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## **Chapter 7: Work-family conflict and well-being in Northern Europe**

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chapter in: Jacqueline Scott, Shirley Dex and Anke C. Plagnol (eds.). *Gendered Lives: Gender Inequalities in Production and Reproduction*. Edward Elgar (May 2012)

### **Introduction**

Work-family conflict is a crucial issue for quality of life. Moreover, public interest in work-family balance policies has expanded significantly in recent years. From the policy-maker's perspective the issue concerns the extent to which the state can and should intervene to help men and women reconcile work and family responsibilities. This issue has become urgent because, as Esping-Andersen asserts, there is an incomplete revolution in gender roles that threatens societal stability (Esping-Andersen, 2009). What is meant by such a claim? The idea is that in modern societies women are facing severe problems of reconciling their dual preference for children and careers. For a growing proportion of women and men, women's employment and less gender specialization is desirable, both ideologically and pragmatically. Thus the dual-earner based partnership is becoming normative – it is the 'thing to do'.

Yet, we know only too well from time-budget studies that changes in the domestic sphere lag well behind the changing realities of women's employment. Women, faced with only twenty four hours in a day, find they have to reduce the time they spend on unpaid work such as housework and family care, when they increase their hours of paid work. While women's paid work activity has been on the rise, time-budget studies reveal that, on average, men are not compensating by an equivalent take-

up of unpaid work (Gershuny & Kan, current volume). So what is the solution? While housework can be outsourced to some extent, caring implies an ongoing presence and emotional relationship that makes paid care different to family care.

The fact that current debates about work-family conflict in the UK and elsewhere in Europe have tended to focus on the relationship between paid work, parenting and caring is understandable. As Taylor (2001) points out, the decades since the 1970s have seen a feminisation of the UK labour market. The greatest rise in employment in the 1990s was among mothers with children aged four or under. At the start of the new millennium, almost half of the country's lone mothers are in some form of part-time work, although only one in five of them are in full-time employment, a much lower proportion than in the United States or even France. This change in the gender make-up of the workforce raises inevitable concerns about how women and men can raise families successfully, while contributing as fully as possible to the labour force.

Family life depends greatly on the quality of relationships between and across generations – within partnerships and between parents and children. Traditionally it was the woman who took responsibility for the home, while the man provided the income on which home-life depends. As dual-earner partnerships become increasingly common, the cost for both men and women in terms of work-family conflict and well-being comes under scrutiny. Do women opt out of the labour force during early motherhood because work-family conflicts have become unbearable? Is life less stressful for them than for mothers who are employed? Is part-time work the panacea that some hope, enabling a better balance of work and family and thereby increasing well-being?

An interesting irony is that although gender relations are one of the most important aspects of work-family conflict, much of the existing policy rhetoric about the need to balance work and family life remains deliberately gender neutral. Indeed, as Lewis (2009) asserts, governments have diverse goals for promoting work-balance policies but, outside of Scandinavia, gender inequality is rarely a priority. Lewis further suggests that in the UK gender equality has hardly been discussed; rather, policy documents have striven for gender neutrality. One problem is that, in the domain of work-family balance policies, the thorny problem of ‘equality-as-sameness’ or ‘equality-as-difference’ is core. If the aim is sameness then this translates into an equal division of paid and unpaid work between men and women: a citizen worker/carer model. This position has been championed by Fraser (1994) on the basis of philosophical arguments, and by Gornick and Meyers (2009) on the basis of empirical work. But if, as Orloff suggests (2009), equality consists of differences and diversity, then policy may seek to mitigate any detrimental consequences of caring, albeit at the risk of perpetuating caring work as women’s responsibility. Lewis (2009), Orloff (2009) and others, following Sen (1999) advocate that policy should not be equality of outcome but instead focus on *realisable opportunities* that allow people to put their preferences into action.

Disentangling preference from constraint is hugely difficult and beyond the scope of this chapter. We cannot delve into the extent to which men and women are fulfilling their choices in work-family balance (our data do not permit this). Instead we are constrained to look at how the particular contexts in which individuals’ lives are situated influence their experience of work-family conflict (WFC) and well-being. Our goal is to examine how WFC and well-being differ by gender and across the family life

course. We use data from the 2004 European Social Survey (ESS) to explore these issues in seven countries: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, France and the UK. These countries are selected, in part, because they have very different traditions and policies regarding work and family reconciliation.

One of our aims is to examine whether WFC and well-being varies between countries that differ in their support for maternal employment and a more equitable divide of family work between men and women. We also explore how a couple's division of paid and unpaid work across the family life course influences WFC, separately by country and for all seven countries combined. We are particularly interested in examining how both the experience of WFC and well-being is gendered in ways that reflect, in part, the gendered division of paid and unpaid labour that is manifest throughout Northern Europe.

In the next section we review briefly some of the relevant background literature and present our specific hypotheses. We then describe our measures and the approach to the analyses before we present our results. In the summary and concluding section we bring together our main findings and revisit the challenging problem of what policy can and should do to mitigate gender differences in WFC and how this might impinge on policy efforts that seek to enhance citizens' well-being.

## **Background literature**

There has been a veritable explosion of research on 'work-life balance' or 'work-family conflict' in the past couple of decades, and much of the literature deals with how policy differences across Europe affect people's work-life balance and

associated well-being. These literatures can be divided into two main camps of substantive focus, although the two interlink. The first focus is on employment and working conditions. Many studies have been concerned with the way employment has been changing as a result of new processes of intensification and flexibilisation (Beck, 2000; Burchell, Lapido, & Wilkinson, 2002; Cappelli et al., 1997; Green & McIntosh, 2001). It seems plausible that these developments have severe implications both for personal well-being and for the risks of WFC. There is now increasing evidence that this is indeed the case (Gallie & Russell, 2009; Hildebrandt, 2006). The second focus is on the changing nature of the family and the position of women, in particular. There are concerns about issues of gender equality; specifically in the way men and women divide paid and unpaid work (Harkness, 2008; Kan & Gershuny, 2010; Lewis, 2008). Much of the focus has been on women's difficulties in combining full-time paid employment with motherhood (Crompton & Lyonette, 2008; Fagan, McDowell, Perrons, Ray, & Ward, 2008; McRae, 2008). However, concerns that women's employment conflicts with care for frail elderly parents are also important for ageing societies.

In the 1990s the UK Economic and Social Research Council sponsored a research programme on the Future of Work. A working paper by Taylor (2001) brought together insights into the Future of Work-Life Balance. This emphasised that a focus on the difficulties of balancing paid work and parental responsibilities is too narrow an approach for understanding the importance of the work-life debate. It urged that a broader discussion was needed looking more rigorously at the changing character of paid employment under the pressure it is facing from intensive business competition and technological innovation. Job intensification and increasing job insecurity were thought likely to have negative implications for well-being. Moreover, there was

concern that this might be particularly marked in the UK, because, until recently, the UK lacked the kind of legally enforceable individual and collective rights at work enjoyed by our mainland European neighbours. Taylor cites the example of Nordic countries, where policies have tilted the so-called 'balance' between work and life towards the protection of the perceived interests of employees, while at the same time benefiting corporate performance.

