli-elections-and-parties/elections/1996/>; Hermann, *The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream*, in particular 213-239.

⁵⁷ Golan, in discussion with author.

⁵⁸ Gordon, "The Israeli Peace Camp in Dark Times"

⁵⁹ Ibid, 43.

⁶⁰ Uri Avnery, "Out of Israel-A Vision of Peace," *The Guardian* May 4, 2001 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/may/04/comment.israelandthepalestinians>

⁶¹ Yuval Ben Ami (writer), in discussion with author, January 14, 2013; Anver Inbar (activist), quoted in Joseph Dana and Noam Sheizaf, "The New Israeli Left," *The Nation*, March 28, 2011, <http://www.thenation.com/article/159164/new-israeli-left>.

⁶² See in particular *Anarchistim Neged haGader* (Anarchists Against the Wall) and *Solidariut* (Solidarity)

⁶³ See speech by Gadi Alghazi, "The Tangled History of Our Peoples," *For Palestine* 43 (2004), founder of *Ta'ayush*.

⁶⁴ Reuven Kaminer (veteran activist), in discussion with author, March 6, 2013

⁶⁵ Matar, in discussion with author.

⁶⁶ Baum, in discussion with author.

⁶⁷ "About Ta'ayush."

⁶⁸ "The Vision for Peace of the Coalition of Women for a Just Peace,' Coalition of Women for a Just Peace, last modified on June 2001, <http://www.fire.or.cr/junio01/coalition.htm>

⁶⁹ Eitan Bronstein Aparicio (founder of Zochrot), in discussion with author, January 16, 2013.

⁷⁰ Hannah Safran, "The Israeli Resistance," *Red Pepper: Spicing up Politics* March 2009
<http://www.redpepper.org.uk/The-Israeli-resistance/>

⁷¹ Jews of Eastern origin

⁷² Jews of European decent.

⁷³ Roi Ball (activist), in discussion with author, January 27, 2013.

⁷⁴ Ball, in discussion with author.

⁷⁵ Anonymous (activist from Tarabut-Hithabrut), in discussion with author, March 16, 2013.

⁷⁶ See Maxine Kaufman-Lacusta, *Refusing to be Enemies*. (Reading, UK: Ithica Press, 2010).

for a detailed study of joint Israeli-Palestinian resistance against the Separation Barrier

⁷⁷ Donna Perry, *The Israeli Palestinian Peace Movement: Combatants for Peace*. (New York: Palgrave, MacMillan, 2001).

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ The contact hypothesis takes a psychological approach to reconciliation and involves individuals in conflict meeting each other and getting to know each other on an equal footing, based on the belief that, 'it is much harder to hate the people you really know.' See Judy Kuriansky, ed. *Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Grassroots Peace Building between Israelis and Palestinians*. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007).

⁸⁰ Avner Wishnitzer, e-mail message to author, April 30, 2013.

⁸¹ Larry Lester (activist in *Locahmim l'Shalom*), in discussion with author, April 4, 2013).

⁸² "Memorial Day Ceremony," *Combatants for Peace*, accessed January 15, 2014
http://cfpeace.org/?page_id=4412

⁸³ Stan Cohen, *States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).

⁸⁴ Hagai El-Ad, quoted in Matt Surrusco, "Occupation will never be consistent with human rights," *+972mag* June 30, 2013 <http://972mag.com/reflections-on-human-rights-an-interview-with-acris-hagai-el-ad/74790/>

⁸⁵ Tania Hary (Deputy Director, *Gisha*), in discussion with author, February 28, 2013.

⁸⁶ Anonymous (tour guide, *Ir Amim*), in discussion with author, April 26, 2013.

⁸⁷ Aviv Tatarsky (researcher, *Ir Amim*), in discussion with author, March 6, 2013.

⁸⁸ Anonymous (tour guide, *Emek Shaveh*), in discussion with author, April 14, 2013.

⁸⁹ Yonatan Mizrahi (archaeologist, *Emek Shaveh*), in discussion with author, January 23, 2013.

⁹⁰ “Organization,” *Breaking the Silence*, accessed on January 8, 2014

<http://www.breakingthesilence.org.il/about/organization>

⁹¹ Kobi Snitz (Activist *Anarchistim Neged* HaGader), in discussion with author, January 15, 2013.

⁹² Adalah, *New Discriminatory Laws and Bills in Israel: June 2011*, October 9, 2012,

http://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/Public/files/English/Legal_Advocacy/Discriminatory_Laws/Discriminatory-Laws-in-Israel-October-2012-Update.pdf

⁹³ B’Tselem, *Humanitarian Crisis in Gaza – Call to the International Community*, November 27, 2006

<http://www.btselem.org/btselem-newsletter/131488>; See the following reports: Operation Cast Lead 2008/9

http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/publication/200902_operation_cast_lead_position_paper_eng.pdf;

Operation Pillar of Defense 2012

http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/201305_pillar_of_defense_operation_eng.pdf; Operation Protective

Edge 2014 http://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/2015_black_flag

⁹⁴ B’Tselem, *Humanitarian Crisis in Gaza – Call to the International Community*

⁹⁵ Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); A significant example is the Goldstone report. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that that, “Report advances a narrative which ignores the threats to Israeli civilians, as well as Israel’s extensive diplomatic and political efforts to avoid the outbreak of hostilities,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Initial Response to Report of the Fact Finding Mission on Gaza Established Pursuant to Resolution s-9/1 of the Human Rights Council*, September 24, 2009.

⁹⁶ Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, *Extended Study Tour*, June 25, 2014 <http://cjpp5.over-blog.com/article-israeli-committee-against-house-demolitions-icahd-extended-study-tours-123966166.html>

⁹⁷ Rachel Shabi, “Groundswell: Protests in an East Jerusalem Neighborhood are Reviving the Israeli Left,” *Tablet*, June 10, 2010 <http://www.tabletmag.com/news-and-politics/35732/groundswell/>

⁹⁸ *Ibid*; Benninga, in discussion with author.

⁹⁹ Sharon, in discussion with author.

¹⁰⁰ Doyle Paul Johnson, *Contemporary Sociological Theory: An Integrated Multi-Level Approach* (New York: Springer Science + Business Media, 2008).

¹⁰¹The author participated in the Memorial Ceremony, April 14, 2013, Tel Aviv