Gallie and Russell (2009) took up the challenge of examining WFC and working conditions in Western Europe. They found that working conditions make a huge difference to WFC among married cohabiting employees across the same seven European countries that are examined in this chapter. They suggest that there is a clear Nordic effect for men. Perceived WFC is lowest in the Nordic countries where coordinated production regimes and social policies are more supportive of combining paid work and care demands. Paradoxically they found that for women 'raw' levels of WFC are particularly high in France, Denmark and Sweden, where supports for reconciling work and family life are good. In the case of France, they suggest that the high conflict is due to higher levels of family pressures associated with household composition. However, in Denmark and Sweden the high WFC among women appears to be associated with long work hours. Gallie and Russell (2009) found that when looking at seven Northern European countries combined, working conditions explained almost thirty per cent of the variance in WFC for both men and women, while 'family variables' explained less than five per cent of the variance. The fact that length of working hours, the prevalence of asocial working hours, the intensity of work and job insecurity all had strong negative effects for work-family conflict is not surprising. But what is surprising is their finding that working conditions accounted for much of the

inter-country variation in WFC. This raises the question of whether their measures are overly work-centric and fail to capture the realities of gender-related conflicts between paid and unpaid work.

One important concern is how working mothers and fathers can rear their children while at the same time performing paid work effectively. Lewis (2008) argues that in the UK the balance between family and employment responsibilities was historically considered to be a private responsibility. This is not the case in some countries of Europe where gender equality enters the frame as a policy goal (see also Lewis, current volume). In Nordic countries in particular, policies have been based on the assumption that men and women will be fully engaged in the labour market. The Nordic model treats women as workers, but then makes allowance for difference by grafting on transfers and services in respect of care work for partnered and unpartnered mothers alike. Hobson (2004) has described the Swedish variant as a ‘gender participation model’ focusing as it does on promoting gender equality in employment and providing cash support for parental leave and services of child care and the care of older adults. As a result of this ‘supported adult worker model’, high proportions of women work (long) part-time hours exercising their right to work a six-hour day when they have pre-school children. In many European countries including the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, part-time work remains the main way for women to reconcile work and family demands.

In recent decades, both in the UK and in other European countries, policies have explicitly been designed to raise employment participation amongst women. Thus for example, in Lisbon in March 2000 the Heads of Government of the European Union subscribed to the goal of raising the employment rate of women to 60 per cent by 2010

(Lewis, Campbell, & Huerta, 2008). In the UK, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries the goal was already met by 2000 (Boeri, Del Boca, & Pissarides, 2005), with France and Germany also close to the target in 2000. There have also been concerns that reduced fertility is problematic when the population is ageing. For example, Esping-Andersen (2009) noted that the quality of people's retirement years will depend on the productivity of increasingly small cohorts of workers. He goes on to suggest that, without any need of resort to feminist arguments, a rational utility model would point to a normative shift towards dual career couples. He argues that in contemporary societies welfare systems should support a more gender equitable divide in paid and unpaid work. This would allow men and women to reconcile the competing demands they face as partners, parents and workers.

Boye (2009) studied how paid and unpaid work affects patterns of well-being in Europe. She found that while men's well-being appears to be unaffected by hours of paid work and housework, women's well-being increases with increased paid working hours and decreases with increased hours of housework. Gender differences in time spent on paid work and housework accounted for one third of the European gender difference in well-being and helped to explain why women have lower well-being than men. In a more recent paper, Boye (2011) investigated whether associations between well-being and paid work and housework differed between European countries with different family policy models, and how this related to WFC.

Boye followed Korpi's (2000) typology of welfare state classification and differentiated three family models: dual-earner, traditional and market orientated. *Dual-earner models* are characterised by Scandinavian policies; these have strong support for female labour force participation as well as male participation in unpaid reproduction

work in the family, but weaker support for women as homemakers. The *traditional family models* (found in France, Germany and Netherlands) have high levels of traditional family support and low levels of dual-earner support. The *market-orientated family model* is typical of the UK where reproduction work is allocated to the family or the market and ‘choices’ of how to combine family and employment are seen mainly as a private concern. Boye finds, counter-intuitively, that countries with the traditional family policies show the most positive association between women’s well-being and paid work hours, although this association is concealed by WFC.

## **Hypotheses**

From the literature, we derive ten hypotheses concerning the relationship between gender, paid and unpaid work, and well-being in Northern Europe. These are as follows:

H1. Full-time employed women will have higher WFC than employed men. This is because in the UK and other developed countries women still undertake the bulk of the housework. This ‘second shift’ phenomenon was first named by Hochschild (1989). While there is some evidence that the years since 1989 have seen some erosion of the gender gap in household labour, the overwhelming bulk of housework is still done by women (Kan & Gershuny, 2010).

H2. Part-time employed women will have less WFC than full-time employed women as part-time work is often used to reconcile work and family demands.

H3. Gender patterns of well-being will be less pronounced than for WFC because the well-being measure does not tap directly gender inequalities in paid and unpaid work.

H4. WFC and well-being will be negatively correlated because high levels of conflict reduces well-being.

H5. Country differences in both WFC and well-being will remain strong even when individual characteristics and couple work strategies and family conditions are accounted for because the different welfare systems/family policies vary in their support for combining work and family life.

H6. Work conditions will be more important predictors than family conditions for the WFC of both men and women. Thus we expect to confirm Gallie and Russell's (2009) findings, even when couples' paid and unpaid work strategies across the life course are included in the models.

H7. Work and family factors will explain more of the variance in WFC than in well-being, because well-being is more individualistic. For example, health is an important predictor of well-being (Boye, 2011).

H8. There will be gender differences in the way family life stage affects WFC and well-being. Mothers' are expected to display heightened WFC and lower levels of well-being relative to fathers' during the child-rearing phase, because women tend to remain the primary carer, regardless of their employment status.

H9. There will be gender differences in the way a couple's paid work strategies affect WFC and well-being. Boye's findings suggest that men's well-being will be unaffected by work hours, whereas work hours increase women's well-being (Boye

2011). This sounds plausible because work gives women an independence, which men may take for granted.

H10. We expect men's WFC and well-being to be more negatively affected than women's by a less traditional divide of unpaid housework. Theories of 'doing gender' (West and Zimmerman 1987) suggest that for women but not men to engage in housework is acting out what is seen as the 'essential nature' of male and female roles. Thus engaging in housework will have an adverse effect on the WFC and well-being of men, but not women.

## **Data and measures**

Our data are from the 'Family, work and well-being' module in the European Social Survey (ESS) (Jowell, 2005), which was created for the second round of this cross-sectional survey conducted in 2004-2005. Our main variables of interest – the questions relating to WFC – were only asked of people who were employed at the time of the survey, and we limit our sample to those of prime working age, aged 18 to 65. We restrict our sample to those in partnerships as we are particularly interested in the way heterosexual couples arrange paid and unpaid work within a household. We exclude same sex partnerships as there was only a very small number of same sex couples. We further restrict our sample to include only seven of the original 25 ESS countries, namely Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The survey's response rates in these countries were 65 per cent in Sweden; 66 per cent in Norway; 64 per cent in Denmark; 64 per cent in the Netherlands; 51 per cent in Germany; 51 per cent in the UK, and 44 per cent in France. In our

analysis we use both design weights and population weights (for more details see European Social Survey, 2004). The sample characteristics of variables in our analyses are shown in Appendix A Table A7.1.

## **Key variables**

### ***Work family conflict***

The ESS contains five indicators which measure various aspects of WFC (see Table A7.2, Appendix A). These items are supposed to measure work-to-family conflict as well as family-to-work conflict. However, the wording of the items emphasise mostly paid work. Not surprisingly previous research has found that work-life conflict (or work-life balance) is most closely associated with paid work hours (for an overview see Pichler, 2009). These five indicators are often lumped together into a composite measure of WFC. However, we chose to include only the first four items in our composite measure of WFC because the last item – which asks the respondent about their difficulty to concentrate on work because of family responsibilities – is rarely mentioned as being a problem. The responses to each item range from “never” (coded as 1) to “always” (coded as 5). Our composite measure of work-family conflict consists of the mean score of these first four items with values ranging from 1 to 5 (5 is the highest amount of work family conflict).

### ***Well-being (WHO-5)***

We also consider a further measure of psychological well-being which is less work-centric than WFC. This variable is a composite measure representing the mean of five items, which are often referred to as the WHO-5 well-being index (Bech, 1998). The WHO-5 well-being index is constructed to measure positive well-being such as positive mood, vitality and general interests (Psychiatric Research Unit, 2008). The five items comprising the measure are reverse coded from the original, ranging from 1 (at no time) to 6 (all of the time). Our composite measure of well-being consists of the mean score of these five items with values ranging from 1 to 6 such that a high score reflects high well-being (Appendix A, Table A7.3).

### ***Paid work strategies***

We are particularly interested in whether couples' division of work significantly affects their perceived WFC. We define four distinct paid work strategies which are derived from the male and female partners' usual weekly hours of work. A couple in which both partners work 30 hours or more per week is classified as a 'dual earner' couple. 'Modified male breadwinner' couples consists of a female partner who works part time at less than 30 hours per week, and a male who works more hours than the female partner. If the female partner does not do any paid work, the couple is denoted as a 'male breadwinner' couple. Couples in which the female partner works more weekly hours than the male partner are 'female breadwinner' couples. Table 7.1 summarises our paid work strategies.

\* Table 7.1 about here \*

### ***Unpaid work division***

Individual male and female respondents (not living together) were asked how many hours a week are usually spent on activities such as cooking, washing, cleaning, shopping, maintenance of property (but not including childcare) by members of the household. This question is followed by the respondent's assessment of what proportion of this time is spent on housework by the respondent him/herself and his/her partner. The six response categories range from 'None or almost none' to 'All or nearly all of the time'. We derive from these questions whether the division of unpaid labour in a household is 'balanced', 'mostly male', 'mostly female' or whether housework is done primarily by 'others'. However, this measure is not very precise and respondents tend to overestimate their own contribution to unpaid work within a household. While most male respondents state that the housework is done mostly by their female partner, male are still more likely than female partners to state that the division of housework is balanced or largely done by the male partner. (Our data do not allow us to compare or reconcile potential differences in male or female partners' views about their respective shares of unpaid work (since we only have data on one partner's views.)

### ***Family life course***

Our family life course variable has four categories – younger couples (where the woman is aged under 45) with no dependent children; couples with children under five;

couples with children five to eighteen; older couples (with women aged 45 or over) with no dependent children.

In addition to these key variables our multivariate analysis, which we report in the final part of our results section, includes measures of household income (quintiles). We include several measures about the respondents only, including their years of full-time education, log work hours, unsocial hours and task discretion. The unsocial hours index combines three questions that tap the frequency of weekend work, evening work and overtime, which are combined to form a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 represents those who never engage in these three activities and 5 represents participation in all three on a weekly basis. Task discretion is measured by a question which asks people how much “the management at your work allows you: (1) to decide how your daily work is organised, (2) to influence policy decisions about the activities of the organisation and (3) to choose or change your pace of work.” The resulting index is a scale of zero to 10 with zero no influence and 10 complete control.

Our analytical strategy is to first examine the bivariate associations between WFC, gender and work status in the seven countries. We then examine, for descriptive purposes, country differences in the way family life stage and dual earner work status are related. We also examine the relationship between WFC and well-being across countries and by gender. This initial section on work status, family life course and gender allows us to address the first four hypotheses. The remaining six hypotheses require multivariate regression analyses of WFC and well-being. For each, we introduce three models: Model 1 examines country differences only; Model 2 includes both country and family variables, along with gender, age, education and household income;

Model 3 adds in characteristics of employment along with gender interactions for family life course, couples' paid work strategies and unpaid work division.

### **Work status, family life course and gender**

\* Figure 7.1 here\*

In Figure 7.1 we can see the mean scores of WFC by gender and work status across country among this sample of employed men and women, aged 18-65 living in heterosexual partnerships. Contrary to our expectations in Hypothesis 1, which derived from the 'double shift' ideas of Hochschild (1989), the difference in WFC between women who work full-time and men is very small. (We do not differentiate in this bivariate analysis between full-time and part-time work for men, because the vast majority of employed men have full-time jobs). In accordance with Hypothesis 2, we find that women who work part-time have significantly lower WFC than women who are in full-time employment (all countries  $p < 0.000$ , except Norway  $p < 0.026$ ).

\*\*\*Table 7.2 here\*\*\*

So what of this 'double shift' theory? In our data, as Table 7.2 shows for the seven countries combined, women do the bulk of the unpaid work, regardless of the couple's paid work strategy. It is not surprising that housework is done by 'mostly female' in three quarters of our couple households. Perhaps more surprising is that outsourcing most of domestic labour is so rare – approximately 3 per cent in total. Our

definition of unpaid work includes cooking and shopping which are probably less frequently outsourced than cleaning, which is also included. It may also be the case that domestic labour is viewed as too expensive or too intrusive by most. The reports of a 'balanced' division of housework are quite high - including one in five of our dual earner couple households.

\*Table 7.3 here\*

Table 7.3 shows the percentage of dual earner couples by family life course stage for each of the seven countries and for all countries combined. In all countries combined across all stages of the family life course fifty per cent are dual earner couples. This percentage rises to over 72 per cent for younger couples without children. The dual earner model is most common in Sweden (73%) and Denmark (75 per cent of all couples) and least common in the Netherlands (30%). It is clear from Table 7.3 that most women work full-time before having children and many women cut back on their paid work hours or drop out of the labour force altogether when they have children. However, family paid work strategies vary considerably across countries. In Denmark and Sweden over three quarters of couples with young children are dual earner couples, compared with approximately twenty per cent in Germany and the Netherlands. France has relatively high maternal employment with dual earners making up 65 per cent of couples with young children. In the UK the equivalent percentage is twenty eight per cent.

The high proportion of dual earners among couples in the child rearing years in Sweden and Denmark is as we would expect. The Nordic countries' public provision of

childcare is very high for under-three year olds, due to the assumption that childcare is a legal right of every child (De Henau, Meulders, & O'Dorchai, 2008). Interestingly, France shows a much higher proportion of dual earner couples with children than would be expected of a country classified as following the traditional family model (Boye 2011). This classification needs updating as there is relatively good state provision for childcare in France (Gallie & Russell, 2009). In the Netherlands, UK and Germany, dual earner families are rare when children are young. In Germany mothers are expected to care for infants (De Henau, et al., 2008), whereas in the United Kingdom childcare provision remains mostly private and relatively expensive (Schober & Scott, forthcoming).

\*Figure 7.2 here\*

Figure 7.2 shows, confirming Hypothesis 3, that the gender differentiation of well-being is much less marked than for WFC across all countries. The striking finding from this figure is the relatively low well-being of UK men and women, compared with the other six countries. This is something we return to in our multivariate analysis.

### **Association of WFC and well-being**

\*Table 7.4 here\*

Hypothesis 4 suggested that WFC and well-being would be negatively correlated and this is indeed the case as we can see in Table 7.4. The correlation is

strongest in Denmark and weakest in France, with the UK neither strong nor weak. Possibly a relative absence of ‘protestant work ethic’ in France may contribute to this pattern, but the country differences are not large. In all countries the correlation is stronger for men than for women, except in Norway (where the gender pattern is reversed). The gender difference is more pronounced in the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands and somewhat less marked in Sweden and Denmark. This is not surprising given the strong support in Scandinavian countries for the citizen worker model.

### **Multivariate regression analysis of WFC and well-being**

\*Tables 7.5a-c here\*

Tables 7.5a-c show three different regression models for WFC and well-being for both genders combined (Table 7.5a) and men and women separately (Tables 7.5b and 7.5c). The country differences are shown in Model 1; family variables along with gender, age, education and household income are added to country dummy variables in Model 2; characteristics of employment are added in, along with gender interaction effects with couples’ paid work strategy, unpaid work division, and family life course stages in Model 3. The reference categories are the UK for country differences; dual earner couples for paid work strategies (see Table 7.1 for definition); balanced housework for the division of unpaid work; and women under forty-five without children for family life course.

## **Work family conflict and well-being**

Our fifth hypothesis predicted that country differences in both WFC and well-being will remain strong even after controlling for other differences; controls include individual characteristics, couple work strategies, and family and employment conditions, included because the different welfare systems/family policies vary in their support for combining work and family life. It can be seen in Model 1 in Table 7.5a that the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Denmark have significantly lower WFC than the UK (the omitted category). In Table 7.5b, which shows men only, we can see that men in all other countries have lower WFC than UK men. Table 7.5c shows this country pattern is not the same for women as only Dutch women have less WFC than UK women. However, this difference between the Netherlands and the UK disappears in Model 3, once employment conditions are accounted for. In addition, once employment conditions are controlled, WFC is not significantly different between France and the UK, for either men or women. Despite the overall country patterns differing across models, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries have consistently lower WFC than the UK for both women and men.

A similar picture emerges as we examine psychological well-being. The highest well-being levels are found in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands. The UK is by far the lowest – significantly lower than any of the other six nations, including France and Germany. This holds true for both men and women, across all three models. In all countries, except Sweden and Denmark, the country differences become even more pronounced in Models 2 and 3 when family circumstances and employment are accounted for.

Hypothesis 6 suggested that work conditions would be more important predictors than family conditions for the WFC of both men and women. This is indeed the case. If we look at the explained variance ( $r^2$ ) we can see that for our total sample combined (Table 7.5a), once employment conditions are introduced in Model 3, we explain twenty-three per cent of the variance in WFC, as compared to only six per cent explained by family conditions (Model 2) and less than two per cent by country differences alone (Model 1). The pattern is similar for both men (Table 7.5b) and women (Table 7.5c). Thus we can confirm Gallie and Russell's (2009) findings about the relative importance of employment conditions, even after couples' paid and unpaid work strategies and family life course stage are included in the models.

Hypothesis 7 suggested that work and family factors would explain more of the variance in WFC than in well-being, because well-being is more individualistic. This is also confirmed. Again looking at the explained variance ( $r^2$ ), we can see that for the combined sample (Table 7.5a) all three models for psychological well-being explain less than four per cent of the variance. The models do marginally better when broken down by gender (explaining up to five per cent of the variance for men and seven per cent for women). However, compared with WFC, the explanatory power of these family and employment variables is slight. This is not surprising, as psychological well-being is likely to be far more closely linked to individual factors such as subjective health (Boye 2011).

Hypothesis 8 suggested that there would be gender differences in the way family life stage affects WFC and well-being. Mothers' WFC is expected to be heightened and well-being reduced relative to that of fathers during the child-rearing phase, because women tend to remain the primary carer, regardless of their employment status. If we

look at the gender interaction effects of family life stage, we see that women's but not men's WFC increases after they have children. The same is not true however for psychological well-being. The well-being of men, but not that of women is enhanced for older couples without dependent children, where children have likely left the home. Perhaps mothers, because they are primary carers, suffer 'the empty nest syndrome' in ways that fathers do not.

Hypothesis 9 suggested that there would be gender differences in the way a couple's paid work strategies affect WFC and well-being. Compared with dual earner couples WFC is lower for men in male breadwinner households and for women in modified male breadwinner households. However, both of these effects disappear when accounting for employment conditions that include work hours (Model 3). Long work hours increase the WFC for both men and for women. The same is not true for psychological well-being. Here work hours have no discernable effect for either men or women. In terms of other employment conditions there are some interesting findings. Unsocial hours, as might be expected, increase the WFC of both men and women. However, counter-intuitively, task discretion also increases WFC, but only for men. This might be because the WFC measure includes a question about 'how often your partner/family gets fed up with the pressure of your job'. Family disapproval of men spending long hours at work may intensify when their task discretion is high. For both men and women, task discretion significantly increases psychological well-being ( $p < 0.001$ ). This is not surprising because task-discretion is likely to boost a person's self-esteem and sense of control which in turn heightens well-being.

According to hypothesis ten, we would expect men's WFC and well-being to be more negatively affected than women's by a less traditional divide of unpaid

housework. Engaging in housework may be more demeaning for men than for women. The findings indicate that our expectation is completely wrong. Men's but not women's WFC is increased when couples adopt a 'mostly female' division of unpaid labour compared to a 'balanced' division of household labour. This average increase in men's WFC ranges from 0.128 (Table 7.5a, Model 2) to 0.16 points (Table 7.5a, Model 3) on our WFC scale (which ranges from 1-5). The same gender pattern is found for psychological well-being. The well-being of men is significantly reduced when the housework is done mainly by women, but this is not the case for women. For well-being, the gender interaction term is not significant, but for WFC it is significant ( $p < 0.01$ ).

This unexpected finding may reflect partners' dissatisfaction with the pressures of men's jobs. Men who leave the chores to women may be subject to more complaints than are men who do their share of home chores. We consider other possible explanations in the concluding section which discusses our findings in more detail and draws out possible policy implications. First however, we briefly review the other findings from our multivariate analyses that are not related to our hypotheses.

In Table 7.5a Model 2, we see that being female reduces both WFC and well-being, but this gender effect disappears once work indicators are introduced in Model 3. Older people experience more WFC ( $p < .05$ ) once work hours and employment conditions are included (Table 7.5a, model 3), although this only applies to men, not to women (Tables 7.5b and 7.5c). Age has no effect on psychological well-being for this sample of working couples. Years of education are positively related to WFC for men and women combined (Table 7.5a) and for men and women separately (Tables 7.5b and 7.5c). This may reflect the higher ambitions that are associated with higher education

and the gap between aspirations and reality may lead to greater conflicts for more educated men and women. Oddly, income increases WFC in Model 2, but this disappears when employment is controlled in Model 3. However, higher levels of income markedly increase the psychological well-being, for men and women.

### **Summary, discussion and conclusions**

In this chapter, one particular focus has been on how the experiences of WFC and well-being are gendered in ways that reflect, in part, the gendered division of paid and unpaid work in Northern Europe. We also wanted to explore whether WFC and well-being vary between seven countries with very different family policies, particularly in terms of their support for maternal employment and for a more equitable share of family work between men and women.

Our study is set against a background of family change. We note that family life has changed markedly from the traditional male breadwinner family of the past and that the rise of dual earner couples implies both an ideological and pragmatic move towards less gender-role specialisation. However, we also note that there has been a structural and cultural lag in terms of gender role change, with women still doing the bulk of the housework and unpaid family care. We concur with Esping-Andersen (2009) that there has been an ‘incomplete revolution in gender roles’ and we tested ten hypotheses concerning the way the divisions of paid and unpaid work among couples relate to each partner’s experience of WFC and well-being.

Six of our hypotheses were confirmed by our data, one hypothesis was partially confirmed and partially refuted, and three were not supported. Hypotheses that were

confirmed included that women who work-part time have markedly lower WFC than women who are in full-time employment (H2). We also found that well-being is less gender differentiated than WFC (H3) and that WFC and well-being are negatively correlated (H4). In addition, we confirmed the Gallie and Russell (2009) finding that work conditions are more important predictors than family conditions for both men and women (H6). Also, work and family factors explain more of the variance in WFC than in well-being (H7).

We confirmed that country differences in both WFC and well-being remain even when individual characteristics, couple work strategies, family life stage and employment conditions are accounted for (H5). However, this finding went well beyond our expectations. It is not at all surprising that the UK comes out significantly higher than Scandinavian countries for WFC, given how much support Scandinavian countries provide in terms of high quality childcare and generous parental leave, argued to reduce WFC. However, what is surprising is that the UK is significantly worse than other countries for the more general well-being measure (WHO-5). Moreover, our analysis shows that this relatively dismal UK well-being result remains after controlling for differences in gendered patterns of paid and unpaid work. Undoubtedly, this measure is likely to be strongly influenced by individual factors not investigated here such as physical and subjective health. However, the fact that UK citizens (both men and women) in our sample have significantly less positive psychological well-being than equivalent couples in the other six Northern European countries is something that merits further investigation.

The hypothesis which was only partially confirmed suggested there would be gender differences in the way family life course stage affects WFC and well-being (H8).

Women's WFC was indeed increased after they had children, compared with when they were younger and without children. Moreover, the effect of family life course variables only enhanced the WFC of women not men. However, family life course had the reverse gender effect in terms of influencing psychological well-being, enhancing men's but not women's well-being.

The three hypotheses that were not supported are in many ways the most interesting findings. Contrary to our expectations derived from the theories of the 'double shift' we expected women who worked full-time to have more conflict than men (H1). While we found clear evidence that regardless of paid work strategy, women remain primarily responsible for unpaid work, we also found that women in full-time employment had very similar levels of WFC to that of men. Our expectation, following the research by Boye (2011), that men's well-being is unaffected by work hours, whereas work hours benefit women's well-being (H9) was not supported by our data. We found that long work hours affected the WFC of men and women in similar ways. Also, work hours did not affect the psychological well-being of either men or women in our sample. In addition, couple's paid work strategies did not affect the WFC or well-being of men or women, once employment conditions were accounted for.

This lack of a gendered effect of paid work strategies on WFC and well-being makes it even more surprising that the division of unpaid work does affect men's, but not women's, WFC and well-being. Our expectation that men's well-being would be more negatively affected than women's by a less traditional divide of unpaid work (H10) was overturned. It may be that women accept their 'double shift' as a fact of life and therefore do not show the same reduction in WFC or increased well-being as men when the gender division of housework is less traditional (i.e. not mainly female).

What is particularly interesting, however, is the way that Northern European men's WFC increases when the female partner is doing most of the unpaid chores. The perceived conflict may result from the dissonance of practice being at odds with normative gender equality beliefs. Or it may be that men's heightened WFC reflects their partners' dissatisfactions. Gershuny, Bittman and Brice (2005) suggest that women could adapt to changing employment patterns in one of three different ways: exit, voice and suffering. The three strategies concern stark choices: exiting from their marriage or quitting their job; expressing dissatisfaction to their husband or partner and pressing for a more equitable division of domestic labour; or suffering their 'second shift' of doing both their paid job and the bulk of the unpaid household chores. Few women would see the extreme option of quitting their marriage or their job as feasible or desirable. Our data provide some evidence that women combine the second and third strategies. The bulk of the household chores are done mainly by women, even in dual earner couples. However, perhaps one reason that men feel increased WFC when the housework is done mainly by women is that their partner complains. It is also plausible that some men want a more equitable role in the home and their well-being is reduced when the pressure of their job gets in the way. It certainly bodes well for more equitable gender role change in Northern Europe when men's WFC is increased and their well-being is reduced when the housework is left mainly to women.

No country in our sample has reached a position of gender equality. However, our findings are reinforcing other research that suggests that we need to pay closer attention to the gender division of unpaid work in order to examine how changes in family life and employment impinge on well-being. In a recent study based on analysis of the British cohort studies, Sigle-Rushton (2010) found that in the UK a more

equitable divide of housework offsets the enhanced risk of divorce associated with female employment. Our study points to wider benefits for men who do their fair share of the housework. Change is slow and, on average, men still play a somewhat minimal role in unpaid domestic labour. However, men today play a far greater role in home and childcare than did their fathers or grandfathers. It might help change move faster if the benefits of a more equitable divide became more widely known.

Can policies help nudge men and women towards greater gender equality in paid and unpaid work? This is a thorny issue and one that has been discussed elsewhere (e.g. Scott and Dex 2009; Dex 2010). These authors conclude that the political will is often lacking for the radical steps that would reduce gender inequalities in the division of labour. However, in our view, token and symbolic gestures do matter and state encouragement towards greater male participation in unpaid work could help advance gender convergence. The UK Equality and Human Rights Commission (2009) has also urged reform of policies that perpetuate the traditional gender role division of labour and leave women doing the bulk of family care and prevent men from doing a more equitable share of parenting. The report argued the social and economic benefits of integrating work and care. It called for more financial support for paternity and parental leave and more affordable childcare. In the UK, political rhetoric is supportive, but actions to eradicate the economic inequalities that underpin the traditional gender divide of paid and unpaid labour are less forthcoming. Yet the logic of addressing the inequalities that arise from what Esping-Andersen (2009) calls the ‘incomplete revolution’ gets stronger as couples aspire to share work and parenting across the life course. By demonstrating that gender equality in paid and unpaid work is associated with enhanced well-being, our study hopes to strengthen the cumulative evidence about

potential costs of not tackling the pronounced gender inequalities in employment and family care.

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## Appendix A

Table A7.1: Sample characteristics (N=4,065; weighted N=5,151)

| <b>Variable</b>                                        | <b>Mean</b> | <b>Std. Dev.</b> | <b>Min</b> | <b>Max</b> |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------------------|------------|------------|
| WFC                                                    | 2.68        | 0.82             | 1          | 5          |
| Well-being                                             | 4.13        | 0.91             | 1          | 6          |
| Age                                                    | 43.10       | 10.17            | 19         | 65         |
| Female                                                 | 0.45        | 0.50             | 0          | 1          |
| Income quintile                                        | 3.38        | 1.17             | 1          | 5          |
| Years of full-time education completed                 | 13.35       | 3.27             | 1          | 30         |
| <i>Paid Work Strategy</i>                              |             |                  |            |            |
| Dual earner                                            | 0.50        | 0.50             | 0          | 1          |
| Male breadwinner                                       | 0.17        | 0.37             | 0          | 1          |
| Modified male breadwinner                              | 0.24        | 0.43             | 0          | 1          |
| Female breadwinner                                     | 0.09        | 0.28             | 0          | 1          |
| <i>Unpaid Work Division</i>                            |             |                  |            |            |
| Balanced                                               | 0.14        | 0.35             | 0          | 1          |
| Mostly female                                          | 0.75        | 0.43             | 0          | 1          |
| Mostly male                                            | 0.08        | 0.27             | 0          | 1          |
| Other/outside help                                     | 0.03        | 0.18             | 0          | 1          |
| <i>Family Life stage</i>                               |             |                  |            |            |
| Before children, woman <45                             | 0.15        | 0.36             | 0          | 1          |
| Couples with children under 5                          | 0.18        | 0.39             | 0          | 1          |
| Couples with children 5-18                             | 0.35        | 0.48             | 0          | 1          |
| Older couples (women>44)<br>with no dependent children | 0.32        | 0.47             | 0          | 1          |
| Log work hours                                         | 3.64        | 0.38             | 0          | 4.39       |
| Unsocial hours index                                   | 2.60        | 1.20             | 1          | 5          |
| Task discretion index                                  | 6.44        | 2.51             | 0          | 10         |

Table A7.2: Indicators of work-family conflict (WFC) in the ESS Round 2

**ESS 2004/2005**


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How often do you:

1. How often do you keep worrying about work problems when you are not working?
2. How often do you feel too tired after work to enjoy the things you would like to do at home?
3. How often do you find that your job prevents you from giving the time you want to your partner or family?
4. How often do you find that your partner or family gets fed up with the pressure of your job?

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Not included in composite measure:

5. How often do you find it difficult to concentrate on work because of your family responsibilities?

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Answer categories: Never, hardly ever, sometimes, often, always

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Table A7.3: Indicators of well-being (WHO-5) in the ESS Round 2

**ESS 2004/2005**


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I would like you to say how often you have felt like this over the last two weeks.

1. I have felt cheerful and in good spirits
  2. I have felt calm and relaxed
  3. I have felt active and vigorous
  4. I have woken up feeling fresh and rested
  5. My daily life has been filled with things that interest me
- 

Answer categories: All of the time, most of the time, more than half of the time, less than half of the time, some of the time, at no time

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Reverse coded from the original

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**Table 7.1 Paid work strategies**

| Paid Work hours strategy: | his weekly hours       | her weekly hours     |
|---------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Dual earner               | 30 or more             | 30 or more           |
| Male breadwinner          | Only male works        | 0                    |
| Modified male breadwinner | More than female       | Less than 30 hours   |
| Female breadwinner        | Less hours than female | More hours than male |

**Table 7.2 Percentage reporting division of unpaid work by paid work strategy for all 7 countries**

| Paid work strategy        | Unpaid work strategy |               |             |       | Total per cent |
|---------------------------|----------------------|---------------|-------------|-------|----------------|
|                           | Balanced             | Mostly female | Mostly male | Other |                |
| Dual earners              | 19.62                | 68.37         | 8.62        | 3.39  | 100            |
| Male breadwinner          | 4.97                 | 88.1          | 4.14        | 2.79  | 100            |
| Modified male breadwinner | 9.21                 | 84.82         | 3.56        | 2.42  | 100            |
| Female breadwinner        | 15.12                | 57.45         | 22.44       | 4.99  | 100            |
| Total                     | 14.3                 | 74.67         | 7.84        | 3.19  | 100            |

**Table 7.3 Percentage of dual earners couples by family life stage for the 7 countries**

| Countries      | Before children | Children < 5 | Children 5-18 | Older couples | All   |
|----------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|-------|
| Germany        | 57.38           | 21.15        | 43.64         | 44.06         | 42.65 |
| Denmark        | 73.85           | 75.45        | 82.80         | 65.70         | 74.67 |
| France         | 83.08           | 65.38        | 63.89         | 51.88         | 63.49 |
| United Kingdom | 79.44           | 27.58        | 36.56         | 41.19         | 43.77 |
| Netherlands    | 68.66           | 18.89        | 20.06         | 23.71         | 29.92 |
| Norway         | 65.96           | 58.94        | 61.45         | 54.66         | 59.28 |
| Sweden         | 73.74           | 74.03        | 77.65         | 66.37         | 72.95 |
| All countries  | 72.03           | 42.23        | 49.36         | 45.57         | 50.35 |

**Table 7.4 Correlations between Work-Family Conflict and well-being measures**

|             | Correlation |           |           |
|-------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|
|             | All         | Male      | Female    |
| Germany     | -0.284***   | -0.330*** | -0.249*** |
| Denmark     | -0.424***   | -0.459*** | -0.373*** |
| France      | -0.217***   | -0.265*** | -0.177**  |
| UK          | -0.251***   | -0.329*** | -0.231*** |
| Netherlands | -0.288***   | -0.336*** | -0.223**  |
| Norway      | -0.270***   | -0.251*** | -0.319*** |
| Sweden      | -0.318***   | -0.341*** | -0.289*** |
| All         | -0.265***   | -0.324*** | -0.221*** |

\* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Table 7.5a OLS regressions, both genders

|                                                     | Work-family conflict         |                                |                       | Well-being                   |                                |                       |
|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|
|                                                     | Model 1<br>Countries<br>only | Model 2<br>Family<br>variables | Model 3<br>Full model | Model 1<br>Countries<br>only | Model 2<br>Family<br>variables | Model 3<br>Full model |
| Denmark                                             | -0.146*<br>(-2.11)           | -0.269***<br>(-3.93)           | -0.258***<br>(-4.16)  | 0.652***<br>(8.62)           | 0.656***<br>(8.59)             | 0.649***<br>(8.50)    |
| France                                              | -0.032<br>(-0.99)            | -0.063*<br>(-1.97)             | -0.009<br>(-0.31)     | 0.358***<br>(10.26)          | 0.375***<br>(10.52)            | 0.370***<br>(10.30)   |
| Germany                                             | -0.049<br>(-1.60)            | -0.118***<br>(-3.80)           | -0.127***<br>(-4.48)  | 0.356***<br>(10.59)          | 0.380***<br>(10.92)            | 0.389***<br>(11.17)   |
| Netherlands                                         | -0.297***<br>(-6.37)         | -0.288***<br>(-6.24)           | -0.218***<br>(-5.20)  | 0.457***<br>(8.95)           | 0.481***<br>(9.33)             | 0.480***<br>(9.29)    |
| Norway                                              | -0.252***<br>(-3.65)         | -0.331***<br>(-4.87)           | -0.350***<br>(-5.67)  | 0.625***<br>(8.28)           | 0.651***<br>(8.56)             | 0.639***<br>(8.40)    |
| Sweden                                              | -0.152**<br>(-2.82)          | -0.207***<br>(-3.89)           | -0.213***<br>(-4.40)  | 0.427***<br>(7.26)           | 0.413***<br>(6.93)             | 0.401***<br>(6.73)    |
| Age                                                 |                              | 0.003<br>(1.35)                | 0.004*<br>(2.24)      |                              | -0.001<br>(-0.69)              | -0.002<br>(-0.92)     |
| Female                                              |                              | -0.171***<br>(-6.61)           | 0.091<br>(1.31)       |                              | -0.120***<br>(-4.14)           | -0.123<br>(-1.43)     |
| Income quintiles                                    |                              | 0.022*<br>(2.11)               | 0.002<br>(0.23)       |                              | 0.052***<br>(4.38)             | 0.046***<br>(3.82)    |
| Years of full-time<br>education                     |                              | 0.043***<br>(11.33)            | 0.035***<br>(10.00)   |                              | -0.008<br>(-1.89)              | -0.010*<br>(-2.40)    |
| Male breadwinner                                    |                              | -0.117**<br>(-3.20)            | -0.067<br>(-1.89)     |                              | -0.013<br>(-0.33)              | 0.002<br>(0.05)       |
| Modified male<br>breadwinner                        |                              | -0.249***<br>(-8.51)           | -0.037<br>(-1.01)     |                              | -0.054<br>(-1.64)              | -0.051<br>(-1.13)     |
| Female<br>breadwinner                               |                              | -0.015<br>(-0.34)              | 0.009<br>(0.09)       |                              | -0.109*<br>(-2.19)             | 0.168<br>(1.31)       |
| Mostly female                                       |                              | 0.128***<br>(3.84)             | 0.160***<br>(4.03)    |                              | -0.097**<br>(-2.60)            | -0.150**<br>(-3.06)   |
| Mostly male                                         |                              | 0.047<br>(0.95)                | 0.044<br>(0.75)       |                              | -0.078<br>(-1.39)              | -0.061<br>(-0.85)     |
| Outside help                                        |                              | 0.002<br>(0.03)                | 0.056<br>(0.60)       |                              | -0.216**<br>(-2.78)            | -0.345**<br>(-3.01)   |
| Couples with<br>children under 5                    |                              | 0.050<br>(1.26)                | 0.012<br>(0.25)       |                              | -0.039<br>(-0.88)              | -0.029<br>(-0.48)     |
| Couples with<br>children 5-18                       |                              | 0.019<br>(0.47)                | -0.038<br>(-0.82)     |                              | 0.020<br>(0.46)                | 0.028<br>(0.49)       |
| Older couples<br>(women>44) with<br>no dep children |                              | -0.036<br>(-0.68)              | -0.054<br>(-0.96)     |                              | 0.080<br>(1.36)                | 0.162*<br>(2.33)      |
| Mod male<br>breadwinner x<br>female                 |                              |                                | 0.030<br>(0.50)       |                              |                                | 0.065<br>(0.90)       |

|                                     |          |          |           |          |          |          |
|-------------------------------------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Female breadwinner x female         | 0.096    |          |           |          |          | -0.254   |
|                                     | (0.87)   |          |           |          |          | (-1.86)  |
| Mostly female x female              | -0.161** |          |           |          |          | 0.116    |
|                                     | (-2.66)  |          |           |          |          | (1.55)   |
| Mostly male x female                | -0.011   |          |           |          |          | -0.052   |
|                                     | (-0.12)  |          |           |          |          | (-0.45)  |
| Mostly outside help x female        | -0.020   |          |           |          |          | 0.273    |
|                                     | (-0.15)  |          |           |          |          | (1.75)   |
| Couples with child under 5 x female | 0.169*   |          |           |          |          | -0.015   |
|                                     | (2.37)   |          |           |          |          | (-0.17)  |
| Couples with child 5-18 x female    | 0.163*   |          |           |          |          | -0.016   |
|                                     | (2.57)   |          |           |          |          | (-0.21)  |
| Older couples x female              | 0.158*   |          |           |          |          | -0.162*  |
|                                     | (2.47)   |          |           |          |          | (-2.06)  |
| Log work hours                      | 0.537*** |          |           |          |          | 0.094    |
|                                     | (12.74)  |          |           |          |          | (1.82)   |
| Unsocial hours index                | 0.204*** |          |           |          |          | 0.000    |
|                                     | (21.59)  |          |           |          |          | (0.04)   |
| Task discretion index               | 0.014*** |          |           |          |          | 0.018*** |
|                                     | (3.35)   |          |           |          |          | (3.54)   |
| Constant                            | 2.748*** | 2.083*** | -0.580*** | 3.839*** | 3.958*** | 3.550*** |
|                                     | (122.43) | (23.24)  | (-3.37)   | (156.37) | (39.49)  | (16.71)  |
| r2                                  | 0.0108   | 0.0690   | 0.2380    | 0.0416   | 0.0563   | 0.0628   |
| Weighted N                          | 5151     | 5151     | 5151      | 5151     | 5151     | 5151     |

Ref.: UK, Dual earner, balanced, no children

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 7.5b OLS regressions, only men

|                                                     | Work-family conflict         |                                |                       | Well-being                   |                                |                       |
|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|
|                                                     | Model 1<br>Countries<br>only | Model 2<br>Family<br>variables | Model 3<br>Full model | Model 1<br>Countries<br>only | Model 2<br>Family<br>variables | Model 3<br>Full model |
| Denmark                                             | -0.318***<br>(-3.43)         | -0.371***<br>(-4.06)           | -0.301***<br>(-3.56)  | 0.612***<br>(6.13)           | 0.629***<br>(6.24)             | 0.629***<br>(6.22)    |
| France                                              | -0.123**<br>(-2.85)          | -0.118**<br>(-2.75)            | -0.013<br>(-0.32)     | 0.299***<br>(6.45)           | 0.307***<br>(6.50)             | 0.313***<br>(6.56)    |
| Germany                                             | -0.082*<br>(-2.03)           | -0.152***<br>(-3.71)           | -0.139***<br>(-3.66)  | 0.254***<br>(5.85)           | 0.300***<br>(6.60)             | 0.299***<br>(6.58)    |
| Netherlands                                         | -0.388***<br>(-6.34)         | -0.425***<br>(-7.02)           | -0.310***<br>(-5.49)  | 0.336***<br>(5.10)           | 0.369***<br>(5.52)             | 0.372***<br>(5.52)    |
| Norway                                              | -0.304***<br>(-3.39)         | -0.335***<br>(-3.80)           | -0.314***<br>(-3.84)  | 0.539***<br>(5.57)           | 0.576***<br>(5.92)             | 0.571***<br>(5.84)    |
| Sweden                                              | -0.278***<br>(-3.94)         | -0.251***<br>(-3.59)           | -0.220***<br>(-3.39)  | 0.361***<br>(4.75)           | 0.336***<br>(4.34)             | 0.333***<br>(4.29)    |
| Age                                                 |                              | 0.004<br>(1.55)                | 0.005*<br>(2.48)      |                              | -0.003<br>(-1.03)              | -0.003<br>(-1.09)     |
| Income quintiles                                    |                              | 0.039**<br>(2.86)              | 0.009<br>(0.66)       |                              | 0.047**<br>(3.11)              | 0.041**<br>(2.67)     |
| Years of full-time<br>education                     |                              | 0.035***<br>(7.30)             | 0.033***<br>(7.28)    |                              | -0.014**<br>(-2.71)            | -0.015**<br>(-2.81)   |
| Male breadwinner                                    |                              | -0.077*<br>(-1.98)             | -0.051<br>(-1.43)     |                              | -0.010<br>(-0.24)              | -0.004<br>(-0.09)     |
| Modified male<br>breadwinner                        |                              | -0.024<br>(-0.61)              | -0.023<br>(-0.63)     |                              | -0.044<br>(-0.99)              | -0.043<br>(-0.97)     |
| Female<br>breadwinner                               |                              | -0.690***<br>(-6.56)           | 0.070<br>(0.62)       |                              | 0.034<br>(0.29)                | 0.167<br>(1.24)       |
| Mostly female                                       |                              | 0.253***<br>(5.90)             | 0.162***<br>(4.05)    |                              | -0.134**<br>(-2.83)            | -0.145**<br>(-3.05)   |
| Mostly male                                         |                              | 0.113<br>(1.80)                | 0.050<br>(0.87)       |                              | -0.059<br>(-0.86)              | -0.064<br>(-0.92)     |
| Outside help                                        |                              | 0.076<br>(0.76)                | 0.055<br>(0.60)       |                              | -0.341**<br>(-3.09)            | -0.339**<br>(-3.07)   |
| Couples with<br>children under 5                    |                              | 0.009<br>(0.17)                | 0.010<br>(0.20)       |                              | -0.028<br>(-0.48)              | -0.025<br>(-0.43)     |
| Couples with<br>children 5-18                       |                              | -0.011<br>(-0.21)              | -0.063<br>(-1.31)     |                              | 0.046<br>(0.79)                | 0.039<br>(0.67)       |
| Older couples<br>(women>44) with<br>no dep children |                              | -0.126<br>(-1.87)              | -0.103<br>(-1.65)     |                              | 0.187*<br>(2.51)               | 0.188*<br>(2.53)      |
| Log work hours                                      |                              |                                | 0.626***<br>(9.28)    |                              |                                | 0.122<br>(1.51)       |
| Unsocial hours<br>index                             |                              |                                | 0.168***<br>(12.77)   |                              |                                | 0.003<br>(0.20)       |
| Task discretion                                     |                              |                                | 0.019**               |                              |                                | 0.010                 |

|          |          |          |           |          |          |          |
|----------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|
| index    |          |          | (3.24)    |          |          | (1.43)   |
| Constant | 2.871*** | 2.020*** | -0.883*** | 3.963*** | 4.149*** | 3.651*** |
|          | (96.17)  | (18.09)  | (-3.40)   | (123.14) | (33.63)  | (11.75)  |
| r2       | 0.0207   | 0.0838   | 0.2197    | 0.0314   | 0.0489   | 0.0511   |
| N        | 2809     | 2809     | 2809      | 2809     | 2809     | 2809     |

Ref.: UK, Dual earner, balanced, no children

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 7.5c OLS regressions, only women


|                                                     | Work-family conflict         |                                |                       | Well-being                   |                                |                       |
|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|
|                                                     | Model 1<br>Countries<br>only | Model 2<br>Family<br>variables | Model 3<br>Full model | Model 1<br>Countries<br>only | Model 2<br>Family<br>variables | Model 3<br>Full model |
| Denmark                                             | 0.051<br>(0.50)              | -0.187<br>(-1.87)              | -0.216*<br>(-2.36)    | 0.702***<br>(6.14)           | 0.688***<br>(5.91)             | 0.669***<br>(5.75)    |
| France                                              | 0.079<br>(1.67)              | -0.043<br>(-0.91)              | -0.010<br>(-0.24)     | 0.435***<br>(8.29)           | 0.444***<br>(8.16)             | 0.431***<br>(7.92)    |
| Germany                                             | -0.029<br>(-0.63)            | -0.118*<br>(-2.54)             | -0.120**<br>(-2.84)   | 0.471***<br>(8.99)           | 0.487***<br>(9.02)             | 0.502***<br>(9.30)    |
| Netherlands                                         | -0.195**<br>(-2.74)          | -0.157*<br>(-2.29)             | -0.115<br>(-1.83)     | 0.598***<br>(7.52)           | 0.615***<br>(7.68)             | 0.614***<br>(7.67)    |
| Norway                                              | -0.204<br>(-1.91)            | -0.341***<br>(-3.31)           | -0.402***<br>(-4.26)  | 0.721***<br>(6.06)           | 0.737***<br>(6.13)             | 0.716***<br>(5.96)    |
| Sweden                                              | -0.004<br>(-0.05)            | -0.146<br>(-1.85)              | -0.208**<br>(-2.86)   | 0.498***<br>(5.47)           | 0.496***<br>(5.36)             | 0.479***<br>(5.18)    |
| Age                                                 |                              | 0.000<br>(0.14)                | 0.001<br>(0.35)       |                              | 0.001<br>(0.39)                | -0.000<br>(-0.03)     |
| Income quintiles                                    |                              | 0.009<br>(0.54)                | -0.008<br>(-0.51)     |                              | 0.054**<br>(2.91)              | 0.048**<br>(2.58)     |
| Years of full-time<br>education                     |                              | 0.048***<br>(8.00)             | 0.038***<br>(6.84)    |                              | 0.002<br>(0.33)                | -0.000<br>(-0.07)     |
| Modified male<br>breadwinner                        |                              | -0.467***<br>(-11.12)          | -0.031<br>(-0.57)     |                              | -0.051<br>(-1.03)              | 0.004<br>(0.05)       |
| Female<br>breadwinner                               |                              | 0.013<br>(0.26)                | 0.097*<br>(2.04)      |                              | -0.104<br>(-1.73)              | -0.088<br>(-1.45)     |
| Mostly female                                       |                              | -0.025<br>(-0.48)              | 0.011<br>(0.23)       |                              | -0.035<br>(-0.59)              | -0.026<br>(-0.44)     |
| Mostly male                                         |                              | 0.029<br>(0.37)                | 0.042<br>(0.58)       |                              | -0.116<br>(-1.25)              | -0.108<br>(-1.16)     |
| Outside help                                        |                              | -0.088<br>(-0.93)              | 0.057<br>(0.65)       |                              | -0.078<br>(-0.70)              | -0.054<br>(-0.48)     |
| Couples with<br>children under 5                    |                              | 0.130*<br>(2.21)               | 0.198***<br>(3.70)    |                              | -0.052<br>(-0.76)              | -0.051<br>(-0.74)     |
| Couples with<br>children 5-18                       |                              | 0.104<br>(1.70)                | 0.174**<br>(3.11)     |                              | -0.011<br>(-0.16)              | -0.000<br>(-0.01)     |
| Older couples<br>(women>44) with<br>no dep children |                              | 0.116<br>(1.41)                | 0.184*<br>(2.44)      |                              | -0.055<br>(-0.57)              | -0.026<br>(-0.27)     |
| Log work hours                                      |                              |                                | 0.498***<br>(9.15)    |                              |                                | 0.072<br>(1.04)       |
| Unsocial hours<br>index                             |                              |                                | 0.238***<br>(17.04)   |                              |                                | -0.007<br>(-0.40)     |
| Task discretion<br>index                            |                              |                                | 0.010<br>(1.71)       |                              |                                | 0.029***<br>(3.67)    |

|          |                     |                     |                   |                     |                     |                     |
|----------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Constant | 2.606***<br>(77.60) | 2.037***<br>(14.83) | -0.362<br>(-1.58) | 3.694***<br>(98.62) | 3.513***<br>(21.91) | 3.187***<br>(10.90) |
| r2       | 0.0087              | 0.1047              | 0.2528            | 0.0566              | 0.0660              | 0.0721              |
| N        | 2342                | 2342                | 2342              | 2342                | 2342                | 2342                |

Ref.: UK, Dual earner, balanced, no children

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

**Figure 7.1 Work-Family Conflict by country, work status and gender**



**Figure 7.2 Well-being by country and gender**

